Govt vs Frank: Facts: April 19, 1903: In the City of Chicago, in the State of Illinois, in the United States,

the defendant, through a representative of the Insular Government of the Philippine Islands, George I. Frank entered into a 2-year contract with the Government of the Philippine Islands. Frank was to receive a salary of $1,200.00 per year as a stenographer of the plaintiff. He will be paid in advance the traveling expenses incurred from Chicago to Manila. He will receive one-half salary during the period of travel. In case of Frank violating its terms, he will be liable to the plaintiff the amount of the expenses incurred in traveling and the one-half salary paid during such period. The defendant entered upon the performance of his contract upon the 30th Day of April 1903, and was paid halfsalary from that date until the date of his arrival in the Philippines. On February 11, 1904, Frank left the service and refused to make further compliance with the terms of the contract. Issue: Did Frank violate Laws No. 80 and No. 224? Was he capable of entering into a contract since he was a minor at that time? Held: Yes (for both issues) Ratio Decidendi The amendment of Acts No. 80 and No. 224 did not have the effect of changing the terms of the contract made between the plaintiff and defendant. The execution, interpretation and validity of a contract are determined by the law of the place where the contract is made. (Scudder vs. Union National Bank, 91 U. S., 406.) Development Bank of the Philippines vs CA: Uypitching vs Quiamco: Facts: 1982: respondent Ernesto C. Quiamco was approached by Juan Davalan, Josefino Gabutero and Raul Generoso to amicably settle the civil aspect of a criminal case for robbery filed by Quiamco against them. They surrendered to him a red Honda XL-100 motorcycle and a photocopy of its certificate of registration. The motorcycle was parked in an open space inside respondents business establishment, Avesco-AVNE Enterprises, where it was visible and accessible to the public. October 1981: the motorcycle had been sold on installment basis to Gabutero by petitioner Ramas Uypitching Sons, Inc., a family-owned corporation managed by petitioner Atty. Ernesto Ramas Uypitching. To secure its payment, the motorcycle was mortgaged to petitioner corporation. When Gabutero could no longer pay the installments, told petitioner corporations collector, Wilfredo Verao, that the motorcycle had allegedly been taken by respondents men. January 26, 1991: petitioner Uypitching, accompanied by policemen, went to Avesco-AVNE Enterprises to recover the motorcycle. Unable to find respondent, the policemen went back to Avesco-AVNE Enterprises and, on petitioner Uypitchings instruction and over the clerks objection, took the motorcycle. February 18, 1991: petitioner Uypitching filed a criminal complaint for qualified theft and/or violation of the AntiFencing Law against respondent in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Dumaguete City. July 30, 1994: the trial court rendered a decision finding that petitioner Uy pitching was motivated with malice and ill will when he called respondent a thief, took the motorcycle in an abusive manner and filed a baseless complaint for qualified theft and/or violation of the Anti- Fencing Law. Petitioners appealed the RTC decision but the CA affirmed the trial courts decision. Thus, this petition. Issue: Whether or not the petitioners are liable for damages? Held: WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.

Ratio Decidendi As they never questioned the findings of the RTC and CA that malice and ill will attended not only the public imputation of a crime to respondent but also the taking of the motorcycle, petitioners were deemed to have accepted the correctness of such findings. A mortgagee may take steps to recover the mortgaged property to enable it to enforce or protect its foreclosure right thereon. There is, however, a well-defined procedure for the recovery of possession of mortgaged property: if a mortgagee is unable to obtain possession of a mortgaged property for its sale on foreclosure, he must bring a civil action either to recover such possession as a preliminary step to the sale, or to obtain judicial foreclosure. Petitioner corporation failed to bring the proper civil action necessary to acquire legal possession of the motorcycle. Instead, petitioner Uy pitching descended on respondents establishment with his policemen and ordered the seizure of the motorcycle without a search warrant or court order. Worse, in the course of the illegal seizure of the motorcycle, petitioner Uy pitching even mouthed a slanderous statement. There is an abuse of right when it is exercised solely to prejudice or injure another. The exercise of a right must be in accordance with the purpose for which it was established and must not be excessive or unduly harsh; there must be no intention to harm another. Otherwise, liability for damages to the injured party will attach. In this case, the manner by which the motorcycle was taken at pet itioners instance was not only attended by bad faith but also contrary to the procedure laid down by law. Considered in conjunction with the defamatory statement, petitioners exercise of the ri ght to recover the mortgaged vehicle was utterly prejudicial and injurious to respondent. On the other hand, the precipitate act of filing an unfounded complaint could not in any way be considered to be in accordance with the purpose for which the right to prosecute a crime was established. Thus, the totality of petitioners actions showed a calculated design to embarrass, humiliate and publicly ridicule respondent. Petitioners acted in an excessively harsh fashion to the prejudice of respondent. Contrary to law, petitioners willfully caused damage to respondent. Hence, they should indemnify him. Article 22: Every person who through an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him. This case involves a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which seeks to reverse the decision of the Seventh Devision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 76574. IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN, DECEASED. ADOLFO C. AZNAR, Executor and LUCY CHRISTENSEN, Heir of the deceased, Executor and Heir-appellees, VS. HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA, oppositor-appellant January 31, 1963 FACTS: Edward E. Christensen, though born in New York, migrated to California, where he resided and consequently was considered a California citizen. In 1913, he came to the Philippines where he became a domiciliary until his death. However, during the entire period of his residence in this country he had always considered himself a citizen of California. In his will executed on March 5, 1951, he instituted an acknowledged natural daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen as his only heir, but left a legacy of sum of money in favor of Helen Christensen Garcia who was rendered to have been declared acknowledged natural daughter. Counsel for appellant claims that California law should be applied; that under California law, the matter is referred back to the law of the domicile; that therefore Philippine law is ultimately applicable; that finally, the share of Helen must be increased in view of the successional rights of illegitimate children under Philippine law. On the other hand, counsel for the heir of Christensen contends that inasmuch as it is clear that under Article 16 of our Civil Code, the national law of the deceased must apply, our courts must immediately apply the internal law of California on the matter; that under California law there are no compulsory heirs and consequently a testator could dispose of any property possessed by him in absolute dominion and that finally, illegitimate children not being entitled to anything and his will remain undisturbed. ISSUE: Whether or not the Philippine law should prevail in administering the estate of Christensen?

RULING: The court in deciding to grant more successional rights to Helen said in effect that there are two rules in California on the matter: the internal law which should apply to Californians domiciled in California; and the conflict rule which should apply to Californians domiciled outside of California. The California conflict rule says: If there is no law to the contrary in the place where personal property is situated, is deemed to follow the person of its owner and is governed by the law of his domicile. Christensen being domiciled outside California, the law of his domicile, the Philippines, ought to be followed. Where it is referred back to California, it will form a circular pattern referring to both country back and forth. TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased, PEOPLES BANK & TRUST COMPANY, executor, MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS, oppositors-appellants, VS. EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET. AL., heir-appellees June 6, 1967 FACTS: Amos Bellis, born in Texas, was a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States. He had 5 legitimate children with his wife, Mary Mallen, whom he had divorced, 3 legitimate children with his 2nd wife, Violet Kennedy and finally, 3 illegitimate children. Prior to his death, Amos Bellis executed a will in the Philippines in which his distributable estate should be divided in trust in the following order and manner: a. $240,000 to his 1st wife Mary Mallen; b. P120,000 to his 3 illegitimate children at P40,000 each; c. The remainder shall go to his surviving children by his 1st and 2nd wives, in equal shares. Subsequently, Amos Bellis died a resident of San Antonio, Texas, USA. His will was admitted to probate in the Philippines. The Peoples Bank and Trust Company, an executor of the will, paid the entire bequest therein. Preparatory to closing its administration, the executor submitted and filed its Executors F inal Account, Report of Administration and Project of Partition where it reported, inter alia, the satisfaction of the legacy of Mary Mallen by the shares of stock amounting to $240,000 delivered to her, and the legacies of the 3 illegitimate children in the amount of P40,000 each or a total of P120,000. In the project partition, the executor divided the residuary estate into 7 equal portions for the benefit of the testators 7 legitimate children by his 1st and 2nd marriages. Among the 3 illegitimate children, Mari Cristina and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their respective opposition to the project partition on the ground that they were deprived of their legitimates as illegitimate children. The lower court denied their respective motions for reconsideration. ISSUE: Whether Texan Law of Philippine Law must apply. RULING: It is not disputed that the decedent was both a national of Texas and a domicile thereof at the time of his death. So that even assuming Texan has a conflict of law rule providing that the same would not result in a reference back (renvoi) to Philippine Law, but would still refer to Texas Law. Nonetheless, if Texas has conflict rule adopting the situs theory (lex rei sitae) calling for the application of the law of the place where the properties are situated, renvoi would arise, since the properties here involved are found in the Philippines. In the absence, however of proofs as to theconflict of law rule of Texas, it should not be presumed different from our appellants, position is therefore not rested on the doctrine of renvoi. The parties admit that the decedent, Amos Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas, USA andthat under the Laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimates. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the amount of successional rights has to be determined under Texas Law, the Philippine Law on legitimates can not be applied to the testate of Amos Bellis.

PCIB VS. ESCOLIN 56 SCRA 266 FACTS: Linnie Jane Hodges died giving her testamentary provisions to her husband. At the time of her death, she was citizen of Texas but, was, however domiciled in the Philippines. To see whether the testamentary provisions are valid, it is apparent and necessary to know what law should be applied. ISSUE: Whether or not laws of Texas is applicable. RULING: It is necessary that the Texas law be ascertained. Here it must be proven whether a renvoi will happen or whether Texas law makes the testamentary provisions valid. In line with Texas law, that which should be proven is the law enforced during the death of Hodges and not in any other time. The Supreme Court held that the estate of Mrs. Hodges inherited by her brothers and sisters could be more than just stated, but this would depend on (1) whether upon the proper application of the principle of renvoi in relation to Article 16 of the Civil Code and the pertinent laws of Texas,it will appear that Hodges had no legitime as contended by Magno, and (2) whether or not it can be held that Hodges had legally and effectively renounced his inheritance from his wife. Under the circumstances presently obtaining and in the state of the record of these cases, as of now, the Court is not in a position to make a final ruling, whether of fact or of law, on any of these two issues, and We, therefore, reserve said issues for further proceedings and resolution in the first instance by the court o quo, as hereinabove indicated. We reiterate, however, that pending such further proceedings, as matters stand at this stage, Our considered opinion is that it is beyond cavil that since, under the terms of the will of Mrs. Hodges, her husband could not have anyway legally adjudicated or caused to be adjudicated to himself her whole share of their conjugal partnership, albeit he could have disposed any part thereof during his lifetime, the resulting estate of Mrs. Hodges, of which Magno is the uncontested administratrix, cannot be less than one-fourth of the conjugal partnership properties, as of the time of her death, minus what, as explained earlier, have been gratuitously disposed of therefrom, by Hodges in favor of third persons since then, for even if it were assumed that, as contended by PCIB, under Article 16 of the Civil Code and applying renvoi the laws of the Philippines are the ones ultimately applicable, such one-fourth share would be her free disposable portion, taking into account already the legitime of her husband under Article 900 of the Civil Code. HERMOSISIMA VS. COURT OF APPEALS -109 PHIL. 629FACTS: The complainant Soledad Cagigas is thirty six years old, a former high school teacher and a life insurance agent. The petitioner Francisco Hermosisima is ten years younger than complainant, and an apprentice pilot. Intimacy developed between them and thus sometime 1953 after coming from the movies, they had sexual intercourse in his cabin. In February 1954, the woman advised the man that she is pregnant whereupon the man promised to marry her. Their daughter Chris Hermosisima was born June 1954 in a private clinic. However, subsequently the man married one Romanita Perez. Hence, Soledad filed a complaint against Francisco for acknowledgement of her child as a natural child of the petitioner, as well as for support of said child and moral damages for alleged breach of promise to marry. The CFI declared the child a natural daughter of the defendant, ordered Francisco to support the child by giving a monthly alimony, awarded actual damages and moral damages. On appeal of the petitioner, the CA affirmed the assailed decision however increased the amount for actual and moral damages. ISSUE: Whether or not the award for moral damages is valid. RULING: The Supreme Court held that no moral damages can be had in the instant case because it was the woman who virtually seduced the man by surrendering herself to him because she a girl ten years older was overwhelmed by her love for him, she wanted to bind him by having a fruit of their engagement even before they had the benefit of clergy.

BEATRIZ P. WASSMER, plaintiff, vs. FRANCISCO X. VELEZ, defendant December 26, 1964 FACTS: Francisco Velez and Beatriz Wassmer planned to get married. However, Velez went away and Beatriz did not hear from him again. Beatriz sued Francisco and asked the latter to pay her moral damages. Velez contended that there is no provision of the law authorizing an action for breach of promise to marry. However, the court did not find this defense meritorious because even though it is true that there is no law for breach of promise to marry, Wassmer still suffered frustration and public humiliation. ISSUE: Did the court err in ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff moral damages? RULING: The case at bar is not a mere breach of promise to marry because it is not considered an actionable wrong. The mere fact the couple have already filed a marriage license and already spent for invitations, wedding apparels, gives the plaintiff reason to demand for payment of damages. The court affirmed the previous judgment and ordered the defendant to pay the plaintiff moral damages for the humiliation she suffered; actual damages for the expenses incurred and exemplary damages because the defendant acted fraudulently in making the plaintiff believe that he will come back and the wedding will push through. ALBENSON vs. COURT OF APPEALS FACTS: Albenson Ent. delivered mild steel plates to Guaranteed Industries Inc. A Pacific Banking Corporation Check was paid and drawn against the account of EL Woodworks. Check was later dishonored for the reason Account Closed. Company traced source of check and later discovered that the signature belonged to one Eugenio Baltao. Albenson made an extrajudical demand upon Baltao but latter denied that he issued the check or that the signature was his. Company filed a complaint against Baltao for violation of BP 22. It was later discovered that private respondent had son: Eugene Baltao III, who manages the business establishment, EL Woodworks. No effort from the father to inform Albenson of such information. Rather the father filed complaint for damages against Albenson. ISSUE: Whether there is indeed cause for the damages against Albenson Enterprise. RULING: Based on Art 19, 20, 21 of the civil code, petitioners didnt have the intent to cause damage to the respondent or enrich themselves but just to collect what was due to them. There was no abuse of right on the part of Albenson on accusing Baltao of BP 22. Albenson Corp. honestly believed that it was private respondent who issued check based on ff inquiries: SEC records showed that president to Guaranteed was Eugene Baltao Bank said signature belonged to EB EB did not do his part in clarifying that there were in fact 3 Ebs, Jr., Sr. and the III.

There was no malicious prosecution on the part of Albenson: there must be proof that: the prosecution was prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate a person and that damages was initiated deliberately by defendant knowing that his charges were false and groundless

Elements of abuse of right under Article 19: 1. 2. there is a legal right or duty exercised in bad faith

3.

for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another

Elements under Article 21: contra bonus mores: 1. 2. 3. there is an act which is legal but which is contrary to morals, good custom, public order or public policy it is done with intent to injure

A person who has not been paid an obligation owed to him will naturally seek ways to compel the debtor to pay him. It was normal for petitioners to find means to make the issuer of the check pay the amount thereof. In the absence of a wrongful act or omission or of fraud or bad faith, moral damages cannot be awarded and that the adverse result of an action does not per se make the action wrongful and subject the actor to the payment of damages, for the law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. C.V. No. 14948 dated May 13, 1989, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Costs against respondent Baltao. Alfredo Velayo vs Shell Company on September 8, 2011 Download a copy of this digest here. 100 Phil 168 Torts and Damages Obligations arising from human relations Prior to 1948, Commercial Airlines (CALI) owed P170k (abt. $79k) to Shell and CAL offered its C-54 plane as payment to Shell Company (the plane was in California) but Shell at that time declined as it thought CALI had sufficient money to pay its debt. In 1948 however, CALI was going bankrupt so it called upon an informal meeting of its creditors. In that meeting, the creditors agreed to appoint representatives to a working committee that would determine the order of preference as to how each creditor should be paid. They also agreed not to file suit against CALI but CALI did reserve that it will file insolvency proceedings should its assets be not enough to pay them up. Shell Company was represented by a certain Fitzgerald to the three man working committee. Later, the working committee convened to discuss how CALIs asset should be divided amongst the creditors but while such was pending, Fitzgerald sent a telegraph message to Shell USA advising the latter that Shell Philippines is assigning its credit to Shell USA in the amount of $79k, thereby effectively collecting almost all if not the entire indebtedness of CALI to Shell Philippines. Shell USA got wind of the fact that CALI has a C-54 plane is California and so Shell USA petitioned before a California court to have the plane be the subject of a writ of attachment which was granted. Meanwhile, the stockholders of CALI were unaware of the assignment of credit made by Shell Philippines to Shell USA and they went on to approve the sale of CALIs asset to the Philippine Airlines. In September 1948, the other creditors learned of the assignment made by Shell. This prompted these other creditors to file their own complaint of attachment against CALIs asset s. CALI then filed for insolvency proceedings to protect its assets in the Philippines from being attached. Velayos appointment as CALIs assignee was approved in lieu of the insolvency proceeding. In order for him to recover the C-54 plane in California, it filed for a writ of injunction against Shell Philippines in order for the latter to restrain Shell USA from proceeding with the attachment and in the alternative that judgment be awarded in favor of CALI for damages double the amount of the C-54 plane. The C-54 plane was

not recovered. Shell Company argued it is not liable for damages because there is nothing in the law which prohibits a company from assigning its credit, it being a common practice. ISSUE: Whether or not Shell is liable for damages considering that it did not violate any law. HELD: Yes. The basis of such liability, in the absence of law, is Article 21 of the Civil Code which states: Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. Thus at one stroke, the legislator, if the forgoing rule is approved (as it was approved), would vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold numbers of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to provide for specifically in the statutes. A moral wrong or injury, even if it does not constitute a violation of a statute law, should be compensated by damages. Moral damages (Art. 2217) may be recovered (Art. 2219). In Article 20, the liability for damages arises from a willful or negligent act contrary to law. In this article, the act is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy.

Development Bank of the Philippines vs. CA CASE ISSUE: Entitlement to moral damages (445 SCRA 500) FACTS: Spouses G owned seven parcels of land which they used as collateral to secure a loan for their poultry project from the DBP. The spouses subsequently entered into an agreement with E for him to pay to the bank the principal and remaining interest balance in in exchange for ownership of such lots. Come maturity time, DBP wrote a letter addressed to the spouses demanding for the payment of their remaining balance, but they did not pay or even respond to the bank. Seven months after, DBP wrote a demand letter coupled with a reminder of the upcoming maturity of their loan. When the bank, despite its efforts, did not receive any response from the spouses, it proceeded with the extrajudicial foreclosure of the secured parcels of land. Because of this, E filed a complaint claiming for injunction and payment of damages. On the part of the spouses, they also filed a complaint alleging, among others, that they are entitled to compensation for moral damages brought about by the pre-mature foreclosure. Abuse of Right Doctrine LESSONS: One may seek for compensation of moral damages through the Abuse of Rights Doctrine found in Article 19 of the Civil Code. This states that, Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith. The said doctrine has the following elements: (a) the existence of a legal right or duty; (b) which is exercised in bad faith; and (c) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another. For as long as these three are present, then the doctrine shall apply. And the test used to prove the existence of these three elements is by proving the presence of malice which is construed as bad faith or bad motive. In the case at bar, moral damages cannot be granted to the petitioners since although the foreclosure was premature, DBP made efforts as manifested in the letters of notice it sent to the spouses to let them know the status of their loans as well as the legal implications of such. Hence, the absence of DBPs malice in doing such action.