UNITEDSTATES ARMYCOMMAND ANDGENERAL STAFFCOLLEGE, FORTLEAVENWORTH, KANSAS

COMMANDANT . ASSISTANT

Major General Michael S. Davison

COMMANDANT .

Brigadier General Robert C. Taber

The Military

Review is published by the United States Army Command and General

, . > .. ,,.>

Staff College in close association with the United States Army War College. It provides a forum for the expression of military thought on national and military strategy, national security affairs, and on doctrine with emphasis at the division and higher levels of command. ,,. . .. ~,q+ ,, ..., , ,: !. . .,>, ,, .. ., ,,. J, . . ,.. 3 -,,7

Military Review

Professional Journal of the US Army

Electronic Warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
LTC Charles B. Ablett,

USA

3
12
17
25
32

Chinas Total Strategy

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. .

Raymond

L. Garthoff

British Weapons and Tactics in Malaysia Letter to a New Major h!ackhrders Heartland The Social Sciences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. Jac Weller

BG Lynn D. Smith, USA, Ret . . William D. Franklin

COL Daniel F. Riva, USAF

Politico-Military Expertise

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Raymond J. Barrett . Niu Sien-thong

40
44

53
60
69
75
82
65

Two Forgotten American Strategists Peace in Vietnam . . . . . . . . . . . .

COL Joseph F. H. Cutrona, USA . . . . . . . . . Franz Kosar . Thomas An

Reconnaissance Vehicles New winds in Pyorrgyang? .Expansion for Limited War

MAI James S. Angeles, USA . . . . Robert Reynolds

Brazils Overseas Military Operations ,+faosThree Stages . . . .

Robert C. Suggs
;rrd Brenda M. Wolak . . . . . . . . . . . . .

92
68
106

Mifitary tfote Militery Boolm

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........ . . . . . . .

The VIEWS expressed in this ma azine ARE THE AUTHORS and not necessarily those of the f Staff College. US Army or the Command and Genera

Editor in Chief COL Donald J. Delaney Associate Editor COL John B. McKinney
Army War College

.
Assistant Editor LTC A. Leroy Covey Features Editor MAJ Charles A. Gatzka Spanish-American Editor LTC Ren6 Ramos Brszilian Editors LTC Paulo A. F. Viana LTC Walter J. Faustini Production Officer MAJ Norman C. Murray

staff Artist
Charles A. Moore 1

MILITARY REVIEW-Published monthly by ths U. S. Arm Command and Genersl Staff Collega, Fort Leaw enworth, Kansas, in En Iish, Spanish, and Portuguese. Lse of funds for printing of this publication has been approved by Heaf qusrfers, De srfmant of the Army, 28 May 1965. Second+ss posfega ~jd at fort Lesvenworfh, Kancos. .Nbacripfion rates $4.00 (US currency) s year m the Umted Statas, mted States military frost offices, and those countries which are members of the PawAnrericen Postal Union fincluding Spain); $5.00 a year in all other comrtrie% single copy price 50 cents. Address subscription mail to the Gook Department, U. S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansss 66027.

EIECTROHIC

WARFARE
A Modem Weapon
Colonel Charles B. MAett, United Stute.r Arrnu

system
4

Lieutenant

LECTRONIC devices have be come accepted, even rreceseary, parta of a military force. Such de , vices continue to evolve, to take on new forms, to be put to new applica tions, and to become increasingly re lied upon. Their direct effect is bene ficial, otherwise they would not be adopted. But a commander and his staff cannot ignore the fact that tbe increased use of electronics has its risks and vulnerabllitiee. The Army officer interested in higher command should be thinkhrg about the conduct of warfare in a fourth dimension the electromagnetic epectrum. Any modem major military force generatee a radiated electronic field. When two such opposing forces meet, their radiated electronic fields intsract, either accidentally or intention ally. Actions intentionally taken by one force to make the interacting elec tronic fielde contribute to its own in creased combat effectiveness are col lectively referred to as electronic

ELECTRONIC WARFASE These actions are either offensive or defensive. Offensive EW opera tions, sometimes celled electronic coun termeasures (ECMS), have the ene mys electronic systems as the target. Defensive operations, on the other hand, are directed to ones own elec tronic systems with the intent to de feat or minimize effects of the enemys offensive operations. Defensive mezs ures are esllcd electronic counter countermeeaurca (ECCMS). Offensive Aatfons One type of offensive operatSOn in volves paseive measures. A major miiitary force provides observable ev idence of its existence in the electronic dimension just se irrevocably ae it does in three-dimensional physical space. This evidence ind]cates not merely the existence of the force, but also where it is, something about its size, mobility, and types of firepower, how it is organized, and the type of activity in which it is engaged. Pse sive ECMS may be considered as re connaissance carried out in the elec tronic dimension to detect and observe the indicators with the prime intent of producing intelligence about the enemy. Such, intelligence may eupport ac tive military operations either of the conventional type or within the elec tromagnetic spectrum. The intelli gence value of paseive ECMe is greatly enriched when coordinated with traditional surveillance of the enemy by patrole, photo and visual air reconnaissance, and prieoner in. terrogation. Active ECMS may be thought of as the bombardment of the enemys electronic systems with radiatione electronic %dleta-with the intent of disrupting normal operation of these syetems. The ultimate purpose ie to degrade in some way the enemys control of his forces, thereby produc ing a relative increase in our own combat power. If the intent ie eimply to override the valid sigoale with false signale, the activity is called jam ming. A more subtle and at times more effective measure is to inject fraudu lent eignals in euch a way that they will be accepted es valid by the enemy equipment or personnel. Thie setivity is celled imitative deception. Defensive Measures Since the enemy is capable of per forming all these offensive operation against our own systems, defeneive measures must he developed to counter them. A unite capability to counter the enemys offensive ECMS, actilve or passive, is largely determined long be fore actual operation begin by the plane, pcdiciee, and doctrine prepared by the unit and higher headquarters. Urdees epecific consideration has been given to the effeeta of enemy EW on a future operation, a unit will be un able to counter enemy efforts effec tively after actual engagement oc curs. Two forme of ECCMS that require special planning and additional speMilitrry

Lieutenant CoZonel Charlea i?. Ab lett is with the 3d Radio Re8earch Unit He@uarter8 in Vistnam. He holde an M.S. degree in Mathvmattc8 from &uthera IUinoie Vnivere@ and an M.S. $n &?attatic8 from Sbnfotd University in California. He baa eerved m a member of the faculty of the V. S. ArmII Command and Gem eral Staff CoUege and as Chief, Opera tion Re8earch Division, US ArmII Security Agetw Board. HiiI article. Computer8 and &7viee Schoolej ap prared ira the October 1965 insue vf the MILITAIWREVIEW.
4

nWiEW

cialized resources of personnel and equipment are security monitoring and %nanipulative deception. The first includes intercepting and analyz ing signals from ones own electronic systems for counterintelligence infor mation. This information provides the commander with a basis for cor recting insecure uracticee and for im-

Efforts to take advantage of elec tromagnetic devices during warfare predate World War I. It wae during World War II, however, that such ef forts besame a major factor in decid ing the course of the entire war rather than ieolated battlee. Thie was particularly true of air operations which had come to rely on the exten-

Redio intereept operators copied Jepsneee diplomatic mearwges plementing contingency plans based on probable compromise of primary plans. Manipulative dcseption includes measures taken with regard to the operation of ones own electronic syz tems designed to mielczd the enemys paseive ECM efforte. One of the sim plest examples is the simulation of a notional units electronic systems. To be effective, manipulative elec tronic deseption must generally be a part of a broader dcseption effort de signed to deceive all of the enemys intelligence systems with a consistent etory. Novembor 1968 eive use of elcstronic equipment. EW operations during World War 11 show the complexities of planning and ex ecution and illustrate the successes and risks involved. They thue serve as a guide for present and future op erations. It is, of course, a well-known fact that the United States had broken the Japanese cryptosystems well before the attack on Pczrl Harbor. The tragic train of circumstances which resulted in the failure to act on the warnings which EW had supplied is not part of this account. But the importance which the United States placed on I 5

ELECTRONIC WARFARE this source of intelligence is dramat ically revealed in a letter from Army Chief of Statf George C. Marshall to Governor Thomaa E. Dewey during the presidential campaign of 1944:

TOP SECRET FOR MR. DEWEYS EYES ONLY. You have my word that neither the Secretury of War nor the President haa ang intimuticn wfzatsoevev that such a letter hna been addreneed to
you.

The most vital evidence ~n the Pearl Harbor matter consiets of our inter-

to inteatione toward Hawaii cmtil the la.%? weeeage before December 7, which did not reach OUThands uutil the following c!qi, December 8. Now the point to the present di lemma ie that we have gone ahead with thie buaineee of deciphering their codee until we poese$s other codee, German ae well as Japaneee, but our main ba& of infomnatbu regarding Hitlers intentions in Europe is ob tained from Baron 08hima8 meseages from. Berlin reporting hia interviews with Hitler and other o@nla to the

Germans used agents to talk bombers to targete

cepta of the Japune8e diplomatic com municatbnw. Over a period of years our Crpptograph people aualgzed the character of the machine the Japa nese are ueiug for eaooding their dip lomatic message.r. Baeed en thti, a ccrreeponding machine wae built by us which ~dempheratheir me88age8. Therefore, we po88e88ed a wealth of infovwwtion regarding their moves in the Pacific which in tmn wae fu? ntihed the Stnte Departmwttiather than, ae is popularly eupposed, the S@te Department providing ue with the information-but which unfor tunately made no reference whatever 6

Japane8e Government. The8c are atizl in the codes involved in the Pearl Harbor events. To explain further the critioal ua ture of this 8etup which wmdd be wiped out almost in an iuatant if the least euepicioa were arcuaed re~ard ing it, the Battle of the Coral Sea was baaed on deciphered me88agc8 and therefore our few 8hip8 were in the nght place at the right time. Fuvther, we were able to concentrate en our limited forces to meet their advances on Midway when otherwise we almoat certuinly would have been some S,000 miles out of place.
Militcry ReviOW

ELECTRONIC WARFARE

We had full information of the etrength of their foreee i% that ad vance aud also of the emaller force directed againet the Alew%zne which fmallg lauded troope on Attu and Kieka. Operaticne in the Paci@ are targely guided by the information we obtain of Japaneee desdosrmente. We know their etrength in van-owe garrisons, the rationa and other etoree continu ing available to them, and what ie of vaat importance, we check their jleet movement8 and the movement8 Of the$r ccnv0u8. The heavy loeeee reported from time to time which they sustain by vea80n if our eubmarine action largely re eulte from the fact that we know the eailing datee and the routes of their convow and can notify our eubm rinee to lie in wait at the proper point. The current raid8 by Admiral Halees?e carrier force8 on Japaneee chip ping in Manila Bay aud eleewhere were largely baeed on timing on the known movements of Japaneee con VOS18, two of which were canght, as anticipated, in hia destructive attacke. You will understand from the fore going the utter tragic corwequences if the pre8ent political debate8 regard ing Pearl Harbor di8cloee to the enem~, German or Jap, any euqaicion of the vital mnrcee of information we nOW ~088e8e. . . . * * * The conduct of General Eiaenhow
ere campaign and of all operation in

livee,

both in the eouduet of current operations and in looking toward the early termination of the war.
Governor Deweys patriotic duty was clear, and the Pearl Harbor con troversy receded from the political spotlight. Navigational Aids The increasing use of aircraft with their associated navigational aids pro vided two of the major ingredients to what Wlneton Churchill referred tu as the Wizard War. The particular struggle related to navigational aids illustrate the dynamic nature of EW the constant interplay of measure and countermeasure. After the fall of France, Germany nndertook to reduce the British to submission by aerial bombardment. The German bombers were guided to their targets by radio beacons beamed at England from stations in north ern France and Belgium. These and other navigational aids permitted all-weather, day-and-night bombing which severely taxed British defenses. The British turned to electronic countermeasure. The most obvious countermeasure was to jam the re ceiving equipment in the bombere. This, however, would have been obvi ous to the Germans and, if successful, would have induced them to try some thing new. Thus, the British chose to use imitative deception. The initial German navigational system was called the Lcrenz. The German bomber wae equipped with a directional antenna so that it could ride the beam the required dktance to place the bomber over the target. The British. located directional bea cons called Meaco?w (masked beacons) so that their beams intersected the Lorouz beams at a slight angle. As the bomber neared the target in Eng

the Pacific are cloeely related in ccn cepticw aud timing to the informa tion we secretly obtain through theee intercepted code8. They contribute greatlg to the victorti and tremen dowdy to the savinge of American
Novemb8r 1986

ELECTRONIC WARFARE land, the stronger ilfeacerr signal dom inated so that the bomber followed the false beam, dropping its bombe over uninhabited areas. To counter tlds beam-bendhrg~ the Germans introduced a new navi gational aid which the Britieh called Headache. This consisted of two par allel beams-one eendlng dote, the other dashes. The signals were sgrr chronized eo that a bomber flying di rectly between them received a solid tone. Any deviation from course could be quickly correeted. The British countered with a coun terpwsure appropriately named Asm%in.They reinforced only one beam by intercepting, amplifying, and re transmitting it. As the bomber neared the target, again the imbalance sig nals achieved what was effectively a Radio Parie noticed that the volume varied suspiciously. Every time they had to turn the volume down, an air raid followed. Closer investigation ehowed the volume ontdde the target area faded. Further amdyeis revealed that Radio Parie was switching to a directional antenna with the beam pointed toward the target area. The British found that a beacon beam from another etation intersected the Radio Paris bum at the target, electronically marking the bomb re lease point. To counter this, the Brit ish retranemitted an amplified Radio Paris signal which intersected the beacon beam over open country or the English Channel. The Luftwaffe aleo tried using ee cret agents in England along the bomb route, equipped with frequency modu-.

.
Thense of window or chaff greatly reduced the effectiveness of radar bending of the beem. One report has it that the result of 400 bombe dropped in one German rzdd wee two chickens kilied in the open fields. The additional value of deception over jamming be gan to pay off as German aircrews lost confidence in their navigational systeme. Later in 1940 several British house wives Listening toentertainrnent from 8 lated. radios, to talk the bombere to their targets. This system. called Be nito, wa; countered-by u;ing skilled Iinguists and stronger signals to trans mit faIse bearings and generally cause confusion. Thecounterrneasure, called Domino, ceused such confusion and disorientation that some pilots landed in England by error. It ie also sue pseted that the bombings of Dublin Militery nOViEW

ELECTRONIC WARFARE in 1941 may have inadvertently re sulted from Domino. The Battle of the Beams: as Churchill called it, went mainly to the British. This contributed significantly to Adolf Hitlere failure to defeat, the British by airpower alone, Switsh in Air War By late 1940 the air war switched from countering German offensive systems to searching for and counter ing German defensive systems. These operations became essential to suc cessful air attacks againat Germany. The Germans had developed and in stalled several types of radar for early warning, directing interceptor aircraft, and air defense fire direc tion. The Allieeneeded intelligence on equipment characteristics, operating procedures and schedules, and geo graphic deployment in order to de velop effective countermeasures. For the most part, these data were obtained by passive ECM reconnais sance-signal interception and analy sis. In many cases, however, these measures were supplemented by lowIevel, air photoreconnaissance mis sions and visual observations. In at least one case, while a commando raid W?S carried out On a radar sit@> the radar was dismantled and the vital parts evacuated by boat to England fordeteiled analysis. As early as 1937, the British bad discovered that aluminum strips sim ilar to Christmas tree tinsel, called window or chaff, could be released by an aircraft and would reflect radar signals which masked the signal re turned by the aircraft. A major controversy developed in England whether window should be ueed to protect British bombers for fear the Germans would apply it against Brit ish radar. The Germans also knew the Wembsr 1966 effeets of window and apparently de. layed using it because they were wrestling with the same dilemma. The Allies finally used window to maak bombers during raids on Ham burg in July 1943. The raids were highly effective with a sharply de creased loss of bombers to either air interception or flak. Six weeke later, the Germans used window during a raid on an Allied base with equally devastating effects. Window became a standard offensive EW measure for both sides throughout the remainder of the war. Physical devices were suppleme&.ed or replaced by a series of electronic jammers mounted in the bombers or in One or more escort aircraft. Al though these varied in technical de tail, all generated signals which either masked or spoofed the radars in in tercept aircraft or those on the ground. controlling the searchlights and air defense artillery. As in the case of the Battle of the Beams, each ECM device was countered by new or im proved radar which, in turn, was im paired by a new ECM device. Classic Naval Operation Not all ECM operations pertahed to air operations. One of the classic EW operations occurred early in 1942. Three German warabips-tbe Scharw horst, Gnsisenau, and Prinz Euge+ had been bottled up in the Brest Har bor. British attempts todeatroy them by air attack had been called off due to heavy losses incurred from air de fense. The British relied on superior naval forces controlling the seas to the south and west should the ships head for the Atlantic. Tbe route up the Channel was covered by coastal radars which would alert the Royal Air Force in the unlikely event that the Germans chose that escape route.

ELECTRONIC WARFARE speaking operators with a talent for Onthe night of 11 February 1942, mimicry in the bombers. They simu during foul weather, German jam lated the ground controllers, provid mers along the French coast were ing the interceptor pilots with erro turned on, gradually increasing their neous information which, at the least, signal strengths. The jamming was so caused confusion as to who was the aklllfully executed that British radar 1 real controller. The Germans switched personnel thought their equipment had developed malfunctions. While to a woman broadcaster; the British followed suit with a German-speaking the Britieh were disassembling radma Englishwoman, looking for nonexistent bugsfl the three warahips were moving through In one incident, the German con the English Channel. troller, after much harassment, gave Only one experimental radar op out with a violent outburst of pro erating on a frequency not previously fanity. The ghost voice advised the detected by the Germans-hence not interceptors, The Englishman is now jammed-observed the flight of the swearing. The German shouted, It ships. But since it was not tied into is not the Englishman who is swear the communication net, it could not ing, but me ! alert the British to counteraction. Sir Arthur T. Harris described a In this one EW operation, the Ger favorite tactic of the British which mans had earned great dividends, and was to intersperse recordings of Hit; the British had learned an expensive lers speeches in the broadcasts. The lesson. Thedecision aeto whether the Fuhrers screams did little to relieve benefit to be derived by using a par the irritation of the fighter pilots. ticular measure is worth the loss of Operations Today surprise and the inevitable develop The opportunities to influence mil ment of a countermeasure by the en itary operations with EW today are emy always challenges theseniorcom vastly greater than in World War II. mander and his staff. The preparedness of the scientists and Communications technical pereonnel to eupport such Concurrent with the struggles in ra operationa ia, of course, a critical fac dar and navigational aids, the inter tor. But equally important, every sen play of measure and countermeasure ior commander and staff officer needa was takhg place in communications. to review the age-old pririciples of Since the use of window increasingly war, broadening hie interpretation to reduced the effectiveness of radar on include all military operation, even interceptor aircraft, the Germana used those conducted in the fourth dimen ground controllers to direct intercep sionthe electromagnetic spectrum. tors by voice radio. The Britieh soon Marehal Vaaili D. Sokolovsky offere equipped bombers with an electronic a good summary of EW today. That jammer to search out the signal and it represents a Soviete view makes it jam it. The Germans countered by usdoubly aigniticant. He states: o ing high-powered broadcasting sta tions. Rather than try to match the in creased power with heavier jamming equipment, the British placed Gerrnan 10

The wide8r?read use of radio-elec tronic equilnnsnt in all lield8 fro8ee a dij)icult problem concerning the battle in space. The problem LQhow be8t to
Military hViEW

ELECTRONIC WARFARE

prohibit or decreaee the eff ectivenes.s of the enemge rudio-electronic 8g8 tems ad at the same time, how to emsure the eucceeeful use of ones own equipment. One O( the main aims is to disrnpt the enemys comtrol over his troops amt weapons by active ra dio interference and the destruction of hie mo8t importaut radio eyeteme. Thi8 iucludes demolishing or inter fering with the enemye electronic equipment tnetalled in aimraf t or mieailee; preventing the enemy% Wee of electronic equipment for aenal de tection, navigation, bombing, and mis

and di8TUpting the op eration of the enemye ground-baaed electronic apparatus ueed for com manding trOOp8. Thie li8t alone 8howe the great ez tent to which electronic countermeas ure, and protection from electronic countermeasures of the enemy, can be ueed; it showe how eeriorw their con sequences can be. The development of electronics ie, at the pre8ent time, ae significant as the development of nu clear mieeilee, which, incidentally, cannot be ueed without electronic 8ile guidance; equipment.

The increasing use of aircraft makes such equipment as terrain avoidance radar, better navigational aids, better surveillance sensors, and devices which will give our aircraft a better all-weather capability very important. Higb speed communications over great distances with fightweigbt equipment is under development. We are aleu working on ways to jam the enemys com . municatione and to make our radios ae immune to jamming as possible. General Dwight

$. Beach

November 1966

Chinas Total Strategy

A Soviet Critique

From The Reporter

Raymond L. Garthoff

HE exchange of polemical letters and articles between the Communist PartY of the Soviet Union and the Communist Party of China has been highly revealing. It has, however, been a public polemic-fashioned with an eye to domestic consumption and on the Communist and neutral nations following the dispute abroad. Perhapa even more revealing are dwumenta of an internal So viet discussion on Chinese Communiet politico-military strategy
; not intended to be made public. One such is an article called The
. Peking Version of Total Strategy: which appeared in the Soviet

12

Military ltlwiOW

CHINAS TOTAL STRATEGY Gener81 Staff theoretical journal MiL itar~ !Moctght for October 1963, and it is still both perthent and instruc tive. This journal is marked For Gen erale, Admirals, and Officers of the Soviet Army and Navy Onlyit was not intended to be read by Chinese (or American) eyes. the Chineqe exaggerate the signifi cance of the political and ideological character of poeeible future war at the expense of evaluating realistically the balance of real material forces that is, recognition of American military power. The Chinese Commu nists are eaid to bank on a protracted war, and on winning such a protracted war: . . . even if at a given timetkut is, epeaking plainly, at the preeent timethe enemy ie etronger, becauee in the cocwee of the etwuggle the reZation of forces will change to the advantmge of the weaker. Soviet Rebuttal This the Soviet writer finds uncon vincing. He says:

Journal Is Revealing
It analyzee Chinese Communist views on military theory and policy, and while it no doubt distorts the Chinese Communist position to some degree, it reveals a great deal both ahout the Chinese and Soviet concep tions. The current Chinese Commu niet view of military science is described as facing the past, the Chinese past, not recognizing any ex perience other than the experience of China. . . . Thie attitude, according to the Soviet critic I. Yermashev, leads to another and even more crib iwd fault of contemporary Chinese military science:

It is .cimplg obsolete. Aad it became obeolete not meretg bv iteelf but as a ceueequenee of radical chnngee in many objective conditions, including the material base of war and above all of weaponry.
Primarily, Yermashev commente,

It ie absurd to euppoee that a war of attntion will favor the weak and harm the etreug. In euch a war, the weak will be exhaueted before the strong. Chinese Marxism (Military Thought put it in quotes) is eaid to
make population a decisive factor, along with political-morale factors, determining victory or defeat. The, Soviet rebuttal not only cites the British conquest of India as an ex ample where size of population was no index of strength, but aleo pointedly recalle the defeat of China in 1895 by little Japan. Similarly, the Chi neee example of the defeat of Japan in China in 1945 as an illustration of victory in a protracted warthe cornerstone caee for Mao Tee-tunge theoriesis rejected as unconvinc ing. The Chinese neglect to note that Japan was tied down on many fronte in the Pacific Ocean: Yermashev says, and that the anti-fascist coali tion took the war to the Japimese

This article wae rewnted frmn the original, publiehed in THE REPORTER, 19 May 1966, under the title, A Soviet Critique of Chinae Total Strategy. CoprJ righted @ 1966 by The Reporter Magazine Company. Dr. Garthoff ie Special Aseist ant for Soviet Bloc Politico-Mili tary Affairs with the Department of State. Hie article, Marehal Malinovskye Manchuria Cam paign: appeared in the October 1966 ieeue of the MILITARY RE
VIEW. November 1966

ki

CHINAS TOTAL STRATE6Y homelandboth rare, if indirect, So viet credits to our role in defeating Japan. The author does not forget to note that the Soviet Army dealt com plete defeat to the Japanese Army in Northeastern and Northern China: without which the might of Japanese imperialism would not have been bro ken. Both the historical role of the Chinese Communists and the theoret ical underpinning of their present mil itary doctrine and politico-military strategy are thus demolished. Stress Relianca In the early 1960s, the Chinese, seeking to make a virtue of the neces sity imposed by the cessation of So viet economic, technical, and military assistance, began to stress reliance on ones owh etrength. Yerrnashev attacks this principle (which he terms anti-L-eninist, anti-Marxist, and Na tionalist) on the ground that it is advanced by the Chinese for: . . . the political and tactical aim of attempt to force on othersa strategy based on the conclusion that the antiimperialist etruggle requires war. One Chineee article in particular is cited, Lu Chih-chaoe Examination of the Question of War Must Not Run Counter to the Marxist-Leniniet View point of the Claes Struggle: which appeared in Red Nag on 15 August

separating the peoplee of the oppreesed countrfee from the camp of eoc?izhrn [for inetance, the Soviet bloc], sowing among them the eeede of nationalism and chauvinism.
Referring to Pekings development of its own nuclear weapons, he cays:

After all, not a single eocialist state except Chimz coneidere it necee sarg to have its own nuclear weapone, considering entirely correctly that the power of the Soviet nuclear forces re liably covere the entire sociuli.et camp from attack. The leader8 of the CCP [Chinese Communiet Partv] do not believe in fraterrud friendship with the other socia!ist conntriee and do not value this friendship, menting themselves only on their own strength. According to Military Thought, the
Chinese Communists argue forand

1963. It argued that the Soviete judge the nature of war by the scope of its deetructivenees in the nuclear age, rather than by adhering strictly to the Marxist-Leninist viewpoint of the class nature of any war. The Soviet afilcle deals with this charge only obliquely, but claims that the real class approach ie to con sider the consequences of such a war, which leads to the conclusion that nuclear war muet not be permitted. Mllitqy Review

14

CHINAS TOTAL STRATEGY Concerning Mao Tse-tungs remark that only half of the population of the world would die in a nuclear war, Militarst Thought comments:

Forward] to soctalism ministrative meaeures.

by crude ad

AU the subsequent development of this idea [in Chinese Communist writings] beam witnees to the fact that it was no chance remark but a considered conception. Just Wars Military Thought defends national
liberation wars ae just warsY but it qualifiee thie eupport by reiterat ing the need for peaceful coexistence between statee, and by challenging the alleged Chineee advocacy of revolu tionary war everywhere rather than selectively. It finds in this positilon the characteristics of the ideology of pett~bourgeois revolutionism, and goes on to make this condescending but slashing critique of Communist China: One

The Soviet diecuesion arguee that capitalism ie, indeed, doomed but that the role of the SOcialiet countries ia to speed ite fall not through war, which would bring ruin to them, too, but through economic competition, for which peace ie neceseary. Thk is a familiar theme in the polemics of the past several years. On the basia of this Chinese theoretical readiness for nuclear war, which the Soviets dia lectically interpret as desire for nu clear war, the Military Thought article goes so far as specifically to accuse the Chinese Communist leaders of sup porting genocide. Pure Adventurism To the Soviets these deficiencies in the Chinese Communist approach to military science, policy, and strategy lead to several conclusions. First, Chinas military ecience is pure ad venturism; her view of the West as a paper tiger is illogical and errone oue; and the reeult of a protracted military conflict would be defeat, not victory: The adventurist, total strategy of the Pekkg etyle ia fraught with indeecrihable calamities for all peoples, including the Chinese people. The Chinese Communiet, leaders, derisively referred to as the Peking supermen, are not genuine MarxistLeninist, and they know it:

must not forget that con temporary Chiua is etill jcwt an enor moue peasant countrg with a relatively emall proportion of proletarian ele ments, with a young and not get tem pered working class, actually omgiruzt ing only in the Zast quarter centurg; a ,comztt-~ in which there are etitl strong and living rem?wnte, not com pletely eliminated, of the otd ideologg of small and veng emalt prapertg awnere of the recent past and eves ele ments of feudzzl ideologv in customs, the family, and interperaoual rela tio?w, One cannot completely exclude the influence of all these pettv-bourgeois social strata on the leaders, especially if these very leadere themselves ako suffer from etrokee of extreme revo lutienariee in a time of internal difi cultiee as a result of the adventunet course of the epeedup [Great Leap
Novembef 1966

When one acquainte oneeelf cloeely with the themee of the Peking lead ers and their practical activity in the international arena, itbecomes clear that they pat in Jirat place not the in tereete of the peofdee struggling for peace, soctal$em, and national libera tion, but their own great power aims. They coneider that world thermo nuclear war is inevitable and, atten@t

CHINAS TOTAL STNATE6Y ing to hurrg it along, they evidcntlti euppoee that the Chinese people wiU have the best chance since they are the meet POPU1OUC people on the earth. In case of the destruction of the ma. jority of the peoples of the world, their statee, and their ccdtures (and thte, in the &nguuge of the Pehing political hysterics, is t$alled the fall of imperialism), there would remain, in their opnion, the epoch of world domimatien by people of the Uellow race. The Pehing leadere have already conce to teraw wth the idea of d{ vialing people by race, by the CO1OT of their dcine, rather than bg class and social characteriatice. Thus, they have entered the path leading into the ewamp of racism, with aU the conaequencee that fZow therefrom.

The Soviet critique concludes:

The propaganda war conducted with unheard-of licentiou-snees in Chino against the Soviet Union, the CPSV [Cmmmnniat Party of the Soviet Union], and other Marzist-Leninict partiee ie an integral part of thie strategy. By their hoetile tene, mali cious impertinence, and dirty inebma tione, articlc8 in the Chineee zneee could grace anti anti-Soviet snper reactimmtyi, even fa8cist preee. . . . And all thie ie not the reecdt of po lemical ranting, bnt on the contra~ ti a Coti blooded realization of the definite plan of the leadev8 of the CCP in descending the path of extreme rac ist chawinism.

COMMENTS INVITED
The Military Review welcomes your comments on any mate rial published. An opposite viewpoint or a new line of thought will assist us and may lead to publication of your ideas. If you are an authority on a certain subject, why not write an article for our consideration ? If you have, only an idea, query us; per haps we can assist you in developing an acceptable article.

16

Military Review

HE confrontation between In donesia and Malaysia came to an end on 11 August 1966. The sign ing of a peace accord in Jakarta brought a formal halt to three years of sporadic fighting between British and Commonwealth forces on one hand and guerrillas and Indonesian troops on the other. Malayeia, a member of the British Commonwealth of Nations and pro tected by a mutual defense agreement with Great Britain, formally achieved independence on 16 September 1963. Although Malaysian independence ini tially reeeived the blessings and good wishes of abnoet all nations, a threat to this independence began as early as April 1963. Malaysia has a total land mass of 127,461 square miles, and consiets of two eegmenta separated by 400 to 1,000 miles of water. The Malaya seg ment consists of the lower third of the Malay Peninsula at the southeast ern extremity of the continent of Asia. It has only one land boundarythat in the north abutting Thailand. It is bounded on the east by the South

China Sea, and on the south and west by the narrow Strait of Malacea. Roughly oval in shape, Malaya measures approximately 480 milee in its north-south dimension and 200 miles east-west, encompassing a total area of 50,400 square miles. Its shore line measures over 1,200 miles, and its land boundary with Thailand is 314 miles long. The Malaysian section of Borneo (Sarawak and Sabah) is a long, nar row strip of land extending across the

BRITISH WEAPONS AND TACTIC$

INMALAYSIA

Jac Weller \ November 1966 17

BRITISH IN MALAYSIA northern quarter of the island. It ex tends in a northeasterly-southwest erly direction for about 670 miles with a maximum width of 160 miles. Coastal boundaries include the South China Sea to the northwest, the Sulu Sea to the north and east, and the Celebes Ses for a short distance on the east and south. In addition, it has a 900 mile land border with Krdimantan, formerly known as Borneo, wh]ch oc cupies the rest of the island. Its land mass. tot& approximately 77,000 square miles. tactics against the Federation of Ma laya by penetrating from the sea and air. The guerrilla concealed them selves for a time, but were forced into the open in search of food. In eo do ing, tbe local population reported them, contributing immeneely to tbe failure of the cadres to eetablieh guer rilla forcee. In early 1965 the Indonesians changed their tactice by concentrat ing on acte of eabotege and attacks on police and military unite. Forces of from three to 100 pereone came acroea the land border in Sabah and by eea into both Malaya and Sabah. Indonesian confrontation forces along the Sabah border increased to several full brigades. Fighting contin ued on the ground and at sea through out 1965. The Malayeian security forcee under British command did an extremely efficient, professional job. Personnel losses were in favor of tbe British-Malaysian forcee five to one. They were succeeeful in more than 200 separate enemy operations. Infd trators were caught individually and in small groups, and guerrilla units at times were accounted for 100 per cent.

Strategic Defense
At first sight, the strategic probl em of defending Malaysia from out side aggression appears insurmount able. The border areas comprise hun dreds of miles of dense rain forest which melt into swamps and lagoons that extend up to 20 miles inland. All of the Malay Peninsula can be reached from Sumatra by canoe. The initial attacks against Malay sia during 1963 and the first half of 1964 were primarily aimed at setting UP pockets of guerrilla resistance deep inside the border in North Borneo. The idea was to penetrate the country overland with skeleton cadres and have them disappear to recruit local guerrilla forces. During the second half of 1964, In donesians endeavored to use the same

Experience an Advantage
Perhaps the greatest eingle advan tage the British had in thie war was experience. More than two centuriee of political and military accomplish ments in the Far East provided a reedy source of experienced personnel and proved jungle warfare tactics. In addition ti officer and enlisted men fresh from western Europe, the British Gurkha soldier, recruited from Nepal, was an enormous help in the successful defeat of the aggreseor forces. The Gnrkha soldiers have a record of more than a century and a half of loyal service in the British
I

Jac Weller, a firearms cenenltfmt with ofies in Pnnceton, New Jereeg, attended Georgia M&?arII Academy and was graduated from Pmnceton University. He i-r a frequent contribu tor to numerous US and foreign jour uafa and is the author of the book, Wellington in the Penineula. His meet recent article for the MILITARY RE VIEW, Scandi?mvian Infantrg Weap ona: appeared in the Febrmwy 1966 ieeue.
18

Nilitary Review

BRITISH IN MALAYSIA Army. They are mpall men, but in credibly tough, brave, and skillful at all forms of war, particularly in the jungle. When ambushed, their reae ment in Malaysia weighed slightly more than 50 pounds and included a rifle and 180 rounds of ammunition in magazines. A black nylon overall and a pair of sneakers-entirely satisfactory for night combatbedding according to habits of individual soldiers, medical

tions were so quick and vicious they frequently won the ensuing fight.
They suffered casualties, but still pur sued the enemy force until every sin-

gle man captured.

in it was

either

killed

or

Even though the individual and small unit effectiveness of the British and their allies in the jungle was ex cellent, these men were not asked to endure unnecessary hardships. Cars ful study indicates that British, Gurkha, and the new Malaysian sol diers functioned well in the jungle environment when provided with a klt that allowed comfort. Individual equip tlovembcr 1966

supplies, drinkhg water, and various tools for use in the jungle were all carried in a comfortable harness. Mos quitoes, leeches, wet feet uncomfort able sleeping arrangements, poor food, and exposure can contribute to poor health and morale and increase the problems of warfare. The soldier was equipped to combat these problems, and yet was not burdened with so much equipment that he became im mobile. I 19

BRITISH IN MALAYSIA Although the British steadily em phasized the individual, his personal equipment, and his operation in the jungle on foot with a rifle, they were not averse to taking advantage of more complicated equipment. They were unusually successful in adapting electronic communications to jungle conditkms. Radio communications in a rain forest are notoriously poor, but British and Gurkha experience re stored full range and clarity of recep tion.

modern miracle drugs were dkpeneed in 1arge quantities. WeI1s were dug,
buildings erected, and, more impor tant, the British and Gurkbaa showed a real and friendly interest in the peo ple. In this hearts and minds pro gram, the soldiers under Britileh com mand proved the best advertisement for democratic government and the way of life of the Free World. Britieh, Australians, and New Zea landers helped Malaysians arm and train themselves, making it possible for them to gain confidence from their own modest combat achievements es well as from those of their Com monwealth allies. This positive ap proach to problems which are com monly faced by newly emerging na tions will serve as a useful format for developing Malaysian military and economic resources. Small Arms Because of the Britfsh emphasis on the individual sotdier and his personal weapon, small arme were of great im portance. The British Army had a fine new family of predominantly 7.62 millimeter infantry weapons, as effi cient and effective as any in the world for conventional warfare. For various reasons, these arms were not particu larly well adapted to the jungle. To some extent, they were superseded by others, or did not replace weapone pre viously used by the British Army in the area. The standard infantry rifle in the British Army and the armies of the wealthier members of the Common wealth was the self-loadlng rifle de signed by the Fabmque Nationale dArmes de Guerre (FN). This is a fine weapon which tires the %.62 milli meter NATO round, 20 to each de tachable box magazine. In the British Army, this weapon does not fire fti)ly

Airlift System
The poor roads in Malaya and al most complete lack of them in Sabah greatly limited the use of motor ve hicle travel. However, lightly armored vehicles were extremely useful in cer tain areas. To compensate for lack of motorahle roads, the Britieh managed to integrate helicopters, and small fixed-wings and some larger aircraft into an airlift system capable of pro viding logistic support to a combat force of approximately 20,000 in Sa bah. In addition to logistic support, these aircraft provided an effective means for strategic deployment of personnel to areas where the military situation dicfated. Britain realized from the beginning of the Indonesian and Malaysian con frontation the extreme importance of intelligence in counterguerrilla op erations. Success in these operations hinged on friendship with the local people. The enviable record of the British for fair dealing, decent gov ernment, and honest economic and social progrese during the colonial pe riod contributed advantageously to gaining the support of the local people. Britain, extended economic aid and expanded civic action, pafilcularly in areae where the government was weakest. Free medical treatment and November 1966

automatically, but can deliver rapid single shots with astonishing accu racy. It waa entirely eatiefactory dur ing the Malayan emergency, but event ually ran into severe competition from the AR15 (US M16) that tires a cai iber .223 (5.56 millimeter) cartridge. The high-velocity bullet from thie

as opposed to 10.7 pounds. The lighter weapon waa aaid to be coneiderahly quicker to use in an emergency and had a fully automatic capability. For uae in the jungle, the British Army felt that the AR15 was euperior to their self-loading rifle, and they equipped units of battalion eize com pletely with these new rifles.

New Machinegun
The British Army adopted a new general purpose machlnegun, also of FN design, that tires 7.62 millimeter NATO ammunition from the came dis integrating link beltz that are used by the US M60 macbinegun. The gen eral purpose machinegun, in its light role, haa a biped mount and hutt stock similar to moat modern light machineguns. It can also be equipped with a heavy barrel and mounted oh a tripod for medium machinegun op eration. Thk weapon ia one of the best and most reliable in the world today when used in conventional war. fare situations ae either a squad light machinegun or as a company eupport waapon. It had trouble, however, in both of these functions in the jnngle. The new medium macbinegun on its special recoil-ahsorbhg tripod with two sighting eystema was effi cient, accurate, reliable, and much lighter than the old caliber .903, watercooled Vickers. Weight was of little importance because medium machine gune were generally installed ifi bun kers and remained there until the en tire fortified area wae moved. The old Vickcrs weapons fired slower and more accurately and were able to stay in action indefinitely with no barrel changing. Becauee of its relatively high cyclic rate, the barrel of the general pur pose mechlnegun must be replaced if MiliiIY Review

A Gurkha soldier with the tmdttiomd knkri light round wae found to be aatiefec tory in regard to killing power in the jungle. The AR15 with 180 rounda of am munition in magazinee weigha 13.8 pounde compared to a weight of 23.5 pounde for the self-leeding rifle and the same number of rounde. The AR15 is 3S.6 inches long as opposed to 41 inches for the standard rifle and weighs, when fully loaded, 7.4 pounds

BRITISH IN MALAYSIA
it is to remain long in action. A skill ful crew can change a barrel in eec onds and be back in operation. But even seconds may be too long in a jungle bunker if an enemy only a few yards away chooses the barrel-chang ing time to run forward and bow] a hand grenade through the embrasure. extent at least, the British continued to use the 3.6-inch rocket launcher which was simpler, lighter, and equally effective on Malayeian targets. Since the terrorists and the Indo nesians rarely used more than 160 men together, Britieh forces in Malayeia often did not need to operate above company strength, Although Britieh and Commonwealth battalions and even brigades sometimes maneuvered together, platoone were far more im portant in contact with the enemy.

Jungle Tactics
A platoon armed with rifles, and small and light machineguns carried sufficient ammunition to engage in a fairly exteneive action witbout resup ply. The important reasons for this were that these units were the hunt ers, not the hunted, and knew how to take full advantage of the jungle while denying its use to their enemies. Their weapons and fire discipline were good. They changed their bivouac area every night, and perimeter security in darknese wee aseured because of their experience and constant prac tice. As in other jungle combat areas, patrolling and ambuehee were of ex treme value in Malaysia, particularly at night. In order to make their of feneive maneuvers more effective, the British adopted a system of company bases. These earth, timber, and some times concrete fortkications were sur rounded by barbed wire and punjis. They normally contahed one 105-milli meter pack howitzer and two 81-milli meter mortars, and relied heavily on medium machinegune in bunkers, usu ally the water-cooled Vickere. The baeic idea of a defense of this type, however, wae to support offen eive patrolling. A British rifle com pany contains four platoons. One of

The

Ferret unloading here fmrctions well in reasonably open erees

In some base camps, the general pur pose machineguns were in cosmoline in boxee while the old water-cooled Vickers held the forts. Tbe British had a superb new 84 millimeter recoilless rifle that would kneck out any tank and wae lighter and shorter than most other similar arms in use throughout the world, in cluding the new US 90-millimeter re coillees rifle. But these weapons were not required in the jungle. To some November 1966

\
23

BRITISH IN MAIAYSlh

these, plus headquartersand assigned troops, could hold a base camp while
as many as three patrolled outilde it. The Britieh preferred a large num ber of small patrols, in some instances no larger than a single squad, to a small number of large patrols. The ides was to confuse the enemy. It also bad the secondary advantages of cov ering a larger amount of ground and impressing more civilians. If small patrols were coordinated, but irregu lar in time and path, they supported each other. The British and their allies made f~iends with the jungle and with the local inhabitants. The Gurkbas, who are superb jungle fighters, deserve much credh in this connection. They are intensely ambitious militarily, and their ability to move in jungle terrain by day or night was remarkable. The British used dogs with consid erable success. For offensive opera tions, they developed a tracker teem that usually coneisted of two dogs, each with a handler, and two human trackers from the inland Sabah tribes known as 2bans or Dayake. Each dog handter and each Iban had a rifleman for protedion, and there was a commanding officer and a noncmumissioned officer with a ra dio for a total strength of 10. The animals used in these units were usually Labrador retrievers. One of these teems could move fast, far, and accurately. The British a2ao used dogs for se curity around their bases and for alerting patrols to danger at night. These animals were chosen for their over-all alertness, viciousness, and sense of hearing. German shepherds were usually best for this mission. British and Malaysian forces were able to maintain a reel superiority 24

in intelligence, Malaysian polic~ and security force bases were hit oceqsion ally by emall units armed with mor tare, rocket launchers, and medium machineguns. But reports of these unite usually reached the British while the Indonesians were still on their own side of tbe border. Most of the penetrating forces were ambushed before they reached their objectives. Ae long se British and Malaysian intelligence was superior to that of the enemy, their better radio and transportation equipment, including helicopters, allowed them to disperse to protect a large portion of the border and concentrate for effective action when neceseary. What lies ahead ? Can Malaysia, without Britkh and other allied mil itary and economic assistance, main tain internal peace and successfully repel external overtures with an armed force of less than 20,000 men? Need 1sss to say, any immediate withdrawal or cessation of military and economic assistance would surely tax the in genuity of Malaysian leaders. The Ma laysian armed forces would certainly provide an experienced nucleue for continuation of the military civic ac tion programs and jungle warfare tac tics that have eo far proved eucceeeful. Capitalizing on Iessone learned during the past three years, enhanc ing national rapport, and establish ing a eound economic baee te euetain present and future progressive gov are foremost ernment programe among the problems facing Malaysia. Continuation of friend2y relations with neighboring countries and de termination on the part of the people will contribute immeasurably to re solving these problems and will lead Malaysia forward toward a eolvent independent country. MiiitalyReview

Brigadier General Lynn D. Smith, Uaited State8 Armg, Retired

Li%tzw 46/a Ji%i% Ai!.+w

Dear

Major:

Congratulations on your recent promotion. Inclosed is a set of leaves that were given to another new major long ago. I am eorry not to be. present to pin them on you, but I will take this opportunity to discuss your new status ae a field grade officer. The field grade is a broad field, and thus these comments range from cabbages to kings. By the time you are wearing eagles, you may have different views on the matter. The only trouble is that by then you will be buckhg for a star, and in that state of frustration it is sometimes difficult to view your profession with objectivity. Today, you are still young enough to laugh at ulcers. Oh, I know yoti already have seen action and been decorated, and the lieutenants in your outfit refer to you as the old manfl but you are still younger than those who rank you. This will not alwaya be the case. Before you retire, some men now junior to you will be wearing more stars than you. More important, you will be taking orders from men in civilian clothes who are schoolboys today. That is one of the reasons for this letter. When the men making the big decisions are older than you, their domain seems far removed, and you do not lie awake nights quarreling with their judgment. Later, how ever, the destiny of the Nation will be in the hands of men who are your contemporaries or juniora rather than your elders. It is then that you may think you can do a better job than they, particularly as it concerns national strategy.

I want to otFerfor your corwideration, therefore, some thoughts con cerning strategy for the layman. Yes, even though you wear the uniform, you are as much a layman in the sphere of national strategy as the man in the gray flannel suit. When you have learned to live with this fact, YOU will have taken a long step toward professional objectivity. As a starting point, consider the nuclear weapon. Before you re tire, there may be devices which can effectively ward off the awesome destructiveness of this weapon. As of the moment, however, the existence of the nuclear-tipped ballistic missile drastically limits the ability of armed forces to perform their traditional role of interceding between the enemy and the homeland. This has created a situation which demands an understanding of the difference between a calculated risk and a gamble. . Field Marshal Erwin Rommel defined that difference in laymans terms: It ia my experience that bold swcceiw. But O?W m~t di#erenti@e neee and a military gamble. A bold not a certaint~, but which in caae forcee in hand to cope with whatever
give the beet promise of strategti or tcwtical bokf operatwn is one in which eaccess &? of failure leaves one with. @kie?zt eibaatwn may ariae. A gamble, on de&iona between

the other hand, ia an operation which can lead either to victo~ complete deetrwction of once force.

or to the

In the last 20 years there have been many, both in and out of uni form, who have londly urged bold courses of action in our national strategy. For the occupants of the WMte House, however, the existence of the nuclear weapon has caused such recommendations to be viewed as gambles in which the 10SScould be total, rather than as calculated risks in which a loss would leave the Nation with the ability still to cope with whatever situation may arise. Well, then, what is strategy? The Dictwmwyi of US MilitaW Tern-w for Joint Usage contains a wide spectrum of definitions of the term. The broadest pertsins to national strategy: The art and science of developing amt using the political, economic, and p~chologiazl powers of a natwn, together with ite armed forces, dumngpeace and during war, to secure the national objective. Edward Mead Earle wrote:
The highest tgpe of etrategy-eometimee called gvand etrategy-ia thut which so integrate the pol%ee and ammwnents of the natwn thut the reeort to war is either reno%ed unneceeeaw or ia cmdertaken with

the mummzm chunce of victov. . . . Strategy, tiwrefore, ia not merely a concept of wartime, but is an inhereni element of statecraft at all times. 20
Military Review

NEW MAJOR

That is not a new concept or a result of the nuclear age. Abraham Lincoln and Franklin D. Roosevelt were well versed in this meaning of strategy. They were also aware of the pros and cons of bold operations and military gambles. When President Lincoln finally found his generals, for example, he could take calculated risks. He could afford to let General William T. Sherman cut loose from his base and disappear into the heart of the Confederacy because if the operation failed, it would not have re sulted in the complete destruction of the Union. When the entire Pacific appeared to be at the mercy of the Imperial Japanese war machine in 1942, President Roosevelt could cooly calculate the risk and then give first priority to the elimination of Adolf Hitler. Such freedom of action has not been available to a President of the United States since 1950 when the othef side acquired the bomb. In the 1950s and 1960s, the men in the Oval Room have had to give far greater weight to the possibility of rendering war unnecessary than to the alter native of maximum chance of victory. As a professional soldier, you must understand the difference be tween national strategy and military strategy. Military strategy is de fined in the Dictionqt for Jo$nt Usage as:
The art and .cCieme of employing the armed forces of a nution to secure the objectives of national policy by the appltiatiun of fovce, or

the threat of force. If you master this art and science, you will earn all the stars and decorations your country can bestow. You will be so occupied that you will not have time to concern yourself with debates on the fine points of the political, economic, and psychological aspects of national strategy. You learned the basic national objectives of our country when you were still in grade school. These objectives were stated in their simplest and most enduring terms in our Declaration of Independence as life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. The attainment of those objectives is in the sphere of the profes sional politician. The term politician is used in its proper and honorable connotation. Websters dictionary defines a politician as one versed or experienced in the science of government. Today, the science of govern ment encompasses the population explosion, the effect on people of scienBrigadier General Lzmn D. Smith, US Arnw, Retired, is a graduate and former faeultg member of the US Armu War College. Hie aeaignments include duty with the 18th Airborne CorP8; 8th Infantrg Divieicn; Director of the Re eerve Affaire Divieian, O&e of the Aeektant Secretarzi of Defense (Manpower); and Director, Enlieted Pereonnel Directorate, O&e of Pereonnel Operatio~, Department of the A?vrvy. I
November 1966 21

NEW MAJOR tific and technological breakthroughs, the great and compelling effort to eliminate racial discrimination, the incalculable wealth of a few nations in a world where millions are still starving to death, and the demand for a place in the sun by dozens of nations so new their names are not yet in the atlas. Under such conditions, the attainment of such apparently simple objectives as life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness requires the leader ship of the most professional of politicians.

As a personal checkpoint-to be noted periodically in the effort to maintain your objectivity-I urge you, therefore, to remember that, al though you wear the uniform, you are a layman in the field of national strategy. Now, let us look a$ this business of being a field grade officer. You have just relinquished command of a company, probably the most satis. @ing command you will ever have-cert.ahlly, the most instructive. Never again will you live so C1OSC to the men who make up the Army. In your tours of small unit troop duty, you have learned more about your fellow Americans than Ph. D.s can learn in a lifetime of controlled experi ments. When the time comes that your advice is sought as to the capa bilities and limitations of the Armed Forces, the most important part & your recommendations will concern men. When you sit in a leather chair acrose a table from a civilian member of the Government, your authoritative knowledge of the capabilities of men may well be your greatest contribution to national strategy. ~ou have learned that the great majority of young men are truly fine, regardless of their background. You have discovered that 100 per cent of the mischief is caused by ahout three percent of the men, and that the other 97 percent habitually abide by the rules because they un derstand that the rules are for their protection rather than for their harassment. Remember this when prophets of doom preach the short & comings of the younger generation. You have Iived intimately in an environment where desegregation was a fact long before the term civil rights became a byword, and you learned to judge a man by his ability rather than the color of his skin. You have seen men demonstrate the real meaning of patriotism when the chips were down. Some of those men probably did not cornwehend the significance of the pamphleta on Why We Fight, but they unhesitatingly put their lives on the line for the fellowmen in their outfit. Interest ingly enough, Websters first definition of the word patriot is fellow countryman. In the years ahead, as your efforts are directed toward more nebulous matters, you must not discount the importance of your knowledge of men. You have now advanced into that phase of your life where time
28
Militafy hviOW

NEW MAJOR

moves faster. When the gold leaves were pinned on your shoulders, it may have seemed there was a long gap between major and major general, but before you really want it to happen you will be in the zone of con sideration for general officer. In the meantime, the Army will devote much time and money educating you to use what you already have learned. In this postgraduate part of your schooling, you will have the intel lectual freedom to explore many concepts. You will be tempted to take your eye off the ball and become a dilettante with words and theories, ratherthan a practitioner of facts as you were when you commanded a company. If tattooing were still in vogue, I would suggest that on the back of your right hand there be indelibly inscribed the words, I am an Army officer, not a politician.~ and on the back of your left hand, words have no meaning in themselves. As a company officer you used words, usually in a direct exchange of ideas with Sergeant Jones or Private First Class Doe. As you became proficient in your job, you did not worry too much about the words them selves. Rather, you formed your judgment by the expression in Private First Class Does big blue eyes, or the slightly cynical droop of Sergeant Jones? mouth. They,in turn, did not worry as much about your choice of English as they did about the set of your jaw when you asked, Do I make myself clear ? Communication between you and the men of your command was loud and clear, even though it might have been unintelligible to a psychologist studying motivation. Now, your end of that channel of communication is disconnected. In the future, you will deal with those men through others. Usually, what the others tell you will be in written form, or in a stylized oral pres entation. Before it is too late, I hope you learn that words have no, meaning in themselves. The quotation is from Stuart Chase. Read his book, titled The Tgranny of Words, and you may avoid some of the frustration that causes most of the ulcers in the Pentagon. That building has a large accumula tion of the most articulate men in uniform, but too many of them spend too much of their time manipulating words, Hundreds of young field grade officers there put in 60 to 70 hours every week writing essays on everything from grand strategy to how many etripee a private first class should wear. These studies are then read by other field grade officers who, in turn, write equally long and scholarly studies commenting on, and often nonconcurring with, the papers of their brethren. Sometimes these papers are shown to a general or a civilian official. Before this can be done, the hundred pages of the beautifully writtep Mvembm 1988
29

essay are reduced to a single page contilning the meat of the matter, together with a recommendation as to why the idea should not be ap proved. The original author is convinced that his concept was not ac cepted because the recipients of his paper failed to grasp its true meaning, despite his lengthy and painful research to find exact and exotic words to express his ideas. Mr. Chase might have had these dedicated men in mind when he wrote, We assume we know exactly what we mean, and that readers who do not understand us should polish their wits. In this environment, reality can become obliterated in a plethora of verbiage. Staff positions can become idols to be defended at all cast by words rather than ideas. Even pragmatic officers who should know better can sometimes forget that a position paperfl which cleverly and devaetatingly cuts the ground from under the opposition across the . hall, does not usually do much for an infantry platoon engaged in a search and destroy mission in some far off jungle. Before long, Major, you will find yourself in that arena. As you deal with problems far above the company level, your recommendations will be baeed on judgment and logic more than on specific experience. Your ideas will be ueeful only if they can be communicated to others. In thie matter of communication, Mr. Chases viewe, on the meaningless ness of worde in themselves, are worthy of wnsideration. An example quoted from his book makes the point: ae indicated in Here are three paile of water, with temperatures the dtigram:

Put your left hand into pail A, and IIOW right hand in pail C. Now withdraw the left baud from A aud putit into B: Nice warm water.
Withdraw the right huud from C aud put it into B: Brrr! beaetly cold water. There is thus no absotute thing cold w warn?: The uee of lam guzzge to produce euch subetantivee ie false to the facte. Theee words canuot truly exprese thinge, but on.lg relatiom. 30
Military Review

You can chew on that for quite a while, Major, so I will bring this to a close. In this pinning ceremony: I have imposed on your time to suggest some guidelines that may bring tranquility rather than frustra tion in the remainder of your career. When you develop the grand plan for nations, right wheel ! remember you are a layman in the field of national etrategy. Remember, too, that the nuclear weapon and its fan tastic delivery systems will require most bold concepts to be judged as risky gambles by the men in civilian clothes who must make the final decisions. As you become older and tend to look on your fellow beinge with a more jaundiced eye, cheer yourself by recalling the fine things you learned about men when you were a company officer. Finally, do not despair when others fail to agree with your papere. It could be that the words you used have a different relationship to the problem in the minds of your readers than they do to you. There, Major, I know exactly what I mean, and if you do not under stand it, you should polish your wits. Affectionately,

Lynn D. Smith BG, USA, Ret

bomber 1966

31

WNiam D. Franklin

IR Halford J. Mackinder in Dem ocratic Ideata and R@tw ob served that democracy refuses to think strategically until compelled to do so for purposes of defense. The influence of Macklnders thought has been wide and profound, and most analysis of national strategy since 1942 has been based, in whole or in part, upon his theories. He believed that the Soviet Union occupied the strotigest natural seat of pnwer in the world, and his in fluence upon Soviet etrategic thought cannot be minimised. He was one of the first strategic thinkers to predict the eventual clash between the two greatest land and sespowers the world has ever known.
BY the end of World War II, the United States was undisputed maeter of the worlds oeeami, while the USSR had amassed a landpower of gargan tuan dimensions. For the contahnnent of this Communist landpower, the US

32

Militmy Review

MACKINDERS HEARTLAND command of the sea is vital to the maintenance of forces in Europe and Asia. Most of the earlier criticism of Macklnders heartland concept was connected with the effects of new tech. nology upon strategy. It waa thought that the introduction of the longrange bomber and intercontinental balliatic missile (ICBM) with nuclear warheads would eupersede hia work in favor of a more esoteric megadeath strategy. Pivot Area The heartland waa considered by Ma&inder as the pivot area of world power. Viewing the world as a Mer cator projection, he attributed over whelming importance to the conti nental heartland. rea would give the heartland a door way to the sea, and, in addition, would provide a buffer between tbe heart land and the outer crescent. The Ru8 sian-Siberian area was tbe heartland of the World Island, and occupied a poeition destined eventually to dom inate the outer crescent. Concerning tbe doctrine of seapower, Macklnder believed that the unity of the oceana meant nothing un less the dominant navy also poseeseed naval bases at strategic places on land. Naushofers Geopolitics A German soldier-echolar named Karl Hauehofer drew all of Mackin ders concepte together into the sci ence which he called geopolitics. He developed bts theory in an effort to justify the German expansion that reeulted in World War II. Germany failed to acquire the heartland, but . her defeat left a resurgent Soviet Union in undisputed control of the area. If German geopolitical doctrines were valid, nothing could prevent So viet-Chinese domination of the world. But they may not be valid. A brief examination of the general and lim ited conflict etrategiea will reveal that the essential parameters of warfare have, undergone drastic indeed, changes since World War H. Never theless, it can be argued that in some respects the strategic theory of Mackinder is as viable in an ICBM and thermonuclear framework as it wae in the era of short-range aircraft and gunpowder. The frozen wastes of the Arctic, ae they appear in a polar radar projec tion, offer scant protection in the event of war. An ICBM launched from un derground or underwater could be de livered in 30 minutes or lese to a i.

Who

rutee

easterw

Europe

com

maruta the Heartland; who rvde8 the Heartkwtd commande the wor3d island; who rules the world ieland commande

the world.
Mackinder visualized eastern Eu rope as the heartland. He classified the balance of Europe and Aeia ae the inner or marginal crescent, and the rest of the world aa the outer or in sular crescent. He considered the in ner crescent rimlands aa being excep tionally valuable ae land bridges whose poeaeesion would enhance a nations power position. The land bridges of France, Italy, Egypt, India, and KoWiUiam D. Franklin is an Aseiztant Research Economist in the Depart ment of Economics, Texa8 Transpor tation I?wtit~te, Tezae Agmcultuval and Mining University, CoUege Sta tion, Texas. He holds a B.S. degree in HiatoW and Economic8, aud an M.S. in Economics. Hz is the author of Probability, VtilitV, and National Strategy; which appeared in the Au gust 1966 iseue of the MILITARY REVrEw. Wovemher 1986

i3

MACKINDERS

HEASTIAHD

target anywhere in the world-even to the interior of the heartland. New weapon systems have virtually changed the fundamental parameters of warfare. One thermonuclear weapon has more firepower than has been ex pended in all the wara in Klstery. We have an implied sliding scale of relevance embodied withkr the an-

dication of politicrd leaa%ehip or whea there exiete eo deep a echiem betwean the ce?rtctutere that the totrd de8t?wction of the encmg appeare tiw onlI/ goat worth contending for.
It is one of the most obvious and dangerous manifestations of the prin ciple of least effort. It is simply men tally easier to attempt the resolution of seemingly unanswerable conflicts by the application of geomilitary means. There has been practically no occa sion in recorded history wherein the victor in a confikt put the entire pop ulation of the vanquished to the sword, which, in a nuclear eense, ie the im plied result of general nuclear war. This would depict the death of popu lations in terms of millions, a thought which tends to assume a fuzzy ab stractness in the mind of most indl viduals. Major Altarnativea

to consider is located at an intermedi ate point on the conflict scale and has, as an alternative to thermonuclear war, been actively pureued as policy by the United States. This alternative is the concept known as limited war. nourwed policies of our Government Approximately six months after the that indicates that not all cases of armistice wtilch ended the Korean aggression will he countered with corn. plete reaction on the general war level. ~ War, Secretary of State John Foster Dunes coined the term massive re Dr. Henry A. Kksinger felt that: taliation in a speech before the Coun . . . all-out war corwtitutee a epecial cil of Foreign Relatione in New York caae. It comes about through the ab 34 Military Roviaw

U.9New In the event of war, hmdmassee and Iro&es of wster would not prevent nu clear missiles from reaching the heart land interior

Nevertheless, decision makers, on national and internationallevels,muet cometo grips with the reality of total thermonuclear conflict. In a world abundantly supplied with multimega tmr weapons and, therefore, destined henceforwardto be living always on the edge of total disaster, new alter natives, new solutions, and new con cepts must receive thoughtful consid eration. One of the major alternatives

MACKINDEQS HEARTLAND on 12 January 1964. Massive retalia tion as a response to a direct attack upon us has generally been accepted as appropriate. President John F. Kennedy invoked this type of threat ened responee with the Soviet Union in relation to the Cuban crieie. Dur ing eeaentially the same period, he also utillized the eliding scale to ra spond in a different manner in south east Asia. Deterrent Force In the interaction between nations, the threat of war haa alwaya been an instrument of diplomacy by which one state or nation deterred another from doing something of a military or po litical nature which the former wished to delay or prevent. In a thermonu clear sense, this impliee that the par ticular nation has the forcee in being to implement a policy or strategy of deterrence. General Cutile E. IAfay has stated: intended to pursue the expansionistic policies advocated by Haushofer dur ing the Adolf Hitler period, From a geopolitical standpoint, the USSR recognized the signitkxmce of the inner crescent as both a buffer againet the outer crescent and aa a strategic outlet to the oceans that could secure a jumping off place to the eventual conquest of the empires of the sea made up of the islands of the outer or insular crescent. Essen tially following the pattern laid down by Haushofer, and utilizing the his torical interpretation of Karl Marx aa to the eventual expansion of commu nism, the Soviets began the expanaion of the heartland both during and fol lowing World War II. First Limited War President Harry S Truman, who had been observing this expansion as part of the big picture of world gee- . political movemente, decided that this inner creecent must be denied the Comnmniets. He felt that denial of the rimlands would contain further expaneion of the Communiet heart land, and announced his policy as euch in 1947, with the Truman ~ doctrine, promising aid to Greece and all other countries threatened by Communist expansion. As President of the most powerful nuclear nation on earth, he restrained that power and entered hia country into the firat limited war of the nuclear age. The fundamental characteristic that distinguishes limited war from gen eral war is the important concept of restraint. It is a war fought to achieve limited objectives. The purpose of lim ited war, ae Kissinger pointed out, is to infl:ct loseee or to pose risks for the enemy out of propofilon to the ob jectives under dispute. It requires a desire by both eides not to exceed cer-

A deterrent fores is orw that & large enough that no matter whut the enemg does, either offeneivelp or de feneivelg, he etill will receive a quaw tity of bombs or explosive force that i8 mare than he ia v@Wng to accept.
The nuclear stalemate that exists between the major powere today may p$e~ent general war for the present. On the other hand, it will not prevent limited conSicte. It may, in fact, as Kieeinger has pointed out, even en courage them. Without the thin thread of nuclear destruction hanging over every peripheral decision, greater boldness can be expected in confron tations dealing with the Wimlands to the Communist world. Since 19S9 about 18 different coun tries have been incorporated into the Communist world and encloeed behind the Iron or Bamboo Curtaina. It was readily apparent that the Soviet Union Kovember le66

MACKINDERS

HEARTLAND key to the game is credibility~ which means the capacity to convey ones intent in unmistakable form by diplomatic-military signaling. This ia the overwhelming advantage to the limited nonnuclear war strategy. Both sides are permitted to signal their de sires in a more adequate manner than would be poseible in a general war. Industrial Potential An important aspect of limited con ventional war is the fact that it per mits the mobilization of the industrial war potential of both the United States and the patilcular country de fended, Thue, if conflicts are limited to the Korean or southeast Wlan-type, tbie mobilization of the industrial base can be employed to the greatest strategic advantage. The Communist world cannot match the Western World in this respect, and thie gives an overwhelming ad vantage to the West in any limited or controlled conflict. In recent ycare, the importance of this tremendous indus trial potential was overshadowed in strategic thinking because war was being thought of in a totally nuclear sense that would not permit any time for mobilization. Any potential for military production possessed by any country was discounted because it wae believed it would be crippled or wiped out in the first few boors of devas tation. It is clear that under limited war conditions this it not true. With the initial commitment by the United States in any limited war, a small un dercurrent of strategic industrial mo bilization ia set into motion. If the war then progresses through various stages of escalation, at each stage more of thie potantial is brought into use. Then, as the conSict escalates into ever greater ferocity, an increasing MilitaIY Review

tain restraints-a

gain that might conceivably

sort of tacit bar include strategic bombing on selected targeta such as airstrips or ammunition dumps while being as careful as pos sible not to hit cities. Korea was a peripheral and limited war, and represented the only means for preventing, at an acceptable cost, the eapaneion of the Communist haart-

US Amw General Curtis E. LsMay land. During and since this period, the United States has declined to employ even limited nuclear war. It has been felt that this reluctance is a clear in dication or signal that the United States wanted te keep conflicts lim ited to conventional weapons. All evi dence points to the fact that this sig nal has been received and agreed upon by the Communists. The United States is in a conflict in sontheast Asia in which men and machines are used not merely to de stroy or conquer, but for psycholog ical gain as tokens of intent in a grim game of bluff and counterbluff. The

a6

MACKlt40ERS HEASTLAND amount of industry. is converted to producing military hardware. There fore, even if the limited conflict does eventually degenerate into general war, the initial limitation has per mitted the mobllizaticin of the stra tegic industrial base over time. The time factor in this type of conversion from nonstrategic to strategic produc tion can mean, perhaps, the critical difference between ultimate success or failure. Assessment of Probabilities It is evident that the probabilities connected with each strategic move in limited war can be assessed with con siderably more empirical knowledge than could thoee connected with gen eral war. The decieion maker, either political or military, has a baee of knowledge, information, experience, and belief that can be utilized to as. eign a subjective probability weight to a particular strategic decieion, He may have a limited type of frequency distribution accumulated ae a result of previous deeisione that can be con sidered in arriving at a current de cieion. As a limited war progresses up the ecale of ever greater violence, each es calation can be subjectively ,weighed in relation to the probabilities as signed as a result of previous moves either up or down the violence scale. Given the individual mix of cireum stancee that determine each subjec tive weight at a given time, the in dividual decision maker may view the violence ecale and the probability scale as moving in tbe same direction, in versely, or as having no relationship at all. If he felt that both scales moved in the same direction, he would assign higher and higher probabilities as the conflict eecalated up the fiolence scale. Novsmbw 1966 If he felt that the two varied in versely, he would probably assign lower probabilities ae more force was applied. On the other hand, he may feel that either of the two scales bae reached a plateau and would be unaffected by any subsequent change connected with the scale. He may feel that additional escalation of violence would not in-

US AmII President Harry S Truman crease or decreaee the probability to ward general war, or he might con versely feel that to continue present levels of violence would increase the probability over time. Needless to say, it ie important to ascertain theee individual subjective probabilities related to the decision maker. In addition, the utility at tached to each event must be deter mined in order for a rational decision to be rendered adequately. An indi vidual utility ecale must be computed as it relates to strategic loss or gain. Evidently, this assessment of prob ability and utillity, permitted over

31

time in limited war, provides a bet ter field for decision making than does that of general war. This is another reason why escalation serves an im portant purpoee. It permits consid eration of these steps on the scale between limited and general war. If, at any given time in this escalation, the United States decides that the next etep on the scale of violence has a high probability of resulting in gen eral war, that step may be delayed or even canceled before it is taken. Ordy under conditions of limited war is the time available for this type of deci sion. since it is possible to control the level of violence under limited war condition, escalation ie only another strategic tool to be employed in the over-all conflict. But the fact remaine that $his escalation must be carefully consiilered because it can conceivably get out of control once it is initiated. Ratchet Effect In economics, a concept relating to nonreversible cyclical fluctuation in economic activity results in what is known as a ratchet effect. Such a con cept would be appropriate in relation to controlled escalation. With each step upward on the escalation scale, it hccomes progressively more difficult to move back down the scale, thereby reeulting in a nonreversible ratchet effect. This means that each deeision to escalate muet be considered care fully at the highest military and civil ian decision-making levels before be ing implemented. In utilizing controlled escalation to prevent expansion of the Communiet heartland, the very concept of the term eurrender must be reconsid ered. By the boundaries of the defini tion of limited war, there can be no such thing as total victory. If both

participants in a particular conflict possess nuclear capability, it ie ques tionable whether either side would submit to the World War 11 concept of unconditional surrender. There fore, the very concept of surrender, aa it is preeently known, muet be placed in a new thought perspective. It will no longer be feasible to exact the conditions that were considered acceptabla+ws actual satisfactory surrender under present thermonu clear conditions may consist of no more than a secession of overt conflict. Maintain Over.All Force Given the probability of either a general thermonuclear war or a con dition of limited war, it is reasonable to provide for both twee Of eventu ality. Since any general conflict must be fought with the forces in being at, the time of the initial attack, it is im portant to maintain an over-all force large enough to respond to this type of threat. This will entail a somewhat large diversion of the annual gross national product to the prbduction of nonconsumer-type goods, but this is necessary to maintain the precarious equilibrium we know as peace. It will also be ncceeeary to train and maintain the capability to con duct nonnuclear limited war on almoat any level of violence. The exietence of a highly trained force that can respond to any given situation will insure that action is taken rapidly enough to prevent any initial limited aggression from quickly escalating into a complete takeover. Perhaps, there may be even a further escala tion into total war before adequate re sponse can he given that would signal our intentions to the aggressor before the conflict rezched excessively dan gerous propoWlons. Mackinder saw the world struggle Militsry REVi8W

MACKINDERS HEARTLAND as a continental seesaw between the great heartland powers of the Eura sian Continent and the people who lived within eaey reach of the oceane. Today, the big heartland powers are the Soviet Union and Red China. They cannot be reached or dissuaded by threate of invasion as was once pos sible in the prethermonuclear world. But they can be contained all around tbe rime of Europe and Aeia by the mobile strength of the greet eeapower of the United States. Ae long ae tbe nuclear powere of tbe world relay the correct eignals concerning the nonuse of the thermo nuclear arsenal, and as long ae limited war ie accepted as a national policy by tbe United Statee, the Mackhder etrategy is relevant and viable to mod ern decision makers as is all too evi dent today in southeast Aeia.

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Colonel

Daniel

F. Iiivq

UmtedStete.s Air Force

.: \

,$

OME scholars contend that giant eteps in the physical eciences have made paste and security 1sss at tainable. Certainly, quantum advancss in tsehnology applied to machinse ~f
war have enabled weaponry to out strip mans cetiltude of warfare man. agement. If the physical sciences can not provide more than momentary eo lutions to security problems, then, perhaps, the social sciencas ehould be examined for poseible answers. The social sciences usually include anthropology, economics, hietory, po litical science, psychology, and seci ology. Sometimes social psychology, education, and international relations are eplit out 55 eeparate social sci ences and added to the list. Each of these has its own domain and defini tion. A common definition couid go something like thisthe study of man and his response to KIS fellow man and his environment, If the purpose of physical science is to un derstand the universe, the purpose of social science is to understand man. It is convenient in a university to have a department for each social sci ence. Organisational hedgerows, how. ever, are ineffective against maraud ,

SOCIAL SCIENCES the basis of his having a shortage of On the other hand, while the social eciences defend their puny and porous fence linee, the maes grows critical. Using the broad definition of the social sciences ae the study of man and hie response ti his fellowman and his environment: we understand readily that the onue reste squarely on the social sciencee. But can our disarray of eocial eciencee which are split asunder, which are out of com munication with each other, and which do not nnderetand each othere probIeme cure their intellectual anemia and make the great contribution which must be made if we are to survive on this earth? It may be time to question whether the eociai sci ences have lost their way by insisting incorrectly that they are on the right road. Schisms and Chasms There are valid reasons why there are differences among the social eci ences. Although many potilons of the fields are similar, there are parts of the disciplines which are unique. This may be ahown by narrow definitions for each eocial ecience: e Anthropology. Tbe study of man since his appearance on earth. .s Econemice. The study of how men employ scarce resourcee and pro duce and distribute commodities. e Historg. The record of what one age of man Sinde worthy of note in another. e Political Science. The systematic analysis of government, its proceeees, forms, institutions, and purposes. e Pezichologg. The ecience which attempts to describe, understand, pre dict, and control the behavior of people. e Sociologg. The ecientitic study of eociety. From these specific definitions we

aPProSJriate mental petrol or because he ie not intimately familiar with the topography ? What precludes his call ing Mayday and requesting assist ance from those friendlier indige nous to that area? Vested Interests When we mention vested interest these days, it is like swearing, al though tbe term itself is benign. The problem is that applied vested intereet producee something undesirable for unvested segments of an organizaflon. Nevertheless, in a university, for ex ample, almost everyone, from the jan itor to the president, hae vested in terests. Some social science depart ment seem exceedingly bnrdened with this questionable endowment. They defend to the death their intel lectual terrain, and they teach new recruite to guard vigilantly the pe rimeters. Decorations for answers to intellectual questione are awarded in accordance with the extent to which the reeponses remain within the sa cred ground. It is not the purpose of this arti cle to be critical about university spheres of interest, because it is real ized that interesta must square with reepohsibilities. It is realized also that tbe course lines muet be drawn eome where to avoid chaos, to stay within resources of staff and equipment, and provide manageable spans of control. Colonel Daniel F. Riva i8 Chisf of the Air Force Ssctien at the U. S. Arvnp C!ommand aad Genwwl Stag CoUege. Holder of a Maetere degree and a graduate of the US AiT War College in 1958, Colonel Riva was Chief, International Afaire Division, Directorate of Plans, US Air Force, Washington, D. C. prior to hie pre8ent aeeignment. November 1966

note that, although the social sciences all work with the same ingredienta em man and his envirement-the phases, directions, aims, and objec tives are diversa Ironiselly, within the social seiencee we find an apparent cleavage precisely dowa the middle. Anthropology, psychology, and soci ology claim the Wle of behavioral sci ences and d]stingoish themeelvee by professing a higher order of interest in the direst behavior of individuals or small groupe. The diversi~ of language in some of the sesial sciences is effective in @eping out invaders. Too frequently, idwation is obscured by inhouse jargon and strange terms. Speclaliued Knowledge The need for speeializztion has helped to maintain separate areas. It is fashionable to decry specialization even though highly speeialiced knowl edge has advanced our society on al most all fronts. A dMiculty with spe cialization emanata from the fact that we must pay a high price for ita pred ucts. It has extraeted a high toll from our universities as the isolated, spe cializing scientists and scholars of past years have develoWd into entire department of specialists. We contend that our problems have become so complex that one must spe cialize in order h cope with them. We argue that, although we would like to be educated in many disciplines, there is so much to learn in eaeh field that neither teacher nor student can hope for more than eupertlcial knowledge in other than his own specialty. Most of our univereitiea are or ganisationally arranged in a manner which influences component pa,yta to travel their separate ways. Except in rare szeee, there eeems to be little co operation or exchanges of thought 42

betieen departments. Administrative conservatism tends to keep the pree ent university structure intact. Edu cational experiment toward brave new organisational arrangements are risky, and most university officiale are understandably hesitant to undertake them. Common Ground Beseuse all the eeeial sciences study man and his response to his fellowmsn and his environment: the overlapping portions of tbe disciplines are numerous. Anthropology, as it studiee man, for example, may draw from seciology, psysbology, econOm ics, listory, and sometimes politisal science. History crosses into the prov inces of all the other seeial sciences and interestingly adopts much of the language of its hosta. Historians muSt be responsive to political sensitivities and human behavior bemuse their tack is to illuminate the fuU array of mans activity. In methodology, some of the inves tigators in specific disciplines have invented pa%lcular ways of handling their tools. There are obvious advan tages to the speeial techniques which they apply. In general, research meth odology is borrowed from the physical sciencee abnost intact. The scientific method is applied in cases where such a method ie appropriate and, nor mally, statistiezl analyses and ac cepted investigative procedures are scrupulously employed. Under eetiln conditions, however, it is permissible to use information gathered through nonscientific approaches. The physieel ecieneee have brought great blessings to mankind. They beve unlocked seereta of tbe univeree long held, and have given us affluence, im proved health, and increased longev ity. Along with the benefits, however,

Military
Review

SOCIAL SCIENCES have come great problems. For exam ple, in splitting the atom, science gave ue new sources of inexpensive indus trial power at the same time that it provided meane by which we can transform our earth into a contam inated swamp. Many answers to the queetions which the physical eciencee have raised lie in the area of the sozial sciences, Do we actually believe that man can live in harmony with hle fellowman ? Doee not all of rezorded history teach us that the nature of man compels him to war on his neigh bor ? How can man manage hie great weapons ? Do arme ezuee teneion or do tensions heget arms? Is it possible for the United States to have a viable and prosperous economy without a huge defense budget ? If we deeide to disarm, would we not be defenseless before those nations which choose otherwise? While the problem of survival looms large, there are other less urgent, hut critilcal, enigmas which must be con templated simultaneously. Theee also are caused hy great technological ad vances. Automation, for example, causes unemployment. Afluence causes poverty. Mass education causes cha otic, khort-term social mobility. The social sciences are relatively young and their natures differ from those of the physical sciences. It is possible that we are asking too much of them, hut at least let us ask it. Further, let us pose the question cor rectly. The danger is so immediate and so potentially catastrophic that we have no choice but to ask. The hope, perceived as a faint glim mer, seems to be in makbrg use of all the knowledge that the social sciences have accumulated. Perhaps combinations of patilal eolutions from sepa rate disciplines will enable us to solve important ,puzzles. Unified sosial science department in our universities is not the answer. Specialization brings forth abundant fruit that could never he germinated otherwise. Even a common language is not nezessary because unique terms are important in providing new and special meanings. However, there should be a cross-ferWization+or respondence without cohabitation. We can no longer pick away piece meal at the dilemma of man. Uncoor dinated studies, experiments, and in vestigations have not provided the answers because the questions range widely. If we are to have a chance for victory, we must attack with a mixed, supporting forc+with a syn theeis of knowledge. The idea that one can specialize in only one area of knowledge is obso lescent. There is no longer anything sacred about a four-year college course -or a 10-year college course. The kinds of knowledge needed call for never-ending study. Departmental boundaries and biases cannot be overcome and university or ganization changed abruptly. How ever, the problem can be approached from the human rather than the or ganizational side. A scholar zan study, investigate, and experiment in other areas and still belong to a single department. In tbie way, he can bring to hls new colleagues his own spe cialized knowledge and, perhaps, pre clude the neeessity for their having to reinvent the wheel. Perhaps some pragmatic scholar may discover not only how to preserve life, but how to make the life we would preserve worth living.
I

November 1966

43

Polit
Raymond J. Barrett 3

The viewe ezpressed in this arti cle are the authors and are not nec essarily those of the Department of the Ar-mII, Department of Def cmse, or the U. S. ArmII Command and General Staff College.Editor.

OREIGN policy and military ac tivity ean no longer be claarly eeparated. American military forces play a daily role in our foreign policy. Our military aeeistance programs in evitably influeuce foreign institutions and the policies of other countries.
American military personnel influ ence their foreign counterpart in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and other alliance organizations. They

POLITICO-MILITARY have a direct and indirect impact on the attitudes of the foreign military personnel who attend US training coursee. These foreign military offi cere, in turn, often greatly influence the etrncture and conduct of their governments. The interdependence of political and military elements ie strikingly demonstrated by the com plex political, economic, psychological, and military efforts in which we must engage to combat subversive aggres sion in Vietnam and to try to fore stall its development elsewhere. Areas of Interaction To play an effective role in decieion makhg, an increasing number of of ficers must now have the know-how and background to fill the growing number of politico-military poeitione in the Office of the Secretary of De fenee, in the individual eervicee, in joint and allied commands, and throughout the Department of State and our diplomatic miesione oversese. Obviously, there are areas of mili tary and diplomatic responsibility and expertise that do not overlap, and in which intrueion by officers of the other services would be unwarranted. For eign Service officers have no business in arsnored tactics, the command of ships, and the piloting of aircraft.

EXPERTISE

There are few occasions that might warrant military officere handling vieae, passports, and other coneular functions. But there are many important areas of interaction between military and foreign policy responsibilities. Some of these areas might not always be readily recognized by one side or the other as significantly affecting the re sponsibilities of the other service. Continental air defense, for inetance, may seem like an eminently military function, but it bae a eerious impact on our relatione with Canada and on the atiltudes of our other allies. Political Impact to improve our Research efforts programe can have counterinsurgency impact in other eeneitive political and logistics are countriee. Airlift military and technical mattere, but they also involve such questione ae basee, operating rights, and overflight permissions from foreign govern ments. On the diplomatic side, care must be taken in other dealings with foreign governments to prptect our base and operating needs. Opportuni ties to uee other mattere for lever age in maintshing or expanding theee rights muet not be overlooked. Informational and diplomatic ef forte to win friendship abroad muet not be at the expense of compromis ing the understanding of the validity of, and need for, US military strength. It is also important for Foreign Serv ice officere te be positive, rather than negative, in dealing with military mat ters. This could be done by drawing on their knowledge of foreign atil tudee to seek arrangements that might be satisfactory both for our military needs and to foreign governments con cerned. There are, in short, exteneive areae, I &

Raymond J. Barrett ie a US For eign Sevvice omer aeeigned to the American Embaesy in Madrid, Spain. He has eerved at American Emba.wiee in Mexico City, Managua, Dublin, and Caivo. Prior to hie present assignment, he was with the O&e of Eaet and Southern African Affairs and waa US Secretary of the Canadian-United States Permanent Joint Board on De feuee in Washington. He is the author of The Problem of Lower Spectrum Viokmoe/ which appeared in the Feb ruary 1966 iseue of the MILITARY REWmv. November 1W6

POLITICO.MILITARY

EXPERTISE One helpful etep would be to expand the present successful interchange of officers between the Departments of State and Defense. This interchange has an impact far beyond ite modest size. These officers enter operating PO. sitions in the other service, and ac quire a realietic appreciation of tbe teehniquee and probleme of that serv ice. They work with and learn a great deal ahout many other parts of the

of common concern. Technical com petence in our own fields is not enough. Skill in government-to-go vernment diplomacy ie not sufficient. Command of troops, seagoing chips, or aircraft does not provide the nec eseary capabllitiee. We all need to de velop more politico-military expertiee. There is no magic that will imbue all military and diplomatic officers with politico-military backgrounds.

However, a variety of steps could be taken now that would tend to increase or improve our Wlitilco-military capa bilities. These steps would help de velop this competence in a growing number of present-day officere. They would also help to place oflicers show ing these characteristics in the billets most demand]ng this expertise. 46

department in which they serve, and the personnel in that department work with and learn much about them. In addition, theee officers informally pass on their experiences to colleagues in their own eervicee. Thie exchange of responsibilities develops understand ing and improvca cooperation. Other exchange possibilities mjght Millbwy Review

POLITICO-MiLITARY be explored. Since both the military and the diplomatic services muet main tah their current ahilitiea to carry out their primary functions, no large sesle exchange of personnel is faeeihle. On the other hand, the development of politico-military capabilities is as le gitimate a goal of both services as their development of their other capa bilities. In the light of these considerations, selective exchanges of personnel are desirable and should be possible. In fact, the relatively recent and growing need for officers sklllcd in political and military affairs requires extra effort to find new ways to broaden and strengthen our talents in this area. Oiplomatio Positions The idea of military officers in dip lomatic positions may seem strange, and the administrative complexities are not always easy to solve. Clearly, the approach to new areas of inter change between the military and diplo matic services will have to be on a careful and aelactive basis. Flexibility is essential. A small nnmber of military officers, for instance, might be detailed ae po litical officers at selected US Embas sies to handle political reporting, anal ysis, and negotiation. These Embas sies would have to be carefully chosen. At some peats in the newer countries, knowledge that an officer waa actually in the military service would arouse euch distruet ae to compromise the of ficers ability to perform his Embassy dutiee satisfactorily. Conversely, the suggested arrange ment ehuuld be possible at some of our larger Embaesiee in western Eu rope or Latin America. I am sure from my own experiences that there are military officers with adequate backgrounds to enable them, after SSowmher 1SS6

EXPERTISE

brief training in Foreign Service metbode, to become integral parte of Embassy operations. Change the Concapt If it should prove completely in feasible to detail military officers as JImbaesy political officere, I suggest that the concept of the military attach6 be changed, At present, our military attach6s are oriented primarily to overt intelligence gathering regard ing the military forcee, terrain, and other pefilnent military information in tbe country or countries in which they are atstionsd. They, of course, find themselves engaged in a consid erable amount of liaison work with the host countrys armed forces. Our attach6s come largely from in telligence background, and training and intelligence is their principal end product. To a certain extent, they also provide the Ambassador and the Embassy political officers with advice on military mattera. Under present con cepts, our attach6s are not trained or oriented toward contributing politicomilitary analysis to the Embassya as eessmente and recommendations on which depend US policies in the coun try concerned. In this age of sporadic violence and insurgency, the Country Teams at our diplomatic missions need to be espe cially capable at politico-military anal yais and policy coordination. A vital element, often now missing, is a mili tary advisor with the requisite broad background. He needs to have an ex pert military knowledge of the eval uation and direction of US military and aconomic programs and their in terrelation. To go with this knowledge, he must be able to relate with each other such disparate elements as the social and political a&ltudee of local military

41

POLITICO-MILITARY

EXPERTISE Service officers to joint staff duty so that they can be more intimately ex posed to military matters. Foreign Service pereonnel would not have the necessary technical knowledge for many staff positions. But there are Foreign Service officere who could, after orientation in military proce dures, deal with such functions as plans, programs, intelligence, or pub lic relatione. They might also bring new insight to these activities, just as military officere would undoubtedly add a new dimension to Embassy peIitical analyaes. Joint commands to which Foreign Service officere might be posted would be those actively en gaged in international planning such ae the STRIKE Command, the Euro pean Command, and tbe Commander in Chief, Pacific. TrainingSchool Faculties Another area for increased officer exchange is that of training school faculties. The National War College has a senior Foreign Service officer ae deputy commandant and two For eign Service officers on its faculty. The service war colleges and a few other senior military schoole have a Foreign Service officer ae faculty ad visor. The US Air Force and Naval Academiee have a Foreign Service of ficer on the faculty. There are other areas of military training+ivic ac tion, attach6 duty, MAAG duty, for instanc+that could usefully ,include exposition of broader international considerations by Foreign Service of ficers as full or part-time faculty members. Similarly, the Foreign Service In stitute would benefit by having a num ber of military officers on its faculty. Several aspects of its training efforts could thue include more thoroughgo ing explanations of pertinent military Militaty Review

leaders, public opinion and other psy chological factors, and local and inter national political developments. This kind of advice can seldom be provided by, Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) officers beeeuae their background and eklll are quite prop erly oriented to practical training of tbe local military forces. To a consid erable extent, tbie gap in our Country Teame ie going unfilled. Attech6 ho I auggeet that officere with politicomilitary background be aseigned ae military attach6s, and that the at &wh6e be the politico-military mem bers of our Country Teame. The pres ent intelligence collecting function could be continued, but as the eccond ary miseion for the attach6e. In meet cases, it can still be effectively carried out. Otlicera assigned to attach6 duty would thus he trained particularly in the elements of political, social, and economic instebllity, and their inter relation with our military activities, and, secondarily, in military intelli gence collection. The attacht?s primary role would be as tbe Ambassadors ad vieor on the military elements of po litico-military analysie and policy. It should also be possible to detail eelected Foreign Service officers to duties on some of our military joint etaffe. Meet of the commands with im portant international responsibilities already have a senior Foreign Serv ice officer as political advieor. These officers are detailed by the Depart ment of State and provided with con tinuing background information by that department. But each functions enthely as a member of the staff to which he ie assigned, and he is re sponsible to the commander there. It is proposed that there be an even more integral assignment of Foreign 4e

POLITICO-MILITARY matters than is now possible through occasional and rather stereotyped briefings. These aspects could include junior and midcareer courses, area orientation programs, and even the wives orientation course. There might also be an exchange of one or two inspectors occasionally. There are obvious difficulties in this field because of the high degree of

F.XPERTISE

inent private citizen so that they may benefit from the lattere insight and suggestions. Once in a while, perhaps, thie third member of the team could be a senior military officer. With the current importance of our pOlitico military assessments, his ideas and tomments would be valuable. In a similar way, a Foreign Service inepector or other appropriate senior

US Armu
The faculties and student bodies of eur senior service collegee and the Foreign Service Institute offer oppertmrities for incressed exchsnge of State and Defense Department etlicera expert knowledge that an inepector must have if he is to assess properly the operations he is examining. How ever, an inspector for one service could eometimee accompany, rather from the than replace, inspectors other service. Foreign Service inspec tors travel in two-man teams.- They are now often accompanied by a prornKwsmber1966 Foreign Service officer could accom pany a military inspection team. In many technical and strictly. military areas, he would, of course, not be com petent or expected to comment. But he could be usefnl in inspecting im portant military staffs, MAAGs, and military missions. The unexcelled ex posure the exchange inspector would; 49

POLfllCO-MILITARY

EXPERTISE countries are within hh purview, and he thus has a considerable degree of common interest with the country dL rectors in the State Department and those in the other areas of the Da fense Establishment. Infermal Centacta The officers concerned with the same country can obviously benefit by informal contact among themselves. Thh type of contact seems to be in hibited by undue concern about chain Obviously, of-command principles. each organisation requiree a certiln amount of self-discipline and direc tion if it is to arrive at considered decisions. But following internal pre ceduree rigidly without regard te out eide sources of information and view points can lead to decieions that are defective because they have failed to consider all the pertinent factore. This also tende te escalate tbe level at wh]ch such decisions must be ra worked. Informal contocta among officere dealing with the came country would tend to make each more aware of the full range of considerations that might be involved in decieions regarding that country. Each officer ie thue more likely to see that these elements are reflected in hk organizationa han dling of relations with that country. Adjusting the various elements of ,policy is likely to be done at the work ing level. Each officer can readily till gaps in h]e knowledge by a telephone call to his appropriate counterpart. Aside from greatly improvikg the in formation and decision-making proe essee, informal contact among the offi cers dealing with the same country gives them insight into the problems and procedures of the other services. It ie not proposed that there be any formal or regularly scheduled consulMllitayRevisw

have to the other services problems and proeedur+ would be aa important as the suggestions made by him. Some adjustments in promotion pro cedures might also help to identify and advance officers with the desired talents. Thk could be done by includ ing leading private citizens or officers from other services on the promotion boards with or without vote. An ar rangement of tMe nature might be made for the boarde considering the more senior grades from which polit ico-military positions are likely to be tilled. There is a prominent private c%izen on each Foreign Service board, and a senior military officer should also be a member. Military promotion boards could regularly include a suitable senior Foreign Service officer and a leading private citizen. Since there might be problems in making these men full members of the boards, they could still be included es observers. As observ ers, they would be charged with point ing out politico-military talents that should be considered. Working levels Greater contact among what might be called the working levels in Washington is desirable. The Depart ment of State hae a country direc tor for each foreign country, a For eign Service officer who looks after US relations with the country in ques tion. The Office of the Secretary of Defense, the joint staff, and each of the military services has an officer who is somewhat of a counterpart of the State Department @titer. Typically, the military officer deals with several countries, ao it is more accurate to speak of him as having several State Department counter parts. But in greater or lesser degree, US military relationships with these

POLITICO-MILITARY

EXPSRTISE

tation among these ollicers since this could tend to subvert the chain of
command. But each should be encour aged to get to know his counterpart in the other services, and to cell on them for information. Informal visits to each other% ottices and an occasional lunch together would be helpful. Diacueeions among those officers of the Foreign Service and the military cervices who deal with aesignmente to political and poSitico-military posi tions would also be beneficial. Greater contact between them would make it easier to overeome some of the admin istrative complexities involved in in creased exchanges of officers between the cervices. More importantly, they are likely to learn from each other re garding the characteristics needed for pO1itic*military positions. Continu ing contact would help everyone better define the broad backgrounds and particular qualifications leading to success in those positiona. Personal Characteristics Full definition of the personal char acteristics apt to produce success in politico-military work may not be pos sible. However, a long step toward that goal would result from better identification of the personal charac teriatica that lead to success in over seas service and contact with nation als of other countries. These two ele ments are involved in greater or lesser degree in most politico-military work. Something more is needed than a pedestrian standard like capacity to work with and understand other peo ples. There have been studies that euggest the characteristics whk!h may lead to sueeeas in overseas service and in dealing with other nationals. These include a resourceful personal ity, above average curiosity, and a background of social or geographic Nowseber 1968

mobility. These factors are not easy to catalog and will not always be identifiable. Technical competence and other abilities are equally important and may often have to bs given priority to insure that a position is properly staffed. The important point, however, is that we should actively include in our assignment processes the charac teristics likely to produce success in politico-military positions. Whenever possible, we should make the extra effort to find and aseign personnel with these characteristics as well as technical or other abilities needed. Family Role Wives also play an important role in most politicemilitary positions, especially in the many billets that in volve overseas service. The wife has a vital effeet on her husbands per formance, for it is she who must adapt family life to new and different conditions. Non-Americans aee more of the family than of the officer him self, and they form their impressions of American waye and attNudes by the familys actions. To the degree possible, the same se lection criteria for politico-military billets should be applied to wives as well as to officers. Unfair as it may seem to some, comment on tfi~ wives of officers in politico-military posi tions should be included in the latters efficiency reports. Thk is a contro versial subject in the military serv ices, but Foreign Service wives have been rated for many years. The wives, rather than resenting it, have devel oped an outstanding sense of service and esprit ds corps. In recognition of the wives key role, on the other hand, we need to give greater attention and more cony sideration to their morale. The imeg: 51

POLITICO-MILITARY

EXPERTISE

inative orientation course offered by the Foreign Service Institute, for in stance, has received favorable reac tions from the ladies. Perhaps it could be expanded or similar topflight courses given by the other service& Wives are now provided opportunities for language instruction, but it might sharply improve morale and our over all language capabilities if cash bo nuses were offered to those wives at taining real conversational ability. The paper war also enters into the development of potitico-military abilities aa it does in all aspecte of our tiork. The heavy flow of paper reflects the complex world in which we live; we can cut it down somewhat, but we cannot eliminate it. Perceptive and intelligent reading is an important as pect of virtually any politico-military job, and the ability to write in an incisive and well-founded manner is equally necessary. Reading and. writing abilities are important elements in any officers proficiency, and they are well-nigh es sential for those serving in pesitions having politice-military responsibili ties. There are proved techniques for improving reading comprehension and for clearer drafting. Reading comprehension and writ ing improvement courses should be mandatory for all officers fairly early in their careers, and later, as a re fresher, when they are entering the

more senior grades. We should incor porate proved reading and writing ability in our assignment criteria for politico-military positions. Assess ments of these abilities should also be included in the efficiency reperts of
officers in these positions. We are shortsighted if we fail to provide ads. quate trainiug in reading comprehen sion and effective writing, or to in clude these skMs among those that constitute politico-military expertke. We might also improve the flow of background information to officers en gaged in politico-military activities. Any arrangement, of course, would have to avoid flooding these officers with material. A suitable solution might be a professional journal dev~ted more specifically to politico-mil itary matters than are the existing journals. Included might be thought ful articles on military, political, and international affairs, plus a chronol ogy of pertinent events and extracts from significant speeches and docu ments. With an evenings reading, an officer could thus keep himself reason ably up to date. In todays perilous world, the For eign Service and the military services need to bend every reasonable effort toward improving their combined abil ity to meet the serious challenges and dangers. Appreciable improvement in the politico-military competence is ur gently needed.

52

Military Review

OUT significant conbributtona to warfare have been in the field of tactice and technology, rather than strategv. . . . Our ~ore fathers of colonial and revolutionary dage developed the fundsmental tactice of camouflage and taking cover. . , . The tactics of our Civil War were for generation the object of careful etudy b~ European staffe. . . . In the field of military technology, we introduced to the world &/Zee with interchangeable purte, the machine gun, the baUoon, the tractor for tanks, the parachute, dive bombem, the eubmarinc, and the airplane. . . . But we hove not prodcwed a Ctacwewttz or a Vauban. Mahan is mm o?dg mili tary theorist of comparable reputation.

N THE introduction of his book, Makers of Modern Strateg#, the late professor Edward Maed Earle wrote:

This observation, however, is only partially correct. Cer tainly, American people are mechanically minded and possess al. most religious faith in machines. They are aleo practical in men tal atWude and abhor pure theory. Neverthelees, they have pro duced a number of brilliant theorists. At least in the field of military art, we can name two persons whose fame and contribu tion are nearly forgotten by the contemporary Americane. They are Dennis Hart Mahan and Homer Lea. They both had supreme genius, and their writings have not lost their significance in pres ent timee.
There are two Mahans in the history of US military thought. The first one was Dennie Hart Mahan, who was the father of Alfred Thayer hfahan. Because the son was the prophet of sea. power and earned a much greater reputation than his father, the elder Mahan has faded in our memory. Only a few people tecog nize that he was a strategist not inferior to his son. i November 1966 53

Dennis Hart Mahan was born in

1805 and entered the US Military Academy in 1820. After graduating at the top of his class, he was ap pointed an aesistsnt professor. He was next sent to Europe to etudy public works and military art. Most of hIs four-year stay wee spent in France where he studied artillery tsa tics, military engineering, and the art of war. He especially devoted his mind to the campaigns of Napoleon Bonaparte and the thoughts expressed by Baron Henri Jomini. Engineering Authority When he returned from Europe, Mahan was appointed Professor of Civil and Wllitsry Engineering and the Art of War at the US Military Academy. He taught at West Point until 1871. Since there were no text hooke available for his courses, he began to write his own. His work on civil engineering was regarded as a standard US text and was used in numerous universities for many years. Both civilians and soldiers recognized him as the leading authority of his time on engineering. All this notwithstanding, his accom plishment in the field of the art of war was more valuable than that in the science of engineering. Although he never actually participated in a battle, he possessed an extremely sen sitive mind and understood the finest

i points of strategy. His thought was strongly influenced by French mili tary theory in general, and by Jominis writings in particular. However, hk , lectures and writings were his owrr product, baeed on a critical analysis of military history, and fully reflected his brilliant creative power. The first contribution of the elder Mahan to military thinking wae his viewpoint which was much broader than that of the other military think ers in the 19th century. He once eaid that there existed both a science and an art of war, and that an intilmate acquaintance with general literature as well as ecience was indispensable to the development of a thorough mil itary leader. Although he began bie career as a professional soldier, his thought was never restricted by narrow profession alism. He was a scientist with a pro found knowledge in tbe field of mili tary science. On the other hand, he was a loyal dkciple of Jomini and eincerely believed that war, far from being an exact science, was really a fine art. Siatorian The second contribution of Mahan was the objeetilveness of hie mental attiltude. He was a modest schotar who never considered that he had in vented some new formula to bring vic tory in war. He was a historian as well as a scientist, and introduced the scientific spirit and method into the study of military history. By study ing and analyzing the past, he reached conclusions and then summarized them as fundamental principles. He taught these to successive classee at Weet Point. Mahan believed the penetrating study of hietory was the foundation of the art of war. He wrote that we Military Review

Niu Sien-thong ia with the National Defense Planning Bureau of ths Re public of China Government in Tai wam He 8erved in the Chinese Army during World War II and holds a B.S. degree from the Utaiveraity of Nan?aing. He ie the anther of TIw Ranklese Arrray/ and Troop Traim ing in Red China; which appeared in the Febrmwyi and June 1966 iseuee of the MILITARY REVIEW.
se

AMERICAN STRATEGISTS look to military history as the source of all military science. In thh history are found those exemplifications of failure and success by which the truth and value of the rule of strategy can be tested. He considered that the prin ciples of organization and tactica of the early Greeks and Remans pre sented valuable lessons to modern gen erals. Only entire ignorance of the past could have led professional sol diers to abandon or forget those les sons. Cognizant of Own Times The third contribution of the elder Mahan wae his open mind. Although he emphasized the importance of the study of military history, he did not lose sight of the new phenomena of modern times. He thoroughly appre ciated the difference between the pres ent day and ancient times. He not only devoted bis attention to the study of military hktory, but he also tried to apply the theory of war to the circumstance of hk own times. Because he was an engineer, he never undereetimated the value of sci ence and teebnology. He strongly em phasized the importance of new weap one and equipment. In our nuclear age, it seems that he can give us a meaningful direction on how to value the worth of military history and the principle of war. Mahans fourth contribution was his emphasis upon generalship-the qualifications of a military leader. He believed that no man should he so rash as to suppose that donning a generals uniform made hlm compe tent to perform a generals functione. He wrote that all too often the general has only conjectures to act upon, and these may be based on false premises. Even when the way may seem clear, he knows that the guiding rules admit Novsmbw1966 of many exceptions. Even while he is deliberating, events ar~ succeeding each other with such rapidity that what is true now may have no exist. ence at the next moment or exist in a contrary sense. . All of theee considerations and many others will explain why hMory produces so few greet generale. In

~:,
Dennis SIzrt Mshan

US Amw

war, as in every other art baeed upon established principles, there are ex ceptions to the normal rules. The tal ent of the general is shown in dis covering the exceptions. Dennis Hart Mahan was the Amer ican prophet of the blitzkrieg. He especially regarded mobflity ae the key to military euccese. He eaid that speed was a chief characteristic of strategical marches. In thie quality reside the advantages that a fortu nate initiative may have procured. Rapid movements are an element ip 55

almost every success in war. Based on this theory, the elder Mahan may be called the father of the modern con cept of strategic mobility. In this century, the US soldier has become more of a logistician than a strategies. He often overestimates the importance of the logistic support and forgets that, despite all its importance,

vantage of the enemys unreadiness, make your way by unexpected routes, and attack unguarded spots, tbe US professor, putting it another way, suggested a eudden attack when the enemy is not prepared to resist. We do not know whether he ever read that oldest Chinese military classic, The Thirteen Chapters, bet ter known as The Art of War in tbe Western World. We do know Napoleen was influenced by the teaching of Sun-tzu to a certain extent, and we aleo know Maban had read many French books and made a critical re search in tbe Napoleonic campaigns. At any rate, it can be concluded that Mahsn deduced his theory principally from his study of Napoleon. Worldwkle Influence As a professor at West Point, the eider Mahan contributed greatly to the development of military knowl edge. He was an excellent teacher whose lectures were eyetematic, in teresting, and inspiring to his stu dents. Most of the important leaders on both sides in the Civil War, includ ing Robert E. Lee, Thomas J. Jack. son, Ulysses S. Grant, and William T. Sberrnan, had been indoctrinated by him. The Civil War may be regarded as the first modern great war, so the lessons derived from that war prob ably exercised more influence on tbe modern military thinking than any other war prior to World War II. Therefore, it seems proper to say that the teaching of that forgotten strate gist profoundly influenced not only the fate of this country, but also mil itary thought and practice in the en tire world. All these teachings were contained in a single book which bore an awk ward and long title: Advanced Guard,

Homer Lea in his uniform of lieutenant general, Chinese Imrwrial Reform Army it is only a means and not the end in war. In our present age, both the nu clear and unconventional wars require a consideration of the customary doc trinee. Therefore, the teachings of the elder, Maban, akbough written during the middle part of the last century, acquire a new significance in this modern era. There also appeare to be a sim ilarity between Mahans thinking and that of Sun-tzu, the famous Chinese military thinker. WMle Sun-tzu said, speed is the essence of wari take ad

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Military Review

AMERICAN STRATEGISTS

Troops, with the Etwential Principles of Strategy and Gramd Tactica. It was
first published in 1847 and might be regarded as the first important work on military theory written in the United States. The cadete at once called it Outpost, and it was used con tinuously as a standard textbook at West Point from 1848 to 1872, and then wae forgotten. If be had choeen an adequate title for hie book, hie name and theory might today hold a place among those of Jomini, Harl von Clausewita, and his own eon Alfred Thayer Mahan. It was both fortunate and unfortu nate for the elder Mahan that he had a great son. Since the reputation of hie son is much better known than his own, the name of the father was covered by his sons and destined to be forgotten. The younger Mahan once said that his first interest in military strategy had been aroused by listening to some of his fathers lec turee at West Point. Nevertheless, the direct influence of the father on the son was relatively limited. The father died in 1871, long before the eon at tained his stature as a prophet of seapower. Iiomer Lea Homer Lea, another strategist, wae more nameless than the elder Mahan, although he was, perhape, the greatest genius on etrategy of his time. Born in 1876, he had a physical deformity and bad eyesight which kept him from military service. However, he did not despair and abandon his ambkion in the military profession. He possessed an unyielding will and an excellent mind. He received no formal military ed ucation, but he acquainted himeelf with military knowledge by self-learn ing. He also studied current evente November leee

as well ae palitical, eocial, and mili tary history. It was a curious but never wellknown etory that Dr. Sun Yat-sen, the father of the Republic of China, was one of the few men who appre. ciated the genius of Homer Lea. Dr. Sun once told him that he would ap point him chief of staff if he besame the president of tbe future Republic. Lee ie said to have answered: point me chief of staff now, and 111 make you preeident of China.

Ap.

Chinese Revelutieo With the Chinese Revolution of 1911, Dr. Sun was elected provisional Preeident of the new Republic, and appointed Lea a lieutenant general in the Chinese Republican Army. Had he not written two hooks, per haps nobody would remember him now. Hie first book, entitled The Valor of Ignorance, was publiehed in 1909. . The second one, The Dav of the Saxon, waa published in 1912, juet after he had finished his last fight for Chinese freedom. Lea had gathered notes for a third book to be called The Swarm iwg of the Skcrw. This work was never accomplished, ae be died soon after the publication of his second book. He was not quite 36 yeara of age. After his death, his name faded away in peoplee memory and his booke remained unknown. Only after the World Wars broke ont in 1914 and 1939, and someone took the two aged volumes, from the library ehelvee, was Homer Lea rediscovered. This man had written two books which foretold the great ware in this century. It was through his books that Homer Lea gained the fame that he deserved. Many people glorified bim as the great prophet of the 20th cen tury, but Lea was more than a prophet he was also a great strategist. \

AMERICAN STRATEGISTS Leas first book was concerned with the complacency and unpreparedness of the United States. It was he who first pointed out the inadequacy of US military defense and warned of the danger of an expansionist Japan. He forecsst, with dramatic exactness, the .Pearl Harbor attack, the destruc tion of the Pacific Fleet, and the fall of the Philippines. He discussed the Japanese plan of aggression in the Pacitic at length, pointed out how and where they would invade the Philippine, and eetimated the time required. Lea predicted that .a Japanese force at least double that of the US and native defendere, dh vialed into two columne, would ad vance from the Lingayen Gulf on the north and Polillo Bight on the east, and defeat the defendere. He eeti mated that three weeks would be re quired for this operation. Leas book was written in 1908, and 34 years later, Manila actually fell to the two Japanese columns ae he had foreeast. scientific developments would tend to reduce epace and inevitably lead to conflict. He eaid:

The shrinkage of oceanic space ha8, by bringing continental nations into closer contact, decreased insular sig nificance and increased ths universal ity and intensity of contine?ztal etrwg glss and the necessity to secure cen trol of the intervening uea-lineu whoue distance diminiuheu with each inven tive decads. International Poliics He aptly pointed out in his second
book that all national frontiere are subject to fluctuation and must be for ever shrink]ng or expanding. This was his basic ides of international re latione, and from this he derived hie two principles about international pol itics: The duration of national exiet ence depende upon a nations phyeical power to remain or become supreme over other political entities whose in terests are convergent. A nations physical power muet remain conetant in ite capacity to pre vent dictation, conquest, or eupremacy by other states whose interests are convergent. Although he wae not a geopolitician in name, Lea thoroughly recognized the importance of the geographical foundation of international politics. He wrote:

Second Book

His secondhookpossesseda broader scope than the first, but the funda mental idea was almoet the same. In
this hook, he discussed the future of Great Britain, Germany, Japan, and Ruesia. He forecast the struggle be tween Britain and Germany, and pointed out that Great Britain, even if victorious, would be so exhaueted that ebe would suffer the lose of her Empire. Nearly all that he forwast in these two hooks is now past hietory, but still both valuable and interesting for ue are hle analyses of the world sib uation, hla understanding in the field of grand strategy, and hls estimate of Ruesian expaneion. At the beginning of the 20th cen tury, Homer Lea already believed that

Natione in their development are constrained to given linee by their geographical environment. Two na tions situated in diffe?ent parte of the world and inhabited b~ different racee
will progreee akmg identical lines if

the geography and climatic condition of their respective coemtriss are rel ativelg the came. When, mersover, we jind two viatioae whoee welfare and greatness are dependent upon the acMilitary Review

ae

qaiaition of the same sources of wealth or powe?, and to ueenre which the same means are employed, then we are at once cognicant of this ualicnt and at the came time ominoue condition, that 80 long au theue two aatioaz con tinue to be of relative strength their intereatu and lineu of expaneion are so acutely convergent that in due time theti enter into that fatal Punic era wherein even peaee iu war. We can logically regard thie theory ae the real origin of our modern con cept of cold war. And, unfortunately, we may now have entered into that fatal Punic era wherein even peace is war as he predicted. Although Leas third book wzs never finished, from his incomplete notes for that book, one can discover that he had predicted, after a period of ware between Britain and Ger many, America and Japan, the great est and last war would come-tbe war for the world, the war with Rnssia. Lea devoted one chapter to Ruesia in his eecond book, and his thorough understanding of the nature of Rus sia as well as his penetrating analysis of Ruesian expansionism made thie chapter the most valuable contribu tion to us in a critical age. His analy sis, made half a century ago, hae not lost ite significance at the present time. Far from it, the importance ie much enhanced by modern develop ments. He compared tbe expansion of the Ruseian Empire with thoee character istics that mark tbe measured, un hurried growth of nature. Like a gla cier, its movement is only apparent by periods of time. He euggested that tbe expaneion of Russia has never been erratic nor dependent upon fortuitous circumstances. Rather than being the reeult of an aggregate of expedients, t40vember 1968

it hau been the ruthless exemplifica tion of a predetermined plan. And what ie the predetermined plan ? Lea wisely observed: . . . we can reduee it to thiu almout

invariable law: that the imp?dee of Ru8sian ezparwion along alternate linee is measured by the degree of retroceuuion on other tines of aggres sion, the ratio of ezpauuion to that of retrogression being an three is to two. It is because of thiu law that Ru8eia continues to spread over Aeck and Eu rope in defeat as well ae in victoW. Generally speaking, he regarded
that a nation poeseseed four dimen sions of expansionterritorial, seo nomic, political, and racial. Russia had learned to exercise all of them in coordination. Although his books were tilled with dismal prophecies, Homer Lea was neither a fatalist nor a defeatist. His . warning was angry and bitter, never theleeshis main purpose was in hop ing that the United Statee would heed his worde and awake in time. He hoped that a revival of the prim itive principles of the Republic would save the United States. He regarded the militant patriotism of the US peo ple as the only hope for the future of his country. Lea firmly believed that in peacetime the responsibility for preparedness should not rest solely upon the military servicee: During pe riode of peace, every loyal citizen of the United States should strive to in snre preparedneee. And such patriotic effort ehould not be construed as an onue, but as a privilege. In tbe final analysis, he concluded that warfare has never been nor will ever be mechanical. There ie no such possibility as tbe combat of instru ments. It is the soldier who brings victory or defeat. I 59

PEACE in VIETNAM
An Acceptable Soiution
Colonel Joseph F. IL Cutron& fJmtedStates Arm@

The views expressed in tk~ artWe are the au thors and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, Department of Defenee, or the U. S. Army Command and General Staff College,Editor.
HILE the raal Vietnam problem is deeply seated in the many years of Chinese, Japanese, and French control of thie southeast Asian country, todays crisis dates from the Geneva accords of 1954. The accords provided that there would be no establishment of any new military bases, and that there would be no military bases

.
ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION the International Control Commission for Vietnam issued on 2 June 1962. The same report by the? Control Commission indicated that the South Vietnamese had also technically vio lated the Geneva accords by introduc ing military personnel and equipment above the prescribed limits. However, the report clearly established that the South Vietnamese actions were a de fense against aggression and subver sion from the North. US. involvement did not include American fightilng units, the United States was committed from the start to any action neces sary to prevent aggression. The orig inal intent was merely to advise the South Vietnamese and to aesist them with materiel. However, when the sit uation worsened and some regular forces were introduced by the North,. it was necessary to increase aid to comply with the initial pledge. The North Vietnamese and Vlet Cong, on the other hand, consider the United States to be the aggreesor and to be acting in violation of the Ge neva accords. They do not admit that they have initiated aggression except in response to US actions. They purport to be supporting the Geneva ac cords, and charge that US interven tion prevente their implementation. FundamentalPrinciples This is the situation. The iseues are clearly dewed by official statements of the adversaries. The Foreign Min ieter of South Vietnam has set forth the fundamental principles of a juet and enduring peace: e An end to aggression and sub version. e Freedom for South Vietnam to choose and ehape her own destilny in conformity with democratic principle and without any foreign interference from whatever sources. e As soon as aggreeeion hae ceased, the ending of the military measures now necessary by the government of South Vietnam and the nations that have come to her aid; and the removal of foreign military forces from South . Vietnam. e Effective guarantee for the free dom of the people of South Vietnam. The United States fully indorsee theee principles. Ho Chi-minh, in responding to the Chrietmas-New Year 1965-66 US peace offensive, reiterated the North Vietnamese conditions for negotia tions: e The United States must com pletely and unconditionally end her bombings and all acts of war against North Vietnam. e The United States must stop her aggression in South Vietnam. e The United States must with draw her troops and armaments from South Vietnam. e The United States must let the Vietnamese people settle their inter nal affairs themselves. The North Vietnamese also insist that the political arm of the Vlet Co~g 61

US Commitment Wtdle initial

Cotonel Jo8eph F. H. Cutrowa, a 1966 graduate of the US AcwesI War College, is with the .$th Infantvg! Di visiou. He received his Maeters in Journalism from the Univereitg of Missouri, and attended the V. S. Arww Command and General Staff College in 1959. His service includes duty with the $d Infantry Division in Korea; Ofie of the Chief of Information, Department of the Army, Washing ton; and with the .$?dBattalion, 15th Artillerp, in Afa.rka. He ie the author of Parr# the One-Two Punch: which appeared in the August 1966 issue of the MmITARY REVIEW.
November 1966

ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION must have a decisive voice in the gov ernment of South Vietnam. While it may appear to be an over simplification, the alternatives open to the United States can be reduced, in essence, to: Get out of Vietnam now without eny conditions. Meet the North Vietnamese pre conditions for negotiations and then be rapidly eliminated as being com pletely incompatible with the US po sition on Vietnam. It would give up South Vietnam, and, eventually, all of southeaet Asia. It would be an admis sion that there was no validity to the US position, and would abandon an ally whom three Presidents have pledged to defend. The second alternative, to meet all

negotiate for settlement at the con ference table. Continue the fight without agres ing to negotiations until the Vlet Cong aggression ceases and all North Viet namese influence in South V~etnam is withdrawn. . Continue to exert military pres sure until the North Vietnamese agree to a no-conditions conference. The first of these alternatives can Sz

NortN Vietnamese conditions, affords little tiore than the first alternative, except, perhaps, the formality of a conference. Agreeing to the conditions stipulated by the North Vietnamese would be to abandon South Vietnam to tbe same extent as in the first al tertiative. Once the conditions are ac cepted, little more could be accom plished by a conference than defini tion of the details of compliance on MlIii
aSViEW

issues already settled by tbe US de fault. The second alternative is not an acceptable solution, Application of Force The third alternative, to force the North Vietnamese and Vlet Cong to withdraw by applying overwhelming military force, is probably the most acceptable solution in view of the an tithetical nature of the North Viet namese and US positions. The real purpose of the US involvement is to provide an environment in which the South Vietnamese can establish a via ble government which will guarantee the security of the individual citizen and permit him to improve his social and economic position. Once this basic environment ia es tablished through removing Viet Cong pressure, the eventual goal of assuring each citizen a voice in the selection of a government for South Vietnam, and in the decision concern ing unification with North Vietnam, ia a feasible objective. This stability can be achieved, and an orderly envi ronment provided, by driving the ag gressors out of South Vietnam. Alter native three, therefore, becomes a feasible objective. Although the application of over whelming military force may be the most efficient means of forcing North Vietnamese and Viet Cong with drawal, it is doubtful that such a solution would be pcditically accept able. Many natione in the world com munity are urging negotiations and decrying military escalation as lessen ingthe possibility of peaceful aokrtion of the Vietnam problem. Some have even questioned the authenticity of US offers of negotiations. Any solu tion which does not include the offer of negotiation would unfavorably af fect tbe poeition of the United States Member le66

in the community of nations and lessen support of US policies. Alter native three thue becomes at best a fallback solution in the event some more favorable solution cannot be achieved. Alternative four recognizes that a negotiated solution would place the United States in a more favorable position in the community of nations. While continued offers of uncondi tionalnegotiations are appropriate, it is essential to continue military pres sure to convince the North Vietnam ese and Viet Cong that they cannot achieve a military solution, and that negotiation offers the only feasible and desirable means of ending the conflict. For these reasons, alterna tive four is recommended as the most desirable of, the alternatives consid ered here. Itaal Challenges bfaklng a choice between the vari ous alternatives open to the United States and assessing the relative mer its of those alternatives are by far the easiest of the steps which must betaken bythe United States. Deter mining the bases for negotiation and proposing actions and procedures which will provide Vietnam the op portunity to determine her own des tiny without being influenced unduly by external forces, or even by insur gent, dissident, or revolutionary in ternal forces, present the real chal lenges which must be met. when all of the chargea and coun tercharges have been swept aside so that oppossing positions become clear, there is, on the surface, full agree ment on one basic iesuc+that the 1954 Geneva accords should be imple mented. All contendere agree that the accorde provide for free choice on the part of the Vietnamese, Thie ie wh!re

ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION the basic disagreement arises. The Communist definition of free choice is entirely different from that of the Free World. has indicated that, although she might not accept tbe Viet Cong as separate negotiators, she would ac cept them as part of the North Viet namese representation. It is certainly impossible to elimi nate consideration of the Viet Cong and to maintiln a position that they have no role. The Viet Cong provide a major portion of the force whlcb ie OPPosing the South Vietnamese and the United States on the battlefield in Vietnam. Any eolution to the Viet nam conflict muet necessarily include spacitic actions which the Vict Cong will be required to take as steps to ward endhg the fighting and estab lishing peace. The South Vietnamese would possi bly agree to participation of the Viet Cong in a conferences protagonists if itwere clear that they were not considered ae representatives of any government or territory. The other protagonists in the Vietnam conflict would, of ncceesity, be conferees. If the fighting is to end, and remain halted, allprotegonists must not only pledge an end to combat, bnt muet ac tively comply with tbe condition mu tually accapted at a conference in which all participated.

Supervised Elections
The United States holds that tbe eltilons, and the establishment of the future Vietnamese stete, must be based upon free choice as it is gen erally accepted by the free nations of the world. In this case, what is called for is supervision of elections by neu tral and impatilal observers, and elim ination of pressures upon the voters. It is obvious that this cannot occur rmder the present conditions of Viet Cong terrorism. Those who live in areas under Vlet Congcontrol are not free to make a choice without the most dire results. Similarly, those in areas not now under Vlet Cong con trol are susceptible to Viet Congter rorism prior to the election, or to retaliation after the election. In North Vietnam, a free election is most unlikely. The North Vietnam ese would not agree to supervision. Thie is certainly not an indication of good faith and resolve to comply fully with the Geneva accords. Failure to accept impartial supervision is clearly a bar to satisfactory solution of the Vietnam problem. It would be of little value to discuss a basis for negotiations and a recom mended US poeition unless there was some opportunity for tbe United States to present this position at a peace conference. There will be no con ference unless the question of confer ees is settled. The North Vietnamese insist that the Viet Cong must be fulhfledged participants in any nego tiations. The South Vietnamese say that they will never mxwt theViet Congas conferees. The United Statee

Answers Required
The questions which muet be sat isfactorily anewered by the confereee
include:
Withdrawal of forces. o The role of the Viet Conk. Means of ineuring free elections.

Issues to bedecided

byekctions.

Certainly, the United States would

not agree to withdraw troops from
South Vietnam until basic guarantees
were provided. These guarantees
should ineure that South Vietnam will
be free to establiah viable govern-
MilitstyReview

ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION ment down to the hamlet level with out any coereion imposed by insurgent or dissident groups. The conditions for troop withdrawal should provide that North Vietnamese elements be withdrawn immediately, and that North Vietnamese serving in Viet Cong unite be withdrawn as early as this could be accomplished. Similarly, the Viet Cong, as well as any civilin competition with other political parties might make the disarming phase more acceptable to the North Vietnamese andthe Vlet Cong. Such disarmament could not be su pervieed or enforced by US elements if the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong are to be expected to accept the conditions. However, accomplishment of a large portion of this activity in a

US Amu

As @ prelude to participation in any peace conference, the Viet Cong must be disarmed iane not members of government forces, must be diearmed to preclude violence. These conditions for withdrawal of US forcee from Vietnam would be a bitter pill for the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong to accept. How ever, violence cannot be precluded un lese only those forcee which are con trolled by duly constituted authority are permitted to bear arms. Recogni tion of the Viet Cong as an author ized political party permitted to en gage in supervised political activities November 1966 manner acceptable to impartial observ ere would be a prerequisite to with drawal of US troops from Vietnam. As a first move, or proof of intent, US forces would be withdrawn into the troop haees, and such bases established as enclaves. During the period of dis armament, US troops would be re tained in these enclaves. They could be employed only upon request of the South Vietnamese Government for specific assistance in a specific situa tion, and then only with the approval of the neutral observers. ( .1 05

ACCEPWLE SOLUTION Impartial, neutral observers would be an important element in tbe over all agreement. it is doubfful that a system of peaee enforcement could be set up in the United Nations unless the bssic pease forse issue is first resolved-end tbk does not appeor likely at the present time. Such ob servers, responsive to the conditions of the agreement developed at the aforementioned negotiatilone, could be provided by the 17 nonaligned coun tries who on 15 Marsh 1965 urged un conditional negotiations. South Vietnam would preelude unifi sstion. Further, the Control Commis sion would cetilfy to the treaty sig natories that the eltilons were free and devoid of any pressures. Following the Geneva eeeords, there was no indication at any time that conditions conducive to free and truly representative elestions were present. There were no adequate prweduree to establish such conditions either in the North or in the South. The accords allowed a period of two years for the establiebment of such conditions. However, the problem of disarmament of irregulars and disengagement of major forces was not part of the problem at that time. lbrse-Year Period In the present eeee, a period of three yeare following the withdrawal of US forces from Vietnam would be more appropriate. The signal for with drawal, aeeording to this plan, is the completion of dkarmament and disen gagement. The three-year period fol lowing the return to conditions more nearly approaching normal would pro vide time to permit readjustment of esonomic and political fsstors wldch were certainly far from normal dur ing the protrssted period of warfare. Patilcularly important would be time to accomplish corrtilon of those con ditions eeused by wafilme inflation and a dispropotilonate distribution of eesete. Political patilee ehould not, be per mitted to commence operations lead ing toward free elestions for the se lection of government officiale until the disengagement of forsea is com plete. it is expeeted that this would take nesrly a year. Although not all US forces would necessarily be with drawn from Vietnam by this time, politieel activity would be appropriate Milii
RMOW

control-commission
These nations could meet to accept the responsibility of supervising the enforcement of any agreements made as a result of negotiations between the protegonista, and to establish an appropriate ControlC oaUUission or ganization similar to that of UN peace-keeping forces. In this csee, it would be appropriate for the nations involved as primary ,Patiles to the conflict to beer the costs of such su pervision. Therefore, it is proposed that the United States, South Viet nam, and North Vietnam share the expenses of the operations of the Con %onaligned trol Commission of -countries. The Viet Cong, as a con nation, would not contribute. While the first task of the Control Commission would be to supervise the disarmament of the irregulars in South Vietnam and the withdrawal of North Vletnameee units, the eventual tesk would be to supervise the eatab lisbment of a baeis for free eleetions in both North and South Vietnam. The provisions of tbe agreement should be that unification of North and South Vietnam would oeeur only if independent eleetions in the North and South cash agree to unification. A negative vote in either North or

.66

ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION
even during euch withdrawal once it had been established that the protag onists had, in fact, beerr disengaged. A general election for government officials could be conducted both in the North and in the South within six months after completion of the troop withdrawal. The final phase of the solution would be general elections on unification in beth North and South Vietnam. organization. A eecond step would be registration. All Viet Cong would be required to register in order to obtain amnesty and to engage in political ac tivity. Those who did not register would be considered ae outlaws. Payment of legal taxee wonld be a prerequisite for votingnot only by the Viet Cong, but by all citizens. Thh

Political Organization
The consideration of the Vlet Cong as an authorized political party ie a cri~lcal part of any eolution since the views of the protagonist on the role of the Viet Cong are diametrically op posed. The Viet Cong and North Viet namese hold that the Viet Cong po litical organization is not only a political party, but the only valid gov ernment in South Vietnam at thh time. The United States and the South Vietnamese do not accept this position in any reepact. While the Viet Cong political ela ment cannot be ignored nor denied some participation in the future of Vietnam, it cannot be permitted to participate in the future under any condition which might allow it to operate ae a force for liberation in the Communist senee of takbrg over the government. Terrorist and revohr tionary-type ZctMties muet be elim inated if the Viet Cong are to be ac ceptable ae a political party to the South Vietnamese and the United States. On the other hand, the eohr tion muet permit sufficient valid par ticipation in the future to satisfy both the Viet Cong and the North Viet namese if the proposed eolution is to be acceptable to the Communiet pro tagonists. Disarmament would be a first etep in normalizing the Vlet Cong political November 1900

President Hzbib Bourgeibz of Tunisia represents one of the 17 normfiied cormtriee which could provide neutral obeerverz of diezrerzment procedures would be one means of measuring valid citizenship. After meeting these condition, the Vlet Cong, ae a political party, would be permitted to participate in political activities and to nominate eend]datee for election. In the meantime, the present South Vietnamese Govern ment would continue to govern the nation until replaced by valid elec tions. This solution accomplishes certa/rr 87

ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION
objectives the North Vietnamese demand as a prerequisite for negotia tionsbut only in a phased program to be accomplished under neutral su pervision after an agreement has been signed. The Geneva accords are placed in effect with appropriate guarantees. The Viet Cong are given a voice in the government, although not to the extent the North Vietnamese indicate they desire at thk time. US treops are withdrawn, hut withdrawal is delayed until after disarmament has been com pleted. Finally, all aggression is halted, but as an immediate aftereffect of the ,agreement, not as a prerequisite to negotiations. On the other hand, the proposal bas ically meete US conditions. North Vletnameze units are withdrawn and Viet Cong aggression is halted. A guarantee that aggression will not he renewed is provided by diearming the Viet Cong. The Geneva accords are implemented under the supervision of neutral observers. While the United States has adamantly refused to rec ognize the Vlet Cong political arm in any manner, thb3 refusal cannot logically be extended to supervised ac tivities of registered members of the Viet Cong as a political party in frw elections to be conducted with ade quate supervision if thers is to be any hope of solution. The United States has taken the stand that, in truly free elections, she ie confident that the South Vietnam ese will not select a Communist form of government. This would put that theory to the test. That test of Viet namese attitudes is essential if a last ing pO]itical solution to the Vietnam problem is to be achieved. Many would hold that a military peace-keeping force ie necessary as a meane of enforcing the conditions of a truce. This would not bs necessary if both North and South Vietnam were required by the agreement to make military forces available to the Con trol Commission to assiet in enforc ing the condition of the truce in their respective potilon of Vietnam. US forces would be present in enclaves ae an available backup to encourage compliance with the disarmament pro visions of the agreement. Once disar mament is accomplished, US forces will no longer be necessary, and tvill be withdrawn from Vietnam. This is but one solution from among many which might be propqsed. How ever, it is one which offers the possi bility of achieving the baeic goals of both sides in the confIict. It is defi nitely a solution which provides a means of implementing the Geneva accords with proper guarantees. It also provides a role for the political arm of the Viet Cong once that or ganization is humanized and nor malized as a nonrevolutionary and nonviolent political organization. It is offered as an acceptable solution for peace in Vietnam.

BB

Miliirg

Review

Prom

Truppendienst

(Austria)

RECONNAISSANCE

VEHICLES

Frrmz Kosar

HE development of reconnais sance vehicles has not been uni form, a fact readily apparent when one examines the varieties produced throughout the world. Usually, the de velopment of a specific type of recon naissance vehicle starts with a rela tively light model. However, modifica tion of the basic model to improve its fighting capability cause the vehi cle to become heavier and heavier un til it reachee a point where it no longer is suited for its primary mission. Then, the development usually etarte anew. November 1966

With other types of vehicles, the question as to whether they should be wheeled or tracldaying has been long settled. But with reconnaissance vehicles there are differences of opin ion. Part of the blame for these differ ing opinions rests with those individ uals in the military establishments who fail to make their requirements epecific. From a technical standpoint, both types of vehicles have certain ad vantages and disadvantages. Advantages of the wheeled vehicle over a tracked vehicle are its greater speed, its lower fuel consumption, and

-1

RECONNAISSANCE VENICLES
the fact that every country which produces motor vehicles can develop wheeled armored vehicles by adapting commercial vehicle components. The requirements for building a tracklaying vehicle are much greater, and, for this reason, smaller countries have developed many wheeled recon naissance vehicles but few of the, tracldaying types. hicle has 30 gearwheels. Other ad vantages of the tracked over the wheeled vehicle are its eimpler steer ing mechanism, its lower silhouette which is made poseible by the chain drive, and ite lower ground preeeure. The type of vehicle chosen by a country largely depends upon the na tione technical capabilities, tbe den eity of the road system, and the planned conduct of operations. Since the end of World War II, revonnaiseance unite of the US Army have only been equipped with track. laying vehicles. In the early 1950s the M.Z-$,which had seen service in World War II, was replaced by the M41. However, reconnaissance patrols still traveled by jeep for many years. In the 7th Army in Europe, US units replaced the Mbl tanks with. the newer M48 and M60 tanke. Yet it was not until 1963 that the jeep reconnais sance parties switched to the MI14 armored personnel carriera light weight, amphibloue reconnaissance ve hicle, mounting one caliber .50 and one 7.62-millimeter macbinegun. New US Vshicls The General Sheridun, a new ar mored reconnaissance vehicle which ie amphibious and air transportable, will be introduced into eervice soon. The General Sheridan ie an interesting ve hicle because of its armament-the Shillelagh missile system which con eiste of a 152-millimeter gun launcher, gun mount, conventional gun-fired am munition, the ShiUeZagh missile, and fire control equipment. The French Army has two recon naissance vehicles in servic+the EBR and the AML245. The EBR evolved from the AMZO1, built in 1940. For travel on roads, the EBRs four center wheels can be raised to enable the vehicle to operate as a Militery hViOW

Cross-Country Mobility Cross-country mobility is an impor

tant requirement of a ieconnaiseance vehicle. Here, the tracked vehicle has a slight advantage, but not to the . extent often assumed. New tire pro files and low-pressure tires give the wheeled vehicle about tbe same crosscountry mobility as the tracked vehi cle. The tracked vehicle has an ad vantage over a four-wheeled vehicle in crossing trenches, but a vehicle with eight wheels can operate just about as efficiently as the tracked ve hicle. The vulnerability of wheeled vehi cles to enemy fire hae been reduced by multichamber and so-called bullet proof tires. On the other hand, the tracked vehicle becomes immobile when one of its tracks is destroyed, while the wheeled vehicle can keep on moving because of ite all-wheel drive. The tracked vehicle offers greater reliability because its driving mecba nism is not as complicated as that of wheeled vehicles; for example, the transmiseicm of an eight-wheeled ve-

Thie article was translated and digeeted from the original, Wb lished in TBUPPENDIENST (Aus trlu) June 1966, under the title, Aufkl&ungsfahrzeuge. CosUI righted @ 1966 by TEUPPEN
DIENSS.

70

RECONNAISSANCE VENICLES

four-wheeledvehicle. This is the only modern armored vehicle that can be driven in either direction. The EBRe engine, only eight and one-halfinches high, is located under the floor; this accounts for its low silhouette. The earlier versiontbe
k71?iZ75 54-n-mounts a 75-millimeter guh. A later vereionthe EBR75 55 Io-usee the EBR chasais, the turret of the AMX19 light tank, and has a more powerful gun. Prototype of other variante of the .EBR chow the possibility of using thie chaseis for all vehicles in a reconnaissance unit. The lateet vereion of the EBR weighs about 16 tons. SA?M Launcher The AML245 was originally devel ~oped for uae in guerrilla-type war fare; therefore, it did not mount an armor-defeating weapon. One version mounts a 60-millimeter mortar and two 7.5-millimeter machineguns; an other vereion is armed with a 60-milli meter mortar and a caliber .50 ma chinegun. Recently, these vehicles have been fitted with a SAMO Ieuncher for the Erztac antitank mis sile. The latest version of the AML 245 is armed with a 90-millimeter tank gun and a 7.5-millimeter ma chinegun. France is currently developing a new reconnaissance vehicl~esig nated the ERACwhich ie believed to incorporate many modern features such as low weight (eight tone), heavy armament, and an amphibious capability. Aa in World War II, Great Britain usee two types of reconnaissance ve hiclee, a light scout ear and a combat vehicle with heavier armament. Two versions of the Ferret scout car are currently in use. The Ferret 1, which is used aa a liaieon vehicle. mounts a fsovemher 1966

7.62-millimeter Bren machinegun and does not have a turret. The Ferret 2 is armed with a 7.62-millimeter ma chlnegun mounted in a revolving tur ret. A variant of this vehicle ie armed with Vigilant antitank guided mis siles which are fitted on each aide of the turret. Since mid-1960, British reconnais sance unite have ueed the Saladin which mounte a 76-millimeter tank gun and two machineguns. This sixwheeled vehicle has all-wheel drive, good cross-country mobility, and of fers protection against chemical, bio logical, and radiological warfare. The Federal Republic of Germany has equipped her armored reconnais sance platoone with a shorter vereion of the HS90 armored vehicle. DeveL oped by a French manufacturer and patterned after a number of French and German vehicles, the HS90 (short) is a well-designed vehicle. It mounts a 20-millimeter automatic. gun. Weet Germany also usee the US-buiIt M41. USSR Vehicles At the end of World War II, the Soviet Union had only a few wheeled reeonnaieaance vehiclee. Meet recon naissance was accomplished with T94 tanks. Around 1950 a new reeonnaia sance tank, the PT76, was introduced; it was later followed by a wheeled re connaissance vehicle. The PT76 is amphibious and mounts a 76-millime ter gun. This vehicle hae no counter part in the West. Its major drawback is that it carries only three persons; this requires the tank commander to double as the gunner. The wheeled reeonnaiseance vehi cle, the B7R40A, first seen in 1959, is also amphibious. Ita armament con siste of a single 7.62-millimeter ma chinegun; however, crewmembers c~n 71

REcONNAISSANCE

VEHICLES

Frances EBR can be driven in either direction .

$.

,.

73 NovombEf 1966

RECONNAISSANCE VENICLES fire

1 viet BTR40A, the vehicle is also man ufactured in Czechoslovakia and used by the Czech Army. There ie no uniform trend in the design of reconnaissance vehicles. The designs reflect the differences in tactical concepte. Moreover, many other reconnaissance means such as helicopters, drones, radar, and infra red devices have appeared on the scene. However, further improve ments to existing vehicles can be ex pected. These improvements will in clude: More powerful armament, pri marily guided missiles. Greater mobility which will be achieved by better engine perform ance without an increase in weight, through a reduction in the vehicles ground pressure, and by an amphibi ous capability. Reduced weight through the use of light metale or alloye for armor.

their individual weapons while riding in the vehicle. The Netherlands has developedthe YP104 which correspondsin perform ance and construction to the Br]tish

Ferret 1. It has no turret and mounts a 7.62-millimeter machinegun. Sweden has developed the StRV71, a light tank mounting a 75-millimeter gun. This tank reeemblee the US-built bf41. Two versions of the FN4RM/62FAB have been developed by Belgium, One vereion of this eight-ton wheeled ve hicle mounts a 90-millimeter cannon and the other a 60-millimeter mortar and two machineguns. The vehicle hae four-wheel drive, a maximum speed of about 60 miles an hour, and an operating range of approximately 350 miles. Hungary is the only Soviet satellite that has developed an armored recon naissance vehicle. Similar to the So

HAVINGTROUBLESELECTING CHRISTMAS GIITS?

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74

Military Review

NEW WINDS IN

From Problem

of CQmmuN8m

Thomas An

Subsequent to the initial publica tion of thk eartic~e, North KOTea8 Communist Party declared its in dependence from Peking and MoeCOW. The deckwatien appeared in an edito?ial in the party newepaper, Rodong Shinmoon, on 1$? August 1966, under the title, Let Us De fend OUTIndependence! The editorid said, There can be %0 superior part~ or infmor party nor a party that givee guidance and a party that receives guto!ance. One memtrp of the party cannot eerve m the center of the werld revolu. tion or the leading party.-Editor.

INCE early last year, Nikita S.

is
Khrushchevs succesaore have been making cautious but determined efforts to reassert Soviet influence c(n

Wovember 196$

75

PYON6YAN6
North

Korea, until then one of Com munist Chinaa closest allies in the

~ino:soviet conflict. One of the first snamfeatations of these efforts was Soviet Premier Alekeei N. Kosygins visit to the North Korean capital of Pyongyang in February 1965.

Oiminisldng Influence At the same time, it has become

increasingly clear that North Kore% too, has been seeking to improve her relatJons with the Soviet Union as a counterweight to Communist China. Since February 1965 the Pyongyang regime bas ceased following the lead , of the Chlneae Communists in their vicious tiradea againat the new Soviet Ieaderahip and modern revisionism. Even on the issue of the Vietnam war, its public utterances have been much less vitriolic in condemning US im perialism than Peking would have liked them to be. And there have been other atrawa in tbe wind as well. At the celebrations in honor of the 16th anniversary of the Chinese Peo ples Republic in Peking on 1 October 1965, the abaence of a North Korean delegation was glaringly conspicuous. Still more recently, pyongyang did not join Pekinge boycott of the 23d Congress of the Soviet Communist Party and, instead, sent to Moscow a high-level delegation led by Choi Yong Kun, Chairman of the Presidium of the North Korean Supreme Peo ples Aesembly. Nor has Peking been slow to mani fest its anger over North Koreas emerging policy of nonalignment. According to a report published in the Zndiun Eapress (New Delhi) on 20 July 1965, a North Korean Em bassy official in Moscow revealed that Communist China had claimed a 100 square-mile piece of North Korean territory near Mount Paektu as com

pensation for her aid during the Ko rean War. Shortly thereafter, Peking sent only a delegation of minor officials to Pyongyang to attend the North Ko rean celebration of the 20th anniver sary of Koreas liberation from Japan, 15 August 1965. By contrast, th6 So viet Union dispatched a high-level delegation headed by Alexander N. Shelepin, a member of the top echelon of the Soviet hierarchy. In the recent past, also, there has been a gradual decline in the number of articles about North Korea in the Chinese Commu nist prese. In ehort, all the evidence suggests that Chinese Communist influence in North Korea is markedly diminishing and that Pyongyang is gradually edg ing away from its former total align ment with Peking toward a more neu tral position in the Sine-Soviet rift. What are the reasona for North Ko reas. evident change of heart? Reasens Ier Neutrality In order to answer this queetion, it ie both necessary and ueeful to look back first at the development that led to North Koreas former close alignment with Pek~ng. Notwitbstanding the maesive mili tary suPPort it received from Commu nist China in the Korean War, the North Korean regime, from 1948 nntil late 1962, looked primarily to the So viet Union for guidance and assist ance. when the growing ck%vage be-

Thie article was reprinted from

the original, pablished in PsoBLEMB OF COMMUNISM, Jcdv-Aw

gu-st 1966. Dr. An is Aeeietant Profeeeor of Political Science at Waehing tcm!cCollege, Cheetertown, Mavy-

76

MilkwyReview

PYON6YAN6 tween MOSCOWand Peking erupted into the open in 1960, Pyongyang at firet adopted a cautious neutral etance toward the dispute and at the same time sought to use the opportunity afally all issuee in the Sine-Soviet clash. Curiously enough, the ehift to ward Peking came long after Premier Kim H-sung, the little Stalin of North Kores, had crushed the pro-Chinese

The 1962 Cuban crisis prompted North Kerea to back Communist China on most issues in the Sine-Soviet dkpute forded by the conflict to increase its independence and maneuverability. The Cuban crisie of 1962, however, marked a turning point in North Korean policy. Pyongyang abruptly abandoned its neutralist posture and, after January 1963, began solidly backing Communiet China on practicNovember 1968 faction within the North Korean Workers (Communist ) Party. The Pyongyang-Peking alignment was the result of eeveral important factors. The first was Premier Kims profonnd dissatisfaction with Khru shchevs seemingly one-sided preoccu coexistence pation with peaceful L 71

PYON6YANfi with the United Statee, whom Pyong yang regarde as the major enemy blocking attainment of ita primary na tional goalsthe destruction of the anti-Communist regime in South ,o rea and the reunification of the w rde country under Communist dominat- n. Kim and his associates feared t f at Khrushchevs pcdiey spelled a soften ing$ of Moscows revolutionary bellig erency and might lead to Soviet aban donmerrti of North Korea to her own difficulties, virtually removing all chance of redressing her grievances against the United States. . Cuban Crisis $Kbrushchevs backdown in the Cu ban crisis of 1962 and Moscows half hearted aid to North Vietnam in the Vietnamese war evidently convinced the North Korean leaders that the So viets were willing to sacrifice the in terests of other Communist countries to their own policy of peaceful coex istence with Washington. On the other hand, Pekings hard line appeared more closely attuned to Pyongyangs interests, needs, and world outlook. Like Communist Chha, North Korea is still in the militant Stalinist etage of Communist develop ment. In this stage, world tension serves the regime as a useful excuse for imposing the heavy domestic workloads and striugent policies re quired for rapid industrialization and stronger national defense, at the same time helping to distract the attention of the populace from difficulties and hardship at home. North Koreahas been constantlyex United States could hardly have been welcomed by tbe North Korean leader ship. , A second factor was Premier Kims Opposition to Khrushchevs de-StaIinization campaign. De-Staliniza tion, especially its repudiation of the cult of personality, had an immedi ate bearing on Kims own dictatorial leadership in North Korea. Indeed, the first serious challenge to hls leadership by the pro-Chhese faction followed soon after Khru shchevs famous de-Stalinization speech of February 1966. Moreover, aside from the issue of the personality cult, the repudiation of Stalinism threatened to call into question many of Kims other Stalinist policies. It was, therefore, not surprising that in November 1961 he declared de-Stalin ization to be purely an internal prob lem of the Soviet Communist Party witbout any relevance whatever for North Korea. There has been no de-Stalinization in Communist China either, and if anything, the cult of Mao Tse-tung has steadily increased in intensity since 1966. Thus, Pyongyangs alignment with Pekiing can be understood, in part, as a defensive effort to win Chi nese support against the Soviet cam paign of de-Stalinization. A third factor was the North Ko rean leaderships nationalistic reaction against what it viewed as Soviet big power chauvinism and Khrushchevs high-handed interference in Pyong yangs internal affairs. Moscows ex cessive efforts to exert control over North Korean policy led Premier Kim to move closer to Communist China, who appeared to Pyongyang to be a staunch champion of the right of small Communist powers to national indeMilitary Review

horting her people to greater produc tive effort to strengthen the country in the face of threatened American aggression. Under theee circum stances, Khrushchevs heavy emphasis
on 78 peaceful coexistence with the

.
pendence, and particularly of their prerogative to reject the erroneous Khrushchev line. A fourth factor was the cultural and racial affinity between North Ko rea and Communist China. Besides their geographic propinquity, the two nations share the traditions and insti tutions of a common civilization, and

PYONGYAN6

amazingly generous considering the major economic difficulties which be set mainland China, and it was also better suited to the condition and needs of North Korea.l There ie no doubt that it helped to strengthen Pekinge influence in Pyongyang. In ehort, the North Korean regimes alignment with Peking after 1962 wee influenced by a variety of factors, but, above all, it was based upon a coin cidence of tbe two regimes immedi ate practical interests. New Shift Evident Since early 1966, bmvever, a new shift in the North Korean posture has become evident. The Pyongyang regime bas gradually ceased echoing Pekings strident denunciations of So viet policy and, inetead, is endeavor ing to cultivate frtendly relatione with Khrushchevs successors within the framework of a general policy of non alignment. Why this new change of direction ? Ae far as can be judged, it does not at all signify the conver sion of the K1m Ii-sung regime to tbe Soviet line, but, inetead, simply re flects a readjustment of policy in epired by an altered view of North Koreas national intereet. Ae eleewhere in the Communist bloc, a etrong eense of nationalism ie reemerging in North Korea ae a Po tent force affecting the countrys Com mnnist orientation. North Korea to day is proudly searching for a new national identity, and it seeme quite likely that the Klm Ieaderehip hae become apprehensive over the danger that its total alignment with Peking might eventually lead to the aatel lizetion of North Korea by Commu nist China. Therefore, Pyongyang probably viewa its return to a neu tralist posture as a neeeseary step to safeguard itz independence, and also 79

North Koremr Premier Kim Ii-sung knows through experience that the United States is not a paper tiger this close tie waa further reinforced by their collaboration in the Korean War. By contrast, the cultural link be tween North Korea and tbe Soviet Union ie quite remote. The Soviets are European whites in the eyes of the North Koreans who etill harbor rather bitter memories of the behavior of Soviet troope during the brief post 1945 eecupatiqn of Korea. A fifth facthr was Communist Chi nae economic aeeistance to North Ko rea as a peacetime ally. Thie aid wae thwembw1986

PY0NGYdN6 of reaping advantages from the Sine-Soviet eplit which it could not obtah if it remained inflex ibly tied to Peking. In other words, North Korea aspiree to the classic role of a buffer state between the two major Communist powers, eeeking to play Mao off against the Kremlin in order to extract maximum political ae well as material concessions from the Soviet leaders. Economic and Military Aid Economically and militarily, the policy of alignment with Communist China proved highly disadvantageous .to North Korea. Not only was China incapable of providing economic and aeeietance in military adequate amounte to satisfy North Korean needs, but immediately after Pyong yang began takbrg a pro-Chinaee stance in 1963, Khrushchev abruptly cut off Soviet economic and military aid to North Korea. The cessation of economic aid bad a eharp impact on the economy, caus ing North Korea to fall behind the major production tergeta of her cur rent seven-year plan (1961-67). At* the same time, Soviet ebipmente of jet fuel and spare parts for the 500 Sovie~supplied MiG-15 jet fighters in the North Korean Air Force dropped to almost zero, seriously impairing North Koreas defense capabilities. Theee factors undoubtedly played an important part in influencing the Kim leadership to move away from ite pro-Peking position, and ita deci sion to do eo was rewarded last year by the resumption of Soviet aid to North Korea. Moscow reportedly agreed in May 1965 to strengthen North Koreas defense potential by supplying much-needed aircraft fuel, spare parta, and other military hard ware, possibly including antiaircraft

as a means

miesiles like those given to North Vietnam. Tbe resumption of Soviet assistance has, in turn, strengthened Moscows influence in Pyongyang. One recent evidence of thie was the North Ko rean regimes silence regarding the Soviet Unions mediation role in the Indo-Pakistan crisis, which Peking severely denounced. Another factor underlying North Koreas present neutralist policy seeme to be an increasing annoyance at Communist Chhas equivocal atti tude toward the war in Vietnam! Pyongyang ie no doubt dieillueioned, perhaps even disgusted, by the fact that Peking is urging North Vietnam to go on fighting the United States no matter what the coet, yet herself failing to give Hanoi adequate and effective military aid. perhaps, suspeete that Cornrnuni@ China is exhortkrg Ho Cbi-minh ti fight to the daath to the death, that is, of every last Vietnamese. Indeed, Pekings failure to react-except verballyto the grad ual expansion of the US military ef fort in Vietnam has tended to con vince Pyongyang that Communist China is but a paper dragon: fierce in appearance only. Pyongyang is fur ther convinced that for some time in the future only Soviet military sup port, including the protection of Mos cowe nuclear umbrella, would provide an effective deterrent to US power in ease North Korea were again to be come embroiled with the United states. With the military fortunes of the Vietnam war now gradually turning against tbe Communists, it is not at all inconceivable that Peking may have urged Pyongyang to launch a VietMilitary ROViEW

Paper Dragon Kim, Premier

80

PYONSYAN6 nam-like guerrilla war in South Ko rea, partly in order to open up a second fronty which would drain US forces from Vietnam, and partly to retaliate againet South Koreas mili tary contribution to the defense of South Vietnam. Premier Kim, however, knows through the bitter experience of the Korean War that the United States is not a paper tiger. He aleo knows that a local war of liberation in South Korea would inevitably he ee calated, exposing North Korea once again to the deetructivenese of US airpower-thk time without any as surance of effective Chinese or Soviet help. At best, North Korea would be sacrificing herself merely to pull Chi nese or North Vietnamese chestnuts out of the fire. Premier Kim has every reason to euepect that C?ommuniet Chinas real aim in Vietnam and other parts of Asia is to vindicate the Maoist strat egy of wars of national liberation at the expense of Vietnamese or Ko rean lives. North Korea has been striving to maneuver herself into a more neutral position as a sign of her unwillingness to serve as an expend able proxy for Chinese communism. North Koreas reemergent policy of neutralism or nonalignment with in the Communist camp thus appears to reflect a realistic reassessment of Pyongyangs changing national inter est. Premier Kim undoubtedly believes that such a policy is best calculated to enable North Korea to assert her nist giants. Therefore, the Kim re gime is likely to be cautious, ambigu oue, and even ambivalent on issues dividing Moscow and Peking. Pre mier Kim will undoubtedly appeal for efforte to preserve the unity of the fraternal socialist bloc, while simul taneously eulogizing both major Com munist powers in his speeches and in the party preee. In short, he intends to walk a diplomatic tightrope. Communist China certainly cannot look with favor upon North Koreas nonalignment and would prefer to keep Pyongyang tightly in her own anti-Soviet camp. But in this desire Peking has to contend with at least three major obstacles. First, there is the increasingly na tionalistic orientation of tbe Commu nist revolution in North Korea which opposee outeide domination whether hy Pekbrg or by Moscow. Second, North Korea no longer needs to look to Communist China as her main source of outside material eupport. The present leadership in Moscow has shown iteelf to be willing and eager to furnish economic and military as sistance to North Korea, while de manding less ideological and political conformity from Pyongyang. Third, there is no longer any pro-Chheee faction or splinter group within the North Korean Party whom the Chi nese Communists might manipulate against the Kim leadership. Under these circumstances, Peking no doubt realizes that intimidation or retaliation will not succeed in forcing North Korea back into the Cbineee Communiet fold. The Mao regime is, therefore, likely to handle Pyong with caution yangs nonalignment and eubtlety+mpecially in view of the many setbacks it has suffered abroad in recent months. ~ 81

own national identity and independ ence es the puppet of neither.Moscow

nor Peking. Various political, economic, geo graphic, and other factors, of course, make it difficult for North Korea to

antagonize either of the two CommuNovember 1966

The views ezpree8ed in this arti cle are the WthOr8 and are not necea.rarily those of the Department of the Armu, Department of De fense, or the U. S. ArmzI Command and Goueral Stafl College.Editor.
SCALATION of the war in Viet nam haa generated greatly in-, creaeed demande for US combat power. Prior to the buildup in Viet nam, the Army had eight of ite dh+ eione deployed overseas-five in Eu rope, two in Korea, and one in Ha .

increasing the span of control at the division and higher cchelone. But what
of the lower echelons? Can the same principle be successfully applied? The most significant effect of a change in the span of control ie to be found at the Ioweet level of com mand. An increase from three to four in the number of rifle platoons in a company would increaee the platoon etrength of a division by 27 or the equivalent of a full brigade without creating a eingle additional headquar-

Major James S. Angele~ United States Arm# waii. Thie represented 50 percent of its divieion etrength. The equivalent of more than three divisions has now been committed to Vietnam. The task which has confronted the Army ie to provide the increase in combat power with the lczet poeeible adveree effect on the strategic reserve. The logical method of accomplish ing this expansion is to organize, equip, and train new unita in sufficient time to meat the Armys needs. In the past, this has meant primarily raising new divisions, increasing the normal peacetime corps from two to three, four, or even five divisions and, in turn, the peacetime field army from two to three or more corps. Thie is tere. The addition of one company to each battalion would produce the equivalent of a brigade, but thie would aleo require nine company headquar ters. By adding a fourth brigade to the divieion, nine company headquar tare, three battalion headquarters, and one brigade headquarters would he required. A choice existe of increasing the epan of control at one or all levele. Although the infantry company hae three infantry platoone, it also has a wezpone platoon. Therefore, adding another infantry platoon would give it a epan of control of five and a etrength of over 200. This might ex ceed the capability of the company headquarters.
Milltwy

an excellent example of cxpaneion by af

Review

LIMITED WAR An increase at company level ap pears to be the most- advantageou_e. The four-company battalion is a proved concept employed in the ar mored, organization prior to the Re organization Objective Army Divi sions and in the air defense artillery today. It offers the battalion com mander greater tactical flexibility, especially in the employment of a re serve. The brigade could also hold back a company from a battalion or battalion without reducing them to two companies. Battalion and Brigado LaMel An increase in the span of control at battalion and brigade is not as ad vantageous. At battalion level, the personnel, training, and time require ments are increaeed. Adding a fourth brigade to the division would necessi tate the complete reorganization of the division since the support ele ments are organized in increments of thre=ne per brigade. The battalion plan is acceptable while the brigade expansion is not. An expansion is normally under taken to increase the combat power of any military force which may be ex pressed in foxhole strength. The entire complex support structure of a divieion can only justify its exist ence by its support of the combat ele ments. The ratio of support to sup ported within the divieion is roughly one to one. The addition of one com pany to each battalion would repre James S. Angelee ie with Headquarters, .?oth Region, North American Air Defense Command, Truaz Field, Wizce?win. A veteran of World War II and the Korean Con flict, he returned from Vietnam in 1964 where he eerved as Psychological Warfa?e O&er with 2d Corps Head quurters. Major Nowrnber wee ) sent a 10-percent increase in over-all division strength and a 20 to 25-per cent increase in the foxhole etrength. Applied to the Armye I?-division force structure, this represents a fox hole etfiength of more than five divi sions. Expansion within each battalion is the Ieaet difficult, the quickest, re quires the least number of officer per sonnel, and does not excessively dis turb combat readinese. The fact that all personnel remain in the same unit means that etandlng operating pro cedures and policies are already known. Since no staff organization is needed, the training problem ie sim plified and the officer personnel re quirement is minimal. 1 Tactical Flexibility Greater tactical flexibility is also offered in the organization of task forces. In an armored or mechanized division, the makeup of tack forces can be weighted with armor or infan try three to one or balanced two to two with all battalion headquarters fully utilized. Under the present threecompany organization, a balanced force of infantry and armored com paniee leaves one battalion headquar ters commanding only two companies. Under certain conditions it is possible that a battalion could be without a command. Similar results may be obtilned if applied tO Other branchee. The num ber of firing batteries within an ar tillery battalion could be lhwreased to four. The addition of a 155-howitzer battery to the 105-howitzer battalion normally allocated as direct support to each brigade would add flexibility and firepower at brigade level. Replacement of unite on a three for four basis would result in a saving of personnel equal to the strengt~ of 83

the headquarters units that would be eliminated, These savings are accumu. lative. A reduction in troop units, not troop strength, from overseas would be a distinct possibility provided tbe political climate is favorable. World wide expansion is feasible because of the simplicity and level of the plan. The favorable morale factors caused by the potential enlisted promotions created by the expansion, as well as the preclusion of a future distasteful

reduction in force, are worthy byproducts. Inasmuch se the expansion is to be through the draft, the reduc tionwhen it comes about-can be accomplished by reducing draft calls. Strength can be further decreaeed by the early release of enlisted personnel and junior officers brought to a$tive duty through tbe Reserve Officers Training Corps program. Thue, no se rious imbalance of the authorized grade structure would reeult.

LESSONS LEARNED
The
ing MILITARY REVIEW ie patilcularly interested in receiv manuscript covering leeeons learned by US unite in

Vietnam. Probleme of organization, command and control, equipment, tactics, and fire eupport merit informed discus sion. After complying with appropriate local regulation, authors may submit manuscripts direct to the MILITARY RE VIEW. We will obtain the neceseary security review on those accepted.

84

Miiittwy Review

Robert Reynolds

HE course of history in the 20th century has brought the United Statea into two World Wars and several smaller scale military ac tions. Whether as pafilcipant or sponsor, the United Stetee has acted in each

instance in concert with other nations. These allies in wartime and in peace time have included several of the countries of Latin America, and none hae proved to be more steadfast in ita support than Brazil. For the first 40 years of the 20th

November 1966

85

BRAZIL century, Brazils armed forces did not take part in any world conflict, although a Brazilian naval force was on its way to the Mediterranczn when World War I ended. A Naval War Operations Division of two cruisers, four destroyers, one auxiliary cruiser, and one seagoing tug sailed from Bra zil for Freetown, Sierra Leone, on 1 August 1918. In one contact with a German snb marine en route, the Brazilians made a depth charge attack and were cred ited with itz destruction. Its other op erations were limited to patrol dnties . off the African coast from Dakar to Gibraltar. Road to World War II Postwar Brazil had no enthusiasm for foreign entanglements and with drew from the League of Nations in 1926. It was not until Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini had pressed their threats of global aggression beyond the point of no return that the Bra zilians teok aides in the deteriorating world situation. The government at that time was in the hands of President Getulio D. Vargas who had consolidated his power in the yeors following the 1930 coup which brought him to the Pres idency. Vargas found himself in an ambiguous situation by 1939. On one hand, Brazils economy was closely linked to that of the United Statee. Moreover, through cultural ties and az a result of President Franklin D. Roosevelts Good Neighbor Policy, a large number of the Brazilian people aided with the Allied cauee. On the other hand, Vargas had among his advizors a number of proAxie sympathizers, and Germany and Italy were good customere for Bra zilian cotton. Brazils population in cluded strong German, Italian, and Japanese minorities in eeveral etra tegic areze. While many in these colo niee remained loyal to Brazil, the loy alty of other elements wae questioned, and there were undoubtedly come with pro-Axis sentiments. Neutrality Declaration President Vargas first solution to thie dilemma wae a declaration of neu trality on 20 October 1939. In the ensuing monthe, ae the Wehcvnacht moved machinelike into Denmark, Norway, Belgium, the Netherlands, and France, Vargas edged closer to the apparent winner. In June 1940 he all but adhered to the Axis in a speech welcoming a new era. New era or not, there were geopo litical realities to coneider. President Vargae in January 1941 granted the United States air and naval baee righte in or near Be16m and Natal, Recife, and Fernando Noronha in northeastern Brazil. These basee were required by the United Statee to in sure communications later with North Africa. Within the yezr, the Japanese at tacked Pearl Harbor. Entering the war, the United States quickly sought Lstin-American zupport at the Third Meeting of Foreign Ministere of the American Republice in Rib de Janeiro in January 1942. Brazil joined the majority of the Latin-American Re publics in breaking relations with the Axis countries. Military Review

Robert RsIInolde was, until recently, American Conmd in Sdo Paedo, Bvazil. He eerved during World War 11 with the US ArmII Air F07@8 and later with the US Air Ferce, and L+an of ficw in the US Air Force Reeerve. He received hia A.B. in Political Scisnce from the Univereitzi of Califmmia at Berkeley. In 1950 he joined the De partment of State and haa eerved in Mexico, Argentina, and Bolivia.
33

BRAZIL German submarine attacks against Brazilian shipping followed the sev erance of relations. Public anger mounted as coastal shipping vessels fell prey to German torpedos. It reached a peak after the Germans ssnk five ships off Sergipe in a 48 hour period in August 1942. Mobs comm&nder. He was destined to earn the ra~k of marshal. A major problem was one of con version from French to US organiza tion and doctrine. The Brazilian Army had been patterned on the French model because a French military mis sion had worked with the Brazilians

US Arnw

Major General J050 Baptieta Maeearenhas de Moraee commended the Lieutenant General Mark W. Clsrks 5th Army sacked German and Italian commer cial establishments in violent protest. On 22 Auguet 1942 Brazil declared war on Germany and Italy. Although the idea of organizing a Brazilian Expeditionary Force (FEE) began to take root with the declara tion of war, it was August 1943 be fore a 1st Expeditionary Infantry Di vision was created by a War Ministry decree. Major General JoFio Baptists Mascarenhae de Moraes was the units November 1966

FEBas Part

of

for years. Overnight it was necessary to substitute American for French methods and equipment. General Mae carenhas had the help of about three dozen division officers who bad at tended US military schoole and, from January 1944, a US Army mission sent to Brazil. Minor problems included learning to use 105-millimeter and 155-milli meter howitzers, creation and integra tion of an aerial observation and ~re 81

BSAZIL

controlsquadron,translation of Army field manuale into Portuguese, and familiarization with modem commu nication equipment. With intensive training, the 1st Expeditionary In fantry Divieion was combat ready by mid-1944. From July to September, 15,000 of ficers and men of the division sailed
to Naples aboard SKIPS of the US Navy. By February 1945 the FEB te taled over 25,000. The first FEB detachment to see

action had replaced a US unit in the

the north. There followed a series of advancesfirst unopposed, then met with heavy atilllery fire. On 18 September the Brazilian ex perienced their firet encounter with German infantry when the detachment attacked and seized the town of Camaiore. This action proved they could be relied on and earned for them thecongrahdations of Lieutenant Gen. eral Mark W. Clark, 6th Army com mander. The ZEB epent a total of 239 days in action against the Germans. From

Brazilian pa>atroepers on duty in the Dominican Republic have their equipment checked - -. ite initial position near Pis% it moved area just north of Piss on 15 Sepalong a counterelozkwkie, semielliptitember 1944. Not since their war with eal swath that came to a stop, just Paragaay in 1870 had Braziliantroops before V-E Day, near tbe French been in foreign combat, On the mornborder in the Piedmont region. A ing of 16 September, the Brazilian large number of defended areas had general commending the FEB detaehfallen before the FEBs advance. On ment asked for and reeeived permisite way to theee military eccomplishsion to move his part of the line to 88 Milittry REviBW

menta, the FEE lost 451 dead, 2,722

wounded or injured, 23 miesing, and W prieoners, A total of 20,673 prie oners were taken. These included an entire German division whicli sur rendered in the last days of the war. Brsfils Air Force In the meantime, Brazils Air Force, which had just won its autonomy from the army, wae represented in World War II by the let Fighter Squadron. It received ita training for combat at US Army Air Force bases and began combat operations at Tar quinia, Italy, on 31 October 1944. After suffering a series of combat casualties, the equadron moved to Piss in December and began operat ing on a solid basis. Its mission, like those of the US squadrons who made up the rest of the 350th Fighter Group, was a fighter-bomber mission. They had no interceptor or eecort functions since all Axis airpower had long eince been swept from the Italian ekles. They were juet 20 minutee fly ing time from the German lines strung through the Apennines Mountaine. They etrafed and bombed military targets, particularly rail and road vehicles. By the end of the war, the Bra zitiane had lost eight pilots to German antiaircraft fire. Another three had abandoned their planes and bailed out over friendly territory, four para chuted into German territory and were captured, and two more who jumped in German-held territory were hidden by friendly patileane until the wars end. One Brazilian pilot who jumped wae befriended and clothed by Italian partkane, and then walked 240 miles back to Allied territory. An other who bailed out was uneure of his position until he saw some eoldiere in green uniforms like those of the November 1966

Germans. He wae preparing to run when one of the eoldiere spoke-in Portuguese. The pilot had landed in an area held by hie compatriots of the

FEB.
With 4,000 milez of coastline, Bra zil ie highly vulnerable to attack from the sea. Consequently, eubmarine raids against Brazils coaetal chipping brought the country into the war in mid-1942. Not unnaturally, the Bra zilian Navys contribution to the Al lied war effort took the form of anti submarine and convoy eecort duties. Tesk Ferce 46 After declaring war in Auguet 1942, the Brazilian Government as zigned ite Northeast Naval Force to the US 4th Fleet operating in tbe South Atlantic. The Brazilian com ponent was designated as Task Force 46. Three vessels of Task Force 46 were. lost as a result of the war. An auxil iary ship was torpedoed and eunk in July 1944. In the same month, a cor vette went down, and in July 1945 shortly after the end of the war in Europe-the venerable cruiser Bahia eank while returning from the war zone. There were 474 officers and men who lost their lives in these sinkings. The Brazilian Navy distinguished itself by providing eecorta for hun dreds of convoys and thousands of merchant chips. By their Hlreleee ef forts, they prevented far more devas tating German raids, and they freed other Allied naval elements to carry the battle to the enemy eleewhere. Brazil did not respond to the United Nations call for military unite for the Korean Conflict. The period of that action coincided with the turbulent election campaign and second term of office of President Vargas. The Bra zilian military establishment was 89

The Korean War had ended by the time Vargas was succeeded in office. When the United Nations next is sued an emergency summone to ite members for military force contribu tions, it was in response to the situa tion which arose following the Anglo French-Israeli invaeion of the Suez Canal ares of Egypt in 1956. After eucceesfully appealing to the tripartite force to abandon Egyptian territory, on 5 November the UN General Ae eembly established a UN Emergency Force (UNEF) to secure and super viee the cessation of hostilities. Secretary General Dag Hammar skj~ld immediately sought offers of troops from nonaligned natione not having representation in tbe Security Council. Brazil wae one of 10 nations whose offer was accepted. Suez Battalion There were many volunteers for the Brazilian Suez Battalion, especially Arabic-speaking soldiers from fami lies of Middle Eaetern ancestiy. On 11 January the Suez Battalion of 520 officers and men eailed to join the UNEF. They were given the responsibility for patrolling a stretch of the canal running through Ismailia. Their du ties entailed unexpected hazards in the form of undetonated World War II mines that etill lay buried through out the area. They met this problem and have now established a 10-year tradition of service in Suez and the Gaza Strip. The troops are logistically self-sufficient, and receive materiel and suppliee by Brazilian Navy transports and the aircraft of tbe Brazilian Air Force. On 15 January 1964, Brazilian Gen eral Carlos Flores de Paiva Chaves took command of all UN troops in the 90

badly divided over political issues.

area. However, be became ill and was unable to complete his four-year as signment. He was replaced in August 1964 by Brazile General Syzeno Sar mento. The Congo Suez and Gaza showed how a multi national military force could serve the interests of world peace. When tbe newly independent Congo became the scene of a secessionist movement in July 1960, Secretary General Ham marskjold called on the Security Coun cil to reetore peace there through the application of the Suez formula. He was given authority to provide military assistance and set out to cre ate a UN Operation in the Congo (ONUC). Again, he appealed to mem ber natione not directly involved in the problem to contribute forces. .He organized a command composed of 23 nationalities and having a strength of over 15,000 infantry troope and 2,245 supporting troops. Supporting forces included thoee engaged in air traneport operation, and it was in this work that Brazils contribution was made. Thirteen Bra zilian pilots and 11 other personnel from the Brazilian Air Force flew to the Congo to start an air transport facility. Thie continued throughout the lifetime of the ONUC. The strength of the Brazilian contingent had increased to about 30. The Bra zilian contribution in tbe Congo was recognized with the appointnient of a Brazilian officer as the first corn-. mander of the unified ONUC air com mand. All of the formerly independent national air elements were consoli dated under hie command in Febru ary 1962. The Congo troubles eubsided sufficiently to allow the withdrawal and dkbandment of the ONUC in June 1964. MiliiafyReview

BRAZIL

With the occurrenceof the Domin ican revolution in April 1965, one of the first governments to give tacit recognition to the significance of the crisis was the government of Brazil. The Brazilian position again paral leled that of the United States.
The Brazilian delegate was a mem ber of the five-man peace committee of the Organization of American States (OAS) which recommended an OAS international military force to maintahr order in the Dominican Re public. On 6 May the OAS voted to adopt the recommendation. By 20 May the Brazilian Senate voted to send a Brazilian contingent to the Inter-American Peace Force. The militiry ministers designated units from the army, the marine corps, and the air force to make up a force totaling over 1,100 officers and men. They also named Colonel Carlos de Meira Mates as ite commander. On 22 May the OAS passed a reso lution placing over-all command of the peace force in Brazilian hands. The Brazilian, in turn, nominated Gen eral Hugo Panasco Alvim for the commanders joh on 24 May with OAS confirmation, naming Lieutenant Gen eral Bruce Palmer, Jr., of the United States as his second in command. Gen eral Palmer retained command of the US joint task force that he had brought to the Dominican Republic in late April. General Panasco AlVim arrived in Santo Domingo on 28 May and as sumed command of the Inter-Ameri can Peace Force (IAPF), as it had become known officially by that time. The Brazilian contingent of the force

known by its Portuguese initiale es the FAZBRASarrived a day later. General Panasco Alvim assigned Brazilian troops to guard the Na tional Palace in Santo Domingo a few days after their arrival. Next, he began replacing US troops with Brazilians at crucial sectors where the IAPF line confronted that of the Do minican rebels. Use of the Brazilians and the other Latin Americans as buf fers did not eliminate friction com pletely at these peints, but it undoubt edly reduced them. In other waya as well, the Brazilian knack of finding solutions to ticklish problems proved to be of value in the Dominican Republic. One example was the installation of a hot line with rebel headquarters to aid in clarify ing the origin or purpose of any new shooting. Brazilian participation in the IAPF has brought benefits-militarily, po litically, and psychologically. The mo tivation hehind the Brazilian decision to contribute to the IAPF, as ex preseed by President Humberto de Alencar Castello Branco, was their in ternational obligation and to insure the eurvival of democracy in the Do minican Republic. The Brazilians have rarely courted ware or other foreign military excur sions. But when international obliga tion or force of circumstance has re quired it, thk heterogeneous people, sprawled ecrozs a land of red earth, uncharted jungles, pine forests, arid desert, modem cities, and endlees coastline-nearly half the area of South Americahas produced the mil itary means to meet the challenge.

,
I

November 1966

91

Brenda M. Wolak

The viewe ezpreeeed in this article are the authors and

are not necessarily those of the Department of the Armg,
Department of Defewse, w the U. S. Army Command and
Geneml Staff College.Editor.

REQUENT references appear in the popular prees, ae well ae in military professional and technical literature, to the
three-stage theory of the evolution of insurgency. Often attrib uted to Mao Tea-tung, thle theory or analytk scheme permeates
the literature on unconventional warfare and insurgency. News papermen etete, for ekample, that we are on the verge of paesing
into Stage 111 in Vietnam, while military doctrine detaile ac tions to be taken in varioue eteges of ineurgerwy. Studente in
military coursee are taught to view insurgent development in
this framework, and one reeeives t? strong impression that the
Communiet ineurgente aleo do.
where did this theory begin, and is it applicable ae a descri ptive theory and an analytic tool?
An early reference to the evolutionary position of guerrilla
warfare appeare in the worka of Nicolai Lenin. No theory of
etagee was preeented, but guerrilla wam%w+underetood se corn-
pricing aseaseinations and expropriations-wae seen as an in evitable form of the class struggle. Leon Troteky, however, was
the first to develop the general theory of protracted war in his
diepute with Joseph Stalin over the Comintern (Communiet In ternational) policy relevant to the Chinese revolution.
The firet mention of the fully developed three-stage theory
is in Maos On the Protracted War, in an addrees presented
during a conference held in May-June 1938 to discuse the progress
of the Sino-Japan*e War. In that speech, Mao outlined the now
familiar three phaeee (eae chart).
92 Militcfyt!eviow

MAOS THREE STAGES Maofa theoretical presentation rep resents his eummation of a goed deal of experience and many diverse influ ences, including those from Maos comrades, such es Chu Teh as well ae Sun-tzu, Karl von Clausewitz, and T. E. Lawrence. Stages of Conffict Maos celebrated three stages of guerrilla warfare, upon close exami nation, appear to be three stages of total national conflict. In each phase, conventional unita conduct conven tional operations with greater or lesser aid from guerrilla forces in the en emys rear. Mobile warfare, sup posedly characterizing the culminat ing phase of insurgency according to the current three-stage scbemq ap psars in all three phaees. The regular forces and their mie sions are viewed by Mao as of prime importance. Guerrilla forces operate as auxiliaries to the regulare. In! hie view, they are not capable of attairiing victory on their own. Prefacing hie discueeion, Mao statee:

It ie impoeeible to predict the cow crete eiteuttione in the three stagee, of the rear but certain maim trends mu be pointed oat in the light of preeent conditiorw. . . . Nobody ean cast a horoecope for the Sino-Japane.ce war; but to make a rough ckavt of the trend of the war is neceeearg for its strategic direction. Hence, although our chart may not coincide with, but will be amended bg, futute develop ment, it ie still nece8earp in formu lating the etrategic pfan for cavrying on a protracted war firmly and pur posefully. Mao was careful to emphasize that
his discussion applied only to a epe cific point in space and time; hie views were not to be universally applicable. Important Conditions The conditions under which this spesch waa delivered are important to rememberChineee forcee had been driven from large areas of tbe north, and the over-all military situa tion was deteriorating. Mao seems to have been attempting to rationalize the inordinate demands that a pro longed war was to mzke on the Chinese people, and to combat the peesimiam of the summer soldiers, defeatists, and r~mpromisers by pro viding a blueprint and prophecy of inevitable victory. Maos writings on all mattera in evitably had great influence among the Vietnamese Communiata, and it is no surprise to see Maoa three stagee appearing in a somewhat al tered form in the writings of Truong Chinh. In his Auguet Revolution written in 1946, Truong stated that a flexibility of tactice ie an abeolute necessity in revolutionary warfare. He made it clear that no progression through a seriee of phases wae to ~ expected.

Robert C. Sugge and Brenda M. Wolak are a88ig7Zed to Technical Op eration Research, Combat Operations Research Group, US Army Combat Developrnente Command, at Fort Be f voir, Virginia. Mr. Sugge, Chief of the Sped Warfare Branch, eerved in the US Marine Corps from 1950 to 195.2. He holde B.A., M.A., and Ph. D. degreee in Anthropology from Columbia Uni versity, and ie experienced in weap on eystema design, field 8tudie8 of human behuvior in military unite, and human faCt078reeearch.
Brenda Wofak, Reeearch Aide, Spe ceisl Warfare Branch, ie a former cm greeebnal Reeearch Aide in Foreign Relatiorw, and ie a Ph.D. candidate in Sirso-Soviet relations at Geovge Wash ington Univemity Plovamber 1966

MAOSTHREE STA6ES

MAOSTHREE STAGES However, Truong reversed his ear lier view in 1947, presenting a threestage theory of the evolution of the Indochina conflict (see chart). The flexible approach of Truonge earlier writings had ~isappeared in 1947. He confidently stkted that the Indochi nese War muet, of necessity, pase through the three stages, the duration of which alone was eubjeet to vari ation. General tliaps Writings The three stagee identified by Truong reappear in the 1959 writinge of Vo Nguyen Giap. There, they are stated in somewhat less dogmatic form, perhaps due to Giapa early dif ficulties in making his anti-French military operations conform to the the ory. Giap etatee that the development of warfare through the three phasee of contention, equilibrium, and coun teroffensive can be viewed ae a gen eral law, that was fulfilled in main directions by all insurgences. In insurgency, according to Giap, three forme of warfare fluctuate in importance relative to each other. Guerrilla warfare, mobile warfare, and camp warfare all exiet in the initial phase of an insurgency, but guerrilla warfare predominate. Grad ually, the importance of mobile war fare and camp warfare increasee and that of guerrilla warfare diminishes. The problem, Giap believes, ie to main tain the correct relationship or ratio between the forms. Thie view of the gradual transmutation of the charac ter of an insurgency actually seems to be a separate- theory from that of the three etagee, showing more potential flexibility for interpretation than Truongs views. The adaptation of Maoa three-stage theory by the Vietnamese authore waa by no meane lavish. It could not November 1966 be, eince the local objective, subjec tive, and operational conditions of the Indochina insurgency were too different. Nevertheless, the number three seems to have retained a certain eacred inviolability. Although the characteristic of each of the three stages have changed con siderably from Mao to Truong, Giap has even introduced what might be termed a second theory in which the development of guerrilla warfare ie seen ae the result of a dynamic rela tionehip between guerrilla, mobile, and camp warfare. This last theory ie eomewhat antithetical to the first in failing to specify clear-cut develop mental phase lines, but was seen by Giap ae complementary to it. Genetic Relationstdp It ie clear that a genetic relation ship exists between Maos three-stage theory and those of Truong and Giap. There is, however, no evidence that Maos original views were based on an objective analysis of the trends of the war. They appear to have been, at least partially, a reeponse to cer tain propaganda neede of the mo ment. Clearly, they were not explicitly intended for application outside the concrete historical situation for which they were developed. The appropriateness of the threestage theory for the Vietnamese sit uation may be seriously questioned. Many marked differences-military, political, economic, geographic-exist between the war in north China and that which has been ding on in Indo china since the 1940s. It is doubtful if thie application of the theory has, any other baeie than a dogmatic one. An examination of the Communist inepired insurgenciee throughout the world also fails to indicate any clearcut development of insurgenciee f~l 95

lowing the scheme, which would he expected if it possessed any kind of statue as a general law. Insurgences chow a definite lack of inevitable progression: Certain cases such as Greece may have failed in Stage HI, while others retrogressed from Stage 11 to Stage I and then defeat as in Malaya. Cuba is quite an anomaly from the point of view of this theory. Consideration of the multitude of non Communist-backed ineurgencies in re cent years further complicates the picture, revssling different approaches and courees of progression of insur . gencies than those postulated by the Reds. Only a Slogan The reason for the perpetuation and elaboration of Maos original echeme in both Red China and North Viet nam, it ie submitted, lies in its statua as revealed truth from the source of party dogma. Secondarily, it presente a simplistic view of insurgencya view weK adapted to the indoctrina tion and psychological organization of cadres, troops, and populace whose average level of formal education is quite low. It is not baeed on any kind of sci entific analysis of the war. It can lay no claim to a basis in historical fact or an ability to clarify history. It ie also inadequate when examined from the point of view of Western, Aristotelian logic. It is not even in tended to impart information. Maos scheme is, in fact, only a slogan for use in the drive toward ideological unity of Communist China. It is, therefore, somewhat surpris ing to seethe same three-stage scheme, albeit in eomewhat revised form, ap pearing in a special text published by the US Army Special Warfare School (now the John F. Kennedy Center for

Special Warfare) at Fort North Carolina (see chart).

Bragg,

Whatever the exact genealogy of this US version of the three-phase scheme, it would be difficult to deny the influence of Mao, Truong, and Giap in its formulation. The queetion im mediately arises: If the Red authors theories are not objective, then how valid or worthwhile is this American elaboration of them? The answer, it is submitted, is very likely in the neg ative. The three-stage theory may be useful for a facile explanation at a popular level, but it becomes less valid and increasingly misleading to the ex tent that it ia ueed as a vehicle for military instruction or planning of counterinsurgency action. Inadequacies Apparent Its simplicity and face validity is diearming, but its inadequacies be come immediately apparent when one attempts to analyze the past su~cess ful and unsuccessful insurgenciee, in terms of its categories, and arrive at some scholarly consensue as to what phases each were jn at various times and in what phasehach terminated. Such a conseneus is quite difficult to reach. It ie apparent that these inadequa cies are well recognized by profes sional military pereonnaf ae well as students of special warfare, for one hears frequent reference to prephsee insurgency and poetphase III both of which are, in fact, fairly critical periods for both insurgent and coun terinsurgent. Increeeed attention is also being given to non-Conmmnist revolutionary techniques that fail to conform to Communist theories in many ways. If the present theory or scheme of insurgency development is truly inMilhy REViOW

aa

MAOSTHREE STASES adeauate, then what is the course of acti& to be taken ? It is not, as might be eupposed, to develop a new scheme based on an intensive analyeis of past and present insurgenciee. It is to re view critically the whole concept of insurgency and counterinsurgency, and eee if it has not become a catch all for a variety of typee of conflicts of varying intensity Ievele that, in fact, belong in a number of quite sep arate conceptual categories. The entire conceptual framework of the field of special warfar+ae cur rently comprehended in US Army manualsie in need of review and revision by virtue of a number of eimilar conceptual difficulties. For ex ample, why separate psychological op erations from other areas of special warfare when it is an integral part of unconventional warfare, civil af fairs, and counterinsurgency ? A review of thie type, aimed at identifying the critical elements of a wide range of conflicts and establish ing a typology that has utilitarian validity, should go a long way to free thinking from the bonds impoeed by terms and theories that have, for one reason or another, been accepted with out careful consideration. A common failing of Western military thinking ie to accept at face value the state ments of authorities euch as Bayo, Erneeto (Che) Guevara, and Truong, without subjecting both the writing and the author to a searching analy sie. A review of tlds type should be ac companied by a careful consideration of the need for developmental theories of insurgency or guerrilla warfare. It is not at all clear why euch theories are needed. Soldiers in conventional warfare do not need any evolutionary theory of the progression of war to aid their combat actions. They are taught tactics, techniques, and prin ciples. Is there any reaeon for more than thie in unconventional warfare or Counterinsurgency? An alternative to the formulation of an evolutionary theory of guerrilla warfare is tbe analysis for baeic prin ciples underlying all guerrilla war, as Colonel Virgil Ney has done eo euc ceeefully. These principle appear to be more useful from the points of view of the operator, the instructor, and the student than any evolutionary scheme. Once the concept of insurgency has been defined and ite raison dt%re es tablished, only then should a theory of insurgency development he reformu lated, based on a more carefully defined subject matter and oriented to specific needs. The entire matter may seem highly academic, but if we are to be in the bnsinese, then we ehordd at least apply ourselves to understanding the environment in which we have to fight.

November 1966

91

UNITED Army Orders T-II Trainers An order for 255 T-42 trainers to replace 0-1 Bird Dofs observation planes now used for training has been placed by the Army. Tbe O-I aircraft are used for operational missione in Vietnam. No official designation has been given the trainer, but a 1965 Air

STATES OCS Orive The Army is making a major effort to recruit more than 42,000 qualified persons to enter Officer Candidate Scherd (OCS) during Fiscal Year 1967. Commanders at all levele have been told to make intensive and sus tained efforts to locate qualified can didates. ~ The OCS program will be tbe major source of tbe Armys junior officers for the fiscal year. Regulation previously required OCS candidates to be at least 1S and not more than 27 years old at the time of enlistment. This hae heen modified to allow, in exceptional caaes, a waiver of the maximum age requirement up to 32 years and six months.DOD releaae. Portable Gas Stations A contract to produce more than 500 rubber-coated, flexible storage tanks for uee in Vietnam haa been awarded by the Army Mobility and Equipment Center in Saint Louie, Mieeouri. Each tank holde 10,000 gallons of fuel, enough for more than 50 heli copter eorties. Tank farms of the col lapsible units can be dismantled, loaded on a single aircraft, trans ported, and erected in a new location in a matter of hours.Newa release.

Air

Force/Sm.. D{w.t

Air Force

T-41A

Force version, called the T-41A, ie deecribed as a singbengine, bigh wing monoplane with dual controle and room for two crewrnembere and baggage. Tbe new trainer cruises at 126 kn ,ts, reaches a 17,000-foot service ceili.ig, and hae a short field Iand]ng and takeoff capability.DOD release.

sPormibNUY for mmey

The MILITARY

or faetm.1 stmtamentsis Intended.-The

REVIEW and the U. S. Arau C.ammmmd d G..ersf ets@ Cdlese asmme m re of Inf.nn.tim emralncd in the MILITARY NOTS3S metion of rhrs ub. / U-tip. Item s- mrinfed m s semi- to the rend.. NOernelsl endonemmtof the view,, OPimmu,

I?ditc.r.

es

MilOsry Rovisw

MILITARY NOTES New Grenade Launchar

Anw

Nmm Feat.%

Plwtus

A new weapon for the combat soldier, one designed to couple the firepower of a rifle with the mortarlike capability of the grenade launcher, ia going into for the Army. The versatility of the combined rifle and launcher production adds a new dimension to the tactical needs and firepower of the soldier. Attached to the underside of the 5.56-millimeter XiU16El rifle (commonly celled the Ml 6), which ie widely used in Vietnam, the 40-millimeter XM148 rifle launcher will provide a combination weapon that will improve the tirepower and destruction capability of the infantrymen by offering a choice of point or area targets. Incorporating a forward moving, lighbveight aluminum barrel which locks at the bottom, tbe 2. S-pound, single-shot launcher has a maximum range of about a quarter of a mile and fires the standard family of ammunition available for the M79 grenade launcher. Hidden targete, including an enemy utilizing a corner of a building for cover, can be effectively reached by exploding a grenade just in the vicinity of the enemy. The light mortar-type weapon can be fired without impairing mobility or accuracy.-DOD release. Communications Officer Positions All communications officer positions in non-Signal Corps units throughout the Army are to be occupied by Signal Corps officers trained in communieetions-ekctronics. Directed by the Army Chief of Staff, the action revises the tables of organization and equipment of other than Signal Corps units.DOD release. Hovemtmr lae6 Miniature Generator A radio wave signal generator, the size of a grain of rice, has been developed by the ArmY. According to the report, experi ments have proved the device is highly efficient with an almost unprecedented signal etrength output in comparison to the electrical power input.DOD t release. 99

MILITARY NOTES Eaplosive Anchor Fuze A safe, reliable fuze to eet off a propellant which embede an explosive anchor deep into the ocean bottom has been designed and fabricated by the Army. The explosive embedment anchor which wiil use the fuze is being de veloped as a mooring component to replace the tremendous weight of ground tackZe required in a conven tional mooring. The 4,600-pound ex perimental anchor can do the job of conventional ground tackle weighing about 33 tonz. Incorporated in a multileg mooring zyztem, it will permit safe mooring of tankere of up to 40,000 deadweight tons under iimited sea condition, while fuei cargoes are pumped through eubmarine pipelinez to etorage tanks on chore.DOD relezze. Headquarter Merge The Department of Defense haz an nounced the merger of the two princi pal US Army Headquarters in the Federal Republic of Germany. The move, to be completed by 1 Deeember, sends the 7th Armye Head quarters to Heidelberg to be merged with Army Headquarters for Europe. The 7th &my is now headquartered at Stuttgart, about 80 milee from Heidelberg. Another move relocates Headquar ters, US European Command, from ita current Iccation in France to the vacated facilities in Stuttgart. The planned operational date in Stuttgart is 31 March 1967. The moves were brought on by the relocation of US military forces now stationed in France.Army News Features.

The Armys OV-I Mokuwk surveillance aircraft has claimed five world aviation records for a new category for land-based, turbopropaircraft weigh ing between 13,227 and 17,636 pounde.

vmtiovmle, include these recorde:

The claims, which heve been filed with the Federation Asmvuwtique Inter straight line dletance; 100-kiiometer, closedcircuit course; time to climb to 3,000 meters; time to climb to 6,000 meters; and sustahed altitude in horizontal flight.-DOD release.

100

Militvrv Review

MILITARY NOTES Man.transportable Generator A one-man powerpack capable of continuously generating 300 watta of eleetrieel power has been developed for military use. Carried on a soldiers back like a field pack, the portable Branch Study Oirected The Army ia reexamining tbe func tional areas of the Ordnance, Quarter master, and Signal Corps. Directed by tbe Army Chief of Staff, tbe studys purpose ie ~o determine if the brancbes should be realigned as equip ment maintenance/ammunition; sup ply; and communications-electronics branches respectively.-Army News Features. Balloon-Typo Satellite The Air Force recently placed a balloon-type satellite, 30 feet in diam eter, into a 640-mile-high orb]t. Pack aged prior to launch, it unfolded and was inflated in epace. .The hollow sphere is made of fine aluminum wire and covered with a thin, purple-colored plastic that dis integrataa when exposed to the auna ultraviolet raye. The satellite is the first of its khd to be put in space and will be used

Cmurec ccw90mti0n

generator burns diesel oil or gasoline to produce direct current power. Weighing 28 pounds, the generator operates so silently it cannot be heard at u distance of 100 feet. The manu facturer expects the unit to be ready for field trials early in 1967.News release. Fewer Old Soldiers The increasing etrength of the Army will reeult in more than 70 per cent of the enlisted men having less than two yeare service by June 1967 according to the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel.Army News Features. November 1966

to study pressure of solar raya, par ticle drag, rigidity of the wire struc ture, and its potential as a passive communications relay station.-US Air Force relaaae. I 101

MILITARY NOTES Esplosivo Anchor Fuze A safe, reliable fuze to set off a propellant which embeds an explosive anchor deep into the ocean bottom has been deeigned and fabricated by the Army. The exploeive embedment anchor which will use the fuze ie being developed as a mooring component to replace the tremendous weight of ground taclde required in a conventional mooring. The 4,600-pound experimental anchor can do the job of conventional ground tackle weighhg about 33 tons. Incorporated in a multileg mooring system, it will permit safe mooring of tankers of up to 40,000 deadweight tons under limited sea conditions, while fuel cargoes are pumped through eubmarine pipelines to storage tanks on shore.DOD release.

Headquarters Merge
The Department of Defense has announced the merger of the two princi pal US Army Headquarters in the Federal Republic of Germany. The move, to be completed by 1 December, sende the 7th Armys Headquarters to Heidelberg to be merged with Army Headquarters for Europe. The 7th Army is now headquartered at Stuttgart, about 80 miles from Heidelberg. Another move relocatee Headquar ter, US European Command, from its current location in France to the vazeted facilities in Stuttgart. The planned operational date in Stuttgart is 31 March 1967.

The moves were brought-en by the relocation of US military forces now stationed in France.Army News Features.

Mohawk Sets Five World Records

Department ./ D./e...
The Armys OV-I Mohawk surveillance aircraft haa claimed five world aviation reeorde for a new category for land-based, turboprop aircraft weigh ing between 13,227 and 17,636 pounde. The claims, which have been filed with the Federation Aemmmtique lnter mztionde, include these records: straight line distznca; 100-kilometer, cloaed circuit couree; time to climb to 3,000 meters; time to climb to 6,000 meters; and sustained altitude in horizontal flight.-DOD release. lM WterV Rwiew

MILITARY NOTES Man-Transportable 6enerator A one-man powerpack capable of continuously generating 900 watts of electrical power haa been developed for military use. Carried on a soldiers back like a tleld pack, the portable Branch Study Dhactad The Army is reexamining the func tional areae of the Ordnance, Quarter master, and Signal Corps. Directed by the Army Chief of Staff, the etudys purpose is to determine if the branches should be realigned as equip ment maintenance/ammunition; sup ply; and communications-electronics branches respectively.-Army News Fwtures. Balloon-Typa Satellite The Air Force recently placed a balloon-type satellite, 30 feet in diam eter, into a 540-mile-high orbit. Pack aged prior to launch, it unfolded and was inflated in space. The hollow sphere is made of fine aluminum wire and covered with a thin, purple-colored plastic that dis integrates when exposed to tbe suns ultraviolet rays, The satellite is the first of ita kind to be put in space and will be ueed

Cmufe.

Gwvmtimt

generator burns diesel oil or gasoline to produce direct current power. Weighing 28 pounds, the generator operates so silently it cannot be heard at a distance of 100 feet. The manu facturer expects the unit to be ready for field trials early in 1967.News release. Fewer Old Soldiers The increasing strength of tbe Army will result in more than 70 per cent of the enlisted men having less than two years service by June 1967 according to the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel.Army Newa Featuree. November 1966

US A<, l%,..

to study preseure of eolar rays, par ticle drag, rigidity of the wire struc ture, and ita potential ae a pasaive communications relay etation.-US Air Force rekaee. ,

101

MILITARY NOTES Missile Mentor Tests

Hu#ha

Airmuft

CmmnU

Artists ryrception of the MfiecikMentor shows the operational configuration of the electronic %mmand poti Cutaways of the vans show housing for did-state cir crdtry, lef~ and tie general purpow ronrpnter and display console% right The US Army Air Defense Com mand has started teatfng a number posta for im of new command proved coordination of surface-to-air missile defenses of US cities. The tsate involve the AN/TSQ-51 fire distribution system, called Missile comer of a Miseile Master building. The system provides commander more completa target data than before on which to base their battle decisions. Missile Msntere modular design makse it possible to enlarge its cover age by netting additional radars lo cated at great distances into the over all surveillance coverage. The initial cost of the new system ie ens-tenth that paid for the Misei2e Master eight to 10 yeara ago. Operat ing costs par year are estimated to be ona-foufih that of a Miseile Master. Fifty to 60 persons are required to operate the system compared to 200 for the MLveile Master.-US Army release. MiliiIY Review

Mentor,

a computer-controlledsemi automatic electronic complex that will

harmonize battle actions of missilefiring units within a single defense. The Miseite Mentor will replace the Missile Maeter and some of the Bat tery Integration and Radar Display Equipment (BIRDIE) systems now in use. The new solid-state circuits in the system fit into two trailer vans which would OSCUPY only a small 102

MILITARY NOTES Overtarget Movies Recent photographs of oil depots in Haiphong, North Vietnam, appearing in the press were taken by Navy air craft equipped with a new strike mo tion picture capability. All of the Navys ith Fleet aircraft carriera are equipped with the strike mopix ca pability. Since July 1965 camera-carrying pods have been installed on fighterattack aircraft operating from car riers off the Republic of Vietnam coast. The Air Force and Marine Corps also have aircraft equipped with the camera pod. The atrike mopix capability ie being used for documentation and assess ment of combat operations in south east Asia.DOD release. Air-Cushi~ Relocation of Reconnaissance Squadrons Six Air Force reconnaissance squad rons are being relocated from France ae a result of French action forcing the removal of US air and ground forces from that country. Three squadrons are being moved to bases in the United Kingdom, two are returning to the United Statee with provision for dual-baeing in the United Statee and Weet Germany, and the eixth is being deactivated ae pre viously scheduled. The US commitment of eight recon naissance squadrone to the North At lantic Treaty Organization will be met with six squadrons based in Europe and two based in the United States with alternate facilities in Europe. DOD release. Vehicle

Ee!l

Hel<amte, New.

12-ton military or cargo version of the SK-9 air-cuehion vehicle is planned for development by a US manufacturer. The cabin area would cover more than 500 square feet and be provided with an eight-foot ramp for quick removal of troops and equipment. The amphibious craft would have aide doors and an overhead hatch for shipside loading. \ Its maximnm water speed would exceed 70 knots.News item. November 19a6 103

MILITARY NOTES

FRANCE
Mirage Ill VTOL

. ... . ..

NATO.

Fift8en

Nations

Test flighte of the second prototype of the vertical takeoff and landing (VTOL) Mirage III began in June this year. The Mach 2 aircraft ie fitted with a turbofan engine rated at almost 19,000 pounds of thrust. Jet lift ie provided item. by eight jets rated at 3,600 pounde of thrust eaeh.-News

YUGOSLAVIA
MiIitsry Education
The Yugoslav Defense Ministry has announced that the training period at the three military academies (infan try, qnarterraaster, and navy) will be extended from three to four years. The introduction of new dieeiplines euch as mathematics, general and nu clear physiea, electronics, engineering, and engine technology prompted the decision. A new military academy for ad vanced technieel studks opened in September. Only officers who have graduated from the lower level mili tary technological academies and who have paesed a practical course in troop serviee are quatified to attend the new eztablishment.-News item. 104

BRAZIL
Jungle Warfaro Training Center X jungle warfar; training center hae been eatabliehed by the Brazilian Army in Manaus, in the state of Ama zonas. The first of ita khd in South America, the centers purpose is to train officers and nonconnnieeioned of ficers in jungle and guerrilla warfare. News item.

WEST GERMANY
Army Schools West Germanys Army maintains 22 schools for the training of its forces. They include 16 service schools, three schools for officers, two for non commissioned officers, and the train ing facilities for etaff officers. A third echool for noncommissioned officers is programed.News item. Militsry Review

MILITARY NOTES

GREAT BRITAIN
ET.316Air Defense Weapon System
The British developer of the ET. 916-s low-altitude, tactical air de fense missile weapon ayetemgives ,.

ALBANIA
Army To Produce Own Food

The Albanian Army is cultivating fallow land in the so-called military zones of the country, primarily in the
highland areas which have been idle for years. This action will enable the army to produce food for its forcee within the next two or three yeare. News item. Insignia Of Rank Abolished Following the example of Commu niet China, the Peoples Army of Al bania has done away with all rank and branch of service insignia. Al bania has approximately 60,000 men

Tech.olotw

Week

the missiles speed as in excess of Mach 2. The low-cost syetem mounts on a trailer.News item. Army Troops Withdrawn Three British infantry battalions and a light artillery regiment are re turning to Great Britain from the Far East. Together with minor army units, about 3,400 men are involved. The forces were deployed in the Far East to assist in the defense of Malaysia during the recent confronta tion. The move is expected to be com pleted this month.News release.

under arms and 200,000 trained re servists. The country hae more than 280 tanks, 100 aircraft, and 28 small combat vessek.-News item.

SWEDEN
Underground Bases Sweden has established three nu clear bombproof underground bases one as a war headquarters, one for civilian administration, and one for storing of essential goods. The bases air supply syetem offers protection frnm radiation and chemical agents. Sweden also hae nuclear bombproof harbors built into rock which even cruisere can anter without difficulty. A large part of Swedens munition supplies are stored /n underrock fa cilities. There are nearly 1,000 completely equipped military installations built into the rocke along Swedens coast line and at other points in the coun try. Some aremore than 300 feet be low surface. With these facilities, Sweden hopea to survive the initial effect of a nuclear attack and be able to launch a counterstrike.News item. io5

CANADA
Self.PropaHed Howitsara
The Canadian Army has ordered 50 155-millimeter Mlo9 self-propelled, howitzers, from the United States. The weapons are scheduled for deliv ery in 1966 to the Canadian artillery regiment in West Germany and a reg iment in Canada. Both are equipped with a mixture of towed 105-millimeter and 156-milli meter howitzere.News item. !40vombw waa

MILITARY NOTES

USSR
SURFACE-TO-SURFACEMISSILES

The foUowing notee Iwve been compiled from Weet German pubUcatimw. Thegdorwt emwtitutea$a owl US evaluation of Soviet eur fme-to-rfaee ?&eilee, nor do they re$ect the viewe of the DeWrtmenfi of Defense, Department of the Army, or the U. S. Army Command and Genend, Staff College.Editor. Skean
A single-etage, liquid propellant

Sasin A two-etage, liquid propellant, in

tercontinental ballistic mieeile, the Sosin wae first shown to the public iu the November 1964 Moecow Darade.

missile, Skean wae first dieplayed in in Bfoacow in November , a wade

1964. Believed to be the latest version of the medium-range ballistic missile Shyeter/Sandal development, tbe 85 foot missile reeembles the Sane!d ex cept that it has a blunt nose and no tail fins, Eetimates of tbe Skeans range vary from between 1,500 and 2,400 miles. Scrag A three-stage, liquid propellant, in tercontinental ballistic missile, also called Big Brother, Serag was first

Its length is estimated to be from 78 to 85 feet and its range between 6,QO0 and 7,500 miles. It is towed on a trailer by an eight-wheeled tractor which is aleo used for other missile systems.

Scronge
The first public showing of the Scrooge was in November 1965 where it was described as a solid mouellant.

Sd&t

.ad

T6chnik

displayed on 9 May 1965. Approxi mately 120 feet long, with a thrust estimated at more than one million pounds, it has a range of about 8,000 miles. Scrag is also used as a launch vehicle for manned spacecraft.

intercontinental ballietk miesile. It is carried on the tracked chassis of the Scamp erector-launch vehicle.

MilitcrY IWiew

MILITARY NOTES Savage

A three-stage, solid propellant, in tercontinental ballistic missile, savage was first shown on 9 May 1965 in a parade marking the 20th anniversary of Germanys defeat in World War II.

More Naval Powor

More missile-armed chips have re cently joined tbe Soviet naval forces. They are believed to include subma rines, destroyers, and fast motor pa trol boats. It is currently reported that more than 150 units of the So viet Navy are armed with guided mis siles. The number of nuclear-powered sub marines ie presently estimated at 45, thirty of which are armed with guided miseiles. Sixty Soviet submarines are believed to carry ballistic miseiles. News item. 14artbllietaamese PNota Trained North Vietnamese fighter pilots are being trained in the Soviet Union to fly supersonic interceptors according to reports in the Soviet press. The ar ticles disclosed that at leaet one de tacbmentof pilots had completed the course and returned to NOrth Viet-. nam, and that another group was still in training. Photographs in two newspapers, Pravda and Kraznaga Zvezda (Red Star), showed North Vietnamese pi lots beside MiG-21 jet fighters. R is believed that the training is being conducted at Batakk, a small city seven miles from Rostov.News item.

.%ldat ad

Tech.%

The missile may be compared to the US Minuteman. Approximately 60 feet long, Savages range is estimated be tween 6,000 and 5,600 miles. The So viets claim Savage can also be used as a launch vehicle for unmanned spacecraft.

a single-stage, solid pro pellant, mobile strategic missile, Scamp was first displayed on 9 May

Scamp Probably

SoOlat wd

Te.hnik

241MdilNmeterMortara
Only the Soviet Army presently uses mortars of as large a caliber as 240 millimeters. Considered epecial artillery, the weapons are ueed in spe $ial situations euch as combat in cities and in mountainous terrain.News item.

1965. It is incloeed in a container made in two halves, horizontally split and hinged, which resulted in the nickname, Iron Maiden. Scamp desig nates the entire weapon system in cluding the tracked erector-launch ve hicle.News items.

t40vembor t9aa

!107

BOOKS

SALUTE THE SOLOIER. An Anthology of Ik tations, Poems and Prose. Editad by Captain Eric Whaler Bush, Royal Navy. 436 Pagas. 6aorge AM & Unwin Ltd, London, Eng., 1966.$7.35. BY COL JULrAN F. PANE, British
ArmII

This excellent anthology of quota tions, poems, and prose dedicated to the courage and fortitude of the Brit ish soldier and his companions in arms in the ConxnomveaRh mid Al lied forces has been compiled by a nava} ottker, The anthology covers the period of history from Cromwell in the 17th century to the Allied operations dur ing World War II under General Dwight D. Eisenhower in Europe and Admiral Louis Mountbatten in south east Asia. It is interesting to see hk+ tory in the making through the eyes of those who made it and of their contemporaries. Throughout the book one gets a glimpse of the loneliness of command, the qualities of leadership, and the stoicism of the private soldier who, often unrecognized in the pagee of history, has made this possible. The simplicity and pathos of the epitaph on the war memorial to the 2d British Division at Kobima in As sam, India, sums up the essence of this book : When you go home Tell them of us, and sayFor your tomorrow We gave our to-day.

CHIHESE WARLORO. Tba Caraer of Fang Yii hsiang. By Jamas E. Sheridan. 386 Pages. Stanford University Prass, Ststsferd,Calif., 1966.$10.00. BY LTC FIBLOING L. GaaAvae, USA, Retired
As the dust jacket aptly remarks:

This . . . is the fi?at 88rious full length studg iw ang Zanguage of the turbulent context in which Chinese natiomdis?n and Chine8e (%nw-zunism were &nm and grew to matum.tg.
The time of the warlords was the formative period for rmmy of the kad ers who were to figure prominently in the Chinese civil war. Even today, there survive in the armies of both Red and Free China some who first learned the military trade in the ranks of the warlords. The author has made a study of one warlord, Feng Yii-heiang, the Christian General: one of the more important, more colorful, and less evil of the genre. The book gives the reader a rare insight into that intriguing and little-known period in Chinaa his tory. The first chapter is a particu larly valuable reference for the stu dent of Chinese affairs, providing a brief analysis of the peeuliar phenom enon of warlordism, its causee, course, and results. An interesting account in its own right, Chinese Warlord is especially recommended to those desiring to broaden their understanding of China today.

MIIISWS Review

MILITARY BOOKS MIDWAY: Turning Point of tho Pacific. By Vice Admiral William Ward Smith, United States Navy, Retired. 174 Pagea.Themas Y. CreweNCo.,New Yerk, 1966.$4.65. BY LTC CASSLF. BASWELL, USA
This volums is a detailed compila tion of the ships, personalities, places, tactics, and events from the attack on Pearl Harbor to the Battle of Midway. It should be an excellent reference book for the naval historian.

DETERRENCE ANO STRATEGY. By G&t6ral dftrmheAndr6 Beaufre.TranslatedFrem the French by Majer General R. if. Barry. 174 Pagas. FredarickA. Proeger,Inc.,New Yerk, 1965.$6.95. BY MAJ CHASLES L. MCNEILL, USA
As a sequel to hia first book, An to Strategy, the author introduces a new definition of deter rence in this work. His basic premise is that deterrence ie the new and com ing strategy for the 20th century. He expounds on the lawa of deterrence as he has formulated them, and then proceeds to discuss analytically the impact of these laws on the present and future international military structure.

Introduction

THE 6ATLIN6 SUN. BY Paul Wahl and Denald R. Teppel. 164 Pages. Arco Publishing Cc., Inc.,New Yerk, 19B5.$12.50. BY LTC Josarxi D. HYNES, USA
The authors have prodnced an ex cellent history of the f amoua Gatli?zg gun from its invention by Dr. Richard J. Gatling as a labor saving device for warfare in 1862 to the adapta tions of the Gatling gun principle now in rise. The Gatling gun, capable of firing at the then unheard of rate of 200 rounds per minute, saw little use in the Civil War. Later, it was adopted by armies and naviee around the world and saw action in nearly every other conflict during the last half of the 19th century. Both author% are well qualified for their undertaking. Mr. Wahl, one of Americas top firearms experts, has written numerous books and magazine articles. Mr. Toppel, a collector of arme and armor, hae devoted years to the study of the Gutling gun and is con sidered to be the leading authority on this weapon. Working parts drawings, photo graphs, and old woodcut reproductions of GatWWs in action supplement a text that is of value to the reader in terested in military history as well as to the gun enthusiast.

The author visualizes tbe worlds nuclear stockpiles ae the most power ful stabilizer man has ever known since the dawn of time. It is interest ing to ponder hla hypothesis that the fantastic price a nation muet pay, even if victorious in a nnclear war, has caused this strategy of deterrence to emerge. For the military reader, this book ia a lucid statement of a strategy that has great merit. General Beaufre has stated his caee well.

REO CNINA TOOAY. BY Huge Portiscb.Trans. Iated Frem the German by Nelnz vcn Kesch embahr. 363 Pages. Fluadrarrgfe Beeks, Inc., Chicago,111.,1666.$0.95. BY COL DOUGLASP. H~PES, USA
Thie interesting and well-written travelere diary, with some incidental economic and social data together with several fresh photographs, includes interesting detail on travel procedures and restriction. It is good light reading for the casual student of the Chineee Com munist society today. I

Novemberle68

Ice

MILITARY BOOKS THE OFFICER AS A LEADER. By General S. L A. Marshall,288 Pages, TIIe Stackpole Co,, Harrisburg, Pa., 19S6. $6.50. BY LTC H-r J. MAIHAFER, USA The Ofier ae u Leader is an up dated version of General Marshallra The Armed Forces Ofier which was ieaued as a Department of Defenee pamphlet and ueed widely ae a leader sfsip text.
The author again sets forth worth while admonitions for the young of ficer. He dfscueses with authority such eubjeeta ae The Nature of Disci pline: Keeping Your Men Informedfl ana Ueing Rewards and Punieh mente. In small doses, thie is a fine bookrich in aneedote and one that can be quoted effectively. Q 4 The latter-day disputes concerning the battJe are analyzedfor example, who was the real hero of the Maine miracle, Joffre or Gallieni, and what was the precise role of Von Moltkee emissary, Lieutenant Colonel von Hentach, in the fateful withdrawal of the 1st and 2d German Armies? On the debit side, the author does not appaar to introduce much new evidence in telling hts story, and the eeveral maps are not particularly help ful in foKowing the development of the five-day battle.

INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL COMMUNICA TION. By W. Phillips Davison. 404 Pages. Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., New York, 1965. $7.50.
BY JOHN R. CAMESON The initial chapters set forth a. framework for discussion of the com munication process. They define com munication as a procese by which meaning is transferred both within and between nations. Theee proceseee are diecuesed in the abstract and then ae applied to the internal eystems of democratic, Communiet, and develop ing natilone. The latter half of the book ie de voted to a discussion of international communication aa a means of advanc ing national policy. Communist or ganisation for euch communication is examined and contracted to that of the United States. The scope of these two discussions includes overt ae well as covert means. In the caee of tbe United States, no tice is paid to the roles played by nongovernmental organizationa. The final chapter indicates four US gov ernmental roles which the author concludes follow from the previous discussion.

THE BATTLE OF THE MARHE.By Henri Isselin. Translated by Charles Connell. Intreductien by Jehn Terraine. 304 Pages. Doubleday Fi Co., Inc.,6arden City, N. J., 1965.$5.95. BY LTC BSOOKS E. KLSBER, USAR
Most lists of the worldsgreat bat tles include the Battle of the Marne. The five-day struggle in September 1914 shattered the myth of German invincibility and saved France from the rapid conquest which had been her fate in 1870. Its indecisive outcome and the subsequent race to the esa set the scene for years of static war fare in which victories were meae ured by the few yards gained and the thoueands of lives lost. The author gathera the threads of the story, weaving together the ac tivities of firet one side and then the other. Description of the major per sonalities, who were so important to the outcome of the battle, are pafilc ularly ekillful. Joffre, Gallieni, Focb, Von Moltke, and Ktuck all come alive in thie book. 110

Military Review

MILITARY BOOKS
ABOVE THE PACIFIC. BY lieutenant Colonel William J. Horva4 United States Air Force. Foreword by Arthur Godfrey. 211 Pages. Aore Publishers,Inc.,Fallbrook,Calif.,1966. $8.95. BY LTC STANLEYM. ULANOFF, USAR

FLINTLOCK ANO TOMAHAWK: New England in King Philips War. By Douglas E. Leactr. 304 Pages. W. W. Nerton & Co., Inc., New York, 1966.$6.00. BY CPT ROBSSTM. WORCESTIp, USAR
The Indian uprising known ae King Philipe War began in the sum mer of 1675, Within a few months, all of southern New England was quaking with fear ae town after tuwn went up in smoke. Cluetered in small groups, unable to defend themselves, the settlers were ill-prepared to counter the increasingly effeetilve In dian attacks that continued through the late winter of that year and the early spring of 1676. The author, a Professor of Hietory at Vanderbilt University, hae ex amined the strategy of the Indian tribes and pieced together from sketchy eource material the reasons for early Indian success and their eventual failure.

Horvat has written a com prehensive and readable history of aviation ae it ie related to the Pacific area. He covers every aspect of sig nificancein Pacific avtaflon etarting with the first balloon ascent in 1889;
Colonel the first hietoric Mainland to Hawaii flight of Army Lieutenant Maitland and Hegenberger in 1927; and the trans-Pacitic flighte of Sir Charles E. Amelia Earhart, Kingsford-Smith, and many others. Of particular interest to the Army reader are the two chapters on tbe Pearl Harbor attack, December 7, 1941 and The Pacific Air War? 1812: EYEWITNESS ACCOUNTS OF 14AP0. LEONS OEFEAT IN RUSSIA, Compilad, Edited, and Translated by Anteny Brett. James. 312 Pages. St. Martins Press, Inc., New York, 1966.$6.50. BY MAJ ANmioNY P. DE LUCA, USA Antony Brett-James, an English historian and writer, has woven first hand accounts of Napoleons disas trous Russian venture into a detailed narrative of that campaign. The major phaees of the six-month campaign are eummariaed by the au thor, with each summary followed by first-pereon reports. Thsae reports provide behind-the-scenes viewa of the personalities and politics involved with the preparation of the Grand Army, the nearly 1,000-mile march to Mos cow, and the eventual defeat and re trsat of that army. Thie book providee interesting back ground material for instructors and students of military hktury. Novomber 19Se

THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITEO STATES: A New Appraisal Frem Washingtonte John. sari.Third Editien,Revised.By Ahzim Ethan Armbruster. 356 Pages. Horizon Press, Inc., Hew York, 1S66. $5.95. BY LTC CF. BASWSLL, USA
This comprehensive and unique work is a new approach to the in formal presentation of American his tory as it was made and influenced by the Presidenta. This book ia inter esting and easy to read. Colorful an ecdotes and accounts of family back grounds and pereonal relationships are pa~lcularly interesting. Criticiema of many of our Presi dents are often severe and serve to explode popular myths. However, the author has been objective in reporh ing the errors es well as the accom. pliehments of American Presidents.

llt

MIL17ARY BOOKS OTHER BOOKS RECEI!JEO

AIRCRAFT CARRIERS IN PEACE AND WAR. Edited by Joseph A. Skiers. 296 Pages. Franklin Watts, Inc., New York, 1966.$5.95. THE AIRSHIPS AKRON AND MA CON. Flying Aircraft Carriers of the United States Navy. By Richard K. Smith. 22S Pages. United States Naval Annapolis, Md., Institute, 1966. $12.50. THE ATTACK SUBMARINE. A Study in Strategy. By Robert E. Kuenne. 215 Pages. Yale University Pr$ss, New Haven, Corm., 1965.$6.00. THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERV ICE: Chemicals in Combat. United States Army in WorId War IL By Breaks Edward K1eber and Dale B]rd sell. 697 Pages. Superintendent of Documents, US Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C. $5.25. GUIDE TO ARMY POSTS. Revised Edition. By Editors of Armg Timee. 333 Pages, The Stsckpole Co., Harris burg, Pa., 1966.$4.95. GRANT THE SOLDIER. Edited by Thomas M. Pitkin. 88 Pages. Acrop olis Books, Washington, D. C., 1965. $4.50. UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION MANUAL 1966-67. Revised June 1, 1966.811 Pages. Su perintendent of Documents, US Gov ernment Printing Office, Washington, D. C. $2.00 paperbound. RANK AND FILE. The Common SoI dier at Peace and War 1642-1914. Compiled by T. H. McGuffie. 424 Pages. St. Martbis Prese, Inc., New York, 1964.$8.50. THE UNITED NATIONS IN THE BALANCE : Accomplishments and Prospects. Edited by Norman J. PadeI. ford and Leland M. Goodrich. 482 Pages. Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., New York, 1965. $S.60 clothbound. $2.95 paperhound. LATIN-AMERICAN MISSION: An Adventure in Hemispheric Diplomacy. By Delessepe S. Morrison. Edited and With an Introduction by Gerold Frank. 287 Pages, Simon & Schuster, New York, 1965.$5.96. THE NAVAL PROFESSION. Rear Admiral James Calve States Navy 197 Pages Mc%~~ Beok Co., N~w York, 1965.$5.50. By

THE BATTLE OF TRAFALGAR. Iard Nelson Sweeps the Sea. By Alan Villiers. 96 Pages. The Macmillan Co., New York, 1965.$2.96. THE SECURITY OF SOUTHERN ASIA. Studies in International Se curity: S. By D. E. Kennedy. 308 Pages. Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., New York, 1965.$7.50. U. S. MILITARY STRATEGY IN THE SIXTIES. By Colonel Robert N. Ginsburgh, United States Air Force. 160 Pagee. W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., New York, 1965.$4.00. UNMASKED ! The Story of Soviet Espionage. By Ronald Seth. 317 Pages, Hawthorn Brooks, Inc., New York, 1965.$5.96. THE WAR OF THE FLEA. A study of Guerrilla Warfare Theory and Practice. By Robert Taber. 192 Pages. Lyle Stuart, Inc., New York, 1965. $4.96.

112

MilitaryRhw

&

announces the selection of the following article from the September 1966 issue as a MILITARY REVIEW AWARD ARTICLE : The Military Review

Political Negotiations
Lisutsnant Colonel

in Vietnam
USA

Joe M. Palmer,

A permanent peace in Vietnam can be achieved only by resolving the underlying political problems. This will require political negotiations as distinguished from armistice negotiations. The combinsd United StatesSouth Vietnamese military operations must eventually force the Com munists to the political conference table. When begun, these negotiations will be affected significantly by several nonmilitary factors? The author discusses five of these factors, including the sovereignty of South Vietnam; serious internal problems which make South Vietnam incapable of com psting politically with the Communists of North Vietnam; and anticipa-, tion that Communist China will seek to prevent negotiations. The USSR desires to limit the spread of Communist Chinas influence, and may even join the United States in keeping the peace, once basic terms have been agreed upon. * +$ *

COMING:
Irvin M. Kent in Hard Skills and Dropouts suggests ac cspting school dropouts into a promilitary training corps, Technics] educational training in skilk nseded by the services would prepare thsss individuals for later productive military duty. In Who Rides Shotgun: Lieutenant Colonel Thomas G. Woods discusses the important problem of protection for the division support command. He recom~ mends a table of organization and equipment security unit in the support com mand to ride shotgun for these supply and service elements.

Lieutenant Colonel