The Postwar junctures TIMELINE

About Postwar Junctures In accordance with John Ikenberrys After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding, major postwar junctures are strategic moments that provide opportunities for leading states to put forward new rules and principles of international relations and by doing so reshape international order. To do this, the leading states must have incentives to resort to institutional strategies as means to restraint indiscriminate and arbitrary state power, as well as locking in a favorable and durable postwar order. The above is shaped by two factors: 1) the extent of power disparities after the war in which the greater the power disparities the greater incentives for weaker and secondary states to establish institutional agreements that reduce the risks of domination or abandonment; and 2) the types of states that are party to the settlement in which democratic states have greater capacities to enter into binding institutions and thereby reassure the other states in the postwar settlement than non-democracies. So that, while international politics is thought to be anarchic, there indeed has been a movement in the direction of institutionalized settlement and constitutional order in which international politics, like domestic politics, has been tamed. Yet, if wars between states are becoming less common, wars within them are on the rise, especially as terrorism is becoming the weapon of the weak. Moreover, the intensive/extensive global economy that has resulted in complex interdependence could at the same time produce economic crises or post economic crises that can alter the international order, much like the postwar junctures.

1648

Westphalia settlement ending the Thirty Years War emphasized the efforts of two victorious states that of France and Sweden to undermine or erode the religious or universalism and hierarchal control of Holy Roman Empire through three principles. That is, every king or the territorial ruler is not subject to any higher political authority; the ruler was given the right to determine the religion of his realm; and the practice of balance of power, preventing any hegemon from arising and dominating anyone else. These new rules and principles have strengthened the political and legal autonomy of emerging territorial nation-states.

1713

Utrecht settlements consisted of six bilateral treaties that ended the War of Spanish Succession: Great Britain-France; Great Britain-Spain; France-Prussia; France-Holland; France-Savoy; and Savoy-Spain. The settlements eroded the tendencies of dynastic unions, severely limiting the opportunity for a dynast again to see universal monarchy. The settlements solidified state power and national interests and established the European balance of power. The settlements also marked the beginning of Britains involvement in shaping the European state system and its ascendancy in world trade. The Congress of Vienna created the order of 1815 in which the victorious states However, Britains steady expansion in Asia and the Americas created direct conflict with Britain, Austria, Prussia, and Russia buried the principles advanced by the French France. revolution and Napoleon. Great Britain, as a leading power, advanced some extensive institutional binding proposals and institutional arrangements that they understood would work alongside, but also modify, the traditional balance of power among states. It was also Britain, with technological advances and productive economy that led the rest of Europe into industrialization. The new constitutional order was able to use institutions as a mechanism of power restraint, but such order reveals the limits to which non-democratic states could create binding institutions.

1815

1919

The United States emerged after the war as the leading economy - it was almost three times the size of Great Britain in domestic economic product - but its military capabilities were not substantially greater. The prevalence of democracies among the Western postwar powers provided the Wilson administration to advance the League of Nations, binding democratic states together in a universal rule-based association. However, only some of the proposals were partially enacted and ultimately without American participation. The settlement failed apart because of the poor exercise of American power and because conflicting interests among the allies - the British wanted to use the League of Nations as a mechanism to shape the American commitment, whereas the French pursued a more formal security alliance.

1945

The United States emerged as a superpower , commanding a far more favorable position of power and its allies had pronounced incentives to move toward an institutionalized settlement than in post-WWI. The U.S. transformed post WWII by creating extensive use of binding institutions, manifest most fully in the security commitments and restraints established between the United States and its postwar allies. It was also notable for its range of institutions established in the areas of global, regional, economic, security and political. The resulting institutionalization of postwar order was vastly greater in scope than in the past, dealing with issues of economic stabilization, trade, finance, and monetary relations as political and security relations among postwar allies. But the 1945 postwar juncture also culminated in another type of settlement. One Can the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks be considered a postwar juncture? between the United States and the Soviet Union and their respective allies, and it took the While after 9/11 the United States with international support attempted to transform the form of Cold War bipolarity. Middle East (and, to a lesser extent, Southeast Asia) through building an order based on constitutional and democratic institutions, there are high risks of transnational terrorism explosions in those regions as a result. The end of the Cold War the the Soviet leaders in the late 1980s to allow NO. Clash of Globalizations bydecision Stanley of Hoffman: If wars between states are becoming peaceful change in Eastern Europe the Soviet shows evidence of the less common, wars within them areand on in the rise and Union especially in which terrorism is ability of the and of other Western to establish instituionalized restrain in becoming theU.S. weapon the weak. In democracies particular, because transnational terrorism could be great-power and superpower relations. the As aU.S. rising post-Cold War power the challenged United States seen as a product of globalization, and its allies are being in had incentives to use insitutions to lock in favorable policy orientations in otherbrought states. containing transnational terrorism. After 9/11, globalization has not profoundly NATO expansion, APEC were examples of this thinking. about changes in NAFTA, peoplesand citizenship and all that international civil society American remains officials believed that bringing newly reforming countries into these organizations would embryonic. help reinforce domestic instituions and political coalitions in these countries that were committed to political and market liberalization. YES. Will U.S. Democratization Policy Work by Lorne Craner: Despite setbacks, adjustments, and hurdles, there is cause for optimism that democracy can take root in the Middle East. Before 9/11, changes in the region were underway and now women have the right to vote in Kuwait, multiparty elections in Egypt, growing government stability in Iraq, and elected parliament in Afghanistan. Democracy is a long-term investment and when coupled with diplomatic commitment, it works. No in the sense that foreign forces should not intervene in Middle East countries internal affairs. BRICS to support Middle East Countries in Independent Political Transition: There should be basic maintenance of international law of respecting the state sovereignty and
territorial integrity of the Middle East countries. The common interest is for the Middle East to be politically open and inclusive, independent in foreign policy, sustainable in economic development, and peaceful and stable in security matters.

1989

2001

2008

Can the 2008 financial crash transform the end of history? The international order has been underlined via intergovernmental institutions and an intensive/extensive global economy of which have facilitated complex interdependence and restrained the exercise of hard power. Such transformation is likely to curb major world wars from emerging. But in an international order that is ever more interdependent, economic crises or post economic crises are likely to transform the international system. Yes with a new center of power. The Great Crash, 2008 by Roger Altman: After financial crisis, U.S. and the EU will neither have the resources nor the economic credibility to lead global affairs. The worlds center of gravity is shifting to China, which could expand its diplomatic presence or soft power in the developing world to further its model of capitalism and to secure scarce resources in order to achieve global power status. Yes with the rise of the Liberal World Order. The Future of the Liberal World Order by John Ikenberry: Many have concluded that world politics is experiencing not just a changing of the guard (i.e., BRICS) but also a transition in the ideas behind globalization (i.e. Beijing Concensus). But this panicked narrative misses a deeper reality: today's power transition represents not the defeat of the liberal order but its ultimate ascendance. BRICS have all benefited from liberal orders rules, practices, and institutions. Yes with erosion of dictatorships. Is It 1848 All Over Again by Gustavo de las Casas: The 1848 recession, unlike the 1930s, heralded democratic reforms in the major powers of Austria, France, and Prussia, as well as smaller kingdoms like Bavaria, Saxony, Denmark, and Sardinia. Drawing parallels to 1848, the 2008 recession will force current authoritarian states to hasten change to prevent mass revolts or hasten change to make them stop. This may foster reforms in Middle Easter monarch states, Belarus, Burma, Cuba, Zimbabwe, and North Korea.