WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

RG: 148 Exposition, Anniversary, and Memorial Commissions

SERIES: Team 3,9/11 Commission
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9/11 Classified Information

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE
 ATTACHMENTS TO THE TESTIMONY OF
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE DONALD H. RUMSFELD
TO THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS
UPON THE UNITED STATES
23 MARCH 2004

1. Media Availability with Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld en route to

Munich, Germany - February 2, 2001

2. Confirmation Testimony and Pre-Confirmation Statements by Donald Rumsfeld

on: 1. Terrorism and Asymmetrical Warfare and 2. Intelligence Failures

3. Statement of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld to the NATO North Atlantic

Council (NAC-D), June 7, 2001

4. Memo by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld - Guidelines to be Weighed

When Considering Committing U.S. Forces ~ March 2001

5. Memo by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld: "Thoughts on Terrorism" -

September 19, 2001

6. U.S. Department of State List of "Selected Terrorist Incidents Involving U.S.

Citizens Resulting in Casualties" Since 1968

7. Remarks of Donald Rumsfeld to the Association of the United States Army,

October 17, 1984

8. Memo by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld on "Major Directional

Decisions" - prepared on or after 9/11/01.

9. September 2001 Letter by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld to the Senate

Armed Services Committee Regarding Potential Veto Recommendation

10. Evolution of Certain War Plans, Programs, and Deployments from 1998-2001

11. Summary of Department of Defense Accomplishments and Initiatives 1 /01 -3/04

12. Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States-
Intelligence Side Letter, March 18, 1999,
 United States Department of Defense.

News Transcript
On the web: http://www.defenselink.mil/cgi-bui/dlprint.cgi?
http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/200 l/t02032001 t0202sd.html
Media contact: +1 (703) 697-5131
Public contact: http://www.dod.mil/faq/comment.html or +1 (703) 428-0711

Presenter: Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld Friday, February 2,2001

Media availability with Secretary Rumsfeld en route to Munich, Germany

(Media availability en route to Munich, Germany)

Q: Are you going to give the allies— you know they are quite concerned about NMD [national missile
defense] — we realize, of course, that the defense ministers understand a lot more than the ordinary person.
Are you going to give people some assurances that you are not going to move, hastily or precipitously on
NMD without close consultation or cooperation from the allies?

Rumsfeld: Well, yes indeed. I mean that's been what I've said previously when the subject's come up. It is
what the president said and it is what Secretary Powell has said. There is no question but that we are interested
in and intend to consult very closely with our allies. That is what allies do.

Q: What kind of questions do you anticipate from them? Are you prepared to give them any specifics about
^_ how you will proceed on the NMD decision-making?

Rumsfeld: We are working that through now back home but we are not yet at that stage. I had my first
meeting earlier this week. It seems it is all a blur. I am trying to think when that was on the subject. And they
are working through some things for me now. We are going to be meeting again. We are not in a position to
talk specifics.

Q: You are going to make a speech, I assume, or talk.

Rumsfeld: A little talk -- ten minutes maybe.

Q: Do you tend to outline to people what might happen if this is not done, if NMD is not done?

Rumsfeld: I am kind of old-fashioned, as everyone has been writing (laughter). I like to talk to people
individually about things like this. When you consult and listen to them and hear what they have to say; I don't
plan to make any pronouncements or anything like that —

Q: You have said pretty clearly that the danger is there and threat is there and isn't going to go away.

Rumsfeld: And it does not affect just us; it affects them every bit as much as it does us.

Q: How will you try to overcome their reservations about this and that seems to be across the board in Europe
that NMD can start another arms race, it could increase tensions with the Russians, and you, yourself, have
'"""mentioned the concern that some Europeans are concerned about de-coupling of the United States from
Europe.
remarkably peaceful close. U.S. and allied military power was the indispensable instrument
that contained the Soviet Union, confronted Soviet power and its surrogates at the
geographic extremities of its advance, and provided the shield within which democratic
order and economic prosperity could evolve and develop.

When the great struggle that was World War II has passed, this country found itself
facing new challenges with the advent of the Cold War and the development of nuclear
weapons. Today, the Cold War era is history and we find ourselves facing a new era, often
called the post-Cold War period, or possibly more properly the era of globalization.

It's an extraordinarily hopeful time, one that's full of promise, but also full of challenges.
One of those challenges, one that, if confirmed, I look forward to working with President-
elect Bush and this committee and the Congress to meet, is the challenge of bringing the
American military successfully into the 21st century, so that it can continue to play its truly
vital role in preserving and extending peace as far into the future as is possible.

As President-elect Bush has said, "After the hard but clear struggle against an evil
empire, the challenge that we face today is not as obvious, but just as noble, to turn these
years of influence into decades of peace." And the foundation of that peace is a strong,
capable, modern military, let there be no doubt.

The end of the Cold War did not bring about an end to armed conflict or the end of
challenges or threats to U.S. interests; we know that. Indeed, the centrifugal forces in world
politics have created a more diverse and less predictable set of potential adversaries, whose
aspirations for regional influence and whose willingness to use military force will produce
challenges to important U,S. interests andJo. those of our friends and allies, as Chairman
Levin mentioned.

President-elect Bush has outlined fcree overarching goals for bringing U.S. armed forces
into the 21st century. First, we must sfreng^theij.4ne bond of trust with the American
military. The brave and dedicated men and women, who serve in our country's uniform,
active Guard and Reserve, must get the best support their country can possibly provide
them, so that we can continue to call on the best people in the decades to come.

RUMSFELD:

Second, we must develop the capabilities to defend against missiles, terrorism, the newer
threats against space assets and information systems, as members of the committee have
mentioned. The American people, our forces abroad, and our friends and allies must be
protected against the threats which modern technology and its proliferation confront us.

And third, we must take advantage of the new possibilities that the ongoing technological
revolution offers to create the military of the next century. Meeting these challenges will
require a cooperative effort between Congress and the Executive Branch and with industry
and our allies as well.

If confirmed, I look forward to developing a close working relationship with this

committee and with the counterpart committees and the House of Representatives to
achieve these goals and to fashion steps to help to transform our defense posture to address
 September 28, 2001

INFORMATION MEMORANDUM: Pre-Confirmation Statements by Mr. Rumsfeld on:

1) Terrorism and Asymmetrical Warfare
2) Intelligence Failures

1) Terrorism and Asymmetrical Warfare

January 11,2001 SASC Testimony

"President-elect Bush has outlined three over-arching goals for bringing U.S. armed
forces into the 21st century. First, we must strengthen the bond of trust with the
American military. The brave and dedicated men and women who serve in our country's
uniform - active, Guard and Reserve — must get the best support their country can
possibly provide them so that we can continue to call on the best people in the decades to
come. Second, we must develop the capabilities to defend against missiles, terrorism,
the newer threats, against space assets and information systems, as members of the
committee have mentioned. The American people, our forces abroad and our friends and
allies must be protected against the threats which modem technology and its proliferation
confront us. And third, we must take advantage of the new possibilities that the ongoing
technological revolution offers to create the military of the next century." (Opening
statement)

"I'm committed to strengthening our intelligence, to serve both our short-term and our
long-term national security needs. I will personally make establishing a strong spirit of
cooperation between the DoD and the rest of the intelligence community, ... one of my
top priorities. We simply must strengthen our intelligence capabilities and our space
capabilities, along with the ability to protect those assets against various forms of
attack. (Opening statement)

"I would rank bioterrorism quite high in terms of threats. I think that it has the
advantage that it does not take a genius to create agents that are enormously powerful,
and they can be done in mobile facilities, hi small facilities. And I think it is something
that merits very serious attention not just by the Department of Defense, but by the
country. And I have an interest in it, and certainly would intend to be attentive to it."
(exchange with Senator Kennedy)

"And what we have to do is better understand what will deter and what will defend
against this new range of threats? And I don't look at them in isolation. I don't think of
long-range ballistic missiles and short-range ballistic missiles and cruise missiles and
terrorism as something that's disconnected. I think of it as a continuum. With the Gulf
 United States Department of Defense

Speech
On the web: http://www.defenselink.mil/cgi-bin/dlprint,cgi?
http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/200 l/s20010607-secdef.html
Media contact: +1 (703) 697-5131
Public contact: http://www.dod.mil/faq/comment.html or+1 (703) 428-0711

NATO North Atlantic Council (NAC-D)

Prepared Remarks by Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, Brussels, Belgium, June 7, 2001.

[NATO] Secretary-General Robertson, fellow ministers of defense.

It is certainly a surprise to me to be returning to this distinguished Council after a brief absence of a quarter of
a century. My last time at a North Atlantic Council meeting as Secretary of Defense was December 5, 1976.
Back then, we were 15 nations, and a topic of discussion was the admission of Spain into the Alliance. Today,
we are 19.

Then, the principal challenge NATO faced was the military threat posed by the Soviet Union and the Warsaw
Pact. Since then, the Alliance succeeded in its mission of preserving peace and freedom during the Cold War,
has welcomed three former members of the Warsaw Pact into the Alliance, and has extended a hand of
friendship to 27 other nations through the Partnership for Peace (PFP). These are important accomplishments
of which we all can be proud - and on which we must build.

But, as we gather here for this first meeting of NATO defense ministers in the 21st Century, we must be
careful not to rest on the accomplishments of the 20th Century. We must prepare together for the new and
quite different challenges we will face in the new century.

This is a matter of some urgency. The Cold War threats have receded, thanks, in no small part, to the work of
this Alliance. The new and different threats of the 21st Century have not yet fully emerged, but they are there.
We need to take advantage of this period to ensure that NATO is prepared for the newer security challenges
we will certainly face in the 21st century.

What might those new challenges be? We know this much for certain: it is unlikely that any of us here even
knows what is likely. One statesman summed up the prevailing mood at the turn of the last century: "War," he
wrote, "is too foolish, too fantastic, to be thought of in the 20th century. Civilization has climbed above such
perils. The interdependence of nations in trade and traffic, the sense of law, the Hague convention, liberal
principles... high finance... common sense have rendered such nightmares impossible." Then he asked: "Are
you quite sure? It would be a pity to be wrong."

They were wrong -and it was more than a pity. How often have we been wrong about the threats and
challenges to our peace and freedom? Consider the track record during my lifetime: I was born in 1932, the
Great Depression was underway, and the defense planning assumption was "No war for ten years."

By 1939, World War II had begun, and in 1941 the fleet we constructed to deter war became the first target of
a naval war of aggression in the Pacific. Airplanes did not even exist at the start of the century; by World War
II, bombers, fighters, transports had all became common military instruments that critically affected the
outcome of the war.
 March 2001

Guidelines to Be Weighed When Considering Committing U.S. Forces

Is the proposed action truly necessary?

• A Good Reason: If U.S. lives are going to be put at risk, whatever is to be done must be
in the U.S. national interest. If people could be killed, the U.S. must have a darn good
reason.
• Diplomacy: All instruments of national power should be engaged before resorting to
force, and they should stay involved once force is employed.

• Legal Basis: In fashioning a clear statement of the legal underpinning for the action and
the political basis for the decision, avoid arguments of convenience. They may be useful
at the outset to gain support, but they will be deadly later.

Is the proposed action achievable?

• Achievable: When the U.S. commits force, the task should be achievable—at acceptable
risk. It must be something the U.S. is capable of accomplishing. We need to understand
our limitations. The record is clear; mere are some things the U.S. simply cannot
accomplish.
• Clear Goals: To the extent possible, there should be clear, well considered and well
understood goals as to the purpose of the engagement and what would constitute success,
so we can know when we have achieved our goals and can honestly exit or turn the task
over to others.

• Command Structure: The command structure should be clear, not complex and one the
U.S. can accept—not a collective command structure where key decisions are made by a
committee. If the U.S. needs or prefers a coalition to achieve its goals, which it most
often will, we should have a clear understanding with coalition partners that they will do
whatever might be needed to achieve the agreed goals. We must avoid trying so hard to
persuade others to join a coalition that we compromise on our goals or jeopardize the
command structure. The mission should determine the coalition; the coalition should not
determine the mission.

Is it worth it?

• Lives at Risk: If an engagement is worth doing, the U.S. and coalition partners should be
willing to put lives at risk.

• Resources: The military capabilities needed to achieve the agreed goals must be
available and not committed or subject to call elsewhere halfway through the
engagement The U.S. cannot do everything everywhere at once.
 September 19, 2001 3:13 P

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Thoughts on Terrorism

0\g a

speeches, press briefings and talking points, internally and externally. It is always
helpful if we are all working off the same sheet of music.
1. Terrorist Attack. The September 11fc terrorist attack on the U.S. was
carefully planned. There may well be more attack plans in place, and we
must recognize that. It is likely that the terrorists planned not only the
September 11* attack and future attacks, but that they planned how they
would hide and what evidence they wished to leave behind for us to find to
confuse our search. Therefore, it will take a sustained effort to root them
out.
2. Expectations. The world needs to have realistic expectations. This
campaign is a marathon, not a sprint. No terrorist or terrorist network, such
as the Al-Qaida network, is going to be conclusively dealt with by cruise
missiles or bombers. We recognize that it will take time and pressure on
the countries that harbor these people for the foes of terrorism to be
successful. Therefore, the fact that the first, second, or third wave of our
efforts does not produce specific people should not come as a surprise. We
are patient and determined.

3. Worldwide Support. The legitimacy of our actions does not depend on

how many countries support us. More nearly the opposite is true: the
legitimacy of other countries' opinions should be judged by their attitude
toward this systematic, uncivilized assault on a free way of life. •":

4. Coalitions. The coalitions that are being fashioned will not be fixed;
rather, they will change and evolve. While most countries are concerned
about terrorism, and properly so, each country has a somewhat different Q
perspective and different relationships, views and concerns. It should not —
be surprising that some countries will be supportive of some activities in
which the U.S. is engaged, while other countries will not. Which group
any country falls into will depend on the nature and location of the activity.

U1559A /Ol

NCT0047107
 We recognize that some countries will have to conceal or downplay their
cooperation with us. That needs to be understood and accepted.

5. Fear. We understand that people have fears—fear for themselves, their

families and their governments. Therefore, some will be reluctant to join
an effort against terrorism or at least some aspects of our efforts. Terrorists
terrorize people. We accept that fact. However, we need people's help and
any information they can provide that will assist us. A number of countries
are helping quietly and we appreciate that. Indeed, we ask people across
the globe to provide us any information they have that can help in rooting
out terrorists and their networks.

6. Against Terrorism. Not the People. We are after terrorists and the
regimes that support them. This is not a war against the people of any
country. The regimes that support terrorism terrorize their own people as
well. We need to enlist all civilized people to oppose terrorism, and we
need to make it safe for them to do so.
7. Not Against Islam. This is not a war against Islam or any other religion.
The Al-Qaida terrorists are extremists whose views are antithetical to those
of most Muslims. Their actions threaten the interests of the world's
Muslims and are aimed in part at preventing Muslim people from engaging
the rest of the world. There are millions of Muslims around the world who
we expect to become allies in this struggle.
8. Secondary Effects. Finally, there will be secondary effects. We recognize
that as we continue to go after terrorism, our activities will have effects in a
number of countries. We have to accept that, given the importance of the
cause. As a result, relationships and alliances will likely be rearranged over
the coming years.

DHR:dh
091901-13

NCT0047108
 iONLY in 2004

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SELECTED TERRORIST INCIDENTS INVOLVING US CFTIZENS RESULTING IN CASUALTIES

Principal Source: Bureau of Diplomatic Security, U.S. Department of State

US Foreign Total
Date Incident Name(Sf Deaths Deaths Deaths Injuries Responsible Organization

16-Jan-68 Assassination-Cdr. USMAAG. Guatemala City 2 2 Rebel Armed Forces

28-Aug-68 Assassination-US Ambassador, Guatemala 1 1 Rebel Armed Forces

12-Oct-68 Assassination-US Armv officer. Sao Paulo. Brazil 1 1 Popular Revolutionary Vanguard

11-Jan-70 Assassination-US Armv soldier. Asmara. Ethiopia 1 1 Eritrean Liberation Front

Popular Front for the Liberation of
2l-Feb-70 Aircraft bombing-Swissair Flight 330, Zurich 6 14 20 Palestine
Kidnapping/Murder-American serviceman, Clark Air
2-Apr-70 Force Base 2 2 New People's Armv
Assassination-US Army Assistant Attache1, Amman,
10-Jun-70 Jordan 1 1 Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
Kidnapping/Murder-USAID advisor, Montevideo,
31-Jul-70 Uruguay 1 1 Tupamaros
8 May 72 Hllack aircraft-from Vienna to Tel Aviv. 1 1 5 Black September Oraanization
11 May 72 Pipe bomb~V Corps HQ. Frankfurt. GE 1 1 13 Red Armv Faction
Car Bomb-US Army European Command HQ,
24 May 72 Heidelberg. GE 3 3 5 Red Armv Faction
Machinegun/Grenade attack-Led Airport, Led,
' 30 May 72Israel 16 12 28 Japanese Red Army
US Ambassador Cleo Noel,
Kidnap/Execution- US Ambassador and DCM, DCM George Moore, &
1 Mar 73 Khartoum, Sudan Belgian Charge 2 1 3 Black September Organization
Assassination-Ford Motor Company executives,
21 May 73 Buenos Aires. Argentina 1 1 1 People's Revolutionary Army
2Jun73 Assassination-US Military Advisor. Tehran. Iran LTC Lewis Hawkins 1 1 Unamed Radical Leftist Group
5Sep72 Kidnapping/Murder-Munich Olympics, Munich 11 11 Black September Organization
Lebanese Socialist Revolutionary
18Oct73 Kidnao/Murder-Robberv of Bank of America Beirut 1 1 Organization
5Aug73 Kidnap/Murder, Athens Airport 3 2 5 55 Seventh Suicide Squad
Murder. General Manager of TRANSAX, Cordoba,
22Nov73 Argentina John Swint 1 2 3 1 People's Revolutionary Armv
Grenade Attack-ARAMCO Employees, Flumlcino
17 Dec 73 Airport, Rome, Italy 14 14 Unnamed Palestinian Terrorist Group

22 Mar 74 Kidnap/Murder. US Vice Counsel, Hermosillo, Mexico John S. Patterson 1 1 People's Liberation Armv of Mexico

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

 REMARKS OF

DONALD RUMSFELD
PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER
G.D. SEARLE & CO.

On the Awarding of

THE GEORGE CATLETT MARSHALL MEDAL

Presented By

JOHN W. DIXON
CHAIRMAN, COUNCIL OF TRUSTEES
THE ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY

OCTOBER 17, 1984

WASHINGTON, D.C.
 •*fay-H),2002 11:42 AM

SUBJECT: Major Directional Decisions—9/11/01 etseq.

1. Despite the September 11th terrorist attacks or attacks that may occur in the future, the U.S. will not pull
back or withdraw - the U.S. will stay engaged in the world.

2. When attacked, the U.S. will be "leaning forward, not back." When the U.S. is seen as faint-hearted or
risk-averse, the deterrent is weakened.

3. Terrorism: it is not possible to defend against terrorism in every place, at every time, against every
conceivable technique. Self-defense against terrorism requires preemption - taking the battle to the
terrorists wherever they are and to those who harbor terrorists.

4. The war against terrorism will be "broad-based, applying pressure and using all elements of national
power—economic, diplomatic, financial, intelligence, law enforcement and military, both overt and
covert."

5. The campaign against terrorism will be "long, hard and difficult." Terrorists do not have armies, navies
or air forces to attack, so we must go after them where they are and root them out.

6. The U.S. will not rule out anything—including the use of ground forces. This will not be an antiseptic,
"cruise missile war." The U.S. is ready and willing to put boots on the ground when and where
appropriate.

7. Coalitions: "The mission must determine the coalition; coalitions must not determine missions";
missions must not be dumbed down to the lowest common denominator by coalition pressure.

8. The U.S. wants help from all countries, in every way they consider appropriate; we recognize that to
get maximum support, it is best for each country, rather than the U.S., to characterize how and in what
ways they are assisting the overall effort.

9. Declaratory policy: the U.S. is against global terrorists and countries that harbor terrorists—"you are
either with us or against us."

10. The U.S. recognizes it must be willing to accept risks. There are causes so important that they require
putting lives at risk - fighting terrorism is one.

11. Avoid personalizing the war against terrorism by focusing excessively on UBL or Omar. The task is
bigger and broader than any one individual. We must root out the terrorist networks.

12. Because Afghanistan is "anti-foreigner," the U.S. emphasized the truth, that the U.S. is not there to
stay; rather, we are there to help fight terrorism, liberate the Afghan people from the Al Qaeda and the
Taliban, assure that it does not harbor terrorists in the future, assist with humanitarian assistance and
help establish the conditions to ensure the new Afghan government has the opportunity to succeed.

13. The link between global terrorist networks and the nations on the terrorist list that have active WMD
capabilities is real, and poses a serious threat to the world; it points up the urgency of the effort against
terrorism.
14. September 11th resulted in a major shift in the world, offering opportunities to establish new
relationships and to reorder institutions in ways that will contribute to our goals of peace and stability
for decades to come.

15. Victory on the ground was crucial to the success of the information campaign—because strength is
respected throughout the world, and particularly in the Arab world, but also because liberation of the
Afghan people has been one of the most powerful stories on our side.

16. The U.S. can be effective when we leverage the capabilities of others.

17. Perhaps most important of all, we leveraged the Achilles heel of our opponents, which was the fact that
the Taliban regime and the terrorists were so widely hated by the people they oppressed. More
generally, every government that supports terrorism also rules by terror, and the people they terrorize
are our potential allies.

18. Momentum is crucial, and it was important to pursue the campaign relentlessly—no pauses to
negotiate, no pauses for Ramadan, no pauses outside Kabul.

19. The campaign had to include humanitarian operations (and information operations) from the very
beginning. Moreover, humanitarian operations had to be viewed in a strategic way, focused on helping
those people who were on our side.

20. Military force can have political effect only if it is militarily effective or threatens to be militarily
effective. Merely blowing things up, without affecting events on the ground, becomes a symbol of
impotence.

21. Finally, success required recognizing that defeating the Taliban regime had to be a goal, rather than
preserving it to avoid chaos in Afghanistan or separating "good" Taliban from bad ones. Afghan
reconstruction (and rehabilitation of "good" Taliban) could only come after the defeat of the Taliban
regime.

22. Unified commanders are expected to develop military options void of preconceived political
constraints. First determine what is possible, then let folks in Washington worry about what can be
achieved. (CINC can certainly voice his opinion about the advisability of options.)

23. Setting the bar higher—we should list our expectations of countries based on what we want them to do
rather than what we think they are willing to do.

24. Special reconnaissance operations (SRO)—focus changed to a proactive mode that places value on our
adversaries knowing we are doing it. Some will remain unseen, others will be coercive.

25. Even though we are engaged in a large conflict, we must continue to transform in order to emerge from
this current operation with the quality of our force intact and ready to meet the many challenges of the
21st century.

Donald Rumsfeld

DHR:dh
SD Memos/Current MFRs/Major Decisions.0501
 THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1OOO DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 2O3O1-1OOO

The Honorable John W.Warner 8EP 6 2001

Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate
Room SR-228 Russell Senate Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20510-6050
Dear Senator Warner:
We have been advised that the Committee on Armed Services is considering language for OsJ
the FY02 Defense Authorization Bill that would seriously constrain the President's ability to ^ \y out

$8.3 billion for missile defense programs by $1.3 billion. In addition, the language proposed to
establish a congressional approval process for certain expenditures related to U.S. ABM Treaty
obligations would further complicate the Administration's ability to work with the Russians to
develop a new framework that moves beyond the ABM Treaty of 1972.
If such language were to become law, the U.S. would fall still further behind in
countering the threats of long-range missiles. It would extend the time of deployment for a
missile defense system even further into the future. In addition, it would send a signal to the
Russians and other countries that may prefer that the U.S. remain vulnerable to ballistic missiles
that they can wait us out, while proliferation and offensive missile developments continue apace.
By encouraging the Russians to believe that we will remain indefinitely constrained by the
restrictions of the ABM Treaty, it will make it more difficult for the President to succeed in his
efforts with the Russians to find a cooperative way forward.
Finally, I want to reiterate what Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz and I have said in testimony
before your Committee; this Administration has no plans to violate the ABM Treaty. We intend
to maintain a research and development program and continue discussions with the Russians to
establish a framework to move beyond the treaty, because it inhibits the testing of ballistic
missile defense.
If the language the Committee is considering were to be adopted by the Congress and
forwarded to the President for his signature, I would have to recommend to the President that he
veto the FY02 National Defense Authorization Act.
Sincerely,
^± Ov

cc: The Honorable Carl Levin

Chairman

U 1 4 9 0 4 701
UNCLASSIFIED

Evolution of Infinite Resolve Planning

Summary of TLAM Availability (1998-2001)

Evolution of the Armed Predator Program

UNCLASSIFIED
 The First 3 Years—1/01-3/04—Highlights
DoD A ccomylishments
Global War on Terrorism—
- Developed global offensive strategy
- Removed Taliban andAl Qaeda power
base
- Removed Iraqi regime from power—
Saddam Hussein and top Ba'athist
leaders in custody
- Degrading/damaging worldwide
terrorist networks
- Innovative approaches—to high value,
time-sensitive targets; maritime
interdiction
- Transforming mindset—more flexible
and agile
- Delegated authorities to capture/kill
high value targets
- Sense of urgency
Implemented Space Commission
Recommendations
3/4/04
Improved Military Readiness
- Funding increases to support tempo
- Joint combat capability strengthened
- Targeted pay raises
- Budget supplemental to sustain
readiness
Nuclear Posture Review
- New triad
- Nuclear weapons reductions underway
Developed Proliferation Security
Initiative
Restructured Missile Defense Program
- Withdrawal ABM Treaty
- Refocused and broadened R&D for MD
- Aggressive test program
- Began fielding an initial capability
 •') 1 ' j i
! ( « £ • '

Report of the

TO THE UNITED STATES

 DONALD RUMSFELD
SUITE *oo
400 NOBTE MICHIGAN AVEKUE
CHICAGO, LLLIKOIS eoen
TELEPHONE sie-646-oect
FACSIMILE oie-646-oese

18 March 1999

SUBJECT: Unclassified Version of Intelligence Side Letter

On behalf of members of the Commission to Assess the

Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States, I am sending
to you the unclassified version of our Intelligence Side
Letter.

The classified version of this Intelligence Side Letter

was developed by the Commissioners in response to requests
from the Congressional Leadership. We were asked to provide
observations on the extent to which the Intelligence
Community is organized, trained and equipped to monitor and
assess the ballistic missile threat to the United States
into the 21st Century, gaps that might exist with respect to
those capabilities, and any recommendations the
Commissioners might have with respect to those capabilities.

In addition, the Director of Central Intelligence asked

us to provide him with our observations.

We chose to provide these observations in a Side Letter

to our Final Report, because our charter was explicitly
limited to an assessment of the nature and magnitude of the
existing and emerging ballistic missile threat to the United
States. The classified version of the Side Letter was
delivered to the Congressional Leadership and to the senior
leadership of the Intelligence Community on 15 October 1998.
Prior to its delivery, we discussed its contents at length
with the Director of Central Intelligence, George Tenet.
 The DCI requested that the Commissioners meet with him
and the senior leadership of the Intelligence Community to
discuss their observations. This meeting took place on
6 January 1999.
At that meeting the Commissioners were briefed on the
steps being contemplated or taken by the DCI and the 1C to
address the concerns raised in our Side Letter. At that
meeting the DCI agreed to the Commissioners request to
review the Side Letter so that it might be declassified and
released to a broader audience. The. Commissioners also
proposed, and the DCI agreed, to include as part of an
unclassified Side Letter the main points raised by the 1C in
its 6 January briefing for the Commissioners.
In.late 1998, the Congress provided the Intelligence
Community with nearly $3 billion in new funding. That
funding was meant to address, in part, the issues raised in
our classified Side Letter. The Commissioners understand
that the DCI has used portions of that funding to support
the initiatives he briefed to the Commissioners.
I hope this unclassified version of the Side Letter
will help inform future efforts to assure that our
Intelligence Community is properly organized, trained and
equipped to monitor and assess the ballistic missile threat
to the United States today and into the 21st Century.
Sincerely,

Donald Rumsfeld
Enclosure