You are on page 1of 22

Philosophy of Education - HISTORICAL OVERVIEW, CURRENT TRENDS HISTORICAL OVERVIEW The word education is used sometimes to signify the

activity, process, or enterprise of educating or being educated and sometimes to signify the discipline or field of study taught in schools of education that concerns itself with this activity, process, or enterprise. As an activity or process, education may be formal or informal, private or public, individual or social, but it always consists in cultivating dispositions (abilities, skills, knowledges, beliefs, attitudes, values, and character traits) by certain methods. As a discipline, education studies or reflects on the activity or enterprise by asking questions about its aims, methods, effects, forms, history, costs, value, and relations to society. Definition The philosophy of education may be either the philosophy of the process of education or the philosophy of the discipline of education. That is, it may be part of the discipline in the sense of being concerned with the aims, forms, methods, or results of the process of educating or being educated; or it may be metadisciplinary in the sense of being concerned with the concepts, aims, and methods of the discipline. However, even in the latter case it may be thought of as part of the discipline, just as metaphilosophy is thought of as a part of philosophy, although the philosophy of science is not regarded as a part of science. Historically, philosophies of education have usually taken the first form, but under the influence of analytical philosophy, they have sometimes taken the second. In the first form, philosophy of education was traditionally developed by philosophersfor example, Aristotle, Augustine, and John Lockeas part of their philosophical systems, in the context of their ethical theories. However, in the twentieth century philosophy of education tended to be developed in schools of education in the context of what is called foundations of education, thus linking it with other parts of the discipline of educationeducational history, psychology, and sociologyrather than with other parts of philosophy. It was also developed by writers such as Paul Goodman and Robert M. Hutchins who were neither professional philosophers nor members of schools of education. Types As there are many kinds of philosophy, many philosophies, and many ways of philosophizing, so there are many kinds of educational philosophy and ways of doing it. In a sense there is no such thing as the philosophy of education; there are only philosophies of education that can be classified in many different ways. Philosophy of education as such does not describe, compare, or explain any enterprises to systems of education, past or present; except insofar as it is concerned with the tracing of its own history, it leaves such inquiries to the history and sociology of education. Analytical philosophy of education is meta to the discipline of educationto all the inquiries and thinking about educationin the sense that it does not seek to propound substantive propositions, either factual or normative, about education. It conceives of its task as that of analysis: the
1

definition or elucidation of educational concepts like teaching, indoctrination, ability, and trait, including the concept of education itself; the clarification and criticism of educational slogans like "Teach children, not subjects"; the exploration of models used in thinking about education (e.g., growth); and the analysis and evaluation of arguments and methods used in reaching conclusions about education, whether by teachers, administrators, philosophers, scientists, or laymen. To accomplish this task, analytical philosophy uses the tools of logic and linguistics as well as techniques of analysis that vary from philosopher to philosopher. Its results may be valued for their own sake, but they may also be helpful to those who seek more substantive empirical of normative conclusions about education and who try to be careful about how they reach them. This entry is itself an exercise in analytical philosophy of education. Normative philosophies or theories of education may make use of the results of such analytical work and of factual inquiries about human beings and the psychology of learning, but in any case they propound views about what education should be, what dispositions it should cultivate, why it ought to cultivate them, how and in whom it should do so, and what forms it should take. Some such normative theory of education is implied in every instance of educational endeavor, for whatever education is purposely engaged in, it explicitly or implicitly assumed that certain dispositions are desirable and that certain methods are to be used in acquiring or fostering them, and any view on such matters is a normative theory of philosophy of education. But not all such theories may be regarded as properly philosophical. They may, in fact, be of several sorts. Some simply seek to foster the dispositions regarded as desirable by a society using methods laid down by its culture. Here both the ends and the means of education are defined by the cultural tradition. Others also look to the prevailing culture for the dispositions to be fostered but appeal as well to experience, possibly even to science, for the methods to be used. In a more pluralistic society, an educational theory of a sort may arise as a compromise between conflicting views about the aids, if not the methods, of education, especially in the case of public schools. Then, individuals or groups within the society may have conflicting full-fledged philosophies of education, but the public philosophy of education is a working accommodation between them. More comprehensive theories of education rest their views about the aims and methods of education neither on the prevailing culture nor on compromise but on basic factual premises about humans and their world and on basic normative premises about what is good or right for individuals to seek or do. Proponents of such theories may reach their premises either by reason (including science) and philosophy or by faith and divine authority. Both types of theories are called philosophies of education, but only those based on reason and philosophy are properly philosophical in character; the others might better be called theologies of education. Even those that are purely philosophical may vary in complexity and sophistication.

In such a full-fledged philosophical normative theory of education, besides analysis of the sorts described, there will normally be propositions of the following kinds: 1. Basic normative premises about what is good or right; 2. Basic factual premises about humanity and the world; 3. Conclusions, based on these two kinds of premises, about the dispositions education should foster; 4. Further factual premises about such things as the psychology of learning and methods of teaching; and 5. Further conclusions about such things as the methods that education should use. For example, Aristotle argued that the Good equals happiness equals excellent activity; that for a individual there are two kinds of excellent activity, one intellectual (e.g., doing geometry) and one moral (e.g., doing just actions); that therefore everyone who is capable of these types of excellent activity should acquire a knowledge of geometry and a disposition to be just; that a knowledge of geometry can be acquired by instruction and a disposition to be just by practice, by doing just actions; and that the young should be given instruction in geometry and practice in doing just actions. In general, the more properly philosophical part of such a full normative theory of education will be the proposition it asserts in (1), (2), and (3); for the propositions in (4) and hence (5) it will, given those in (3), most appropriately appeal to experience and science. Different philosophers will hold different views about the propositions they use in (1) and (2) and the ways in which these propositions may be established. Although some normative premises are required in (1) as a basis for any line of reasoning leading to conclusions in (3) or (5) about what education should foster or how it should do this, the premises appearing in (2) may be of various sorts empirical, scientific, historical, metaphysical, theological, or epistemological. No one kind of premise is always necessary in (2) in every educational context. Different philosophers of education will, in any case, have different views about what sorts of premises it is permissible to appeal to in (2). All must agree, however, that normative premises of the kind indicated in (1) must be appealed to. Thus, what is central and crucial in any normative philosophy of education is not epistemology, metaphysics, or theology, as is sometimes thought, but ethics, value theory, and social philosophy. Role Let us assume, as we have been doing, that philosophy may be analytical, speculative, or narrative and remember that it is normally going on in a society in which there already is an educational system. Then, in the first place, philosophy may turn its attention to education, thus generating philosophy of education proper and becoming part of the discipline of education. Second, general philosophy may be one of the subjects in the curriculum of higher education and philosophy of education may be, and presumably should be, part of

the curriculum of teacher education, if teachers are to think clearly and carefully about what they are doing. Third, in a society in which there is a single system of education governed by a single prevailing theory of education, a philosopher may do any of four things with respect to education: he may analyze the concepts and reasoning used in connection with education in order to make people's thinking about it as clear, explicit, and logical as possible; he may seek to support the prevailing system by providing more philosophical arguments for the dispositions aimed at and the methods used; he may criticize the system and seek to reform it in the light of some more philosophical theory of education he has arrived at; or he may simply teach logic and philosophy to future educators and parents in the hope that they will apply them to educational matters. Fourth, in a pluralistic society like the United States, in which the existing educational enterprise or a large segment of it is based on a working compromise between conflicting views, a philosopher may again do several sorts of things. He may do any of the things just mentioned. In the United States in the first half of the twentieth century professional philosophers tended to do only the last, but at the end of the twentieth century they began to try to do more. Indeed, there will be more occasions for all of these activities in a pluralistic society, for debate about education will always be going on or threatening to be resumed. A philosopher may even take the lead in formulating and improving a compromise theory of education. He might then be a mere eclectic, but he need not be, since he might defend his compromise plan on the basis of a whole social philosophy. In particular, he might propound a whole public philosophy for public school education, making clear which dispositions it can and should seek to promote, how it should promote them, and which ones should be left for the home, the church, and other private means of education to cultivate. In any case, he might advocate appealing to scientific inquiry and experiment whenever possible. A philosopher may also work out a fully developed educational philosophy of his own and start an experimental school in which to put it into practice, as John Dewey did; like Dewey, too, he may even try to persuade his entire society to adopt it. Then he would argue for the desirability of fostering certain dispositions by certain methods, partly on the basis of experience and science and partly on the basis of premises taken from other parts of his philosophyfrom his ethics and value theory, from his political and social philosophy, or from his epistemology, metaphysics, or philosophy of mind. It seems plausible to maintain that in a pluralistic society philosophers should do all of these things, some one and some another. In such a society a philosopher may at least seek to help educators concerned about moral, scientific, historical, aesthetic, or religious education by presenting them, respectively, with a philosophy of morality, science, history, art, or religion from which they may draw conclusions about their aims and methods. He may also philosophize about the discipline of education, asking whether it is a discipline, what its subject matter is, and what its methods, including the methods of the philosophy of education, should be. Insofar
4

as the discipline of education is a science (and one question here would be whether it is a science) this would be a job for the philosopher of science in addition to one just mentioned. Logicians, linguistic philosophers, and philosophers of science may also be able to contribute to the technology of education, as it has come to be called, for example, to the theory of testing or of language instruction. Finally, in a society that has been broken down by some kind of revolution or has newly emerged from colonialism, a philosopher may even supply a new fullfledged normative philosophy for its educational system, as Karl Marx did for Russia and China. In fact, as in the case of Marx, he may provide the ideology that guided the revolution in the first place. Plato tried to do this for Syracuse, and the philosophes did it for France in the eighteenth century. Something like this may be done wherever the schools "dare to build a new society," as many ask schools to do. Dewey once said that since education is the process of forming fundamental dispositions toward nature and our fellow human beings, philosophy may even be defined as the most general theory of education. Here Dewey was thinking that philosophy is the most general normative theory of education, and what he said is true if it means that philosophy, understood in its widest sense as including theology and poetry as well as philosophy proper, is what tells us what to believe and how to feel about humanity and the universe. It is, however, not necessarily true if it refers to philosophy in the narrower sense or means that all philosophy is philosophy of education in the sense of having the guidance of education as its end. This is not the whole end of classical philosophy or even of philosophy as reconstructed by Dewey; the former aimed at the truth rather than at the guidance of practice, and the latter has other practical ends besides that of guiding the educational enterprise. Certainly, analytical philosophy has other ends. However, although Dewey did not have analytical philosophy in mind, there is nevertheless a sense in which analytical philosophy can also be said to be the most general theory of education. Although it does not seek to tell us what dispositions we should form, it does analyze and criticize the concepts, arguments, and methods employed in any study of or reflection upon education. Again it does not follow that this is all analytical philosophy is concerned with doing. Even if the other things it doesfor example, the philosophy of mind or of scienceare useful to educators and normative theorists of education, as, it is hoped, is the case, they are not all developed with this use in mind.
Philosophy of education is a field characterized not only by broad theoretical eclecticism but also by a perennial dispute, which started in the mid-twentieth century, over what the scope and purposes of the discipline even ought to be. In the "Philosophy of Education" article that was included in the previous edition of this encyclopedia, William Frankena wrote, "In a sense there is no such thing as the philosophy of education" (p. 101). During certain periods of the history of the

philosophy of education, there have been dominant perspectives, to be sure: At one time, the field was defined around canonical works on education by great philosophers (Plato of ancient Greece, the eighteenthcentury Swiss-born Frenchman Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and others); at other times, the field was dominated, in the United States at least, by the figure of John Dewey (18591952) and educational Progressivism; at other times, the field was characterized by an austere analytical approach that explicitly rejected much of what had come before in the field as not even being proper "philosophy" at all. But even during these periods of dominance there were sharp internal disputes within the field (such as feminist criticisms of the "Great Man" approach to philosophy of education and vigorous critiques of the analytical method). Such disputes can be read off the history of the professional societies, journals, and graduate programs that institutionalize the field, and they can be documented through a succession of previous encyclopedia articles, which by definition attempt to define and delimit their subject matter. These sorts of struggles over the maintenance of the disciplinary boundary, and the attempt to define and enforce certain methods as paramount, are hardly unique to philosophy of education. But such concerns have so preoccupied its practitioners that at times these very questions seem to become the substance of the discipline, nearly to the exclusion of thinking about actual educational problems. And so it is not very surprising to find, for example, a book such as Philosophers on Education. Consisting of a series of essays written by professional philosophers entirely outside the discipline of philosophy of education, the collection cites almost none of the work published within the discipline; because the philosophers have no doubts about the status of the discipline of philosophy of education, they have few qualms about speaking authoritatively about what philosophy has to say to educators. On the other hand, a fruitful topic for reflection is whether a more selfcritical approach to philosophy of education, even if at times it seems to be pulling up its own roots for examination, might prove more productive for thinking about education, because this very tendency toward selfcriticism keeps fundamental questions alive and open to reexamination. WILLIAM K. FRANKENA Philosophy of education is a field characterized not only by broad theoretical eclecticism but also by a perennial dispute, which started in the mid-twentieth century, over what the scope and purposes of the discipline even ought to be. In the "Philosophy of Education" article that was included in the previous edition of this encyclopedia, William Frankena wrote, "In a sense there is no such thing as the philosophy of education" (p. 101). During certain periods of the history of the

philosophy of education, there have been dominant perspectives, to be sure: At one time, the field was defined around canonical works on education by great philosophers (Plato of ancient Greece, the eighteenthcentury Swiss-born Frenchman Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and others); at other times, the field was dominated, in the United States at least, by the figure of John Dewey (18591952) and educational Progressivism; at other times, the field was characterized by an austere analytical approach that explicitly rejected much of what had come before in the field as not even being proper "philosophy" at all. But even during these periods of dominance there were sharp internal disputes within the field (such as feminist criticisms of the "Great Man" approach to philosophy of education and vigorous critiques of the analytical method). Such disputes can be read off the history of the professional societies, journals, and graduate programs that institutionalize the field, and they can be documented through a succession of previous encyclopedia articles, which by definition attempt to define and delimit their subject matter. These sorts of struggles over the maintenance of the disciplinary boundary, and the attempt to define and enforce certain methods as paramount, are hardly unique to philosophy of education. But such concerns have so preoccupied its practitioners that at times these very questions seem to become the substance of the discipline, nearly to the exclusion of thinking about actual educational problems. And so it is not very surprising to find, for example, a book such as Philosophers on Education. Consisting of a series of essays written by professional philosophers entirely outside the discipline of philosophy of education, the collection cites almost none of the work published within the discipline; because the philosophers have no doubts about the status of the discipline of philosophy of education, they have few qualms about speaking authoritatively about what philosophy has to say to educators. On the other hand, a fruitful topic for reflection is whether a more selfcritical approach to philosophy of education, even if at times it seems to be pulling up its own roots for examination, might prove more productive for thinking about education, because this very tendency toward selfcriticism keeps fundamental questions alive and open to reexamination. Any encyclopedia article must take a stance in relation to such disputes. However much one attempts to be comprehensive and dispassionate in describing the scope and purpose of a field, it is impossible to write anything about it without imagining some argument, somewhere, that would put such claims to challenge. This is especially true of "categorical" approaches, that is, those built around a list of types of philosophy of education, or of discrete schools of thought, or of specific disciplinary methods. During the period of particular diversity and interdisciplinarity in the field that has continued into the twenty-first century, such
7

characterizations seem especially artificialbut even worse than this, potentially imperial and exclusionary. And so the challenge is to find a way of characterizing the field that is true to its eclecticism but that also looks back reflexively at the effects of such characterizations, including itself, in the dynamics of disciplinary boundary maintenance and methodological rule-setting that are continually under dispute. One way to begin such an examination is by thinking about the impulses that draw one into this activity at all: What is philosophy of education for? Perhaps these impulses can be more easily generalized about the field than any particular set of categories, schools of thought, or disciplinary methods. Moreover, these impulses cut across and interrelate approaches that might otherwise look quite different. And they coexist as impulses within broad philosophical movements, and even within the thought of individual philosophers themselves, sometimes conflicting in a way that might help explain the tendency toward reflexive selfexamination and uncertainty that so exercises philosophy of education as a field.
The Prescriptive Impulse

The first impulse is prescriptive. In many respects this is the oldest and most pervasive inclination: to offer a philosophically defended conception of what the aims and activities of teaching ought to be. In some instances, as in Plato's Republic, these prescriptions derive from an overall utopian vision; in other instances, such as seventeenth-century English philosopher John Locke's Some Thoughts Concerning Education or Rousseau's mile, they derive from a fairly detailed reconception of what the day-to-day activities of teaching should look like; in still other instances, such prescriptions are derived from other social or moral principles, as in various Kantian views of education (even though eighteenth-century German philosopher Immanuel Kant himself had very little to say on the subject). These prescriptive inclinations are in many respects what people expect from philosophy of education: a wiser perspective, a more encompassing social vision, a sense of inspiration and higher purpose. It is what people usually mean when they talk about having a "philosophy of education." A broad range of perspectives in the field share this prescriptive impulse: many of these perspectives can be comprised in what was once called the "isms" approach (perennialism, idealism, realism, Thomism, and so on) the idea that a set of philosophical premises could generate a comprehensive and consistent educational program. For many years, working out the details of these "philosophies of education" was considered the main substance of the field, and the debates among the

"isms" were typically at the very basic level debates among fundamentally different philosophical premises. An implication of this approach was that disagreements tended to be broadly "paradigmatic" in the sense that they were based on all-or-none commitments; one could not, of course, talk about a synthesis of realist and idealist worldviews. One wag has suggested that the "isms" have more recently been replaced by the "ists"less purely philosophical and more social/political theories that now typify many scholars working in philosophy of education (Marxists, feminists, multiculturalists, postmodernists, and so on). These will be characterized as critically oriented philosophies below, but at this stage it is important to see that these perspectives can be equally driven by the prescriptive impulse: many writers (for example, neo-Marxist advocates of Paulo Freire's "critical pedagogy") offer quite explicit accounts of how education ought to proceed, what it is for, and whose interests it ought to serve.
The Analytical Impulse

The second impulse that drives much of philosophy of education is analytical. In a broad sense this includes not only philosophical approaches specifically termed "analytical philosophy" (such as conceptual analysis or ordinary language analysis), but also a broader orientation that approaches the philosophical task as spelling out a set of rational conditions that educational aims and practices ought to satisfy, while leaving it up to other public deliberative processes to work out what they might be in specific. In this enlarged sense, the analytical impulse can be seen not only in analytical philosophy per se but also in studies that focus on the logical and epistemological criteria of critical thinking; in the diagnosis of informal fallacies in reasoning; in certain kinds of liberal theory that spell out broad principles of rights and justice but that remain silent on the specific ends that education ought to serve; and even in some versions of German philosopher Jrgen Habermas's theory, which proposes a structure of communicative deliberation in which conversations must satisfy what he calls a set of general "validity" claims, but which does not specify or constrain in advance what that process of deliberation might yield. The analytical impulse is often seen as expressing a certain philosophical modesty: that philosophers do not prescribe to others what their educational choices ought to be, but simply try to clarify the rational procedures by which those choices should be arrived at. Here metaphors such as referees who try to adjudicate an ongoing activity but remain nonpartisan within it, or groundskeepers who pull up weeds and prepare the soil but do not decide what to plant, tend to predominate in how this

version of philosophy of education is presented and justified to others. The idea that philosophy provides a set of tools, and that "doing philosophy of education" (as opposed to "having a philosophy of education") offers a more workmanlike self-conception of the philosopher, stands in sharp contrast with the idea of philosophy as a system-building endeavor. Of course, it must be said that this impulse is not entirely free of the prescriptive inclination, either. For one thing, there is a prescriptiveness about the very tools, criteria, principles, and analytical distinctions that get imported into how problems are framed. These are implicitly (and often explicitly) presented as educational ideals themselves: promoting critical thinking or fostering the conditions for Habermasian communication in the classroom, for example. However rationally defended these might be, they will undoubtedly appear to some as imposed from "on high." Moreover, at a deeper level, the analytic/prescriptive distinction is less than clear-cut: a theory of logic, or a theory of communication, however purely "procedural" it aspires to be, always expresses conceptions of human nature, of society, of knowledge, of language, that contains social and cultural elements that might appear "natural" or "neutral" to the advocates of those procedures, but that will be regarded as foreign and particularistic by others ("why must I justify my educational choices by your criteria?"). This is not meant as a criticism of the analytical orientation, but it just shows how these impulses can and do coexist, even within accounts that regard themselves as primarily one or the other.
The Critical Impulse

Similarly, the third impulse, a critical orientation, can coexist with either or both of the others. The critical impulse, like the analytical one, shares the characteristic of trying to clear the ground of misconceptions and ideologies, where these misrepresent the needs and interests of disadvantaged groups; like the prescriptive impulse, the critical impulse is driven by a positive conception of a better, more just and equitable, society. Where the critical impulse differs from the others is in its conception of the contribution philosophy can play in serving these ends. From this orientation, philosophy is not just a set of tools or an abstract, programmatic theory; it is itself a substantive personal and political commitment, and it grows out of deeper inclinations to protect and serve the interests of specific groups. Hence the key philosophical ideas stressed in critically oriented philosophies of education (reflection, counterhegemony, a critique of power, an emphasis upon difference, and so on) derive their force from their capacity to challenge a presumably oppressive dominant society and enable put-upon individuals and groups

10

to recognize and question their circumstances and to be moved to change them. As there are prescriptive and analytical elements in critically oriented philosophies of education, so there can be critical elements in the others. Philosophers of education more driven by a prescriptive or analytical impulse can and do share many of the same social and political commitments as critically oriented philosophers of education; and some of them may see their work as ultimately serving many of the same goals of criticizing hegemonic ideologies and promoting human emancipation. This is why these three impulses or orientations must not be seen as simple categories to which particular philosophies (or philosophers) can be assigned. Stressing their character as impulses highlights the motivational qualities that underlie, and frequently drive, the adoption of particular philosophical views. While philosophers tend to stress the force of argument in driving their adoption of such views, and while they do certainly change their minds because of argument and evidence, at some deeper level they are less prone to changing the very impulses that drive and give vigor to their philosophical investigations. By stressing the ways in which all three impulses can coexist within different philosophical schools of thought, and even within the inclinations of a given philosopher, this account highlights the complex and sometimes even contradictory character of the philosophical spirit. When philosophers of education teach or speak about their views, although they certainly put forth arguments, quotations of and references to literature, and so forth, at a deeper level they are appealing to a shared impulse in their audience, one that is more difficult to argue for directly, and without which the arguments themselves are unlikely to take hold.
Implications of the Impulses for Philosophy of Education

Given the existence of these three impulses, how can they help in providing an overview of the field of philosophy of education that does not fall into arguments about disciplinary boundary maintenance? First, these very broad orientations are in many respects easier to generalize within the field than would be any specific set of disciplinary criteria; many different kinds of philosophy of education can manifest these sorts of inclinations. Indeed, it makes for strange bedfellows when people consider that despite their vigorous paradigmatic differences they are actually motivated by very similar underlying philosophical commitments. Perhaps this recognition might create a stronger incentive for them to engage one another respectfully across those differences. Second, it is beneficial for philosophers to consider that the validity they attribute to certain kinds of arguments may not be driven simply by the

11

objective force of those arguments, but also by a particular appeal those kinds of arguments have for them. This sort of reflectiveness might be fruitful for various reasons, but a significant benefit could be in raising a person's appreciation for why others may not be moved by the arguments that seem so patently obvious to that person; and why the force of argument alone may not be sufficient to generate philosophical agreement or reconcile disagreement. Given the pervasively eclectic and interdisciplinary nature of the field of philosophy of education, such a spirit of tolerance and inclusiveness, while not needing to be unbounded entirely, would be a valuable corrective to the historical tendency to establish the methodsor the philosophical school that will separate proper philosophy of education from the imposters. Advocates of more prescriptive approaches typically buttress their case for dominance by reference to canonical Great Works (Plato, ancient Greek philosopher Aristotle, Locke, Rousseau, Dewey). This sort of systembuilding across epistemological, ethical, and social/political issues is what the great philosophers do, and it is revealing that for them philosophy of education was rarely seen as a distinct area of inquiry but merely the working out in practice of implications for teaching and learning that were derived from their larger positions about truth, value, justice, and so on. Advocates of more analytical approaches, as noted, tend to put more reliance upon the tools of philosophical investigation, and less on particular authors or sources. In the twentieth century, versions of these approaches tended to dominate philosophy of education, especially in the English-speaking world, as they have many departments of philosophy itself. Indeed, when one surveys accounts of the field of philosophy of education from the 1990s forward, they nearly all chart the history as one of the rise to dominance of an analytical approach and then a succession of critiques and attacks upon it. Advocates of more critical approaches suffer from a particular difficulty carrying out their philosophical work in a way that is consistent with their broader commitments. Naturally, any philosophical approach aspires to consistency of some sort; but to the extent that critically oriented philosophers are concerned with challenging power structures, hegemonic belief systems, and universalisms that obscure, not to say squelch, the particular beliefs, values, and experiences of those whom they seem to empower, such philosophers must also endeavor to avoid these potentially oppressive tendencies in their own writing and teaching. This tension is perhaps felt most acutely by contemporary post-modern philosophers of education, but it can be seen in much of the work of neoMarxists, critical theorists, feminists, and Foucauldians as well: how to

12

argue for and promote an emancipatory approach to education that does not itself fall into the habits of exclusionary language, authoritative (if not authoritarian) postures, and universalizing generalizations that are excoriated when detected in the work of others.
Summary

This entry has tried to provide an overview of how the field of philosophy of education has seen itself, and it has recounted major elements in the narratives by which the history of the field has been traced by others. At the same time it has tried to reveal problems with the ways in which these different accounts have been driven in part by various agendas to define a scope and boundary for the field, and often to privilege one or another approach to philosophy of education, even when they have endeavored to be comprehensive and fair to all views. This entry has taken a different approach, first, by resisting the temptation to provide a single definition or characterization of the field; and, second, by stressing not schools of thought or methodological divisions as the categories for thinking about the field, but rather the underlying inclinations, or impulses, that animate philosophical inquiry. As noted, for a field that tends to resist and argue over every attempt to define it, such caution is probably prudent, but it has an added benefit as well. When philosophers think about the impulses that motivate their areas of inquiry and ways of thinking about them, they relate their philosophical work not solely to an abstract order of truth but to themselves; and it is a short step from that recognition to extending that way of thinking to others as well. The generosity of outlook that results might be the one thing that all philosophers of education can share.

Aristotle B.C.) (384322) - Education for a Common End Aristotle, the Greek philosopher and scientist, was born in Stagira, a town in Chalcidice. At the age of seventeen he became a member of the Greek philosopher Plato's school, where he stayed for twenty years. After Plato's death in 348 B.C.E. Aristotle taught philosophy, first at Atarneus in Asia Minor, then in Mytilene on the island of Lesbos. Then he became tutor of Alexander the Great at the court of Macedonia. In 335 or 334 B.C.E. he returned to Athens and founded a school called the Lyceum. Aristotle's first writings were dialogues modeled on Plato's examples; a few have survived in fragmentary form. The main body of writings that have come down to us consists of treatises on a wide range of subjects; these were
13

probably presented as lectures, and some may be notes on lectures taken by students. These treatises lay unused in Western Europe after the collapse of the Roman Empire in the sixth century C.E., until they were recovered in the Middle Ages and studied by Muslim, Jewish, and Christian thinkers. The large scope of the treatises, together with the extraordinary intellect of their author, gained for Aristotle the title, "the master of those who know." The treatises are investigative reports, describing a method of inquiry and the results reached. Each treatise includes: (1) a statement of the aim of the subject matter; (2) a consideration of other thinkers' ideas; (3) an examination of proposed principles with the aim of determining the one that has the best prospect of explaining the subject matter; (4) a search for the facts that illustrate the proposed principle; and (5) an explanation of the subject matter by showing how the proposed principle explains the observed facts. The treatises were essential to the work of the Lyceum, which was a school, a research institution, a library, and a museum. Aristotle and his students compiled a List of Pythian Winners; researched the records of dramatic performances at Athens; collected 158 constitutions, of which only The Constitution of Athens has survived; prepared a literary and philological study called Homeric Problems; and put together a collection of maps and a museum of objects to serve as illustrations for lectures. Aristotle's writings on logic worked out an art of discourse, a tool for finding out the structure of the world. The other subject matters of Aristotle's treatises are of three kinds: (1) the theoretical sciencesmetaphysics, mathematics, and physicsaim to know for the sake of knowing; (2) the productive sciences such as poetics and rhetoricaim to know for the sake of making useful or beautiful things; and (3) the practical sciencesethics and politicsaim to know for the sake of doing, or for conduct. Aristotle said that the theoretical sciences are capable of being understood by principles which are certain and cannot be other than they are; as objects of study their subject matters are necessary and eternal. The productive sciences and the practical sciences are capable of being understood by principles that are less than certain; as objects of study their subject matters are contingent. Thus Aristotle's idea was that distinct sciences exist, the nature of each to be determined by principles found in the midst of the subject matter that is peculiarly its own. A plurality of subject matters exists, and there is a corresponding plurality of principles explaining sets of facts belonging to each subject matter. What is learned in any subject matter may be useful in studying others; yet there is no hierarchy of subject matters in which the principles of the highest in the order of Being explain the principles of all the others.

14

Education for a Common End


Unlike Plato's Republic and Laws, Aristotle's treatises do not contain lengthy discussions of education. His most explicit discussion of education, in Books 7 and 8 of the Politics, ends without being completed. Yet, like Plato, Aristotle's educational thinking was inseparable from his account of pursuing the highest good for human beings in the life of a community. The science of politics takes into account the conduct of the individual as inseparable from the conduct of the community. Thus Aristotle holds that ethics is a part of politics; and equally, politics is a part of ethics. This leads him to argue that the end of individuals and states is the same. Inasmuch as human beings cannot realize their potentiality apart from the social life that is necessary for shaping their mind and character, an investigation into the nature of society is a necessary companion to an investigation into the nature of ethics. The good life is inescapably a social lifea life of conduct in a community. For Aristotle, "the Good of man must be the end of the science of Politics" (1975,1.2.1094b 78). In community life, the activity of doing cannot bring into existence something apart from doing; it can only "end" in further doing. And education, as one of the activities of doing, does not "produce" anything apart from education, but must be a continuing process that has no end except further education. In Aristotle's explicit remarks about the aims of education, it is clear that, like all activities in pursuit of the good life, education is "practical" in that it is a way of conduct, of taking action. At the same time, in pursuing the good life, the aim is to know the nature of the best state and the highest virtues of which human beings are capable. Such knowledge enables us to have a sense of what is possible in education. Educational activity is also a "craft" in the sense that determining the means appropriate for pursuing that which we think is possible is a kind of making as well as a kind of doing. It is commonplace to say that, in doing, we try to "make things happen." Education is an attempt to find the kind of unity of doing and making that enables individuals to grow, ethically and socially. The Politics ends by citing three aims of education: the possible, the appropriate, and the "happy mean." The idea of a happy mean is developed in the Nicomachean Ethics. There human conduct is held to consist of two kinds of virtues, moral and intellectual; moral virtues are learned by habit, while intellectual virtues are learned through teaching. As examples, while humans are not temperate or courageous by nature, they have the potentiality to become temperate and courageous. By taking on appropriate habits, their potentialities can be actualized; by conducting themselves appropriately they can learn to actualize their moral virtues. Thus children learn the moral virtues before they know

15

what they are doing or why they are doing it. Just because young children cannot control their conduct by intellectual principles, Aristotle emphasizes habit in training them. First, children must learn the moral virtues; later, when their intellectual powers have matured, they may learn to conduct themselves according to reason by exercising the intellectual virtues. Arguing that the state is a plurality that should be made into a community by education, Aristotle insisted that states should be responsible for educating their citizens. In the Politics, Book 8, he makes four arguments for public education: (1) from constitutional requirements; (2) from the origins of virtue; (3) from a common end to be sought by all citizens; and (4) from the inseparability of the individual and the community. In most states in the Greek world before Aristotle's time, private education had prevailed. Finally, Aristotle's enduring legacy in education may be characterized as threefold. First is his conception of distinct subject matters, the particular nature and conclusions reached in each to be determined as the facts of its subject matter take their places in the thinking and conduct of the investigator. Second is his insistence on the conjoint activities of ethics and politics, aiming to gain the practical wisdom that can be realized only insofar as citizens strive for the highest good in the context of a community of shared ends. This means that the end of ethics and politics is an educational end. And, third, the education that states need is public education. Although thinkers may know in a preliminary way what the highest good isthat which is required by reasonthey will not actually find out what it is until they learn to live in cooperation with the highest principles of reason. The highest good is never completely known because the pursuit of it leads to further action, which has no end but more and more action. The contingent nature of social existence makes it necessary to find out what is good for us in what we do; we cannot truly learn what it is apart from conduct. While reason is a part of conduct, alone it is not sufficient for realizing the highest good. Only by our conduct can we find out what our possibilities are; and only by further conduct can we strive to make those possibilities actual.
TOPIC 4: THE PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE FOR TEACHERS (MIDSEM TEST) 4.1 Introduction The philosophy of education will be discussed first, since we need to understand the philosophy of education, before we can discuss about its significance for teachers. The lecture will cover seven philosophies of education (idealism, realism, pragmatism, existentialism, essentialism, progressivism, and social reconstructionism); followed by the

16

significance of four of these philosophies (pragmatism, existentialism, essentialism, and social reconstructionism) for teachers. 4.2 The Philosophy of Education Philosophy of education, as we know, focuses on the values, beliefs and attitudes in relation to the process of growth of individuals and society. These values, beliefs and attitudes determine the direction of our education, particularly the aims, goals, objectives, contents, delivery and assessment of education. Now, we will look some educational philosophies which will help us to understand better the goals of education. Idealism: Ideal means a conception of objects as something that are perfect, having noble character, visionary, and existing only in imagination. Idealism views that education should focus on moral, spiritual and mental aspects of human being; and that the truth and values are absolute, timeless, and universal. Education should concern with ideas and concepts and their relationship, with the final outcomes of education are the most general and abstract subjects. Mathematics is important to develop abstract thinking; while history and literature are important to develop moral and culture. Realism: Real means a conception of objects as something that are actual, existence, and authentic, rather than imaginary. Realism views the world in terms of objects and matter; and everything is derived from nature and is subjected to its laws. Realism suggests that education should focus on objects and matter; and views that people can learn about the world through their senses and reasons. However, just like idealist, realist views that the ultimate goals of education are the most general and abstract subjects. Realist stresses that the subjects such as ethical, political and economics are important in life; while reading, writing and arithmetic are necessary as basic education. Pragmatism: Pragmatic means a conception of objects as something that are real, and having cause-effect relationship and practical values. Pragmatism views the world as not fixed, but constantly changing; and views knowledge as process and not as product. Education, therefore, should focus on experiencing the process, for example, learning occurs as pupil engages in problem solving. Knowing is an interaction between the learner and environment (both are undergoing constant changes). Teaching is not focused on what to think, but on how to think critically; and hence, it should be more exploratory than explanatory. The ultimate goal of education is for the learner to acquire the process of solving problems in an intelligent manner. Existentialism: Existential means a conception of objects as actual being, existing, occurring, appearing, or emerging. Existentialism views the world as subjective, depending upon ones perception; and that knowledge is a personal choice. Education should focus on emotional, aesthetic and philosophical subjects; such as literature, drama and arts. Learners are allowed to choose the subject(s) for their self-fulfillment. Curriculum should stress on selfexpressive and experimentation activities that will create emotions, feelings and insights. The ultimate goal of education is to develop consciousness about freedom to choose, and the meaning ones choices and responsibility in relation to these choices. Essentialism: Essential means a conception of objects as something that are absolutely necessary, indispensable, or vital. Essentialism views that education should focus on the fundamental and essential subjects, such as the 3 Rs (reading, writing, arithmetic) as the fundamental subjects at primary school level; and five academic subjects at secondary school level (English, mathematics, science, history & foreign language). Essentialism rejects the subjects such as arts, music, physical education, homemaking and vocational education. The ultimate goal of education is the acquisition of culture and mastery of essential skills, facts, concepts, and thinking skills.

Progressivism: Progressive means a conception of objects as something that are moving forward toward specific goal, further stage, or cumulative improvement. Progressivism views that education should promote democratic society in which students could learn and practice the skills and tools necessary for democratic living; which include problem-solving methods and scientific inquiry; and learning experiences that include cooperative behaviors and selfdiscipline; which are important for democratic living. Since reality constantly keeps changing (similar to pragmatism), progressivism believes that there is little need to focus on fixed body of knowledge. Social Reconstructionism: Social reconstruction means a conception that the social problems; such as poverty and lack of educational and employment opportunities; can be solved through education. Social reconstructionism believes that people are responsible for creating social conditions, whether they are good or bad. It views that education should prepare people to create new good and just society and to bring the have-nots into a better society.

17

Other than those who are fortunate helping out those who are unfortunate, education can play its role by preparing students to meet their intellectual, emotional, personal, and social needs, to solve their social problems. 4.3 Significance of Philosophy of Education for Teachers The significance of the philosophy of education for teachers can be discussed by looking at the goals of education, role of students, role of teachers and teaching methods for various philosophies of education (Figure 6.3, p 151). We are going to look at four philosophies of education as examples, i.e. the Existentialism, Pragmatism, Essentialism, and Social Reconstructionism. Pragmatism: The goal of education under this philosophy is developing and applying practical knowledge and skills for life in a progressive democratic society. The role of students is to show active learning and participation. Hence, teachers need to plan teaching and learning activities that encourage students to actively participate in learning. The role of teachers is to teach inductive and deductive reasoning, scientific method, and the power of observation and practice, which can be achieved through the teaching methods of hands-on curricula, group work, and experimentation. Existentialism: The goal of education under this philosophy is developing authentic individuals who exercise freedom of choice and take responsibility for their actions. The role of students is to develop independence, selfdiscipline, set challenges, and solve problems. Teachers should know this goal to decide what to teach, how to teach, how students learn and how to assess learning outcomes. The role of teachers is to encourage students to philosophize about life and to recognize and fulfill personal freedom, which can be done through the teaching methods of discussion and analysis, examination of choice-making in own and others live. Essentialism: The goal of education under this philosophy is acquisition of culture and cultural literacy for personal benefit. The role of students is to receive knowledge and demonstrate minimum competencies. The role of teachers under this philosophy is to deliver a standard curriculum, which can be done through teaching methods of subject-centered direct instruction. Teachers need to know this role in order to plan teaching and learning activities that are subject-centered and can deliver the standard content through direct instruction. An example of a subject with standard curriculum is history. A teacher can prepare the content of a lesson and delivers the content through direct instruction. Social Reconstructionism: The goal of education under this philosophy is solving social problems and create a better world. The role of students is to inquire, apply critical thinking skills, and take action. The role of teachers under this philosophy is to ask questions, present social issues and problem solving challenges, and serve as organizer and information resource, which can be done through the teaching methods of stimulating divergent thinking and group discussion. Teachers should give emphasis on social studies, social problems, global education, and environmental issues. 4.4 Tutorial Activity Read Chapter 6 of the textbook from page 152 to 156. Explain in your own words of your understanding about the philosophies of Marxism, Behaviorism, Cognitivism, Perennialism and Essentialism.

TOPIC 5: THE SOCIOLOGY OF EDUCATION (MIDSEM TEST) 5.1 Introduction

In Topic 1, we defined education as the growth process of the individuals and society; and in Topic 2, we defined sociology as the branch of knowledge that deals
with the origin, development, organization and functioning of human society. Since, sociology of education is a branch of sociology that focuses on education, it can be defined as the origin, development, organization and functioning of human society that are associated with the growth process of the individuals and society.

18

Some argued that education is a valued-based activity in which individuals experiencing and accepting what is valued by our society. Few argued that education is the transmission of culture. As we all know, a society is made up of people with different customs, beliefs, values, languages, religions and social institutions. Beside all these local cultures, our society is exposed to global cultures brought to us by foreign visitors and various technologies, such as internet, CDs, magazines, films, etc. Ask ourselves, Which of these cultures should we transfer to children/youths? 5.2 Social Foundations of Education Transmitting and Improving Society: John Dewey (an American educator) believed that aims of education were of both transmitting and improving society. To do this, educators must be very selective in determining and organizing the experiences for the children and society. Hence, educators, together with others in the society, are responsible in determining the content and activities (experiences) that can help individuals to grow and finally to improve their society. The aims of transmitting and improving society were carried out by the schools which educate and socialize the younger members of the society. Modal Personality comprises of a set of characteristics that differentiate citizens of one country to those of other countries (mod means distinguished attributes). For example, there are certain behaviours, attitudes and feelings that distinguish the Americans from Europeans, which are believed to be the outcomes of schooling. American schools, among other things, focus on the national civic culture to inculcate modal personality. How do Malaysians differ from citizens of other countries? Is it due to their schooling (formal education) or other institutions, such as homes or religious institutions (informal education)? Though each country has cultural pluralism, there still exist a modal personality for all citizens of that country. They gain this modal personality through schooling, which offers standard curriculum that develops the modal personality. Do Malaysians have modal characteristics? Can we list some of them? We in Malaysia have a large number of foreign workers that came from many countries. Do you think they have the Malaysian modal personality? If we have a modal personality, regardless of religion, national origin, race, class or gender; we will still have common points of likeness. The Americans, for example, despite of having different economic level, education, manners, taste, ethnic group, origin and tradition; they have many points of likeness, such as language, diet, hygiene, dress, basic skills, land use, community settlement and recreation. They are closer together in their moral outlook, political beliefs and social attitudes; compared to other nationals. Do we have any points of likeness in Malaysia? What are they? Most of these points of likeness are society behaviours, which are actually the sociology of a community. This is in fact an example of the social foundations of education. Belief in the possible is perhaps another point of likeness that the Americans have, i.e. belief that anything is possible. Slogans such as Work hard and you will succeed, Just do it, Anyone can grow up to be president and What counts is not where you came from but what you do are just some examples of this belief. US schools are promoting this message throughout the country. What can these slogans promote for the American people? Perhaps right attitudes and the belief that The measure of a person is his or her achievements. Belief in moral bases for right action is another point of likeness for the Americans. When American educators discuss about the rights of individuals to an education, they belief that people have a moral right to further their humanness (to be good people). The belief also will guide the Americans in their individual and collective (group) conduct (behaviour). The slogan such as Just say no to either sex or drugs indicates the influence of this belief. This is another social phenomenon that influences education. 5.3 A Dynamic, Changing Society

19

The social foundations become very important in education because of the rapid change in our society. The appropriate education for various groups cannot be determined accurately, since the groups are changing, ethnic demands are emerging, information is exploding, behaviours are being modified, and values are being altered. What are the changes that we see in Malaysia? May be food preferences, entertainments, etc. How do these affect education? Thus, we have difficulty to set education for the present, and even more complex for the future. As the society changes rapidly, the education should also change accordingly. For example, as most mothers are now working, they have problems taking care of their young children. In response to this change, the schools now have the provisions of taking children as young as four years old. Parents can send their younger children to nurseries either at private place or at place of work. The idea of literacy is no longer confined to reading and writing, but must be expanded to cultural, scientific, computer, technological, electronic and research literacy. The number of Asian immigrants in US increases from 13% to 38% in 1981-1990. In California, people of colour are already majority. In Seattle schools, over 34 languages are spoken. English as second language is a must for the students. Education must be responsive to the needs of the diversity of students, while at the same time, transferring the civic culture that serves as the binding for the American nation. Schools need different learning outcomes, pedagogical approaches, flexible curricula, and different teaching environments. 5.4 Tutorial Activity National Philosophy of Malaysian Education (NPME): Education in Malaysia is an on-going effort towards further developing the potential of individuals in a holistic and integrated manner so as to produce individuals who are intellectually, spiritually, emotionally and physically balanced and harmonic, based on a firm belief in and devotion to God. Such an effort is designed to produce Malaysian citizens who are knowledgeable and competent, who possess high moral standards and who are responsible and capable of achieving high level of personal well-being as well as being able to contribute to the harmony and betterment of the family, society and nation at large (CDC, MOE, 1988). Discuss the Malaysian philosophy of education from the perspectives of the philosophy of education and the sociology of education. Which philosophy(s) matches the NPME? What are the social aspects of human relations that are covered by NPME?

TOPIC 6: HISTORY OF EDUCATION (FINAL EXAM) 6.1 History of Education: Introduction History, in Topic 2 is defined as: the branch of knowledge that deals with past events. Therefore, history of education can be defined as: the branch of knowledge that deals with past events that were related to education. The events that took place during a particular period of time in a country had influenced the education of that country, that is, the history of particular country becomes the foundations of education of that country. Think of Malaysia, can you recall an event that had changed our goals of education? Curricula are prepared or created within political, social, economic and cultural contexts. The people who created the curricula have firm belief in appropriate social action, views of knowledge, acceptance of political ideologies, allegiances to class value systems, incorporation of economic motives, and even 20

adherence to religious convictions. These values are sometimes being challenged by various sectors of community. Can you think of one curriculum that was not yet accepted in Malaysia? We are going to look at American history of education as an example. 6.2 The Colonial Period: 1642-1776 In the northern (New England) colonies, the history of American education started with the education in the earliest colony of Massachusetts, a settlement of the Puritans (members of a sect of Protestant from England) who hold strictly to religious discipline. The earlier schools in Massachusetts were concerned with the doctrines of Puritan church. The major purpose of schooling was to teach children to read scriptures (passages) from the Bible and the notices of civil affairs department. The major goal of education then was to enable children to read and understand the principles of religion and the laws of the Commonwealth. The basic education in Massachusetts at that time was reading and writing; and Latin in addition was taught mainly to prepare students to go to Harvard College. In the middle colonies, unlike in Massachusetts (everyone used English language), there were no common language or religion existed. Due to the differences in the language used and religious believes, no single school system could be established in the middle colonies. These differences motivated the settlers of different ethnic and religious groups to established parochial (provincial/ local) and independent schools, rather than the central or district-wide school system as in New England. The present concept of cultural pluralism in fact already existed 200 years ago in the middle colonies. Think of Malaysia, are there similarities to what had happened in the North America with respect to school system or cultural pluralism? In the southern colonies, the education decisions were left to the family. There was no formal education here and the focus of education was only on vocational skills. Why vocational skills? The legislative provision was instituted only to the guardians of poor children, orphans, and illegitimate children, that is for them to provide private education or vocational skills to the children. The privileged class of white children (children of plantation owners) received their education through private tutors. The poor white children (children of the farm workers) did not have any formal education, with most of them could not read or write. They continued to become farmers just like their parents. The children of Black slaves were forbidden to learn to read or write. The curriculum of colonial schools in the northern, middle and southern colonies; despite the differences in language, religion, and economic system; was influenced by the English political ideas. The religious commitment had high priority in all schools and society, and the family played a major role in socialization and education of all children. The curriculum of colonial schools consisted of reading, writing, arithmetic, and some religious faith, and lessons to develop manners and morals. The curriculum stressed on basic skills, social and religious conformity, faith in authority, knowledge for the sake of knowledge, rote learning and memorization. There were various types of schools existed during this period, such as the town schools (one-room primary schools), private schools (established by missionary, ethnic and religious groups), Latin grammar schools (for sons of upper class), academy (secondary school) and college (Harvard or Yale). 6.3 The National Period: 1776-1850 School curricula during Colonial Period were mostly based on religious needs. However, during the National Period, secular forces had changed American education from religious based primary and secondary education to more function based education. The secular forces argued that the time spent on studying the two dead languages (Latin & Greek), for example, should be better used to study science, to help the new America to explore and develop its natural resources. The secular forces also had influenced the development of democracy, strong federal government, an emerging cultural nationalism,

21

the idea of religious freedom, and new discoveries in natural sciences. As a result of this movement, the federal government became more committed to education and had allocated 154 million acres of land for schools. The government even decided to give free primary, secondary, college and university education, The school curriculum during the National Period (Rushs curriculum) stressed on reading, writing, arithmetic and history in elementary school; English, German, the arts and especially sciences at secondary school and college level; and good manners and moral principles for all levels. Education was seen more for the development of natural resources, and to promote democracy. During this period also, grammar schools were built for gifted students and scholarships were given to gifted students who could not pay tuition fees. Half of the scholarship students were later assigned positions as primary school teachers. Educational policy makers (e.g. Rush, Jefferson, Franklin) were all concerned with equality of educational opportunity; and had proposed nationwide education for all children and youth. Students of superior ability were identified and given free secondary and college education. During this period also, the Americans were thinking of having their own national cultures, for example having a national language and literature, which should be different from the English language and literature used in Britain. This language (spelling, pronunciation & reading) should be taught deliberately and systematically to the children and youth in the nations schools. The selection of literature was focused on portraying patriotism, heroism, hard work, diligence, and virtuous living; with the tone of moral, religion, capitalistic, and pro-American. Other than the cultures, the Americans also aspired to expand the moral and political ideas as their contributions to humankind. For example, they had shown to Europe the proof that institutions founded on equality and representation principles (democracy) were capable of maintaining good governments. 6.4 Tutorial Activity Read Chapter 4 of the textbook from page 90 to 102. Explain in your own words, your understanding about the influence of religion, politics, industry or others in each of the education described (Education in Southern Colonies, Middle Atlantic Colonies, New England Colonies, Education for the Slaves, Education for Native Americans, Education in Spains Colonies, Education for Women).

22

You might also like