Design, Safety and Operability Performances of 220 MWe, 540 MWe & 700 MWe PHWRs in India

Inter-regional workshop on
Advanced Nuclear Reactor Technology for Near Term Deployment

July 4th 8th , 2011 IAEA Headquarters, Vienna, Austria
U.C.Muktibodh
NPCIL, India
Lecture Outline
Introduction to Indian PHWR designs Nuclear Steam Supply Systems Safety Systems and ESFs Turbine Generator Systems
Electrical, Control & Instrumentation Systems

Safety concepts Security (Physical protection aspects)
Performance of Indian PHWRs

In light of events at Fukushima Design certification & near term plans
Design, Safety and Operability performances of 220 MWe, 540 MWe and 700 MWe PHWRs in India - U.C.Muktibodh, NPCIL
Current Status
FIRST STAGE
Established Comprehensive Indigenous Capabilities for Designing, Equipment Manufacturing, Constructing, Commissioning, O&M of 220 MWe PHWRs
Indian Nuclear Power Programme: Current Status
SECOND STAGE
Fast Breeder Test Reactor (40 MWt ) operational
THIRD STAGE
Experimental reactor with U233 fuel in operation. Thorium Bundles in PHWRs. AHWR-300 MWe being developed in BARC. Technology Demonstration for electricity generation from Thourium. Bridge between the I & III Stages to be Launched in X plan
Developed 540 Mwe PHWRs & operating experience gained; Unit size scaled up to 700 MWe Developed Front End & Back End Technologies of Complete Fuel Cycle
Design for 500 MWe PFBR developed. Construction commenced in 2004
The Indian PHWR

18 PHWR units in operation - installed capacity of 4360
MWe 4 units of 700 MWe under construction. More PHWRs of 700 MWe capacity planned in other states of India. Design of PHWRs in India has evolved over the years to grow into a robust and a proven model
Power Reactors in India

S. No. Site/Station/Project Units Type Status Year of Rated commercial capacity operation (MWe)
1 Tarapur Maharashtra Site (TMS) TAPS-1&2 TAPS-3&4 2 Rawatbhata Rajasthan Site RAPS-1&2 (RRS) RAPS-3&4 RAPS-5&6 RAPP-7&8 3 Madras Atomic Power Station MAPS-1&2 4 Narora Atomic Power Station NAPS-1&2 5 Kakrapar Atomic Power Station KAPS-1&2 KAPP-3&4 6 Kaiga Atomic Power Station KGS-1&2 KGS-3 KGS-4 7 Kudankulam Atomic Power KKNPP-1&2 Project KKNPP-3&4
BWR Operating PHWR Operating PHWR Operating PHWR Operating PHWR Operating PHWR Under construction PHWR Operating PHWR Operating PHWR Operating PHWR Under construction PHWR Operating PHWR Operating PHWR Operating LWR Under construction LWR Under construction
1969 2005, 2006 1973, 1981 2000 2009 2016 1984, 1986 1991, 1992 1993, 1995 2015 2000 2008 2010 2011 2017
2 X 160 2 x 540 100, 200 2 x 220 2 x 220 2 x 700 2 x 220 2 x 220 2 x 220 2 x 700 2 x 220 220 220 2 x 1000 2 x 1000
Evolution of the Indian PHWR

RAPS-1 AECL RAPS-2 Indigenous efforts
MAPS Changes due to site conditions

NAPS-1&2 - Major modifications incorporated, design upgraded in
line with the internationally evolving safety standards and to cater to the seismic environment at the site. KAPS-1&2, KAIGA-1&2 and RAPS-3&4 saw further improvements leading to standardisation in design and layout for 220 MWe PHWRs. 2 units of 220 MWe each were constructed subsequently at KAIGA3&4 and RAPP-5&6. 2 units of 540 MWe have been constructed at TAPS-3&4 with minimum import content. 4 units of 700 MWe are under construction and many more planned.
Evolution of the Indian PHWR

Indian PHWR design has come a long way right from
RAPS to current 700 MWe units. Enormous amount of construction, operation & maintenance experience and adoption of state of the art technology for engineering and analysis has contributed in development of a proven, robust, safe and reliable model of the Indian PHWR, which will fulfil the energy requirements of the country to a large extent. Indian PHWR is a combination of inherent and engineered safety features, incorporating defence in depth through active and/or passive means to cope with DBA.
Introduction to Indian PHWR design

Horizontal reactor vessel Calandria Pressure tube concept (306/392 channels) Natural Uranium fuelled (Fuel pins; Bundles) Heavy water cooled and moderated
Calandria surrounded by water enclosed in a
concrete structure Calandria Vault On-power refueling Double containment Suppression Pool (220 MWe, 540 MWe)
Pressurised Heavy Water Reactor
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Summarised Technical Data

General Plant Data Description
Reactor Thermal Output Power Plant Output (Gross) Power Plant Output (Net)
220 MWe
755 MWth 235 MWe 210 MWe
540 MWe 700 MWe

1730 MWth 540 MWe 485 MWe 2166 MWth 700 MWe 630 MWe
Power Plant Efficiency (Net)

Plant design life Primary Coolant material Secondary Coolant material
27.8%
40 yrs. Heavy Water Light Water
28.08 %
29.08 %
Moderator material
Heavy Water
Heavy Water
Heavy Water
Summarised Technical Data (Contd.)

Description
SAFETY GOALS Core Damage Frequency Large Early Release Frequency
Occupational radiation exposure
220 MWe
10-5 / Year 10-6 / Year 20 mSv/Yr * 30
540 MWe
10-5 / Year 10-6 / Year 20 mSv/Yr * 30
700 MWe
10-5 / Year 10-6 / Year 20 mSv/Yr * 30
Operator action time (in minutes)

* : Average in any 5 consecutive years

Nuclear Steam Supply System Description 220 MWe 540 MWe 700 MWe
Steam flow rate nominal conditions Steam pressure/temperature Feed Water flow rate at nominal conditions Feed Water temperature
1330 t/h 4.03 MPA(a) 250.6 deg C 1261.7 t/h 171 deg.C 3078 t/h 4.17 MPa(a) /252.8 oC 3078 t/h 180 deg.C 3874 t/h 4.5 MPA(a) 256.3 deg C 3874 t/h 180 deg.C

Reactor Core & Coolant System 220 MWe Description
Primary coolant flow rate Reactor operating pressure Mean temp. rise across core Average linear heat rate Fuel material
13.26x106 kg/h 87 kg/cm2g (nom.) 44 deg. C 28.6 kW/m Natural UO2
540 MWe
28.1x106 kg/h 100 kg/cm2g (nom.) 44 deg. C 40.1 kW/m Natural UO2
700 MWe
28.9 x106 kg/h 100 kg/cm2g (nom.) 44 deg. C 50.2 kW/m Natural UO2
Fuel clad material

Fuel assembly Average discharge burn up
Zircaloy - 4
19 elements 6700 MWd/T
Zircaloy - 4
Zircaloy - 4

Reactor Pressure Vessel Description 220 MWe
Inner diameter of Calandria
Wall thickness Base material No of Coolant channels Lattice pitch ID of coolant channel Core length
540 MWe
7800 mm
32 mm Austenitic SS 304 L 392 28.6 sq lattice 103.4 mm 5.940 m
700 MWe
7800 mm
5996 mm
Coolant channel material
Zr 2.5% Nb
Zr 2.5% Nb Zr 2.5% Nb

Steam Generator, Coolant pumps & Pressuriser Description 220 MWe 540 MWe 700 MWe
Type
Mushroom type with integrated steam drum and preheater Mushroom type with integrated steam drum Mushroom type with integrated steam drum
Number of SGs
SG tube material
Type of coolant pump
Incoloy 800
Vertical, Centrifugal, single stage.
Incoloy 800
Incoloy 800
Pressurizer volume
--
30 Cub M
45 Cub M

Containment Description
Double Containment PC dimensions PC Design pressure Design leak rate of Containment System
220 MWe
540 MWe
700 MWe
Prestressed ICW, Prestressed ICW, Prestressed ICW, Reinforced OCW Reinforced OCW Reinforced OCW 42.56 m dia 55.35 m ht 0.27 MPa (a) 1 % V / day 49.5 m dia 50.1 m ht 0.24 MPa (a) 1 % V / day 49.5 m dia 53.1 m ht 0.26 MPa(a) 1 % V / day

Core Cooling Systems Description 220 MWe
Residual Heat Removal (Active / Passive systems) Safety Injection (Active / Passive systems)
Active- SD cooling system Passive Thermo syphon through SGs
540 MWe
700 MWe
ECCS
ECCS
ECCS

Turbine & Generator Description 220 MWe
Type of Turbine Tandem compounded, Horizontal impulse reaction type. 1 HP + 1 LP Direct coupled, Hydrogen cooled rotor
540 MWe
Tandem compounded, Horizontal impulse reaction type. 1 HP + 2 LP Direct coupled, Hydrogen cooled rotor
700 MWe
Tandem compounded, Horizontal impulse reaction type. 1 HP + 3 LP Direct coupled, Hydrogen cooled rotor
Number of turbine sections Generator
Inherent Safety Features of Indian PHWRs

Higher neutron generation time Low fissile content Short bundle length limits consequences in case of
single bundle failure. Passive core cooling feature. On power detection of failed fuel. Online fuelling and low excess reactivity in the core. Moderator as heat sink. Reactivity Devices located in low pressure moderator : Rod ejection ruled out
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NSSS PHT System

PHT System has been designed to ensure adequate cooling of reactor core under all operational states and during and following all postulated off normal conditions.
Normal Operation Loss of power to PCPs Shut down Loss Of Coolant Accident (LOCA) By Primary Coolant Pumps (PCPs) Initially by pump flywheel inertia and later by thermo syphoning. By shut down cooling pumps and heat exchangers which are independent of SGs By Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) consisting of high pressure D2O / H2O injection from accumulators and low pressure long term recirculation by pumps.
PHT System features

Different feeder sizes & orificing Controlled pressure at ROH Over pressure relief to PHT pressure boundary Feed & Bleed / Pressuriser Assist natural circulation Layout Small leak handling capability Online purification & filtration Accessibility during shutdown Header level control for maintenance of SGs, PCPs etc. Variable / constant pressure program for SG pressure
control
PHT System Features (Contd.)

Total elimination of valves in PHT System
General reduction in the number of components has
helped to decongest the layout in the pump room Better maintenance approachability, less maintenance and lesser dose uptake
Two loop concept

Minimize the inventory loss Minimize core positive void coefficient Minimize the enthalpy release to the containment
under loss of coolant accident
PHT System Features (Contd.)

In 540 MWe PHWR, a pressurizer was introduced for pressure control, while feed and bleed is retained for inventory control. In 700MWe units, interleaving of feeders has been adopted
Reduction in void coefficient Minimise the reactor over-power during a LOCA
Passive Decay Heat Removal System (PDHRS) has been introduced for the first time in 700 MWe units to ensure removal of decay heat in Station Blackout condition
STEAM GENERATOR 540 MWe
Reactor Core and Fuel design

Heavy Water moderator and coolant Natural Uranium Dioxide Fuel The reactor is an integral assembly of two end shields
and a Calandria with the latter being submerged in the water filled vault. Fuel bundles are contained in 306 / 392 Zr-2.5%Nb pressure tubes, arranged in a square lattice. At each end, the pressure tubes are rolled in AISI 403 modified stainless steel end fittings, which penetrate the end shields and extend into the fuelling machine vaults so as to facilitate on power fuelling
Calandria
Calandria is a horizontal vessel containing the coolant
channel assemblies, moderator and internal components of various shutdown mechanisms and reactivity control devices. The Calandria structure is fabricated from Austenitic stainless steel type 304 L. The design, fabrication, inspection and testing is in accordance with ASME Section III NB
End Shield
The end shield is a cylindrical box whose ends are closed by the Calandria side tube sheet (CSTS) and the fueling side tube sheet FSTS). The box is pierced by 306 / 392 Stainless Steel Lattice tube arranged in a square lattice. The box is filled with water and carbon steel balls in the ration 47:53. The End shields are designed, fabricated and tested as class II components according to the ASME section III NC.
Calandria and End Shields
Reactor inside vault
Fuel Bundle
37-element fuel bundle (540 MWe/700 MWe)
Residual Heat Removal & Auxiliary Cooling

Shut down cooling system. End shield cooling system. Calandria Vault Cooling system. Spent Fuel Storage Bay cooling system. Active process water system.
Service Water system.
Fuel Handling Systems

Fuel Handling System has seen major evolutions in carriage design,
fuel transfer system and controls in progressive stations.

In RAPS/MAPS, FM head is supported on a mobile type carriage,
which moves on rails.

In the standardised design of 220 MWe PHWR, a seismically qualified
fixed column & moving bridge was introduced, which is better suited for high intensity seismic events. Transit equipment called Transfer Magazine was introduced in Fuel transfer system in place of Air Lock and Transfer Arm used in RAPS / MAPS. This facilitates the parallel simultaneous operation of refueling by FMs on the reactor and transferring of irradiated fuel from the Transfer Magazine to the storage pool through Shuttle Transport Tube .
While earlier fuel handling controls employed hard wired system, for
standard PHWRs, computerized control system has been provided. This has resulted in flexibility and better manmachine interface.
Fuel Handling Systems (Contd.)

540 MWe PHWR, basic design of FT system is
similar to that in 220 MWe PHWRs. Additional features :

FM design with rack & pinion based ram assembly.
Separate calibration and maintenance facility to
test various sub-assemblies like ram assembly, separators, B-ram drive, various process devices and control equipment was introduced . This is specifically meant for performance testing after major maintenance.
Fuel Handling Systems (Contd.)

FH system in 700 MWe PHWRs adopts the features of
220 & 540 MWe PHWRs. Based on operating experience, Fuel Transfer system is based on a unique concept of Mobile Transfer Machine, which receives spent fuel from the Fuelling Machine & discharges it to the spent fuel bay. Accordingly, shuttle transport system has been eliminated.
There is a single Spent Fuel Storage Bay (SFSB) in 220
MWe PHWRs, whereas for the later 540 & 700 MWe units, separate SFSB for each unit has been incorporated.
FM BRIDGE & CARRIAGE

FM Head
BALL VALVE
FT PORT NEW FUEL PORT INDEXER
SWING TABLE ZFRAME
SUPPORT FRAME
CYLINDER
CABLE DRAG CHAIN
MOBILE TRANSFER MACHINE

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Reactor Shutdown Systems

Concept of two diverse and independent shut down
systems was introduced in standard 220 MWe reactors. Primary Shutdown System (PSS) using gravity fall of cadmium absorber elements, and Secondary Shutdown System (SSS) injecting liquid poison column in vertical tubes located inside the core.
Each of these systems is independently capable of
terminating all conceivable fast reactivity transients from any state of the reactor. The reactivity transients considered include those from a large loss of coolant accident, which result in the fastest reactivity addition rate in a PHWR due to coolant voiding in the core.
Reactor Shutdown Systems (Contd.)

The design in 220 MWe units has additional system
called Liquid Poison Injection System (LPIS) to augment the negative reactivity worth to take care of xenon decay during long term shut down.
For 540 Mwe / 700 MWe PHWRs, each of the two shut
down systems have adequate worth for long-term shutdown. These systems are :
SDS#1 : Cadmium rods that fall under gravity SDS#2 : Direct injection of poison in moderator inside
calandria
Emergency Core Cooling

In earlier versions of Indian PHWRs (RAPS/MAPS), the cold
heavy water available in the moderator system is used for emergency injection into the PHT system and long term recirculation for postulated LOCA. Subsequently ECCS for these plants were upgraded by retrofitting high pressure injection system.
For standard 220 MWe units, the ECCS was modified to
delink the system from moderator system and it includes

High pressure heavy water injection Intermediate pressure light water injection Low pressure long-term recirculation
All actions up to and including the establishment of longterm recirculation from suppression pool are automatic.
Emergency Core Cooling (Contd.)

In 540 MWe PHWR, the high pressure injection is from light
water accumulators. A simple scheme of injecting light water into all reactor headers followed by low pressure long term recirculation has been adopted. In 700 MWe PHWR, there are two trains of ECCS injection and long term recirculation
2x100% trains of high pressure light water injection system
followed by 2x100% trains of low pressure long term recirculation system by ECCS pumps.
The equipment/components of two trains are located diversely to avoid any common cause failure. Pump suction of each train has got multiple strainers protected by coarse screen to assure continued long term recirculation flow from ECCS sump.
Reactor Containment Systems

The containment system of Indian PHWRs has seen several
modifications in successive projects. The first Indian PHWR (RAPS) reactors have a single containment envelope of reinforced concrete cylindrical section and a prestressed concrete dome. In RAPS, pressure suppression in the containment is provided by a dousing system where water stored in a very large tank, at the topmost floor of the containment establishes a curtain of water in the path of releasing steam during postulated loss of coolant accident to limit the building pressure. In MAPS and all standard 220/540 MWe reactors a pressure suppression system is used where the released steamair mixture is led to a large body of water (suppression pool) stored at the bottom of the containment. In MAPS, a partial double containment was used with primary containment of pre-stressed concrete, and secondary of rubble masonry.
Reactor Containment System (Contd.)

For standard 220 MWe/ 540 MWe/ 700 MWe PHWRs,
full double containment design has been adopted with primary containment of pre stressed concrete and Secondary containment of Reinforced concrete.
In 700 MWe PHWRs, a containment spray cooling
system is provided for dual functions of fission product mop up and depressurisation of containment to reduce ground level releases in place of pool-based vapour suppression system.
The primary containment for 700 MWe units is lined with
steel for achieving better leak tightness
Evolution of Indian PHWR Containments
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Engineered Safety Features

Reactor Building Cooling Systems.
Primary Containment Filtration and pump back
system (for 220 MWe and 540 MWe PHWRs)

Secondary Containment Recirculation and
Purge system.
Primary containment Controlled Discharge
system.
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TG & Auxiliaries
Steam turbines for PHWRs are configured as follows :
One single flow high pressure (HP) turbine and one double flow low
pressure (LP) turbine tandem compounded and coupled to 2-pole generator for 220 MWe PHWRs. One single flow high pressure (HP) turbine and two double flow low pressure (LP) turbine tandem compounded and coupled to 2-pole generator for 540 MWe PHWRs One double flow high pressure (HP) turbine and three double flow low pressure (LP) turbine tandem compounded and coupled to 2-pole generator for 700 MWe PHWRs As the steam at the exhaust of HP turbine is around 12% wet, it is routed through moisture separator and re-heater before it is led to LP turbines.
The TG sets for the latest plants are designed to operate on
continuous basis in the band of 47.5-51.5 Hz as against 48-51 Hz to improve availability of the units considering prevailing variation in grid frequency.
TG & Auxiliaries (Contd.)

Integral drain arrangement is provided in the turbine
casing to remove the excess moisture

Redundant turbine over speed protection systems
provided
Non-return valves are provided in almost all extraction
lines to close automatically

The generator is provided with hydrogen cooled rotor,
stator core & overhang and water cooled stator conductors
TURBINE GENERATOR 220 MWe

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C&I in Indian PHWRs

Control and instrumentation is an area of nuclear reactor design,
which has undergone major changes during past 60 years.

Reactor control and protection system of RAPS-1&2 and MAPS-
1&2 was made using conventional discrete analog circuits.

Control room computer system was another step towards
centralization of acquisition of control room data with improved humanmachine interface. The introduction of digital systems (computers) did away with the problems of analog circuit design.
For KAPS-1&2, more steps were taken towards utilizing the
flexibility of computer-based systems. The boldest of the steps was to computerize the alarm and trip contact generation function. The system was called Programmable Digital Comparator System.
C&I in Indian PHWRs (Contd.)

Computer Based Systems were further evolved and used for
standard 220 MWe, 540 MWe and 700 MWe PHWRs for process and reactor control applications. For one of the Reactor Protection Systems and other safety systems, hardwired logics are retained. In 700 MWe PHWRs, Computer Based Systems are being designed in clusters. This will ensure uniform architecture for systems in a cluster. Operator interface with menu driven screens for control action and system information were also introduced. Upgradation of old projects was started in decade of 1990s and lot of old systems were re-engineered with computerbased systems.
Reactor Protection Systems

In order to protect the plant against common mode
incidents such as fires that could affect many safety systems at the same time, the I&C of safety systems are located in distinct, physically separate rooms / panels in control building (control equipment room). Each of the safety systems viz. reactor shutdown systems, emergency core cooling system, containment isolation system are provided with a triplicate channel philosophy with 2 out of 3 coincidence logic. This permits one channel to be tested without affecting normal plant operation. It also allows one faulty channel to be put in a safe state. It facilitates inter-channel comparison among the signals
Control Room
The main control rooms (MCR) have conventional control
room design, which has evolved from plant to plant with incremental improvements based on the plant design and technology available. Hybrid control rooms, wherein computer based operator information displays and parameter selection and settings facilities have been provided. The normal operations are mostly carried out from discrete hardwired controls at the panels. The operator consoles located in the center of these control rooms provide facilities for detailed presentation of data in various formats and also provide capabilities for changing operational parameters using Visual Display Unit (VDU) consoles of individual systems.
Control Room (Contd.)

The control panels are organized in a plant system-wise
manner, with systems associated with various associated functions suitably located nearby for ease of operations.
Control Room is located in the seismically qualified
control building (CB).

CB location is such that it is not affected from internal
missiles from turbine.

Unitized Control Room concept is followed.

The MCR panels are placed behind the OICs so that the
operator can view the indications & annunciations on the MCR panels from his seat.
The MCR panels and OICs of both the units are arranged in
L shape having linear image with the other unit. The use of computerized systems has reduced the density of components on Main Control Room panels.
A separate Back up Control Room (BCR) has been provided
for each unit. Essential safety functions can be carried out from BCR to bring the unit under safe cold shut down state in case of unavailability of MCR.
BCR has been back-fitted in older units.

In 700 MWe, compact computerized Main Control Room
(MCR) is provided. MCR comprises of sitting console based operations with computerized operating procedure, advance fault diagnostics and intelligent alarm system. Plant over view panels and limited hardwired back up control panels are provided. Separate Back up Control Room (BCR) is provided for each unit. Essential safety functions can be carried out from BCR to bring the unit under cold shut down state in case of unavailability of MCR.
KGS-2 Control Room
TAPS -4 Control Room
KAPP-3&4 MCR
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Electrical Systems
Offsite Power System 400 kV and 220 kV switchyards, 400kV and 220kV grids. Start up power for each reactor unit is derived from 220
kV switchyard through one start-up transformer (SUT) having two secondary windings. Two main cum transfer switching is adopted for 220 kV switchyard. Station Auxiliary Power Supply System (SAPSS) Normal Power Supplies and Emergency Power supplies
Electric Power Supplies

Normal Power Supply This system has two voltage levels at 6.6 kV, 3 phase supply and 415 V, 3 phase supply. Emergency Power Supply Emergency Power Supply System consists of three tier power supply classes i.e. Class III, Class-II and Class-I power supplies.
These Power Supplies feed all the safety / safety related system loads of the unit and also some of the non-safety system loads.
Control Power Supplies

Main Control Power Supply (MCPS) system Class-I 48 VDC MCPS system (220 & 540 MWe) Class-I 24 VDC / 220 VDC MCPS System (700 MWe) Class-II 240 VAC MCPS system Supplementary Control Power Supply (SCPS)
system
Class-I 48 VDC SCPS system (220 & 540 MWe)
Class-I 24 VDC / 220 VDC SCPS System (700 MWe)

Class-II 240 VAC SCPS system
Operating Modes
Normal operation
Operation within specified operational limits and conditions.

Hot shutdown state
Shutdown state of the reactor with primary coolant temperature (inlet to reactor) and pressure close to normal operating condition and the primary coolant pumps (PCPs) running is defined as hot shutdown state.
Operating Modes (Contd.)

Cold shutdown state
Reactor maintained sub-critical with specified subcriticality margin and temperature of the PHT system at inlet to the core is less than 550C.
Guaranteed shutdown state(GSS)
A specified shutdown state of the reactor with sufficiently large reactivity shutdown margin, established by the addition of liquid poison into the moderator to provide positive assurance that an inadvertent increase in reactivity by withdrawal of all other reactivity devices cannot lead to criticality.
Standard Fuel Cycle

PHWRs use 'Natural' uranium in dioxide form as fuel. Closed end fuel cycle - based on availability of fissile and
fertile fuel resources in the country.

The spent fuel bundles from PHWRs are reprocessed and the
depleted uranium and plutonium is planned to be used in fast breeder reactors.

A small quantity of reprocessed depleted uranium is also
recycled in PHWRs.
The Front-End of this cycle like mineral exploration, mining
and processing of ore and fuel fabrication; and back end of the cycle, which includes fuel reprocessing, re-fabrication and nuclear waste management are carried out by different units of Department of Atomic Energy (DAE), Government of India.
Alternative Fuel Options

To achieve fuel burn up beyond 15000 MWd/TeU, fissile
materials like slightly enriched uranium and Mixed Oxide fuel elements have been studied for use in 220 MWe PHWRs. Studies showed that burn-up can be increased up to 30000 MWd/ TeU.
Studies on reactor physics characteristics like reactor control,
shut down margin, fuel, systems thermal-hydraulics and material compatibility have been carried out for each fuel type before taking up actual loading in the reactor.
Reprocessed depleted uranium dioxide fuel bundles, Slightly
Enriched Uranium Bundles (SEU), MOX bundles and thorium dioxide bundles were designed, developed and successfully irradiated in different 220 MWe reactors.
Alternative Fuel Options (Contd.)

Thorium bundles and reprocessed depleted uranium dioxide
bundles were used for flux flattening in the initial core such that the reactor can be operated at rated full power in the initial phase.
MOX-7 bundle design evolved is a 19-element cluster, with
inner seven elements having MOX pellets consisting of plutonium dioxide mixed in natural uranium dioxide and outer 12 elements having only natural uranium dioxide pellets.
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Defence in Depth
Multiple barriers to radioactivity release Prevention is priority and Mitigation if
deviations or accidentt happens To achieve defence in depth - SSCs at first four levels Elaborate emergency plans at the fifth level
Defence in Depth (Contd.)

Prevention Seismic design of SSCs Consideration of possible flood mechanisms to decide safe grade elevation Consideration of internal flood in design Quality requirements for design, fabrication, plant construction and operation Safety Classification of SSCs Assignment of SSCs at various levels of defence in depth Environmental qualification Redundancy and diversity at system and function level Physical and functional separation between process and safety systems

Prevention (contd.)
Single failure criteria In service inspection and regular surveillance Operation within defined limits in technical specifications
for operation Licensing and periodic relicensing of operating personnel Single point vulnerability assessment Balanced design, quantification of reliability, absence of cliff edge effects, permissible down time of equipment etc. are overseen by PSA Adherence to normal operating procedures Regular and multi tier review by utility and regulators Operating experience feedback

Mitigation AOOs and DBAs Control systems and protection systems Safety systems Multiple means to achieve three fundamental safety functions Passive features and systems Reliable safety support services Procedures for off normal and emergency conditions Rehearsing these procedures on plant simulators Safety analysis to show compliance to acceptable dose limits and PSA targets Regular and multi tier review by utility and regulators Operating experience feedback

Mitigation BDBAs and severe accidents Available plant systems Severe accident management provisions Severe accident management guidelines Hydrogen management

Emergency Plans and Preparedness Hierarchy of emergency plans (Plant, Site and Offsite) These plans are regularly rehearsed with a defined frequency Participation of local government authorities in emergency exercises Participation of nearby population in public awareness programme and emergency exercises
Licensing
Identified stages (Siting, Construction, Operation) As per requirements specified by regulators in
codes and guides Periodic safety review at every 10 years Review at the time of renewal of license at every 5 years Internal review within utility Multi tier review by regulators
Licensing Approach - Projects

The regulatory body adopts a multi-tier review process for safety review and assessment of NPP First level of review and assessment
Site evaluation Committee (SEC), Project Design Safety Committee (PDSC) Civil Engineering Safety Committee (CESC).
These Committees as a body are comprised of experts in various aspects of NPP safety. The next level of review is conducted through an Advisory Committee on Project Safety Review (ACPSR)
Members drawn from the regulatory body, reputed national laboratories
and academic institutions. Representation from other governmental organizations and ministries.
After considering the recommendations of ACPSR and the first level committee, the regulatory board decides on the authorization.
Licensing
Safety Review Process for Nuclear Power Projects
Consenting Stages: Siting
Construction Commissioning First Criticality / Tests Power Operation (In stages) Regulatory Body
REGULATORY BOARD
Governing Document Regulation of Nuclear and Radiation Facilities (AERB-SC-G)
ACPSR
LEGEND:
SEC - SITE EVALUATION COMMITTEE PDSC - PROJECT DESIGN SAFETY COMMITTEE ACPSR- ADVISORY COMMITTEE FOR PROJECT SAFETY REVIEW
SEC APPLICATION FOR SITE CONSENT
PDSC APPLICATION FOR CONSTRUCTION CONSENT
Utility
NPC-SRC HQ
Licensing Approach - Stations

First tier of safety review is carried out by the Unit Safety
Committee Representatives from the regulatory body Representatives from NPP under review and Experts in various aspects of nuclear technology drawn from different institutions. The second-tier of safety review of Indian NPPs is by Safety Review committee for Operating Plants (SARCOP), which is Apex body to decide on the matters of nuclear safety pertaining to NPPs. The third-tier is the regulatory board, which based on the recommendations of SARCOP, considers the major safety issues pertaining to operation of NPPs.
Licensing
Safety Review Process for Operating NPPs
Regulatory Board Safety Review Committee for Operating Plants (SARCOP)
REGULATORY STAFF -INPUTS -INTERNAL REVIEW -CONTINUITY -CO-ORDINATION -ENFORCEMENT -FOLLOW-UP -INSPECTION
Regulatory Body
EXPERT GROUPS -REACTOR PHYSICS -REACTOR CHEMISTRY -CONTROL & INST. -ISI -COOLANT CHANNEL SAFETY
Unit Safety Committee
Utility
NPC SRC HQ Station Operation Review Committee (SORC)

Seismic Design Considerations

The seismic design is incorporated by classifying SSC under three categories SSE Category : SSE category incorporates all systems, components, instruments and structures conforming to safety classes 1, 2 and 3 and are designed for the maximum seismic ground motion potential at site (i.e. SSE) obtained through appropriate seismic evaluations based on regional and local geology, seismology and soil characteristics. OBE Category : All systems, components, instruments and structures which are to remain functional for continued operation of the plant without undue risk fall under OBE category and the design basis is a lower level seismic ground motion than SSE which may reasonably be expected during the plant life. Exceeding of OBE level seismic event requires a shutdown of the plant and carry out detailed inspection of entire plant prior to startup. General : Seismic design by relevant Indian standards
Safety Systems to cope with Severe Accidents

An accident sequence involving loss of coolant with failure of emergency core cooling can lead to a severe accident with failure of maintaining moderator and Calandria Vault water heat sink.
Fire water injection into SGs. Fire water injection into Calandria. Fire water injection into Calandria Vault. Fire water injection into End Shields. Provision for passive/active mixing of containment atmosphere to
limit hydrogen concentration. Fire water back-up is provided to moderator heat exchangers and ECCS heat exchangers. Provision for manual interconnection of Class-III emergency power supplies between units (700 MWe).
Safety Assessment
A comprehensive safety analysis by rigorous deterministic and complementary probabilistic methods is carried out covering the following plant states Normal operational modes of plant Anticipated operational occurrences Design basis accidents During combination of events leading to beyond design basis scenarios including severe accidents The deterministic safety analysis is available up to the severe accident and is being utilized in conjunction with probabilistic safety assessment in preparation of severe accident management programme
Emergency Planning
In accordance with different degrees of severity of the potential consequences, emergency situations are graded as: 1. Plant emergency 2. Site emergency and 3. Off-site emergency.
Emergency Measures
The emergency measures consist of the following Notification Assessment action during Emergency Corrective actions Protective measures (countermeasures) Contamination control measures Infrastructure for Emergency Response Plant Control Room Emergency Control Centre Communication System Assessment Facilities Protective Facilities
92
Security & Physical Protection

Security systems have under gone several changes based on
changing threat perceptions and the technological developments. NPCIL has established the environment to create and foster characteristics and attitudes in organization and individuals so that physical protection issues receive attention as warranted by their significance. A multi pronged approach is in place to ensure security of the countrys NPPs, which includes the following :
Screening/ongoing intelligence about employees
Physical Protection System

National Security Force Defence coverage Regulatory Frame work
94
Plant Operation
The commencement of operation of a Nuclear Power
Plant (NPP) begins with approach to the first criticality of the station.
Before the start of commissioning activities, the station
prepares a comprehensive programme for the commissioning of plant components and submits the same for review and acceptance of Regulatory body.
The Operation and Maintenance (O&M) department at
the station prepares the Technical specification for operation in consultation with the plant designers before the approach to first criticality, based on the inputs from the design and safety analysis.
Plant Operation (Contd.)

Once the commissioning activities are completed, the entire
plant is handed over for regular operation and maintenance, to the O&M department which already exists at the Site.
To ensure a high degree of quality in operation, all
operation persons who are at or above the position of Assistant Shift Charge Engineer (ASCE) are qualified graduate engineers who are trained and licensed as per the licensing procedures approved by Regulatory body.
All activities including surveillance testing are performed
with approved procedures to minimize errors due to human factors.

Plant Operation (Contd.)

The station has a well defined organization chart. The chart
clearly defines the lines of responsibility and authority to ensure smooth operation as well as safety during start up, normal and abnormal operations.
Station Director is the Chief of Station O&M management
at site. He has the overall responsibility for the safe operation of the plant and in implementing all relevant policies and radiation protection rules and other instructions and procedures laid down by the operating organization for plant management, and the statutory / regulatory requirements.
The performance of operating Indian PHWRs has
improved significantly and an overall availability factor of greater than 90% has been achieved.
Reliability & Availability Targets

Contributing factors :
Successful and proven technology Extensive use of vast experience available from
Indian PHWR and similar plants elsewhere High degree of automation to minimize human error Functionally and physically independent safety systems Basic safety functions carried out by multiple means Online testing and maintenance of a protection channel without affecting reactor operation Use of fire-retardant materials
Reliability & Availability Targets (Contd.)

Contributing factors :
Fuel reliability Elimination of human error Extensive training Earthquake resistant design Adequate defences have been built in the design against
flooding, externally or internally generated missiles, fire, etc. Highly reliable safety systems with very low unavailability targets Defence in Depth Periodic testing and inspection of active components in safety systems - Online

Designed for an average annual availability factor of
greater than 90%, averaged over the life of the plant Targets for different types of outages are planned accordingly. Indian PHWRs are normally designed to have one planned biennial shut down for about one month duration The maintenance programme is put in place to ensure that
Safety Status of the Plant is not adversely affected due to
aging, deterioration, degradation or defects of plant structures, systems or components since commencement of operation and their functional reliability is maintained in accordance with the design assumptions and intent over the operational life span of the plant

Preventive maintenance schedule for systems,
structures and components

In Service Inspection (ISI) programme Performance Review Programme to identify and rectify
gradual degradation, chronic deficiencies, potential problem areas or causes
Capacity Factors of Operating Units

100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 2001-02 2002-03 2003-04 2004-05 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 2009-10 2010-11
84.89
89.66 81.1 76.29 74.4 71.37
63.04
53.72 49.61
60.8
102
Availability Factors of Operating Units

100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30
86
90
91
88
89
92 85 88 83 82
20
10 0
2001-02 2002-03 2003-04 2004-05 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 2009-10 2010-11*
103
Longest Continuous Reactor Operation

700
600
590 529
500
486
400
404
432 394 346 371
414
407
Days
300
289 250
200
100
0
TAPS-1 TAPS-2 RAPS-3 RAPS-4 MAPS-1 MAPS-2 NAPS-1 NAPS-2 KAPS-1 KAPS-2 KGS-1 KGS-2
104
105
5
4.5 4 3.5
Collective Dose/Unit in Indian NPPs for Routine O&M activities (Older units)
Person Sievert
3 2.5 2 1.5 1 0.5 0
2007 TAPS-1&2
2008 RAPS-2 MAPS
2009 NAPS
Collective Dose/Unit in Indian NPPs for Routine O&M activities (New units)
1.6 1.4 1.2
Person Sievert
1.0 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 0.0
2007 KAPS KGS-1&2
2008 RAPS-3&4 TAPS-3&4 KGS-3
2009
P -Sv
Construction Management
Setting up of nuclear power projects in India in about 5 years has
been demonstrated with the help of developments in construction technology, mechanization, parallel civil works and equipment erection, computerized project monitoring and accounting systems Further reduction of construction time is being aimed at The design of 700 MWe is being carried out in an Integrated Engineering Environment using state of art tools like 3D plant modeling, Prodok etc. The Plant Design, Construction, Operation and Maintenance organizations together develop a detailed overall Project Master Plan prior to the start of construction. This encompasses : Design Procurement Construction Commissioning activities up to the commercial operation
Construction Management (Contd.)

All schedules are regularly reviewed and monitored to check for
compliance with the overall project plan and to identify any deviation requiring corrective action.
The project is monitored using quantitative methods appropriate
to the particular activity. Schedules are maintained using modern technology (Primavera software, etc.) and methods, and updated as work progresses to realistically reflect the actual work status
Regular interaction between the construction engineers and the
design engineers as well as interdisciplinary design reviews are periodically carried out to successfully implement the constructability requirements at the design stage itself.
Standardized component sizes, types and installation details are
provided to improve productivity and reduce material inventories

111
Plant Layout considerations

The main plant layout of Indian PHWRs has been
developed on the basis of twin unit concept.

The principal features of plant layout Concept of independent operation of each unit. Only
some of the common facilities are shared for reasons of economy.

The buildings have been grouped according to their
seismic classification in consonance with the classification of the system/ equipment contained.
Plant Layout considerations (Contd.)

Mirror images in equipment layout are avoided to the
maximum extent possible for O & M convenience A separate Control Building has been provided as a common facility. However, the control room and control equipment rooms located in this building are provided to cater for unitized operation. A separate backup Control Room has been provided for each unit Emergency power supply systems such as Diesel Generators, UPS systems and Batteries are separately housed in safety related structures, for each unit.
Plant Layout considerations (Contd.)

Proper access control measures are provided by
means of Central Alarm Station (CAS), physical protection fencing and manned gates. The two unit module in the nuclear island has been so chosen that it is possible to : Enforce single point entry in the radiation zones. Follow radiation zoning philosophy without undue inconvenience to the operating personnel.
Plant layout 220 MWe PHWR
Plant layout 540 MWe PHWR
Plant Layout (700 MWe)
119
Fukushima Accident - Implications

In depth review by utility and regulators Extreme natural events Loss of on site power sources and supply Loss of water storage and supply Safety of spent fuel More than one unit getting affected Severe accident management Issues related to emergency handling
Fukushima Accident Implications (Contd.)

Extreme natural events Confirmation of design basis Evaluating margins Strengthening as required (like water proofing, raising levels, additional shore protection measures) More than one unit getting affected Revision of procedures Training and defining roles and responsibilities Mitigation provisions to take into account this situation

Safety of spent fuel Evaluating existing capabilities (before fuel is exposed following loss of cooling) External water make up provisions Loss of power and water sources/ supplies Alternate power sources Augmenting on site water storage Arranging water from nearby sources Hook up schemes to various systems

Severe accident management Enhancing severe accident management programme with post Fukushima recommended provisions Incorporation of severe accident management guidelines Hydrogen management Containment safety Issues related to emergency handling Accessibility and communication enhancement Further improving emergency preparedness
124
Regulatory review
All 220 MWe and 540 MWe units are operating
successfully. Conceptual design review of 700 MWe PHWRs completed and detailed design review is in progress. Regulatory consent for construction of KAPP 3&4 obtained and construction is in progress. Regulatory consent for construction of RAPP 7&8 is expected shortly.
Deployment schedule
Sr No. Project 1. Kakrapar Atomic Power Project 2. Rajasthan Atomic Power Project 3. Haryana Atomic Power Project 4. MP Atomic Power Project Expected criticality / Remarks KAPP-3: December 2014 2 X 700 MWe KAPP-4: June 2015 Units 2 X 700 MWe RAPP-7: December 2015 RAPP-8: June 2016
4 X 700 MWe Approved in principle 2 X 700 MWe Approved in principle
127

Design, Safety and Operability Performances of 220 MWe, 540 MWe &amp; 700 MWe PHWRs in India

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Design, Safety and Operability Performances of 220 MWe, 540 MWe &amp; 700 MWe PHWRs in India

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Inter-regional workshop on

Advanced Nuclear Reactor Technology for Near Term Deployment

Electrical, Control & Instrumentation Systems

Performance of Indian PHWRs

Indian Nuclear Power Programme: Current Status

Fast Breeder Test Reactor (40 MWt ) operational

Design for 500 MWe PFBR developed. Construction commenced in 2004

The Indian PHWR

Power Reactors in India

Evolution of the Indian PHWR

MAPS Changes due to site conditions

Evolution of the Indian PHWR

Introduction to Indian PHWR design

Calandria surrounded by water enclosed in a

Pressurised Heavy Water Reactor

Summarised Technical Data

540 MWe 700 MWe

Power Plant Efficiency (Net)

Summarised Technical Data (Contd.)

Operator action time (in minutes)

Summarised Technical Data (Contd.)

Summarised Technical Data (Contd.)

Fuel clad material

Summarised Technical Data (Contd.)

Coolant channel material

Summarised Technical Data (Contd.)

Summarised Technical Data (Contd.)

Summarised Technical Data (Contd.)

Summarised Technical Data (Contd.)

Number of turbine sections Generator

Inherent Safety Features of Indian PHWRs

NSSS PHT System

PHT System features

PHT System Features (Contd.)

Two loop concept

under loss of coolant accident

PHT System Features (Contd.)

STEAM GENERATOR 540 MWe

Reactor Core and Fuel design

Calandria and End Shields

Reactor inside vault

37-element fuel bundle (540 MWe/700 MWe)

Residual Heat Removal & Auxiliary Cooling

Service Water system.

Fuel Handling Systems

fuel transfer system and controls in progressive stations.

which moves on rails.

Fuel Handling Systems (Contd.)

similar to that in 220 MWe PHWRs. Additional features :

Separate calibration and maintenance facility to

Fuel Handling Systems (Contd.)

FM BRIDGE & CARRIAGE

SWING TABLE ZFRAME

CABLE DRAG CHAIN

MOBILE TRANSFER MACHINE

Reactor Shutdown Systems

Reactor Shutdown Systems (Contd.)

Emergency Core Cooling

delink the system from moderator system and it includes

Emergency Core Cooling (Contd.)

Reactor Containment Systems

Reactor Containment System (Contd.)

steel for achieving better leak tightness

Evolution of Indian PHWR Containments

Design, Safety and Operability Performances of 220 MWe, 540 MWe & 700 MWe PHWRs in India

Design, Safety and Operability Performances of 220 MWe, 540 MWe & 700 MWe PHWRs in India