6.

MORE LIGHT ON OLD RELIEFS: NEW KINGDOM EGYPTIAN SIEGE TACTICS AND ASIATIC RESISTANCE
by Aaron A. Burke

a pleasure to celebrate the career of Lawrence E. Stager by adding to the discussion of New Kingdom Egyptian reliefs and their importance for the archaeology and history of the Levant, building upon Larrys own contribution to this subject (Stager 1985).1 Although some scholars have identified such reliefs as part of a more or less historical narrative (Gaballa 1976:12728), others have taken a more minimalist approach concerning their historical value. Donald Redford, for example, has suggested that the post-Kadesh war reliefs, which depict the siege of Levantine towns, do not constitute a reliable source for the reconstruction of historical details of individual campaigns (Redford 1992:186). While it is essentially correct to state that these illustrations do not add historical detail to the brief textual accounts that accompany them, they do supply an important source of information about sieges in the Levant during the Late Bronze Age, contributing to our understanding of the cultural practices of the period. To a lesser extent, the reliefs also illustrate Egyptian siege tactics. I will attempt, therefore, to demonstrate that a nuanced study of these reliefs yields further insights into both Levantine and Egyptian customs, specifically as they pertain to the conduct of warfare during the Late Bronze Age. Even though various stock motifs were obviously employed in the carving of these reliefs, several distinct themes related to Egyptian New Kingdom siege warfare can be recognized among the motifs used. When these themes are supplemented by Egyptian New Kingdom sources that record sieges, such as Thutmose IIIs annals, the nature of Egyptian siege tactics and Asiatic responses to them can be quite well understood.2
T IS

Stagers work was done in conjunction with that of the late Frank Yurco (1977; 1986) during the years that Stager was at the Oriental Institute in Chicago. Yurco also attempted to shed light on the identity of ancient Israel using evidence from New Kingdom reliefs (Yurco 1990; 1997). 2 I have chosen the term Asiatic to avoid using the term Canaanite, because the towns depicted in these reliefs fall within a larger geographical region than Canaan proper. Similarly, because some of these towns had ethnically mixed populations, it is not possible to refer to their inhabitants simply as Amorites.

Several observations must be noted that are fundamental to the arguments set forth in this article. First, while New Kingdom reliefs that depict the siege of Asiatic towns do employ the repetition of stock motifs, these motifs were used in regularly defined combinations. Thus, as I shall demonstrate, these combinations very nicely illustrate the progression of a successful Egyptian siege. Second, while scholars often assume that those conducting a siege, in this case the Egyptians, had the upper hand over those being besieged, the preponderance of historical data from the pregunpowder era suggests that defenders had a better chance of thwarting a siege than historians and archaeologists often assume. It is easy to place undue emphasis on a selected set of textual sources, such as the writings of the biblical prophets, the Assyrian annals, or accounts of Alexander the Greats campaigns, when attempting to assess the probable success of a besieging army. Such sources are useful only to illustrate the effects of a successful siege. Too few accounts are preserved of failed, protracted, or aborted sieges to provide a balanced picture of the frequency with which sieges succeeded. Indeed, archaeological and historical evidence over the course of thousands of years suggests that sieges were often thwarted. Convincing evidence of this can be drawn, for example, from the work of Aeneas Tacticus (1990), a fourth-century B.C.E. Greek author whose work remains mostly unknown to Near Eastern scholars. A comparison of the prescriptions set forth in Aeneass How to Survive under Siege (hereafter Siege) with the details of Asiatic towns and their defenders shown in New Kingdom reliefs, demonstrate the value of his work. Aeneass writing should be regarded as a collection of ancient wisdom on the art of siege warfare, much of which can probably be traced back to the conduct of siege warfare in the Near East during the Bronze Age. Finally, it must be remembered that what is not portrayed in any of the Egyptian reliefs or textual accounts is a failed siege. This bias in the Egyptian sources has resulted in the widespread assumption that the offensive force always had the upper hand. As will be shown in what follows, this does not appear to have been the case in the Late Bronze Age Levant.

58 Motifs in New Kingdom Siege Scenes

Aaron A. Burke A bull, O Balu, we shall sanctify, a vow, (O) Balu, we shall fulfill; a firstborn, (O) Balu, we shall sanctify, a tp-offering, (O) Balu, we shall fulfill, a rt-feast, (O) Balu, we shall offer; To the sanctuary, (O) Balu, we shall ascend, th(at) path, (O) Balu, we shall take. [Pardee 1997b:28485] This prayer illuminates in a profound way the principal iconographic evidence for Asiatic religious worship, namely, the Egyptian reliefs discussed here. The second motif illustrates individuals, presumably Asiatic priests, raising incense burners (or chalices?) to Baal in the manner described in the texts above. Only one individual is usually shown in a given relief in which the motif was used, which also supports the suggestion that this individual should be identified as a priest.4 However, the priests were not depicted in a way that distinguishes them from other male inhabitants of the town. The priests are also never depicted alone; rather, they are followed by one or more worshippers whose hands are raised in supplication. Unfortunately, it is impossible to determine whether the vessels held by the priests in these reliefs are metal or ceramic. The third motif consists of Asiatics brandishing various sorts of weapons against Egyptian soldiers who have either surrounded the town or have begun to scale the fortifications. Although in most scenes the individuals are depicted wielding the same type of weapon, other scenes reveal a more nuanced picture of siege warfare at this time. In some scenes, for example, weapons brandished by the Asiatic defenders include not only spears, bows, and shields, but even stones and sails. The dropping or throwing of stones reveals a level of desperation among the defenders that is not evident with the use of the other weapons. This activity may also support the conclusion that protracted sieges often left the defenders with a limited supply of missiles. Conspicuously absent from this motif is any evidence for the use of the sling by Asiatic defenders. Although the reason for this is impossible to determine, we may speculate that this was due to the inherent difficulty of using this weapon within the confined area atop the city wall. An unusual feature that appears in some of these reliefs, such as in the scenes of the siege of Dapur (see Wreszinksi 1935:pls. 78 and 109), is what appears to be a sail. It is depicted as a triangular sheet flying from a mast above the city (see figure 2). Its purpose was
4

Four primary motifs were used in Egyptian New Kingdom siege scenes to represent the activity of Asiatics within their besieged towns (see table 1).3 These include Asiatics (1) praying with upraised arms, (2) making offerings, (3) defending their town with a variety of weapons, and (4) lowering children from the city wall. Despite the manner in which they are rendered, these motifs should not be thought to depict events that occurred simultaneously or took place atop the walls in plain sight of the Egyptian army. Egyptian artistic conventions must be taken into account; the artist does not distinguish activities that took place within the city from those that occurred atop the walls. The activities related to religious practices probably took place within the city itself. These scenes are especially significant because they are the only depictions of Asiatic religious customs that we possess from the Late Bronze Age, unless examples of banquet scenes are also construed as cultic ceremonies (see Ziffer 2005). The first motif, which consists of Asiatics with upraised arms, was obviously employed to depict Asiatics praying to their gods, presumably in order that their city would survive the Egyptian siege. A parallel for praying and grieving atop city walls is found in the Kirta Epic, where King Kirta is commanded by the god El (Ilu) to: Climb to the summit of the tower, yes, climb to the summit of the tower, mount the top of the wall. Raise your hands heavenward, sacrifice to the Bull, your father Ilu. Bring down Balu with your sacrifice, the Son of Dagan with your game. [Pardee 1997a:334] Thanks to another Ugaritic text we are even able to describe the specific rituals associated with climbing to the top of the wall during a siege. This text (RS 24.266) has been identified as a Prayer for a City under Siege (Pardee 1997b:283). Following the prescriptions for sacrifice are the words of the prayer that was to be recited: O Balu, if you drive the strong one from our gate, the warrior from our walls,
3

While the reliefs examined include many of the Canaanite siege scenes of the New Kingdom, this paper does not attempt to provide an exhaustive study of such scenes.

See Wreszinksi 1935:pls. 94 and 95 for an example of several priests with incense burners.

More Light on Old Reliefs Table 1. Motifs in Scenes of the Siege of Asiatic Towns in New Kingdom Reliefs
Pharaoh Sety I Town name Yenoam Wreszinski plate(s) 36 Upraised arms
x

59

Making offerings
x

Defending with weapons

bows

Lowering children

Gate fallen
x

A massive battle with chariots is depicted to the right of the city.

fort of Sile 39
Town is untouched.

Ramesses II

Kadesh 1 Kadesh 2 Sibat Ikati Kwt Isr Itr k []rd Mutir damaged Krmyn []mw I[pk] Iy unnamed unnamed Dapur Mutir Satuna unnamed unnamed unnamed

53 84, 101 56
Town has two ramparts.

Scene shows siege in progress. shields, bows, spears, daggers, sail

shield n/a

child

56
Window askew.

[x ]

55a (lower left) 55a (upper right) 55a (lower right) 55

Name is damaged.

shield

Upper part of scene is too damaged to read.

n/a n/a

x x

55 54a (lower right) 54a

n/a n/a ? 54a (upper left) Name is damaged; only the lower portion of the scene is legible.

54a (upper right) 54

shield

Name is damaged; town erased.

x spears Upper portion of scene is missing; townss troops are seen marching in. x x x

57a 57 78, 109 71 6667 65 163164a 165168

Scene is damaged.

[x ] x

Lower portion of scene is damaged. stones, spears shields, bows, sail Spears (pl. 78) or arrows (pl 109) through mast of sail; women hanging from walls (pl. 109).

bows

Defenders mistakenly shown as Libyan.

bow

Landscape shown with trees cut down.

x x
?

x x

spears, sickle sword, hot oil?, sail spears, sail

teen and child

Merenptah Ramesses III

Ashkelon unnamed

58 9495

Siege ladders are shown in this scene.

Cutting down trees; axes on gate.

towns in the 14647 land of Amurru

Source: Wreszinski 1935. Brackets [x] indicate damage to a portion of the relief.

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Aaron A. Burke earliest evidence for Canaanite child sacrifice (Morris 1995:23132). Child sacrifice was certainly practiced during the Iron Age among the Phoenicians, the descendants of the Late Bronze Age Canaanites, as has been demonstrated textually by Paul Mosca (1975) and archaeologically by Lawrence Stager (1980).6 But the New Kingdom Egyptian reliefs do not necessarily depict child sacrifice in Canaan during the Late Bronze Age. None of the Asiatic males shown releasing these children was equipped to offer a sacrifice. Merely dropping them would not have constituted a religious act of sacrifice by Canaanite standards. Sacrifices had to be burned and/or cut (see Mosca 1975). Since neither an offertory fire nor a knife is evident in these scenes, the sacrificial interpretation seems unlikely. If the artist had intended to depict a child sacrifice, he would more likely have shown this occurring within the city rather than over the sides of the walls. A more appropriate parallel for the motif discussed by Morris is to be found on an ivory plaque from Ugarit, which depicts an individual pointing a dagger at the head of a prisoner while grasping his hair in his other hand (see, e.g., Yadin 1963:208). Nevertheless, I agree with Morris that the origin of the Phoenician rite should be sought among the Canaanites of the Late Bronze Age, and it would not be difficult to imagine the evolution of the sacrifice of the firstborn, the tp-offering, and/or the rt-feast into child sacrifice over time and under certain conditions. There is also evidence from the annals of Thutmose III that supports a straightforward interpretation of these scenes as depictions of children being lowered to safety over the town walls. During the Battle of Megiddo at the start of Thutmoses reign, it appears that Asiatics fled before the Egyptian army into the walled town of Megiddo and the gates were closed behind them; however, some lagged behind and could not enter because the gate had been closed. As they reached the walls, efforts were made to hoist them up into the city using garments (Lichtheim 1976:32). It is possible, therefore, that the motif of Asiatics lowering children over the walls during the last stages of a siege was an effort to depict parents lowering their children to safety once the defenses had been breached, reversing the operation of raising stragglers into Megiddo during Thutmose IIIs siege.7
6

apparently to defend against arrows shot into the city by the besiegers. Arrows are shown stuck in the sail in one scene of the Dapur siege (ibid., pl. 109); but spears, which can be identified due to the absence of fletching,5 are shown in the other (ibid., pl. 78). The Egyptian artists were evidently confused about the purpose of the sail because spears could not have been thrown so far and high. This confusion is understandable since it is unlikely that the artists personally witnessed the siege. When the sail is shown pierced by arrows, both Asiatics and Egyptians are shown using bows, although the Egyptians are also accompanied by a few spear-wielding Asiatics. However, when the sail is shown catching spears, the defenders themselves are seen wielding only spears and rocks, and no bows at all are present in the scene, except for that of the larger-than-life pharaoh off to the side. Another sail is depicted in the illustration of Kadesh at Abu Simbel (Wreszinksi 1935:73). In this relief, the defending Asiatics brandish spears, which they hold verticallya clear indication that the siege had not yet begunwhile a sail flies above their citywithout any missiles stuck in it. The defenders are prepared for an attack that has not yet been launched. The appearance of a sail in these siege reliefs has not to my knowledge received special attention, but it finds a striking parallel in the treatise of Aeneas Tacticus in the fourth century B.C.E., who refers to the use of sails to thwart incoming arrows, among other things (Siege 32.1, 810). Such a device certainly shielded defenders against incoming arrows but it would also have screened the defenders so they could move along the wall without being seen, as for example during Alexanders siege of Tyre (Arrian 2.21.17). These Egyptian reliefs provide the earliest evidence for this practice, which was in use as early as the thirteenth century B.C.E. While the identification of the three motifs discussed above is fairly straightforward, the fourth motif is more ambiguous. It depicts children (identified as such by the relatively smaller size of the figures, who are usually also depicted naked) being lowered over the sides of the city walls by male Asiatic inhabitants of the besieged cities. This is the rarest motif in the ensemble of siege scenes, suggesting that this practice was less often observed during sieges. Because of the enigmatic nature of this motif, it has been the subject of some debate among scholars. Sarah Morris, for example, has suggested that it is the
5

Fletching, the use of feathers at the end of an arrow to stabilize its flight, is characteristic of depictions of arrows in New Kingdom scenes.

I thank my colleague, Sarah Morris, for calling her article to my attention in the course of preparing this article. 7 For a much later example of this, see the episode of the apostle Paul being lowered out of Damascus through an opening in the wall in an effort to avoid the citys gates, which were being watched by his enemies (Acts 9:2325).

More Light on Old Reliefs Employment of Motifs in Themes of Siege Warfare In order to understand what these four motifs were intended to convey, it is necessary to consider the four identifiable combinations or themes in which these motifs were employed. These four themes reveal four discrete stages through which an Egyptian siege of an Asiatic town progressed: (1) the town prior to the start of a siege; (2) a town in the throes of resisting an Egyptian siege; (3) the final moments of a failing resistance; and (4) an abandoned, perhaps destroyed, town following a siege. The first of these themes, depicting the town prior to the onset of the siege, is characterized by the relative insignificance of the Egyptian army in comparison to the town itself (figure 1). The focus appears to be the prayers of the Asiatic defenders. There is no evidence within the scene that indicates that a siege is underway. This fits with the idea that early New Kingdom siege tactics relied on blockades rather than brute force. This was the case, for example, at Sharuhen and Megiddo (Hoffmeier 1989:183). The motif always employed in this theme is that of the Asiatics with arms raised in prayer. Occasionally, they are accompanied by a male figure, probably a priest, who looks heavenward and raises an incense burner in front of the towns supplicants.

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The offering of such prayers has often been mistaken by Egyptologists to be a sign of Canaanite submission and thus an indication of a completed siege. But the act of prayer should be viewed from the perspective of Asiatics as a sign of continued defiance, revealing their hope that their gods would indeed still deliver their city. This is especially likely in light of the fact that the motif occurs in each of the first three themes and never occurs in the fourth theme that presents the destroyed town. Prayer must, therefore, be viewed as an act of resistance, because it occurs in all three themes that depict stages of the siege prior to the destruction or abandonment of the city. The Asiatics in these scenes seem to be carrying out West Semitic (Amorite) religious rites, which as noted above, may well have followed the liturgy of the Ugaritic prayer for a besieged city. The theme is also reminiscent of Moses raising his arms during the battle between the Israelites and the Amalekites (Exod. 17:813). The only noteworthy variant to the very standardized employment of this theme is the addition in one scene of a towns troops (those of Iy) returning to it in anticipation of the siege that would follow (Wreszinksi 1935:pl. 54). The second theme, which presents the second stage of Egyptian siege warfare, shows armed Asiatic resistance to a siege that is fully underway (figure 2).

Figure 1. An undamaged town (here Yenoam) prior to the start of a siege

after Wreszinksi 1935:pl. 36

Figure 2. A town (here Dapur) resisting a siege

after Wreszinksi 1935:pl. 109

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Aaron A. Burke motif) behind their priest(s), who raise(s) an incense burner heavenward (second motif) as children are lowered over the walls of the city (fourth motif). How was the motif of the child descending outside the wall intended to be understood within the progression of the siege? As I have argued above, it would seem that the Asiatics are attempting to lower their children over the walls to aid their escape from Egyptian soldiers who had by now entered the city, fearing that their children would be sold into slavery in Egypt or a distant land. The fourth and final theme is that of the devastated Asiatic city (figure 4), showing the successful culmination of an Egyptian siege. In this theme an abandoned town is often illustrated by means of a collapsed gateway (specifically by its fallen lintel), a symbol of the Egyptian conquest. It is striking that no additional efforts were made to depict this stage. This may be due to the nature of Egyptian siege tactics, which did not necessarily entail the complete destruction (that is, burning or leveling) of conquered cities (Hoffmeier 1989). The Egyptian reliefs would appear to support James Hoffmeiers argument that the lack of specific references to the destruction of Canaanite towns during the early Eighteenth Dynasty, especially before the reign of Thutmose III, indicates that the Egyptians did not pursue a policy of eradicating the fortifications of Levantine towns, as a number of scholars have claimed (e.g., Gonen 1984), because in the siege reliefs each conquered towns walls are shown still standing. Although each of the sieges depicted in New Kingdom reliefs appears to have culminated in an Asiatic defeat, the focus was intended to be the nature of Asiatic resistance rather than Egyptian siege tactics.

The first three themes represent a process of motif accretion, whereby a new motif is added to the previous theme, thus forming a new theme and illustrating the progress of events. In the case of the second theme, for example, different signs of armed resistance are added to depictions that include, as in the first theme, individuals with arms raised praying and priests raising incense burners before worshipers. In the second theme, armed resistance to the Egyptian siege is illustrated in its varied forms, from the simple act of brandishing shields (sometimes simply clutched in the hands of Asiatics falling from the walls) to the firing of arrows, hurling of spears, and throwing of stones. Usually, only one of these means of defending the town is shown in order to depict Asiatic resistance, but in the most dramatic example of such resistance, the siege of Dapur (figure 2), every form of armed resistance possible was employed, from stone to sail. In the third theme that I have identified, the siege has reached a critical turning point in which Egyptian victory is seen as imminent by the inhabitants of the town. Egyptians are sometimes shown scaling ladders that have been raised against the town wall for the final assault, as in the siege of Ashkelon (figure 3), but the Asiatics are no longer shown brandishing weapons to resist the attack, despite the fact that the siege operation is still underway. Instead, the towns inhabitants stand with their arms raised in prayer (first

Figure 3. A desperate town (here Ashkelon) in the final moments of a siege

after Wreszinksi 1935:pl. 58

Figure 4. An abandoned town (here k) symbolized by a fallen lintel

after Wreszinksi 1935:pl. 55a

More Light on Old Reliefs As I have discussed elsewhere (Burke 2008:2546), the offensive and defensive siege tactics in use during the Middle and Late Bronze Ages are not only textually attested but are visible in the archaeological record, which provides evidence of both the weaponry and the casualties of such warfare. The Egyptian reliefs are exceptional in providing a narrative of the successive stages of siege warfare and, at each stage, the besieged Asiatics actions and culturally determined modes of resistance, from prayers to their gods, to vigorous fighting with all the means at their disposal, to a final desperate concern for the safety of their children. The four artistic themes we have examined, and the four basic motifs used in them, are thus a valuable iconographic source for the study of Late Bronze Age warfare in the Levant and the human and cultural reality expressed within it. The Conduct of Egyptian Siege Warfare during the New Kingdom Unfortunately, these New Kingdom scenes reveal little about the specific Egyptian tactics that precipitated the various Asiatic responses discussed above. Egyptian archers and slingers are depicted firing into the besieged city, which is something that is not described in texts. In a few instances, soldiers are seen hacking at town gates with their axes. But Egyptian siege practices are otherwise rarely depicted. Curiously, only scaling ladders are ever shown raised against a towns walls, despite the fact that iconographic sources from the First Intermediate Period and the Middle Kingdom demonstrate that the Egyptians were familiar with both the siege tower (Gaballa 1976:fig. 3) and the mantelet (Newberry 1894:pl. 5). To understand these scenes they must be placed within the context of Egyptian siege practices, which are attested in textual sources. The absence of depictions of Egyptian siege tactics combined with the lack of textual detail regarding Egyptian sieges at the start of the Eighteenth Dynasty have led scholars like Donald Redford (1992:219) to suggest that before the Ramesside period, New Kingdom siege techniques were unimpressive. Sieges undertaken during the reign of Ahmose, which would have included actions against Avaris8 and Sharuhen, he has called notoriously inept (ibid., 138139),
8

63

presumably because of the long duration of these sieges. But it is impossible to formulate such definitive conclusions on the basis of the absence of siege scenes of the Ramesside type during the early New Kingdom. Would one likewise refer to Assyrian battlefield tactics as notoriously inept because we lack depictions of Shalmaneser IIIs defeat of the Levantine coalition or the fact that four attempts were required before he succeeded? In light of the pervasiveness of this view of Egyptian siege tactics, several factors must be taken into consideration when assessing the Egyptian capacity for siege warfare during the New Kingdom. In the first place, towns in the Levant were by the end of the Middle Bronze Age exceedingly well prepared to withstand siege warfare, being encircled with massive ramparts and walls (Burke 2008:4784). Only the smallest and most recently founded settlements had poor defenses. It should not be surprising, therefore, that the Egyptians were unable to subdue the southern Levant in a blitzkrieg following the fall of Sharuhen. As it is, over a period of decades they were quite successful. It is in this period, probably in the early fifteenth century B.C.E., that we must date the destruction of at least 26 towns in Canaan, which all evidence indicates should be attributed to the Egyptians (see Weinstein 1981). While the Egyptian advance was probably delayed at first by what remained of Middle Bronze Age fortification systems,9 the Egyptians also faced sporadic resistance in open battles, as occurred at Megiddo. But after the Battle of Megiddo, the Canaanites seem to have been unable to come to the aid of their neighbors during what were no doubt a number of protracted Egyptian sieges lasting several years. Moreover, Egyptian siege tactics no doubt improved year by year throughout this early period, perhaps
9

A close reading of The Autobiography of Ahmose son of Abana suggests that the expulsion of the Hyksos from Avaris involved a protracted siege that included various actions in and around the city itself, which may have lasted for some time (for a recent translation, see Redford 1997:15).

It is impossible to adequately address here Rivka Gonens contention that most Late Bronze Age settlements in the southern Levant were unfortified (1984). But it must be remembered that the inherent difficulty in distinguishing between late Middle Bronze and early Late Bronze Age remains is partly to blame for the confusion regarding the nature of Late Bronze Age defenses. To date, no one has provided an extensive review of the archaeological data relevant to this question. At this point, therefore, I would only suggest, in the wake of my detailed assessment of Middle Bronze Age fortifications (Burke 2008), that the data are far more ambiguous than Gonen suggested. Gonens suggestion may, in fact, have served as the impetus for the subsequent and misleading assertion by Ram Gophna (1977), Israel Finkelstein (1992), and Shlomo Bunimovitz (1992) that even the Middle Bronze Age rampart fortifications lacked fortification walls. For a review of the problems inherent in that notion, see Burke 2008:1215.

64

Aaron A. Burke ruled out (irrigation, burial chambers, etc.), they were most likely used to allow the besieged inhabitants of the site to escape secretly into the countryside and perhaps to smuggle in provisions and spies (Burke 2008:232ff.).

aided by lessons learned in their Nubian campaigns. It is quite possible, in fact, as Hoffmeier and a number of other scholars have contended, that Canaan only became Egypts military objective after the subjugation of Nubia, which began during the last half of the sixteenth century B.C.E. (see Hoffmeier 2004: 12425). Thus, it was only during the reign of Thutmose III that the Egyptian conquest of Canaan was fully accomplished, building on the earlier subjugation of key centers that controlled access to Canaan, namely, Avaris and Sharuhen. The Egyptians rapidly growing aptitude for siege warfare, which reached its apex during Thutmoses reign, resulted in an impressive campaign against the extremely distant city of Carchemish, during which he had boats hauled from the Lebanese coast overland in order to cross the Euphrates River (Redford 1992:15355). A final factor that must be taken into account when considering the slow pace of the Egyptian imperial advance through the Levant is the considerable advantage enjoyed by the besieged, for which there is extensive historical evidence. Abundant classical sources support the conclusion that the besieged inhabitants of fortified towns often survived sieges and outlasted their besiegers (see examples in Kern 1999). The extreme length of the siege of Sharuhen, which lasted three years (Lichtheim 1976:13), shows that the defenders could hold out for a very long time and their Egyptian besiegers could not succeed (at least in this case) without unusual persistence. Although the Egyptians eventually succeeded in subduing Sharuhen, the first two years of the siege must be considered Canaanite victories because this siege would actually have constituted at least three separate engagements, in the spring and summer each year, with a hiatus in the winter (see Redford 1992:129). If indeed Tell el-Ajjul is to be identified with Sharuhenand I would argue that it is10evidence of the towns resistance to the Egyptian siege, specifically their efforts to establish a clandestine exit from the site, is found in two tunnels, the so-called Upper and Lower tunnels, that were dug from the exterior, eastern edge of the fosse on Ajjuls eastern side (figure 5). Since all other functions of these tunnels can be
10

Figure 5. Plan of Tell el-Ajjul showing the location of escape tunnels (after Petrie 1931:pl. 45) What, then, accounts for the overall success of Egyptian siege tactics after the reign of Thutmose III? It is often assumed that success is not the result of direct assault; hunger and disease must have overtaken the besieged, who had to choose between starvation and surrender. But none of the defenders of these Asiatic towns is depicted as starving or emaciated. The evidence concerning siege warfare in antiquity suggests that it was ultimately a numbers game that involved three main variables: time, the availability of resources inside the city, and the size of the attacking force. Although it is usually assumed that time was on the side of the besieging army, this is clearly not the case when one considers that the army had a limited supply of food, most of which was drawn from the countryside during the period

For the clearest argument for the identification of Tell elAjjul as Sharuhen, see Kempinski 1974. Although some details of Kempinskis argument could be further refined, Ajjul is the best candidate in the southern region. Tell elFarah (South) was smaller, more poorly defended, and situated in a marginal region farther from the main communication and transportation routes. The identification of Ajjul with Sharuhen is further supported by the presence there of an Eighteenth Dynasty administrative center (see E. F. Morris 2005).

More Light on Old Reliefs between spring and fall, the only time of the year during which it was possible to conduct a successful siege. (There is no evidence that ancient armies ever planted and harvested their own crops.) All the while, the besieging army would have had to guard its rear in the event that allies of the besieged city came to its aid.11 The main reason we view sieges as spelling the inevitable doom of the besieged is the relatively high success rate of numerically overwhelming forces mustered by massive imperial armies fielded by large political entities such as New Kingdom Egypt, and later by the Assyrian, Babylonian, and Achaemenid empires. The overwhelming number of troops available in imperial armies allowed them a more predictable degree of success in siege warfare. As Israel Ephal has noted, this is because large numbers of attackers could do more than just prevent escape from the encircled town; they could mount frontal assaults on the town walls and gates and sustain heavy casualties in order to break through, rather than waiting to starve the inhabitants into submission (Ephal 1983:9296; also 1997:50). A large disparity in numbers between attackers and defenders must have made resistance by towns of average and below average size seem completely futile. Empires could also muster the necessary logistical support to impose extremely successful blockades that could guarantee that an extended siege would succeed. Despite the fact that an empires reputation would have become established after years of repeated success, many of their smaller adversaries appear to have remained convinced that defeats like those experienced by their neighbors were not inevitable, if they could form proper alliances, as in the Battle of Qarqar against the Assyrians. Those who had not yet been consolidated within the empire often concluded, rightly or wrongly, that their own resistance was the primary reason for the empires failure. But it was often the case that an empires resources were diverted into other theaters of operation, depriving them of the requisite numerical superiority to conduct successful sieges in certain regions at certain times. In addition to using their numerical superiority in direct assaults, information about Egyptian siege practices gleaned from the annals of Thutmose III,
That such concerns were a reality for an army during the course of a siege is especially evident from Alexanders failed siege of Pellium in Illyria in 335 B.C.E. (see Arrian 1.5.5ff.). During the circumvallation of this town an ally of Clitus, the Illyrian ruler Alexander was pursuing, arrived behind Alexanders force, thus engaging Alexanders army and enabling Clitus to escape.
11

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specifically the account of the Battle of Megiddo, shows that Egyptian tactics focused on the enforcement of blockades, for which large numbers of troops were also important. During the siege of Megiddo, for example, the Egyptians measured the town, surrounded (it) with a ditch, and walled (it) up with fresh timber from all their fruit trees (Lichtheim 1976:33). In a short time, perhaps as little as thirty-seven days (Goedicke 2000:91), the very large force of Canaanites trapped in the city acknowledged their desperate situation and surrendered. On the one hand, they would have realized that the large number of individuals inside the city would quickly consume Megiddos resources. On the other hand, they would have seen that there was no way to penetrate the Egyptian blockade in order to obtain supplies or call upon allies (if any were left) to attack the Egyptians from behind. Rather than appearing inept, Thutmoses IIIs actionsfollowing his decision to march through the Aruna passshould be viewed as exceptionally apt. Similarly, the Egyptian strategy to take Sharuhen decades earlier cannot be considered a failure or an indication of an army inept in the conduct of siege warfare, despite the fact that the siege lasted three years. We do not know enough about the tactical concerns of the Egyptians (e.g., other towns that they might have engaged) and the sorts of casualties they may have incurred or anticipated incurring during a direct assault at the early stages of this siege. In the end, they won the war, despite what might seem to be slow progress in this particular siege. Another observation related to Egyptian siege practices reveals that Egyptian cultural values may have governed their choice of tactics, if not their overall battlefield strategies, which therefore suggest a uniquely Egyptian approach to warfare. These values are reflected in Egyptian officers autobiographies, which do not focus upon battlefield prowess and the killing of countless enemy troops (as the pharaohs themselves do in their self-portrayals). Instead, the autobiographies emphasize the recovery of loot, including live captiveshence the depiction of children escaping from besieged cities in order to evade capture and enslavement. Even the killing of enemy soldiers was described in the context of looting the spoils. Ahmose the son of Abana bragged after the siege of Sharuhen that he had brought spoil from it: two women and a hand (Lichtheim 1976:13). Severed hands were collected as an indication of how many enemies one had killed in battle, so in a sense the hands themselves were part of the physical spoils of war. The central part played by the acquisition of loot in the conduct of Egyptian warfare

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Aaron A. Burke both iconographic and textual, emphasize the presentation of tribute. But this tribute is more appropriately characterized as plunder or loot, because it was not a regular tax imposed upon a vassal. In most Egyptian depictions, the terms are not distinguished (see note in ANET 3 p. 248). In my view, the key conceptual difference between tribute and loot is that tribute was intended to maintain the empire whereas loot served primarily to motivate the troops to perform their duties. This distinction is more than hairsplitting; it reflects a distinctly Egyptian view of warfare. On the one hand, the Egyptian pharaohs were motivated to expand Egyptian rule into the Levant to create a buffer against foreign incursions, whether Amorite, Hittite, or Hurrian, and they funded this expansion through the collection of tribute. On the other hand, soldiers of all ranks seem to have been induced to participate primarily through the prospect of collecting loot, which could enhance their social rank. The reduction in the number of tribute scenes in tomb reliefs as well as the reduction in references to plunder during the late New Kingdom may reflect an abandonment of this policy in favor of an increasingly disciplined and directly paid army that, in the end, incorporated mercenary troops, such as the Sherden. Conclusion In recent years, the study of warfare in the ancient Near East has begun to move beyond the cataloguing of weapons, the study of fortifications, and rudimentary attempts to discern tactics and strategies. Increasingly, warfare is recognized as an important topic in the study of ancient cultures for the very reason that warfare is itself always an expression of culture (Keegan 1993:12). While Egyptian scenes of Asiatic towns under siege are quintessentially Egyptian in the style of their execution and must be interpreted through an Egyptian cultural lens, to appreciate them fully they must still be viewed through the cultural perspective of the foreigners who are depicted as resisting the Egyptian attack. By considering the defenders perspective on the siege they were experiencing, which the Egyptian artists themselves took pains to portray, I am attempting to correct and refine the dominant understanding of these scenes. For example, Donald Redford has argued that the Dapur scene telescopes the action so that Egyptian shock troops mount ladders; the defenders resist; finally they capitulate and burn incense in supplication (Redford 1992:187, pl. 18). But, as I have suggested, the order of these events must be reconstructed from the perspective of the besieged Asiatics

is nowhere more evident than during the Battle of Megiddo. Because Egyptian soldiers were consumed with acquiring loot rather than defeating the stunned and fleeing Canaanite army, the open battle developed into a siege:
Now if his majestys troops had not set their hearts to plundering the possessions of the enemies, they would have [captured] Megiddo at this moment, when the wretched foe of Kadesh and the wretched foe of this town were being pulled up hurriedly so as to admit them into their town. . . . Then their horses were captured, and their chariots of gold and silver became an easy [prey]. Their ranks were lying stretched out on their backs like fish in the bight of a net, while his majestys valiant army counted their possessions. Captured was the tent of that wretched [foe], which was worked [with silver]Then the entire army jubilated[They lauded] his majesty and extolled his victory. Then they presented the plunder they had taken: hands, living prisoners, horses, chariots of gold and silver and of [painted work]. [Lichtheim 1976:3233]

Thus it seems that renewed consideration must be given to uniquely Egyptian traditions of warfare, particularly during the early New Kingdom, which included the high value placed on the collection of loot by the army. From this perspective, the success of the Egyptian army after the Amarna period was increasingly limited, insofar as most Egyptian soldiers would have measured success by the quantity of booty collected. The theme of the collection of booty figures much less prominently in battle narratives (e.g., the Battle of Kadesh and Merenptah stele) and private tomb paintings after the mid-fourteenth century B.C.E. The majority of tribute scenes in New Kingdom private tombs date from the mid-fifteenth to the mid-fourteenth centuries. The strong emphasis placed upon the collection of loot in early New Kingdom warfare also casts the debate about the nature of Egyptian empire in a different light, allowing us to reconcile diametrically opposed views of Egyptian imperial ambitions. Some have seen the Egyptian empire as a matter of rational economic interest and others have stressed its ideological nature. If looting was a supreme value, with all that it meant culturally in terms of ones status and authority, we can view the empire as motivated equally by economic and ideological factors. On the one hand, Shmuel Aituv (1978) has correctly noted that the quantities of goods taken from the Levant are not commensurate with the collection of regular tribute. On the other hand, Nadav Naaman (1981) is also correct in saying that the sources we possess,

More Light on Old Reliefs because their activities were the focus of these scenes. Redford is right to say that war reliefs, such as those of Ramesses II, do not permit an analysis into individual campaigns (ibid., 186), but when those reliefs are placed within the appropriate cultural context they reveal distinctive features of Asiatic

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resistance to siege warfare. Furthermore, they provide us with a clear basis for understanding the obstacles faced by the Egyptians as they advanced through Canaan in the Late Bronze Age and thus enable us to appreciate more fully the extent of Egyptian efforts throughout this process.

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