DATA

VNEB: Development and Transport Action Group PUBLIC INQUIRY INTO TFL'S PROPOSAL TO EXTEND THE NORTHERN LINE FROM KENNINGTON TO BATTERSEA POWER STATION OBJECTION: VNEB DEVELOPMENT AND TRANSPORT ACTION GROUP STATEMENT OF CASE About DATA DATA is a civic interest group that is an Affiliated Association to one of Vauxhall's longest established Civic Societies, The Vauxhall Society. DATA was established in October 2011 to provide a networking umbrella for a range of other civic groups with an interest in transport implications associated with the major development of the Vauxhall, Nine Elms, Battersea Opportunity Area (VNEB OA). DATA is also associated with, and draws its support from, a wide range of other Civic Groups across the South Lambeth area, including the Lansdowne Residents Association and the Kennington Association Planning Forum and has a wide newsletter readership across the area. DATA is also a member of the Coalition of Lambeth and Walworth Residents group. DATA was at the forefront in pressing the previous owners of the Battersea Power Station site (Treasury Holdings) to allow Civic Groups to have direct discussions with TfL and was one of the first groups to be allowed to do so. DATA's aims were to work with TfL in identifying facts about their proposed NLE project but their best endeavours were cut short by TfL's refusal to undertake any meaningful engagement following their meeting with DATA on 12 January 2012. DATA has drawn upon its broad perspective to provide an holistic view of the NLE proposal. It is important that the full range of concerns and objections against TfL's proposal should be taken as cumulative evidence that demonstrates its unsuitability rather than as a series of individual issues. TfL has access to a huge range of resources and PR teams that can provide glib responses that appear to address individual issues but which lack real substance. The fact is that there are a large number of very serious issues that either have not been addressed or that have been skewed to fit the TfL agenda that there can be no confidence in the overall proposal as it stands, even that it is the right choice of transport investment. Indeed, DATA has carried out research into TfL's NLE proposal and discovered that the whole proposal is built on myth, incomplete information, manipulated presentation of selective information and an absence of any real consultation or consideration for public realm or public interest. It seems that their only interest is to get this tube extension built at someone else's expense as soon as possible. While DATA uses its best endeavours to be able to present its case, it comprises members of the public who have limited resources and limited time to be able to respond to a highly technical issue. TfL, on the other hand, has had the luxury of a huge range of resources, including PR companies, its own staff, a massive

infrastructure and a full time engagement with an obscure agenda. TfL has consistently made it difficult for public engagement with the real issues by dressing up selective facts, not releasing key information when asked and setting difficult deadlines, for example the December 2012 consultation which closed over the Xmas period. It should also be borne in mind that the preparation for this public inquiry also occurs over the Summer holiday period when many families are on holiday, making it difficult to prepare a full Statement of Case. DATA has also only recently been able to access the final report by Lambeth Council's technical consultants, Ramboll and TfL's own Statement of Case. There has been insufficient time to consider the former but DATA has had a preliminary look through the latter and has, so far as possible in the short time available, been able to include reference to TfL's Statement of Case in its own Statement of Case. This is not, however, a full response to TfL's Statement of Case due to lack of time to consider its implications. Introduction to statement of case After more than eighteen months of refusing substantive contact with DATA, TfL wrote to DATA on 5 July 2013 in response to the request to the Department for Transport for a public inquiry to ask for more information on a number of the issues raised in DATA's letter to the Secretary of State dated 17th June. Unfortunately, due to time constraints, DATA was unable to meet TfL separately but the wider coalition of Civic Groups against the NLE proposal held a meeting with TfL on 19th August and DATA's points, sent to TfL in advance by email on 16 August 2013, were reiterated. DATA raised a number of questions in its response to TfL and is still waiting for answers. A copy of TfL's letter to DATA and DATA's response, with a series of question, are shown as documents referenced Intro 1 to Intro 4. DATA's wants a Public Inquiry to examine all aspects of TfL's NLE proposal. It concurs with the detailed points made by other members of the Coalition of Lambeth and Walworth Residents group. DATA's outline objections to the TfL NLE proposal were set out in its letter to the Secretary of State for Transport dated 17th June 2013 (Document Intro 5). This statement of case builds on the points raised in that letter and on objections sent to TfL in response to its calls for comments Documents Intro 6, Intro 7, Intro 8 and Intro 9. It should be noted that no reply at all was received from TfL to any of the points raised in any of these documents and there was no mention of this level and type of objection in the reports submitted by TfL describing their (alleged) consultation and response to it: for example, see pages 11 - 13 of document Intro 10. Overview: Some Common Sense Points Before we move into the detail of the issues, DATA would ask the Inquiry to take a look at what is being proposed in graphic and real terms. In case the Inquiry is unable to take the time to look at the physical site (which would be very revealing indeed),

DATA appends at Picture 1 a Google maps image so that the relative directions and distances can be seen easily. This picture includes hand drawn lines to demonstrate directions and distances. There is a white line that shows the proposed NLE route from Battersea Power Station to the Nine Elms Station (which, incidentally, is some distance, with no current pedestrian access, from the main development of the VNEB OA). There are also red lines showing the route across the VNEB OA to Vauxhall and another showing how close the Battersea Power Station (BPS) site is to the siding lines leading into Victoria Station. The map also shows the immediate proximity of several network rail lines and a range of bus stops, including those running directly into central London that pass directly past the BPS site (bus route 44, 137 and 452) and those that run towards Vauxhall (routes 156 and 344). Directly across the adjacent Battersea Bridge there are further bus routes (route 24 and, slightly further but still easy walking distance, route 360). There is also an almost complete pedestrian (and could be cycle) lane that runs along the Embankment from BPS to Vauxhall and thence right across the centre of London. There is a riverboat service as far as St George's wharf at Vauxhall and this could easily be extended down to BPS. These facts and figures are not indicative of an argument to use any particular one of these alternatives to the proposed NLE but to make the point that the plethora of existing transport options when taken together would provide a clear option to the NLE. This has not, to DATA's knowledge, been explored at all. Just looking at the proposed route of the NLE demonstrates immediately its serious shortcomings as a transport solution for the VNEB OA. The glaringly obvious problem is that the NLE proposal does not cover the VNEB OA at all. This is the first point to be made in this section of DATA's Statement of Case. TfL's NLE proposal runs from the South West corner of the most Westerly aspect to the VNEB OA and heads South, underground, to a point in the Wandsworth Road that lies, at best, at the furthest Southern perimeter of the most generous interpretation of the VNEB OA and outside easy walking access to all the major developments in the VNEB OA. None of the rest of the VNEB OA (the vast majority of the VNEB OA) will benefit from this. DATA suggests that the Inquiry panel should walk the length of the VNEB OA along Nine Elms Lane. It takes about twenty minutes to walk from Vauxhall station to BPS at a brisk walk. Apart from those residents in the BPS site itself, most residents will be situated somewhere along the sides of Nine Elms Road. This is particularly true for those residents in Embassy Gardens, Royal Mail, Market Towers and Riverlight Tideway which, according to TfL's statement of Case (page 16) accounts for some 5,200 of the planned 5,900 new homes. These residents will have the choice, therefore, of either walking ten minutes or so away from London to the BPS site to catch the Northern Line from a station that will presumably be outside Zone 1 and head South, away from London or walking for about the same length of time in the

opposite direction, towards London, to access the Zone 1 Victoria Line directly into London. The point is that situating any transport solution for VNEB OA at its far South West tip with a route that runs away from the VNEB underground, cannot be described as providing a transport solution for the VNEB OA. Therefore TfL's claim in its Statement of Case (page 12 fourth point) that 'The NLE will transform accessibility across the VNEB OA' is completely groundless and misleading. The lack of a transport needs analysis that is not predicated on, and skewed in favour of, the NLE is a major concern. More detail on this will follow. It is important that the cumulative nature of all objections to TfL's NLE proposal are assessed as a whole in assessing whether it is a viable and credible proposal. TfL Documents Discredited The way in which TfL has manipulated timings for comments on its proposals, its lack of any real engagement with objectors and objections, its public presentation and its selective use of responses from objectors in presenting its case has caused many who follow this process to have no faith in anything that TfL produces. Nothing should be taken on face value. For example, TfL produced a marketing document dated 21 December 2012, shortly before their 2012 'consultation' closed on 31 December 2012 (it was held over the Christmas period). This document (at reference Intro 11) sets out a number of disingenuous points including making statements about having considered other Network Rail options (TfL's subsequent FOI statement to DATA demonstrates this to be either grossly exaggerated or totally false - see reference documents A9, A9a and A9b). This same TfL document (Intro 11) states that 'the World Health Organisation (WHO), states that levels should not exceed 45dBLAmax,FAST in bedrooms to avoid sleep disturbance. In 2009 WHO published Night Noise Guidelines which lowers this value to 42dBLAmax, FAST.' But it does not put into context what the WHO guideline actually says, which significantly undermines any claim that 42dBLAmax, FAST is a credible target. The WHO report to which TfL refers (see Document Noise 1 on pages XV, XVI and XVII) which conclude:
Therefore, 40 dB Lnight, outside is equivalent to the lowest observed adverse effect level (LOAEL) for night noise. Above 55 dB the cardiovascular effects become the major public health concern, which are likely to be less dependent on the nature of the noise. Closer examination of the precise impact will be necessary in the range between 30 dB and 55 dB as much will depend on the detailed circumstances of each case.

and which go on to say:

Up to 30 dB Although individual sensitivities and circumstances may differ, it appears that up to this level no substantial biological effects are observed. L night, outside of 30 dB is equivalent to the no observed effect level (NOEL) for night noise.

30 to 40 dB A number of effects on sleep are observed from this range: body movements, awakening, self-reported sleep disturbance, arousals. The intensity of the effect depends on the nature of the source and the number of events. Vulnerable groups (for example children, the chronically ill and the elderly) are more susceptible. However, even in the worst cases the effects seem modest. L night, outside of 40 dB is equivalent to the lowest observed adverse effect level (LOAEL) for night noise.

Nor is the information on page XIII of the report taken into account, which says:
Effect Indicator Threshold, dB Biological effects: Change in cardiovascular activity EEG awakening L Amax,inside Motility, onset of motility L Amax,inside Changes in duration of various stages of sleep, in sleep structure and fragmentation of sleep L Amax, inside ** 35 32 35

This is not a specific argument for a specific lower level of noise in the NLE proposal (although it does indicate that noise levels should be lower than TfL are predicting this will be argued by another member of the Coalition in more detail) but it does show that that TfL has been very selective in ignoring facts that do not fit with its own position regarding the technical requirements and standards for its NLE project. TfL's document at Intro 11 makes claims about extensive consultation but this is demonstrably not the case because the strenuous objections that DATA and others have made against the NLE proposal have not been reflected in any of the consultation reports that TfL has published. There will be more on consultation later in this Statement of Case. The TfL Statement of Case should certainly be seen in this same light. For example, on page 87 there is a claim by TfL that they are 'corresponding and meeting with objectors with a view to reassuring them and, if necessary, reaching a mutually acceptable agreement or undertaking, which will allow the objection to be withdrawn. In particular, TfL has offered to meet with all community groups who have made objections to the scheme to try and address their issues.' This is such an exaggerated and misdirected construction of the real situation as to be regarded as wholly false. DATA refers the Inquiry in particular to reference documents Intro 1, 2, 3 and 4 as evidence of the type of exchanges that have taken place: too little, far too late and without any real substance or expectation that fundamental questions will be addressed. This has not been consultation at all but a carefully stage managed series of selective public presentations that TfL is now using to claim legitimacy for its actions. Others in the Coalition will provide similar evidence in this regard. These few examples are indicative of the way in which TfL has presented its entire case to the public, politicians and public bodies that have been persuaded to lend support to TfL's NLE proposal. DATA doubts that any political support for the NLE project would be forthcoming if the truth were known. The scale of the misdirection and risk to the public purse and infrastructure is of the same magnitude as faced by the DfT in relation to the West Coast railway fiasco.

The first point here is that this short critique has demonstrated that TfL's document dated 21 December 2012 (Intro 11) is of dubious credibility and cannot serve as a generic or specific response to any of the points raised by DATA, or other Civic Groups in their earlier letters to TfL. The second point here is that an initial appraisal of TfL's Statement of Case reveals that it too is based on similar types of misdirection, selective and incorrect statements and is posited as a marketing plan to persuade and convince rather than to inform. It is more akin to a product advertisement that is constructed to convince an audience that its product should be bought. The third and related point here is that TfL has started from the position of having decided they want an NLE and they are now doing everything they can to get it built (at the expense of others). Therefore none of the documents issued by TfL in support of its NLE proposal can be relied upon to provide a true and accurate picture of the proposal because they are designed to persuade and convince rather than inform and generate informed debate. All TfL documentation must therefore be treated as marketing and propaganda and not take at face value. All TfL documents should be treated with extreme caution and examined with the same level of critical scrutiny as above. The fourth point is that, to get an accurate picture of the NLE proposal, there should be an equally well funded and resourced independent analysis of the TfL proposal that does not start with the NLE precept and which reviews the overall need for an NLE.

DATA's main points of argument causing a call for a Public Inquiry:

The points raised in DATA's letter dated 17th June 2013 (Document Intro 5) to the Secretary of State covered the main areas in which DATA has concerns. They are reiterated below with further details and evidence appended by reference: POINT A: DATA is particularly concerned that the decision to build a NLE was not made in response to a neutral and comprehensive transport needs assessment. The original idea seems to stem from the previous owners of the Battersea Power Station to make sales of flats on the site more attractive: ie for private commercial purposes. But even this was not sufficient to save them from bankruptcy. The reciprocal agreement between TfL to build an NLE and the current developers to invest in the Battersea Power Station development project seems to confirm that investment incentive rather than transport needs drive TfL's NLE proposal. In addition, documents that are just coming to light indicate that TfL saw the inherited NLE scheme as a way to dominate transport networks in the South West. Neither of these are a sound basis for a high-cost, public financed, transport infrastructure project; additional bullet point from letter of 17th June is covered in this section for expediency: There has been no impact assessment for other transport and public needs along the route of the proposed NLE. For example, the station at Nine Elms,

would be on an already very busy junction with narrow roads. Pedestrian and road traffic congestion will be exacerbated immediately prior to the Vauxhall Cross gyratory traffic choke point. Commuters travelling to/from Nine Elms station will add to the already overly-congested bus routes in this area; Evidence and argument: There is a long history of plans to develop a Railtrack (now Network Rail) link into central London from the Battersea Power Station area with clear independent research to show that a Network Rail (or, as it was at that stage, Railtrack) main plank in a mixed mode transport solution for the predicted development needs in the Battersea Power Station area was completely viable. Despite this, Treasury Holdings did not use the previous studies as a basis for meeting the transport needs of the development and TfL studiously ignored drawing on this earlier work when they took over the transport project. There are many documents available that demonstrate that up to 2004 a Network Rail option for the development was considered adequate and that TfL's own consultants in 2009 make only a very nuanced case in favour of the possible use of an NLE but make the point that, even then, when the NLE cost was much less than half the cost of the most recent reliable figures (December 2012) the cost benefit was marginal. There is no evidence of TfL ever carrying our, or commissioning a neutral transport needs assessment that was not based on its exaggerated trip generation forecasts and that uses its preferred NLE solution as a benchmark against other forms of transport individually (ie ignoring mixed mode transport solutions). The evidence for this is: A1) the Wandsworth Council Planning Permission document dated 26 September 2000 (Document A1) demonstrates the history of planning towards a Network Rail (equivalent) link from Battersea Power Station development to Victoria; and A2) the record of Wandsworth Council planning permission application progress (document A2) shows a clear commitment by Railtrack (as was - the predecessor for all intents and purposes of Network Rail) to develop a rail service from Battersea Power Station to Victoria as part of the major development at that site. This continued up till 2002 (page 79 of Document A2) when Railtrack undertook a sudden reversal of position, coinciding with the disclosure of huge losses and their going into Administration A3) However, an independent study by the Babtie Group in 2004 (Document A3) demonstrates a Network Rail (previously Railtrack) main plank within a mixed mode transport solution for predicted development at Battersea Power Station is completely viable. See also related point 8 in this section of the Statement of Case. A4) TfL claims to have undertaken extensive discussions with Network Rail about alternative options to an NLE (see document Intro 11 and heavily implied on pages 105 and 106 of TfL's Statement of Case) but TfL revealed under FoI that the only consultation they did with Network Rail was cursory in the extreme, comprising just two very general letters (reference documents A4, A4a and A4b). This disclosure

reveals under FOI reveals that TfL's engagement with Network Rail (NR) in seeking alternatives to NLE or wider option comprised only the exchange of two letters, one of which invites further discussion on one possible NR option (Battersea Park Station) and the other, while advising against a dedicated shuttle service, refers to an existing service from Battersea Park to Victoria. NR bases no further investigation of enhancing this capacity because, once again, there is an assumption that there will be an NLE. A neutral assessment would have looked at enhancing the existing service BEFORE considering whether to build an NLE. Unless TfL has given incorrect information under FOI, they did not follow up these options at all. This is typical of the way in which TfL has ignored or ruled out possible transport options and, at all times, made the assumption that their preferred choice of an NLE should be undertaken. A5) Additionally, in the minutes of a meeting with DATA dated 12 January 2012 it is recorded that there are several Network Rail options that TfL had not considered at all and, despite undertakings to do so, we believe that they have still yet to be fully explored (document A5) A6) TfL wrote to a member of the wider coalition against the NLE on 21 August 2013 (document A6) and referred in paragraph 4, page three, in its defence of the decision to construct an NLE, to the SKM 2009 transport report as proof that it had undertaken a full transport study. Page 8 of this report (document A7) makes a very nuanced cased that an NLE might be necessary at a very high level of development density creates a high level of journeys but that the economic case (even at the much lower predicted cost of an NLE at that stage - much less than half of the cost predicted in December 2012 and therefore substantially lower than any realistic expectation of costs at the present) was precarious. The favoured options for lesser numbers of journey was Network Rail and bus throughout all levels of development density. The statement in page seven of this report reads: Full Appraisal The full appraisal of shortlisted schemes suggests that the better performing transport package for each OA development scenario is as follows: OA Scenario 3 Bus-only package, possibly enhanced by a bus rapid transit facility along the route of the LRT scheme; and OA Scenario 4 and 5 Bus package and the NLE. In OA Scenarios 1 and 2, bus-based initiatives would probably be sufficient for the levels of development envisaged, although probably not without some improvements to interchange facilities at Vauxhall. A7) It is worth noting at this point that TfL has not made any allowance in its journey prediction modelling for the fact that the Battersea Power Station development will be of a luxury type that does not generate standard public transport patterns (see the first three paragraphs of the minutes of the meeting between TfL and DATA on 12 January 2012 at reference document A5) and has not made sufficient allowance for the fact that the majority of jobs created in the region of the development will be filled by local workers. The trip generation figures even for the densest development scenarios 4 and 5 above will be far less than expected and this therefore gives even more weight to the argument that a much fuller transport assessment needs to be undertaken.

A8) London Planning Officer Peter Rees wrote on 21 July 2013 about the low density actual occupancy that could be expected across the VNEB OA due to investment purchasing and predicted that there would be no need at all for an NLE because bus services could cope. See document A8. This should be seen in connection with document A9 which provides an overview of the type of development that should be expected across the VNEB OA. A9) TfL has been invited on numerous occasions (most recently in document Intro 4) to provide evidence of a neutral and comprehensive transport needs assessment that uses realistic trip generation figures, that does not take an NLE as a benchmark based on these figures and which compares a mix of transport options (not just a small selection of other tube routes or bus routes or Network Rail routes in isolation from each other) with the demonstrated need but they have consistently failed to do so. A10) Decisions were taken to focus on an NLE in an environment described by Councillor Reed as 'chaotic and random' and where there were significant concerns that only an NLE was being considered and that all other forms of transport options were being completely neglected. See the 23rd June 2011 Nine Elms Vauxhall Strategy Board meeting record at document A10 A11) TfL's Heads of Heads of Terms agreement with the Developer with the commercially interdependent commitment to deliver a NLE for a building investment continues the original commercial basis for the NLE: ie not a transport basis for building this expensive tube line. See PAPER NO: SB12-62 STRATEGY BOARD 14 DEC 2012 Document A10. The link with the private sector development in Wandsworth is further demonstrated in TfL's Statement of Case (page 15 point 3.1.4) A12) All major reports on transport aspects of the VNEB OA are referenced against an existing decision to build an NLE and couched as justification for an NLE. Illustratively Document A7 for example A13) TfL claims to have undertaken a 'a detailed transport study which assessed a number of transport options for meeting the future transport needs of VNEB. This study considered National Rail, Underground, tram, and bus interventions as well as improvements to walking and cycling' (Document A11 paragraph 3.4) but there is no sign of this ever being published. Where is this document that takes a neutral look at all OPTIONS for transport needs for the VNEB OA rather than a comparison of options TO an NLE? Paragraphs 3.5 and 3.6 of TfL document A11 issued on 13 March 2013 make it clear that the only real comparisons are against other tube lines and set against trip generation figures based on traditional high density housing, which is definitely not the case for the VNEB OA and which the policy of local employment also completely undermines. A14) In the same paper, same paragraph, TfL states: 'Since the OAPF transport study was completed, a further review of alternatives has been undertaken and confirmed that no other scheme would adequately meet the aims underlying the project.' NB The use of the word 'confirmed'. This is all about justifying a previous decision. And when one looks at paragraphs 3.5 and 3.6 of the same document (document A11) the comparisons are all against other tube line extensions, not against a broad range of transport options to meet the VNEB OA need.

A15) Further in paragraph 3.4 of the same document (A11) TfL states: 'While the NLE is the single biggest intervention in terms of cost and providing capacity, it is part of a wider package of transport and urban realm improvements.' There has been no comprehensive and reliable transport needs assessment so how can they know what improvements are necessary? Where is the strategic transport plan that shows this 'wider package'? Who is paying for it, and how? A16) There has never been a proper transport needs analysis but TfL has used its position to skew their attempts at justifying their preferred option of having a tube extension built at public and private costs and risk in an area that has been predominantly the domain of Network Rail. This constitutes rivalry and competition rather than cooperation between and integration of rail systems. The losers are the public and the public purse. A17) DATA understands from anecdotal sources, however, that TfL has some more data on the possible use of Network Rail as a viable alternative to the proposed NLE but this has not been made public. DATA asked about this on 16th August (see document Intro 4) but no reply had been received as at the date of assembling this submission. A18) Question: How will a single tube line going from the very Western edge of the VNEB, leading away from the VNEB OA, to Nine Elms Wandsworth Road (with an existing high level of transport options nearby) and on to the overcrowded Northern Line at Kennington, help with transport needs ACROSS the VNEB OA? A19) There has been no impact assessment for other transport and public needs along the route of the proposed NLE. For example, the station at Nine Elms, would be on an already very busy junction with narrow roads. Pedestrian and road traffic congestion will be exacerbated immediately prior to the Vauxhall Cross gyratory traffic choke point. Commuters travelling to/from Nine Elms station will add to the already overly-congested bus routes in this area. TfL admits in its Statement of Case (pages 10 and 11) that it cannot afford to pay for a second ticket hall and access at the proposed station to be called 'Nine Elms' but it has not explained how it intends to cope with the claimed hugely increased footfall along the narrow Wandsworth and Pascal Roads to the single ticket hall entrance it does intend to construct on an already overcrowded and very difficult road junction in the approaches to the notoriously congested Vauxhall Cross. Combined with the adjacent huge development of Sainsburys (which will surround the planned station on two sides) this will be a pedestrian and traffic nightmare choke point. There has been no impact assessment of this aspect of the proposal and no mitigation proposals for the clearly obvious congestion and overcrowding it will cause. A20 The following commentary is also indicative of the way in which the NLE has been inveigled into a possible transport solution that includes a substantial Network Rail component: 2010 November 11 - Wandsworth Planning Applications Committee Paper 10-809 (3 Nov 2010 Officer's Report - A G McDonald, Director of Technical Services) - see document A12

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SEE Pg 7 - September 2000 - permission for new rail station to link with Grosvenor viaduct into Victoria Ref 2000/1570 - permission lapsed in 2005 SEE Pg 7 - Jan 2002 - blaming NR for need to review the transport strategy SEE Page 11, last paragraph, last bullet point - Mayor wanting longer platforms - sought resolution through unilateral undertaking...never determined SEE Pg 16 - the NLE proposal formally makes itself known in the planning sphere SEE Pg 35 - Transport Assessment ( "The draft OAPF proposed a revised version of Scenario 5, and it recognises the importance of the NLE to deliver this scenario; the TA has been produced on this basis." ) SEE Pg 37 - Transport Assessment - Trip Generation SEE Pg 41 - NLE tube to be operational 2016/17 SEE Pg 44-50 - NLE Progress Reports 1 (Planning application relation of NLE, TWAO scheduling, Policy) & 2 (Funding & Delivery) SEE Pg 138 Applicants proposed S106 contributions (NLE GBP 203m ) SEE Pg 154 Consultation - Public (Transport/NLE - Pg 156) SEE Pg 166 No improvements proposed to Rail stations, yet they provide important service links before the NLE is operational SEE Pg 168, 2nd para, end - linking development phasing to NLE progression, important part of the planning application SEE pg 180-186 - Transport for London GLA Stage 1 Report ... SEE Pg 183-186 - London Underground (LU) comments on the NLE Proposal SEE Pg 194 Network Rail comments SEE Pg 265 2nd para. NLE, Rail phasing, no mitigation for overground stations SEE Pg 276-278 Summary of Transport infrastructure, NLE SEE Pg 289 Some interesting 'decoupling' of the dependency on the NLE in terms of phase/site RS-1 SEE Pg 290-294 Funding issues, Risk & TWAO scheduling SEE Pg 297 (16, 17, 18) Conditions linked to NLE It is the competitive relationship between TfL and (now) Network Rail that has seen the complete absence of the latter as a serious contender in the work towards a transport solution for the VNEB OA that creates the impression of rivalry and lack of cooperation in providing the correct balance of transport response to transport needs that is referred to in DATA's call for a Public Inquiry. There is no empirical evidence that an NLE is needed. TfL has ignored alternatives and structured a case to support and justify its own preferred outcome, which would result in a mix of public and private funding and financing, at huge cost, with dubious transport benefits, to give them a foothold in an area of London where at the moment they have none. The longer term benefits for TfL are evident, and for the developer, but not for the taxpayer more generally, the residents across the VNEB OA or their transport requirements.

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POINT B: TfL has carried out only very cursory transport options assessments based on very dubious residential and journey expectation data and always skewed towards demonstrating their pre-conceived preference of building an extension to the Northern Line. Similarly, 'consultation' and public opinion output is skewed. For example, the choice of Route 2 was based on a faulty consultation process which omitted to consult many on the actual route. The option assessment study that forms part of this consultation contains sixteen criteria but omits impact on low-rise residential households which is one of the major concerns about the proposal. Results were skewed in favour of TfL's pre-selected outcome. TfL's aim at every stage has been to justify their NLE plan, rather than to undertake a transport needs assessment, but they quote actions in support of the former as demonstrating the latter; B1) The decision to opt for a NLE rather than any other mixed mode of transport solution for the VNEB OA has been extensively discussed under POINT A of this Statement of Case but the fundamental issue is that of skewing the outcome of reviews, presentations and documents towards TfL's pre-determined outcome of securing funding and financing for its NLE project. Crucial to TfL's argument is the trip generation figure that it takes for granted and then uses to justify subsequent arguments in favour of its preferred outcome. Our colleagues in the Kennington Association Planning Forum will be arguing this point in much more detail, but DATA makes the point that the figures on which TfL bases its arguments should not be relied upon for the same reasons as outlined above that other aspects of the TfL arguments should not be relied upon - because they are part of a marketing plan to persuade and convince the public, politicians and other interested parties not a reliable source of balanced and neutral information. In this case, TfL has undertaking a marketing campaign that has buried any question of the crucial fundamental data that underpins its arguments and has focussed attention elsewhere (such as which NLE route, rather than should there be an NLE route at all). TfL has created the conditions in which there is now a degree of belief in their assertion that there is an unquestionable need for mass transit and that only NLE will be suffice. This has misled the public and the political leadership into support for the scheme in the belief that there is no credible alternative. This is not the case. Informed experts, such as the planning officer for the City of London (see document A8), have challenged this but TfL has used its size and resources to deliberately and continuously ignore this challenge. B2) TfL has conflated the argument over economic benefits accruing to the VNEB OA with the construction of an NLE. This is pure obfuscation. The economic benefits are those which the VNEB OA will bring. DATA agrees that to maximise these benefits an effective public transport system will be needed across the VNEB OA and between the VNEB OA and the rest of London (and in the opposite direction, to leave London as well). DATA has not seen any evidence from TfL that the NLE will provide either of these essential transport benefits to the VNEB OA. Indeed, as demonstrated in Point A of this Statement of Case, the NLE will not provide any transport benefits across the VNEB OA and it will provide only very limited transport benefits from far Western edge of the VNEB OA to the furthest Easterly part of the central part of London via the Northern Line (including passing through one of the most heavily congested parts of the London underground system at Waterloo).

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B3) TfL has sought to justify the need for mass transit by referring to the expected increase in employment in the VNEB OA but has not mitigated this figure by the policy requirement stated by both Lambeth and Wandsworth Councils that the majority of such employment should be locally sourced. The NLE will not provide any transport benefits for local workers to get to places of work within the VNEB OA and nor should the trip generation figures include this element. B4) With more realistic trip generation figures (that take into account the real levels of trips generated by the type of occupants in the new development - perhaps akin to those who occupy St Georges' Wharf) and mitigated to exclude local employment, a much wider range of transport solutions become significantly more attractive. Even with the higher range of figures used by TfL an assessment of a range of transport options is important, particularly when it is clear that the NLE proposal will not benefit transport requirements across the VNEB OA and the cost-benefit relationship is so unclear - see point A6 on page eight of this Statement. B5) It is a misnomer to call the engagement of TfL with the public consultation according to a professional study by a leading academic with good knowledge of survey design and interpretation. Dorothea Kleine has demonstrated clearly in her critique of TfL survey methodology that the results, certainly of the earlier surveys on which TfL is heavily reliant for claims to support, is so badly flawed as to be meaningless. See document B1. B6) In practical terms TfL's claim that 90% of local people support the Northern Line Extension is misleading in the extreme. According to the 2011 consultation paper produced for TfL (see document B2) , this claim is based on fewer than 1600 opinions (in a Lambeth population of more than 272,000) and even these few votes are not for NLE as the best choice compared to other transport options but in answer to a different question entirely. In reality, the 90% figure of support claimed for NLE in the NLE 2011Consultation document (page 5) s not in response to a question about supporting the NLE but, according to the document: When asked if they thought the proposed scheme would bring transport benefits to the area of Nine Elms and Battersea, 90% (1597) either agreed or strongly agreed, compared with only 4% (64) who strongly disagreed.' So, 90% of those asked thought the proposed scheme would bring transport improvements. They did not support the NLE in terms of preferring it to any alternative transport scheme. This headline figure is therefore misleading. Notice also that this 90% covers only a tiny proportion of the population affected by the NLE. This 90% is 1,661 respondents, a very small sample, which is hardly representative of area in which many thousands live. B7) The same report (document B2) also makes claims about public preference for route 2 of the NLE and construe this to demonstrate support for the NLE and route 2 whereas in reality there was no such option presented: Respondents were asked whether they supported or opposed Route Option 2. Of those that answered, the majority stated that they support Route Option 2, with

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69% (1195) in favour and 14% (260) against. The remaining 17% (284) had no preference. These figures are too small to be meaningful and with no real alternative to chose from a responded to this survey is directed towards an answer that can be construed as support. B7) As residents of the area affected by the NLE many members of the DATA group were not part of any consultation exercise until much later in the process when they received what amounted to a fait accompli. Subsequent leaflet campaigns have allegedly been a lot wider but they too have been patchy, and they only provide opportunities to decide between pre-determined options with a clear and heavily weighted argument by TfL for its own preference. There has been no neutrally informed public debate about TfL's proposal except among Civic Groups and at public meetings hosted by them. B8) Interpretation of TfL's consultants' reports has been extremely selective. TfL chose to interpret their 2009 and 2011 reports by SKM (document A7) and B2 as demonstrating a need for an NLE whereas the facts in both documents show that the Northern Line and the Victoria Line are both unsuitable (even with planned upgrades) for the level of increased commuter traffic that they predict. Indeed, the arguments indicate that if one of the two routes needed to be chosen, the Victoria Line would be able to cope more easily than the Northern Line. Note however, that DATA is not making a case for either but that the logic of the TfL argument is false and their own research does not support the arguments they have made. The details are: Why this is wrong: Vauxhall Station too congested The only congestion problem at Vauxhall is in the area of barrier management, which is being addressed by planned changes identified in the report at relatively low cost. See page 49 of the 2009 report. In any case, extending the Victoria Line past Vau xhall to Battersea will not bring any additional loading at the Vauxhall barrier because commuters will already be on the train at Vauxhall. But, creating a new Northern Line station at Nine Elms would likely (using data in the 2010 report) result in commuters from that area opting to walk five minutes to the Victoria Line at Vauxhall (cheaper and more direct route) thus putting more pressure on the barriers there. Victoria Line is too congested There is only a short journey area north of Victoria th at reaches anything like 80% of capacity at the peak period. The rest of the line (and all of it during most of the day) is at a much lower level of use Absolute figures for Northern Line use are much higher than on the Victoria Line already, without adding a new load from Nine Elms and Battersea For example: The statistics on page 44 of the 2009 report show that Vauxhall is an extremely lightly loaded station (6,000 passengers in the three hour peak period) whereas Waterloo on the Northern line (which would be directly affected in traffic flow as predicted by the NLE model) is the highest

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on the entire Underground network with nearly twelve times as many boardings (69,000) Also: Using the statistics from pages 44 and 45 of the 2009 report, the Vauxhall boardings of 6,000 in the three hour peak period is dwarfed by the 29,000 passengers who use the Stockwell to Oval route in the same period, 22,000 of whom are opting to get into central London via Waterloo. The traffic density indicators on pages 46 and 47 bear this out. The problem relating to crowding on the Northern Line itself has not been addressed in the studies. Adding passengers from the proposed new stations will make the Northern Line even more heavily overcrowded. DATA stresses that it is not using these statistics to argue the use of the Victoria Line but to demonstrate that TfL has sought to manipulate information to support their own preferred outcome. DATA's view is that a comprehensive and neutral transport needs analysis should be undertaken using well informed and realistic trip generation figures. Lambeth Council has also called for a 'satisfactory package of other strategic transport improvements, including improved/new bus services, that ensures the NLE is part of an overall strategic transport solution for the VNEB Opportunity Area' as a condition of not objecting to TfL's NLE (see document D1). B9) TfL's Document A11 Paragraph 5.4 hugely underplays the enormous range of very serious objections, including objections stimulated by an independent expert commissioned by Lambeth Council and makes unquantified and unsupported claims about large levels of support that have not been demonstrated. All the objections cited by various interest groups to the public inquiry were also cited to TfL as part of their consultation, but have been largely ignored. See for example DATA's response to the 2012 'consultation' at Documents B3, B3a and B3b. B10) TfL's Document A11 Paragraph 5.5 claims that TfL has had, and continues to have, a dialogue with groups opposed to the NLE. This is also very selective. The Claylands Group success in having the ventilation shaft moved is an important victory for common sense and sensibility, but it is hardly indicative of the norm. Indeed, our Claylands Green colleagues carefully structured their argument to protect an important and sensitive site. This should not be seen as TfL adapting to consultation but a later realisation of the enormous original planning mistake in even considering building a ventilation shaft in such an environmentally and socially sensitive site. This is, in fact, a clear demonstrates of how poorly thought through the NLE proposal is, including the lack of public consultation in drawing up the proposals. B11) TfL has frequently not replied to emails from DATA and has avoided having a meeting with DATA for over a year. There has been no reply from TfL to any of the points raised by DATA since the end of 2012 and what meetings have been held have comprised a rejection of any of DATA's views. Public consultation started with a rejection of allowing any group to discuss with TfL (by Treasury Holdings) and subsequently a dogged defence by TfL of its plans, not a dialogue on them. TfL has written to objectors to invite discussions only now that a public inquiry has been called.

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Further information on the failure of TfL's consultation will be provided by other members of the Coalition. The point here is that TfL has not presented a balanced view of options but has sought to manipulate information in support of its own preferred outcome. POINT C: TfL has not been forthcoming about the cost of the scheme but admitted in January 2013 that costs have increased by nearly 225% since first consideration (from about 580 million up to 1.3 billion). But this is based on the lowest possible mitigation standards for noise, vibration, and other public realm impact and there is no provision for the essential safety upgrades to Kennington station or financing costs. Actual costs will, therefore be significantly higher than currently admitted and the already tenuous financing scheme will not be able to sustain, let alone repay them. C1) In response to an FOI enquiry in March 2013 (See Doc C1) TfL refused to give a specific figure for the cost of an NLE but referred instead to the highly speculative costing and financing statements in Doc A11 demonstrating that they really do not know how much the project will cost or how it will be financed. C2) Also in document A11 (paragraph 4.2), TfL has sought to disguise the costs of the NLE by stripping out: (i) financing costs; (ii) the cost of necessary environmental impact improvements; (iii) a range of other costs including necessary upgrades to Kennington Station; (iv) and without any mention that it is only now starting the detailed sub-ground condition surveying that could lead to substantial increases in cost These manoeuvres help to justify a predicted headline cost for presentational purposes to just below the level of the Chancellor's agreed loan to build the NLE. This is a convenient figure, but not at all reliable or accurate. Any realistic calculation of the actual costs would put them significantly higher. But, as TfL readily admits ' there is continued uncertainty about the cost of individual components' (Doc A11 paragraph 4.2 line three) and ' Clearly, at this stage, there is a risk that the cost will be higher' (Document A11 paragraph 4.2 lines 7 - 8). C3) On Financing, paragraph 4.7 of TfL's document at Doc A11 states that 'The EZ delivers about three quarters of the funding required to service the 1bn NLE debt' but there is, as yet, no EZ and there is no mechanism extant to create one. C4) TfL's own consultants point out in their assessment of a possible NLE option that cost benefits were marginal even at a substantially lower predicted cost of building the NLE (see paragraph A6 on page eight above). Other parts of the Coalition (in particular, but not necessarily limited to, the KAPF) will explore cost-benefit in more detail and so this will not be pursued further here. DATA is, however, very concerned that there is no cost-benefit for an NLE, particularly when compared to mixed-mode transport solutions which could provide better transport and cost-benefit outcomes. The point is that there are no clear figures for the cost of the NLE or what TfL intends to spend this money on (eg Kennington station safety, environmental impact mitigation, financing, and real costs of a heavily front loaded project) nor

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is there any clear financing package in place. Everything is highly speculative and costs are being presented at a highly unrealistically low figure. This project should not be allowed to go ahead (at all on transport grounds) and for financial probity and accountability reasons, until a much more detailed costing has been obtained and reliable financing is in place. POINT D: TfL has been very vague about mitigating noise and vibration to a level acceptable to residents along the path of the NLE tunnels. Higher levels of noise and vibration will cause extreme disturbance to residents and potential damage to properties. TfL has also not carried out proper surveys of the sub-ground composition to substantiate its predictions on costs or noise/vibration. D1) DATA has already made reference on pages four and five of this Statement to noise issues but wishes to remind that Lambeth Council's letter dated 17th June to the Secretary of State for Transport (document D1) states: ' That the noise level resulting from trains does not exceed 35dB (fast) and the Council has every expectation that TfL will reduce this to 30dB or lower wherever possible'. Lambeth Council's letter also contains a number of other provisions that should not be overlooked, including on environmental impact, safety and security and a 'satisfactory package of other strategic transport improvements, including improved/new bus services, that ensures the NLE is part of an overall strategic transport solution for the VNEB Opportunity Area'. DATA notes that this has not yet been put in place; D2) A detailed case on noise and vibration will be made by other members of the Coalition and DATA will not attempt to reiterate these complex issues again at this stage but fully supports the points made by other members of the Coalition on this subject. D3) DATA is also very concerned about the lack of commitment to preserve or replace community facilities and community activities such as beekeeping and dogwalking areas. DATA fully supports the arguments put forward by other members of the Coalition in making the case for the fullest impact mitigation and assistance to all members of the community who are affected by the TfL NLE scheme. D4) DATA is very concerned that TfL appears to be seeking powers to avoid any controls over the period in which it can conduct excavations and other works, the nuisance this may cause to residents and any noise restrictions resulting from these works in connection with making preparations for, and actually building, the NLE. DATA has not had the time to study these proposals fully but if this is the case it should be firmly rejected. TfL must comply with the law as it currently stands and cannot seek exemption from it purely on the basis of its size and status. The point here is that TfL has tried to oversimplify the acceptable level of noise by quoting part of WHO guidelines out of context and is reluctant to give any firm commitments on an acceptable level of noise disturbance. Presumably, due to the fact that they do not yet know the ground conditions they are unable to even estimate what they will be able to achieve and how much it will cost to provide adequate environmental impact mitigation. TfL's original plans were for least possible mitigation and it is a difficult struggle to get them to make

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anything like an acceptable commitment either in terms of noise and vibration or community impact mitigation. POINT E: TfL's predictions for commuter use and commuter numbers at Kennington Station are not based on any evidence, and are widely at variance with observable data, particularly if TfL's own commuter figures are accepted as accurate. TfL's assertion that there will be few interchanges at Kennington Station are based on flawed supposition to support their case, not on any evidential base. In any case, emergency and evacuation routes are markedly insufficient from the station for this level of commuter traffic. There are therefore strong concerns over safety at the station; E1) TfL has consistently refused to admit that any upgrade work will be necessary at Kennington Station to cope with its predicted high level of increased commuter traffic. This is in spite of the fact that, even with current levels of commuter traffic there is sometimes need to control access to the station to prevent platform overloading. TfL is now reluctantly admitting to the need for more openings between platforms but the cost of this does not seem to have been added to the costs predicted for the NLE project as a whole at the end of 2012: this figure, according to TfL, doggedly remains at a level roughly consistent with the 1 billion loan from central government. This is not plausible. E2) DATA remains extremely concerned that there is no adequate safety and security upgrade works built into the NLE project but understands that TfL are now beginning to admit that this will be necessary. DATA awaits a funding and financing proposal for this essential aspect of the NLE project. TfL has indicated that any such works will be funded separately, but DATA would like to know where this funding and financing will come from and why it is not included in the NLE project itself. These costs should be included in any cost-benefit analysis of the NLE. E3) Other members of the Coalition, in particular, but not necessarily limited to, the KAPF, will make further representations and arguments on this aspect of the TfL NLE proposal so DATA will not reiterate them here. DATA fully supports the points made by other members of the Coalition and the KAPF in this regard. End Notes DATA fully supports the other members of the Coalition of Lambeth and Walworth Residents and the Kennington Association Planning Forum in their arguments and representations against TfL's NLE project. DATA wishes to make it clear that it is not against development and has as an aim only to get the best (integrated, affordable and effective) transport solution for the VNEB OA and surrounding area that will enhance its success and improve the quality of life for residents. VNEB DATA Group

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