T1 B28 Jul 9 2003 Hearing Prep FDR - Entire Contents - Final and Draft Agendas - Emails - FSC Questions - Notes 682

Mail:: INBOX: Re: purpose paras for panel Page 1 of 3
20.10MB / 476.84MB (4.22%)

Date: Fri, 13 Jun 2003 14:23:31 -0400
From: "" <mcoffey@9-11 commission.gov><ff
To: "" <ckojm@9-11 commission.gov>4f
Cc: "" <ytobin@9-11commission.gov>^,"" <tdowling@9-11commission.gov>4P,"" <skaplan@9-
11commission.gov>#,"" <team1 @9-11commission.gov>4F
Subject: Re: purpose paras for panel
Chris -
The congressional invite letters were signed by Tom Kean and Lee Hamilton. I'm
not sure about the aviation invites.
Melissa
Quoting "" <ckojm@9-llcommission.gov>:
> All: Looks good to me, with one addition. As a last sentence for each
> panel
> paragraph, please add the following: "What are your specific recommendations
>
> for U.S. policy?"
>
> Stephanie, Melissa: Are you putting in Philip's name on the signature line?
>
> Is that what we did last time?
>
>
> Quoting "" <ytobin@9-llcommission.gov>:
>
> > Tom:
> >
> > The rest of team 1 made a couple minor edits to your paragraphs. I hope
> > these
> > are ok with you! Paragraph 4 is exactly the same as yours, but I have
> > reproduced it below anyway, for completeness. I believe Stephanie will be
> > sending you some additional information.
> >
> > Here are the revised paragraphs:
> >
> > Panel One: Militant Islam has spawned a series of terrorist groups, most
> > notably Al Qaida, with unprecedented global reach and lethality. What is
> the
> >
> > mix of factors fertilizing this phenomenon and causing it to spread
> > globally?
> >
> > Panel Two: Al Qaida and its allies represent a new, far more complex
> > terrorist
> > organization than the relatively narrowly focused, often single issue
> groups
> > of
> > the past. How did Al Qaida arise? Why did it evolve as it has?
> >
> > Panel Three: What leads a government to support terrorism? How does it
> > perceive the costs and advantages of such support? Does that perception
> > change
> > over time? Why? Has Al Qaida's possession of substantial resources
> > independent of any state changed a potential sponsor's calculus? How
> > significant is the ideology of such groups, especially Al Qaida's
> > revolutionary
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Mail:: Sent Items: Re: Commission web site Page 1 of 2
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Date: Tue, 24 Jun 2003 21:03:26 -0400
From: "" <ytobin@9-11commission.gov>^
To: Gilles Kepel <monde.musulman@sciences-po.fr>4?
Cc: "" <mcoffey@9-11commission.gov>4J,"" <skaplan@9-11commission.gov>4|,"" <tdowling@9-
11commission.gov>4f,"" <dmaceachin@9-11commission.gov>4P
Subject: Re: Commission web site
Dear Professor Kepel,
Thank you for your e-mail. I am responding by e-mail rather than by phone
because it is currently 3 AM Paris time.
First, the entire hearing, including your panel, will occur on the 9th. (Your
panel will be from 9 to 11 AM on the 9th. There will be two other panels later
in the day.)
Second, we will pay for business class. (Thank you for graciously pointing out
that you do not need reimbursement for a hotel room.)
Third, the other members of your panel are 1)former Assistant Secretary of
State Richard Murphy, who is with the Council on Foreign Relations; 2)
Professor John Esposito, who is Director of the Center for Christian-Muslim
Understanding at Georgetown University; and 3) independent scholar Steven
Emerson.
We will call you tomorrow (Wednesday) afternoon or evening Paris time to

finalize and confirm. Thank you!
Yoel Tobin
Staff Member
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States
Quoting Gilles Kepel <monde.musulman@sciences-po.fr>: '•
> Dear Mr Tobin
> I'm now back in my Paris office. Could you be so kind as to give me a ring
> as soon as you read this e-mail, as I have to tighten my schedule if we
> want to make it? It would actually be more convenient for me were it to
> take place on the 9th rather than the eight.
> Many thanks for letting me know asap
> All best
> GK
> At 10:29 19/06/03 -0400, vous avez ecrit:
> >Dear Professor Kepel:
> >It was a pleasure talking to you today. If you would like to learn more
> >about
> >the Commission, our web site is http://www.9-llcommission.gov . As we
> >discussed, I will call you shortly to follow up on our discussion today.
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"ail:: Sent Items: Re: Commission web site Page 2 of 2
> >Yoel Tobin

> >Staff Member
> >National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States
SPEAKERS FOR 3 KU SET OF PUBLIC HEARINGS '
Panel One- ;? Why Now?
Bernard Lewis, emeritus professor at Princeton
Gilles Keppel, French scholar f"
Crenshaw. Wesleyan University in Connecticut
Karen Armstrong, independent scholar
Panel Two- Emergence of Specifiq flvoiros--
Rohan Gunaratna. University of St Andrews- Al Qaida
Steven Emerson, independent scholar.
>0.,Mamoun Fandy- Professor, NDU, - S^sdi Islamist opposition
r?' Marc Sageman- Al Qaida

1 V^v-- — --x
Panel Three - States and Terrorist Groups
Laurie Myh-oie- Iraq

H
Phoebe Marr- Iraq
Telhami. Professor at Maryland. How Arab States see costs/benefits of

^/".^Sponsorship
?-)) Richard Murphy, Council on Foreign Relations. US Policies and the Rise of Islamist
Fundamentalism
'X C«^/ic' s-w^*^£ti^ £*f^
-^ " v
Fuad Ajami - Johns Hopkins
V
Mail:: Sent Items: Commission web site Page 1 of 1
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Date: Thu, 19 Jun 2003 10:29:55 -0400
From: '" <ytobin@§iVlcommission.gov>^
*" <gilles.kepel@sciences-po.fr>y,"" <monde.musulman@sciences-po.fr>^
Cc: "" <tdowling@9-11commission.gov>4F' • •
Subject: Commission web site
Dear Professor Kepel:
It was a pleasure talking to you today. If you would like to learn more about
the Commission, our web site is http://www.9-llcommission.gov . As we
discussed, I will call you shortly to follow up on our discussion today.
Yoel Tobin
Staff Member
x>t
9/11 Personal Privacy
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Mail:: INBOX: Calling witnesses Page 1 of 1
19.91 MB/476.84MB (4.18%)

Date: Fri, 13 Jun 2003 08:52:57 -0400
From: "" <ckojm@9-11commission.gov>4J
To: "" <team1 @9-11commission.gov>4P,"" <skaplan@9-11commission.gov>4f,"" <mcoffey@9-
11 commission.gov> 4f
Cc: ''''<pzelikow@9-11commission.gov> 41,"" <dmarcus@9-11commission.gov>^
Subject: Calling witnesses
Team 1 witness contacts:
We have guidance from Lee but haven't yet closed the loop with Tom.
Nonetheless, we should proceed as follows:
1) We will
2) Invite all 16 witnesses"?"
3) Indicate to first panel witnesses that we are likely to hold the panel on
morning of July 9th, but there is a possibility that we would have their panel
on Tues. afternoon July 8th.
4) Guidance for the other panels follows: Panel 2, Wed. morning, time TBD;
Panel 3 late-morning, early afternoon, TBD; panel 4 afetrnoon, time tbd.
The philosophy above is (a) all 16 are solid witnesses; (b) If all 16 accept,
we really can't handle them all in one day; (c) If we have up to 12 or 13
witnesses, we can handle them in one day.
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Mail:: INBOX: Re: purpose paras for panel Page 1 of 2
20.10MB / 476.84MB (4.22%)

Date: Fri, 13 Jun 2003 13:41:17 -0400
JUL<ckojm@9-11commission.gov>4P
To: "" <ytobin@9-11commission.gov>4P

Cc: "" <tdowling@9-11commission.gov>4P,"" <skaplan@9-11commission.gov>4J,"" <team1 @9-
11commission.gov>^'
Subject: Re: purpose paras for panel
All: Looks good to me, with one addition. As a last sentence for each panel
paragraph, please add the following: "What are your specific recommendations
for U.S. policy?'
Stephanie, Melissa: Are you putting in Philip's name on the signature line? \s that what
> Tom:
>
> The rest of team 1 made a couple minor edits to your paragraphs. I hope
> these
> are ok with you! Paragraph 4 is exactly the same as yours, but I have
> reproduced it below anyway, for completeness. I believe Stephanie will be
> sending you some additional information.
>
> Here are the revised paragraphs:
,-»—
> Panel One: Militant Islam has spawned a series of terrorist groups, most
> notably Al Qaida, with unprecedented global reach and lethality. What is the
> <6
> mix of factors fertilizing this phenomenon and causing it to spread
> globally?
">
> Panel Two: Al Qaida and its allies represent a new, far more complex
> terrorist ;
> organization than the relatively narrowly focused, often single issue groups
> of
> the past. How did Al Qaida arise? Why did it evolve as it has?
>
> Panel Three: What leads a government to support terrorism? How does it
> perceive the costs and advantages of such support? Does that perception
> change
> over time? Why? Has Al Qaida's possession of substantial resources
> independent of any state changed a potential sponsor's calculus? How
> significant is the ideology of such groups, especially Al Qaida's
> revolutionary
> ambitions, to potential sponsors?
>
> Panel Four -- What is the likely future of Al Qaida and its allies? Growing
>
> power? Or are they already declining? What factors will contribute to that
> evolution? What exactly is the importance of US regional policies and
> actions
> to the future of such groups?
>
>
>
>
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"71:: INBOX: Re: purpose paras tor panel Page 2 of 2
> Quoting "" <tdowling@9-llcommission.gov> :
> > Panel One - Since the 1960 's, the Middle East has spawned a series of
> > terrorist groups, most notably Al Qaida, with unprecedented global reach
> and
> >
> > lethality. Why has the Middle East proved so fertile a ground for such
> > groups? What mix of factors produce this phenomenon? Are those underlying
>
> > causes essentially unique to the Middle East or do they represent more
> global
> >
> > problems?
> >
> > Panel Two - Al Qaida and its allies represent a new, far more complex
> > terrorist
> > organization than the relatively narrowly focused, often single issue
> Middle
> >
> > Eastern groups of the past. How did Al Qaida arise? Why did it evolve as
> it
> >
> > has? What are the stresses within Al Qaida? Are there factors which
> could
> > ,.
> > limit its future evolution? Can it adapt to those factors? Will it?
> >
> > Panel Three - What leads a government to support terrorism? How does it
> > perceive the costs and advantages of such support? Does that perception
> > change over time? Why? Does Al Qaida 's possession of substantial
> resources
> >
> > independent of any state change a potential sponsor's calculus? How
> > significant is the ideology of such groups, especially Al Qaida' s
> > revolutionary
> > ambitions, to potential sponsors?
> >
> > Panel Four - What is the likely future of Al Qaida and its allies? Growing
>
> > power? Or are they already declining? What factors will contribute to
> that
> >
> > evolution? What exactly is the importance of US regional policies and
> > actions
> > to the future of such groups?
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Mail:: INBOX: Dr. Kepel Page 1 of 1
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INBOX Compose Folders Options Search Problem? Help Addressbook Tasks Memos Calendar Logout Open Folder L
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INBOX: Dr. Kepel (2 Of 381) Cs Move I copy |This message to"||
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Date: Thu, 19 Jun 2003 08:54:19 -0400
From: "Kirsch, David E" <KirschDE@state.gov>4f
To: "'ytobln@9-1 1commission.gov"1 <ytobin@9-1 1commission.gov>^f
Subject: Dr. Kepel
Embassy Riyadh tracked him down. He can be reached at the Saudi cell phone
number 9/11 Personal Privacy *'
He is departing the KSA tomorrow evening (around 4 pm Saudi' time)
Dave
Delete I Reply I Reply to All I Forward I Redirect I Blacklist I Message Source I Resume I Save as I Print Back to INBOX
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Mail:: INBOX: purpose paras for July 9 panels Page 1 of 1
19.91 MB / 476.84MB (4.18%)

Date: Fri, 13 Jun 2003 09:20:23 -0400
From: "" <tdowling@9-11commission.gov>fl'
To: "" <dmaceachin@9-11commission.gov>^
Cc: "" <ytobin@9-11commission.gov>4J
Subject: purpose paras for July 9 panels
HI,
attached are the four draft paras giving purpose for each panel. Pis. let me
know whpp approve;^ and I will start making calls for mv speakers. Sorry I am
'stuck at home but calling should not be a problem"." Thanks, Tom
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Mail:: Sent Items: Fwd: panel discussion before US Government commission Page 1 of 1
20.75MB / 476.84MB (4.35%)

Date: Mon, 16 Jun 2003 12:59:30 -0400
From: "" <ytobin@9-11commission.gov>4P
To: "" <gilles.kepel@sciences-po.fr>4P
Subject: Fwd: panel discussion before US Government commission
Forwarded message from "" <ytobin@9-llcommission.gov>

Date: Mon, 16 Jun 2003 12:50:14 -0400
From: "" <ytobin@9-llcommission.gov>
Reply-To: "" <ytobin@9-llcommission.gov>
Subject: panel discussion before US Government commission
To: "" <monde.musulman@sciences-po.fr>
The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States will be
holding a public hearing on terrorism and the world of militant Islam in
Washington D.C. next month. The Commission will be hearing from several panels
of experts, and we would be very interested in your appearing on one of these
panels. The precise date will likely be the morning of July 9, 2003, although
there is some possibility that the date for your panel will be the afternoon of
July 8, 2003.
If you might be interested in participating, please call us as soon as possible

at 202-331-4060, and ask for Tom Dowling or Yoel Tobin. (Similarly, if you are
unable to attend, please inform us as soon as possible by e-mail or phone.) We
would be happy to provide you with more information about the Commission, the
hearing, travel expenses, etc. Also, if you do wish to appear, we will send
you a formal letter of invitation later this week.
Thank you for considering this request, and we look forward to hearing from you.
Yoel Tobin
Staff Member
End forwarded message
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"al:: Sent Items: panel discussk>n~6efore US Government commission Page 1 of 1
20.71 MB / 476.84MB (4.34%)

Date: Mon, 16 Jun 2003 12:50:14 -0400
From: "" <ytobin@9-11commission.gov>4^
To: "" <monde. musuiman @ sciences-po.fr> 9
Cc: "" <tdowling@9-11commission.gov>4P,"" <skaplan@9-11commission.gov>4|
Subject: panel discussion before US Government commission
The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States will be
holding a public hearing on terrorism and the world of militant Islam in
Washington D.C. next month. The Commission will be hearing from several panels
of experts, and we would be very interested in your appearing on one of these
panels. The precise date will likely be the morning of July 9, 2003, although
there is some possibility that the date for your panel will be the afternoon of
July 8, 2003.
If you might be interested in participating, please call us as soon as possible

at 202-331-4060, and ask for Tom Dowling or Yoel Tobin. (Similarly, if you are
unable to attend, please inform us as soon as possible by e-mail or phone.) We
would be happy to provide you with more information about the Commission, the
hearing, travel expenses, etc. Also, if you do wish to appear, we will send
you a formal letter of invitation later this week.
Thank you for considering this request, and we look forward to hearing from you.
Yoel Tobin
Staff Member
I*.
C '7
Public Hearing • July 9,2003 - Location TBD
Draft Agenda for "Terrorism, Al Qaeda, and the Muslim World"
9:00 AM Hearing Commences
Opening Statement by Chairman Kean
PANEL ONE: The Roots of Turmoil

Richard Murphy, Hasib J. Sabbagh Senior Fellow for the Middle East at the Council on
Foreign Relations
Gilles Kepel, Professor, Institute of Political Studies, Paris and author of Jihad: The Trail
of Political Islam
Steven Emerson, Executive Director of the Investigative Project and author of American
Jihad: The Terrorists Living Among Us
John Esposito, Professor of Religion and International Affairs and of Islamic Studies, and
Founding Director, Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding, Georgetown University
11:00 AM PANEL TWO: Al Qaeda

Rohan Gunaratna, Head of Terrorism Research and Associate Professor, Institute for Defence
and Strategic Studies, Singapore and author of Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror
Mamoun Fandy, Senior Fellow, United States Institute of Peace and author of Saudi Arabia
and the Politics of Dissent
Marc Sageman, member, American Psychological Association presidential panel on terrorism
1:00 PM Break
2:00 PM PANEL THREE: States and Terrorism

Laurie Mylroie, author of Study of Revenge: Saddam Hussein's Unfinished War Against
America
Judith Yaphe, Senior Research Fellow and Middle East Project Director, Institute for National
Strategic Studies, National Defense University
Murhaf Jouejati, Scholar-in-Residence at the Middle East Institute and a lecturer at
Georgetown University
Mark Gasiorowski, Professor of Political Science, Louisiana State University
4:00 PM Hearing Concludes. Press availability to follow.
All times and panels are subject to change. Visit www.9-llcommission.gov for the most current information.
Mail:: INBOX: Fwd: July Hearing Date, Conference Call, EMail Address and more Page 1 of 2
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INBOX: Fwd: July Hearing Date, Conference Call, Move i copy {This message to
EMail Add... (17 of 403)
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Date: Thu, 19 Jun 2003 15:29:01 -0400
From: "" <ewalker@9-11commission.gov>^ ,f-:
To: "" <team1 @9-11commlssion.gov>4J,"" <cko]m@9-11commission.gov>4f, " <a(elzenberg@9-
11commission.gov>4P,"" <skaplan@ 9-11 commission.gov>9,"" <ehartz@ 9-11 commission.gov>4t
Co: ""<pzelikow@9-11commission.gov>^
Subject: Fwd: July Hearing Date, Conference Call, EMail Address and more
Forwarded message from "" <familyliaison@9-llcommission.gov> --

Date: Thu, 19 Jun 2003 15:25:11 -0400
From: "" <familyliaison@9-llcommission.gov>
Reply-To: "" <familyliaison@9-llconunission.gov>
Subject: July Hearing Date, Conference Call, EMail Address and more
TO; ""I
Dear Friends:
Please be advised that the 9-11 Commission will hold a hearing on Wednesday
July 9th in Washington, D.C. The topic will be "Terrorism, Al Qaeda, and the
Muslim World". We plan several panels and have invited leading experts to
testify about the genesis of Al Qaeda and its future. This.'^hould provide a
strong foundation for the Commission's investigation and its/final
recommendations and provide an opportunity to heighten public understanding of
Al Qaeda.
We would like to hold a telephone conference call prior to the hearing on

Thursday, June 26 at 10:00 am EST with your groups, the family liaisons, and
members of the team investigating Al Qaeda.
Please call:
1-888-857-2295
Passcode: 1848646202
The purpose of this call is to further explain the intent of the hearing and
also to hear your questions and concerns. Please introduce yourself at the
beginning of the call and when you speak so the Commission team can identify
you.
We would ask that you post the hearing date and topic on your web-site and, "if
you have not done so already, create a link to www.9-llcommission.gov.
A press release will be forwarded to you next week with a more specific agenda
and location for the July 9 hearing.
Future public hearings are tentatively scheduled for the following dates:
Mail:: INBOX: Fwd: July Hearing Date, Conference Call, EMail Address and more Page 2 of 2
19 a
September 9-10, October 14-15, November 19-20, January 29-30, Feb. TBD, March
TBD
Most of the hearings will be in Washington, although not all. We will advise
you as soon as we can on the location and topics.
If you have any questions, please call our temporary number at the NY Office at
26 Federal Plaza which opened last week: 347-804-7019. The permanent phones
will be operating soon and the main number is 212-264-1505. The new email
address for the family liaison is familyliaison@9-llcommission.gov. We would
appreciate you including this address on all correspondence as it makes
tracking and response more organized for us.
We look forward to your participation on the June 26th call.
Emily Walker and Ellie Hartz
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Mail:: INBOX: Fwd: teleconference summary; letter and questions sent to Commission Page 1 of 5
\*
' r, ''
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INBOX: Fwd: teleconference summary; letter Move i copyPîs message to"@[
and questions ... (3 of 450) s>
Date: Won, 30 Jun 2003 08:31:57 -0400
From: "" <ckojm@9-11commisslon.gov>4l
To: "" <familyliaison@9-11commission.gov>^F,"" <team1 @9-11commission.gov>^,"" <skaplan@9-
11 commission.gov> $
Cc: "" <pzelikow@9-11 commission.gov>4f
Subject: Fwd: teleconference summary; letter and questions sent to Commission
Part{s): ^2 unnamed text/html 108.99 KB ^
To All -- Forwarding to you what the FSC sent to us.

Forwarded message from ashley I 9/n Personal Pnvacy_
Date: Sat, 28 Jun 2003 2 0 : 1 8 : 5 9 -0 00
From: ashley | 9/n Personal Privacy
Reply-To: ashley
Subject: teleconference summary; letter and questions sent to Commission
To: Philip Zelikow <pzelikow@9-llcommission.gov>
June 28, 2003
Dear Philip,
Below, please find three items:
* a summary of points raised during the conference call on June 26, with
Additional clarifying comments
* a copy of the letter the FSC sent to the Commissioners and staff members who
participated i n t h e teleconference ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
* _a_list of questions about Al Qaeda and state-sponsored terrorism for the
Commissioners and Team 1. ~~ .
Carol Ashley
Notes from Conference Call with Team 1

June 267 2003J ~ ,(,-.!
' f. ;.'
Participants: Commission staff members: Ellie Hartz , Stephanie Kaplan, Emily
Walker, ' " " : —-
jream 1: Topy.powling, Nipple Grandrimo, Yoel Tobin
FJ3C: Carol Ashley, Kristen Breitweiser, Patty Casazza, Beverly Eckert, Monica
Gabrielle, Mindy Kleinberg, Carie Lemack, Robin Wiener, Lorie Van Auken
Families of September llth: Stephen Push
Family Steering Committee Perspective
1) Although there is value in a brief overview of the Al Qaeda ând terrorisjr>
_from an historical perspective, the Commission's public hearings should be more
substantive and investigative in nature.
2) To heighten public support and respect for its investigation, the Commission

should publicly explore our government's links to Al

"oaeda: " ~~
* include public testimony of field agents with first hand knowledge of Al
Qaeda, who can speak to our government'sinvolvement^policies~and~TaiTures
* suggested witnesses
"* anonymous author of "Through Our Enemy's Eyes"
* Jean Charles B r i s s a r d ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
^_O' Neil colleagueC§T
* Ray McGovern, CIA analyst for 27 years
3) The Commission should publicly ask specific questions about the Al Qaeda
^group
asTf relates to September llth
4) The families and the public are seeking accountability and assurances that
the factors contributing to the terrorist attacks have been corrected so that
we are safer now.
June 28, 2003
Dear Commissioners:
Months ago, we were told that each topic in the Commission's mandate will have
one public hearing and Al Qaeda is scheduled for July 9th. After learning
details
of the agenda for that hearing, we have concerns that, in its current format,
salient questions will not be asked publicly.
To combat the lack of favorable press thus far, the Commission can use the
upcoming public hearing to polish its image. Rather than expending its limited'
time and resources on a strictly informational forum about Al Qaeda and state-
sponsored terrorism, the Commission should schedule public testimony from field
agents and others with first hand knowledge of Al Qaeda, who can speak to our
government's involvement and policies. Asking crucial questions of those
witnesses about interrelationships between the oil industry, our government,
Saudi Arabia, the CIA and Al Qaeda will attest to the 9/11 Commission's resolve
to fulfill its mandate for a rigorous investigation.
We are frustrated that the administration and various government agencies are
stalling and are giving only token cooperation while their possible malfeasance
and culpability remain undisclosed and, seemingly, unchallenged. Bureaucrats
are still protecting their turf and no one seems to be challenging that
behavior. Isn't this the same environment that led to September llth? Have any
lessons been learned?
We consider the work of the Commission to be an investigation into the murder

of 3,000 people. The Commission must ferret out all contributing factors,
regardless of whether they involve mistakes, incompetence or something more
sinister. Then, and only then, will the full accountability we seek be
achieved. Only then will the Commission be able to make cogent recommendations
for protecting our nation from future terrorist attacks.
•]
Sincerely, ••' r
The Family Steering Committee for the 9/11 Independent Commission
FSC Questions about Al Qaeda and State Sponsored Terrorism
1) What connections did our government have with the terrorists prior to 9/11? )
* State department negotiations with Taliban re: pipeline through Afghanistan
* interaction with the Taliban and/or bin Laden
* CIA training and arming of terrorists
2) What is the state of the Afghan pipeline now?

J
* When was the deal to construct it finalized?
* Who was involved?
* How is the pipeline being protected?
* Who profits from the connections as the pipeline passes through each country?
* Who has rights to the pipeline?
3) Why isn't Saudi Arabia on the list of countries sponsoring terrorism?
4) Why are the FBI and CIA seeking to exclude evidence about Saudi involvement
with terrorists (See Exclusive: CIA and FBI press Congress to exclude
intelligence on the Saudi role with 9/11 terrorists by Linda Robinson and
Edward T. Pound: http://www.usnews.com/usnews/usinfo/press/saudi.htm )
5) In what ways might our government's policies toward Saudi Arabia have
contributed to September llth?
6) Why was Saudi Arabia given preferential treatment above all other
nations in immigration? (Visa Express)
* What was the reason for creating the Visa Express?
* Prior to Sept. 11, Visa Express permitted approximately 97 percent of Saudi
applicants to obtain visas without face-to-face interviews
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,73485,00.html
7) Why were bin Laden's Saudi relatives whisked out of America so quickly when
other planes were grounded after the attacks?
* Who gave permission for them to leave?
8) On September 9th the president had a war plan on his desk to go into
Afghanistan.
* What was the origin of this plan?
* Why was this plan drawn up even before the September llth1 aittacks?
9) Intelligence was told in March of 2001 to back off investigating terrorists.('? J

* Who gave the order?
* Why?
10) Why did Donald Rumsfeld, immediately after the September llth attack, say J
that Saddam Hussein was involved?
11) Does the FBI have proof that it was in fact Al Qaeda that perpetrated 9/11? /
* Do they know if the names the hijackers used were their real names? —'
12) Did Atif Ahmad have a connection to Atta as well as to Moussaoui? J

* Is Atif Ahmed a British double agent? '—
13) What is the truth about the arrest of El Atriss who sold fake IDs to two
9/11 terrorists? There are discrepancies between the NY Times and Washington

Post accounts of his arrest and release.

Atriss is an Egyptian national who committed a crime. Why hasn't he been
deported?
14) Who were the terrorist informants working with the FBI?
a.) What did the FBI learn from them? :..,...
b.) What were the 9/11 warnings provided by these informants?
c.) What was done with these warnings to protect the American public?
"
G
s-
5) How did, and do, US energy policies play into Islamic terrorism?
the Caspian Sea pipeline?
Dick Cheney's energy task force?
16) How do corporate and big business interests play into foreign policy
decisions?
* Enron pre 9/11; Halliburton, Bechtel pre and post 9/11?
* What are the names of the companies which are getting contracts in foreign
countries and how do they influence our foreign policy?
— ,
17) What role did American think tanks, which make policy recommendations to the
administration, play in American foreign policy decisions and the proliferation
of Al Qaeda?
18) Regarding sharing of intelligence pre and post 9/11:

* Did U.S. intelligence agencies share information about Al Qaeda with foreign
governments?
* Did foreign governments share information with our government about Al Qaeda?
* If so, what information was shared about threats within the U.S. and from
which countries did it come?
* Who received this information and what did they do with it?,-
* What changes have been made in sharing intelligence? ;
f 1 9 ) Why did President Bush specifically request a briefing on Al Qaeda in

( August 2001?
20) What is the connection between the Bush family and bin Laden?
1) Regarding the Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF), which is a collaboration

letween the FBI and NYPD, also at times NYS Police, NY/NJ Port Authority PD and
.he US Secret Service:
was the JTTF aware of 20 warnings of an impending terrorist which were
mentioned in Joint Intelligence Inquiry testimony?
* What did the JTTF know prior to 9/11 regarding potential terrorist attacks in
NYC and specifically, the WTC?
* Was the JTTF informed of any warnings regarding the impending attacks from
agencies of foreign governments?
* What was the nature of the warnings?
L: * What, if any, security precautions were taken as a result of the warnings?

* What information did the JTTF pass up the chain of command?
22) On the issue of state sponsored terrorism:

* Why did Mahmood Ahmed, Director of Pakistan's secret service, the (ISI) order
Saeed Sheikh to wire $100,000 to hijacker Mohamed Atta?
* What was Mahmood Ahmed's relationship with Al Qaeda? ''
* Where did the money come from?
* Did officials in Pakistan know in advance about the terrorist attack?
* On September llth, Mahmood Ahmed had a breakfast meeting in Washington, D.C.,
with House and Senate Intelligence Committee chairmen. Rep. Porter Goss and
Senator Bob Graham. What were they discussing?
http ://kinesis. swishmail.com/webmail/imp/message .php ?index=45 5 6/30/03

23) To combat terrorism

* What sanctions can the U.S. place on individuals of non-terrorist states
who aided and abetted terrorists through funding or other means?
* If there is no recourse, will the CIA continue to monitor their activities
in the future?
* Will the State Department and other allied countries seek to ban their entry
into the U.S. and their nations?
* How long does an individual remain a terrorist threat according to our
policies?
* Will those individuals be banned from doing business with the U.S.?
* Since September llth, has our government developed specific policies
\regarding individual sponsors of terrorism?
/ 24) Were individuals with ties to terrorists or states which sponsor terrorism
involved in shorting airline and other stocks which were impacted by the
I terrorist attacks on September llth?
Move I Copy [This message to
http://kinesis.swishmail.com/webmail/inip/message.php?index=455 6/30/03
Mail ::tSent Items: Re: teleconference summary; letter and questions sent to Commission Page 1 of 5
30.16MB / 476.84MB (6.32%)

Date: Mon, 30 Jun 2003 14:21:35 -0400
From: "" <ytobin@9-11commission.gov>4J
To: ashley|9/ll Personal Privacy]^
Cc: "" <familyliasion@9-11commissk>n.gov>4y
Bcc: "" <lodowling@9-11>^,"" <com mission.gov@>^,"" <ngrandrimo@9-11commission.gov>#
Subject: Re: teleconference summary; letter and questions sent to Commission
Thank you for your note and your thoughts.
Quoting ashley [ 9/11 Personal Privacy | -.
> June 28, 2003 . .;{/

> Dear Team 1 Member,
> Below, please find three items:

> * a summary of points raised during the conference call on June 26, with
> additional clarifying comments
> * a copy of a letter the FSC sent to the Commissioners
> * a list of questions about Al Qaeda and state-sponsored terrorism
> On a personal note, I'd like to thank you for the work you are doing. With
> the deadline looming, you must be working hard to prepare for the public
> hearing. Although the conference call focused on that hearing, I want to
> stress that we were not upset with you or your team's work. Rather, we were
> upset about the thrust of the hearings, which should be more investigative in
> nature, preferably with sworn testimony. Please forgive the raw emotions.
> For us, there are still so many unanswered questions.
> Carol Ashley

> mother of Janice, 25
> 93rd floor, Tower One
> Notes from Conference Call with Team 1 ('.•-•

> June 26, 2003 ''•*"
> Participants: Commission staff members: Ellie Hartz , Stephanie Kaplan, Emily
> Walker,
> Team 1: Tom Dowling, Nicole Grandrimo, Yoel Tobin
> FSC: Carol Ashley, Kristen Breitweiser, Patty Casazza, Beverly Eckert,
> Monica Gabrielle, Mindy Kleinberg, Carie Lemack, Robin Wiener, Lorie Van
> Auken
> Families of September llth: Stephen Push
> Family Steering Committee Perspective
> 1) Although there is value in a brief overview of the Al Qaeda and terrorism
> from an historical perspective, the Commission's public hearings should be
> more substantive and investigative in nature.
> 2) To heighten public support and respect for its investigation, the
> Commission should publicly explore our government's links to Al Qaeda:
> * include public testimony of field agents with first hand knowledge of Al
> Qaeda, who can speak to our government's involvement, policies and failures
> * suggested witnesses
> * anonymous author of "Through Our Enemy's Eyes"
Mail:: SenUtems: Re: teleconference summary; letter and questions sent to Commission Page 2 of 5
> * Jean Charles Brissard

> * 0' Neil colleague (s)
> * Ray McGovern, CIA analyst for 27 years
>
> 3) The Commission should publicly ask specific questions about the Al Qaeda
> group
> as it relates to September llth
>
> 4) The families and the public are seeking accountability and assurances that
> the factors contributing to the terrorist attacks have been corrected so that
> we are safer now.
> June 28, 2003

>
> Dear Commissioners:
>
> Months ago, we were told that each topic in the Commission's mandate will
> have
> one public hearing and Al Qaeda is scheduled for July 9th. After learning
> details
> of the agenda for that hearing, we have concerns that, in its current format,
> salient questions will not be asked publicly.
>
> To combat the lack of favorable press thus far, the Commission can use the
> upcoming public hearing to polish its image. Rather than expending its
> limited time and resources on a strictly informational forum about Al Qaeda
> and state-sponsored terrorism, the Commission should schedule public
> testimony from field agents and others with first hand knowledge of Al Qaeda,
> who can speak to our government's involvement and policies. Asking crucial
> questions of those witnesses about interrelationships between the oil
> industry, our government, Saudi Arabia, the CIA and Al Qaeda will attest to
> the 9/11 Commission's resolve to fulfill its mandate for a rigorous
> investigation.
>
> We are frustrated that the administration and various government agencies are
> stalling and are giving only token cooperation while their possible
> malfeasance and culpability remain undisclosed and, seemingly, unchallenged.
> Bureaucrats are still protecting their turf and no one seems to be
> challenging that behavior. Isn't this the same environment that led to
> September llth? Have any lessons been learned?
>
> We consider the work of the Commission to be an investigation into the murder
> of 3,000 people. The Commission must ferret out all contributing factors,
> regardless of whether they involve mistakes, incompetence or something more
> sinister. Then, and only then, will the full accountability' we seek be
> achieved. Only then will the Commission be able to make cogent
> recommendations for protecting our nation from future terrorist attacks.
>
>
> Sincerely,
>
> The Family Steering Committee for the 9/11 Independent Commission
> FSC Questions about Al Qaeda and State Sponsored Terrorism
Mail:: Sent Items: Re: teleconference summary; letter and questions sent to Commission Page 3 of 5
> 1) What connections did our government have with the terrorists prior to
> 9/11?
> * State department negotiations with Taliban re: pipeline through
> Afghanistan
> * interaction with the Taliban and/or bin Laden
> * CIA training and arming of terrorists
>
> 2) What is the state of the Afghan pipeline now?
> * When was the deal to construct it finalized? '•
> * Who was involved?
> * How is the pipeline being protected?
> * Who profits from the connections as the pipeline passes through each
> country?
> * Who has rights to the pipeline?
>
> 3) Why isn't Saudi Arabia on the list of countries sponsoring terrorism?
>
> 4) Why are the FBI and CIA seeking to exclude evidence about Saudi
> involvement with terrorists (See Exclusive: CIA and FBI press Congress to
> exclude intelligence on the Saudi role with 9/11 terrorists by Linda Robinson
> and Edward T. Pound: http://www.usnews.com/usnews/usinfo/press/saudi.htm )
>
> 5) In what ways might our government's policies toward Saudi Arabia have
> contributed to September llth?
>
> 6) Why was Saudi Arabia given preferential treatment above all other
> nations in immigration? (Visa Express)
> * What was the reason for creating the Visa Express?
> * Prior to Sept. 11, Visa Express permitted approximately 97 percent of Saudi
> applicants to obtain visas without face-to-face interviews
> http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,73485,00.html
>
> 7) Why were bin Laden's Saudi relatives whisked out of America so quickly
> when
> other planes were grounded after the attacks?
> * Who gave permission for them to leave?
>
> 8) On September 9th the president had a war plan on his desk to go into
> Afghanistan.
> * What was the origin of this plan?
> * Why was this plan drawn up even before the September llth attacks?
>
> 9) Intelligence was told in March of 2001 to back off investigating
> terrorists.
> * Who gave the order?
> * Why?
>
> 10) Why did Donald Rumsfeld, immediately after the September llth attack,
> say that Saddam Hussein was involved?
>
> 11) Does the FBI have proof that it was in fact Al Qaeda that perpetrated
> 9/11?
> * Do they know if the names the hijackers used were their real names?
>
> 12) Did Atif Ahmad have a connection to Atta as well as to Moussaoui?
> * Is Atif Ahmed a British double agent?
> 13) What is the truth about the arrest of El Atriss who sold fake IDs to two
> 9/11 terrorists? There are discrepancies between the NY Times and Washington
> Post accounts of his arrest and release.
> * Atriss is an Egyptian national who committed a crime. Why hasn't he been
> deported?
>
> 14) Who were the terrorist informants working with the FBI?
> a.) What did the FBI learn from them?
> b.) What were the 9/11 warnings provided by these informants?
> c.) What was done with these warnings to protect the American public?
>
> 15) How did, and do, US energy policies play into Islamic terrorism?
> * the Caspian Sea pipeline?
> * Dick Cheney's energy task force?
>
> 16) How do corporate and big business interests play into foreign policy
> decisions?
> * Enron pre 9/11; Halliburton, Bechtel pre and post 9/11?
> * What are the names of the companies which are getting contracts in foreign
> countries and how do they influence our foreign policy?
>
> 17) What role did American think tanks, which make policy recommendations to
> the
> administration, play in American foreign policy decisions and the
> proliferation of Al Qaeda?
>
> 18) Regarding sharing of intelligence pre and post 9/11:
> * Did U.S. intelligence agencies share information about Al Qaeda with
> foreign governments?
> * Did foreign governments share information with our government about Al
> Qaeda?
> * If so, what information was shared about threats within the U.S. and from
> which countries did it come?
> * Who received this information and what did they do with it?
> * What changes have been made in sharing intelligence?
>
> 19) Why did President Bush specifically request a briefing on Al Qaeda in
> August 2001?
>
> 20) What is the connection between the Bush family and bin Laden?
>
> 21) Regarding the Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF), which is a
> collaboration between the FBI and NYPD, also at times NYS Police, NY/NJ Port
> Authority PD and the US Secret Service:
> * was the JTTF aware of 20 warnings of an impending terrorist which were
> mentioned in Joint Intelligence Inquiry testimony? '
> * What did the JTTF know prior to 9/11 regarding potential terrorist attacks
> in NYC and specifically, the WTC?
> * Was the JTTF informed of any warnings regarding the impending attacks from
> agencies of foreign governments?
> * What was the nature of the warnings?
> * What, if any, security precautions were taken as a result of the warnings?
> * What information did the JTTF pass up the chain of command?
>
> 22) On the issue of state sponsored terrorism:
> * Why did Mahmood Ahmed, Director of Pakistan's secret service, the (ISI)
> order Saeed Sheikh to wire $100,000 to hijacker Mohamed Atta?
> * What was Mahmood Ahmed's relationship with Al Qaeda?
> * Where did the money come from?
> * Did officials in Pakistan know in advance about the terrorist attack?
> * On September llth, Mahmood Ahmed had a breakfast meeting in Washington,
> D.C., with House and Senate Intelligence Committee chairmen, Rep. Porter Goss
> and Senator Bob Graham. What were they discussing?
>
> 23) To combat terrorism
> * What sanctions can the U.S. place on individuals of non-terrorist states
> who aided and abetted terrorists through funding or other means?
> * If there is no recourse, will the CIA continue to monitor their activities
> in the future?
> * Will the State Department and other allied countries seek to ban their
> entry into the U.S. and their nations?
> * How long does an individual remain a terrorist threat according to our
> policies?
> * Will those individuals be banned from doing business with the U.S.?
> * Since September llth, has our government developed specific policies
> regarding individual sponsors of terrorism?
>
> 24) Were individuals with ties to terrorists or states which sponsor
> terrorism involved in shorting airline and other stocks which were impacted
> by the terrorist attacks on September llth?
Mail:: INBOX: teleconference summary; letter and questions sent to Commission Page 1 of 8
E» *& m
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INBOX: teleconference summary; letter and Move i copy [This message to m
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Date: Sat, 28 Jun 2003 22:37:20 -0400
From: ashley|9/ll Personal Privacy|jy
To: Tom Dowling <tdowiing<89-11commission.gov>^, Nlkki Grandrimo <ngrandrimo@9-11commission.gov>4P, Yoel
Tobin <ytobin @ 9-11 commission.gov> 9
Cc: "T9/11 Personal Privacyl4E
Subject: teleconference summary; letter and questions sent to Commission
® 2 unnamed text/html 83.97 KB f
st1\;*{behavior:url(#default#ieooui)}
June 28, 2003
Dear Team 1 Member,
Below, please find three items:
» a summary of points raised during the conference call on June 26, with additional clarifying comments
• a copy of a letter the FSC sent to the Commissioners
• a list of questions about Al Qaeda and state-sponsored terrorism
\n a personal note, I'd like to thank you for the work you are doing. With the deadline looming, you
\t be working hard to prepare for the public hearing. Although the conference call focused on that
hearing, I want to stress that-we were not upset with you or your team's work. Rather, we were upset
about the thrust of the hearings, which should be more investigative in nature, preferably with sworn
/ testimony. Please forgive the raw emotions. For us, there are still so many( unanswered questions.
I / v v-
Carol Ashley
mother of Janice, 25
93rd floor, Tower One
http://kinesis.swishmail.com/webmail/imp/message.php7indexs453 6/30/03
Notes from Conference Call with Team 1
June 26, 2003
Participants: Commission staff members: Ellie Hartz , Stephanie Kaplan, Emily Walker,
Team 1: Tom Dowling, Nicole Grandrimo, Yoel Tobin
FSC: Carol Ashley, Kristen Breitweiser, Patty Casazza, Beverly Eckert, Monica Gabrielle, Mindy Kleinberg, Carie Lemack,
Robin Wiener, Lorie Van Auken
Families of September 11th: Stephen Push
Family Steering Committee Perspective
1) Although there is value in a brief overview of the Al Qaeda and terrorism from an historical perspective, the
Commission's public hearings should be more substantive and investigative in nature.
2) To heighten public support and respect for its investigation, the Commission should publicly explore our
government's links to Al Qaeda:
• include public testimony of field agents with first hand knowledge of Al Qaeda, who can speak to our
government's involvement, policies and failures
• suggested witnesses
• anonymous author of "Through Our Enemy's Eyes"
• Jean Charles Brissard
• O' Neil colleague(s)
• Ray McGovern, CIA analyst for 27 years
3) The Commission should publicly ask specific questions about the Al Qaeda group
as it relates to September 11th

;'<H
4) The families and the public are seeking accountability and assurances that the factors contributing to the terrorist

attacks have been corrected so that we are safer now.
June 28, 2003
Dear Commissioners:
Months ago, we were told that each topic in the Commission's mandate will have
one public hearing and Al Qaeda is scheduled for July 9th. After learning details
of the agenda for that hearing, we have concerns that, in its current format, salient questions will not be
asked publicly.
To combat the lack of favorable press thus far, the Commission can use the upcoming public hearing
to polish its image. Rather than expending its limited time and resources on a strictly informational
forum about Al Qaeda and state-sponsored terrorism, the Commission should schedule public
testimony from field agents and others with first hand knowledge of Al Qaeda, who can speak to our
government's involvement and policies. Asking crucial questions of those witnesses about
interrelationships between the oil industry, our government, Saudi Arabia, the CIA and Al Qaeda will
attest to the 9/11 Commission's resolve to fulfill its mandate for a rigorous investigation.
We are frustrated that the administration and various government agencies are stalling and are giving
only token cooperation while their possible malfeasance and culpability remain undisclosed and,
seemingly, unchallenged. Bureaucrats are still protecting their turf and no one seems to be challenging
that behavior. Isn't this the same environment that led to September 11 ? Have any lessons been
learned?
We consider the work of the Commission to be an investigation into the murder of 3,000 people. The
Commission must ferret out all contributing factors, regardless of whether they involve mistakes,
incompetence or something more sinister. Then, and only then, will the full accountability we seek be
achieved. Only then will the Commission be able to make cogent recommendations for protecting our
nation from future terrorist attacks.
Sincerely,

The Family Steering Committee for the 9/11 Independent Commission
FSC Questions about Al Oaeda and State Sponsored Terrorism
1) What connections did our government have with the terrorists prior to 9/11 ?
• State department negotiations with Taliban re: pipeline through Afghanistan
• interaction with the Taliban and/or bin Laden
• CIA training and arming of terrorists
2) What is the state of the Afghan pipeline now?

• When was the deal to construct it finalized? .^
• Who was involved?
• How is the pipeline being protected?
• Who profits from the connections as the pipeline passes through each country?
• Who has rights to the pipeline?
3) Why isn't Saudi Arabia on the list of countries sponsoring terrorism?
4) Why are the FBI and CIA seeking to exclude evidence about Saudi involvement with terrorists (See
Exclusive: CIA and FBI press Congress to exclude intelligence on the Saudi role with 9/11 terrorists
by Linda Robinson and Edward T. Pound: http://www.usnews.com/usnews/usinfo/press/saudi.htm )
5) In what ways might our government's policies toward Saudi Arabia have
contributed to September 11 th?
6) Why was Saudi Arabia given preferential treatment above all other
nations in immigration? (Visa Express)

What was the reason for creating the Visa Express?
• Prior to Sept. 11, Visa Express permitted approximately 97 percent of Saudi applicants to
obtain visas without face-to-face interviews
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,73485,00.html
7) Why were bin Laden's Saudi relatives whisked out of America so quickly when
other planes were grounded after the attacks?
• Who gave permission for them to leave?
8) On September 9th the president had a war plan on his desk to go into
Afghanistan.
• What was the origin of this plan?
• Why was this plan drawn up even before the September 11 th attacks?
9) Intelligence was told in March of 2001 to back off investigating terrorists.

• Who gave the order?
. Why?
10) Why did Donald Rumsfeld, immediately after the September 11th attack, say that Saddam Hussein
was involved?
11) Does the FBI have proof that it was in fact Al Qaeda that perpetrated 9/11 ?
• Do they know if the names the hijackers used were their real names?
12) Did Atif Ahmad have a connection to Atta as well as to Moussaoui?

• Is Atif Ahmed a British double agent?
13) What is the truth about the arrest of El Atriss who sold fake IDs to two 9/11 terrorists? There are
discrepancies between the NY Times and Washington Post accounts of his arrest and release.
• Atriss is an Egyptian national who committed a crime. Why hasn't he been deported?
14) Who were the terrorist informants working with the FBI?
a.) What did the FBI learn from them?
b.) What were the 9/11 warnings provided by these informants?
c.) What was done with these warnings to protect the American public?
15) How did, and do, US energy policies play into Islamic terrorism?
• the Caspian Sea pipeline?
• Dick Cheney's energy task force?
16) How do corporate and big business interests play into foreign policy
decisions?
• Enron pre 9/11; Halliburton, Bechtel pre and post 9/11 ?
• What are the names of the companies which are getting contracts in foreign countries and how do they
influence our foreign policy?
17) What role did American think tanks, which make policy recommendations to the
administration, play in American foreign policy decisions and the proliferation of Al Qaeda?
18) Regarding sharing of intelligence pre and post 9/11:
• Did U.S. intelligence agencies share information about Al Qaeda with foreign governments?
• Did foreign governments share information with our government about Al Qaeda?
• If so, what information was shared about threats within the U.S. and from which countries did it
come?
• Who received this information and what did they do with it?
• What changes have been made in sharing intelligence?
19) Why did President Bush specifically request a briefing on Al Qaeda in August 2001?

20) What is the connection between the Bush family and bin Laden?
21) Regarding the Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF), which is a collaboration between the FBI and
NYPD, also at times NYS Police, NY/NJ Port Authority PD and the US Secret Service:
• was the JTTF aware of 20 warnings of an impending terrorist which were mentioned in Joint Intelligence
Inquiry testimony?
• What did the JTTF know prior to 9/11 regarding potential terrorist attacks in NYC and specifically, the WTC?
• Was the JTTF informed of any warnings regarding the impending attacks from agencies of foreign
governments?
• What was the nature of the warnings?
• What, if any, security precautions were taken as a result of the warnings?
• What information did the JTTF pass up the chain of command?
22) On the issue of state sponsored terrorism:

• Why did Mahmood Ahmed, Director of Pakistan's secret service, the (ISI) order Saeed Sheikh to wire
$100,000 to hijacker Mohamed Atta?
• What was Mahmood Ahmed's relationship with Al Qaeda?
• Where did the money come from?
• Did officials in Pakistan know in advance about the terrorist attack?
• On September 11th, Mahmood Ahmed had a breakfast meeting in Washington, D.C., with House and Senate
Intelligence Committee chairmen, Rep. Porter Goss and Senator Bob Graham. What were they discussing?
23) To combat terrorism

• What sanctions can the U.S. place on individuals of non-terrorist states who aided and abetted terrorists
through funding or other means?
• If there is no recourse, will the CIA continue to monitor their activities in the future?
• Will the State Department and other allied countries seek to ban their entry into the U.S. and their nations?
• How long does an individual remain a terrorist threat according to our policies?
• Will those individuals be banned from doing business with the U.S.?
• Since September 11th, has our government developed specific policies regarding individual sponsors of
terrorism?

24) Were individuals with ties to terrorists or states which sponsor terrorism involved in shorting
airline and other stocks which were impacted by the terrorist attacks on September 11th?
Move I Copy |Jh^message to

Mail:: INBOX: Re: Change of witnesses Page 1 of 1
32.21 MB / 476.84MB (6.75%)

Date:
Thu, 3 Jul 2003 14:31:45-0400
From:"" <skaplan@9-11commission.gov><P
To:"" <ckojm@9-11 commission.gov>4P
Cc:"" <afelzenberg@9-11commission.gov>4f,"" <team1 @9-11commission.gov>4F,"" <frotnoffice@9-
11 commission.gov> 4P,"" <mcoffey@9-11commission.gov>^
Subject: Re: Change of witnesses
That's good news. I'll change the agenda and send along a new version this
afternoon. I'll ask Garth to post the new version before the holiday weekend
commences. I would recommend that we send it out a revised agenda late Monday
or early Tuesday morning, along with both media advisories, reminding everyone
of both the press briefing and hearing. Al, I defer to you on exact timing.
Quoting "" <ckojm@9-llcommission.gov>:
> Stephanie, Al -- Murphy is off panel 3, and will be replaced by Dennis Ross
> (Washington Institute) and Rachel Bronson (Council on Foreign Relations).
> Melissa is collecting the particulars on their bios, and both have been asked
>
> to submit statements by OOB Monday.
>
> Stephanie -- I leave it to you to change the draft agenda
> Al -- I leave it to you to advise as to whether & when we send out a revised
>
> witness list.
http://kinesis.swishmail.com/webmail/imp/message.php?actionID=148&mailbox=INBOX&bo... 7/3/03
Mail:: INBOX: Change of witnesses Page 1 of 1
32.21 MB / 476.84MB (6.75%)

Date: Thu, 3 Jul 2003 14:27:18-0400
From: "" <ckojm@9-11commission.gov>#
To: "" <skaplan@9-11commission.gov>4P,"" <afelzenberg@9-11commission.gov>4P
Cc: "" <team1 @9-11commission.gov>U,"" <frotnoffice@9-11commission.gov>4|,"" <mcoffey@9-
11 commission.gov> 4f
Subject: Change of witnesses
Stephanie, Al -- Murphy is off panel 3, and will be replaced by Dennis Ross
(Washington Institute) and Rachel Bronson (Council on Foreign Relations).
Melissa is collecting the particulars on their bios, and both have been asked
to submit statements by OOB Monday.
Stephanie -- I leave it to you to change the draft agenda

Al -- I leave it to you to advise as to whether & when we send out a revised
witness list.
http://kinesis.swishmail.com/webmail/imp/message.php?actionID=148&mailbox=INBOX&bo... 7/3/03
Media Advisory Al Felzenberg 202 331-4062 Page 1 of 4
nri 0x08 graphic
9-11 Commission to Release Progress Report on July 8
July 2, 2003 -- Thomas H. Kean and Lee H. Hamilton, Chair and Vice Chair of the 9-11 Commission,
will release a progress report to the American people at a July 8 press briefing at 2:30 PM at the
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, DC.
Kean and Hamilton will report on the progress of the 9-11 Commission during the past six months and
indicate how the Commission intends to proceed in the coming months. The briefing will be held in
Joseph H. and Claire Flom Auditorium on the sixth floor of the Woodrow Wilson Center, located in the
Ronald Reagan Building at 1300 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW.
The July 8 public briefing will precede the Commission's July 9 public hearing on "Terrorism, Al
Qaeda, and the Muslim World." This one-day hearing will convene at 9:00 AM in Room 253 of the
Russell Senate Office Building in Washington, DC. Chairman Kean and Vice Chair Hamilton will be
available to press at the conclusion of the public hearing.
Members of the media are required to register in advance for both events. To register for the July 8 press
briefing, contact Al Felzenberg, Deputy for Communications, at afelzenberg@9-llcommission.gov. To
register for the hearing, members of the media should visit the Commission's Web site at www.9-
llcommission.gov.
An agenda for the July 9 hearing as well as directions to the Wilson Center follow this advisory.
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United

»l;i ''
States
Third Public Hearing July 9,2003 Russell SOB, Room 253
"Terrorism, Al Qaeda, and the Muslim World"
9 AM Hearing Commences
PANEL ONE: Al Qaeda
Rohan Gunaratna, Head of Terrorism Research and Associate Professor, Institute for Defence and
Studies, Singapore and author of Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror
Politics of Dissent
Marc Sageman, Lecturer, Solomon Asch Center for the Study of Ethnopolitical Conflict, Ur
of Pennsylvania
1)0 AM PANEL TWO: States and Terrorism ft^
Laurie Mylroie, author of Study of Revenge: Saddam Hussein's Unfinished War Against America
Judith Yaphe, Senior Research Fellow and Middle East Project Director, Institute for Natio
http://kinesis.swishmail.com/webmail/imp/view.php ?thismailbox=INBOX&index=486&id=2... 7/3/03

MEDIA ADVISORY
9-11 Commission to Hold Third Public Hearing on Al Qaeda
July 1, 2003 - The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States
will hold its third public hearing on July 9, 2003 beginning at 9:00 a.m. in the Russell
Senate Office Building (Room 253) in Washington, DC.
The one-day session will focus on "Terrorism, al Qaeda, and the Muslim World." The
Commission will hear testimony from experts on the character of the transnational
terrorist threat, the relationships of Arab states to these groups, and the phenomenon of
violent extremism within the Muslim community. An agenda and list of panelists
accompanies this advisory.
In announcing the hearing, the Commission's Chair, former New Jersey Governor
Thomas H. Kean, said: "A key Commission responsibility is to understand the enemy.
Good policy recommendations will depend on a clear understanding of al Qaeda's
emergence and strategy."
The Vice Chair, former Indiana Representative Lee H. Hamilton, added: "There is
considerable knowledge of al Qaeda and terrorist groups outside the government. This
session will enable us to achieve a better understanding how the Arafrworld has viewed
this danger, before and after September 11."
The hearing will be open to the public and members of the media. Seating will be
provided on a first-come, first-served basis. Members of the media must register in
advance by visiting the Commission's Web site (www.9-1 lcornmission.gov').
Additional information, including prepared testimony of witnesses, will be posted on the

Commission's Web site as it becomes available. Archived video and complete transcripts
of hearing proceedings will be posted on the Commission's Web site one week after the
hearing's conclusion.
Chairman Kean and Vice Chair Hamilton will be available to the press at the conclusion
of the hearing.
AL FELZENBERG, DEPUTY FOR COMMUNICATIONS

Office: 202-401-1725 . Cell: 202-236-4878 • Fax: 202-296-5545
afelzenberg@9-llcommission.gov
Third Public Hearing • July 9,2003 • Russell SOB, Room 253
"Terrorism, Al Qaeda, and the Muslim World"

•
PANEL ONE: Al Qaeda

11:00 AM PANEL TWO: States and Terrorism

America
Judith Yaphe, Senior Research Fellow and Middle East Project Director, Institute for
National Strategic Studies, National Defense University
Murhaf Jouejati, Adjunct Scholar, Middle East Institute and Lecturer, George Washington
University
1:00 PM Break
2:00 PM PANEL THREE: The Challenge within the Muslim World

Foreign Relations
Gilles Kepel, Professor, Institute of Political Studies, Paris and author of Jihad: The Trail of
Political Islam
All times and panels are subject to change. Visit www.9-llcommission.gov for most current information.
Mail:: INBOX: July 9th Hearing Agenda Page 1 of 1
INBOX Compose Folders Options Search Problem? Help Addressbook Tasks Memos Calendar Logout Open Folder l~
30.04MB / 476.84MB (6.30%)
INBOX: July 9th Hearing Agenda (8 of 450) a Move i copy |TWs_message tojrj
Date: Fri, 27 Jun 2003 19:01:44 -0400
From: "" <ckojm@9-11commission.gov>^
To: "" <commissioners@9-11commission.gov>4P
Cc: '"'<frontoffice@9-11 commission.gov> 4P,"" <team1@9-11cornmission.gov>4F,"" <skaplan@9-
11 commission.gov> 9
Subject: July 9th Hearing Agenda /• *
Part(s): Q 2 hearing agenda.doc application/octet-stream 275.12 KB H
Dear Commissioners:
Attached please find a draft agenda for the July 9th hearing.
For lead questioners, we propose the following:
Commissioners Roemer, Gorton and Gorelick for the al-Qaeda panel;
Commissioners Lehman, Ben-Veniste, and Thompson for State Sponsors panel;
Commissioners Hamilton, Fielding, Cleland for the Muslim World panel.
(The Chair is not specifically designated)
We will send briefing books to you Monday night, arriving Tuesday. Members of • I
Team 1 will be in touch with you on Tuesday July 1st to set up times to meet /
with you/answer questions /provide additional materials prior to July 9th /
hearing. __ /
Delete I Reply I Reply to All I Forward I Redirect I Blacklist I Message Source I Resume I Save as I Print Back to INBOX ^
M.qve I Copy [This message to
http://kinesis.swishmail.com/webmaiyimp/message.php ?index=450 6/30/03

INTERNAL DRAFT
^ÛNTI^ NOT FOR DISTRIBUTION

Public Hearing • July 9,2003 • Location (tentative) 253 Russell SOB

Opening Statement by Chairman Kean "
PANEL ONE: Al Qaeda

•/ Rohan Gunaratna, Head of Terrorism Research and Associate Professor, Institute for Defence
Sageman, member, American Psychological Association presidential panel on terrorism
11:00 PM PANEL TWO: States and Terrorism

America
1:00 PM Break

Foreign Relations
of Political Islam
All times and panels are subject to change. Visit www.9-llcommission.goy for the most current information.
• i , {f A •
Public Hearing • July 9,2003 • Location TBD
PANEL ONE: The Roots of Turmoil

Foreign Relations
of Political Islam
11:00 AM PANEL TWO: Al Qaeda

1:00 PM Break
2:00 PM PANEL THREE: States and Terrorism

America
Co
I/
ov—-6r ^^-f
Mail:: INBOX: Fwd: July 9th Hearing Agenda Page 1 of 1
30.04MB / 476.84MB (6.30%)

Date: Sun, 29 Jun 2003 22:40:59 -0400
From: "" <ckojm@9-11commission.gov>^P
To: "" <staff@9-11 commission.gov>4P
Subject: Fwd: July 9th Hearing Agenda
Part(s): || 2 hearing agenda.doc application/octet-stream 275.12 KB fH
Staff -- Attached please find a copy of the draft hearing agenda, as sent to
Commissioners Fruday night (and intended to be attached in a message to you as
well) . Please note that it is a draft, and not yet for public distribution.
Forwarded message from "" <ckojm@9-llcommission.gov>

Date: Fri, 27 Jun 2003 19:01:44 -0400
From: "" <ckojm@9-llcommission.gov>
Reply-To: "" <ckojm@9-llcommission.gov>
Subject: July 9th Hearing Agenda
To: "" <commissioners@9-llcommission.gov>
Dear Commissioners:
Attached please find a draft agenda for the July 9th hearing.
For lead questioners, we propose the following:
Commissioners Roemer, Gorton and Gorelick for the al-Qaeda panel;
Commissioners Lehman, Ben-Veniste, and Thompson for State Sponsors panel;
Commissioners Hamilton, Fielding, Cleland for the Muslim World panel.
(The Chair is not specifically designated)
We will send briefing books to you Monday night, arriving Tuesday. Members of
Team 1 will be in touch with you on Tuesday July 1st to set up times to meet
with you/answer questions/provide additional materials prior to July 9th
hearing.
http://kinesis.swishmail.com/webmail/imp/message.php?actionID=148&niailbox=INBOX&b... 6/30/03
'/
INTERNAL DRAFT ' y**wirfiS>'s NOT FOR DISTRIBUTION

Public Hearing • July 9, 2003 • Location (tentative) 253 Russell SOB

PANEL ONE: Al Qaeda

11:00 PM PANEL TWO: States and Terrorism

America
1:00 PM Break

Foreign Relations
of Political Islam
Suggested Questions for
Primary Questions for Panel 1
Questions for Panelists
Your book sets forth Al Qaida's global reach and worldwide threat. Where
Do you think Al Qaida stands today? Are we winning or losing the battle? Does it still pose an
extraordinary threat to the US and its allies?
September 11 was, from a Bin Laden/Al Qaida, perspective an enormous success. Do you have
a sense of how that may have affected recruitment? Is there an upward trend? What, if anything,
is the impact of the relative lack of success since then?
Although Bin Laden's personality shaped Al Qaida, did social and political forces make the
emergence of something like Al Qaida inevitable? Or was Bin Laden the indispensable catalyst
for bringing these forces together?
Al Qaida draws its members from a variety of very different cultures. Has this mix produced
identifiable tensions within the organization? If not, how has it managed to avoid such problems?
2) Your work emphasizes Al Qaida's links with other terrorist groups. What are
the major Al Qaida affiliates active today? How much of a threat
do they pose to the US? Are we paying sufficient attention?
What motivates someone to join a group like Al Qaida? What motivates someone
to fly an airplane into an office building in order to kill thousands of
innocent people as well as himself?
Given the range of national origins and organizations within Al Qaida, are there signs of factions
or rivalries among its leaders? Over what do they differ? Personalities? Policies?
Al Qaida draws significant support comes from South East Asia. These are very different
societies from that of Saudi Arabia. Why has Al Qaida found such a willing base in those
countries?
Is there a regional dimension to Al Qaida recruitment? Are there areas where _ arguments have
the most appeal? Do these areas change over time? He appears to have relatively success in the
L_. Is that in fact true and, if so, why?
Radical groups often form tactical alliances with criminal organizations. Is there any sign Al
Qaida is seeking to do this? If so, where and why? Is there any sign that criminal or secular
radical groups are themselves seeking an alliance with Al Qaida?
Despite the widespread perception that Al Qaida is essentially Bin Laden's creation, would his
removal actually shatter Al Qaida? Or has it now become sufficiently organized to survive his
passing? What would a post-Bin Laden Al Qaida look like?
Although Al Qaida often appears to be Bin Laden's creation, Egyptian radical movements appear
to have been critical to its emergence. Is that an accurate assessment?
Primary Questions for Panel II
What should the US be doing that it is not already doing to discourage state
support for terrorism, and to encourage active participation by other states in
the war against Al Qaida and other international terrorist groups?
3) In the past, you have stated that Iran "remains the main sponsor of both
Shia and Sunni terrorism - including Al Qaida and several of its associate
groups."
You also describe a "tactical relationship" between Al Qaida and

Hezbollah. Could you please elaborate on the relationship between Al Qaida,
and Iran and/or Hezbollah? And are these alleged relationships purely
historical, or do they continue?
Al Qaida's extremist Sunni views are openly hostile towards the Shia, whose protection Iran
regards as a fundamental national interest. How significant are these fundamental religious
differences in determining Iranian policy towards Al Qaida? Are there any circumstances that
would lead Iran to cooperate with Al Qaida? Would increasing US pressure on Iran produce such
a reassessment?
There have been periodic reports of Al Qaida personnel in Iran. How would you assess these
reports? Do these reports indicate to you that Iranian policy is shifting? A split within Iran's
leadership? Are there other plausible explanations?
Would anything bring Damascus to seek cooperation with Al Qaida?
Non-Iraqis appear to be an important element in the mounting resistance our forces face there.
What is your sense of Al Qaida's involvement, if any, in the inflow of foreign fighters. Beyond
the opportunity to hit Americans, are there broader goals that would motivate Al Qaida
involvement in Iraq.
Primary Questions for Panel III
For all of panel 3: What can the US do to promote moderate, tolerant, and pro-
Western forces in the Islamic world?
What should the US be doing that we are not already doing to hasten the demise
of Al Qaida and its affiliated organizations?
For Kepel You have stated that the jihadists are losing
the battle for popular support in the Islamic world. What is the basis for
this conclusion? What can the US do to accentuate this process?
Question either for Fandy, or Panel 2, or Panel 3: Does Wahabi Islam, as

practiced in and promoted by Saudi Arabia, promote hatred of Americans? Does it
provide an ideological or cultural underpinning or context for Al Qaida or
similar groups?
Although Bin Laden's has now added the Palestinian cause to his list of grievances, he rarely
mentioned it in his pre-9/11 days. How do you explain this change? Do we see any signs that he
is moving beyond rhetoric on this issue?
How would you describe current public attitudes in the Arab world and, more generally, the
Muslim world towards Bin Laden? Does public opinion distinguish between Bin Laden and Al
Qaida? In what ways? Do you see a trend? Is support growing? Falling? Where? Why?
Although Bin Laden couches his arguments in religious language, he has no real credentials for
issuing such judgments. Have Muslim scholars challenged either his statements or his implicit
claims to religious authority? How would you categorize those challenges- forceful, reluctant?
Have they weakened his appeal? Could they be more effectively used to counter him? What, if
anything, is the impact of critiques of his religious pretensions by non-Muslim scholars?
Many commentators believe that Saudi support to foreign religious activities contributed, at least
indirectly, to Al Qaida's rise a product of S policies in support of M education. How would you
assess that claim?
Some argue Bin Laden is simply advocating an extreme form of views widely held in Saudi
society. In your view, how closely do Bin Laden ideas resemble those of his society? Where,
other than in the use of violence, does he differ from that broader consensus?
In now appears that the bulk of US forces will be withdrawn from Saudi Arabia. This would
appear to meet one of Bin Laden's fundamental goals. How will this withdrawal affect his
support? How will he alter his rhetoric to accommodate this change?
Most revolutionary movements offer their picture of the glorious future to follow their victory.
Bin Laden appears not to do this, focusing instead on the struggle itself. Is that a fair assessment?
Why has he chosen this approach?
PANEL 1:
For Gunaratna:
Your book sets forth Al Qaida's global reach and worldwide threat. Where
Do you think Al Qaida stands today? Are we winning or losing the battle? Does it still pose an
extraordinary threat to the US and its allies?
2) Your work emphasizes Al Qaida's links with other terrorist groups. What are
the major Al Qaida affiliates active today? How much of a threat
do they pose to the US? Are we paying sufficient attention?
3) In the past, you have stated that Iran "remains the main sponsor of both
Shia and Sunni terrorism - including Al Qaida and several of its associate
groups."
You also describe a "tactical relationship" between Al Qaida and

Hezbollah. Could you please elaborate on the relationship between Al Qaida,
and Iran and/or Hezbollah? And are these alleged relationships purely
historical, or do they continue?
For Sageman:
[note: I know nothing about his work, am just assuming this would be an
appropriate question because he's a psychologist]:
What motivates someone to join a group like Al Qaida? What motivates someone
to fly an airplane into an office building in order to kill thousands of
innocent people as well as himself?
For all of Panel one:
What should the US be doing that we are not already doing to hasten the demise
of Al Qaida and its affiliated organizations?
[throw in question on CBRN?]
For all of panel two:
What should the US be doing that it is not already doing to discourage state
support for terrorism, and to encourage active participation by other states in
the war against Al Qaida and other international terrorist groups?
[Note: re: Mylroie, I think there were relevant press clips on June 27 on Iraq-
AQ connection.]
For Kepel [note: I have not read him, this is from my recollection of what
others have said about his work]: You have stated that the jihadists are losing
the battle for popular support in the Islamic world. What is the basis for
this conclusion? What can the US do to accentuate this process?
For all of panel 3: What can the US do to promote moderate, tolerant, and pro-
Western forces in the Islamic world?
Question either for Fandy, or Panel 2, or Panel 3: Does Wahabi Islam, as

practiced in and promoted by Saudi Arabia, promote hatred of Americans? Does it
provide an ideological or cultural underpinning or context for Al Qaida or
similar groups?
——•
-^_^--~"
Al Qaida's extremist Sunni views are openly hostile towards the Shia, whose protection Iran
regards as a fundamental national interest. How significant are these fundamental religious
differences in determining Iranian policy towards Al Qaida? Are there any circumstances that
would lead Iran to cooperate with Al Qaida? Would increasing US pressure on Iran produce such
a reassessment?
There have been periodic reports of Al Qaida personnel in Iran. How would you assess these
reports? Do these reports indicate to you that Iranian policy is shifting? A split within Iran's
leadership? Are there other plausible explanations?
Would anything bring Damascus to seek cooperation with Al Qaida?
Although Bin Laden's has now added the Palestinian cause to his list of grievances, he rarely
mentioned it in his pre-9/11 days. How do you explain this change? Do we see any signs that he
is moving beyond rhetoric on this issue?
How would you describe current public attitudes in the Arab world and, more generally, the
Muslim world towards Bin Laden? Does public opinion distinguish between Bin Laden and Al
Qaida? In what ways? Do you see a trend? Is support growing? Falling? Where? Why?
September 11 was, from a Bin Laden/Al Qaida, perspective an enormous success. Do you have
a sense of how that may have affected recruitment? Is there an upward trend? What, if anything,
is the impact of the relative lack of success since then?
Is there a regional dimension to Al Qaida recruitment? Are there areas where _ arguments have
the most appeal? Do these areas change over time? He appears to have relatively success in the
<£_. Is that in fact true and, if so, why? l$e-
ijj/fcvv^,
Non-Iraqis appear to be an important element in the mounting resistance our forces face there.
What is your sense of Al Qaida's involvement, if any, in the inflow of foreign fighters. Beyond frw
the opportunity to hit Americans, are there broader goals that would motivate Al Qaida
involvement in Iraq.
Although Bin Laden couches his arguments in religious language, he has no real credentials for
issuing such judgments. Have Muslim scholars challenged either his statements or his implicit
claims to religious authority? How would you categorize those challenges- forceful, reluctant?
Have they weakened his appeal? Could they be more effectively used to counter him? What, if
anything, is the impact of critiques of his religious pretensions by non-Muslim scholars?
Despite the widespread perception that Al Qaida is essentially Bin Laden's creation, would his ]
removal actually shatter Al Qaida? Or has it now become sufficiently organized to survive his //
passing? What would a post-Bin Laden Al Qaida look like? /
Although Al Qaida often appears to be Bin Laden's creation, Egyptian radical movements appear
to have been critical to its emergence. Is that an accurate assessment?
Given the range of national origins and organizations within Al Qaida, are there signs of factions
or rivalries among its leaders? Over what do they differ? Personalities? Policies?
Many commentators believe that Saudi support to foreign religious activities contributed, at least
indirectly, to Al Qaida's rise a product of S policies in support of M education. How would you
assess that claim?
Al Qaida draws its members from a variety of very different cultures. Has this mix produced
identifiable tensions within the organization? If not, how has it managed to avoid such problems?
Some argue Bin Laden is simply advocating an extreme form of views widely held in Saudi
society. In your view, how closely do Bin Laden ideas resemble those of his society? Where,
other than in the use of violence, does he differ from that broader consensus?
^ —-
In now appears that the bulk of US forces will be withdrawn from Saudi Arabia. This would
appear to meet one of Bin Laden's fundamental goals. How will this withdrawal affect his
support? How will he alter his rhetoric to accommodate this change?
Al Qaida draws significant support comes from South East Asia. These are very different
societies from that of Saudi Arabia. Why has Al Qaida found such a willing base in those
countries?
Most revolutionary movements offer their picture of the glorious future to follow their victory.
Bin Laden appears not to do this, focusing instead on the struggle itself. Is that a fair assessment?
Why has he chosen this approach?
Although Bin Laden's personality shaped Al Qaida, did social and political forces make the
emergence of something like Al Qaida inevitable? Or was Bin Laden the indispensable catalyst
for bringing these forces together?
Radical groups often form tactical alliances with criminal organizations. Is there any sign Al
Qaida is seeking to do this? If so, where and why? Is there any sign that criminal or secular
radical groups are themselves seeking an alliance with Al Qaida?
Mail:: INBOX: Re: RE: clarification -'.'•" Page 1 of 5
29.28MB / 476.84MB (6.14%)

Date:
Fri, 27 Jun 2003 11:49:13-0500
From:ALAN KLEINBERG\'9/11 Personal
To:"" <pzelikow@9-1 1 commission. gov>9
Cc:" <tkean@9-11commission.gov><ff , "" <lhamilton@9-1 1commission.gov> 4P, "" <troemer@9-
11 commission. gov>^, " <jgorelick@9-11 commission. gov>4^, "" <rbenviniste@9-11commission.gov>4f, ""
<ffielding@9-11commission.gov><£, "" <jthompson@9-11commission.gov>^, "" <sgorton@9-
11commission.gov>4P', "" <mcleland@9-11commission.gov>4F, "" <jlehman@9-11 commission. gov>9 , ""
<ckojm@9-11commission.gov>4f, "" <skaplan@ 9- 11 commission. gov> 47, "" <ewalker@9-11 Commission. gov>
9, ""<ngrandrimo@9-11commission.gov>4f, "" <tdowling@9-11commission.gov>^, "" <ehartz@9-
11 commission. gov>^, "" <ytobin@9-11 commission. gov>4J
Subject: Re: RE: clarification
Phil-
I appreciate your timely response. However, it seems that once again our
interpretation of the events vary widely. ,
I do not believe that a family member asking a staffer about-fa- possible

conflict of interest rises to the level of questioning their- integrity.
I also do not feel that the families were assailing anyone personally
on that call. We made it quite clear that our disappointment was not
with the staffers themselves.
Additionally, it is extremely callous to characterize our concerns

as "bitter frustration." It is exactly because of our passionate
fervant belief that our nation could be made safer that a commission
even exists. We will continue to make sure that our issues are addressed
because they are too important to the well-being of our country to be
ignored .
I look forward to your participation in future conference calls. You

will then be able to judge for yourself the spirit in which our
concerns are expressed.
Mindy Kleinberg
----- Original Message -----

From: Philip Zelikow <pzelikow@9-llcommission.gov>
Date: Friday, June 27, 2003 9:46 am
Subject: RE: clarification .;.
.t; v-i
> Mindy - 'r'
> As the Commission is in the midst of perhaps the most wide-ranging

> outside investigation of the US government in American history, we
> wouldcertainly share your surprise if anyone thinks that we are
> not expected
> to conduct "an investigative probe."
> I have now talked with or heard from almost all of the s t a f f e r s who
> participated in yesterday's conference call about the upcoming hearing
> (Emily Walker, Ellie Hartz, Tom Dowling, Nicole Grandrimo, Yoel Tobin,
> and Stephanie Kaplan) . I ' m puzzled by and regret any misunderstanding
http://kinesis.swishmail.com/webmail/imp/message.php?actionID=148&mailbox=INBOX&b... 6/27/03
Mail:: INBOX: Re: RE: clarification Page 2 of 5
> on this vital point. I will look forward to addressing these concerns
> directly with family representatives in a teleconference next
> week. I'm
> sure any commissioner you encounter will be equally clear on this
> point.
> i
> I also understand that, in their anger, some of the participants and
> assailed the staffers participating in the conversation, '''•''
> questioning the
> integrity of someone like Nicky Grandrimo - a woman who disrupted her
> career track at State on practically a moment's notice in order to
> helpus in an entirely appropriate way.
>
>
> My colleagues and I want to hear your views and those of other family
> representatives. Some of us have also experienced losses in our
> lives.We try to understand how some of the pain and the anguish in
> the long
> aftermath of the 9/11 catastrophe has been spilling over into bitter
> frustration. And we will continue to listen, no matter how the
> concernsare expressed.
> Philip Zelikow
-Original Message-
> From: mkleinberg | 9/11 Personal Privacy |
> Sent: Friday, June 27, 2003 9:46 AM
> To: tkean@9-llcommission.gov; lhamilton@9-llcommission.gov;
> troemer@9-llcommission.gov; jgorelick@9-llcommission.gov;
> rbenviniste@9-llcommission.gov; ffielding@9-llcommission.gov;
> jthompson@9-llcommission.gov; sgorton@9-llcommission.gov;
> mcleland@9-llcommission.gov; jlehman@9-llcommission.gov
> Cc: pzelikow@9-llcommission.gov; ckojm@9-llcommission.gov;
> skaplan@9-llcommission.gov; ewalker@9-llCommission.gov
> Subject: clarification
> Dear Commissioners, ...',<A,
> It seems that there is some question as to this commission's mandate.

> We have interpreted the law (see sections below) as requiring an
> investigative probe. However, it has been conveyed to us that the
> commissioners are not in agreement with this statement. Can you please
> reiterate for us what your interpretation of these sections are? We
> would like to all be on the same page.
>
> The Family Steering Committee
> SEC. 602. <> PURPOSES.

>
> The purposes of the Commission are to--
> (1) examine and report upon the facts and causes
> relating to
>
> the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, occurring at
> the
> World Trade Center in New York, New York, in Somerset
> County,
> Pennsylvania, and at the Pentagon in Virginia;
> (2) ascertain, evaluate, and report on the evidence
> developed by all relevant governmental agencies regarding
> the
> facts and circumstances surrounding the attacks;
> (3) build upon the investigations of other entities,
> and
> avoid unnecessary duplication, by reviewing the findings,
> conclusions, and recommendations of--
> (A) the Joint Inquiry of the Select Committee
> on
> Intelligence of the Senate and the Permanent
> Select
> Committee on Intelligence of the House of
> Representatives regarding the terrorist attacks of
> September 11, 2001, (hereinafter in this title
> referred
> to as the "vJoint Inquiry' '); and
> (B) other executive branch, congressional, or
> independent commission investigations into the
> terrorist
> attacks of September 11, 2001, other terrorist
> attacks, " :t
> and terrorism generally;
> (4) make a full and complete accounting of the
> circumstances
> surrounding the attacks, and the extent of the United
> States'
> preparedness for, and immediate response to, the attacks; and
> (5) investigate and report to the President and
> Congress on
> its findings, conclusions, and recommendations for
> corrective
> measures that can be taken to prevent acts of terrorism.
>
> SEC. 604. <> FUNCTIONS OF COMMISSION.
http://kinesis.swishmail.com/webmaiyimp/message.php?actionID= 148&mailbox=INBOX&b... 6/27/03

> (a) In General.--The functions of the Commission are to--

> (1) conduct an investigation that--
> (A) investigates relevant facts and
> circumstances
> relating to the terrorist attacks of September 11,
> 2001,
> including any relevant legislation, Executive
> order,
> regulation, plan, policy, practice, or procedure; and
> (B) may include relevant facts and
> circumstances
> relating to--
> (i) intelligence agencies;
> (ii) law enforcement agencies;
> (iii) diplomacy;
> (iv) immigration, nonimmigrant visas,
> and
> border control;
> (v) the flow of assets to terrorist
> organizations;
> (vi) commercial aviation;
> (vii) the role of congressional
> oversight and
> resource allocation; and
> (viii) other areas of the public and
> private
> sectors determined relevant by the
> Commission for
> its inquiry;
>
> [[Page 116 STAT. 2410]] ' ~
>
> (2) identify, review, and evaluate the lessons' learned
> from
> the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, regarding the
> structure, coordination, management policies, and
> procedures of
> the Federal Government, and, if appropriate, State and
> local
> governments and nongovernmental entities, relative to
> detecting,
> preventing, and responding to such terrorist attacks; and
> (3) submit to the President and Congress such reports
> as are
>
> required by this title containing such findings,
> conclusions,
> and recommendations as the Commission shall determine,
> including
> proposing organization, coordination, planning, management
> arrangements, procedures, rules, and regulations.
>
> (b) Relationship to Intelligence Committees' Inquiry.--When
> investigating facts and circumstances relating to the intelligence
> community, the Commission shall--
> (1) first review the information compiled by, and the
> findings, conclusions, and recommendations of, the Joint
> Inquiry; and
> (2) after that review pursue any appropriate area of
Mail:: INBOX: Re: RE: clarification a Page 5 of 5
> inquiry
> if the Commission determines that--
> (A) the Joint Inquiry had not investigated
> that
> area;
> (B) the Joint Inquiry's investigation of that
> area
> had not been complete; or
> (C) new information not reviewed by the Joint
> Inquiry had become available with respect to that
> area.
http://kinesis.swishmail.corn/webrnail/irnp/message.php?actionID=148&mailbox=INBOX&b... 6/27/03
Panel Sat First Position Institution Email
Cleveland E. Dodge Professor
of Near Eastern Studies.
Dr. Bernard Lewis Emeritus Princeton University
G i lies Keppel
Colin and Nancy Campbell
Prolessor in Global Issues and
Dr, Martha Crenshaw Democratic Thought Wesleyan University
Karen Armstrong
Dr. Rohan Gunaratna University of St. Andrews

Steven Emerson
Mamoun Fandy National Defense University
Marc Sage man
Laurie Mylroie
Phoebe Man-
Stephen Fairbanks
Marwan Jouejati
Dr. Shibley Telhami Anwar Sadat Professor University of Maryland

Hasib J. Sabbagh Senior
Amb. Richard Murphy Fellow for the Middle East Council on Foreign Relations
Mafid Khadduri Professor;
Director of the Middle East
Dr. Fouad Ajami Studies Program Johns Hopkins University
Vice President for External
Dr. Bruce HoHman Affairs RAND
Address"! Address2 AddressS City State Zip Country
Near Eastern Studies Department 105 Jones Hall Princeton NJ 08544

FRANCE
Department of Government Wesleyan Station Middletown CT 06459
BSOS-Govemment & Politics 1137 Tydings Hall College Park MD 20742-7215
9/11 Personal Privacy New York NY 10021
School of Advanced International Studies Washington DC 20036
9/11 Personal Privacy Arlington VA 22202-5050

T1 B28 Jul 9 2003 Hearing Prep FDR - Entire Contents - Final and Draft Agendas - Emails - FSC Questions - Notes 682

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Mail:: INBOX: Re: purpose paras for panel Page 1 of 3

20.10MB / 476.84MB (4.22%)

28.04MB / 476.84MB (5.88%)

Dear Professor Kepel,

We will call you tomorrow (Wednesday) afternoon or evening Paris time to

Quoting Gilles Kepel <monde.musulman@sciences-po.fr>: '•

> Dear Mr Tobin

> Many thanks for letting me know asap

> All best

> At 10:29 19/06/03 -0400, vous avez ecrit:

> >Dear Professor Kepel:

> >Yoel Tobin

Panel One- ;? Why Now?

Bernard Lewis, emeritus professor at Princeton

Gilles Keppel, French scholar f"

Crenshaw. Wesleyan University in Connecticut

Karen Armstrong, independent scholar

Panel Two- Emergence of Specifiq flvoiros--

Rohan Gunaratna. University of St Andrews- Al Qaida

Steven Emerson, independent scholar.

>0.,Mamoun Fandy- Professor, NDU, - S^sdi Islamist opposition

r?' Marc Sageman- Al Qaida

Panel Three - States and Terrorist Groups

Laurie Myh-oie- Iraq

Phoebe Marr- Iraq

Telhami. Professor at Maryland. How Arab States see costs/benefits of

24.45MB / 476.84MB (5.13%)

Dear Professor Kepel:

9/11 Personal Privacy

19.91 MB/476.84MB (4.18%)

2) Invite all 16 witnesses"?"

http://kinesis.swishmail.com/webmail/imp/message.php?actionID= 148&mailbox=INBOX&b... 6/13/03

20.10MB / 476.84MB (4.22%)

To: "" <ytobin@9-11commission.gov>4P

> Quoting "" <tdowling@9-llcommission.gov> :

>**•?•. ' -7 t^y~ ^ 5

•o 5V.,, ,?Ts-rT2.s2^ ^i- ^.otv^rjr- ?--ij? ^**-

24.44MB / 476.84MB (5.13%)

He is departing the KSA tomorrow evening (around 4 pm Saudi' time)

19.91 MB / 476.84MB (4.18%)

http://kinesis.swishmail.com/webmail/imp/message.php?actionID= 148&mailbox=INBOX&b... 6/13/03

20.75MB / 476.84MB (4.35%)

Forwarded message from "" <ytobin@9-llcommission.gov>

Dear Professor Kepel,

If you might be interested in participating, please call us as soon as possible

End forwarded message

20.71 MB / 476.84MB (4.34%)

Dear Professor Kepel,

If you might be interested in participating, please call us as soon as possible

Draft Agenda for "Terrorism, Al Qaeda, and the Muslim World"

9:00 AM Hearing Commences

Opening Statement by Chairman Kean

PANEL ONE: The Roots of Turmoil

11:00 AM PANEL TWO: Al Qaeda

2:00 PM PANEL THREE: States and Terrorism

4:00 PM Hearing Concludes. Press availability to follow.

26.99MB / 476.84MB (5.66%)

Forwarded message from "" <familyliaison@9-llcommission.gov> --

9/11 Personal Privacy

We would like to hold a telephone conference call prior to the hearing on

We look forward to your participation on the June 26th call.

Emily Walker and Ellie Hartz