Gfca Packet China Disadvantage Paper

GFCA Packet 2013-2014
China Disadvantage 1
China Disadvantage Index

Explanations
Debating the China Disadvantage ..................................................................................................................................................... 2
Negative 1NC Shell

1NC China DA ............................................................................................................................................................................... 4
2NC/1NR Extensions
They Say: Chinese Investment/Influence Low .............................................................................................................................. 8 They Say: No Chinese Growth ..................................................................................................................................................... 10 They Say: Link is Not Zero Sum ................................................................................................................................................... 12 They Say: No Spillover from Cuba ............................................................................................................................................... 15 They Say: No Spillover from Venezuela ...................................................................................................................................... 16 They Say: No Spillover from Mexico ........................................................................................................................................... 19 They Say: Latin American Resources Not Key ............................................................................................................................. 20 They Say: No Chinese Economic Collapse ................................................................................................................................... 24 They Say: No CCP Collapse .......................................................................................................................................................... 25 They Say: Hegemony Turn .......................................................................................................................................................... 27 Impact Extension Chinese Softpower ........................................................................................................................................ 30
Affirmative 2AC Frontline Materials

2AC Chinese Investment/Influence Low .................................................................................................................................... 32 2AC No Chinese Growth ............................................................................................................................................................ 33 2AC Link is Not Zero Sum ........................................................................................................................................................... 34 2AC No Spillover ........................................................................................................................................................................ 35 2AC Latin American Resources Not Key ..................................................................................................................................... 36 2AC No Chinese Economic Collapse ........................................................................................................................................... 37 2AC No CCP Collapse .................................................................................................................................................................. 38 2AC Hegemony Turn .................................................................................................................................................................. 39
1AR Extensions
Extend: Chinese Investment/Influence Low ............................................................................................................................... 40 Extend: No Chinese Growth ........................................................................................................................................................ 41 Extend: Link is Not Zero Sum ...................................................................................................................................................... 42 Extend: No Spillover .................................................................................................................................................................... 43 Extend: Latin American Resources Not Key ................................................................................................................................ 44 Extend: Hegemony Turn ................................................................................................................................................................. 45 No Chinese Soft Power Impact ....................................................................................................................................................... 46
Debating the China Disadvantage (1/2)

Description:
The China Disadvantage argues that US economic engagement with Latin America trades off with Chinese investment there. China is currently increasing its investment in Latin America in order to ensure access to natural resources that they need to maintain economic growth. Chinese economic decline is problematic because it hurts the credibility of the CCP in China and limits their ability to stay in power. Regime collapse in China causes global economic collapse and war over Taiwan.
Affirmative Answers:
The affirmative has responses to every part of the disadvantage. While cards are labeled 2AC, aff teams should select which arguments they want to make and construct a 2AC from the 2AC materials. Not all cards will be able to be read in a single speech. Affirmatives should also consider making analytical arguments against the disadvantage. The 2AC has evidence to support the following arguments: Chinese investment is not as high as US investment the disadvantage is not unique. Chinese growth is declining now the impact is not unique. US economic engagement in Latin America does not prevent ongoing Chinese investment there is no link. There is no connection between investment in a particular country and Chinas overall Latin America strategy there is no internal link. China does not need Latin American resources to support economic growth there is no internal link. Chinas economy is resilient there is no impact. The CCP will not lose credibility there is no impact. Chinese investment in Latin America is bad because it hurts the USs ability to maintain hegemony there is an impact turn.
Debating the China Disadvantage (2/2)

Terms:
CCP CCP refers to the Chinese Communist Party, or the ruling party in China. In debate, the negative will argue that the CCP relies on robust economic growth to maintain its ruling power. Commodities A commodity is a primary product that can be bought or sold, such as oil, coffee or bananas. In debates, the negative will argue that China needs to be able to buy commodities from Latin America in order to support its economy. PRC PRC refers to the Peoples Republic of China, commonly known as China. It is governed by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Regime Stability A regime is a mode or system of rule or government that holds power in a nation. Regime stability is a term used to describe the durability of a particular regime including its values, norms, and authority structures. Especially in authoritarian states, the transition from one regime to another can be violent and destructive. In debates, the negative will argue that the CCP regime will become destabilized if China is pushed out of Latin America leading to devastating consequences. Soft Power Soft Power is an international relations concept that describes a nation's ability to attract and persuade other nations. Developed by Joseph Nye of Harvard University, soft power is contrasted from the hard power of military force and coercion. In debates, the negative will argue that lack of Chinese investment in Latin America hurts their soft power, undermining its ability to influence other nations. Sphere of Influence A sphere of influence is a geographical area in which one country is very powerful. That area is known as the powerful countrys sphere of influence because that country has political, military, and/or cultural power over the other nations in the area. In debates, the affirmative will argue that Chinas investment in Latin America threatens the United States sphere of influence in the region. Zero Sum A situation where one actors gain requires anothers loss. In debates, the negative will argue that China and the US cant both invest heavily in Latin America, instead, because the relationship is zero sum, any increases in US investment will cause reductions in Chinese investment.
1NC China DA (1/4)

A. Uniqueness Chinese investment in Latin America is strong and increasing. Economic Observer 13 Byline Wang Xiaoxia, Economic Observer, Translated by Worldcrunch (In America's Backyard:
China's Rising Influence In Latin America, Worldcrunch/Economic Observer, May 6, 2013, Available Online: http://worldcrunch.com/china-2.0/in-america-039-s-backyard-china-039-s-rising-influence-in-latin-america/foreign-policy-tradeeconomy-investments-energy/c9s11647/, Accessed: 05/25/2013)
Over the past five years, Chinese businesses have been expanding their footprint in Latin America in a number of ways, beginning with enhanced trade to ensure a steady supply of bulk commodities such as oil, copper and soybeans. At this year's Boao Forum for Asia, for the first time a Latin American sub-forum was created that included the participation of several heads of state from the region. Since 2011, China has overtaken the Netherlands to become Latin Americas second biggest investor behind the United States. China has signed a series of large cooperation agreements with Latin American countries in such fields as finance, resources and energy. According to the latest statistics of the General Administration of Customs of China, Sino-Latin American trade grew in 2012 to a total of $261.2 billion, a year-on-year increase of 8.18%. This trend risks undermining the position of the United States as Latin Americas single dominant trading partner. In 2011, the U.S.-Latin American trade volume was $351 billion.
1NC China DA (2/4)

B. Link Influence is zero sum Latin America allows Chinese investment because of lack of US economic engagement. Erikson and Chen 7 Daniel P. Erikson, Senior Associate for U.S. policy at the Inter-American Dialogue and coeditor of
Transforming Socialist Economies: Lessons for Cuba and Beyond, and Janice Chen, joint-degree candidate at The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy and Georgetown University Law Center, former intern at Inter-American Dialogue (China, Taiwan, and the Battle for Latin America, The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs Journal, Tufts University, Summer, 2007, 31 Fletche r F. World Aff. 69, Available Online from Lexis Nexis Law Journals)
Meanwhile, China's galloping entrance into the Latin American market for energy resources and other commodities has been accompanied by an accelerating pace of high-level visits by Chinese officials to the region over the past few years. Though China's foreign policy strategy toward the developing world prioritizes South Asia and Africa over Latin America, this last relationship has experienced explosive growth . In 2001, Chinese President Jiang Zemin's landmark visit to the region sparked a wave of visits by senior officials and business leaders to discuss political, economic, and military concerns. Since then, the volume of trade between China and the region has skyrocketed. President Hu Jintao traveled to Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Cuba in 2004 and visited Mexico in 2005. The presidents of all those and other countries have paid reciprocal visits to China. China's economic engagement with Latin America responds to the requirements of a booming Chinese economy that has been growing at nearly 10 percent per year for the past quarter century. The economic figures are impressive: in the past six years, Chinese imports from Latin America have grown more than six-fold, at a pace of some 60 percent a year, to an estimated $ 60 billion in 2006. China has become a major consumer of food, mineral, and other primary products from Latin America, benefiting principally the commodity-producing countries of South America--particularly Argentina, Brazil, Peru, and Chile. Chinese investment in Latin America remains relatively small at some $ 6.5 billion through 2004, but that amount represents half of China's foreign investment overseas. n9 China's Xinhua News agency reported that Chinese trade with the Caribbean exceeded $ 2 billion in 2004, a 40 percent increase from the previous year. n10 China has promised to increase its investments in Latin America to $ 100 billion by 2014 , although government officials have since backed away from that pledge and several proposed investments are already showing signs of falling short in Brazil, Argentina, and elsewhere. FIGURE 2. CHINA V. TAIWAN: TRADING WITH LATIN AMERICA n11 [*75] For their part, Latin Americans are intrigued by the idea of China as a potential partner for trade and investment. As a rising superpower without a colonial or "imperialist" history in the Western Hemisphere, China is in many ways more politically attractive than either the United States or the European Union, especially for politicians confronted with constituencies that are increasingly anti-American and skeptical of Western intentions. n12 Nevertheless, most analysts recognize that Latin America's embrace of China--to the extent that this has actually occurred--is intimately linked to its perception of neglect and disinterest from the United States. Nervousness about China's rise runs deeper among the smaller economies such as those of Central America, which do not enjoy Brazil's or Argentina's abundance in export commodities and are inclined to view the competition posed by the endless supply of cheap Chinese labor as a menace to their nascent manufacturing sectors.
1NC China DA (3/4)

C. Impact Chinese investment in Latin America key to economic growth and regime stability. Ellis 11 R. Evan Ellis, professor of national security studies, modeling, gaming, and simulation with the Center for Hemispheric
Defense Studies at the National Defense University, with a research focus on Latin Americas rel ationships with external actors, including China, Russia, and Iran, Ph.D. in Political Science (Chinese Soft Power in Latin America: A Case Study, Joint Force Quarterly, A
Publication of the National Defense University Press, Issue 60, 1 Quarter 2011, Available Online: http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/images/jfq60/JFQ60_85-91_Ellis.pdf, Accessed: 05/22/2013)
st
Access to Latin American Markets. Latin American markets are becoming increasingly valuable for Chinese companies because they allow the PRC to expand and diversify its export base at a time when economic growth is slowing in traditional markets such as the United States and Europe. The region has also proven an effective market for Chinese efforts to sell more sophisticated, higher value added products in sectors seen as strategic, such as automobiles, appliances,
computers and telecommunication equipment, and aircraft. In expanding access for its products through free trade accords with countries such as Chile, Peru, and Costa Rica, and penetrating markets in Latin American countries with existing manufacturing sectors such as Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina, the PRC has often had to overcome resistance by organized and often politically well-connected established interests in those nations. In doing so, the hopes of access to Chinese markets and investments among key groups of businesspeople and government officials in those nations have played a key role in the political will to overcome the resistance. In Venezuela, it was said that the prior Chinese ambassador to Venezuela, Zheng Tuo, was one of the few people in the country who could call President Chvez on the telephone and get an instant response if an issue arose regarding a Chinese company. Protection of Chinese Investments in and Trade Flows from the Region. At times, China has applied more explicit pressures to induce Latin America to keep its markets open to Chinese goods. It has specifically protested measures by the Argentine and Mexican governments that it has seen as protectionist: and, in the case of Argentina, as informal retaliation, China began enforcing a longstanding phytosanitary regulation, causing almost $2 billion in lost soy exports and other damages for Argentina.14 China has also used its economic weight to help secure major projects on preferential terms. In the course of negotiating a $1.7 billion loan deal for the Coco Coda Sinclair Hydroelectric plant in Ecuador, the ability of the Chinese bidder SinoHidro to self-finance 85 percent of the projects through Chinese banks helped it to work around the traditional Ecuadorian requirement that the project have a local partner. Later, the Ecuadorian government publicly and bitterly broke off negotiations with the Chinese, only to return to the bargaining table 2 months later after failing to find satisfactory alternatives. In Venezuela, the Chvez government agreed, for example, to accept half of the $20 billion loaned to it by the PRC in Chinese currency, and to use part of that currency to buy 229,000 consumer appliances from the Chinese manufacturer Haier for resale to the Venezuelan people. In another deal, the PRC loaned Venezuela $300 million to start a regional airline, but as part of the deal, required Venezuela to purchase the planes from a Chinese company.15 Protection of Chinese Nationals. As with the United States and other Western countries, as China becomes more involved in business and other operations in Latin America, an increasing number of its nationals will be vulnerable to hazards common to the region, such as kidnapping, crime, protests, and related problems. The heightened presence of Chinese petroleum companies in the northern jungle region of Ecuador, for example, has been associated with a series of problems, including the takeover of an oilfield operated by the Andes petroleum consortium in Tarapoa in November 2006, and protests in Orellana related to a labor dispute with the Chinese company Petroriental in 2007 that resulted in the death of more than 35 police officers and forced the declaration of a national state of emergency. In 2004, ethnic Chinese shopkeepers in Valencia and Maracay, Venezuela, became the focus of violent protests associated with the Venezuelan recall referendum. As such incidents increase, the PRC will need to rely increasingly on a combination of goodwill and fear to deter action against its personnel, as well as its influence with governments of the region, to resolve such problems when they occur. Blocking the Consolidation of U.S. Influence in the Region and Its Institutions. The rise of China is intimately tied to
the global economy through trade, financial, and information flows, each of which is highly dependent on global institutions and cooperation. Because of this, some within the PRC leadership see the countrys sustained growth and development , and thus the stability of the regime , threatened if an actor such as the United States is able to limit that cooperation or block global institutions from supporting Chinese interests . In Latin America, Chinas attainment of observer status in the OAS in 2004 and its acceptance into the IADB in 2009 were efforts to obtain a seat at the table in key regional institutions, and to keep them from being used against Chinese interests. In addition, the PRC has leveraged hopes of access to Chinese markets by Chile, Peru, and Costa Rica to secure bilateral free trade agreements, whose practical effect is to move Latin America away from a U.S.-dominated trading block (the Free Trade Area of the Americas) in which the PRC would have been disadvantaged.
1NC China DA (4/4)

Chinese economic decline risks internal collapse and war over Taiwan. Lewis 8 Dan Lewis, Research Director of the Economic Research Council, 2008 (Industry will put innovation on fast
track, World Finance, May 13th, Available Online at http://www.worldfinance.com/home/final-bell/the-nightmare-of-achinese-economic-collapse, Accessed 11/26/2012) A reduction in demand for imported Chinese goods would quickly entail a decline in Chinas economic growth rate. That is alarming . It has been calculated that to keep Chinas society stable ie to manage the transition from a rural to an urban society without devastating unemployment the minimum growth rate is 7.2 percent. Anything less than that and unemployment will rise and the massive shift in population from the country to the cities becomes unsustainable . This is when real discontent with communist party rule becomes vocal and hard to ignore. It doesnt end there. That will at best bring a global recession . The crucial point is that communist authoritarian states have at least had some success in keeping a lid on ethnic tensions so far. But when multi-ethnic communist countries fall apart from economic stress and the implosion of central power, history suggests that they dont become successful democracies overnight. Far from it. Theres a very real chance that China might go the way of Yugoloslavia or the Soviet Union chaos , civil unrest and internecine war . In the very worst case scenario, a Chinese government might seek to maintain national cohesion by going to war with Taiwan whom America is pledged to defend .
They Say: Chinese Investment/Influence Low (1/2)

Chinese investment and influence increasing lack of US engagement in the region. Martinez 5/23 Guillermo I. Martinez, Columnist for the South Florida Sun Sentinel (America losing influence
throughout Latin America May 23, 2013, The Sun Sentinel, Available Online: http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/2013-0523/news/fl-gmcol-oped0523-20130523_1_drug-cartels-latin-america-pri, Accessed: 07/15/2013) Once upon a time, as many fairy tales start, the United States was the prevailing force in Latin America . It had a coherent policy for its southern neighbors, and its opinions mattered to those who governed in the region. Despite President Barack Obama's recent trip to Mexico and Costa Rica, and Vice President Joe Biden's upcoming trip to the region, that is no more . The days when John F. Kennedy created the Alliance for Progress and was a hero to the young throughout the western hemisphere have been gone for more than half a century. The time when Jimmy Carter pledged to back only those governments that respected human rights and encouraged that caudillos be ousted is also a historical footnote. True, the world has changed. The attacks of September 11, 2001 made everyone look to the East; to Iraq, to Afghanistan, to Iran, Syria and other countries in the Middle East. Israel is still crucial to American foreign policy, more so now that militants are willing to die to kill Americans and Israelis. Latin America also changed when the late Venezuelan president Hugo Chvez was elected. The rising price of oil gave Chvez riches beyond belief and he began sharing it with similar-minded leaders in Cuba, Nicaragua, Bolivia, Ecuador, Uruguay and Argentina; just to name a few. Colombia once depended greatly on the Plan Colombia assistance from the United States to fight the FARC guerrillas and the drug lords that governed much of the country. The emphasis on the Plan Colombia since Juan Manuel Santos took office has decreased. Santos also believes in negotiations with the FARC and closer ties to those who govern in Venezuela. Mexico counted on American intelligence assistance and money to fight the drug cartels until Obama's visit to Enrique Pea Nieto, recently elected president. The communique at the end of the meeting talked about new economic cooperation between the two nations and how together they would fight the drug cartels. Not highlighted was the Mexican-imposed position that the United States agents would no longer be welcome in their country and that the cooperation would be respectful of their sovereign rights. Pea Nieto, the candidate of the PRI (Institutional Revolutionary Party) wanted a different approach to the war on drugs; one that would mitigate the violence that had killed thousands of Mexicans in the last decade. Finally, China has helped change the equation. After the fall of the Soviet Union and the Berlin Wall, for several years the United States was the only super power. When American presidents spoke, the world listened. Now China offers both a challenge to the United States, as a second super power, and has become an alternative economic trading partner for countries throughout the world. Still, it is inconceivable that American media and officials pay so little attention to the region. Maybe those around President Obama have not told him that Iran has close ties with Argentina, Cuba and Venezuela. Certainly the administration must know Cuba and Venezuela are so close that many critics of President Nicols Maduro are now saying Cubans are helping to keep him in power. They talk, only part in jest, that there is a new country in the region called Cubazuela the alliance between Cuba's Ral Castro and Maduro's supporters is so close. It is true all have heard the main culprit of the drug trade in the world is American and European consumption. Yet the United States has waged war on the producers and importers, and not on the consumers at home. Seldom has Latin America been further from American influence. Many of the leftists' presidents in the region consider the United States their enemy. Others maintain cordial, or even friendly relations with Washington, but are quick to negotiate economic deals with China. The task is not easy, granted. Yet it would help if the United States and the Obama Administration articulated a policy for its neighbors in Latin America. They should not be a second thought in America foreign policy. The region deserves better. So does the United States. This country needs to improve those ties or continue to lose status as a premier world power. This is no fairy tale.
They Say: Chinese Investment/Influence Low (2/2)

China is increasing engagement with Latin America theyre winning the influence battle. Ellis 6/13 R. Evan Ellis, professor of national security studies, modeling, gaming, and simulation with the Center for Hemispheric Defense
Studies at the National Defense University, with a research focus on Latin Americas relationships with external actors, incl uding China, Russia, and Iran, Ph.D. in Political Science (China's New Backyard: Does Washington realize how deeply Beijing has planted a flag? JUNE 6, 2013,
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/06/06/china_s_new_backyard_latin_america)
For the past decade, Washington has looked with discomfort at China's growing interest in Latin America. But while Beijing's diplomats bulked up on their Spanish and Portuguese, most U.S. policymakers slept soundly, confident that
the United States still held a dominant position in the minds of its southern neighbors. In April 2005, the U.S. House of Representatives Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere held a hearing on China's influence in the hemisphere and concluded that the U.S. position in the Western Hemisphere was much stronger than China's and, moreover, that Beijing's economic engagement in the region did not present a security threat. But that was 2005. In late May of this year, when U.S. Vice President Joe Biden went to Latin America for a three-day, three-country tour, Beijing was hot on his heels. Chinese President Xi Jinping
arrived in Trinidad and Tobago just days after Biden left: Whereas Trinidad and Tobago's prime minister, Kamla PersadBissessar, characterized her discussions with Biden as "at times brutal," Xi's stop in Trinidad and Tobago included the unveiling of a children's hospital funded with $150 million from the Chinese government, discussion of energy projects, and meetings with seven Caribbean heads of state. Xi's itinerary took him to Costa Rica and Mexico on June 4 to 6, but his shadow followed
Biden all the way to Brazil. In Rio de Janeiro, Biden referred to a new "strategic partnership" between the United States and Brazil, yet his words' impact was undercut by the strategic partnership that Brazil has had with China since 1993 and the much-publicized fact that China overtook the United States as Brazil's largest trading partner in 2009 (trade between China and Brazil exceeded $75 billion in 2012). It's not an accident that Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff made a state visit to China in April 2011, prior to paying one to the United States. Make no mistake: China is now a presence in the region . Xi's trip to Trinidad and Tobago is only the second visit by a Chinese president to the Caribbean -- his predecessor, Hu Jintao, visited communist Cuba in November 2008 -- but China and the Caribbean's economic and political ties have been growing rapidly. On this trip, Xi promised more than $3 billion in loans to 10 Caribbean countries and Costa Rica. Xi's choice of three destinations near the United States, followed by a "shirt-sleeves" summit with U.S. President Barack Obama on June 7 and 8 at the Sunnylands resort in California, sends a subtle message that the
new Chinese leadership seeks to engage the United States globally as an equal -- without the deference shown in the past to the United States in countries close to its borders. Ironically, it's the Latin American country closest to the United States where Xi might be able to make up the most ground. Mexican President Enrique Pea Nieto's engagement with the Chinese president, both at the April summit in Boao, China, and this week in Mexico City, allow him to differentiate himself from his pro-U.S. predecessor, Felipe Caldern. Similarly, Mexico's role in forming the Pacific Alliance, a new subregional organization built around a group of four pro-market, pro-trade countries (Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru) allows Mexico to reassert a leadership role in the Americas, relatively independent of the United States. The challenges arising from China's global engagement should not, however, be confused with the struggle between
the United States and the Soviet Union that characterized the Cold War, in which each side actively promoted different, competing concepts for a global order. China does not seek to impose a new ideology on the world, yet the mercantilist way in which it
promotes its economic development, combined with its lack of commitment to international norms that it didn't create, makes it more difficult for the United States to conduct business and pursue policy goals in Latin America and other parts of the world. Consider China's ties with the eight countries that make up the leftist Bolivarian Alliance for the
Americas (ALBA). Since 2007, China has loaned $50 billion to Ecuador and Venezuela, the alliance's two largest countries, giving them the financial wherewithal to continue sustaining anti-U.S. policies at home and to advance their cause in the region -- from funding oil alliance Petrocaribe, to setting up teleSUR and Banco del Sur, to sending suitcases of cash to politicians in Argentina. And
the willingness of Chinese companies to invest in Venezuela and Ecuador has made it easier for those countries' regimes to nationalize industries and displace undesired Western corporations. China's indifference to those countries'
political systems has cleared the way for their devolution to less democratic practices, from the legal actions taken against the leadership of El Universo and other Ecuadorean media, to forcing RCTV off the air in Venezuela and persecuting Venezuelan opponents from Manuel Rosales (now in exile) to former armed forces head Ral Baduel (now incarcerated). China's no-strings-
attached investments enable the regimes to thumb their noses at Western institutions and prevailing international norms regarding respect for contracts, freedom of expression, democracy, and human rights.
They Say: No Chinese Growth (1/2)

Chinese economic growth is stable consensus of experts. Muk 6/17 Elva Muk, Financial Reporter for Asian Investor, former Finance Reporter for Hong Kong Economic
Journal, M.S. in Finance from The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology (Experts largely dismiss threats to China's growth, Asian Investor, 6/17/2013, Available Online: http://www.asianinvestor.net/Tools/Print.aspx?CIID=345265, Accessed: 07/15/2013) Experts largely dismiss threats to China's growth . Despite concerns, including shadow banking and potential political and social upheaval, panelists at AsianInvestor's summit are upbeat on China's growth prospects and stability. All eyes are on China after the country's leadership change this March, with president Xi Jinping and his seven-strong Politburo Standing Committee tasked with controlling China's development over the next five years. A diverse panel of market analysts discussed their fears and expectations for these new leaders at AsianInvestor's recent Asian Investment Summit in Hong Kong. They considered how political and social change could impact portfolios as the government engineers a structural slowdown as it rebalances its economy towards domestic consumption. Tom Byrne, senior vice-president at credit agency Moodys who oversees sovereign risk in Asia and the Middle East, sees healthy growth prospects for China over the next five years, estimating that its GDP will maintain an annual 7-8% growth rate, with inflation at 2-3%. He points out that there have only been three periods of major economic reform in China, the most recent of which was when China entered the World Trade Organisation in 2001. That helped to boost China's GDP to 10%, from 8% previously meaning that maintaining a growth rate of 8% is equivalent to what it was a little over a decade ago. The participants also note that domestic consumers will begin to drive China's growth, rather than external investment. But as Stephen Joske, senior manager at AustralianSuper, points out, this economic transition will be far slower than many market pundits are forecasting, largely because China is still very much a poor and developing country in need of major investment. While Shanghai, Beijing, Shenzhen and Guangzhou are leading the way economically, the rest of the country still has a lot of catching up to do in terms of industrialisation, Joske says, adding that he expects China's economy to be driven by investment for a number of years yet. The issue of shadow banking or non-bank lending is also prominent in the minds of investors. However, Byrne sought to sooth frayed nerves, saying that while China's economy has become "very dependent on credit growth" post-2008, the country does not rely on external financing or have a large net-liability position, so the chances of a 2008-style crash are remote .
10
They Say: No Chinese Growth (2/2)

Chinese growth will continue no sharp declines. European Central Bank 13 Byline Ettore Dorrucci, Gabor Pula and Daniel Santabrbara, European Central Bank
and Banco de Espaa (Chinas Economic Growth and Rebalancing, European Central Bank Occasional Paper Series, No. 142, February 2013, Available Online: http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/scpops/ecbocp142.pdf, Accessed: 07/20/13) The fundamental factors underpinning growth in China are likely to remain supportive, at least over the medium run. Although this could help mitigate the economic costs of imbalances for some time to come, it could also reduce the incentives for policy-makers to enact much needed reforms. While the period of double-digit growth is over, we view Chinas recent economic slowdown as largely cyclical. Chinas potential growth is set to decelerate gradually and we do not expect a sharp downward adjustment to occur. A number of factors are likely to continue to support extensive and relatively robust growth . On the supply side, capital stock per capita remains low, industrial profit margins remain high and rural labour supply is still abundant; at the same time, inward foreign direct investment into the mainland areas, efforts to lower the costs of migration and the share of highly sophisticated exports thanks to imported technology via multinational companies are all increasing. On the demand side, there is less vulnerability to external demand fluctuations than is widely perceived. Overall, sustained growth could help to manage the costs of renewed imbalances, at least in the medium run. It could partly compensate for the losses stemming from inefficient resource allocation, help the financial sector to outgrow its stock of non-performing loans and mitigate social unrest despite rising income inequality.
Chinese growth strong now structural reforms allow sustainable growth. Xinhua News 7/11 Xinhua News Agency, Chinese Daily National Newspaper (Chinese Economy Not to Take Hard
Landing: Finance Minister, Xinhua News Agency, 7/11/2013, Available Online: http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/special/2011-11/28/c_131274495.htm, Accessed: 07/20/2013) WASHINGTON, July 11 (Xinhua) -- China's Finance Minister Lou Jiwei said here Thursday that his country's economy will not take a hard landing and a slower economic growth rate is a necessary phenomenon from economic restructuring. "Despite the slowdown of China's economic growth rate, the structural reform is paying off," Lou told the press after a session on reform and sustainable development on the second day of the two-day China-U.S. Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED). He said China's growth performance and quality had been enhanced and the country has the confidence to deal with the current challenges and promote the economic sustainable growth. "The contribution of consumption to GDP (Gross Domestic Product) growth has increased, the proportion of service sector to GDP has also enhanced, the ratio of current account surplus of GDP has dropped, employment situation is good, and CPI (Consumer Price Index) is not high," said Lou. In the first quarter the growth rate was 7.7 percent, and the rate in the first half of this year will be slightly lower than 7.7 percent, he added. There is no doubt that China can achieve this year's growth target of 7.5 percent. With regard to the exit of U.S. quantitative easing policy, Lou said the U.S. economy has maintained 40 consecutive months of recovery, so China understood and supported U.S. consideration of tapering. China has not fully liberalized its capital account, so the impact on China will not be serious, he added.
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They Say: Link is Not Zero Sum (1/3)

Plan eliminates motive US engagement prevents Latin American interest in China. Economic Observer 13 Byline Wang Xiaoxia, Economic Observer, Translated by Worldcrunch (In America's
Backyard: China's Rising Influence In Latin America, Worldcrunch/Economic Observer, May 6, 2013, Available Online: http://worldcrunch.com/china-2.0/in-america-039-s-backyard-china-039-s-rising-influence-in-latin-america/foreignpolicy-trade-economy-investments-energy/c9s11647/, Accessed: 05/25/2013) In their book America's Blind Spot: Chavez, Oil, and U.S. Security, Andres Cala and Michael J. Economides avoid the usual patter of linking South Americas "China factor" with some sordid conspiracy theory. Instead, they investigate Latin Americas subtle choice between China and the United States, attributing Washington's weakened influence in the region to its failure in foreign policy and economic development -- while China rises on the back of globalization. Since 1823, when America put forward the Monroe Doctrine and declared its sphere of influence to Europeans, it has maintained the unique position of the United States in the Americas. Military intervention has always served as the most important tool for the United States. Especially after the start of the Cold War, in order to curb Communism from taking root in Latin America, the U.S. used military means largely without restraint. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States faced new external challenges such as the threat of global terrorism. Latin Americas strategic significance has quickly slipped to a secondary and more loc al ranking. The United States has shifted its focus in Latin America to specific issues such as illegal immigration and drug smuggling.
Option Tradeoff Latin America chooses China due to lack of US economic engagement. Ellis 12 R. Evan Ellis, professor of national security studies, modeling, gaming, and simulation with the Center for
Hemispheric Defense Studies at the National Defense University, with a research focus on Latin Americas relationships with external actors, including China, Russia, and Iran, Ph.D. in Political Science (The United States, Latin America and China: A Triangular Relationship?, Working Paper: Inter-American Dialogue, April 2012, Available Online: http://www.thedialogue.org/uploads/IAD8661_China_Triangular0424en.pdf, Accessed: 05/21/2013) The ability of the United States to serve as a market and a source of investment for Latin America has influenced the regions receptivity toward the PRC. The initial openness of the region to promises of investment and trade by Chinese President Hu Jintao came just after Latin America reached a historic low with regard to flows of investment from the United States and other sources. 25 The 2007-2009 global financial crisis, which significantly impaired US purchases of Latin American exports and US credit to the region, strengthened the perceived importance of the PRC for Latin American governments, and Chinese commodity purchases and investments emerged as one of the key factors helping these governments weather the crisis. Nonetheless, as noted earlier, while the PRC has occupied an important symbolic role as the largest and most visible source of new capital and markets, it has not been the only player to which Latin America has looked as the region seeks to engage globally. Attention also has been given to India and other emerging markets of Asia, as well as traditional players, such as the European Union, and actors such as Russia and Iran.
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Engagement is zero-sum Chinas power depends on Americas neglect. Kreps and Flores-Macas 13 Sarah E. Kreps & Gustavo A. Flores-Macas, Assistant Professors of Government at
Cornell (No Strings Attached? Evaluating Chinas Trade Relations Abroad, The Diplomat, 5/17/2013, Available Online: http://thediplomat.com/china-power/no-strings-attached-evaluating-chinas-trade-relations-abroad/, Accessed: 07/15/2013) To be sure, China may not have a purposeful plan to bring their trade partners into alignment on foreign policy questions. Even if unintentional, however, this gravitational effect has a sound economic basis. Developing countries in Africa and Latin America are comparatively much more dependent on China than China is on these countries. In a ten year period, for example, Sudans trade with China rose from 1 to 10% of its Gross Domestic Product. That pattern is even starker in a country like Angola, for which trade with China represented 25% of its GDP in 2006. While China certainly needs access to the resources in these countries, the individual countries are far less important to China than China is to these countries. The asymmetry in needs gives China a bargaining advantage that translates into foreign policy outcomes even if not by explicit design. Whether by design or not, the convergence with Chinas foreign policy goals is important on at least two levels. First, developing countries in Africa and Latin America may be lulled by the prospect of partnering with a country such as China that does not have an explicit political agenda, as did the United States and Soviet Union during the Cold War, but this appears to be an illusion. Whether this reaches the level of new colonialism as former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton referred to it remains to be seen, but the economic asymmetries that undergird the relationship make that prospect more likely. A second set of implications deals with the United States. During the same period in which Chinas trade with Africa and Latin America and foreign policy convergence have increased, the United States and China have actually diverged in their overall UNGA voting behavior. This suggests something of a zero sum dynamic in which Chinas growing trade relations make it easier to attract allies in international forums while US influence is diminishing. Taken together, these trends call for greater engagement on behalf of the United States in the developing world. Since the September 2001 attacks, Washington has dealt with Africa and Latin America through benign neglect and shifted its attention elsewhere. If foreign policy alignment does follow from tighter commercial relations, the US ought to reinvigorate its trade and diplomatic agenda as an important means of projecting influence abroad.
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Chinas investment depends on US negligence US economic engagement pushes them out. Romero & Barrionuevo 9 Simon Romero & Alexei Barrionuevo, NYT Bureau Chiefs in Brazil (Deals Help China
Expand Sway in Latin America, New York Times, 4/16/2009, Available Online: http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/16/world/16chinaloan.html, Accessed: 07/15/2013) CARACAS, Venezuela As Washington tries to rebuild its strained relationships in Latin America, China is stepping in vigorously, offering countries across the region large amounts of money while they struggle with sharply slowing economies, a plunge in commodity prices and restricted access to credit. In recent weeks, China has been negotiating deals to double a development fund in Venezuela to $12 billion, lend Ecuador at least $1 billion to build a hydroelectric plant, provide Argentina with access to more than $10 billion in Chinese currency and lend Brazils national oil company $10 billion. The deals largely focus on China locking in natural resources like oil for years to come. Chinas trade with Latin America has grown quickly this decade, making it the regions second largest trading partner after the United States. But the size and scope of these loans point to a deeper engagement with Latin America at a time when the Obama administration is starting to address the erosion of Washingtons influence in the hemisphere. This is how the balance of power shifts quietly during times of crisis, said David Rothkopf, a former Commerce Department official in the Clinton administration. The loans are an example of the checkbook power in the world moving to new places, with the Chinese becoming more active. Mr. Obama will meet with leaders from the region this weekend. They will discuss the economic crisis, including a plan to replenish the Inter-American Development Bank, a Washington-based pillar of clout that has suffered losses from the financial crisis. Leaders at the summit meeting are also expected to push Mr. Obama to further loosen the United States policy toward Cuba. Meanwhile, China is rapidly increasing its lending in Latin America as it pursues not only long-term access to commodities like soybeans and iron ore, but also an alternative to investing in United States Treasury notes. One of Chinas new deals in Latin America, the $10 billion arrangement with Argentina, would allow Argentina reliable access to Chinese currency to help pay for imports from China. It may also help lead the way to Chinas currency to eventually be used as an alternate reserve currency. The deal follows similar ones China has struck with countries like South Korea, Indonesia and Belarus. As the financial crisis began to whipsaw international markets last year, the Federal Reserve made its own currency arrangements with central banks around the world, allocating $30 billion each to Brazil and Mexico. (Brazil has opted not to tap it for now.) But smaller economies in the region, including Argentina, which has been trying to dispel doubts about its ability to meet its international debt payments, were left out of those agreements. Details of the Chinese deal with Argentina are still being ironed out, but an official at Argentinas central bank said it would allow Argentina to avoid using scarce dollars for all its international transactions. The takeover of billions of dollars in private pension funds, among other moves, led Argentines to pull the equivalent of nearly $23 billion, much of it in dollars, out of the country last year. Dante Sica, the lead economist at Abeceb, a consulting firm in Buenos Aires, said the Chinese overtures in the region were made possible by the lack of attention that the United States showed to Latin America during the entire Bush administration. China is also seizing opportunities in Latin America when traditional lenders over which the United States holds some sway, like the Inter-American Development Bank, are pushing up against their limits. Just one of Chinas planned loans, the $10 billion for Brazils national oil company, is almost as much as the $11.2 billion in all approved financing by the Inter-American Bank in 2008. Brazil is expected to use the loan for offshore exploration, while agreeing to export as much as 100,000 barrels of oil a day to China, according to the oil company. The Inter-American bank, in which the United States has de facto veto power in some matters, is trying to triple its capital and increase lending to $18 billion this year. But the replenishment involves delicate negotiations among member nations, made all the more difficult after the bank lost almost $1 billion last year. China will also have a role in these talks, having become a member of the bank this year. China has also pushed into Latin American countries where the United States has negligible influence, like Venezuela. In February, Chinas vice president, Xi Jinping, traveled to Caracas to meet with President Hugo Chvez. The two men announced that a Chinese-backed development fund based here would grow to $12 billion from $6 billion, giving Venezuela access to hard currency while agreeing to increase oil shipments to China to one million barrels a day from a level of about 380,000 barrels.
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They Say: No Spillover from Cuba (1/1)

Influence in Cuba key to Chinas overall Latin American agenda. Hearn 9 Adrian Hearn, Ph.D. Senior Research Fellow at the University of Sydney and Kiriyama Research Fellow at the
University of San Francisco Center for the Pacific Rim ("China's relations with Mexico and Cuba: A Study of Contrasts," Pacific Rim Report, University of San Francisco Center for the Pacific Rim, No. 52, January 2009, Available Online: usf.usfca.edu/pac_rim/new/research/pacrimreport/pacrimreport52.html, Accessed: 07/15/2013) China is Cubas second largest trading partner after Venezuela, with 2.7 billion dollars in bilateral trade reported for 2007 (Cubaencuentro 2008). This trade is more valuable to Cuba than to China, though this could change if Chinese oil, nickel, and electronics manufacturing operations in Cuba expand. Furthermore, for the eight resource-rich countries that comprise Latin Americas New Left, Cuba is a unique ideological symbol of resistance to U.S. hegemony. For China, whose pursuit of Latin American natural resources is at least as voracious as that of the United States, cooperation with Cuba, strongly supported by Ral Castro, decreases the danger of being perceived in the region as an external potentially imperialisticthreat to economic sovereignty.
Chinese investment in Cuba key to persuade other Latin American countries. Hearn 9 Adrian Hearn, Ph.D. Senior Research Fellow at the University of Sydney and Kiriyama Research Fellow at the
University of San Francisco Center for the Pacific Rim ("China's relations with Mexico and Cuba: A Study of Contrasts," Pacific Rim Report, University of San Francisco Center for the Pacific Rim, No. 52, January 2009, Available Online: usf.usfca.edu/pac_rim/new/research/pacrimreport/pacrimreport52.html, Accessed: 07/15/2013) Chinas multiple objectives in Latin America are evident in the diversity of its activities in Cuba and Mexico. Although Cuba harbors some economic value for China through oil exploration, nickel extraction, biomedical collaboration, and electronics sales and manufacturing, its appeal is mainly political. Diplomatic links with Cuba promote Chinas image as a non-aligned protagonist of South-South cooperation, providing ideological common ground with the eight mineral-rich countries that make up Latin Americas New Left. Mexico, by contrast, offers China more conventional economic incentives such as a market for Chinese consumer products, a manufacturing base with geographic and legal access to North American markets, and the prospect of potentially massive investment in the oil sector. The following sections discuss the challenges and opportunities that China has brought to Mexico and Cuba, and the steps taken by both governments to respond effectively.
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They Say: No Spillover from Venezuela (1/3)

Venezuela is key China needs energy, agriculture, and telecommunications engagement. Ellis 5 R. Evan Ellis, professor of national security studies, modeling, gaming, and simulation with the Center for Hemispheric
Defense Studies at the National Defense University, with a research focus on Latin Americas relationships with external actors, including China, Russia, and Iran, Ph.D. in Political Science (U.S. National Security Implications of Chinese Involvement in Latin America, Strategic Studies Institute Monograph, Available Online: www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub606.pdf, Accessed: 07/15/2013)
It can be argued that Venezuela is currently Chinas principal strategic partner in Latin America, both in terms of the volume of investment, as well as in the nature of the relationship between the two countries.29 China currently has over
$1.5 billion invested in Venezuelaprior to the recently announced $100 million in investment commitments, the largest investment position of any country in the region.30 Bilateral trade between China and Venezuela increased from $150 million in 2003 to $1.2 billion in 200 ,31 and is anticipated to reach $3 billion in 2005, based on agreements signed during the state visit of Venezuelas populist president Hugo Ch vez Fri as to China during the 2004 Christmas holiday,32 as well as a series of 19 cooperation accords signed between Venezuela and China in January 2005.33 These figures reflect growth in both imports and exports. Venezuelan imports from China grew by 120 percent over 2004 to reach $560 million, while similarly growing oil exports have allowed Venezuela to maintain a net trade surplus.34 The Chinese relationship with Venezuela reflects not only Chinese interest in Venezuelan resources, but also the receptivity of President Ch vez. His interest in developing alternative markets for Venezuelan petroleum, and developing a hedge against U.S. influence in the region, make him a strong potential Chinese ally.35 In his high- profile state visit to China, Ch vez signed a number of accords in which he committed Venezuela to put its petroleum production at the disposition of the great Chinese fatherland.36 On the other hand, he is also a potential threat to Chines e interests, insofar as his Bolivarian revolution and support for indigenous populism and anti- globalist causes could foment instability in Chinas trading partners in Latin America, and undermine Chinese access to the resources of the region. Chinas principal interest in Venezuela, based on trade and investment patterns, is petroleum products. Exports of Venezuelan petroleum products to China registered a 75 percent increase in 2003,37 and a 25 percent increase in 2004, reaching a level of $640 million.38 Although the volume of petroleum shipments from Venezuela to China is limited and there are restrictions on the size of tankers and cargo ships which can be sent through the Panama Canal, infrastructure projects are under consideration which could sidestep these constraints by using pipelines to carry the oil overland to Pacific portseither across Colombia or Panama. As part of a series of accords signed during the state visit of Ch vez to China in December 200 , and leveraging the close working relationship wit h the Chinese developed over recent years,39 Venezuela will give China access to 15 mature oil fields, with proven reserves of up to a billion barrels of oil, for Chinese firms to develop and exploit.40 As part of the accord, China will invest $350 million toward bringing these fields on line,41 and in exchange will be allowed to build refineries on Venezuelan territory to process the oil.42 The agreement will help the Venezuelan government to overcome the shortfalls in technical management that it created when it fired half of all workers in its state oil firm, Petroleos de Venezuela (PdVSA), following the December 2002-March 2003 national strike. By allowing the Chinese to directly develop these fields, Venezuela will be able to almost double its production despite a lack of internal technical capacity to do so, selling significant quantities of oil to China while still serving its traditional markets. As a
compliment to its assistance to Venezuela in extracting its oil, China is also investing $60 million in a number of projects to help Venezuela extract its natural gas. 43 During a scheduled state visit at the end of January 2005, Chinese VicePresident Zeng Quinghong and senior directors of China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) will analyze the viability of even greater Chinese investment in the development of Venezuelan natural gas reserves. A third significant element of Chinese engagement with Venezuela in the petroleum sector involves the Chinese purchase of Venezuelan ormulsi n, and conversion of Chinese facilities to use it for the generation of electricity. Ormulsi n is a low-grade, high-pollution content fuel oil traditionally given little or no value because of the lack of a global market for its use. In December 2001, CNPC and PdVSA established the joint venture Orifuels Sinoven, S.A (Sinovensa and invested $330 million to develop a capability to produce 6.5 million metric tons of ormulsi n per year by the end of 2004. In conjunction with this effort, in November 2003 CNPC began constructing a special new type of power plant capable of burning ormulsi n in the Guangdong province of China. 5 Through a deal finalized in 200 , Chinas commercial agent, Petrochina, a subsidiary of CNPC, is currently purchasing 1.5 millions of tons of orimulsi n annually from Venezuela. 46 By building the new power plant, China is able to make use of the Venezuelan ormulsi n, which it is able to purchase at relatively low cost because of the lack of a global market.
[Continues No Text Removed]
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[Continues No Text Removed] Moreover, Venezuela is Chinas natural partner for the ormulsi n deal, in that the Latin American country currently possesses
the worlds largest proven ormulsi n reservesalmost double those of Saudi Arabia, the next largest source. China is also helping Venezuela to extract its coal. At the end of 2004, China announced that it will invest in the development of mines in the Orinoco River Basin area in the south of the country.47 China Minmetal and the Venezuelan firm, Corpozulia, are slated to sign an agreement during the scheduled state visit of Chinese Vice President Zeng Quinghong at the end of January 2005 that would use Chinese investment to increase Venezuelan carbon production.48 Beyond the domain of extractive industries, the Chinese- Venezuelan partnership has extended to the agricultural sector, where Venezuelan interests in improving agricultural productivity coincide with Chinese interests in developing reliable, friendly suppliers of foodstuffs. As part of the accords reached between the two nations during the Christmas 200 visit of Ch vez to China, the Asian giant has agreed to provide Venezuela with agricul tural machinery and credits for the nation to increase its food production.49 In keeping with the vertically integrated strategy that
China has pursued in other Latin American countries to secure access to sources of supply for strategic materials, China announced in December 2005 that it will invest in the construction of a national railway line, helping Venezuela to transport raw materials and foodstuffs to market.50 Finally, China is also helping Venezuela to develop its telecommunications industry, including assistance to Venezuela in access to space. As part of the series of accords
reached during the Christmas 200 visit of Hugo Ch vez to China, the two nations announced that China will launch a telecommunications satellite for Venezuela, helping the nation become less dependent on U.S. telecommunications networks.51 The initiative built on broader discussions of how China could help Venezuela to develop and modernize its telecommunications infrastructure more broadly, including a December 2004 visit to Venezuela by Vice minister of the Chinese information ministry Lou Kinjian to discuss possible collaboration on telecommunication projects with the Venezuelan telecommunications firm, CVG Telecom.52
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Venezuela key to Chinese natural resource access. Cerna 11 Michael Cerna, graduate student in International Policy Management at Kennesaw State University, GA (Chinas
Growing Presence in Latin America: Implications for U.S. and Chinese Presence in the Region, China Research Center, Vol. 10, No. 1, April 15, 2011, Available Online: http://www.chinacenter.net/chinas-growing-presence-in-latin-america-implications-for-u-s-andchinese-presence-in-the-region/, Accessed: 05/21/2013)
Chinas thirst for natural resources has sent the country in search of sustainable supplies of oil, soy and iron ore. In South America, China has found some of the most well-endowed partners in the world. China is devouring Latin American commodities and eyeing a market of 500 million people. Countries in South America have arable land and need our
technology and investment, and they welcome our companies. Its a win -win solution, said Wang Yunkun, deputy director of the Agriculture and Rural Affairs Committee of the National Peoples Congress, as reported by MercoPress. In 2006, more than 36% of Chiles total exports were directed toward Asia, with China taking 12% of the total. Chile was the first Latin American country to complete a major bilateral trade agreement with China (Santiso, 2007). Since then China has looked beyond Chile, also targeting Brazil, Venezuela, Ecuador, Argentina and Peru. In 2009, China became Brazils largest single export market, eclipsing the U.S. for the first time in history. Later, Brazil s thenpresident, Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, and his Chinese counterpart, Hu Jintao, signed an agreement that allowed the China Development Bank and Sinopec to loan Brazils state -controlled oil company, Petrobras, $10 billion in return for as many as 200,000 barrels a day of crude oil for ten years (Economist, 2009). This is but one example of how China is seizing lending opportunities in Latin America when traditional lenders such as the Inter-American Development Bank are being pushed to their limits. Just one of Chinas loans, the $10 billion for Brazils national oil company, is almost as much as the $11.2 billion in all approved financing by the Inter-American Bank in 2008, according to The New York Times. It was not only in Brazil that China went after oil. In order to meet rising industrial needs and consumer demand, China has
pursued investments and agreements with a variety of Latin American oil producers. In 2007 Venezuela agreed to a $6 billion joint investment fund for infrastructure projects at home and for oil refineries in China able to process Venezuelan heavy crude oil (Santiso, 2007). Venezuela planned to increase oil exports to China by 300,000 barrels per day. Then
in 2009, Venezuela announced a $16 billion investment deal with the Chinese National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) for oil exploration in the Orinoco River to develop heavy crude oil resources (Economist, 2009). Meanwhile, the CNPC has invested $300 million in technology to use Venezuelas Orimulsion fuel in Chinese power plants. This exemplifies Venezuelas desire to break
away from the U.S. During a visit to China in 2004, President Chavez said shifting exports to China would help end dependency on sales to the United States (Johnson, 2005).
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They Say: No Spillover from Mexico (1/1)

Mexico is key to China most important market. Dominguez 6 Jorge Dominguez, Professor at Harvards Weatherhead Center for International Affairs (China's
Relations With Latin America: Shared Gains, Asymmetric Hopes, Inter-American Dialogue Working Paper, June 2006, Available Online: www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/china.pdf, Accessed: 07/15/2013) Mexico is one of Chinas strategic partners in Latin America. Its overall trade importance for China is second only to Brazils in this region. It is Chinas principal export market in Latin America. Compared to the four South American countries under discussion, China runs a substantial bilateral trade surplus with Mexico (see Tables 3 and 4). From 2000 to 200 , Chinas exports to Mexico nearly quadrupled while its imports from Mexico quintupled. The dynamic of Sino-Mexican trade since 2000 is thus closest to that of Sino-Brazilian trade, except that Chinas bilateral trade surplus with Mexico also tripled in those years. China is also a significant foreign direct investor in Mexico; in 2004, the stock of accumulated Chinese direct investment in Mexico exceeded $28 billion, with clothing manufacturing accounting for a third and plastic products nearly a fourth of the total.52 Mexico is the most important Latin American economy for Chinese investment, much of which is geared for sales throughout the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) area. China has good reasons to call Mexico a strategic partner.
Mexico is economically key to China consumer products. Hearn 9 Adrian Hearn, Ph.D. Senior Research Fellow at the University of Sydney and Kiriyama Research Fellow at the
University of San Francisco Center for the Pacific Rim ("China's relations with Mexico and Cuba: A Study of Contrasts," Pacific Rim Report, University of San Francisco Center for the Pacific Rim, No. 52, January 2009, Available Online: usf.usfca.edu/pac_rim/new/research/pacrimreport/pacrimreport52.html, Accessed: 07/15/2013) One summary of Chinas relations with six Latin American countries (Jorge I. Domnguez et al., 2006 juxtaposes political cooperation with trade patterns. The study argues that although economic considerations are paramount, Cuba, Venezuela, Argentina, and Brazil have to varying degrees used China to balance U.S. influence in the region. Varying degrees of alarm about this prospect are expressed in the publications of research institutions and think tanks associated with the U.S. military and government (CLATF 2006:2, Eisenman 2006, Lam 2004, Mrozinski 2002). Indeed, the triangular relationship between China, Latin America, and the United States is emerging as a prominent topic of debate (e.g. Arnson et al. 2007). Chinas multiple objectives in Latin America are evident in the diversity of its activities in Cuba and Mexico. Although Cuba harbors some economic value for China through oil exploration, nickel extraction, biomedical collaboration, and electronics sales and manufacturing, its appeal is mainly political. Diplomatic links with Cuba promote Chinas image as a non-aligned protagonist of South-South cooperation, providing ideological common ground with the eight mineral-rich countries that make up Latin Americas New Left. Mexico, by contrast, offers China more conventional economic incentives such as a market for Chinese consumer products , a manufacturing base with geographic and legal access to North American markets, and the prospect of potentially massive investment in the oil sector. The following sections discuss the challenges and opportunities that China has brought to Mexico and Cuba, and the steps taken by both governments to respond effectively.
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They Say: Latin American Resources Not Key (1/4)

Latin American resources key to stable Chinese growth its the CCPs macroeconomic policy. Hongbo 13 Sun Hongbo, associate professor at the Institute of Latin American Studies of the Chinese Academy of Social
Sciences in Beijing, in an interview with Inter-American Dialogue (How 'Strategically Important' Is Latin America for China?, InterAmerican Dialogue, 1/18/2013, Available Online: http://www.thedialogue.org/page.cfm?pageID=32&pubID=3210, Accessed: 05/22/2013)
Q: China's ambassador to Chile, Yang Wanming, told newspaper China Daily that the Asian nation should look to Latin America to make up for declining demand from developed markets. Chinese exports to the region grew 12 to 15 percent last year, and it "is now a strategically important market," he said. How significant is Latin America as an export destination for China? Are business and government leaders actively looking to the region to expand trade? Where is the Chinese economy headed next year and in the mid-term, and how will that affect Latin America? A: Sun Hongbo, associate professor at the Institute of Latin American Studies of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in Beijing: "China regards Latin America as a promising strategic trade partner not only for diversifying export destinations, but also for safeguarding commodity import security. According to official statistics, Chinese exports to Latin America represented 6.74 percent of its total exports for the first nine months of 2012. Compared to the United States, European Union and Asia, Latin America has absorbed a marginal share of China's fast export expansion. From 2003 to 2011, the region's share of China's export volume only rose from 2.71 percent to 6.41 percent. Chinese policymakers expect to build a more sustainable and balanced trade relationship with Latin America. This issue has been widely negotiated both in political and commercial circles from the two sides. However, the bilateral effort still needs to find an efficient way to achieve satisfactory results, particularly for those countries that have a trade deficit with China. China continues to increase its imports from Latin America-with the region supplying 3.62 percent of China's total imports in 2003 to 7.13 percent in 2012. China's slowdown in 2012 caused serious concern in commodity-exporting countries in South America. Nonetheless, Chinese trade with Latin America in 2012 is estimated at more than $250 billion, higher than the year prior. Chinese business groups will attach great importance to the market volume in Latin America, but the export opportunities will also depend on strong economic growth in this region. In 2013, China's highlighted macroeconomic policy device for sustaining stable growth is to accelerate the pace of high-quality urbanization, which will necessitate increasing imports of mineral, agricultural and energy products from Latin America."
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No replacements Latin American goods are crucial to Chinese growth. Stallings 8 Barbara Stallings, Professor at the Watson Institute for International Studies at Brown University, co-director of
Browns Graduate Program in Development, and editor of Studies in Comparative International Development, a PhD in economics from the University of Cambridge, PhD in political science from Stanford University, former director of the Economic Development Division of the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (The U.S.China Latin America Triangle: Implications for the Future, in China's Expansion into the Western Hemisphere : Implications for Latin America and the United States, Ed. Riordan Roett and Guadalupe Paz, Washington, DC, USA: Brookings Institution Press, 2008, Available Online through Ebrary, Accessed 05/25/2013)
Approaching the question first from the point of view of attractions for China, this chapter argues that Chinas main interest in Latin America is related to trade. China clearly needs suppliers of raw materials . In 2004 it purchased over a quarter of the worlds tin and zinc, over a fifth of its soy and aluminum, and about a fifth of its copper, numbers that will be much higher by now. As Luisa Palacios states in chapter 8, it has also become the second largest consumer of oil in the world, although it remains a long way behind the United States. 16 China has entered into a competition with other countries for obtaining raw materials, which has driven up prices and brought new countries and regions into the center of world trade. For its part, Latin America exports a number of products that are crucial to Chinas continued industrial success. In chapter 6 Robert Devlin provides data showing that the top Latin American exports to China are metals (copper, iron ore, and scrap metal), foodstuffs (soy, sugar, and wheat), and industrial inputs (cotton, wool, and leather). Petroleum is noticeably absent from this list, despite high-profile discussions between Venezuelas Hugo Ch vez and Chinese leaders. In chapter 8 Palacios points to a variety of obstacles to greater exports of petroleum to China. First is Latin Americas declining production; second is the weak legal framework for investment in many Latin American exporting countries; third are transportation difficulties. Overall, Latin America provides less than 7 percent of Chinas petroleum needs, and most of this comes from Ecuador, not Venezuela. Palacios does not believe this will change significantly.
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Latin American engagement key to CCP stability they need stable natural resources. Farnsworth 12 Eric Farnsworth, vice-president of the Council of the Americas, former senior adviser to the White
House special envoy for the Americas (Memo to Washington: China's Growing Presence in Latin America, Americas Quarterly, Vol. 6, No. 1, Winter 2012, Available Online: http://www.americasquarterly.org/Farnsworth, Accessed: 07/16/2013) What is China doing in the Americas? Its a good questionand an increasingly important one for policymakers in Washington. According to one U.S. analyst, its about goodwill, good business and strategic position.1 Perhaps. But the jury is still out, mostly because Chinas interest in the Western Hemisphere is barely a decade old. For many years, beyond attempts to wean Latin American and Caribbean nations away from support for Taiwan and efforts to build Third World solidarity, Chinas footprint in the Americas was light. That has now changed. Since then-President Jiang Zemins 13-day trip to Latin America in April 2001 and the subsequent visits of President Hu Jintao in 2004 and 2011, Chinese engagement with the region has exploded. Today, China is the top trade partner of Brazil and Chile, and the second trade partner of Argentina and Peru. By late 2010, Chinese enterprises had invested almost $44 billion in the region, according to Chinas National Development and Reform Commission, almost a quarter of which was invested in 2010 alone. Top investment targets included Brazil, but also Argentina, Chile, Ecuador, Panama, Peru, and Venezuela. Innovative financing by Chinese entities was often behind the dealsand in some cases, such as Ecuador and Venezuela, investments took the form of loans secured by guaranteed future deliveries of oil. That is a marked change from 2003, the year before Hus first visit, when China invested just $1 billion in all of Latin America. By now the outlines of the story are well known. As part of the dash for economic growth that the Chinese Communist Party believes will help to maintain its legitimacyan average annual rate of 9.8 percent from 1979 to 2009, including an 8.7 percent growth rate in 2009 when much of the rest of the world faced economic collapseBeijing is on a global quest to lock in the natural resources that fuel its growth. From Southeast Asia to Africa to Latin America and beyond, China is scouring the globe to invest in primary commodities. By the end of 2011, more than $3 trillion in foreign exchange reserves provided an impressive war chest from which to purchase the global assets that Chinas leaders believe they need to support economic growthand thus political stabilityfor the medium to longer term. As China faces its own near-term leadership transition, efforts to purchase domestic political stability with foreign trade and investment are likely to intensify. At the same time, Latin American nations that have been the primary trade and investment partners with China have also gained handsomely, at least in the short term, in the sectors that produce primary goods. Longer term questions abound regarding the balance and terms of trade, the nature of the investments that China is making, and the values that are being promoted or undermined by such investments.2 Additionally, nations that are not supplying significant amounts of commodities to China, including Mexico and Central America, view China more as an aggressive competitor than as an economic partner. The costs and benefits of trade with China are unequally distributed across the Americas.
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China needs Latin American resources trade and economic leverage. Jiang 7 Shixue Jiang, Deputy Director of the Institute of Latin American Studies (ILAS) of the Chinese Academy of
Social Sciences (Three Factors in the Recent Development of Sino-Latin American Relations, in Enter the Dragon? Chinas Presence in Latin America, 2007, Available Online: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/EnterDragonFinal.pdf, Accessed: 07/19/2013) Chinese achievements in the realm of reform and opening to the outside world have been impressive. But there are problems. First of all, China is facing increasing friction with the developed countries, which have frequently used antidumping practices and other means to restrict Chinese exports. From time to time, the United States uses economic leverage to exert political pressure on China. Therefore, it is imperative for China to reduce economic dependence upon the United States and other developed countries. To realize this goal, China needs to diversify its trade partners. In this regard, Latin America, a continent with a population of more than 500 million people and an economic size of more than US$2 trillion, is certainly a big market for Chinese products. Second, while China is a nation with a great amount of natural resources, because of its huge population, China is also lacking resources in terms of per capita distribution. Consider forest area and timber, for example. According to recent statistics, Chinas forest area is 1.2 million square kilometers, and timber resources are about 10 billion cubic meters. These two absolute numbers are huge compared to many other countries in the world. But in per capita terms, Chinas forest area is merely 0.10 hectares, and timber resources are less than 10 cubic meters, as compared with the world average of 1.07 hectares and 83 cubic meters, respectively. According to a report published in 2006, Chinas per capita reserves of coal, oil and gas are only 70 percent, 11 percent, and 4 percent of the world average.1 On the one hand, the nation should make strenuous efforts to upgrade the ef ciency of using its resources; on the other, it needs to locate supplies from abroad. Latin America is the perfect place from which China can import many kinds of needed resources. Additionally, the importance of Latin America goes beyond the economic area. Politically speaking, Latin America could be a partner for China and other developing countries in their efforts to oppose hegemony, establish a just world order, and a harmonious world. Both Latin America and China share many common or similar positions towards some of the major international issues. Also noteworthy is the fact that in the United Nations, each country enjoys one vote, and China has the potential to win support from Latin American countries on many issues.
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They Say: No Chinese Economic Collapse (1/1)

Lack of Chinese economic growth causes societal collapse. Mead 9 Walter Russell Mead, Henry A. Kissinger Senior Fellow in U.S. Foreign Policy at the Council on Foreign
Relations (Only Makes You Stronger, The New Republic, 2/ /2009, Now Available Online: http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/news/2169866/posts, Accessed: 07/19/2013) The greatest danger both to U.S.-China relations and to American power itself is probably not that China will rise too far, too fast; it is that the current crisis might end China's growth miracle. In the worst-case scenario, the turmoil in the international economy will plunge China into a major economic downturn. The Chinese financial system will implode as loans to both state and private enterprises go bad. Millions or even tens of millions of Chinese will be unemployed in a country without an effective social safety net. The collapse of asset bubbles in the stock and property markets will wipe out the savings of a generation of the Chinese middle class. The political consequences could include dangerous unrest--and a bitter climate of anti-foreign feeling that blames others for China's woes. (Think of Weimar Germany, when both Nazi and communist politicians blamed the West for Germany's economic travails.) Worse, instability could lead to a vicious cycle, as nervous investors moved their money out of the country, further slowing growth and, in turn, fomenting ever-greater bitterness. Thanks to a generation of rapid economic growth, China has so far been able to manage the stresses and conflicts of modernization and change; nobody knows what will happen if the growth stops .
Chinese economic decline causes World War Three. Plate 3 Tom Plate, columnist who publishes Americas longest-running column about Asia, Visiting Professor at the
United Arab Emirates University, 2003 (Why Not Invade China?, Asia Media, June 30th, Available Online at http://asiamedia.ucla.edu/TomPlate2003/06302003.htm, Accessed 11-29-2012) But imagine a China disintegrating -- on its own, without neo-con or CIA prompting, much less outright military invasion -- because the economy (against all predictions) suddenly collapses. That would knock Asia into chaos . Refugees by the gazillions would head for Indonesia and other poorly border-patrolled places, which don't want them and can't handle them; some in Japan might lick their chops for World War II Redux and look to annex a slice of China. That would send small but successful Singapore and Malaysia -- once Japanese colonies -- into absolute nervous breakdowns. India might make a grab for Tibet, and while it does, Pakistan for Kashmir . Say hello to World War III Asia-style ! That's why wise policy encourages Chinese stability, security and economic growth -- the very direction the White House now seems to prefer.
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They Say: No CCP Collapse (1/2)

CCP is only stable because of economic growth no legitimacy absent investment. Shapiro 5 Charles S. Shapiro, US Department of State Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Western
Hemisphere Affairs (Chinese Engagement in Latin America Should Enhance U.S., Statement before the Senate Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, Peace Corps, and Narcotic Affairs, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 9/21/2005, Available Online: http://archives.uruguay.usembassy.gov/usaweb/paginas/527-00EN.shtml, Accessed: 07/15/2013) China in the Western Hemisphere We see two major trends in China's engagement with Latin America and the Caribbean: first and foremost, growing trade and investment are necessary to fuel China's own rapid domestic development . Second, China wants to match its growing economic strength with political influence in order to advance its own national agenda. China's Economic Influence China is the world's seventh-largest economy (with an economy about the same size as Italy's), the world's third-largest trading nation, and a major destination for foreign-direct investment from around the world. Its economy has grown at over 9.5% per year for the past twenty-five years. Rapid growth and development are significant sources of legitimacy for the Chinese Communist Party. To sustain that growth, China has increasingly engaged with the rest of the world, including with Latin America, to secure inputs it needs and markets for its surging exports. China's demand for Latin American goods has helped fuel economic growth in many countries. At the same time, however, China's exports, especially in textiles, apparel, and shoes, pose stiff competition for some Latin American and Caribbean producers, primarily in third-country markets. -- China's imports from Latin America reached $22 billion in 2004 and are up 16% in the first half of this year. Primary imports from Latin America include metal ores, soybeans, and copper. -- China's exports to Latin America reached $18 billion in 2004 and were up an additional 32% in the first half of this year. China's top exports to Latin America include machinery, electronics and apparel. -- While it is difficult to attribute what portion of overall economic growth in Latin America is attributable to particular factors, it is clear that China's boom has expanded markets for Latin exports, and thus contributes to economic growth. For example, the value of Chile's net exports to China more than doubled in 2004, increasing by about $1 billion in a $94 billion economy. -- China is an important new investor in the region as it searches for resources. Still, Chinese investment is rather small, at approximately $8.3 billion at the end of 2004, according to Chinese data. And the lion's share of that sum consists of investments in tax haven countries, such as the Cayman Islands and British Virgin Islands. However, deals for future investments, primarily in infrastructure and extractive sectors, could be a significant boost to the region if realized. -- China is now the world's second-largest consumer of petroleum, and has become a net importer of oil. We believe that securing reliable access to petroleum products from Hemisphere is an important element of China's engagement in the region, especially with Venezuela, Colombia, and Ecuador.
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They Say: No CCP Collapse (2/2)

Perception of growth key to regime stability US involvement threatens it. Ellis 11 R. Evan Ellis, professor of national security studies, modeling, gaming, and simulation with the Center for
Hemispheric Defense Studies at the National Defense University, with a research focus on Latin Americas relationships with external actors, including China, Russia, and Iran, Ph.D. in Political Science (Chinese Soft Power in Latin America: A Case Study, Joint Force Quarterly, A Publication of the National Defense University Press, Issue 60, 1st Quarter 2011, Available Online: http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/images/jfq-60/JFQ60_85-91_Ellis.pdf, Accessed: 05/22/2013) Blocking the Consolidation of U.S. Influence in the Region and Its Institutions. The rise of China is intimately tied to the global economy through trade, financial, and information flows, each of which is highly dependent on global institutions and cooperation. Because of this, some within the PRC leadership see the country's sustained growth and development, and thus the stability of the regime, threatened if an actor such as the United States is able to limit that cooperation or block global institutions from supporting Chinese interests. In Latin America, China's attainment of observer status in the OAS in 2004 and its acceptance into the IADB in 2009 were efforts to obtain a seat at the table in key regional institutions, and to keep them from being used "against" Chinese interests. In addition, the PRC has leveraged hopes of access to Chinese markets by Chile, Peru, and Costa Rica to secure bilateral free trade agreements, whose practical effect is to move Latin America away from a U.S.-dominated trading block (the Free Trade Area of the Americas) in which the PRC would have been disadvantaged. Finally, the PRC benefits from the challenges posed to the dominance of the United States in the region by regimes such as Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia, and its trade and investment with those regimes help to keep them economically viable. Nonetheless, as mentioned above, the PRC is careful to avoid association with the anti-U.S. rhetoric and projects of those regimes, which could damage its more strategically important relationship with the United States.
26
They Say: Hegemony Turn (1/3)

No threat to hegemony Chinese interest in Latin America is purely economic. Ferchen 12 Matt Ferchen, Resident Scholar, Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy where he runs a program on
Chinas economic and political relations with Latin America and Africa (Chinas Latin American Interests, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, April 6, 2012, Available Online: http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/04/06/chinas-latin-american-interests/a7av, Accessed: 06/09/2013) What is the nature of the relationship between Latin America and China? China-Latin America relations, especially economic ties, have boomed in the last decade. Between 2000 and 2010 China-Latin America trade expanded over 1,500 percent, and between 2008 and 2010 alone Chinas investment in the region expanded more than 180 percent. This boom in economic relations has been primarily driven by strong Chinese demand for South American mineral, agricultural, and energy resources like copper, iron ore, soybeans, and oil. At the same time, Latin America has become an important destination for increasing amounts of Chinese manufactured-good exports ranging from modems to motorcycles. While there are other dimensions to the Latin America-China relationship, including a history of Chinese immigration to countries like Cuba and Peru, the recent decade-long surge in relations has been primarily driven by trade and investment ties. Though those ties have also underpinned renewed and strengthened diplomatic relations between China and countries throughout the region, the main binding force remains economic rather than political or ideological.
27

No Hegemony Impact Alternative causes prevent US exercise of leadership. Walt 12 Stephen M. Walt, Robert and Renee Belfer Professor of International Affairs at Harvard Universitys
Kennedy School of Government (Whether or not the U.S. is declining is the wrong question, Online blog of the journal Foreign Policy, January 26, 2012, Available Online: http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/01/26/asking_the_wrong_question_about_the_us_and_china, Accessed: 07/20/2013) As I've noted elsewhere, the issue isn't whether the United States is about to fall the from the ranks of the great powers, or even be equaled (let alone surpassed) by a rising China. The world may be evolving toward a more multipolar structure, for example, but the United States is going to be one of those poles, and almost certainly the strongest of them, for many years to come. Instead, the real issue is whether developments at home and overseas are making it harder for the United States to exercise the kind of dominant influence that it did for much of the latter half of the 20th century. The United States had a larger share of global GDP in the 1940s and 1950s, and it wasn't running enormous budget deficits. The United States was seen as a reliable defender of human rights, and its support for decolonization after World War II had won it many friends in the developing world. It also had good relations with a variety of monarchies and dictatorships, which it justified as part of the struggle against communism. These features allowed the United States to create and lead combined economic, security and political orders in virtually every corner of the world, except for the portions directly controlled by our communist rivals. And the U.S. and its allies eventually won that struggle too, driving the USSR into exhaustion and watching the triumph of market economies and more participatory forms of government throughout the former communist world. The United States remains very powerful -- especially when compared with some putative opponents like Iran -- but its capacity to lead security and economic orders in every corner of the world has been diminished by failures in Iraq (and eventually, Afghanistan), by the burden of debt accumulated over the past decade, by the economic melt-down in 2007-2008, and by the emergence of somewhat stronger and independent actors in Brazil, Turkey, India, and elsewhere. One might also point to eroding national infrastructure and an educational system that impresses hardly anyone. Moreover, five decades of misguided policies have badly tarnished America's image in many parts of the world, and especially in the Middle East and Central Asia. The erosion of authoritarian rule in the Arab world will force new governments to pay more attention to popular sentiment -- which is generally hostile to the broad thrust of U.S. policy in the region -- and the United States will be less able to rely on close relations with tame monarchs or military dictators henceforth. If it the United States remains far and away the world's strongest state, its ability to get its way in world affairs is declining.
28

Other countries will fill-inAmerican military power is not necessary to prevent war. Preble and Friedman 10 Christopher Preble, Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Cato Institute, served as a
commissioned officer in the U.S. Navy, holds a Ph.D. in History from Temple University, and Benjamin H. Friedman, Research Fellow in Defense and Homeland Security Studies at the Cato Institute, Ph.D. Candidate in Political Science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2010 (A U.S. Defense Budget Worthy of Its Name, The Globalist, November 18th, Available Online at http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=12582, Accessed 01-07-2011) Another argument for high military spending is that U.S. military primacy underlies global stability . According to this theory, our forces and alliance commitments dampen conflict between potential rivals, preventing them from fighting wars that would disrupt trade. This logic liberates defense planning from old-fashioned considerations like enemies and the balance of power. It sees the requirements of global policing as the basis for the size of the U.S. military. That is no standard at all, which is why hawks embrace it. Boundless objectives justify limitless costs. That argument overestimates both the American military's contribution to international stability and the danger that instability abroad poses to Americans. U.S. force deployments in Europe and Asia now contribute little to peace , at best making already low odds of war among states slightly lower . Inertia, rather than our security requirements, explains the perseverance of U.S. military alliances. During the Cold War, Japan, Western Europe and South Korea grew wealthy enough to defend themselves. We should let them do so. These alliances heighten our force requirements and threaten to drag us into wars, while providing no obvious benefit. Without our forces there, our allies would pay the cost of balancing local adversaries .
29
Impact Extension Chinese Softpower (1/2)

Chinese economic engagement key to their soft power. Ellis 11 R. Evan Ellis, professor of national security studies, modeling, gaming, and simulation with the Center for
Hemispheric Defense Studies at the National Defense University, with a research focus on Latin Americas relationships with external actors, including China, Russia, and Iran, Ph.D. in Political Science (Chinese Soft Power in Latin America: A Case Study, Joint Force Quarterly, A Publication of the National Defense University Press, Issue 60, 1st Quarter 2011, Available Online: http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/images/jfq-60/JFQ60_85-91_Ellis.pdf, Accessed: 05/22/2013) This article examines Chinese soft power in the specific context of Latin America. The United States has long exercised significant influence in the region, while the PRC has historically been relatively absent. Nonetheless, in recent years, China's economic footprint in Latin America, and its attempts to engage the region politically, culturally, and otherwise, has expanded enormously. Understanding the nature and limits of PRC soft power in Latin America casts light on Chinese soft power in other parts of the world as well. In general, the bases of Chinese soft power differ from those of the United States, leading analysts to underestimate that power when they compare the PRC to the United States on those factors that are the sources of U.S. influence, such as the affinity of the world's youth for American music, media, and lifestyle, the widespread use of the English language in business and technology, or the number of elites who have learned their professions in U.S. institutions. It is also important to clarify that soft power is based on perceptions and emotion (that is, inferences), and not necessarily on objective reality. Although China's current trade with and investment position in Latin America are still limited compared to those of the United States,3 its influence in the region is based not so much on the current size of those activities, but rather on hopes or fears in the region of what it could be in the future. Because perception drives soft power , the nature of the PRC impact on each country in Latin America is shaped by its particular situation, hopes, fears, and prevailing ideology. The "Bolivarian socialist" regime of Hugo Chvez in Venezuela sees China as a powerful ally in its crusade against Western "imperialism," while countries such as Peru, Chile, and Colombia view the PRC in more traditional terms as an important investor and trading partner within the context of global free market capitalism.The core of Chinese soft power in Latin America, as in the rest of the world, is the widespread perception that the PRC, because of its sustained high rates of economic growth and technology development, will present tremendous business opportunities in the future , and will be a power to be reckoned with globally. In general, this perception can be divided into seven areas: hopes for future access to Chinese markets hopes for future Chinese investment influence of Chinese entities and infrastructure in Latin America hopes for the PRC to serve as a counterweight to the United States and Western institutions China as a development model affinity for Chinese culture and work ethic China as "the wave of the future." In each of these cases, the soft power of the PRC can be identified as operating through distinct sets of actors: the political leadership of countries, the business community, students and youth, and the general population.
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Impact Extension Chinese Softpower (2/2)

Chinese soft power is an existential impact it controls every scenario for extinction. Zhang 12 Senior fellow at the Centre for Asian Studies, visiting professor of Diplomacy and IR at the Geneva School
of Diplomacy, professor of IR at Fudan University (The Rise of Chinas Political Softpower, China.org.cn, 9/4/2012, Available Online: http://www.china.org.cn/opinion/2012-09/04/content_26421330.htm, Accessed: 07/20/2013) As China plays an increasingly significant role in the world, its soft power must be attractive both domestically as well as internationally. The world faces many difficulties, including widespread poverty, international conflict, the clash of civilizations and environmental protection. Thus far, the Western model has not been able to decisively address these issues; the China model therefore brings hope that we can make progress in conquering these dilemmas. Poverty and development The Western-dominated global economic order has worsened poverty in developing countries. Per-capita consumption of resources in developed countries is 32 times as large as that in developing countries. Almost half of the population in the world still lives in poverty. Western countries nevertheless still are striving to consolidate their wealth using any and all necessary means. In contrast, China forged a new path of development for its citizens in spite of this unfair international order which enabled it to virtually eliminate extreme poverty at home. This extensive experience would indeed be helpful in the fight against global poverty. War and peace In the past few years, the American model of "exporting democracy'" has produced a more turbulent world , as the increased risk of terrorism threatens global security . In contrast, China insists that "harmony is most precious". It is more practical, the Chinese system argues, to strengthen international cooperation while addressing both the symptoms and root causes of terrorism . The clash of civilizations Conflict between Western countries and the Islamic world is intensifying. "In a world, which is diversified and where multiple civilizations coexist, the obligation of Western countries is to protect their own benefits yet promote benefits of other nations," wrote Harvard University professor Samuel P. Huntington in his seminal 1993 essay "The Clash of Civilizations?". China strives for "being harmonious yet remaining different", which means to respect other nations, and learn from each other. This philosophy is, in fact, wiser than that of Huntington, and it's also the reason why few religious conflicts have broken out in China. China's stance in regards to reconciling cultural conflicts, therefore, is more preferable than its "self-centered" Western counterargument. Environmental protection Poorer countries and their people are the most obvious victims of global warming, yet they are the least responsible for the emission of greenhouse gases. Although Europeans and Americans have a strong awareness of environmental protection, it is still hard to change their extravagant lifestyles. Chinese environmental protection standards are not yet ideal, but some effective environmental ideas can be extracted from the China model. Perfecting the China model The China model is still being perfected, but its unique influence in dealing with the above four issues grows as China becomes stronger. China's experiences in eliminating poverty, prioritizing modernization while maintaining traditional values, and creating core values for its citizens demonstrate our insight and sense of human consciousness. Indeed, the success of the China model has not only brought about China's rise, but also a new trend that can't be explained by Western theory. In essence, the rise of China is the rise of China's political soft power, which has significantly helped China deal with challenges, assist developing countries in reducing poverty, and manage global issues. As the China model improves, it will continue to surprise the world.
31
2AC Chinese Investment/Influence Low (1/1)

Non-Unique Chinese investment in Latin America is still far behind the US. Dadush and Ali 12 Uri Dadush, senior associate and director of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
International Economics Program, PhD in Business Economics from Harvard, MA in Economics from Hebrew University of Jerusalem, and Shimelse Ali, economist in the International Economics Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (Chinas Rise and Latin America: A Global, Long-Term Perspective, International Economic Bulletin, based on a presentation to Inter-American Dialogue, March 8, 2012, Available Online: www.thedialogue.org/page.cfm?pageID=32&pubID=2892, Accessed: 05/22/2013) Clearly Beijing is making its mark in Latin America. In 2000, China was the seventh-largest export market for Latin America and accounted for less than 2 percent of the regions exports. Today, China accounts for 10 percent of Latin Americas exports and is the leading export destination for Brazil and Chile. Even so, the United States and Europe remain Latin Americas most important trading partners , accounting for 40 percent and 14 percent of its exports, respectively. The United States is, moreover, a key provider of remittances to Latin Americaaccounting for 75 percent of the $60 billion the region received in 2008and, thus, a critical source of foreign exchange for many countries in the region. As the chart below suggests, there is a marked difference between Chinas importance as an export market for Mexico, which is closely tied to the United States and exports manufactures that often compete with Chinas, and the natural resource exporters in South America. For example, the export similarity index, a measure of the extent to which exports overlap, for China and Mexico in the U.S. market is estimated at 56.9 percent, suggesting high competition in third markets, compared to 38.5 percent for China and Brazil. China is, however, quite uniformly a more important source of Latin Americas imports than the United States.
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2AC No Chinese Growth (1/1)

Non-Unique Chinas economy is down decline in imports. New York Times 6/8 Byline Gerry Mullany, New York Times Global Business (Chinas Export Growth Slows Amid
Concern of Slowdown, New York Times, 6/8/2013, Available Online: http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/09/business/global/chinas-export-growth-slows-amid-concern-ofslowdown.html?_r=0, Accessed: 07/15/2013) Concern is rising about the sputtering Chinese economy and tightening liquidity. The European Union, Chinas biggest trading partner, remains mired in a stubborn economic downturn, while in the United States, Chinas next-largest export market, the Federal Reserve has recently been sending signals it may start curtailing its stimulative monetary policies. Chinas figures showed it had a trade surplus of $20.4 billion in May, up from $19.3 billion, as imports declined 0.3 percent, the Customs Administration said. The drop in imports however slight was a possible sign of weakness in the domestic economy. Chinese stocks declined last week, their first weekly decline in six weeks, amid signs of tightening liquidity within China. A clearer picture of the Chinese economy is expected Sunday, when the government releases data on retail sales, industrial output and inflation. Economists had expected the May figures to show a slowdown, as the government has begun a campaign to prevent companies from overstating their exports. Many businesses are believed to have done so in March and April as a way to bypass currency controls and bring more money into the country to speculate on further appreciation of Chinas renminbi. The main evidence for such strategies lay in official statistics showing soaring exports to Hong Kong and bonded export zones on the mainland even as exports to the rest of the world from these places remained weak.
33
2AC Link is Not Zero Sum (1/1)

The link is not zero sum Chinese investment doesnt trade off with US involvement. Dadush and Ali 12 Uri Dadush, Senior Associate and Director of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
International Economics Program, PhD in Business Economics from Harvard, MA in Economics from Hebrew University of Jerusalem, and Shimelse Ali, economist in the International Economics Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (Chinas Rise and Latin America: A Global, Long-Term Perspective, International Economic Bulletin, based on a presentation to Inter-American Dialogue, March 8, 2012, Available Online: www.thedialogue.org/page.cfm?pageID=32&pubID=2892, Accessed: 05/22/2013) Although the relative size of the U.S. economy is expected to decline over the coming decades, the United States is projected to remain an important destination for Latin Americas exports even in 2050. Similarly, the importance of individual European economies, in terms of trade and investment, will decline over time; however, the European Union as a trading bloc is likely to be among the regions major partners. Thus, while Latin American countries will need to reorient their economic diplomacy towards emerging powers such as China, India, Russia, and Indonesiaincluding fostering trade and investment agreementsrelationships with Europe and the United States will remain critical . And as Latin American economies become richer and more diversified, major opportunities are likely to arise for them to spur regional integration, especially as Brazil and Mexico are on their way to becoming two of the worlds largest economies.
34
2AC No Spillover (1/1)

No Internal Link Latin America is not a single actor individual relationships dont affect the entire region. Ellis 12 R. Evan Ellis, professor of national security studies, modeling, gaming, and simulation with the Center for
Hemispheric Defense Studies at the National Defense University, with a research focus on Latin Americas relationships with external actors, including China, Russia, and Iran, Ph.D. in Political Science (The United States, Latin America and China: A Triangular Relationship?, Working Paper: Inter-American Dialogue, April 2012, Available Online: http://www.thedialogue.org/uploads/IAD8661_China_Triangular0424en.pdf, Accessed: 05/21/2013) The triangle concept implies that it is valid to group together the nations of Latin America with respect to their relationships with the PRC and the United States. But this is not the case . Latin America can be physically grouped as a geographic region, but referring to Latin America as one leg in a triangular relationship incorrectly assumes that actions by the other legsthe United States and Chinaimpact Latin America as a whole . It also falsely assumes that Latin America as a whole deals with the United States and China. While it is possible to discuss the overall triangular set of interactions at some level of abstraction, the nature of the relationship between each state and the PRC, and between each state and the United States, varies dramatically .
35
2AC Latin American Resources Not Key (1/1)

No Internal Link China doesnt need Latin American resources substitutes and other sources. Dadush and Ali 12 Uri Dadush, senior associate and director of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
International Economics Program, PhD in Business Economics from Harvard, MA in Economics from Hebrew University of Jerusalem, and Shimelse Ali, economist in the International Economics Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (Chinas Rise and Latin America: A Global, Long-Term Perspective, International Economic Bulletin, based on a presentation to Inter-American Dialogue, March 8, 2012, Available Online: www.thedialogue.org/page.cfm?pageID=32&pubID=2892, Accessed: 05/22/2013) Contrary to the popular impression, Latin American commodity exporters cannot be sure that the rise of China and other relatively poor countries will sustain a commodity price boom forever; therefore, diversification of their economies remains a challenge. For nearly all commodities (petroleum, where the marginal cost curve may rise steeply, could be a partial exception), increased demand may well be eventually matched by increased investments in supply and technological innovation that reduces production costs and develops new substitutes as has happened historically. As business conditions in Russia, Indonesia, Africa, and other natural resource exporters improve, moreover, so too will their capacity to export commodities. Finally, demand for commodities will eventually be held back by the natural shift to services and manufactures as incomes rise, as well as by innovations which reduce the wastage and intensity of commodity use. Latin American resource-based economies may sooner or later need to strengthen their capacity to produce manufactures and services, the demand for which will soar as the middle class burgeons domestically and in other emerging markets. At present, nearly 90 percent of Latin Americas exports to China are in mining and agriculture. Although the regions terms of trade have improved, on average, by nearly 4 percent annually between 2002 and 2008, compared to 0.5 percent a year between 1995 and 2001, there is no guarantee that the recent favorable trend will persist indefinitely. Given the profound structural changes in global demand and supply implied by the rise of the emerging powers, and the uncertainties inherent in predicting commodity prices, Latin Americas development strategy should be robust to a number of plausible scenarios. Examples of policies that could underlie such a strategy include investing in education, strengthening governance, improving the business climate, and enhancing the capacity to innovate.
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2AC No Chinese Economic Collapse (1/1)

No Impact No Chinese economic collapse checks and balances prevent breakdown. Coonan 8 Clifford Coonan, Beijing Correspondent of The Irish Times (Chinas Stalling Boom Has Globe Worried,
Published in Irish Times, 10/25/2013, Clifford, Available Online: http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/opinion/2008/1025/1224838827729.html (may require subscription), Also Available: http://cliffordcoonan.com/?p=447, Accessed: 07/19/2013) All of this downbeat news feeds into a growing suspicion that China has had its cake and eaten for way too long, and that there is simply no precedent for a country growing and growing without some kind of respite. Establishing what that pause will look like and what it means to the rest of the world is the latest challenge facing global analysts. A hangover is considered inevitable and the Olympics, while meaningless economically, are widely considered the psychological trigger for China to face a slowdown. Despite all this gloom, however, writing China off is premature. The Beijing government is well placed to help protect the economy from the worst ravages of a global downturn. It has spent the last two years trying to fight inflation and cool the overheating economy, so it's a lot easier for it to take the foot off the brakes than it is to put them on in the first place. The central bank has lowered its benchmark interest rate twice in the past two months, the first time in six years. The State Council is increasing spending on infrastructure, offering tax rebates for exporters and allowing state-controlled prices for agricultural products to rise. Expect significant measures to kick-start the property market to avoid house prices falling too drastically. China has a lot of plus points to help out. Chinese banks did not issue subprime loans as a rule, and the country's 1.43 trillion in hard-currency reserves is a useful war chest to call on in a downturn. The currency is stable and there are high liquidity levels, all of which give China the most flexibility in the world to fend off the impact of the global financial crisis, says JP Morgan economist Frank Gong. China is now a globalised economy, but its domestic market is still massively underexploited, and it is to this market that the government will most likely turn. While it is a globalised economy committed to the WTO, China is also a centralised economy run by the Communist Party, and it has no real political opposition at home to stop it acting however it sees fit to stop sliding growth. Should the economy start to worsen significantly, public anger will increase, but China has been so successful in keeping a tight leash on the internet and the media that it is difficult for opposition to organise itself in a meaningful way. Recent years of surging growth in China have certainly done a lot to keep global economic data looking rosy, but perhaps China's influence has been somewhat oversold. It is not a big enough economy by itself to keep the global economy ticking over, accounting for 5 per cent of the world economy, compared to the United States with a muscular 28 per cent. And whatever about slowing growth, 9 per cent is still an admirable rate, one that European leaders gathered this weekend in Beijing for the Asian-Europe Meeting would give their eye teeth to be able to present to their constituencies.
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2AC No CCP Collapse (1/1)

No Impact CCP is resilient and instability impacts are empirically denied. Li 13 Eric X. Li, serves on the board of directors of China Europe International Business School, Henry Crown Fellow of the Aspen
Institute, The Life of the Party, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 92, Issue 1, Jan/Feb, Summary Available Online: http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/138476/eric-x-li/the-life-of-the-party, Accessed: 07/16/2013)
Even if critics accept that the Chinese government is adaptable and meritocratic, they still question its legitimacy.
Westerners assume that multiparty elections are the only source of political legitimacy. Because China does not hold such elections, they argue, the CCP'S rule rests on inherently shaky ground. Following this logic, critics have predicted the party's collapse for
decades, but no collapse has come. The most recent version of the argument is that the CCP has maintained its hold on power only because it has delivered economic growth -- so-called performance legitimacy. No doubt, performance is a major source of the party's popularity. In a poll of Chinese attitudes published by the Pew Research Center in 2011, 87 percent of respondents noted satisfaction with the general direction of the country , 66 percent reported significant progress in their lives in the past five years, and a whopping 74 percent said they expected the future to be even better. Performance legitimacy, however, is only one source of the party's popular support. Much more significant is the role of Chinese nationalism and moral legitimacy. When the CCP built the Monument to the People's
Heroes at the center of Tiananmen Square in 1949, it included a frieze depicting the struggles of the Chinese to establish the People's Republic. One would expect the CCP, a Marxist-Leninist party, to have its most symbolic political narrative begin with communism -- the writing of The Communist Manifesto, for example, or perhaps the birth of the CCP in 1921. Instead, the first carving of the frieze depicts an event from 1839: the public burning of imported opium by the Qing dynasty's imperial minister, Lin Zexu, which triggered the first Opium War. China's subsequent loss to the British inaugurated the so-called century of humiliation. In the following hundred years, China suffered countless invasions, wars, and famines -- all, in the popular telling, to reach 1949. And today, the Monument to the People's Heroes remains a sacred public site and the most significant symbol of the CCP'S national moral authority. The CCP'S role in saving and modernizing China is a far more durable source of its legitimacy than the
country's economic performance. It explains why, even at the worst times of the party's rule in the past 63 years, including the disastrous Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution, the CCP was able to keep the support of mainstream Chinese long enough for it to correct its mistakes. China's recent achievements, from economic growth to space exploration, are only strengthening nationalist sentiments in the country, especially among the youth. The party can count on their support for decades to come. A final type of staying power comes from repression , which China watchers in the West claim is the real force behind the CCP. They point to censorship and the regime's harsh treatment of dissidents, which undoubtedly exist. Still, the party knows very well that general repression is not sustainable. Instead, it seeks to employ smart containment. The strategy is to give the vast majority of people the widest range possible of personal liberties. And today, Chinese people are freer than at any other period in recent memory; most of
them can live where they want and work as they choose, go into business without hindrance, travel within and out of the country, and openly criticize the government online without retaliation. Meanwhile, state power focuses on containing a small number
of individuals who have political agendas and want to topple the one-party system. As any casual observer would know, over the last ten years, the quantity of criticism against the government online and in print has increased exponentially -- without any reprisals. Every year, there are tens of thousands of local protests against specific policies. Most of the disputes are resolved peacefully. But the government deals forcefully with the very few who aim to subvert China's political system, such as Liu Xiaobo, an activist who calls for the end of single-party rule and who is currently in jail. That is not to say that there aren't problems. Corruption, for one, could seriously harm the CCP'S reputation. But it will not derail party rule anytime soon. Far from being a problem inherent to the Chinese political system, corruption is largely
a byproduct of the country's rapid transformation. When the United States was going through its industrialization 150 years ago, violence, the wealth gap, and corruption in the country were just as bad as, if not worse than, in China today. According to Transparency International, China ranks 75th in global corruption and is gradually getting better. It is less corrupt than Greece (80th), India (95th), Indonesia and Argentina (tied at 100th), and the Philippines (129th) -- all of which are electoral democracies.
Understood in such a context, the Chinese government's corruption is by no means insurmountable. And the party's deeply rooted popular support will allow it the breathing room to grapple with even the toughest problems.
38
2AC Hegemony Turn (1/1)

Impact Turn Hegemony A. Close Latin America-China relations prevents US hegemony. Dominguez 6 Jorge Dominguez, Professor at Harvards Weatherhead Center for International Affairs (China's
Relations With Latin America: Shared Gains, Asymmetric Hopes, Inter-American Dialogue Working Paper, June 2006, Available Online: www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/china.pdf, Accessed: 07/20/2013) There is, of course, a delicate triangular problem. To the extent that China may assist Latin America to combat hegemonism, problems may develop in U.S.-Chinese relations. And, if Latin American states look at the world strategically from the perspective of self-interest, as Chinese academics claim, then Latin American officials mayin classic neorealist fashionseek Chinese support to provide a soft balance U.S. influence in Latin America. Chinese academics are acutely aware that the United States considers Latin America to be its backyard (houyuan). Jiang Shixue, a scholar at the CASS, has put it as follows: The rapid development of China-Latin America relations has not yet posed a security threat to the United States, but China is currently in the process of becoming a political competitor in Americas own backyard some Latin American countries may use China to challenge American hegemony .34 Jiang Shixue also avers that China and Latin America share interests in building a new economic order and opposing hegemonism. Xu Shicheng, also from the CASS, attributes left-wing election victories in Brazil, Venezuela, and Uruguay to Latin American anger at neoliberal economic policies and a desire to take a firmer stance against U.S. dominance in the region.35
B. The loss of American hegemony will increase the risk of global conflict. Felzenberg and Gray 11 Alvin S. Felzenberg, Professorial Lecturer at The Elliott School of International Affairs at
George Washington University, Presidential Historian and Adjunct Faculty Member at the Annenberg School for Communication at the University of Pennsylvania, former Fellow at the Institute of Politics at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, served as Principal Spokesman for the 9/11 Commission, holds a Ph.D. in Politics from Princeton University, and Alexander B. Gray, Student at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University and the War Studies Department of Kings College, London, 2011 (The New Isolationism, National Review, January 3rd, Available Online at http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/print/256150, Accessed 0103-2011) A world in which the United States willingly ceded power and influence would both be more dangerous and prove less receptive to values that most Americans share, such as respect for human rights , the need to restrain governments through the rule of law , and the sanctity of contracts . By reducing its military strength to alarmingly low levels, the United States would create dangerous power vacuums around the world that other nations, with entirely different values, would be only too happy to fill. That, as history shows, would make war more, rather than less, likely . Congress and the president would do well to reflect on those lessons and remember their duty to provide a dominant American military presence on land, at sea, and in the air.
39
Extend: Chinese Investment/Influence Low (1/1)

Chinese investment is limited promises didnt translate into projects. Stallings 8 Barbara Stallings, Professor at the Watson Institute for International Studies at Brown University, codirector of Browns Graduate Program in Development, and editor of Studies in Comparative International Development, a PhD in economics from the University of Cambridge, PhD in political science from Stanford University, former director of the Economic Development Division of the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (The U.S.China Latin America Triangle: Implications for the Future, in China's Expansion into the Western Hemisphere : Implications for Latin America and the United States, Ed. Riordan Roett and Guadalupe Paz, Washington, DC, USA: Brookings Institution Press, 2008, Available Online through Ebrary, Accessed 05/25/2013) On the Latin American side, the situation is somewhat more ambiguous, since a few governments seem to want to significantly change the status quo. An alliance with China might be useful in promoting their project, although that can be debated. In the meantime, the South American countries that were so enthusiastic about China in the halcyon days of 2004 05 are reconsidering. They have come to realize that Chinese money also comes with strings if it comes at all . Most of the initial promises (or what were thought to be promises) have not even begun to materialize. Also, a better understanding of how Chinese investment takes place makes it appear less attractive. As Xiang states in chapter 3, Chinese trade and investment in the region cannot escape the stigma of a neocolonial pattern, especially given Chinas very narrow commodity needs. In this sense, a careful study of the African experience would be useful. Trade relationships, which really have provided copious new resources, are also being questioned. On the one hand is the issue of whether Latin America wants to become primarily a commodity exporter again. On the other hand, even in South America, not to mention Mexico and Central America, there is concern about competition in the industrial sector from a large, lowcost producer. Already barriers are being erected against Chinese exports, which the Chinese feel are unfair (see chapter 2). Clearly, Latin America will be looking for ways to obtain the advantages from the Chinese relationship without the disadvantages. In chapter 6 Devlin has some useful economic suggestions along this line. In chapter 4 Tokatlian presents an equally useful discussion from the political side.
40
Extend: No Chinese Growth (1/1)

Chinas finances doom long term growth. Business Times 5/30 (Fitch: China credit bubble shows crisis is brewing 5/30/2013, Available Online:
http://www.btimes.com.my/Current_News/BTIMES/articles/chibanks/Article/, Accessed: 07/15/2013) CHINESE banks are adding assets at the rate of an entire US banking system in five years. To Charlene Chu of Fitch Ratings, that signals a crisis is brewing. Total lending from banks and other financial institutions in China was 198 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP) last year, compared with 125 per cent four years earlier, according to calculations by Chu, the company's Beijing-based head of China financial institutions. Fitch cut the nation's long-term local currency debt rating last month, in the first downgrade by one of the top three rating companies in 14 years. "There is just no way to grow out of a debt problem when credit is already twice as large as GDP and growing nearly twice as fast ," Chu said in an interview.
Chinas economy declining now debt and demographics. Chang 4/14 Gordon G. Chang, China Contributor at Forbes (The Biggest Threat To China's Economy 4/14/2013,
Available Online: http://www.forbes.com/sites/gordonchang/2013/04/14/the-biggest-threat-to-chinas-economy/, Accessed: 07/15/2013) On Tuesday, Fitch Ratings downgraded Chinas long-term local currency debt one notch, from AA- to A+. The primary reason for the move was the countrys too-rapid expansion of credit, one of the underlying structural weaknesses the agency cited in its announcement. Many analysts in fact think the debt resulting from then Premier Wen Jiabaos borrowing binge, which began to accumulate in earnest in late 2008, is now Chinas number one economic risk. There are, of course, other risk factors now undermining the countrys economic growth. Among them are an eroding environment, unfavorable demographic trends, and persistent internal discontent . Yet the events since early last month in North Asiathe tearing up of the Korean War armistice, Pyongyangs promises of pre-emptive nuclear strikes on the U.S., and the deployment of North Koreas mobile missiles, to name just a few of themsuggest the biggest threat to the Chinese economy may be the least discussed one: turmoil in the region. As Fitch carefully noted in its explanation of Tuesdays downgrade, The ratings assume there is no significant deterioration of geopolitical risk, for example a conflict between China and Japan or an outbreak of war on the Korean peninsula.
41
Extend: Link is Not Zero Sum (1/1)

Latin America has many trading partners Chinese investment doesnt displace the US. Economic Observer 13 Byline Wang Xiaoxia, Economic Observer, Translated by Worldcrunch (In America's
Backyard: China's Rising Influence In Latin America, Worldcrunch/Economic Observer, May 6, 2013, Available Online: http://worldcrunch.com/china-2.0/in-america-039-s-backyard-china-039-s-rising-influence-in-latin-america/foreignpolicy-trade-economy-investments-energy/c9s11647/, Accessed: 05/25/2013) China's involvement in the Latin American continent doesnt constitute a threat to the United States, but brings benefits. It is precisely because China has reached "loans-for-oil" swap agreements with Venezuela, Brazil, Ecuador and other countries that it brings much-needed funds to these oil-producing countries in South America. Not only have these funds been used in the field of oil production, but they have also safeguarded the energy supply of the United States, as well as stabilized these countries' livelihood -- and to a certain extent reduced the impact of illegal immigration and the drug trade on the U.S. For South America, China and the United States, this is not a zero-sum game , but a multiple choice of mutual benefits and synergies. Even if China has become the Latin American economys new upstart, it is still not in a position to challenge the strong and diverse influence that the United States has accumulated over two centuries in the region.
No trade off US and China offer different types of economic engagement. Shapiro 5 Charles S. Shapiro, US Department of State Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Western
Hemisphere Affairs (Chinese Engagement in Latin America Should Enhance U.S., Statement before the Senate Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, Peace Corps, and Narcotic Affairs, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 9/21/2005, Available Online: http://archives.uruguay.usembassy.gov/usaweb/paginas/527-00EN.shtml, Accessed: 07/15/2013) In comparison, U.S. trade with and investment in the region dwarf China's , and is distinct from what China has to offer. We provide high-tech and knowledge-based goods and services. U.S. trade with the region exceeded $445 billion in 2004, ten times China's level; Latin America's exports to the U.S. are up 10 percent and imports from the U.S. are up 15 percent in the first half of this year. U.S. investment in Latin America is over $300 billion. The region needs and values our market and our expertise for its continued development.
42
Extend: No Spillover (1/1)

Latin America doesnt have a unified China policy no link spillover. Ellis 12 R. Evan Ellis, professor of national security studies, modeling, gaming, and simulation with the Center for
Hemispheric Defense Studies at the National Defense University, with a research focus on Latin Americas relationships with external actors, including China, Russia, and Iran, Ph.D. in Political Science (The United States, Latin America and China: A Triangular Relationship?, Working Paper: Inter-American Dialogue, April 2012, Available Online: http://www.thedialogue.org/uploads/IAD8661_China_Triangular0424en.pdf, Accessed: 05/21/2013) The triangle concept has a certain resonance in both the United States and the PRC, but it is more problematic when viewed from the perspective of Latin America. The region would, arguably, prefer to see itself as strengthening relationships with multiple extra-regional actors as it projects more extensively into the global arena, rather than being trapped as a leg in a triangle with the two current global powers. Moreover, many in Latin America would take issue with the concept of the region as a unitary actor. Indeed, discussions of China in Latin America are replete with concerns about the regions inability to present a unified position in dealing with the PRC. 8
43
Extend: Latin American Resources Not Key (1/1)

China can get raw materials from Africa especially oil. Stallings 8 Barbara Stallings, Professor at the Watson Institute for International Studies at Brown University, codirector of Browns Graduate Program in Development, and editor of Studies in Comparative International Development, a PhD in economics from the University of Cambridge, PhD in political science from Stanford University, former director of the Economic Development Division of the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (The U.S.China Latin America Triangle: Implications for the Future, in China's Expansion into the Western Hemisphere : Implications for Latin America and the United States, Ed. Riordan Roett and Guadalupe Paz, Washington, DC, USA: Brookings Institution Press, 2008, Available Online through Ebrary, Accessed 05/25/2013) Africa is similar to Latin America in that it is distant from China in geographical, cultural, and historical terms. Nonetheless, many indicators show that China is currently more active in Africa than in Latin America . In chapter 10, Chris Alden emphasizes Africa as a source of raw materials for China. While a number of commodities are imported from Africa, petroleum is key: over 30 percent of Chinas oil comes from Africa, and the figure is rising . Alden also points to Africas importance as a market, especially for Chinas low-end goods. In political terms, the Taiwan issue is as important in Africa as in Latin America, but another political goal is also mentioned: obtaining political support in multilateral institutions.
44
Extend: Hegemony Turn (1/1)

US economic engagement key Chinese economic ties will become political. Arnson and Davidow 11 Dr. Cynthia J. Arnson, director of the Latin American Program at the Woodrow Wilson
International Center for Scholars, member of the editorial advisory board of Foreign Affairs Latinoamrica, the Spanishlanguage edition of Foreign Affairs, and Jeffrey Davidow, President of the Institute of the Americas, former U.S. Ambassador to Mexico, Venezuela, and Zambia, former Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs (China, Latin America, and the United States: The New Triangle, Edited by Cynthia J. Arnson and Jeffrey Davidow, January 2011, Available Online for Download: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/china-latin-america-and-theunited-states-the-new-triangle, Accessed: 06/09/2013) Building a strategic relationship with China is challenging not only because of low levels of Chinese investment in the region, but also because the investment that does occur generally employs Chinese laborers and materials brought over for specific infrastructure projects. While Chinas lack of human rights and environmental restrictions makes it an easier commercial partner as compared to the United States and Europe, the relationship lacks the deep cultural kinship that exists between Latin America and these other two areas of the world. Within this context, Cunningham posited that the relationship between China and Latin America will remain strictly commercial, but recommended that the United States be vigilant regarding the way that increasing commercial ties can transform into political alliances . In order for the United States to maintain its privileged relationship with the region, it must compete with China at the commercial level . This consists of lowering trade barriers to Latin American exports and expanding preexisting commercial and corporate ties. [*Nelson Cunningham is the former Special Advisor to the President for Western Hemisphere affairs under President Clinton and a member of the United States Department of State's Advisory Committee on International Economic Policy.]
45
No Chinese Soft Power Impact (1/1)

No Impact Chinese soft power decline inevitable internal flaws and resentment. Kurlantzick 7 Joshua Kurlantzick, Visiting scholar in the Carnegie Endowments China Program (Charm Offensive:
How China's Soft Power is Transforming the World, 2007, pp. 232-233, Preview available online from Amazon book preview at http://www.amazon.com/Charm-Offensive-Chinas-Transforming-Republic/dp/0300136285) China also may not be able to build its soft power indefinitely. As we have seen, greater familiarity with China will expose many countries to the People's Republic's flaws. China's promises of aid and investment could take years to materialize , yet Beijing has created heightened expectations about its potential as a donor and investor in many countries. China's exportation of labor, environmental, and governance problems alienates average people in Asia, Latin America, and Africa. China's support for autocratic rulers in countries like Zimbabwe and Sudan angers civil society leaders and opposition politicians. If Beijing seems to be dropping its preference for noninterference and "win-win" relations, it will spark fears in countries like Vietnam already suspicious of China. It also could reinforce the idea that despite Beijing's rhetoric of cooperation, when it comes to core interests, China, like any great power, will think of itself first. The Mekong River offers an obvious example. Though China promises to cooperate peacefully with other countries, in the development of the river, China has proven both uncooperative and meddling. It has meddled by refusing to join the multilateral group monitoring the river and by injecting itself into other nations' domestic politics 8 to get politicians to support China's damming of the river. China could further alienate other nations if it seems to be using multilateral institutions as a cover, without jettisoning Beijing's own more aggressive, even military aims. Despite signing a deal with the Philippines and Vietnam for joint exploration of the disputed South China Sea, Beijing has not retracted its claim to large swaths of the water. Any Chinese decision that appears arrogant or targeted toward Chinese domination of the region will cause a backlash. Even as officials in Vietnam signed the join exploration deal, they privately warned that they still could not trust their Chinese counterparts enough to share the most important data to Beijing. Chinas trade relations, too, ultimately could limit its soft power . If China builds the kind of trade surpluses with the developing world that it enjoys with the United States, it could stoke local resentment. Eventually, Beijing could wind up looking little different to people in Asia or Africa or Latin America than the old colonial powers, who mined and dug up their colonies, doing little to improve the capacity of locals on the ground. Whole regions could become trapped in a cycle of mercantilism, in which they sell natural resources to China and buy higher-value manufactured Chinese goods.
46

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GFCA Packet 2013-2014

China Disadvantage Index

Negative 1NC Shell

Affirmative 2AC Frontline Materials

GFCA Packet 2013-2014

Debating the China Disadvantage (1/2)

GFCA Packet 2013-2014

Debating the China Disadvantage (2/2)

GFCA Packet 2013-2014

1NC China DA (1/4)

GFCA Packet 2013-2014

1NC China DA (2/4)

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1NC China DA (3/4)

GFCA Packet 2013-2014

1NC China DA (4/4)

GFCA Packet 2013-2014

They Say: Chinese Investment/Influence Low (1/2)

GFCA Packet 2013-2014

They Say: Chinese Investment/Influence Low (2/2)

GFCA Packet 2013-2014

They Say: No Chinese Growth (1/2)

GFCA Packet 2013-2014

They Say: No Chinese Growth (2/2)

GFCA Packet 2013-2014

They Say: Link is Not Zero Sum (1/3)

GFCA Packet 2013-2014

They Say: Link is Not Zero Sum (2/3)

GFCA Packet 2013-2014

They Say: Link is Not Zero Sum (3/3)

GFCA Packet 2013-2014

They Say: No Spillover from Cuba (1/1)

GFCA Packet 2013-2014

They Say: No Spillover from Venezuela (1/3)

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GFCA Packet 2013-2014

They Say: No Spillover from Venezuela (2/3)

GFCA Packet 2013-2014

They Say: No Spillover from Venezuela (3/3)

GFCA Packet 2013-2014

They Say: No Spillover from Mexico (1/1)

GFCA Packet 2013-2014

They Say: Latin American Resources Not Key (1/4)

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They Say: Latin American Resources Not Key (2/4)

GFCA Packet 2013-2014

They Say: Latin American Resources Not Key (3/4)

GFCA Packet 2013-2014

They Say: Latin American Resources Not Key (4/4)

GFCA Packet 2013-2014

They Say: No Chinese Economic Collapse (1/1)

GFCA Packet 2013-2014

They Say: No CCP Collapse (1/2)

GFCA Packet 2013-2014

They Say: No CCP Collapse (2/2)

GFCA Packet 2013-2014

They Say: Hegemony Turn (1/3)

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They Say: Hegemony Turn (2/3)

GFCA Packet 2013-2014

They Say: Hegemony Turn (3/3)

GFCA Packet 2013-2014

Impact Extension Chinese Softpower (1/2)