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http://mo nthlyreview.o rg/2013/05/01/the-po litical-eco no my-o f-deco llectivizatio n-in-china

The Political Economy of Decollectivization in China :: Monthly Review

Zhun Xu mo re o n Enviro nment/Science , Imperialism

Z hun Xu (zhun [at] ruc.edu.cn) is an assistant prof essor at Renmin University of China in Beijing. His research interests include political economy, social development, and economic history. Decollectivization of Chinas rural economy in the early 1980s was one of the most signif icant aspects of the countrys transition to a capitalist economy. Deng Xiaoping praised it as an innovation, and its signif icance to the overall capitalist-oriented ref orm process surely cannot be overstated.1 T he Chinese government has repeatedly ref erred to the supposed economic benef its of decollectivization as having greatly increased the incentives to millions of peasants.2 Nevertheless, the political-economic implications of decollectivization have always been highly ambiguous, and questionable at best. Individual or small groups of peasants were f requently portrayed in mainstream accounts as political stars f or initiating the process, but this served to obscure the deep resistance to decollectivization in many locales. Moreover, the deeper causes and consequences of the agrarian ref orm are downplayed in most writings, leaving the impression that the rural ref orm was in the main politically neutral. A f ew works did address the political-economic aspect, but even those works were generally conf ormist analyses, presenting the usual stereotypes, and in accord with the of f icial history. One of the popular stories was that peasants wanted f reedom f rom collective controls and so they creatively and collectively dissolved their own collectives.3 A typical analysis tends to f ollow this story line: collective f arming caused years of poverty and laziness, so brave and wise peasants signed secret contracts to perf orm household f arming. Due to the powerf ul incentive ef f ects of decollectivization, agricultural production was dramatically increased. Once this was imitated nationwide with impressive results, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) had to accept this institutional innovation f rom the peasants. However, increasing evidence has shown that decollectivization did not have its acclaimed ef f ects on ef f iciency.4 T hese studies, challenging the consensus in the literature, have important implications. T he economic benef its of decollectivization, it now appears, were actually not that large. T his suggests that there were perhaps more important f actors beyond the ef f iciency and incentive aspects of f ered by conventional wisdom. In particular, a class analysis is missing f rom the mainstream stories. In what f ollows it will be argued that decollectivization served as the political basis of the capitalist transitions in China. It not only disempowered the peasantry, but broke the peasant-worker alliance, and greatly reduced the potential resistance to ref orm. T he political signif icance f or the CCP of the rural ref orm to capitalist transition cannot be overstated, and this was exactly why the CCP of f icially interpreted decollectivization as spontaneous and purely economic. Debunking the Myths Around Decollectivization Politics T here are many myths created regarding the history of decollectivization. T he two most prominent are that: (1) the whole movement was largely spontaneous and apolitical, and (2) the only people who opposed decollectivization were the cadre, rather than peasants. Since these myths are the pillars of the mainstream interpretation, they are worth critical examination. Spontaneous Movement?

Decollectivization in 1980s has been labeled as a spontaneous, grassroots collective action against the previous collectives.In this story, most peasants wanted decollectivization, and the CCP was passive in the ref orm.5 But a closer reading of the actual history reveals the opposite is true. All the anecdotes of peasants dismantling their own collectives seem to be in conf lict with the basic logic of decollectivization. T he mainstream explanation was that peasants did not agree with collective production. But as Chris Bramall argues, if the peasants were capable of organizing their decollectivization in the way they are said to have done, then collective agriculture would have been a huge success and there would have been no need f or decollectivization.6 To be sure, there were singular cases of decollectivization in small groups and isolated instances. Nevertheless it is simply ahistorical to explain the majority of cases this way. T he CCPs own report in the early days proudly claimed that decollectivization was carried out by local authorities f ollowing instructions f rom above.7 Solid evidence of the coercive nature of the agrarian ref orm can be f ound in the of f icial provincial records. Shanghai, one of the most developed regions in socialist China, in 1980 declared that it would not implement decollectivization. However, it quickly decollectivized its rural economy af ter it decided to f ollow national policy in 1982.8 Beijing also tried to maintain the collectives and resist decollectivization in the early 1980s. However, Hu Yaobang, then the CCP national secretary, criticized Beijing cadre f or this resistance in 1982. Af ter that the Beijing Communist Party Committee quickly made an announcement charging that some cadre have not f reed their minds and still had reservations on decollectivization, and urged its quick implementation.9 Yunnan Province had just 3.5 percent decollectivized production teams by March 1981. T he provincial leadership held a meeting in May in order to unif y thoughts on decollectivization, and in November advocated this model. By the end of 1981, Yunnan had more than half the teams decollectivized.10 In Z hejiang Province, the of f icial record reckons that the local leaders were not enthusiastic about decollectivization and attributed this to a lack of awareness. T he record even ref erred to discussions among the provincial leaders of the f act that maintaining the collective economy was deemed inappropriate. T hese unusual tones imply a f ierce political struggle between the local leaders and the pro-decollectivization central leaders. In August and September, Z hejiang had several cadre meetings to correct the lef tist errors in the agrarian ref orm and advocate household f arming. T he result was clear: whereas less than 40 percent had been decollectivized in June 1982, by April 1983 more than 90 percent of teams were.11 Hunan Province had a similar story with Z hejiang. T he Hunan leaders were initially supportive of collectives. However, several central leaders went down to push f or decollectivization in spring 1981. Af ter that, the provincial party secretary of f icially apologized f or his lack of understanding of the central policy and the slow pace of decollectivization. T he Hunan leaders then started the campaign, and within one year nearly 80 percent of the teams were decollectivized.12 Du Runsheng, the architect of nationwide decollectivization, revealed more inside inf ormation in his recent memoirs. Du claims that some provinces accepted household agriculture only af ter replacing their leadership; this included Fujian, Jilin, Hunan, Guangxi, and Heilongjiang provinces.13 Moreover, Du also documented how the central leaders pushed the decollectivization campaign using their authority. For example, af ter the CCP national leader Hu Yaobang went to Hebei Province and criticized their slow adoption of household agriculture, the household model was rapidly implemented.14 Hu also publicly claimed that those cadres who opposed decollectivization should just be removed.15 Pressures f rom above were also well documented in the literature.16 Even one of the leading def enders of decollectivization admitted that, although f amily f arming began as a peasant innovation that did not mean all peasant communities wanted it. But he still claimed that af ter the process most peasants appeared to accept their share of the land with pleasure.17 Some authors are clearly selective in presenting evidence. For example,

Kate Xiao Z hou quotes Shu-min Huang to show that collectivization was spontaneous, but then ignores a story in Huangs book which suggests decollectivization was enf orced by the CCP.18 It is dif f icult to say how many peasants actually f avored f amily f arming, but according to a national survey by He Xuef eng, an expert on rural issues in China, at least one-third had considerable reservations about decollectivization.19 T he CCP clearly played a crucial role in the early 1980s as the whole ref orm was rapidly implemented nationwide. Z hou claimed that no work team was ever sent down to villages to carry out decollectivization and regarded this as important evidence of the absence of state power in the campaign.20 However, several provincial records mention large-scale work teams; f or example, more than ten thousand people were sent down to implement decollectivization in Fujian Province.21 Moreover, work teams were not necessary when the existing political machine was capable. An interview about a Jiangxi Province team vividly illustrates the passive role of the peasants: T he communist Party cadre had held a meeting at the commune. T hen the team head returned and held a team cadre meeting. Cadre called the system divide the land to the households (fen tian dao hu). T he cadre didnt propagandize the system; they just held a meeting [of team members] and said this was the way it was going to be done.22 As a matter of f act, even researchers who were not necessarily supportive of the collectives also claim that the decollectivization campaign was f ar f rom spontaneous. Anita Chan, Richard Madsen, and Jonathan Unger document that, like many campaigns bef ore, Beijing indicated a decided enthusiasm to see decollectivization adopted; some local cadre who appeared reluctant to implement it f ound themselves publicly chastised f or lef tist thinking.23 T homas Bernstein admits that by 1982 the adoption of the household model became a matter of compliance with the current party line and was pushed through regardless of local pref erences.24 T his evidence challenged the view that the decollectivization was a spontaneous collective action and showed that agrarian ref orm was highly political and led by the CCP f rom the beginning. T his naturally leads to the question of understanding the resistance to decollectivization in the early 1980s. Opposition to Decollectivization Let us turn to the second dominant myth: where there was signif icant opposition to decollectivization, it came f rom cadre who were simply af raid of losing control of peasants.25 A concise phrase, of ten quoted in Chinas mainstream media, summarizing this is: T he top (leaders) agreed, the bottom (peasants) desired, the middle (cadre) blocked.26 Some cadre might not have wanted decollectivization because management would become dif f icult,27 but it is hard to believe that a majority of cadre would simply oppose the policy f rom the central leaders because of f ear of losing control. As the last section showed, opposing decollectivization was close to committing political suicide, while f ollowing the central policy could be quite rewarding. As David Z weig documents, the provincial party committee in Shaanxi province changed the leadership in Z hidan county in 1978 because of its continued support f or a radical agrarian policy (i.e., collectivization).28 In winter 1979 the new county leadership allocated land to groups and households in 90 percent of the teams in the county, and this was not an isolated case. Dongping Han also noted that Jimo county in Shandong Province was f orced to accept decollectivization, and local leaders who opposed it were removed f rom their of f ice.29 In an extreme case a rank-and-f ile prodecollectivization researcher in Hebei Province was directly promoted to the provincial standing committee of the CCP.30 Provincial-level cadre resisted decollectivization f or a short time, but as soon as they realized the intention of the central leaders, their attitudes swung f ull circle to secure their political positions.31 T here were still some pro-collective provincial leaders who were able to resist, but they could not continue supporting the collectives f or very long.32 Roderick MacFarquhar observes that rural cadres were initially unhappy about their new tasks, but soon

realized the rural ref orm could benef it them; their political skills and connections could both preserve their status and increase their incomes.33 Interestingly, Shu-min Huang also suggests that many local cadre were enthusiastically promoting decollectivization because they could then take over the collective enterprises and make prof its.34 T he experience and connections they gained as leaders of the collectives would allow them to run these f irms as their own. Huang suggests that ordinary peasants and workers in the collectives were very worried about their f uture and protested vigorously, and Han describes similar political changes.35 With decollectivization, collective enterprises were lef t under the control of the village party leaders and f irm managers who of ten then rented the enterprisesor simply bought them, despite strong resistance f rom villagers. Decollectivization disempowered peasants. T he loss of collective economic interests f ragmented their political power. Village leaders, in contrast, were able to concentrate political power in their own hands and hence gained the most f rom decollectivization. Although anecdotally we know some high-level cadre also opposed ref orm, their voices were never signif icant in the public arena.36 Some authors have tried to f ind some anti-decollectivization central leaders, but their arguments are unconvincing. Take Kate Xiao Z hou f or example; she identif ies Prime Minister Z hao Z iyang as a central leader who opposed decollectivization in 1980, but on the same page she counts Z hao as a prodecollectivization leader on another occasion in 1980!37 In f act, the CCPs dominant f igure Deng Xiaoping highly praised decollectivization as early as 1980, so it was very unlikely that any central leader would oppose decollectivization, as observed by MacFarquhar and conf irmed by Z hao Z iyang himself .38 Huang documents a story in southeast China where the higher authorities and some villagers pressured the local leader to dismantle the collective, but the leader was able to resist until 1984.39 He did not resist because he was af raid of losing control, since he would remain in a position of unchallenged power even af ter decollectivization; he simply f elt that a system that was working well should not be destroyed. T he of f icial provincial records mention reactions f rom some peasants and cadres. For example, in Jilin Province, some old Communist Party members publicly claimed that there would not be any socialism without collectivesnot to mention communism or the Communist Party! Some cadres are reported to have burst into tears when they divided f arm land and draf t animals. T hey were sincerely af raid that the merits of collectives such as economy of scale, mechanization, and diversif ied production would get lost af ter decollectivization.40 Another report f rom Luan district in Anhui Province is also illuminating.41 T he author caref ully documents two debates in 1979 among the cadre on whether they should f ollow the direction of decollectivization. T he procollective cadre raised several major critiques of decollectivization. First, they observed that leadership rather than decollectivization explained the growth in agriculture. Second, only 30 percent of the peasants who had a high level of labor and human capital wanted decollectivization. T hird, agriculture naturally required collective decision making in irrigation and f arming. T hese arguments were strong and not related to the concern of losing control at all. So the pro-collective f action actually won the f irst debate. However, under clear pressures f rom pro-decollectivization leaders, the pro-collective cadre had to make signif icant compromises in the second debate and their critiques were dismissed. T heref ore, the overall change to decollectivization was potentially benef icial f or the cadre,42 but not so much f or ordinary peasants. An award-winning pro-ref orm novel in 1981 showed dif f erent attitudes on the ref orm in a very subtle way. In it a young and educated cadre member started decollectivization ref orm; other leaders opposed him while the peasants welcomed it, and some anti-decollectivization women f irst opposed him but later agreed to his ref orm ideas.43 In this novel, the contradictions previously mentioned were solved by the leaders superman spirit: he deliberately allocated inf erior land to himself rather than take advantage of the situation. Moreover, he worked day and night f or f ree f or those f amilies with insuf f icient labor. However, the logical problem comes up again: if this leader was so charismatic and self -sacrif icing, it is hard to imagine why he could not lead peasants in collective production. T he interpretation that depicts agrarian ref orm as a bottom-up movement originating with the peasants and

opposed by local cadre is f atally f lawed. T he cadre and a small part of peasants implemented and benef itted f rom ref orm. T he average peasant was not enthusiastic, and was even opposed to, decollectivization in some cases. But the question is: If the ref orm was actually led by the CCP cadre and other advantaged groups, then what was their major goal? A brief review of the CCP party lines on agrarian relations over the last three decades sheds some light on this. Changing Political Winds Maos death in 1976 marked a new era in China. It was not long bef ore Deng Xiaoping became the most powerf ul person in the CCP central committee. Although he and his allies were longtime supporters of household production, it was not clear at the beginning that he wanted to dismantle the collective economy so rapidly. In his f amous political speech in 1978 which outlined his plan f or economy wide market ref orms, he only mentioned agriculture brief ly.44 For example, he said: Now the most important task is to increase the autonomy of f actories and production teamshow much wealth can be produced out of that!the more wealth individuals create f or the state, the more income they should receive and the collective welf are could be better.45 It was clear that he did not appreciate the Maoist collectives with egalitarian income distribution. However, his critique of collective agriculture was very general. Around this time, the CCP also passed a new resolution on agricultural development, which encouraged collectives to rely on economic incentives and raised procurement prices to increase peasants income.46 T he of f icial CCP documents concluded that the main problem with collective agriculture was a legacy f rom extreme-lef tists in the Cultural Revolution. Nevertheless, all the new policies clearly retained the collective model. In an extremely important political resolution in 1981 the CCP cadre f inally reached a general consensus on its own history.47 T his report basically settled the debates within the party and provided a f ormal evaluation of Mao and his policies. It is interesting to note that although the report criticized many aspects of the Cultural Revolution and claimed it caused huge waste and unnecessary cost to the economy, it praised agriculture, with its increased grain production, as one of very f ew f ields that had made steady growth. Along this line, some history books also held that agriculture was steadily growing in spite of the Cultural Revolution.48 Af ter the decollectivization ref orm was rapidly carried out, the collective economy began to be seen as stagnant. In a political report to the CCP 12th National Congress in 1982, Hu Yaobang claimed that as the previous lef t error in the direction had been corrected, agricultural perf ormance was immediately changed signif icantly, f rom stagnant to prosperous.49 T his became the standard description of collective agriculture af terwards. T he problem was now not only identif ied with the extreme-lef t, but also with the normal lef t. In the same national congress, Du Runsheng, head of the agricultural committee in the state council, explained: the lef t error in agriculture had been there f or more than 20 years until the responsibility system and especially bao gan dao hu (decollectivization) gave a strong f ight back; long-suppressed incentives were released and long-lasting stagnation in agriculture was changed.50 T heref ore, the CCPs 12th National Congress in 1982 started demonizing collectives, only one year af ter the CCP had praised collective agriculture f or its steady growth. However, the evaluation of decollectivization was also subject to change. Af ter 1984, grain production stagnated f or quite a while. T he CCP leaders changed their tune on this issue. Z hao Z iyang claimed agriculture needed policy support beyond decollectivization if it were to move f orward.51 Du Runsheng also downplayed decollectivization and said that agriculture ultimately depended on more technological progress.52 Interestingly, collective agriculture was not always demonized; in f act, the evaluation varied according to the political atmosphere. For example, af ter the events in Tiananmen Square in 1989, political f igures had to pretend to be a bit more lef t than they were in the 1980s. As D.Y. Hsu and P.Y. Ching discovered, the leaders began repeatedly praising the achievements of the past f orty years.53 Hsu and Ching also of f er this example:

Chinas vice-premier, Tien Chi-yun (Tian Jiyun) acknowledged that the development of the agriculture inf rastructure in the thirty years bef ore the ref orm was the main reason f or increases in agricultural production since the ref orm.54 It was also af ter the political unrest in 1989 that the new CCP leader Jiang Z emin deliberately changed the name of the household responsibility system (the standard decollectivization policy) to the responsibility system in his speech f or the 40th National Day in 1989.55 T his change, though subtle, implicitly understated the substance of decollectivization in the ref orm.56 However, as the political pressure was relieved in the early 1990s, the name household responsibility system was restored and has remained since. T his was f urther conf irmed by the report of the CCPs 15th Central Committee 3rd Plenary, in which the decollectivization of the rural economy was considered to have led, and greatly contributed to, the whole market ref orm.57 But since the new century began, the previously stabilized party line on household production has once again changed. T he leaders f orgot that they used to insist that only individual or f amily f arming can have ef f ective incentives. Now they think incentives are ef f ective when workers work togetheras long as they are wage laborers working f or a capitalist owner. T he new political argument maintains the superiority of household over collective f arming, but at the same time points out the limits of small-household f arming. As an alternative it calls f or land consolidation to reach a suf f icient scale to launch agricultural investment and more ef f icient management. Household production is now considered to be inef f icient. Of course this assessment was never mentioned in the story against collective f arming in the 1980s when small peasants were avowed to be the basis of agriculture modernization.58 T he new line was clear in the resolutions f rom the CCPs 16th and 17th Central Committee 3rd Plenary in 2002 and 2008 respectively.59 Particularly, the resolution passed by the 17th Central Committee 3rd Plenary f ocused on rural development and it encouraged peasants to trade land use rights to concentrate land f or more largescale ef f icient agricultural production. T he party line on agriculture has constantly changed over the last thirty years. T he mainstream media mostly f ollowed the changes in the party lines. At f irst, collective agriculture was good, but soon the household model was applauded. Later, the CCP and the mainstream media began to claim that in f act households were not productive enough, and advocated land consolidation. T he scale of agricultural units changed cyclically, f rom large f arms to small, then back to large. T he ownership structure, in contrast, changed monotonically, with a continuous erosion of collective ownership. Perhaps these changes in the party lines can point toward a causal explanation of the whole agrarian change. At least it makes one even more curious about the political motivations that pushed decollectivization. Causes and Conditions of Decollectivization in the Post-Mao Context Although many members of the central leadership including Deng Xiaoping were f ond of household agriculture, this is not suf f icient to explain the decollectivization of the whole rural economy. It is possible that the ref orm could have been enf orced, but it would not have been as smooth as it was. It is also unlikely that Deng and other pragmatic bureaucrats would have supported something without suf f icient conditions having been prepared. T his section will analyze the political causes of , and the conditions f or, decollectivization. T he End of Class Struggle A short time af ter Maos death, everything that sustained the Maoist society seemed to be changed. Indeed, the now endless condemnation of the Cultural Revolution activists, the restoration of the old cadre who lost power during the Cultural Revolution and the previous political campaigns,60 and the emerging scar literature (which described the destructive impacts of the previous era) all marked the political f ailure of Mao and his allies. Moreover, the bureaucrats reached out to f orm alliances with upper-level intellectuals who lost their privileges during Maos time. T he new intellectual policies such as reestablishing the national college entrance exam were ways of gaining support f rom them. As Maurice Meisner argued, Deng Xiaoping succeeded in taking

over power f rom Hua Guof eng (Maos immediate successor), based on his wide support f rom cadre, military, and intellectuals.61 Although they may dif f er f rom the past and will dif f er in the f uture, at the end of the 1970s these political f orces united under Deng on the common ground that the stable bureaucratic order shall be maintained, and that Maoist mass movements like the Cultural Revolution shall not be repeated. T his change, in the elites interests, was expressed in the CCPs political and economic policies. A resolution in the CCPs 11th Central Committee 3rd Plenary changed the central principle of the CCP f rom class struggle to modernization. T he resolution also claimed that since the errors of the Cultural Revolution had been corrected, the major political enemy of workers and peasants was gone. T his point was f urther explored in the 1981 resolution f rom 11th Central Committee 6th Plenary, as it of f icially announced that class struggle was not the major contradiction in China any more.62 Of course, this assertion was true only in the sense that the bureaucrats and their allies now enjoyed overwhelming power over the country, as their major political opponents within the CCP were already def eated. However, the workers and peasants were yet to be tamed and remained the potential enemies of the bureaucrats. T he strong push f or modernization, plus the admiration of advanced capitalist countries wealth, created an ideology that China must catch up with advanced capitalism using their scientif ic and advanced technology and management. But exactly what was scientif ic and advanced? Deng had already given the answer in 1978: the responsibility system. T his vague term included more power to management, more power to technicians and intellectuals, and stricter labor discipline with bonuses and punishment.63 In f act, capitalist-oriented ref orm was already being implemented in the urban industries since the late 1970s.64 In the minds of the CCP leaders, modernization was clearly dif f erent f rom socialism, and it was not likely to be welcomed by workers. However, these tendencies and trends had not caused immediate social conf licts. One of the major reasons was that, instead of trying to extract more f rom workers and peasants, the government pretended to compromise with them. In rural areas the agricultural procurement prices were raised dramatically and in urban areas workers got more dividends and awards.65 T hese measures were supposed to enhance the incentives of workers and peasants and indeed agriculture and light industry enjoyed f ast growth af terwards. But the honeymoon between the capitalist-minded cadre, and the workers and peasants, soon came to an end. Frustrating Urban Ref orm T he modernization program in industry was in f act a war on workers in the public-owned enterprises. Jiang Z ilong, then a worker writer, published a novel in 1979 that illustrates the conf licts between the ref ormer cadre and workers.66 In the story, a brave, smart, and newly appointed f actory director, accompanied by his very intelligent wif e (who both had been studying in an advanced countrythe Soviet Union), observed that, due to a loss of ideals af ter the Cultural Revolution, the workers were lazy and shirking their jobs. As the standard scientif ic management would suggest, they used very harsh methods towards the workers, including f iring more than 1,000 non-tenured workers to increase productivity. Many workers hated him and wrote complaints to the f actorys party secretary, hoping the CCP would save them; however, the party secretary was of the same mind as the director. In the end, highlevel leaders encouraged the director to f eel f ree to experiment, while the leaders in the f actory decided to go to an advanced country to learn more about new management techniques. What this novel described was exactly the direction of urban ref orm. Instead of increasing workers participation and political power, leaders became commanders and workers were merely disciplined to serve production. Although in this novel the goal of f actory leadership was still modernization, it could be easily changed to prof its f or the leadership af terwards because workers would have no power at all. Nevertheless, it would be f air to say that at the end of the 1970s workers power was still considerable in most cases, and even many workers who supported ref orm did not accept capitalism. Take the author of the novel as an example; although he advocated ref orm at the beginning, Jiang later rethought his position, and has publicly opposed privatization and suppression of workers.67

According to MacFarquhar, strong opposition in the 1980s to urban ref orm posed great problems f or the CCP.68 T he f ailure of urban ref orm was shown clearly in the huge def icit in 1979 and 1980 (although it did not cause immediate social tension). It was not only caused by the increased pay f or workers and peasants, but also by the large-scale imports f rom f oreign countries under the ambitious modernization programs.69 T he Chinese people were shocked by the resulting inf lation, as there had been no inf lation in the Maoist China.70 In order to balance the budget, the CCP had to close many f actories, and that caused massive unemployment.71 As a mainstream history book admitted: in the late 1980s, due to some negative ef f ects of the New Great Leap Forward on state owned enterprises, there were f iscal def icits, accelerating inf lation and chaotic economic order.72 T hus it was clear that the compromise between cadre and worker was not going to continue. First, the basic idea of ref orm was to discipline workers to make more prof its; so sooner or later the conf lict of interests would come to the surf ace. Second, even if the cadre planned to buy support f or ref orm f rom workers, they were not able to do so anymore, given the severe conditions in the cities. T he problems in the urban areas led to the f irst political and economic crisis of the post-Mao CCP. It became politically risky to proceed with the capitalist line since that would lead to direct conf rontation with workers in bad economic conditions. It was natural that the cadre turned to the rural economy in 1980.73 T he Weak Link T he CCP leaders were f ortunate in the sense that the rural economy was the Achilles heel of the socialist economy. Not only were one-third of the collectives not in good shape, but even the more successf ul ones suf f ered f rom a number of problems.74 First, even though collective agriculture had impressive achievements, the f ast growing population cancelled out many of their gains. Sulamith Potter and Jack Potter showed that, in the commune they studied, per capita distribution (income f rom work points per person) f ell f rom a high of about 180 yuan in 1962, to a level just over 100 yuan in most of 1960s and 70s, even though the gross output kept increasing.75 Although the rapid population growth due to better health care and other improvements in the quality of lif e slowed down in the 1970s, it was not suf f icient to overturn the trend. On the national level, grain production increased annually by 2.68 percent f rom 1956 to 1978; at the same time population grew annually by 1.95 percent, so there was limited improvement in per capita product despite the growth in agriculture.76 Second, there was a lack of mechanization in agriculture. Collective f arming is not necessarily more productive than individual f arming unless it has suf f icient mechanization and inf rastructure. In Maos time, a lot of inf rastructure was built by the communes, but mechanization only started to increase rapidly in the mid1970s. T hird, dif f erent historical paths led to dif f erent perf ormances in collective f arming. As William Hinton pointed out, the successf ul collectives he saw had a long history of land ref orm and military struggle against reactionaries, and in that process many strong peasant political leaders emerged and led collective production.77 Other places, such as Anhui Province, were quickly led to land ref orm and collectivization by outsiders rather than local political leaders. In those places, collective f arming was never as widely accepted by the peasants. Last but not least, the prevailing political stratif ication dampened the mobilization and organizational capacity of the collectives, which led to underperf ormance of collective f arming. In some cases, the lack of socialist superstructure reduced the peasants potential support f or maintaining the collectives. T he underperf ormance of collective f arming in many places made it an easier case f or the central authority to stress the inef f iciency of the collective regime and enf orce the decollectivization ref orm. Peasants political power was never as strong as that of industrial workers who had been through decades of experience with

industrialization and political organizing. T heref ore, the relative weakness of peasants both economically and politically made them the f irst major target af ter the f ailure of urban ref orm. Selling Decollectivization Even with a relatively less powerf ul peasantry, decollectivization was not easy. Ref orm f aced oppositions on all levels. T he strong resistance was largely due to the benef its the peasants received f rom the collectives and long-time emphasis on collective f arming during Maos time. But it turned out that the CCP indeed convinced many peasants that decollectivization would be both ef f icient and socialist. A strange blend of bourgeois propaganda and the old revolutionary slogans, the campaign was so successf ul that it deserves a separate discussion. First, the leaders always tried to f it their new policies in line with the socialist tradition. From the very beginning, the cadres were very caref ul with their language. For example, Deng and others always used the term responsibility system. It was deliberately vague because no one would reject the necessity to have people take responsibility f or their work. As a matter of f act, during the Maoist period the collectives encouraged and widely contracted small jobs to either groups or individuals, and these measures did not change the nature of the collective.78 However, radical decollectivization ref orms were hidden under this name, as if they were the same as existing small-job contracting. T he CCP also tried very hard to dif f erentiate decollectivization f rom complete privatization as the nominal ownership of land was kept collective. T his vagueness of propaganda helped peasants and cadres perceive the ref orm as still socialist and progressive.79 An interesting anecdote shows the most important agenda under the responsibility name tag was actually not responsibility per se. During the decollectivization campaign, Romanian government representatives visited China and asked whether the household responsibility system might simply be renamed the responsibility system, since the inclusion of household made it look too similar to privatization. T his suggestion was quickly rejected by the policy makers because they saw the household aspect of decollectivization as the key element in the ref orm package.80 T here was a deliberate vagueness in the two most popular terms in the decollectivization campaign: da bao gan and lianchan. T he f irst term in Chinese actually means divide the land and work on your own. However, it has another possible meaning: guarantee to work. Many people thought the term ref erred to the second meaning which clearly does not have any political implication. T he second term means linking revenue to production, which means the collectives are not responsible f or allocating income. But in the Chinese language, the term could also imply some sort of cooperative production. Again, many people wrongly believe that it ref ers to the second meaning. Second, while the cadre f ailed to buy workers support f or the ref orm, they succeeded with peasants. T hrough the transition period (19791984) peasants income increased greatly mainly due to increased procurement prices. Propaganda attributed this achievement to decollectivization. T heref ore, at least at the beginning, most peasants had positive views on the rural ref orms. Finally, in f ace of challenges f rom the pro-collective camp, the ref ormers always avoided direct conf rontation and used sophisticated diplomatic skills. For example, many pro-decollectivization reports in the early 1980s admitted that the rural ref orm could lead to eventually dismantling the collectives and restoration of petty peasant production.81 However, they only acknowledged these problems on an abstract level; on a concrete level they would only present pro-decollectivization cases. T hey also argued that a small degree of decollectivization would not really hurt socialist agriculture. In the end they would optimistically conclude with def initive support f or f urther decollectivization as the inevitable trend. Summarizing our discussions on the causes of decollectivization, the strong workers opposition directly caused the f ailure of urban ref orm, which pushed the CCP to ref ocus its attention on rural ref orm. For all the

f actors considered above, rural collectives were vulnerable to the attacks f rom the CCP. At the same time, the importance of ideology in the nationwide agrarian ref orm should not be underestimated. Political Consequences With the success of decollectivization in rural areas, the CCP could restart their urban programs, as the resolution of CCP 12th Central Committee 3rd Plenary in 1984 concluded: the rural ref orm was mostly f inished, and now the f ocus was on urban ref orm.82 Why were they so conf ident about dealing with workers at this juncture? First, the peasants ceased to be an important political f orce in China. T he decollectivization which transf ormed the organized and collective peasantry into independent and competing petty producers greatly disempowered the peasantry as a whole. T he potential threat of a peasants revolt always loomed large to the CCP leaders, who had led a peasant revolution themselves. Even a decade af ter rural decollectivization, a Chinese vice premier reportedly claimed that no one in the present regime could hold on to power if there were problems in the countryside.83 T he leaders in the early 1990s knew that if the f arms were recollectivized, it would inevitably lead to a severe deterioration in the relations between the peasantry and the party and government. T he f ear of peasant power also partly explained the leaders unwillingness to set up a f armers association, despite numerous proposals.84 Decollectivization has largely achieved the aim of disempowering peasants and the CCP successf ully eliminated one big threat to the f urther transition to capitalism. For example, they kept silent when political unrest caused by privatization and market ref orm accumulated in late 1980s. When students in Tiananmen Square were asked where the peasants were, the answer was they are all asleep.85 At the same time Deng Xiaoping assured other leaders that there were no problems with the peasants.86 Even in those riots in subsequent years, they were not as threatening as they could be if organized. Second, the traditional peasant-worker alliance was broken. T he temporary income increase in the countryside persuaded most peasants to support f urther ref orms. T here was also the long-run outcome of providing an almost inf inite labor supply to private industries in the urban areas, since af ter agrarian ref orm the CCP encouraged individual peasants to sell their labor power in the city. T he urban labor glut greatly undermined the power of the old working class in publicly owned enterprises. It was under these conditions, including mass unemployment, that f urther urban ref orm was made possible. T he peasants were not any better of f than urban workers as their own political position declined and the need f or the CCP to appease them decreased. Table 1 shows the historical changes of the ratio of urban-to-rural per capita income in Column 1. Although the peasants passiveness in the late 1980s might be explained by their satisf action that the urban-rural gap was dramatically reduced, the same logic cannot be applied to the later period when the gap widened again and f inally became much larger than it was in 1980. T he decline of the peasants political power also indirectly led to the relative decrease of state investment in agriculture. Clearly, the policy makers seemed to have f orgotten the countryside. As Column 2 in Table 1 shows, the share of rural expenditure in the whole f iscal budget declined f rom its highest level in the collective era, even af ter adjusting f or the declining rural population. Moreover, Column 3 in Table 1 shows how the rural inf rastructure expenditure share within the already small rural f iscal budget also went down dramatically compared to the collective era. Table 1. Decline of the Countryside Urban-Rural income ratio [value (year)] 19712.5 (1980) Adjusted share of f iscal expenditure on rural areas 13.7 % Share of inf rastructure building in total rural expenditure 39.6 %

1980 19811990 19912000 20012006 2.2 (1990) 2.8 (2000) 3.1 (2010) 11.8 13.2 12.8 22.7 25.3 25.0

Notes: Urban-rural income ratio is def ined as the urban per capita disposable income divided by the counterpart in rural areas. T he share of f iscal expenditure in rural areas is calculated as the share of per capita rural f iscal spending in national per capita f iscal spending to adjust f or the changing population composition over time. T he f iscal expenditure data af ter 2006 are not available due to adjustments in the measurement. Sources: Calculated based on Ministry of Agriculture, Agricultural Statistics of Chinas 60 Years (Beijing: Z hongguo nongye chubanshe, 2009), 10, State Statistical Bureau, China Compendium of Statistics 1949-2004 (Beijing: China Statistics Press, 2005), sections 19 and 30; State Statistical Bureau, China Statistical Yearbook (Beijing: China Statistics Press, 2012), sections 3.1 and 9.2. T he workers and peasants were potential opponents of capitalism, and the CCP would have been unwise to f ace the two opponents at the same time. However, af ter dissolving the power of the peasantry, the CCP could now f ace the workers alone. Even if the peasants began to experience hardship in later years, they did not have the solidarity and organization that they used to enjoy in the collective era. Conclusion T he propaganda ef f orts of the CCP tried to make the rural ref orm look spontaneous and politically neutral. Yet it is also clear f rom the changing party lines that ref orm was always a political issue. T his article has discussed the political tensions between the CCP and peasants and workers, arguing that the rural ref orm served as the political basis of the later capitalist transitions although the CCP always tried to downplay the political signif icance of decollectivization. In f act, the politics of decollectivization were made clear by Mao as early as 1962: Do we want socialism or capitalism? Do we want collectivization or decollectivization?87 In particular, he reminded everyone to never f orget class struggle. Despite the continuous depoliticization ef f orts by the CCP, China is having more and more anti-capitalist protests and movements.88 T he historical strike in Tonghua Steel Company in 2009 and the peasants unrest in the Wukan event in 2011 are only the tip of the iceberg. Although not many peasants and workers understood Maos reminders at the time, they def initely understand them now. Notes 1. Excerpts f rom Deng Xiaopings talks given in Wuchang, Shenzhen, Z huhai, and Shanghai, January 18 February 21, 1992. Published in The Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, vol. 3 (Beijing: renmin chubanshe, 1993), 37083 (in Chinese). 2. For example, see the Communique of the T hird Plenary of the 15th Central Committee of the CCP, October 14, 1998, http://cpc.people.com.cn (in Chinese). 3. T his has been suggested in many writings. See Justin Lif u Lin, T he Household Responsibility System in Chinas Agricultural Ref orm, Economic Development and Cultural Change 36 (April 1988) (supplement) S-199S-224; and Rural Ref orms and Agricultural Growth in China, American Economic Review 82, no. 1 (1992): 34-51; Daniel Kelliher, Peasant Power in China (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992); Kate Xiao Z hou, How the Farmers Changed China: Power of the People (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996); and

Licheng Ma and Z hijun Lin, T he Night of Xiaogang Village Shakes the Earth in Jiaofeng (Crossing Swords) (Beijing: Jin Ri Z hongguo chubanshe, 1998) (in Chinese). 4. Carl Riskin, Chinas Political Economy: The Quest for Development Since 1949 (New York: Oxf ord University Press, 1987); Louis Putterman, Entering the Post-Collective Era in North China: Dahe Township, Modern China 15, no. 3 (1989): 275320; Carol Carolus, Sources of Chinese Agricultural Growth in the 1980s (PhD dissertation, Boston University, 1992); Chris Bramall, Origins of the Agricultural Miracle: Some Evidence f rom Sichuan, China Quarterly no. 143 (1995): 73155; Dongping Han, The Unknown Cultural Revolution: Life and Change in a Chinese Village (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2008). 5. See its various versions in Justin Lif u Lin, T he Household Responsibility System in Chinas Agricultural Ref orm and Rural Ref orms and Agricultural Growth in China; Kelliher, Peasant Power in China; Z hou, How the Farmers Changed China; Ma and Lin, T he Night of Xiaogang Village Shakes the Earth; Wu Jinglian, Twenty Years Development of the T heory of Ref orm, in Z hang Z huoyuan, Huang Fanzhang, and Li Guangan, eds., Twenty Years of Economic Reform: In Retrospect and Prospect (Beijing: zhongguo jihua chubanshe, 1998) (in Chinese). 6. Chris Bramall, Sources of Chinese Economic Growth, 19781996 (New York: Oxf ord University Press, 2000), 330. 7. Hongqi, Selected Reports on Chinas Agriculture Responsibility System (Beijing: Hongqi chubanshe, 1984) (in Chinese). 8. Shanghai Nongyezhi Committee, Shanghai Agricultural Records (Shanghai: Shanghai shehui kexueyuan chubanshe, 1996), 3536 (in Chinese). 9. Beijing Dif angzhi Committee, Beijing Rural Economic Records (Beijing: chubanshe, 2008), 54559 (in Chinese). 10. Yunnan Dif angzhi Committee, Yunnan Agricultural Records (Kunming: Yunnan renmin chubanshe, 1998), 13839 (in Chinese). 11. Z hejiang Nongyezhi Committee, Zhejiang Agricultural Records (Bejing: Z honghua shuju, 2004), 19298 (in Chinese). 12. Hunan Dif angzhi Committee, Hunan Agriculture Records (Changsha: Hunan chubanshe, 1991), 5357 (in Chinese). 13. Du Runsheng, Du Runshengs Recollections (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 2005), 13031 (in Chinese). 14. Ibid, 131. 15. T his is conf irmed in Hu Yaobangs sons recollection, Hu Deping on the Motivations of Hu Yaobangs Ref orm, September 27, 2011,http://history.gmw.cn. 16. David Z weig, Opposition to Change in Rural China: T he System of Responsibility and Peoples Communes, Asian Survey 23, no. 7 (1983): 879900; Kathleen Hartf ord, Socialist Agriculture Is Dead: Long Live Socialist Agriculture! Organizational Transf ormation in Rural China, in Elizabeth Perry and Christine Wong, eds., The Political Economy of Reform in Post-Mao China: Causes, Content, and Consequences (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985); William Hinton, The Great Reversal (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1990); Bramall, Sources of Chinese Economic Growth; Tongxue Tan, Morality, Power, and Social Structure in the Transition of Rural Society (PhD dissertation, Huazhong University of Science and Technology, 2007) (in Chinese); Han, The Unknown Cultural Revolution. 17. Kelliher, Peasant Power in China, 105. 18. Z hou, How the Farmers Changed China, 28, quotes f rom f rom Huang Shu-min, The Spiral Road: Change in a Chinese Village Through the Eyes of a Communist Party Leader (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989), about spontaneous collectivization. T he decollectivization story is in Huang Shumins book at

162-73. 19. He Xuef eng, T hree Functions of Peoples Commune, November 14 2007, http://snzg.cn (in Chinese). 20. Z hou, How the Farmers Changed China. 21. Fujian Dif angzhi Committee, Fujian Communist Party Records (Beijing: Z hongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 1999), 189-92; Hunan Dif angzhi Committee, Hunan Agriculture Records, 53-57 (both in Chinese). 22. Reported in Hartf ord, Socialist Agriculture Is Dead: Long Live Socialist Agriculture!, 39. 23. Anita Chan, Richard Madsen, and Jonathan Unger, Chen Village Under Mao and Deng (Berkeley: University of Calif ornia Press, 1992), 271. 24. T homas Bernstein, Farmer Discontent and Regime Responses, in Merle Goldman and Roderick Macf arquhar, eds., The Paradox of Chinas Post-Mao Reforms (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), 197219. 25. Lin, Rural Ref orms and Agricultural Growth in China; Kelliher, Peasant Power in China. 26. T his phrase might have its origins in the Heilongjiang Province. See Wang Z henqi, Hu Yaobang Harshly Criticizes Blocks, Shi ji qiao no. 12 (2011): 45-47 (in Chinese). As David Kotz and Sigrid Schmalzer suggested, the kind of phrase was also used in China during the Mao era and in the Soviet Union. 27. Hartf ord, Socialist Agriculture Is Dead: Long Live Socialist Agriculture! 28. Z weig, Opposition to Change in Rural China. 29. Han, The Unknown Cultural Revolution, 156. 30. Shi Bai, Huge Promotion to Provincial Standing Committee, Yanhuang chunqiu no. 7 (2007): 611 (in Chinese). 31. Z weig, Opposition to Change in Rural China. 32. Ibid; Bramall, Origins of the Agricultural Miracle. 33. Roderick MacFarquhar, T he Succession to Mao and the End of Maoism, 1969-82, in MacFarquhar, ed., The Politics of China: The Eras of Mao and Deng (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 248339. 34. Huang, The Spiral Road, 16273. 35. Han, The Unknown Cultural Revolution, 15859. 36. Here is one story: in a meeting, an old lef tist cadre came to Wan Li (then governor of Anhui Province), saying that decollectivization was not egalitarian and was not achieving socialism. Wan f ought back with the question: Socialism or people, which do you want? T he poor man did not get the trick of the question and immediately replied: Socialism! Wan said: I want people. See Du Runsheng, Du Runshengs Recollections, 126. 37. Z hou, How the Farmers Changed China, 67. 38. MacFarquhar, T he Succession to Mao and the End of Maoism, 1969-82, and conf irmed by Z hao Z iyang himself ; see Z hao Z iyang, The Secret Journal of Zhao Ziyang (Hong Kong: xinshiji chubanshe, 2009), 138 (in Chinese). Dengs talk on rural policy was given in May 1980; it was later published in the Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, vol. 2 (Beijing: renmin chubanshe, 1994), 315-17 (in Chinese). 39. Huang, The Spiral Road, 16273. 40. Jilin Dif angzhi Committee, Jilin Agricultural Records (Jinlin: renmin chubanshe, 1993), 47883 (in Chinese).

41. Wang Yanhai, Hard to Make the First Step, Jianghuai wenshi no. 4 (2007): 11729 (in Chinese). 42. Maurice Meisner, Maos China and After: A History of the Peoples Republic (New York: Free Press, 1999), 463. 43. T he novel was written by Caiqin Z hou, it received the national award f or excellent short novels in 1981, which was the most important literature award in the early 1980s. See Caiqin Z hou, T he Innocent Country Moon, in the Peoples Literature anthology Short Novel Awards of 1981 (Shanghai: Shanghai wenyi chubanshe, 1981) (in Chinese). 44. Deng Xiaoping, Emancipate the Mind, Seek Truth f rom Facts and Unite as One in Looking to the Future, in Deng, Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping. Originally December 1978. 45. Ibid. 46. See the Peoples Daily editorial T he Force of Accelerating Agricultural Development, October 7, 1979, http://cpc.people.com.cn (in Chinese). 47. Resolutions on Some Historical Issues of CCP, f rom the CCP 11th Central Committee 6th Plenary, 1981, http://cpc.people.com.cn (in Chinese). 48. Suinian Liu and Wu Qungan, The Economy During the Cultural Revolution (Harbin: Heilongjiang renmin chubanshe, 1986), 109; Du Runsheng, ed., Collective Agriculture in Modern China (Beijing: dangdai zhongguo chubanshe, 2002), 722 (both in Chinese). 49. Hu Yaobang, Create the New Stage of Socialist Modernization, political report to the CCP 12th national congress, September 8, 1982, http://cpc.people.com.cn (in Chinese). 50. Du Runsheng, Historical Transf ormation of Rural Management, Peoples Daily, September 16, 1982 (in Chinese). 51. Yu Jiaf u, Z hao Z iyan Claims Chinese Agriculture Needs More Policy Support in His Meeting with T. Shultz, Peoples Daily, May 17, 1988 (in Chinese). 52. Du Runsheng, Rely on Technology, Improve the Agricultural Economy, Peoples Daily, April 11, 1986 (in Chinese). 53. D.Y. Hsu and P.Y. Ching, T he Worker-Peasant Alliance as a Strategy f or Rural Development in China, Monthly Review, 42, no. 10 (March 1991): 2743. 54. From the People Daily (overseas edition), June 12, 1986; cited in Hsu and Ching, T he WorkerPeasant Alliance as a Strategy f or Rural Development in China, 43n1. 55. See Jiang Z emins Speech f or the 40th Anniversary of the Peoples Republic of China, Peoples Daily, September 30, 1989 (in Chinese). 56. Wu Rong, Working f or the Central Agriculture Research Bureau, Zhongshan fengyu, no. 3 (2008): 20 22 (in Chinese). 57. Communique of the T hird Plenary of the 15th Central Committee of the CCP, October 14, 1998, http://cpc.people.com.cn (in Chinese). 58. For example, Du Runsheng, T he Responsibility System and the New Development of Rural Cooperatives, Peoples Daily, March 7, 1983 (in Chinese). 59. T he resolutions passed in the plenary are: CCPs Resolution on Improving the Socialist Market Economy, CCP 16th Central Committee 3rd Plenary, October 14, 2003, http://cpc.people.com.cn; CCPs Resolution on Some Crucial Issues in Rural Ref orm and Development, CCP 17th Central Committee 3rd Plenary, October 12, 2008, http://cpc.people.com.cn (both in Chinese). 60. Meisner, Maos China and After, 43032. 61. Ibid.

62. Resolutions on Some Historical Issues of CCP f rom CCP 11th Central Committee 6th Plenary, June 27, 1981, http://cpc.people.com.cn (in Chinese). 63. Deng Xiaoping, Emancipate the Mind, Seek Truth f rom Facts and Unite as One in Looking to the Future.. 64. Meisner, Maos China and After, 470. 65. For grains, quota price increased by 20 percent and above-quota price increased by 50 percent. See Terry Sicular, Agricultural Planning and Pricing in the Post-Mao Period, China Quarterly 116 (1988): 671 705. 66. Jiang Z ilong, Qiao Became the New Director, in the Renmin wenxue anthology, Short Novel Awards of 1979 (Shanghai: Shanghai wenyi chubanshe, 1979) (in Chinese). 67. Jiang Z ilong, Pride and Sorrow: A Recollection of an Old Worker, Tong zhou gong jin, no. 8 (2010): 1417 (in Chinese). 68. MacFarquhar, T he Succession to Mao and the End of Maoism, 196982. 69. Sometimes described as yang yue jin (Import Great Leap Forward), the earlier urban ref orm imported some very expensive machinery to build new f actories. 70. Meisner, Maos China and After , 470. 71. Ibid, 471. 72. Wu, Twenty Years Development of the T heory of Ref orm. 73. Meisner, Maos China and After , 471; Wu, Working f or the Central Agriculture Research Bureau. 74. Du Runsheng, T he Rural Responsibility System and Rural Economic Ref orm, Hongqi (Red Flag) no. 19 (1981): 383 (in Chinese). 75. Sulamith Potter and Jack Potter, Chinas Peasants: The Anthropology of a Revolution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 15879. 76. Calculation is based on State Statistical Bureau, Statistics of China in 55 Years (Beijing: Z hongguo tongji chubanshe, 2005), section 3, 39 (in Chinese). 77. Hinton, The Great Reversal. 78. See the critique on decollectivization in Expose the Real Nature of Decollectivization, Peoples Daily, November 2, 1959 (in Chinese). 79. Most political bulletins/pamphlets on agriculture at that time termed all the decollectivization measures as some kind of responsibility system under socialism. For example, see Wu Xiang, Shining Road and Single-Log Bridge, Peoples Daily, November 5, 1980 (in Chinese). 80. Wu, Twenty Years Development of the T heory of Ref orm. 81. For example, see Wu Xiang, Shining Road and Single-Log Bridge, Peoples Daily, November 5, 1980 (in Chinese); and Du Runsheng, T he Rural Responsibility System and Rural Economic Ref orm. 82. CCPs Resolution on Economic Structural Ref orm, CCPs 12th Central Committee 3rd Plenary, October 20, 1984, http://cpc.people.com.cn (in Chinese). 83. Bernstein, Farmer Discontent and Regime Responses. 84. Ibid. 85. Clemens Stubbe-stergaard, Introduction, in Jrgen Delman, Clemens Stubbe-stergaard, and Flemming Christiansen, Remaking Peasant China: Problems of Rural Development and Institutions at the Start of the 1990s (Aarhus: Aarhus University Press, 1990).

86. Bernstein, Farmer Discontent and Regime Responses. 87. Mao repeated this many times. See Pang Xianzhi and Jin Chongji, eds., A Biography of Mao Zedong: 19491976, (Beijing: Z hongyang Wenxian chubanshe, 2003), chapter 30 (in Chinese). 88. Minqi Li, T he Rise of the Working Class and the Future of the Chinese Revolution, Monthly Review 63, no. 2 (June 2011): 3851.