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Truckee Canal Safe Flow Determination Panel Report

Mid Pacific Region, Fernley, Nevada

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U.S. Department of the Interior Bureau of Reclamation April, 2013

Mission Statements
The U.S. Department of the Interior protects Americas natural resources and heritage, honors our cultures and tribal communities, and supplies the energy to power our future.

The mission of the Bureau of Reclamation is to manage, develop, and protect water and related resources in an environmentally and economically sound manner in the interest of the American public.

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Table of Contents
Page Acknowledgments ................................................................................................. v Acronyms and Abbreviations ............................................................................ vii Executive Summary .............................................................................................. 1 Background on 2008 Failure of the Truckee Canal .................................... 1 Interim Canal Capacity Limitations ............................................................ 2 Conclusions and Recommendations ........................................................... 2 I. Introduction ............................................................................................... 7 II. Project Background .................................................................................. 7 General ........................................................................................................ 7 Background on 2008 Failure of the Truckee Canal .................................... 8 Interim Canal Capacity Limitations ............................................................ 9 III. General Discussion .................................................................................... 9 Safe Flow ................................................................................................. 9 Actions Taken Since January 2008 Embankment Failure .......................... 9 Flow and Staging Restrictions .................................................................. 11 Minimum Required Head for Turnouts .................................................... 12 Increased Canal Seepage Losses ............................................................... 12 Canal Automation ..................................................................................... 13 Water Conservation .................................................................................. 13 TCID Employees - Reclamation Employees - Water Users Public Education ................................................................................. 14 Urbanization Increased Risk and Consequences ................................... 14 Variation in Canal Restriction .................................................................. 15 IV. Conclusions and Recommendations ...................................................... 16 V. References ................................................................................................ 21 Appendix A .......................................................................................................... 23 Appendix B .......................................................................................................... 27

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Acknowledgments
The Panel would like to acknowledge the valuable assistance of the Truckee-Carson Irrigation District and the Lahontan Basin Area Office for providing background information and hosting the Panels site visit.

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Acronyms and Abbreviations

Canal DEC DEC Report Truckee Canal Design, Estimating, and Construction Truckee Canal Issue Evaluation, Design Estimating and Construction Review Report Emergency Action Plan Facility Improvement Plan cubic feet per second Lahontan Basin Area Office Bureau of Reclamation Truckee Canal Safe Flow Determination Panel Standing Operating Procedures Truckee-Carson Irrigation District Technical Service Center

EAP FIP ft3/s LBAO Reclamation Panel SOP TCID TSC

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Executive Summary
A request to assemble a Safe Flow Determination Panel (Panel) to review the restrictions placed on the Truckee Canal (Canal) was received from the Lahontan Basin Area Office (LBAO) February 4, 2013. A Panel was assembled and convened March 27-29, 2013, with the purpose to evaluate and provide guidance to the Reclamation Lahontan Basin Area Office regarding the events and restrictions placed on the Canal since the January 5, 2008, Canal breach. The Panel toured the Canal on March 28, 2013, with the remainder of time spent at the LBAO. The Panel review included, but was not limited to, the two items listed below. Evaluating whether the current flow restriction of 350 ft3/s (based upon the requirements of the March 14, 2008 Truckee Canal Breach Special Written Notice for Reinitiating Flows in the Truckee Canal, [1], and the stage restrictions established in the June 16, 2009 letter entitled Truckee Canal Water Levels [2]), pose acceptable risk if continued as the operational restrictions on the Canal and Providing guidance regarding the frequency of the technical re-evaluation of the Canal

General Background
The Canal was constructed by Reclamation between 1903 and 1906 as part of the Newlands Project. The Canal serves two purposes: a) diversion of water from the Truckee River at Derby Dam to the Carson River at Lahontan Reservoir and, b) delivery of water to water users along the Canal. Currently the Canal is operated and maintained by the Truckee-Carson Irrigation District (TCID). The Canal is operated by controlling diversions from the Truckee River at Derby Dam and through a number of hydraulic structures along the length of the Canal. Several waste ways or spillways and several check structures are located along the Canal to control flow. The Canal is normally operated to divert flow from the Truckee River to Lahontan Dam year round, and during the summer the Canal is normally checked up in order to provide uniform flows to TCID water users.

Background on 2008 Failure of the Truckee Canal

In the early morning of January 5, 2008, a portion of the Canal embankment near the City of Fernley (approximately 12 miles downstream of Derby Dam) failed. This failure resulted in the flooding of several hundred homes and the temporary discontinuation of operations of the Canal. Upon inspection, numerous rodent burrows along much of the Canal embankment, as well as a large number of trees and other woody vegetation growing near or on the Canal, were found. A forensic evaluation found that the most likely cause for the failure was that the high water flows

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of January 4 and 5 had surged into the animal burrows and opened seepage paths through the embankment, which led to a collapse. Both the Canal inspection and the forensic evaluation findings raised concerns about the immediate and long-term structural integrity of the Canal, which included the potential risk of similar failures with continued operation. In response to these concerns, Reclamations Technical Service Center (TSC) conducted a risk assessment and subsequently issued the Report of Findings: Final Risk Assessment, Truckee Canal Issue Evaluation, in February 2008 [3]. This report recommended restricting flows within the Canal to 150 ft3/s, and provided several recommendations for structural and operational fixes that would be needed to increase Canal flows above 150 ft3/s. A flow depth at 150 ft3/s provides significantly less access to Truckee River water than the designed Canal capacity of 900 ft3/s. In the long-term, restrictions to depths at 150 ft3/s could create challenges in serving water rights, particularly to the Carson Division.

Interim Canal Capacity Limitations

In March 2008, Reclamation published the Truckee Canal Issue Evaluation, Design, Estimating and Construction Review (DEC Report) [4], which considered all of the available studies and reports on the risks posed by the Canal. The DEC Report considered factors leading up to the Canal breach, the existing condition of the Canal, and the risks of its operation at various levels of flow and concluded that limiting interim (1-to-5 years) Canal flow depths associated with an unchecked flow to 350 ft3/s would provide appropriately safe operations for the Canal, commensurate with the short-term risks for Canal failure. The certification for unchecked flows of no more than 350 ft3/s depended on several actions by TCID, including preparation and implementation of a Reclamation-approved Emergency Action Plan (EAP) and Standing Operating Procedures (SOP) and continued progress towards addressing concerns outlined in the 2008 Report of Findings [3]. TCID has satisfied these requirements since the publication of the DEC Report and has operated the Canal to unchecked flows no higher than 350 ft3/s since that time. However, the expectation in the DEC Report was that corrective actions would be accomplished in a timely manner (1 to 5 years).

Conclusions and Recommendations

The Panel acknowledges the considerable effort invested by LBAO and TCID and their representatives that has brought the Canal to its current state. Some measures taken since the 2008 Canal breach have made progress in reducing or mitigating the risk of another Canal failure (breach). Others have served to hold the risk of failure from neither increasing nor decreasing. However, some practices may lead to an increase in risk of some internal erosion failure modes, such as over excavating the invert of the Canal during sediment removal operations, potentially removing a beneficial natural lining. Barring the construction and implementation of a comprehensive corrective action alternative improving the physical conditions of the Canal, the operation of the Canal under current conditions continues to present a risk of failure. Even 2
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assuming that ongoing actions of improving monitoring and physical conditions along the Canal continue, the Panel would caution that a failure may still be possible at the current restricted level of flow and stage restrictions. It appears, given the TCIDs budget and the potential costs of the total corrective action alternatives, that any permanent fix to the Truckee Canal may be years away. In the Panels view, a continued prolonging of the 350 ft3/s restriction for an indefinite period of time will not benefit the TCID, Reclamation, or the public at risk in terms of lessening the likelihood of another failure. Given the original 2008 DEC Reports support for corrective actions and the view that the 350 ft3/s restriction would only be in place for 1 to 5 years, as well as the results of the risk assessments performed by the TSC indicating concern about flows over 150 ft3/s, there is documentation in place that suggests that additional restrictive measures to reduce the risk of Canal breach would be advisable. Furthermore, the Panel fully supports the DEC Teams contention that permanent structural modifications to the embankments are needed even if the Canal is not returned to its full capacity and/or operation. With the goal of maintaining the risk of failure as low as practicable while allowing continued operation of the Canal, the Panel offers the following recommendations. Recommendation No. 2013-1: Begin an evaluation of an acceptable long-term operational restriction for the Truckee Canal. The Panel recommends that further evaluation be undertaken to determine an acceptable longterm operating level for the Canal that can be followed until permanent structural corrective actions are completed. This study should be more extensive than the original evaluations held in 2008 and 2009 that established the current level of restrictions. Specifically, the following actions should be considered as part of this effort: Continue holding detailed discussions between the TCID and LBAO, and other stakeholders such as the City of Fernley. These discussions would be to share information learned since the Canal operational restrictions, to explore new ways to provide for safe operation of the Canal, and to minimize consequences in the event of a failure. Conduct a more extensive analysis of cross sections along the Canal in the Fernley Reach to gain an improved understanding of which stretches of Canal may pose higher risk and the relative impact of various flows or stage elevations. This evaluation should include: o Comparing Canal water levels (perhaps at various checked and unchecked flows, but as a minimum at 350 ft3/s) to downstream ground surface along the entire Fernley Reach, to better understand and identify cut and fill areas. o Comparing Canal embankment geometry (height, width, and length of similar section) along the Fernley Reach, to identify those areas where the embankment is the highest and features the steepest slopes and narrowest crest widths, and largest

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volumes of stored water. The results of comparing the Canal embankment geometry will greatly assist in determining areas of interest. o Looking more closely at foundation conditions, based on available geology, to identify areas of pervious foundation materials and potential seepage areas. It is possible that additional data collection may be needed at embankment sections deemed to be critical. Conduct a field or aerial survey that measures the Canals actual hydraulic water surface at an unchecked flow of 350 ft3/s (as well as any other flow rates of interest), at a time when the Canal is in a well-maintained state (relatively free of vegetation). Refine the hydraulic model with updated data and Canal conditions and operations that have changed over the past 5 years. A refined model could potentially improve understanding of flow conditions and resulting Canal water surface elevations due to improved maintenance and operations. Conduct a field survey or analysis of existing turnouts to determine minimum required Canal water surface elevations for operation. As these various studies and efforts are implemented or completed, update the existing risk analyses to reflect these improvements. Include TCID and LBAO personnel in the risk analysis effort.

The Panel strongly believes that such studies and discussions should begin immediately, with a goal of determining a long-term flow and Canal staging restriction by March 2015. Recommendation No. 2013-2: Target future corrective actions at those areas of the Canal that appear to pose the greatest risks. It is expected that future corrective actions may take many years to fully complete, and thus will be pursued in staged manner. The Panel recommends that the information gained from existing risk analyses studies and the above evaluations suggested in Recommendation No. 2013-1 be utilized to identify those areas along the Canal that pose greater risks in terms of probability of failure or resulting consequences. A plan and schedule should be developed to implement corrective actions in priority areas. Recommendation No. 2013-3: In the interim period prior to establishment of a long-term operational restriction, continue ongoing maintenance and improvement efforts. Current practices should continue, as improved maintenance and operations serve a definite role in reducing the probability of Canal failure. Specifically, the following activities should be continued:

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Continue maintenance of the Canal to improve flow characteristics and reduce water surface elevations in areas of identified higher risk. The results of comparing the Canal embankment geometry will greatly assist in determining areas of interest. Continue with Canal improvements, particularly in areas that are judged to be more vulnerable to failure. Continue monitoring and treatment of known seepage areas. Continue and improve TCID employee cross-training and education concerning emergency actions/mitigation, operations, maintenance, and Canal failure modes. o The use of newly developed and documented plans will help to pass this knowledge from personnel to personnel.

Continue ongoing rodent monitoring, eradication, and mitigation efforts Continue efforts to implement the Facility Improvement Plan (FIP). In addition consider utilizing automation in order to optimize Canal operations that may be applied to the FIP. Automation may require rehabilitation of structures, gates, gate operators, and other associated appurtenances.

Recommendation No. 2013-4: Re-establish the stage flow targets to better match an unchecked flow of 350 ft3/s with the Canal in a well-maintained condition. The Panel believes that until a long-term flow and staging restriction is established, the risk of a failure can be reduced by lowering the Canal water surface at all times. As a means of lowering the water surface elevation, the Panel recommends that the hydraulic height of the Canal while un-checked and relatively free of vegetation be measured (surveyed) and that the staging restrictions for the 350 ft3/s flow be re-established based upon a physical survey that represents a well-maintained Canal (not to exceed the present stage restrictions). Recommendation No. 2013-5: Minimize the routine checking-up of Canal water surface elevations. As another means of minimizing the Canal water surface elevation, the Panel recommends that the practice of checking-up the Canal to raise the water surface along certain reaches of Canal deemed to be of higher risk be limited to only those times when Canal flows are substantially below 350 ft3/s and checking is critical to allow any flows into laterals. Routine checking to permit additional storage in the Canal and to make deliveries somewhat more efficient leads to an increase in the water surface elevation which will increase the probability of a Canal failure. Recommendation No. 2013-6: Increase efforts to control vegetation in the Canal. Both of the preceding recommendations (2013-4 and 2013-5) will help reduce water levels in the Canal, but are dependent on careful and thorough control of milfoil and similar vegetation in the
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Canal. All efforts and means to control vegetation should be vigorously pursued in order to maximize the hydraulic efficiency of the Canal and thus minimize water surface elevations. Recommendation No. 2013-7: Eliminate or scale back the amount of excavation within the Canal prism. Although the efforts to keep the Canal prism free of detrimental vegetation or excessive sediment are a worthwhile goal, the Panel is concerned about the detrimental effects that may result. Widening or deepening the Canal prism increases the volume of water stored in the Canal, and as such allows the potential for a larger amount of water to flow out in the unfortunate event of a Canal breach. In addition, excavation at the invert of the Canal may remove a beneficial natural silt lining that provides an extra degree of protection against seepage from the Canal into a potentially underlying pervious foundation soils. Examples of new seepage areas showing up after Canal cleaning efforts are indications of this practice. Thus, the Panel recommends that further excavation efforts be minimized to only minor scraping of the surface to remove vegetation, if needed at all. Recommendation No. 2013-8: Take actions to minimize icing in the Canal. It has been reported that six out of the nine documented past breaches may have occurred in either December or January. This may be due in part to December or January being the most likely time for a large precipitation event to occur that could lead to sudden ramping or overtopping. It may also be due to the potential for ice to develop in the Canal, which can lead to ice dams and sudden ramping of Canal water surface elevations. For this reason, all possible efforts to minimize icing should be continued and possibly improved. For example, ensuring that structure gates can be fully and efficiently operated during freezing temperatures may be an important safeguard. Recommendation No. 2013-9: Annually re-evaluate the decision to continue Canal operations at 350 ft3/s. The Panel would caution that a failure may still be possible even if all recommendations contained in this report are accepted and implemented. The Canal has failed at least nine times in its past. Until a comprehensive corrective action is implemented, internal erosion failure modes will always be a possibility with the Canal in its current condition and at the existing operation levels. Because of the potential for another failure, the Panel recommends that the Canal operational restrictions imposed should be re-evaluated annually until the recommended evaluation to determine a long-term operational restriction is concluded and implemented.

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I. Introduction
A request to assemble a Safe Flow Determination Panel (Panel) to review the restrictions placed on the Truckee Canal (Canal) was received from the Lahontan Basin Area Office (LBAO) February 4, 2013. A Panel was assembled and convened March 27-29, 2013, with the purpose to evaluate and provide guidance to the Reclamation Lahontan Basin Area Office regarding the events and restrictions placed on the Canal since the January 5, 2008, Canal breach. The Panel toured the Canal on March 28, 2013, with the remainder of time spent at the LBAO. The Panel review included, but was not limited to, the two items listed below. Evaluating whether the current flow restriction of 350 ft3/s (based upon the requirements of the March 14, 2008 [1], Truckee Canal Breach Special Written Notice for Reinitiating Flows in the Truckee Canal, and the stage restrictions established in the June 16, 2009 letter [2], entitled Truckee Canal Water Levels, pose acceptable risk if continued as the operational restrictions on the Canal and Providing guidance regarding the frequency of the technical re-evaluation of the Canal

The Panel consisted of the following members: Robert Davis, Manager, DEC Oversight and Value Program Office, Denver, Colorado William Engemoen, Geotechnical Engineer/Risk Advisory Team, Denver, Colorado Christopher Keith, Mechanical Engineer, Boise, Idaho

The Safe Flow Determination Panel Review is based upon project documents, a technical project briefing, and a site visit. The project documents were provided by LBAO to the Panel as the initial step of the Panel Review and are listed in Appendix A. On March 27, 2013, the Panel was briefed by LBAO and Truckee-Carson Irrigation District (TCID) which was followed by a site visit on March 28, 2013. The site visit included viewing the Canals Derby Reach, Fernley Reach, and some of the Lahontan Reach. See Appendix B for a list of participants in the briefing and site visit. On March 29, 2013, the Panel and representatives from LBAO and TCID met to discuss further considerations and general thoughts on the Canal. See Appendix B for a list of participants.

II. Project Background

General
The Canal was constructed by Reclamation between 1903 and 1906 as part of the Newlands Project. The Canal serves two purposes: a) diversion of water from the Truckee River at Derby
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Dam to the Carson River at Lahontan Reservoir and, b) delivery of water to water users along the Canal. Currently the Canal is operated and maintained by TCID. In the vicinity of the City of Fernley, Nevada the Canal was constructed by excavating a ditch with a bottom width of about 16 feet and with internal slopes of about 1.5H:1V. Excavated soil was placed adjacent to the ditch on either side, creating embankments to contain Canal flows. Original drawings indicate that the embankment on the downhill side (the side between the Canal and the City of Fernley) would have a crest width of about 8 feet and the Canal had a depth of about 15 feet (13 feet hydraulic height and 2 feet of freeboard). Over the years sediment and brush accumulated in the Canal has been removed and the sediments placed on the landside of the Canal embankment as a waste berm resulting in a crest width of about 20 feet. Grading and placing road base material on the crest of the embankment has resulted in widening of the embankment crest and steepening of the upper waterside embankment slope above the maximum water surface level in the Canal. The Canal is operated by controlling diversions from the Truckee River at Derby Dam and through a number of hydraulic structures along the length of the Canal. Several waste ways or spillways and several check structures are located along the Canal to control flow. The Canal is normally operated to divert flow from the Truckee River to Lahontan Dam year round, and during the summer the Canal is normally checked up in order to provide uniform flows to TCID water users.

Background on 2008 Failure of the Truckee Canal

In the early morning of January 5, 2008, a portion of the Canal embankment near the City of Fernley, (approximately 12 miles downstream of Derby Dam) failed. This failure resulted in the flooding of several hundred homes and the temporary discontinuation of Canal operations. Upon inspection, numerous rodent burrows along much of the Canal embankment, as well as a large number of trees and other woody vegetation growing near or on the Canal, were found. A forensic evaluation found that the most likely cause for the failure was that the high water flows of January 4 and 5 had surged into the animal burrows and opened seepage paths through the embankment, which led to a collapse. Both the Canal inspection and the forensic evaluation findings raised concerns about the immediate and long-term structural integrity of the Canal, which included the potential risk of similar failures with continued operation. In response to these concerns, Reclamations Technical Service Center (TSC) conducted a risk assessment and subsequently issued the Report of Findings: Final Risk Assessment, Truckee Canal Issue Evaluation, in February 2008 [3]. This report recommended restricting flows within the Canal to 150 ft3/s and provided several recommendations for structural and operational fixes that would be needed to increase Canal flows above 150 ft3/s. A flow depth at 150 ft3/s provides significantly less access to Truckee River water than the designed Canal capacity of 900 ft3/s. In the long-term, restrictions to depths at 150 ft3/s could create challenges in serving water rights, particularly to the Carson Division. 8
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Interim Canal Capacity Limitations

In March 2008, Reclamation published the Truckee Canal Issue Evaluation, Design, Estimating and Construction Review (DEC Report) [4], which considered all of the available studies and reports on the risks posed by the Canal. The DEC Report considered factors leading up to the Canal breach, the existing condition of the Canal, and the risks of its operation at various levels of flow and concluded that limiting interim (1-to-5 years) Canal flow depths associated with an unchecked flow to 350 ft3/s would provide appropriately safe operations for the Canal, commensurate with the short-term risks for Canal failure. The certification for unchecked flows of no more than 350 ft3/s depended on several actions by TCID, including preparation and implementation of a Reclamation-approved EAP and SOP and continued progress towards addressing concerns outlined in the 2008 report of findings [3]. TCID has satisfied these requirements since the publication of the DEC Report and has operated the Canal to unchecked flows no higher than 350 ft3/s since that time. However, the expectation in the DEC Report was that corrective actions would be accomplished in a timely manner (1 to 5 years).

III. General Discussion

The Panel acknowledges that considerable effort has been invested by TCID and LBAO to bring the Canal to its current condition and operation. As a result of the data review, project briefing, and site visit, the Panel has the following general observations as they relate to the technical and operational aspects of the project Canal. These general observations are not intended to present the Panels conclusions and recommendations, but are only general observations made by the Panel during their review. The Panels conclusions and recommendations are presented in the Conclusions and Recommendations section of this report.

Safe Flow
The fundamental problem with identifying a safe or reasonable and acceptable long-term flow restriction for the Canal is that there are no risk guidelines in the United States or within the Federal community that defines what degree of risk is acceptable for canal operations. Applying risk analysis to canal operations is problematic in that there are no threshold risk values against which to compare estimated risks. The risk assessments performed to date have mostly relied on qualitative measures to portray risk. Thus the degree of risk, or safe levels, associated with the operation of a given canal must be made based solely on judgment.

Actions Taken Since January 2008 Embankment Failure

The Panel believes that the various actions that have been taken over the last 5 years have likely resulted in the lowering of the probability of a Canal failure, compared to the conditions prior to
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the 2008 breach. Both the TCID and LBAO are to be commended for their numerous efforts to improve communications, surveillance and emergency action planning, and physical conditions along the Canal, largely in the Fernley Reach. Specifically, the following actions have each contributed to a lessening of the probability and/or consequences of a Canal breach. The recent replacement of, and reduction in the number of, turnout structures has reduced the number of potential defects along the Canal by replacing old and deteriorating penetrating features with modern and filter-protected installations. The ongoing effort to replace individual residents pumping systems with designed suction lines also reduces penetrations of the Canal embankment. The rodent trapping activities and the grouting of observable burrows should serve to reduce the potential for seepage to occur due to defects resulting from burrowing from muskrats, ground squirrels, and possibly beavers. The monitoring of the Canal, including specific seepage areas, provides an improved ability to detect changing conditions and to take action before a developing problem leads to a full Canal breach. The development of documents such as the SOP, EAP, and FIP are helpful in developing and documenting procedures to address potential concerns and threats involved in the operation of the Canal. Improved communication between the TCID and LBAO is helpful in assuring a partnered approach toward the operation of the Canal and notification and discussion of potential issues.

While acknowledging the beneficial changes, it is nonetheless important to recognize that the continued operation of the Canal at a restricted flow of 350 ft3/s still presents a degree of risk. This Canal has failed at least nine times during its history, which equates to an average of almost one Canal breach per decade. Some of the factors that continue to provide a degree of risk are listed below. Both the embankment and foundation soils include low plasticity silts and sands, both of which can be highly erodible. The coarse grained foundation soils are apparently quite pervious in some areas. Over time, the embankment configuration has likely been altered by periodic cleaning efforts (using excavation equipment), which in some places may have disturbed the invert and in other areas possibly reconfigured the embankments by removing compacted soils on the water side and casting uncompacted spoils on the land side. This practice may have the potential to increase seepage, leading to a higher probability of an internal erosion failure mode.

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It is likely that some abandoned rodent holes exist in places along the Canal that do not now have an exposed feature; it would be virtually impossible to locate and fully grout all such features. When trees and other vegetation were removed, root systems were typically left in place, in part due to the risk of damaging the embankments during the effort to remove such systems. However, over time, these root systems will decay and leave penetrating defects in the embankment that could serve as potential seepage conduits.

Given the concerns listed above, it would be difficult to say with any confidence that the Canal can be safely operated at 350 ft3/s for an indeterminate period of time. In spite of the recent efforts by the TCID to improve operations, surveillance, and physical conditions at the Canal, there is simply no guarantee that another breach will not occur within the Fernley Reach. The fact that a complete failure has not occurred in the last 5 years of re-operation does not mean that a problem will not develop next year. Several seeps judged to be serious have occurred recently, even at the lowered flow rates and elevation stages.

Flow and Staging Restrictions

It is the understanding of the Panel that the original 2008 decision to operate at an unchecked flow of 350 ft3/s was meant to be a short-term restriction (1 to 5 years). As stated in the DEC Report, the DEC Team is concerned that continued operation at restricted flow levels may lead to increased animal activity near the newly established maximum water surface, which could over time, further threaten the seepage integrity of the embankments and increase the risk of Canal failure at the restricted operational levels.[4]. Furthermore, the DEC Team fully believed that permanent corrective actions should be implemented during that interim period, as evidenced by the quoted conclusion; The DEC Team strongly supports the Risk Assessment Teams recommendation to perform permanent structural modifications to the Canal embankments even if the Canal is not returned to full capacity operation.[4]. Subsequent iterations of a risk analysis of the Canal performed by the TSC since the 2008 breach have consistently concluded that Canal operations at 350 ft3/s present risks that the Risk Analysis Team considers unacceptable. In the Panels opinion there appear to be two operational constraints being combined into one restriction. The Canal within the Fernley Reach is currently restricted to a maximum unchecked flow of 350 ft3/s, which was recommended by the DEC Team and subsequently established by a court order in 2008 [5]. Secondly, Reclamation issued a letter in 2009 [2] identifying four distinct measuring points along the Fernley Reach and associated stage elevation that must not be exceeded. The elevation stages outlined in the 2009 letter were based on the estimated water surfaces indicated by the 2008 hydraulic model, which admittedly contained uncertainties. Although both sets of recommendations were based on solid engineering judgment, neither was based on a direct detailed assessment of the safe or acceptable risk posed by either the flow rate or the water surface elevations, nor on any specific engineering analyses related to the potential for internal erosion to develop. As near as the Panel can tell, the elevation stages were in large part based on the estimated water surfaces indicated by the 2008 hydraulic model.
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During the site visit on March 28, 2013, the Panel observed that the reported Canal flow measured at the Wadsworth USGS gage was 308 ft3/s. This flow was observed to be checked up at several locations along the Fernley Reach, yet the resulting water surface was well below (about 0.8 feet) the target stage elevation at each of the four monitoring locations. It is the judgment of the Panel that an unchecked flow of 350 ft3/s would likely result in water surface elevations lower than the set restriction stage targets. This is due both to the difficulty of modeling the Canal flows with a number of variables that change along reaches, but also because the TCIDs recent cleaning of the Canal vegetation and controlling milfoil growth that has resulted in more efficient Canal flow characteristics. The DEC Teams original judgment that 350 ft3/s was a reasonable interim unchecked flow restriction does not currently match the higher allowable stage elevations established a year after the DEC Report. A true unchecked flow of this amount should result in stage elevation targets lower than those currently in force as long as vegetation within the Canal is controlled. Since the probability of internal erosion is related to the head acting on the seepage path, any lowering of the Canal water surface will result in a lowered risk of internal erosion. For this reason, the Panel recommends that consideration be given to re-evaluating, and likely lowering, the four stage elevations currently in place. One way to evaluate this would be to survey the resulting Canal water surfaces when the Canal is running unchecked at 350 ft3/s, either by aerial survey or some type of ground survey. The Canal should also be relatively free of obstructive vegetation at the time of the survey. Although lower stage controls may limit the TCIDs flexibility to some extent and increase the effort applied to Canal maintenance (vegetation control), it may not have a profound effect on the ability to make deliveries. Lower stage elevation will reduce the potential for another Canal breach to develop (as well as likely reducing consequences).

Minimum Required Head for Turnouts

The minimum hydraulic head required to operate existing turnouts should also be considered when establishing a staging limit. Since the Canal breach of 2008, TCID has replaced or removed many of the Canal turnouts. This was observed during the Panels site visit of the Canal. It was also noted that the turnouts were simple gated pipes leading directly to an open flume before spilling into an open lateral canal. The Panel would recommend that the minimum hydraulic head required to operate each turnout be determined such that this information may be available when determining a likely long-term operating restriction. Minimum hydraulic levels to operate each turnout may vary depending on the desired operation of the lateral. It should be noted that minimum hydraulic head levels to operate a turnout need not always allow for submergence of the pipeline. Laminar flow may be considered in some cases. Limitations to lateral operations should be considered in concert with potential Canal staging restrictions.

Increased Canal Seepage Losses

During discussions with the TCID, it was reported that Canal seepage losses have increased in the past few years. An actual estimate has not been computed but an estimate of approximately 12
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50 ft3/s was given. Since the implementation of daily monitoring of surface seeps has not indicated such a significant rise in Canal losses, it could be inferred that a significant amount of the seepage losses are occurring directly into the relatively pervious (coarse sands and gravels) foundation formations due to scraping off of the Canals less pervious lining during maintenance operations (vegetation and sediment removal). Geologic reports indicate a general trend of the phreatic surface to dip sharply from the inboard embankment surface down to more pervious foundation layers beneath the Canal. The Panels concern is that a potential internal erosion failure mode through the foundation soils could become more likely. The excavation and removal of finer grained sediments in the Canal invert (which may have been serving as a partial liner) could lead to higher seepage flows and velocities through the upper portion of the foundation soils, potentially increasing the probability that the seepage flows could erode the sandy foundation soils within the foundation (internal erosion of foundation) or the overlying erodible embankment silts (internal erosion along the embankment/foundation contact).

Canal Automation
The Panel recognizes and applauds TCID for pursuing funding and beginning various water delivery automation and automated water monitoring projects throughout the Newlands Project. The Panel encourages continuing automation type projects especially those concerning the Canal. Canal automation will help to allow large precipitation events to be accommodated from the Truckee River and/or surrounding upslope lands in a much safer and controlled manner. Headworks gates, check structure gates, and spillway gates could all adjust and work together to maintain an acceptable level in the Canal. Automation of Canal and appurtenances could include, but is not limited to: Rehabilitation and/or replacement of Canals headworks slide gates located at Derby Diversion Dam o Utilizing existing automation equipment and infrastructure at Derby Diversion Dam may be an option. Rehabilitation and/or replacement of gates and/or gate operators, as necessary, at Canal check and spill structures. TCID is encouraged to re-visit, modify if necessary, and begin implementing the Facility Improvement Plan for the Canal. Automation can improve efficiency, responsiveness, and flexibility of a Canal system, but automation should never replace onsite personnel and judgment.

Water Conservation
The Panel is not completely familiar with the Newlands Project irrigation and water conservation practices; however, the Panel would suggest continued education of water users that water

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conservation and proper irrigation practices are crucial and each individual water users actions affect the entire project water users.

TCID Employees - Reclamation Employees - Water Users - Public Education

TCID Reclamation Education Education and succession planning is crucial when considering long-term safety, operation, and maintenance of a canal/irrigation system. The Canal provides benefits for the entire surrounding communities and beyond. The newly developed and published procedures and plans relating to the Canal will help to provide education and succession planning benefits. The Panel recognizes that the list of documents below are to be reviewed, updated, and exercised, especially with new employees and employees with new responsibilities, etc. The Panel recognizes the following documents and education tools that TCID has applied: Standing Operating Procedures (SOP) Derby Dam and Truckee Canal o Monitoring Program included in SOP o Maintenance Plan included in SOP o Special Rodent Control Plan included in SOP Emergency Action Plan Truckee Canal Facility Improvement Plan Truckee Canal Known seepage locations monitoring documentation Water Users Education Water user education is helpful for the entire project and provides several benefits. New Water Users as well as, existing Water Users can be informed and have the possibility to add value to the Newlands Project water conveyance system. Public Education Due to population growth/urbanization that comes with a water conveyance system, public education is a continual process. It is encouraged that public education continue to be an important part of the TCIDs operations. The Urbanization Increased Risk and Consequences section of this document provides further details.

Urbanization Increased Risk and Consequences

According to the TCID website (www.TCID.org) some of the Canal benefits are: The water carried through the Truckee Canal directly and indirectly supported $330 million in 2007 local economic activity. The establishment of the Newlands Project, including the 14
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Truckee Canal encouraged and allowed for the growth and industry that developed within its boundaries including: The City of Fernley, Hazen, Churchill County, Lahontan Reservoir, The City of Fallon, The Fallon Paiute-Shoshone Tribe, Naval Air Station Fallon, Lahontan Wetlands, Agriculture, and Sustainable green power generation. A hundred plus years of population growth and urbanization have increased risks and consequences for the Canal. TCID and Reclamations responsibilities have increased and/or shifted and each agency is to do its due diligence to protect life and property while continuing to deliver water for authorized project benefits. The Panel recognizes that since the 2008 incident the TCID has: Participated in and helped to foster beneficial working relationships with Reclamation personnel Improved Operation and Maintenance planning practices Worked with local entities (Counties, Cities, Planning & Zoning, Developers, etc.) to review and comment on projects that have a potential impact on Canal operations Inform public, whenever possible, regarding safety and best practices while near water conveyance facilities The above activities, and any others needed in the future, should continue and remain dynamic for as long as the project exists.

Variation in Canal Restriction

During the Panels site visit, it was noted that the Canals physical condition varied greatly along the reaches viewed. This was especially true for the Fernley Reach. The Canal exhibited many short sections of relatively high potential for failure directly adjacent to sections of far lesser risk of failure. A Canal, by nature, passes through variable subsurface geological conditions and as such the structure varies as well (cut and fill). Because of this variability of conditions, the risk of a Canal failure is also variable. This would also be true for determining a safe flow through the Canal. To provide for a reasonably safe flow, one would have to identify the weakest section of a Canal reach and provide a restrictive flow and staging that would be acceptable for that reach. The Panel has noted that it appears to be a common perception that the imposed restriction is to limit flow. The restriction of flow is actually intended to limit hydraulic loading, although the Court order places such a limit on flow. Though the amount of flow within a canal generally relates to the height of water surface in that canal, it is the canals hydraulic loading (staging) that has a direct relationship to the probability of an embankment internal erosion failure mode. Risk of failure is generally dependent on the structural conditions of the embankment, foundation geology, the hydraulic loading within the canal, and the potential of an unfiltered seepage pathway. Further evaluation should be performed to identify sections of Canal, even short sections (50 feet or less), by their relationship to the Canals existing allowable surface water elevation and relative potential for failure. When determining future Canal staging restrictions (flow and staging), it may be possible to allow flow to be checked up in some sections and limited, or disallowed, in other sections of Canal.
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The identification of such sections may also allow for decision makers to employ reasonable cost effective corrective actions to specific locations and accordingly re-assess applied flow and staging restrictions. Prior to implementation of a comprehensive structural modification to improve the physical condition of the Canal, the Panel would encourage an application of targeted improvements made to areas of high risk in conjunction with acceptable long-term flow and staging restrictions.

IV. Conclusions and Recommendations

The Panel acknowledges the considerable effort invested by LBAO and TCID and their representatives that has brought the Truckee Canal to its current state. Some measures taken since the 2008 canal breach have made progress in reducing or mitigating the risk of another canal failure (breach). Others have served to hold the risk of failure from neither increasing nor decreasing. However, some practices may lead to an increase in risk of some internal erosion failure modes, such as over excavating the invert of the canal during sediment removal operations, potentially removing a beneficial natural lining. Barring the construction and implementation of a comprehensive corrective action alternative improving the physical conditions of the canal, the operation of the canal under current conditions continues to present a risk of failure. Even assuming that ongoing actions of improving monitoring and physical conditions along the canal continue, the Panel would caution that a failure may still be possible at the current restricted level of flow and stage restrictions. It appears, given the TCIDs budget and the potential costs of the total corrective action alternatives, that any permanent fix to the Truckee Canal may be years away. In the Panels view, a continued prolonging of the 350 ft3/s restriction for an indefinite period of time will not benefit the TCID, Reclamation, or the public at risk in terms of lessening the likelihood of another failure. Given the original 2008 DEC Reports support for corrective actions and the view that the 350 ft3/s restriction would only be in place for 1 to 5 years, as well as the results of the risk assessments performed by the TSC indicating concern about flows over 150 ft3/s, there is documentation in place that suggests that additional restrictive measures to reduce the risk of canal breach would be advisable. Furthermore, the Panel fully supports the DEC Teams contention that permanent structural modifications to the embankments are needed even if the canal is not returned to its full capacity and/or operation. With the goal of maintaining the risk of failure as low as practicable while allowing continued operation of the Canal, the Panel offers the following recommendations. Recommendation No. 2013-1: Begin an evaluation of an acceptable long-term operational restriction for the Truckee Canal. The Panel recommends that further evaluation be undertaken to determine an acceptable longterm operating level for the Canal that can be followed until permanent structural corrective actions are completed. This study should be more extensive than the original evaluations held in

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2008 and 2009 that established the current level of restrictions. Specifically, the following actions should be considered as part of this effort: Continue holding detailed discussions between the TCID and LBAO, and other stakeholders such as the City of Fernley. These discussions would be to share information learned since the Canal operational restrictions, to explore new ways to provide for safe operation of the Canal, and to minimize consequences in the event of a failure. Conduct a more extensive analysis of cross sections along the Canal in the Fernley Reach to gain an improved understanding of which stretches of Canal may pose higher risk and the relative impact of various flows or stage elevations. This evaluation should include: o Comparing Canal water levels (perhaps at various checked and unchecked flows, but as a minimum at 350 ft3/s) to downstream ground surface along the entire Fernley Reach, to better understand and identify cut and fill areas. o Comparing Canal embankment geometry (height, width, and length of similar sections) along the Fernley Reach, to identify those areas where the embankment is the highest and features the steepest slopes and narrowest crest widths, and largest volumes of stored water. The results of comparing the Canal embankment geometry will greatly assist in determining areas of interest. o Looking more closely at foundation conditions, based on available geology, to identify areas of pervious foundation materials and potential seepage areas. It is possible that additional data collection may be needed at embankment sections deemed to be critical. Conduct a field or aerial survey that measures the Canals actual hydraulic water surface at an unchecked flow of 350 ft3/s (as well as any other flow rates of interest), at a time when the Canal is in a well-maintained state (relatively free of vegetation). Refine the hydraulic model with updated data and Canal conditions and operations that have changed over the past 5 years. A refined model could potentially improve understanding of flow conditions and resulting Canal water surface elevations due to improved maintenance and operations. Conduct a field survey or analysis of existing turnouts to determine minimum required Canal water surface elevations for operation. As these various studies and efforts are implemented or completed, update the existing risk analyses to reflect these improvements. Include TCID and LBAO personnel in the risk analysis effort.

The Panel strongly believes that such studies and discussions should begin immediately, with a goal of determining a long-term flow and Canal staging restriction by March 2015.
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Recommendation No. 2013-2: Target future corrective actions at those areas of the Canal that appear to pose the greatest risks. It is expected that future corrective actions may take many years to fully complete, and thus will be pursued in staged manner. The Panel recommends that the information gained from existing risk analyses studies and the above evaluations suggested in Recommendation No. 2013-1 be utilized to identify those areas along the Canal that pose greater risks in terms of probability of failure or resulting consequences. A plan and schedule should be developed to implement corrective actions in priority areas. Recommendation No. 2013-3: In the interim period prior to establishment of a long-term operational restriction, continue ongoing maintenance and improvement efforts. Current practices should continue as improved maintenance and operations serve a definite role in reducing the probability of Canal failure. Specifically, the following activities should be continued: Continue maintenance of the Canal to improve flow characteristics and reduce water surface elevations in areas of identified higher risk. The results of comparing the Canal embankment geometry will greatly assist in determining areas of interest. Continue with Canal improvements, particularly in areas that are judged to be more vulnerable to failure. Continue monitoring and treatment of known seepage areas. Continue and improve TCID employee cross-training and education concerning emergency actions/mitigation, operations, maintenance, and Canal failure modes. o The use of newly developed and documented plans will help to pass this knowledge from personnel to personnel. Continue ongoing rodent monitoring, eradication, and mitigation efforts Continue efforts to implement the FIP. In addition consider utilizing automation in order to optimize Canal operations that may be applied to the FIP. Automation may require rehabilitation of structures, gates, gate operators, and other associated appurtenances.

Recommendation No. 2013-4: Re-establish the stage flow targets to better match an unchecked flow of 350 ft3/s with the Canal in a well-maintained condition. The Panel believes that until a long-term flow and staging restriction is established, the risk of a failure can be reduced by lowering the Canal water surface at all times. As a means of lowering the water surface elevation, the Panel recommends that the hydraulic height of the Canal while 18
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un-checked and relatively free of vegetation be measured (surveyed) and that the staging restrictions for the 350 ft3/s flow be reestablished based upon a physical survey that represents a well-maintained Canal (not to exceed the present stage restrictions). Recommendation No. 2013-5: Minimize the routine checking-up of Canal water surface elevations. As another means of minimizing the Canal water surface elevation, the Panel recommends that the practice of checking-up the Canal to raise the water surface along certain reaches of Canal deemed to be of higher risk be limited to only those times when Canal flows are substantially below 350 ft3/s and checking is critical to allow any flows into laterals. Routine checking to permit additional storage in the Canal and to make deliveries somewhat more efficient leads to an increase in the water surface elevation which will increase the probability of a Canal failure. Recommendation No. 2013-6: Increase efforts to control vegetation in the Canal. Both of the preceding recommendations (2013-4 and 2013-5) will help reduce water levels in the Canal, but are dependent on careful and thorough control of milfoil and similar vegetation in the Canal. All efforts and means to control vegetation should be vigorously pursued in order to maximize the hydraulic efficiency of the Canal and thus minimize water surface elevations. Recommendation No. 2013-7: Eliminate or scale back the amount of excavation within the Canal prism. Although the efforts to keep the Canal prism free of detrimental vegetation or excessive sediment are a worthwhile goal, the Panel is concerned about the detrimental effects that may result. Widening or deepening the Canal prism increases the volume of water stored in the Canal, and as such allows the potential for a larger amount of water to flow out in the unfortunate event of a Canal breach. In addition, excavation at the invert of the Canal may remove a beneficial natural silt lining that provides an extra degree of protection against seepage from the Canal into a potentially underlying pervious foundation soils. Examples of new seepage areas showing up after Canal cleaning efforts are indications of this practice. Thus, the Panel recommends that further excavation efforts be minimized to only minor scraping of the surface to remove vegetation, if needed at all. Recommendation No. 2013-8: Take actions to minimize icing in the Canal. It has been reported that six out of the nine documented past breaches may have occurred in either December or January. This may be due in part to December or January being the most likely time for a large precipitation event to occur that could lead to sudden ramping or overtopping. It may also be due to the potential for ice to develop in the Canal, which can lead to ice dams and sudden ramping of Canal water surface elevations. For this reason, all possible efforts to minimize icing should be continued and possibly improved. For example, ensuring that structure gates can be fully and efficiently operated during freezing temperatures may be an important safeguard.

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Recommendation No. 2013-9: Annually re-evaluate the decision to continue Canal operations at 350 ft3/s. The Panel would caution that a failure may still be possible even if all recommendations contained in this report are accepted and implemented. The Canal has failed at least nine times in its past. Until a comprehensive corrective action is implemented, internal erosion failure modes will always be a possibility with the Canal in its current condition and at the existing operation levels. Because of the potential for another failure, the Panel recommends that the Canal operational restrictions imposed should be re-evaluated annually until the recommended evaluation to determine a long-term operational restriction is concluded and implemented.

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V. References
[1] Truckee Canal Breach Special Written Notice for Reinitiating Flows in the Truckee Canal, from Bureau of Reclamation, Mid-Pacific Regional Office, Sacramento, California, to Mr. Ernest C. Schank, President, Truckee-Carson Irrigation District, Fallon, Nevada, March 14, 2008. [2] Truckee Canal Water Levels, from Bureau of Reclamation, Lahontan Basin Area Office, to Mr. David P. Overvold, Project Manager, Truckee-Carson Irrigation District, Fallon, Nevada, June 16, 2009. [3] "Final Risk Assessment, Truckee Canal Issue Evaluation - Report of Findings," Newlands Project, Nevada, Mid-Pacific Region, Technical Service Center, Bureau of Reclamation, Department of the Interior, Denver, Colorado, February 2008. [4] Truckee Canal Issue Evaluation, Design Estimating and Construction Review, prepared by Bureau of Reclamation, Technical Resources, Design, Estimating and Construction Office, Denver, Colorado, prepared for Newlands Project, Nevada, Mid-Pacific Region, March 2008. [5] Judy Kroshus, et al., Plaintiff, v. United States of America, Department of the Interior, etc.,et al., Defendants., 3:08-cv-0246-LDG-RAM, Interim Temporary Restraining Order, United States District Court, District of Nevada, Filed May 28, 2008.

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Appendix A
Project Documents
Judy Kroshus, et al., Plaintiff, v. United States of America, Department of the Interior, etc., et al., Defendants., 3:08-cv-0246-LDG-RAM, Interim Temporary Restraining Order, United States District Court, District of Nevada, Filed May 28, 2008. Truckee Canal Breach Special Written Notice for Reinitiating Flows in the Truckee Canal, from Bureau of Reclamation, Mid-Pacific Regional Office, Sacramento, California, to Mr. Ernest C. Schank, President, Truckee-Carson Irrigation District, Fallon, Nevada, March 14, 2008. Guidance on Plans Required by Reclamation Letter Reinitiating Flows in the Truckee Canal dated March 14, 2008, from Bureau of Reclamation, Lahontan Basin Area Office, to Mr. David P. Overvold, Project Manager, Truckee-Carson Irrigation District, Fallon, Nevada, April 9, 2008. Truckee Canal Water Levels, from Bureau of Reclamation, Lahontan Basin Area Office, to Mr. David P. Overvold, Project Manager, Truckee-Carson Irrigation District, Fallon, Nevada, June 16, 2009. Conditional Approval to Increase Flows in the Truckee Canal, from Bureau of Reclamation, Lahontan Basin Area Office, to Mr. Ernest C. Schank, President, Truckee-Carson Irrigation District, Fallon, Nevada, May 8, 2008. Second Conditional Approval to Increase Flows in the Truckee Canal, from Bureau of Reclamation, Lahontan Basin Area Office, to Mr. Ernest C. Schank, President, Truckee-Carson Irrigation District, Fallon, Nevada, May 16, 2008. Approval of Changes to the Derby Dam and Truckee Canal Standing Operating Procedures, from Bureau of Reclamation, Lahontan Basin Area Office, to Mr. Rusty Jardine, Project Manager, Truckee-Carson Irrigation District, Fallon, Nevada, October 13, 2011. V Line Canal SOP and Derby Dam and Truckee Canal SOP, from Truckee-Carson Irrigation District, Newlands Project, to Kenneth Parr, Area Manager, Bureau of Reclamation, Lahontan Basin Area Office, Carson City, Nevada, October 5, 2010. Standard Operating Procedures, Derby Dam and Truckee Canal, Truckee-Carson Irrigation District, Fallon, Nevada, September 2010. Truckee Canal Emergency Action Plan, Truckee-Carson Irrigation District, April 30, 2012.

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Facility Improvement Plan Truckee Canal, prepared by Truckee-Carson Irrigation District, Dave Overvold, prepared for Harvey Edwards, July 31, 2008. Approval of Truckee Canal Plans, from Bureau of Reclamation, Lahontan Basin Area Office, to Mr. Ernest C. Schank, President, Truckee-Carson Irrigation District, Fallon, Nevada, July 31, 2008. Drawings of Known Seepage, Newlands Project Atlas Truckee Canal Seep Locations, Sheets 35, 9-10, 13, 16, 22, 23, 26, & 33 of 33 sheets. Truckee Canal Issue Evaluation, Design Estimating and Construction Review, prepared by Bureau of Reclamation, Technical Resources, Design, Estimating and Construction Office, Denver, Colorado, prepared for Newlands Project, Nevada, Mid-Pacific Region, March 2008. "Final Risk Assessment, Truckee Canal Issue Evaluation - Report of Findings," Newlands Project, Nevada, Mid-Pacific Region, Technical Service Center, Bureau of Reclamation, Department of the Interior, Denver, Colorado, February 2008. Updated Static Risk Analysis Fernley Reach for All Stage Levels, Truckee Canal Issue Evaluation Report of Findings, Newlands Project, Nevada, Mid-Pacific Region, Technical Service Center, Bureau of Reclamation, Department of the Interior, Denver, Colorado, February 2011. Risk Analysis Derby and Lahontan Reaches for 600 ft3/sec Flow Level, Truckee Canal Issue Evaluation - Report of Findings, Newlands Project, Nevada, Mid-Pacific Region, Technical Service Center, Bureau of Reclamation, Department of the Interior, Denver, Colorado, Risk Meeting Date: November 15 through 20, 2009, Original Report Completion Date: April 2010, Revised February 2011. Risk Analysis Derby and Lahontan Reaches for 250 to 350 ft3/sec Flow Level, Truckee Canal Issue Evaluation - Report of Findings, Newlands Project, Nevada, Mid-Pacific Region, Technical Service Center, Bureau of Reclamation, Department of the Interior, Denver, Colorado, Risk Meeting Date: March 16 and 17, 2010, Original Date: July 2010, Revised February 2011. Updated Hydrologic and Seismic Risk Analysis for All Stage Levels, Truckee Canal Issue Evaluation Report of Findings, Newlands Project, Nevada, Mid-Pacific Region, Technical Service Center, Bureau of Reclamation, Department of the Interior, Denver, Colorado, Risk Meeting Date: March 16 and 17, 2010, Report April 2011. Issue Evaluation Risk Reduction Analysis Report of Findings, Newlands Project, Nevada, Mid-Pacific Region, Technical Service Center, Bureau of Reclamation, Department of the Interior, Denver, Colorado, April 2011. Corrective Action Study Alternatives and Appraisal Level Cost Estimates, Newlands Project, Nevada, Mid-Pacific Region, Technical Service Center, Bureau of Reclamation, Department of the Interior, Denver, Colorado, June 2011. 24
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Truckee Canal Failure on 5 January 2008, Investigative Evaluation Report, URS, Sacramento, California, March 2008. Report of Findings, Truckee Canal Failure, 2008, Newlands Project, Nevada, Mid-Pacific Region, Technical Service Center, Bureau of Reclamation, Department of the Interior, Denver, Colorado, August 2008. Documentation of Animal Burrows, Truckee-Carson Irrigation District (TCID) Conduit Replacement, Truckee Canal Fernley Reach, February through April 2012, Newlands Project, Mid-Pacific Region, Geology Branch, MP-230, Bureau of Reclamation, Department of the Interior, Sacramento, California, July 2012. Hydraulic Model Results for Truckee Canal Breach Evaluation, Fernley, Nevada, Technical Service Center, Bureau of Reclamation, Department of the Interior, Denver, Colorado, March 2008. Hydraulic Model Results for the Truckee Canal Risk Assessment, Washoe County, Nevada, Technical Service Center, Bureau of Reclamation, Department of the Interior, Denver, Colorado, Peer Reviewed Draft April 2011. Geologic Data Package Truckee Canal, Fernley Reach, Mid-Pacific Region, Geology Branch, MP-230, Bureau of Reclamation, Department of the Interior, Sacramento, California, March 27, 2012.

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Appendix B
List of Participants
March 27 Project Briefing: Bureau of Reclamation, Lahontan Basin Area Office, Carson City, Nevada Kenneth Parr, Area Manager Terri Edwards, Deputy Area Manager Locke Hahne, Supervisory Civil Engineer, Maintenance Division Lee Berget, Civil Engineer, Coordination Office Bryce White, Agricultural Engineer, Coordination Office Harvey Edwards, Civil Engineer Nadira Kabir, Supervisory Civil Engineer, Special Studies Division Bureau of Reclamation, Technical Service Center, Denver, Colorado Robert Davis, Manager, DEC Oversight and Value Program Office Bill Engemoen, Geotechnical Engineer, Risk Advisory Team Bureau of Reclamation, Middle Snake Field Office, Boise, Idaho Chris Keith, Mechanical Engineer, O&M Group Truckee-Carson Irrigation District Rusty Jardine, Manager Walter Winder, Deputy Project Manager Ernie Schank, TCID Water User President of TCID Board March 28 Truckee Canal Site Visit: Bureau of Reclamation, Lahontan Basin Area Office, Carson City, Nevada Locke Hahne, Supervisory Civil Engineer, Maintenance Division Lee Berget, Civil Engineer, Coordination Office Bryce White, Agricultural Engineer, Coordination Office Harvey Edwards, Civil Engineer Nadira Kabir, Supervisory Civil Engineer, Special Studies Division Bureau of Reclamation, Technical Service Center, Denver, Colorado Robert Davis, Manager, DEC Oversight and Value Program Office Bill Engemoen, Geotechnical Engineer, Risk Advisory Team Bureau of Reclamation, Middle Snake Field Office, Boise, Idaho Chris Keith, Mechanical Engineer, O&M Group Truckee-Carson Irrigation District Rusty Jardine, Manager Walter Winder, Deputy Project Manager Eric Olson, TCID Water Users-Board Members (joined tour right before lunch) Joe Gomes, TCID Water Users-Board Members (joined tour right before lunch)

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March 29 Out-Briefing: Bureau of Reclamation, Lahontan Basin Area Office, Carson City, Nevada Kenneth Parr, Area Manager Terri Edwards, Deputy Area Manager Locke Hahne, Supervisory Civil Engineer, Maintenance Division Lee Berget, Civil Engineer, Coordination Office Bryce White, Agricultural Engineer, Coordination Office Bureau of Reclamation, Technical Service Center, Denver, Colorado Robert Davis, Manager, DEC Oversight and Value Program Office Bill Engemoen, Geotechnical Engineer, Risk Advisory Team Bureau of Reclamation, Middle Snake Field Office, Boise, Idaho Chris Keith, Mechanical Engineer, O&M Group Truckee-Carson Irrigation District Rusty Jardine, Manager Walter Winder, Deputy Project Manager Eric Olson, TCID Water Users-Board Members Joe Gomes, TCID Water Users-Board Members

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