You are on page 1of 84

POLITICAL LAW

CENTER FOR PEOPLE EMPOWERMENT IN GOVERNANCE (CenPEG) v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (2010) Refresher: Comelec failed to provide plaintiffs with the source code of identified canvass machines despite repeated requests and demands. CenPEG is now praying for the issuance of a writ of mandamus, despite the lapse of the May 20 0 elections, claiming that the source code remained important and relevant !not only for compliance with the law, and the purpose thereof, "ut especially in the "ac#drop of numerous admissions of errors and claims of fraud.! Iss e: $%& C'ME(EC could "e compelled to release the source code to CenPEG) *E+ !"#$r%ne: pertinent portion of +ection 2 of ,.-. ./0. is clear in that !once an -E+ technology is selected for implementation, the Commission shall promptly ma#e the source code of that technology availa"le and open to any interested political party or groups which may conduct their own review thereof.! ) 1he C'ME(EC has offered no reason not to comply with this requirement of the law. 2ndeed, its only e3cuse for not disclosing the source code was that it was not yet availa"le when CenPEG as#ed for it and, su"sequently, that the review had to "e done, apparently for security reason, !under a controlled environment.! 1he elections had passed and that reason is already stale. A&A'ON V. (O)SE OF REPRESENTATIVES (2010) Refresher: Plaintiffs -"ayon and Palparan are first nominees of the the party)list groups -angat 1ayo and 4antay, respectively, "oth of which won a seat in the 5ouse of ,epresentatives in the 2006 elections. 1he defendant questioned the eligi"ility and qualification of the plaintiffs to sit as representatives since "oth did not "elong to the sectors in which the respective party)list groups represent. 1he 5ouse of ,epresentatives Electoral 1ri"unal 75,E18 issued an order, dismissing the petition as against -angat 1ayo and 4antay "ut upholding its 9urisdiction over the qualifications of petitioners -"ayon and Palparan Iss e: (1) $%& respondent 5,E1 has 9urisdiction over the question of qualifications of petitioners) *E+ (2) $%& it is the party)list nominee and not the group who stands as elected mem"er) *E+ !"#$r%ne: +ection 6, -rticle :2 of the Constitution provides that the 5,E1 shall "e the sole 9udge of all contests relating to, among other things, the qualifications of the mem"ers of the 5ouse of ,epresentatives. +ince party)list nominees are !elected mem"ers! of the 5ouse of ,epresentatives 7not the party)list group itself8 no less than the district representatives are, the 5,E1 has 9urisdiction to hear and pass upon their qualifications. GREEN(ILLS EAST ASSOCIATION* INC. (GEA) v. E. GAN+ON* INC. (EGI) (2010) Refresher: EG2 sought to develop a ;, 0. sq. m. lot 7land site8 at the corner of e<+a and 'rtigas -ve. in 4rgy. $ac#)$ac#. 2t wanted to "uild a 66)storey mi3ed)used "uilding with an =)storey "asement for a total of => storeys. 1he land site is ad9acent to Greenhills East +u"d. GE- wrote the 5(?,4 &C, ,egional <irector opposing EG2@s pro9ect. 2t also sent a letter to <P$5. EG2 applied with the 4rgy for clearance. 1he "rgy denied the application.

'n 2; &ovem"er ..., 5(?,4 -r"iter rendered a decision, dismissing GE-@s opposition. GE-@s petition for review with the 5(?,4 4oard of Commissioners was also denied. M, also denied. 'n 20 &ovem"er 200 , GE- filed its &otice of -ppeal with the 'ffice of the President. 'n 2 <ecem"er 200 , GE- received an order requiring it to file its memo on appeal within >d from notice. 4efore the period was up, GE- filed a motion for e3tension of >d. on Aanuary 200 it filed another motion for e3tension for >d. 1he 'P denied GE-@s appeal for failure to perfect it on time. M, was denied. Petition for review wth the C- was also denied. 5ence, recourse to the +C. Iss e: $%& the 5(?,4 erred in finding no valid ground to restrict EG2@s use of the land site, which lies "eside a residential su"division, for constructing a high)rise "uilding. B &' !"#$r%ne: +ec. 0, -rt. : of the MMC' = )0 applies to a situation where an ,) property ad9oins a C)2 property. 1his is not the case at "ar after the Mandaluyong City government enacted 'rdinance 2= in ../. Consequently the land site ceased to "e ad9acent to an ,) Done and no longer suffered from height restrictions. 1he ordinance intended to cnvert all the lots, on "oth sides and margins of 'rtigas -ve. up to the point where &otre <ame +treet was. 2n relying on the Mandaluyong Doning map, the 5(?,4 too# note of the standard procedure o"served in fi3ing the "oundaries of the land. -s a quasi)9udicial "ody, which en9oys an e3pertise in land Doning classifications, the 5(?,4 can ta#e 9udicial notice of such official maps as are generated and used in government Doning activities. -lthough the land site indeed ad9oins (ot , 4loc# ;, it does so not in the manner that would properly call for the application of the Doning ordinance. (ot of 4loc# ; and the ladn site do not have common "oundaries that 9oin them. ,ather, they touch each other only at a certain point due to the irregular shape of the properties, following the direction of the meandering cree# that lies "etween them. Eor this reason, it cannot "e said that +ec. 0, -rt. : of MMC' = )0 applies to the pro9ect. -lthough +ec. >27c8 of the (GC requires a "rgy clearance for any activity within its 9urisdiction, such clearance cannot "e denied when the activity is in a permissi"le Done. 1he applica"le ordinance does not preclude the construction of the pro9ect on the land site over the unreasona"le o"9ection of a near"y association of su"division dwellers. 1he city or municipality may still issue the required license or "uilding permit despite the withholding of the "rgy clearance. ROM)AL!E+ v. SAN!IGAN&A'AN (2010) Refresher: ,P filed an action for the forfeiture of alleged unlawfully acquired property with the +andigan"ayan against the ,omualdeD spouses as well as against ,omson ,ealty, 2nc., , F + 1ransport, 2nc., Eidelity Management, 2nc., and <io 2sland ,esort, 2nc. pursuant to ,/6.. Petitioner filed a motion for preliminary investigation and to suspend proceedings, claiming that since it was a forfeiture proceeding filed under ,.-. /6., the 'm"udsman should have first conducted a !previous inquiry similar to preliminary investigations in criminal cases! "efore the filing of the case pursuant to +ection 2 of the law. 5owever, the +andigan"ayan denied the motion and the su"sequent M,. ISS)E: $%& the preliminary investigation that the 'm"udsman conducted satisfied the requirement of the law in forfeiture cases. 'ES

!"#$r%ne: 1he 'm"udsman has under its general investigatory powers the authority to investigate forfeiture cases where the alleged ill)gotten wealth had "een amassed "efore Ee"ruary 2>, .=0. 1he e3ercise of his correlative powers to "oth investigate and initiate the proper action for the recovery of ill)gotten and%or une3plained wealth is restricted only to cases for the recovery of ill)gotten and%or une3plained wealth which were amassed after Ee"ruary 2>, .=0. Prior to said date, the 'm"udsman is without authority to initiate such forfeiture proceedings. $e, however, uphold his authority to investigate cases for the forfeiture or recovery of such ill)gotten and%or une3plained wealth amassed even "efore the aforementioned date, pursuant to his general investigatory power under +ection >7 8 of ,epu"lic -ct &o. 0660. 7Republic v. Sandiganbayan8 -lthough it was the 'm"udsman who conducted the preliminary investigation, it was the '+G that instituted the action. 1he 'm"udsman could not "e faulted for proceeding with the investigation of the ,omualdeDes@ cases when they did not show up despite notice "eing sent to them at their last #nown residence. 1he &ew ,ules on Criminal Procedure !does not require as a condition sine qua non to the validity of the proceedings Gin the preliminary investigationH the presence of the accused for as long as efforts to reach him were made, and an opportunity to controvert the evidence of the complainant is accorded him. 1he o"vious purpose of the rule is to "loc# attempts of unscrupulous respondents to thwart the prosecution of offenses "y hiding themselves or "y employing dilatory tactics.! Petition <2+M2++E< for lac# of merit. NATIONAL (O)SING A)T(ORIT' v. T(E !EPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM A!,)!ICATION &OAR! -n. MATEO VILLAR)+ (M-/ 0* 2010) Refresher: ,espondent :illaruD was the tenant of an Estate, which Estate was later on purchased "y petitioner &5- in a foreclosure sale for failure of the Estate to pay its loan to a "an#. 1he <P$5 constructed roads and "ridges that passed through a portion of the Estate prompting :illaruD to claim damages and distur"ance compensationI said claim was dismissed. Consequent to a complaint filed "y :illaruD, the Provincial -grarian ,eform -d9udicator 7P-,-<8 declared :illaruD as tenant "eneficiary of the lot he tenanted. &5- now contends that it cannot "e su"rogated to the rights and su"stituted to the o"ligations of an agricultural lessor since the lot, which it acquired for its housing and resettlement pro9ects is e3empt from agrarian laws. Iss e: $%& the su"9ect lot is e3empt from the coverage of the agrarian reform laws, the same having "een acquired "y &5- for its housing programJ *E+ !"#$r%ne: P.<. ;62 e3empts from land reform those lands that &5- acquired for its housing and resettlement programs whether it acquired those lands when the law too# effect or afterwards. 1he language of the e3emption is clearK the e3emption covers !lands or property acquired 3 3 3 or to "e acquired! "y &5-. 2n addition, +ection of P.<. ;62 provides that petitioner &5- shall not "e lia"le for distur"ance compensation. 1he &5-@s purchase of the lot for development and resettlement transformed the property "y operation of law from agricultural to residential. 2f the su"9ect lot were held to "e covered "y the agrarian laws, the &5- would "ecome an agricultural lessor with no right to use the land for the purpose for which it "ought the same. 1his, in turn, would "ecome pre9udicial to the government@s housing pro9ects. 1he Court is mindful of the plight of tenant)farmers li#e :illaruD. 4ut it is also incum"ent upon it to weigh their rights against the government@s interest in meeting the housing needs of the greater ma9ority.

ATIEN+A v. COMELEC (11 Fe2 2010) Refresher: 200>K <rilon 7(i"eral Party president8 withdrew his support from the -rroyo administration 2000K -tienDa 7(P chairman8 hosted a party conference%assem"ly which proceeded to elect new officers for all positions. -tienDa won as (P president. <rilon filed a petition "efore C'ME(EC for the nullification of the election. 2006K &ational E3ecutive Council 7&EC'8, the party@s electing "ody, convened for the election of new set of officers "efore <rilon@s term e3pired. Manuel ,o3as 22 was installed as new (P president. -tienDa and other (P mem"ers filed a petition for mandatory and prohi"itory in9unction to en9oin ,o3as from assuming his position, alleging illegal constitution of the &EC' and illegal e3pulsion%e3clusion of -tienDa from the party and its election. Iss es: 1.$'& the &EC' assem"ly that elected respondent ,o3as as (P president was validly constituted) *E+ 2. $'& C'ME(EC has 9urisdiction over the issue of validity of -tienDa, et al.@s e3pulsion from the party) &' !"#$r%ne: 1he C'ME(EC@s 9urisdiction over intra)party disputes is limited. 2t does not have "lan#et authority to resolve any and all controversies involving political parties. Political parties are generally free to conduct their activities without interference from the state. 1he C'ME(EC may intervene in disputes internal to a party only when necessary to the discharge of its constitutional functions. 1he C'ME(EC@s 9urisdiction over intra)party leadership disputes has already "een settled "y the Court. 1he Court ruled in Lalaw v. Commission on Elections that the C'ME(EC@s powers and functions under +ection 2, -rticle 2M)C of the Constitution, !include the ascertainment of the identity of the political party and its legitimate officers responsi"le for its acts.! 1he Court also declared in another case 6 that the C'ME(EC@s power to register political parties necessarily involved the determination of the persons who must act on its "ehalf. 1hus, the C'ME(EC may resolve an intra)party leadership dispute, in a proper case "rought "efore it, as an incident of its power to register political parties. 333 courts will ordinarily not interfere in mem"ership and disciplinary matters within a political party. - political party is free to conduct its internal affairs, pursuant to its constitutionally)protected right to free association. 2n +inaca v. Mula, the Court said that 9udicial restraint in internal party matters serves the pu"lic interest "y allowing the political processes to operate without undue interference. 2t is also consistent with the state policy of allowing a free and open party system to evolve, according to the free choice of the people. LA)REL V SOCIAL SEC)RIT' S'STEM Refresher: -n administrative case was filed against employees, including the petitioner, for grave misconduct and conduct gravely pre9udicial to the "est interest of the service. 2t was alleged that the petitioner and other held stri#es within the +++ Main 'ffice that caused pre9udice to thousands of mem"er of the +++.

1he ++C rendered a <ecision in the case, finding (aurel guilty of simple neglect of duty and imposing on her a fine equivalent to one months salary. Eeeling aggrieved, (aurel filed a petition forcertiorari with the Court of -ppeals 7C-8 under ,ule 0> in C-)G.,. +P 66206. C- rendered a decision, denying (aurel@s petition. 1he C- ruled that the proper mode of appeal for her is a petition under ,ule ;/, not a special civil action of certiorari. +he, thus, filed the present petition. Iss es: 7 8 $hether or not the C- erred in denying the petition on the technical ground it invo#edK *E+. 728 $hether or not the ++C gravely a"used its discretion in finding (aurel guilty of simple neglect of dutyK &'. !"#$r%ne: 7 8 1rue, petitions for review under ,ule ;/ specifically cover decisions rendered "y the ++C. 4ut this applies only to ++C decisions where the remedy of appeal is availa"le. 5ere, considering that the law regards the #ind of penalty the ++C imposed on (aurel already final, she had no appeal or other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law against the decision of that "ody. Provided the ++C committed grave a"use of discretion in rendering the decision against her, (aurel can avail herself of the remedy of special civil action of certiorari under ,ule 0>. 728 1he +C reversed the finding of simple neglect "ecause the evidence used against (aurel 7the petitioner was wea#8. -lso, the nature of simple neglect is !not clear!. EC(ANO v. TOLE!O (Se3$e42er 15* 2010) Refresher: Echano, cashier of the (and 4an#)1aft -venue 4ranch was charged grave misconduct and conduct pre9udicial to the service "y the City 1reasurer of Manila for having approved the deposit of a manager@s chec# that is due to the City, to the account of PereD, a stenographer of the Manila ,1C. 1he dorsal portion of the chec# showed PereD@s signature and a signature of an unidentified person who was supposedly the first endorser. 'M4 found Echano guilty of grave misconduct and dishonesty. Iss e: $hether 'M4 is correct in finding Echano guilty of grave misconduct and dishonesty. *E+. !"#$r%ne: Misconduct is a transgression of some esta"lished and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful "ehavior or gross negligence "y a pu"lic officer. -s differentiated from simple misconduct, in grave misconduct the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard of esta"lished rule, must "e manifest. -s -cting 4ranch Cashier, petitioner was charged with responsi"ility of handling the "an#@s daily transactions which could run into large amounts. 1here is a tremendous difference "etween the degree of responsi"ility, care, and trustworthiness e3pected of an ordinary employee in the "ureaucracy and that required of "an# managers and other officials directly handling large sums of money and properties.

?nder C+C rules, grave misconduct carries with it the penalty of dismissal for the first offense. 2t also allows mitigating circumstances to "e considered.$hile Echano claims good faith, the Court cannot close its eyes to the fact that he approved for deposit to PereD@s personal account a"out 20 other second)endorsed chec#s paya"le to the City 1reasurer of Manila. CENTRAL MIN!ANAO )NIVERSIT' V SEC OF !ENR (Se3$. 21* 2010) Refresher: 2n .>=, Pres. Garcia issued Presidential Proclamation ;60, which reserved /,;0 ha of lands in the pu"lic domain in Musuan, 4u#idnon as the site for CM?, a state university. CM? o"tained titles to /,0=0 ha of those lands. 1he government distri"uted the remaining /00 ha to several tri"es living in the area@s cultural communities. 2n 200/, Pres. -rroyo issued PP / 0 which distri"uted 060 ha of CM?@s titled lands to indigenous peoples and cultural communities in Musuan. CM? filed a petition for prohi"ition and questioned the constitutionality of PP / 0. 1he ,1C dismissed the petition on the ground that since the en9oined act relates to an official act of the E3ecutive <epartment done in Manila, 9urisdiction lies with the Manila ,1C. Iss e6s: $%& Presidential Proclamation / 0, which too# away CM?@s registered lands and distri"uted it to indigenous peoples and cultural communities, is valid and constitutional (e7.: &' . Presidential Proclamation &o. ;60 withdrew from sale or settlement and reserved for CM? the /,0=0 hectares as its future campus. 1he lands "y their character "ecame inaliena"le from the moment Pres. Garcia dedicated them for CM?. 1hey have ceased to "e aliena"le pu"lic lands. 2. $hen Congress enacted the 2ndigenous Peoples@ ,ights -ct 72P,-8 in ..6, it provided in +ec. >0 that !property rights within the ancestral domains already e3isting and%or vested shall "e recogniDed and respected.! 'wnership over the lands had "een vested in CM? as early as .>=. 1hus, transferring the lands in 200/ to the indigenous peoples around the area is not in accord with the 2P,-. /. 1he land registration court considered the claims of several tri"es "elonging to the area in the course of the proceedings for the titling of the lands. Eventually only /,0=0 hectares were titled. More than /00 hectares were ac#nowledged to "e in the possession of and su"9ect to the claims of those tri"es.

REME!IAL LAW
C(INA &AN8ING CORPORATION v. A&EL (2011) Refresher: China 4an# acquired title over -"el@s (a :ista property at a foreclosure sale. China 4an# filed e3 parte petition for issuance of writ of possession in its favor, which the ,1C granted. -"el@s appeal denied "y C-. +C denied. <ecision "ecame final and e3ecutory. ,1CK China 4an# filed a motion for e3ecution. 6 Aune B -"el filed a motion to cancel and reset the hearing 7she needed more time to comment on or oppose the "an#@s motion8 = Aune B ,1C granted her the 0)day period she as#ed "ut !from notice.! . Aune B noting -"el@s failure to file her opposition to or comment on the motion for e3ecution, the ,1C issued an 'rder granting China 4an#@s motion. 2 Aune B -"el filed an omni"us urgent motion for reconsideration and to admit her opposition to the "an#@s motion for e3ecution 22 Aune B the day after receiving her motion, the ,1C denied the same for lac# of merit. 2> Aune B sheriff implemented writ. C-K -"el filed petition for certiorari on 2> Aune. 1,' issued 2. Aune. C- eventually rendered a decision setting aside the assailed orders of the ,1C. C- ruled that the ,1C committed grave a"use of discretion in granting the "an#@s motion for e3ecution, noting that the latter court gave -"el 0 days from notice of its order, not 0 days from the issuance of such order, within which to file her opposition. Parenthetically, the shorter period was what she as#ed for in her motion for postponement. 4ut there was no proof, said the C-, as to when -"el had notice of the ,1C@s Aune =, 2006 'rder as to determine when the 0)day period actually "egan to run.

Iss e: $%& the C- erred in setting aside the assailed ,1C@s Aune . and 22, 2006 'rders on the ground of failure to o"serve due process respecting -"el@s right to "e heard on the "an#@s motion for e3ecution B *E+ !"#$r%ne: -lthough the ,1C caused the issuance of the writ of e3ecution "efore it could esta"lish that -"el@s 0 days !from notice! within which to file her opposition had lapsed, she filed with that court on Aune 2 , 2006 an urgent motion for reconsideration with her opposition to the motion for e3ecution attached. 1he Court, acting on her motion, denied it on the following day, Aune 22, 2006. -ny perceived denial of her right to "e heard on the "an#@s motion for e3ecution had "een cured "y her motion for reconsideration and the ,1C@s action on the same. 'rders for the issuance of a writ of possession are issued as a matter of course upon the filing of the proper motion and approval of the corresponding "ond since no discretion is left to the court to deny it. China 4an#@s petition granted. &ERM)!O v. TA'AG9RO:AS (2011) Refresher: -tty. ,icardo 4ermudo , as e3ecutor, filed a petition for his appointment as administrator of the estate of -rtemio 5ilario and for the allowance and pro"ate of the latter@s will "efore the ,1C of -ngeles City. 1he testator instituted Eermina 1ayag),o3as as his only heir "ut several persons, who claimed to "e 5ilario@s relatives, opposed the petition. ,1C rendered a decision, allowing the will and recogniDing ,o3as as 5ilario@s sole heir. -tty. 4ermudo who also served as counsel for ,o3as in the actions concerning her inheritance filed a motion to fi3 his legal fees and to constitute a charging lien against the estate for the legal services he rendered. Iss e: $hether or not -tty. 4ermudo, as administrator, is entitled to collect attorney@s fees. *E+ !"#$r%ne: -tty. 4ermudo did not only serve as administrator of the estate. 5e also served as ,o3as@ counsel in the suit that assailed her right as sole heir. -tty. 4ermudo "rought the contest all the way up to the +upreme Court to defend her rights to her uncle@s estate. -nd -tty. 4ermudo succeeded. -cting as counsel in that suit for ,o3as was not part of his duties as administrator of the estate 7ergo, does not fall under ,ule => +ection 6 of the ,'C8. Consequently, it was "ut 9ust that he is paid his attorney@s fees.

P(ILIPPINE VETERANS &AN8 v. &ASES CONVERSION !EVELOPMENT A)T(ORIT'* e$ -7. (2011) Refresher: ,espondent 4ases Conversion <evelopment -uthority 74C<-8, a government corporation, filed several e3propriation actions "efore the various "ranches of the ,1C of -ngeles City, for acquisition of lands needed for the construction of the +u"ic)Clar#)1arlac E3pressway Pro9ect. 1en of such cases raffled to 4ranch >= of ,1C. 1he other respondents were the registered owners 7defendants in e3propriation action8 of the e3propriated lands that they acquired as "eneficiaries of the comprehensive agrarian reform program. Petitioner Philippine :eterans 4an# 7P:48 filed motions to intervene in all the cases with attached complaints)in)intervention. P:4 alleged that the covered properties actually "elonged to 4elmonte -gro)2ndustrial <evelopment Corp. which mortgaged the lands to P:4

in .60. P:4 had since foreclosed on the mortgages and "ought the same at pu"lic auction in .=2. 4ut the "an# had "een una"le to consolidate ownership in its name. P:4 also had a pending action for annulment of the titles issued to the individual defendants and this was pending "efore 4ranch 02 of the court. Iss e: $hether or not the P:4 was entitled to intervene in the e3propriation cases "efore 4ranch >= of the -ngeles City ,1C. NO !"#$r%ne: +ection ., ,ule 06 of the ..6 ,ules of Civil Procedure authoriDes the court ad9udicating the e3propriation case to hear and decide conflicting claims regarding the ownership of the properties involved while the compensation for the e3propriated property is in the meantime deposited with the court. 4ut this cannot apply to P:4. -t the time P:4 tried to intervene in the e3propriation cases, its conflict with the farmer "eneficiaries who held C('-s, EPs, or 1C1s emanating from such titles were already pending "efore -ngeles City ,1C 4ranch 02, a co)equal "ranch of the same court. 4ranch >= had no authority to pre)empt 4ranch 02 of its power to hear and ad9udicate claims that were already pending "efore it. PEOPLE v. PA,ARIN -n. PALLA'A (2011) RefresherK 1he prosecution claims that the accused were arrested on a "uy)"ust operation. 1he police officers supposedly o"tained two pac#ets of drugs from the accused. 1he accused denied ownership of the pac#ets of drugs. 1he lower courts found the accused guilty of the charge. 1he accused contest their conviction on the account that the plastic pac#ets of drugs presented in court were unmar#ed and therefore did not prove that such pac#ets were the same ones o"tained "y the police officers from the accused. Iss esK $%& C- erred in not e3cluding the evidence of the seiDed sha"u on the ground that the prosecution failed to prove their integrity "y esta"lishing the chain of custody of the same until they got to the trial court ) *E+ $%& for this reason the C- erred in affirming their conviction ) *E+ !"#$r%neK 1he custodial lin# of the evidence starts with the police officers mar#ing the seiDed pac#ets of drugs, in accordance with +ection 2 7a8, -rticle 22 of the 2mplementing ,ules and ,egulations of ,.-. . 0>. +ection 2 7a8 requires the police officers to ta#e immediate inventory of and photograph the seiDed item in the presence of the accused or his representative or responsi"le third persons mentioned "ut always ta#ing care that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seiDed articles are preserved. ;(ere* $he 3"7%#e "ff%#ers .%. n"$ 4-r< $he se-7e. 37-s$%# s-#he$s $" sh"= $h-$ $he/ =ere $he s-4e $h%n>s $he/ $""< fr"4 $he -## se.. F-%7 re $" 37-#e s #h 4-r<%n>s 3-ves $he =-/ f"r s=-33%n>* 37-n$%n>* -n. #"n$-4%n-$%"n "f $he ev%.en#e. These 7-3ses ser%" s7/ #-s$ ." 2$ "n $he - $hen$%#%$/ "f $he corpus delicti* =-rr-n$%n> -#? %$$-7 "n re-s"n-27e ." 2$.@ Eailure of the police officer to follow rules regarding "uy)"ust operations will result in acquittals, "ut lower courts should "e forced to dismiss the case on account of the police officers@ and prosecution@s failure to follow proper procedure.

AFP M)T)AL &ENEFIT ASSOCIATION* INC. v. REGIONAL TRIAL CO)RT* MARI8INA CIT'* &RANC( 1AB -n. SOLI! (OMES* INC. (2011) RefresherK 2nvestco entered into a contract of sale with +olid 5omes, "ut the latter defaulted on the payments. 2nvestco sued +olid 5omes for specific performance and damages and sold the property to petitioner. 1he register of deeds issued certificates of title in favor of -EPM4-2. +olid 5omes filed an action to cancel the certificates of title and annotate lis pendens, "ut the +C held that the petitioner was a "uyer in good faith and for value and thus ruled against +olid 5omes. +olid 5omes filed another action with the ,1C, "ut the latter dismissed the case on the ground of res 9udicata. ,1C also denied +olid 5omes@ second motion for reconsideration. +olid 5omes then filed a petition for relief from 9udgment of the denial of the second motion for reconsideration on the ground of e3trinsic fraud. 1his fraud consisted in -EPM4-2@s alleged failure to disclose its #nowledge of a prior sale "etween 2nvestco and +olid 5omes. +olid 5omes caused the annotation of lis pendens on the certificates of title "ased on this pending petition for relief from the 9udgment "efore the ,1C. ,1C then issued an order giving due course to +olid 5omes@ petition. 5ence the present petition for prohi"ition and mandamus "y -EPM4-2. Iss esK $%& +olid 5omes filed its petition for relief from 9udgment with the ,1C "eyond the period allowed "y the rules ) *E+ $%& the fraud that +olid 5omes invo#ed as ground for its petition for reliefN-EPM4-2@s alleged fraud in acquiring the su"9ect propertyNis the fraud contemplated "y the rules ) &' $%& the ,1C@s grant of +olid 5omes@ petition for relief "ased on -EPM4-2@s alleged fraud in acquiring its titles to the su"9ect property is "arred "y res 9udicata ) *E+ $%& the annotation of a notice of lis pendens is allowed in connection with a pending petition for relief from 9udgment ) &' "ecause of res 9udicata !"#$r%neK O+ection /, ,ule /= of the ,ules of Civil Procedure 9udgment must "e filed within 00 days from notice from the entry of 9udgment.P +olid 5omes filed its issued "y the ,1C denying the original motion for motion for reconsideration cannot "e the "asis of motion was a prohi"ited pleading. provides that a petition for relief from of such 9udgment or within si3 months petition 0 months after the 9udgment reconsideration. Moreover, the second the lapse of the period "ecause such

-lthough -EPM4-2 petition@s for mandamus must fails since the case does not refer to a ministerial duty, its petition for prohi"ition allows the Court to decide on the case. ;The eC$r%ns%# fr- . $h-$ =%77 D s$%f/ - 3e$%$%"n f"r re7%ef fr"4 D .>4en$ %s $h-$ fr- . =h%#h $he 3rev-%7%n> 3-r$/ #- se. $" 3reven$ $he 7"s%n> 3-r$/ fr"4 2e%n> he-r. "n h%s -#$%"n "r .efense. S #h fr- . #"n#erns n"$ $he D .>4en$ %$se7f 2 $ $he 4-nner %n =h%#h %$ =-s "2$-%ne..25 Eor e3ample, the petition of a defending party would "e 9ustified where the plaintiff deli"erately caused with the process server@s connivance the service of summons on defendant at the wrong address and thus succeeded in getting a 9udgment "y default against him.P AFPM&AIEs -77e>e. 3r%"r <n"=7e.>e "f $he s-7e "f $he .%s3 $e. 7-n.s $" S"7%. ("4es %s n"$ $he <%n. "f fr- . #"n$e437-$e. 2/ $he r 7es. Th%s ;fr- .@ $h-$ S"7%. ("4es -77e>es refers $" $he 4er%$s "f $he #-se =h%#h h-. -7re-./ 2een %n%$%-77/ .e#%.e. 3"n 2/ $he SC* r 7%n> %n f-v"r "f AFPM&AI. ;The 3r%n#%37e "f res D .%#-$-

h"7.s $h-$ %ss es -#$ -77/ -n. .%re#$7/ res"7ve. %n - f"r4er s %$ #-nn"$ 2e r-%se. %n -n/ f $ re #-se 2e$=een $he s-4e 3-r$%es.@ (EIRS OF MARILO) SANTIAGO v. AG)ILA (2011) Refresher: - tenancy dispute arose "etween the parties. $hen the case was "rought to the Provincial -grarian ,eform -d9udicator 7P-,-<8, it was decided in favor of the landowners. ?pon appeal, the decision was reversed "y the <-,-4. -fter the petitioners@ motion for reconsideration was denied, they filed a motion for e3tension of /0 days or until -pril 20 to file a petition for review. 1he petitioners accordingly su"mitted their petition for review on -pril 20. 5owever, on -pril 2=, the C- decided to only grant them a >)day e3tension or until -pril > only. Eor this reason, the C- dismissed petitioners@ petition for review for having "een filed out of time. 2n addition, the C- also ruled that the +P- presented "y the attorney)in)fact is defective, since it was in representation of one <ennis Matu"is instead of <ennis +antiago, the petitioner in this case. Iss e: $'& the +P- is defective. NO. !"#$r%ne: Petitioner heirs e3plained that it was an honest mista#e "ecause <ennis Matu"is 7who appeared not to "e a party in the case8 and petitioner <ennis L. +antiago are one and the same person. +ince -guila has offered no proof to counter the truth of this assertion and since the C- did not require the heirs to su"stantiate it, the Court may presume such assertion to "e true. 4esides, the C- cannot altogether throw out the entire petition for this reason since all the petitioners have a common interest in the success of the suit and since the petition was validly verified with respect to the rest of them. Iss e: $'& the Petition for ,eview filed "efore the C- out of time. NO. !"#$r%ne: Although it is within the CAs discretion to grant or not to grant a motion for extension, such discretion should be exercised wisely and prudently. The rules regulating the filing of motions for extension of time to file certain pleadings are intended to promote the speedy disposition of cases in the interest of justice, not throw out such pleadings on pure technicality. 2n this case, the petitioners timely filed a motion for e3tension of time. 4y the time the Crendered its decision on -pril 2=, the petitioners already filed their petition for review on -pril 20 in accordance with the motion for e3tension of time to file the said petition. Procedural rules are intended to facilitate the administration of 9ustice, not frustrate it. 2t is always "etter that a case is decided on the merits rather than disposed of "ecause of procedural infirmities. !O9ALL METAL IN!)STRIES* ET AL v. SEC)RIT' &AN8 (2011) Refresher: 1he (ims, thru <o)-ll Metal 2ndustries, owed money from +ecurity 4an#. +ince they were una"le to pay their inde"tedness, they assigned their property in Pasig City to the 4an# as payment thereof. 1hereafter, the 4an# agreed to lease the property to the (ims, indicating that should the "an# opt to sell the property, the (ims, thru <M2, shall "e given the right of first refusal. Eventually, the 4an# decided to sell the property, offering it first to the (ims. 5owever, no agreement regarding the purchase price was reached "y the parties. 4ecause of this, the

4an# posted security guards around the area and prevented the (ims from entering the property. -lleging that they suffered damages due to the 4an#@s malicious conduct, the (ims sued the 4an# for damages. 1hey also as#ed for an in9unction against the 4an# to allow them to enter the premises. ?pon chec#ing the premises however, they discovered that some of their personal properties are missing. 1hey thus filed a supplemental complaint against the 4an# alleging an additional actua26M. Iss e: $'& damages may "e awarded "ased on the allegations in a supplemental complaint without prior payment of doc#et fees. NO. !"#$r%ne: -fter)9udgment lien, which implies that payment depends on a successful e3ecution of the 9udgment, applies to cases where the filing fees were incorrectly assessed or paid or where the court has discretion to fi3 the amount of the award. &one of these circumstances o"tain in this case. 'n the contrary, the (ims specified an actual amount from the very "eginning. -nd despite the issue having "een raised in the 4an#@s Motion for ,econsideration "efore the ,1C, they still did not pay the corresponding doc#et fee. 1hey merely said that they did not yet pay the fees "ecause the ,1C had not assessed them for it. A supplemental complaint is like any complaint and the rule is that the filing fees due on a complaint need to be paid upon its filing. The rules do not require the court to make special assessments in cases of supplemental complaints. Consequently, the trial court should have treated their +upplemental Complaint as not filed. SPO)SES ALAGAR v. PN& (2011) Refresher: +pouses -lagar were the owners of &ew 1a9 ,esources 2nc. 1hey were inde"ted to P&4 for a personal loan and a corporate loan, which were secured "y separate mortgages. -s owners of the corporation, they were solidary de"tors in the corporate loan. 1he -lagars were a"le to settle the personal loan "ut P&4 refused to release the mortgage covering it "ecause of the outstanding corporate loan. -lagars filed a petition for mandamus to compel P&4 to release the mortgage covering the said personal loan. ,1C ruled in favor of the -lagars, directing P&4 to release the mortgage. $hile the appeal to the C- was pending, the ,1C declared the decision final and e3ecutory ruling that the motion for reconsideration filed "y P&4 as pro forma hence the appeal was filed out of time. P&4 was forced to o"ey the writ, returned to mortgaged property and pay damages. C- reversed. 1he -lagars now claim that P&4 is estopped from assailing the validity of the writ of e3ecution after it had "een implemented. Iss e: $%& the validity of the writ of e3ecution has "een mooted "y compliance of the writ B &'. !"#$r%ne: E3ecution of a 9udgment pending an action in a higher court essentially challenging its finality cannot "e deemed an a"andonment of that action. 1he rules grant parties the right to question "y special civil actions those orders and rulings that inferior courts issue with grave a"use of discretion. GENTLE S)PREME P(ILIPPINES* INC v. CONS)LTA (2010) Refresher:

Gentle +upreme Philippines, 2nc. 7G+P8 filed a collection case with application for a writ of preliminary attachment against Consar 1rading Corporation 7C1C8, its president, Consulta, and its vice)president, +aray"a. 1he sheriff failed to serve the summons and copies of the complaint on any of C1C@s authoriDed officers as well as on Consulta and +aray"a, so he left copies of such documents with Canave who, according to the sheriff@s return, was +aray"a@s secretary and an authoriDed representative of "oth +aray"a and Consulta. 1he defendants failed to file an answer and they were declared in default. - property owned "y Consulta was also attached. 1he ,1C eventually ruled in favor of G+P. Consulta now claims that he was not properly served with summons "ecause, although his address stated in the complaint was his regular place of "usiness, Canave, who received the summons, was not in charge of the matter. Iss e: $%& there was a valid service of summons B *E+. !"#$r%ne: 2t is not necessary that the person in charge of the defendant@s regular place of "usiness "e specifically authoriDed to receive the summons. 2t is enough that he appears to "e in charge. 2n this case, Canave, a secretary whose 9o" description necessarily includes receiving documents and other correspondence, would have the sem"lance of authority to accept the court documents. L-n. &-n< "f $he Ph%7%33%nes v. C"r-F"n M. V%77e>-sG (e%rs "f C-$-7%n" V. N"e7 -n. Pr"# 7- P. S/ (2010) RefresherK Petitioner (and 4an# filed cases for .e$er4%n-$%"n "f D s$ #"43ens-$%"n against respondent CoraDon M. :illegas and respondent heirs of Catalino :. &oel and Procula P. +y "efore the ,1C of <umaguete City, 4ranch /2, sitting as a +pecial -grarian Court for the province of &egros 'riental. ,espondent :illegas@ property was in 5i"aiyo, Guihulngan City, &egros 'riental, while respondent heirs@ land was in &angca, 4ayawan City, &egros 'riental. 1hese lands happened to "e outside the regular territorial 9urisdiction of ,1C 4ranch /2 of <umaguete City. 4ranch /2 dismissed "oth cases for lac# of 9urisdiction. 2t ruled that, although it had "een designated +pecial -grarian Court for &egros 'riental, the designation did not e3pand its territorial 9urisdiction to hear agrarian cases. Iss e: $%& an ,1C, acting as +pecial -grarian Court, has 9urisdiction over 9ust compensation cases involving agricultural lands located outside its regular 9urisdiction "ut within the province where it is designated as an agrarian court under the Comprehensive -grarian ,eform (aw of ..=. B 'ES. !OCTRINEK The 7-= %s #7e-r. A 2r-n#h "f -n RTC .es%>n-$e. -s - S3e#%-7 A>r-r%-n C" r$ f"r 3r"v%n#e h-s $he "r%>%n-7 -n. eC#7 s%ve D r%s.%#$%"n "ver -77 3e$%$%"ns f"r $he .e$er4%n-$%"n "f D s$ #"43ens-$%"n %n $h-$ 3r"v%n#e. Aurisprudence states that +pecial -grarian Courts have original and e3clusive 9urisdiction over two categories of casesK 7 8 all petitions for the determination of 9ust compensation to landowners, and 728 the prosecution of all criminal offenses under ,.-. 00>6. 4y !special! 9urisdiction, +pecial -grarian Courts e3ercise power in addition to or over and a"ove the ordinary 9urisdiction of the ,1C, such as ta#ing cogniDance of suits involving agricultural lands located outside their regular territorial 9urisdiction, so long as they are within the province where they sit as +pecial -grarian Courts.

,.-. 00>6 requires the designation "y the +upreme Court "efore an ,1C 4ranch can function as a +pecial -grarian Court. 1he +upreme Court has not designated the single sala courts of ,1C, 4ranch 0; of Guihulngan City 7court under which :illegas property is situated8, and ,1C, 4ranch 0/ of 4ayawan City 7court under which &oel%+y property is situated8 as +pecial -grarian Courts. Consequently, they cannot hear 9ust compensation cases 9ust "ecause the lands su"9ect of such cases happen to "e within their territorial 9urisdiction. S%n#e RTC* &r-n#h B2 "f ! 4-> e$e C%$/ %s $he .es%>n-$e. S3e#%-7 A>r-r%-n C" r$ f"r $he 3r"v%n#e "f Ne>r"s Or%en$-7* %$ h-s D r%s.%#$%"n "ver -77 #-ses f"r .e$er4%n-$%"n "f D s$ #"43ens-$%"n %nv"7v%n> ->r%# 7$ r-7 7-n.s =%$h%n $h-$ 3r"v%n#e* re>-r.7ess "f =he$her "r n"$ $h"se 3r"3er$%es -re " $s%.e %$s re> 7-r $err%$"r%-7 D r%s.%#$%"n. S3" ses .e7- Cr F v. R-4"n C. P-3- IV* %n h%s #-3-#%$/ -s C"9A.4%n%s$r-$"r "f $he Es$-$e "f An>e7- M. & $$e (2010) Refresher: ..;K the 2ntestate Estate of -ngela M. 4utte 7the Estate8 filed -n -#$%"n f"r #-n#e77-$%"n "f $%$7es* re#"ver/ "f 3r"3er$%es* -n. .-4->es against several defendants, including petitioner spouses ,eu"en and Minerva <ela CruD 7the <ela CruDes8 "efore the ,1C of -ntipolo City. 'cto"er 2 , ...K the Estate presented Myron C. Papa 7Myron8, its e3ecutor, to testify on the su"stance of the complaint. -t the conclusion of Myron@s testimony on that day, the ,1C required the Estate and the latter agreed to present Myron anew at the ne3t scheduled hearing to identify the originals of certain e3hi"its, after which counsels for the defendants, would "egin to cross)e3amine him. 5owever, Myron was ta#en ill and diagnosed as suffering from stage four colon and liver cancer, sothe Estate never got around recalling Myron to the witness stand, as the co) administrator sought repeated hearing postponements in order to accommodate Myron@s treatment. (ater, the Estate filed a motion for leave to have the defendants #r"ss9eC-4%ne M/r"n 2/ .e3"s%$%"n -$ $he h"s3%$-7 =here he =-s #"nf%ne.. Granted "y ,1C. !e3"s%$%"n se$ "n Se3$e42er H* 2001 2 $ M/r"n 3-sse. -=-/ "n A > s$ 11* 2001. &ovem"er >, 200 K one of the defendants 4"ve. $" eC3 n>e M/r"nEs .%re#$ $es$%4"n/. 1he <ela CruDes for their part 4"ve. $" .%s4%ss $he #-se f"r f-%7 re "f $he Es$-$e $" 3r"se# $e it. ,1C denied the 2 motions. GRO)N!K Estate had no control of the circumstances that caused the delay in the case. <ecem"er /, 200/K the Estate as#ed leave of court $" f%7e %$s f"r4-7 "ffer "f eCh%2%$s. <ecem"er >, 200/K the <ela CruDes f%7e. - 4"$%"n $" s$r%<e " $ M/r"nEs $es$%4"n/ "n $he >r" n. "f f-%7 re $" #r"ss9eC-4%ne him. Meanwhile, the Estate filed its formal offer of evidence.

March ;, 200>K RTC >r-n$e. $he !e7- Cr FesE 4"$%"n $" s$r%<e " $ M/r"nEs $es$%4"n/ QQ G,'?&<K due to the Estate@s fault, such testimony was never completed, depriving the defendants of the opportunity to cross)e3amine him. C-K reversed ,1C 1he C- said that the defendants were guilty of unreasona"le delay in o"9ecting to Myron@s testimony. Myron died on -ugust 0, 200 yet the other defendants moved to e3punge his testimony only on &ovem"er >, 200 . 'n the other hand, the <ela CruDes filed a similar motion only in <ecem"er 200/. Citing +ection /0, ,ule /2 of the ,ules of Court,0 the Cheld that they should have o"9ected to Myron@s testimony when it was offered or soon after the reason for o"9ecting to its admission "ecame apparent. $hen they failed to do so, said the C-, the defendants waived their right to o"9ect to the same. Iss e: $%& Myron@s testimony should "e stric#en out for failure of defendants to cross) e3amine him. B 'ES. !"#$r%neK 1he ,1C set the deposition ta#ing on +eptem"er 6, 200 "ut Myron died "efore that date, on -ugust 0, 200 . Consequently, it was not the defendants@ fault that they were una"le to cross)e3amine him. 1he C- appears too hasty in "laming the defendants for the further delays that followed. $hen Myron died on -ugust 0, 200 , the o"ligation to close his a"orted testimony and proceed with its other evidence remained with the Estate. 4ut it did nothing, prompting one of the defendants to as# the ,1C on &ovem"er >, 200 to stri#e down Myron@s testimony on the ground of the defendants@ failure to cross)e3amine him. 1he <ela CruDes themselves as#ed that the case "e dismissed for the Estate@s failure to prosecute after such a long time. +till, wanting to give the Estate the chance to present additional evidence, on March /, 2002 the ,1C denied the defendants@ motions. 4ut the Estate did nothing for a"out a year and eight months until <ecem"er /, 200/ when, rather than present additional evidence, it as#ed leave to close its case with a formal offer of its documentary e3hi"its. Clearly, it was only at this stage that the Estate signaled its intention to still avail itself of Myron@s unfinished testimony. -nd the <ela CruDes did not lose time to act. 'n <ecem"er >, 200/ they renewed the defendants@ earlier motion to e3punge such testimony. -nd this time, the ,1C granted the motion. 2t did so correctly since the Estate showed a lac# of interest in offering a su"stitute testimony for that of Myron@s. S%n#e $he Es$-$e 3resen$e. %$s ."# 4en$-r/ eCh%2%$s -n. h-. $he s-4e - $hen$%#-$e. $hr" >h M/r"nEs $es$%4"n/* %$ s$-n.s $" re-s"n $h-$ $he s$r%<%n> " $ "f $he 7-$$erEs $es$%4"n/ -7$">e$her =%3e. " $ $he re? %re. - $hen$%#-$%"n f"r $h"se eCh%2%$s. The/ 2e#"4e %n-.4%ss%27e n7ess $he RTC* %n %$s .%s#re$%"n* re"3ens $he $r%-7 3"n - v-7%. >r" n. -n. 3er4%$s $he Es$-$e $" re#$%f/ %$s 4%s$-<es. LAN!&AN8 OF T(E P(ILIPPINES V. FORT)NE SAVINGS AN! LOAN ASSOCIATION INC.* re3resen$e. 2/ P!IC (2010) Refresher: ,espondent Eortune +avings and (oan -ssociation, 2nc. 7Eortune +avings8 owned a ;,2/0) square meter agricultural land in +an Gregorio, Malvar, 4atangas, that it acquired for P=0L after foreclosing on the mortgage constituted on the land "y one of its "orrowers who defaulted on a P6 ,>00 loan.

Eortune +avings offered to sell the property for P 00L to the <epartment of -grarian ,eform 7<-,8 for inclusion in the Comprehensive -grarian ,eform Program 7C-,P8. 4ut petitioner (and 4an# of the Philippines 7(and 4an#8, the financial intermediary for the C-,P, fi3ed the land@s value at only P0,6.0.00. ,e9ecting this amount, Eortune +avings filed a summary administrative proceeding for the determination of 9ust compensation with the <-, -d9udication 4oard 7<-,-48. March /, ... ) <-,-4 rendered 9udgment, finding unreasona"le (and 4an#@s valuation of the land and fi3ing its value at P./,000.00. +ince the (and 4an# received a copy of the decision on March 6, ..., it had > days from that date or until -pril , ... within which to file an action with ,1C for 9udicial determination of 9ust compensation. 4ut, "ecause -pril fell on Maundy 1hursday, a pu"lic holiday, (and 4an# was a"le to file a petition for the determination of 9ust compensation "efore the ,1C of (ipa City in -grarian Case ..)02 ; only on Monday, -pril >, .... Eor (and 4an#@s failure to cause the service of summons, however, the ,1C dismissed the case without pre9udice. Meanwhile, Eortune +avings ceased operations and was ta#en over "y the P<2C as its liquidator. -pril 6, 2000 or ; months after the ,1C dismissed -grarian Case ..)02 ;, (and 4an# filed another petition for the determination of 9ust compensation for the su"9ect land in -grarian Case 2000)0 >>. 4ecause Eortune +avings failed to file a responsive pleading, the ,1C declared it in default. -nd rendered a decision, upholding (and 4an#@s valuation of the property -$P1*HA1.00 "ased on a technical formula adopted "y the <-,. 'n appeal to the C-, it reinstated the March /, ... <-,-4 decision and its P./,000.00 valuation. 1he C- ruled that (and 4an# incurred delay in filing only on -pril >, ... its petition for the determination of 9ust compensation in -grarian Case ..)02 ; and that, consequently, the <-,-4 decision "ecame final and e3ecutory on -pril , .... ISS)ES: . $'& the <-,-4 determination of 9ust compensation "ecame final and e3ecutoryJ &' 2. C- erred in adopting the valuation fi3ed "y <-,-4 for the property at P./,000.00 instead of the P0,6.0.00 esta"lished "y (and 4an#J !"#$r%ne: . -lthough the <-, is vested with primary 9urisdiction under the Comprehensive -grarian ,eform (aw of .== or C-,( to determine in a preliminary manner the reasona"le compensation for lands ta#en under the C-,P, such determination is su"9ect to challenge in the courts. 1he C-,( vests in the ,1Cs, sitting as +pecial -grarian Courts, original and e3clusive 9urisdiction over all petitions for the determination of 9ust compensation 1he ,1C@s 9urisdiction is not any less !original and e3clusive! "ecause the question is first passed upon "y the <-,. The 3r"#ee.%n>s 2ef"re $he RTC -re n"$ #"n$%n -$%"n "f $he -.4%n%s$r-$%ve .e$er4%n-$%"n. 2ndeed, although the law may provide that the decision of the <-, is final and unappeala"le, still a resort to the courts cannot "e foreclosed on the theory that courts are the guarantors of the legality of administrative action.

The $-<%n> "f 3r"3er$/ n.er $he CARL %s - >"vern4en$ eCer#%se "f $he 3"=er "f e4%nen$ ."4-%n. S%n#e $he .e$er4%n-$%"n "f D s$ #"43ens-$%"n %n e4%nen$ ."4-%n 3r"#ee.%n>s %s - D .%#%-7 f n#$%"n* s #h .e$er4%n-$%"n #-nn"$ 2e 4-.e $" .e3en. "n $he eC%s$en#e "f -.4%n%s$r-$%ve 3r"#ee.%n>s "f - s%4%7-r n-$ re. 1hus, even while the <-,-4 summary administrative hearing for determination of 9ust compensation is pending, the interested party may file a petition for 9udicial determination of the same. Consequently, (and 4an#@s filing of -grarian Case 2000)0 >> after the dismissal without pre9udice of -grarian Case ..)02 ; cannot "e regarded as "arred "y the filing of the latter case "eyond the >)day period prescri"ed under ,ule M222, +ection of the <-,-4 ,ules. The 3r"#e. r-7 s" n.ness "f A>r-r%-n C-se 200090155 #" 7. n"$ 2e 4-.e .e3en.en$ "n $he !ARA& #-se* f"r $hese $=" 3r"#ee.%n>s -re se3-r-$e -n. %n.e3en.en$.

2. Re: V-7 -$%"n: the Court notes that Eortune +avings forfeited "y default its right to
present evidence of 9ust compensation "efore the ,1C. 1hus, the latter court simply accepted the computation and supporting documents that (and 4an# adduced at the trial, which computation was at P0,6.0.00 "ased on the formula provided "y +ection 6 of the C-,(. 4ut, although the formula found in +ection 6 of the C-,( may "e 9ustly adopted in certain cases, it is "y no means the only formula that the court may adopt in determining 9ust compensation. 1he Court finds too iniquitous the amount of P0,6.0.00 for the land. As F"r$ ne S-v%n>s 3"%n$e. " $* P1*HA1.00 %s D s$ $he 3r%#e "f - 109%n#h $e7ev%s%"n se$* /e$ =h-$ %s -$ s$-<e %n $h%s #-se %s - 0*2B09s? -re 4e$er 7-n. =%$h 0B #"#"n $92e-r%n> $rees -n. 1 D-#<fr %$ $rees* #er$-%n7/ =%$h 3"$en$%-7 f"r >re-$er 3r". #$%v%$/ $h-n - $e7ev%s%"n se$. 1hat Eortune +avings was willing to pay P=0,000.00 for the property is proof that the property was valued far more than the P0,6.0.00 fi3ed "y the ,1C. 1he C- adopted the <-,-4 valuation of P./,000.00 for the su"9ect land for a technical reason. 4ut, since <-,-4 fi3ed the amount "ased on its e3pertise and since that amount is not quite far from the price for which Eortune +avings "ought the same at a pu"lic auction, the Court is inclined to accept such valuation. Considering the relatively small amount involved, this would "e a far "etter alternative than remanding the case and incurring further delay in its resolution. C(AVE+ AN! !ELES v. CA AN! ATT'. VARGAS (2010) Refresher: Petitioners had "een staying in the remote portion of the land of :argas, planting coconut seedlings and supervising the harvest of coconut and palay. 1hey agreed to divide the gross sales of all products from the land. ChaveD held in trust :argas@ share "ut failed to remit them. +he also refused to turn over the administration of property despite demand. :argas filed a complaint for recovery of possession, rent, and damages with prayer for the immediate appointment of a receiver against ChaveD and her daughter, <eles, "efore the ,1C of 4ulan, +orsogon. Petitioners claimed that the ,1C did not have 9urisdiction over the su"9ect matter of the case since it actually involved an agrarian dispute. 1he ,1C dismissed the complaint for lac# of 9urisdiction "ased on :argas@ admission that the petitioners were tenants.

:argas appealed to the C- and filed a motion for the appointment of a receiver. C- granted the motion and ordained receivership of the land, noting that there appeared to "e a need to preserve the property and its fruits in light of her allegation that ChaveD failed to account for her share of such fruits. +he also filed three estafa cases with the ,1C of 'longapo City and a complaint for dispossession with the <epartment of -grarian ,eform -d9udication 4oard 7<-,-48. In all these cases, Fidela asked for the immediate appointment of a receiver for the property. ISS)ES: . $%& respondent :argas is guilty of forum shopping considering the identical applications for receivership over the su"9ect properties in the criminal cases she filed with the ,1C of 'longapo City and in the administrative case "efore the <-,-4. &'. 1here is no forum shopping. 4y forum shopping, a party initiates two or more actions in separate tri"unals, grounded on the same cause, trusting that one or the other tri"unal would favora"ly dispose of the matter. 1he various suits involved different causes of action and sought different reliefs. 1he civil action filed with the ,1C sought to recover possession of the property "ased on petitioners@ failure to account for its fruits. The cases are similar only in that they involved the same parties and she sought the placing of the properties under receivership in all of them. B T receivership is not an action. It is but an au!iliary remedy, a mere incident of the suit to help achieve its purpose. 2t cannot "e said that the grant of receivership in one case will amount to res "udicata on the merits of the other cases. 1he grant or denial of this provisional remedy will still depend on the need for it in the particular action. 2. $%& C- erred in granting the application for receivership. *E+. ?nder +ection 7"8, ,ule >. of the ,ules of Civil Procedure a petition for receivership requires that the property or fund su"9ect of the action is in danger of "eing lost, removed, or materially in9ured, necessitating its protection or preservation. 2ts o"9ect is the prevention of imminent danger to the property. :argas does not claim that the land or its productive capacity would disappear or "e wasted if not entrusted to a receiver. +he does not claim that the land has "een materially in9ured, necessitating its protection and preservation. ,1C dismissed :argas@ action for lac# of 9urisdiction over the case, holding that the issues raised properly "elong to the <-,-4. 2t seem more prudent for the C- to first provisionally determine that the ,1C had 9urisdiction "efore granting receivership which is "ut an incident of the main action. !"#$r%ne: Elements of forum shopping 7same as in litis pendentia where the final 9udgment in one case will amount to res "udicata in the other8K 7 8 identity of parties, or at least such parties as would represent the same interest in "oth actionsI 728 identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief "eing founded on the same factsI and 7/8 identity of the two preceding particulars such that any 9udgment rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res "udicata in the action under consideration. ARIAL SPORTSWEAR MAN)FACT)RING -n. NARES( GI!WANI v. &ANCO !E ORO Refresher:

G.G. +portswear and &aresh Gidwani mortgaged a lot in Ma#ati and a house and (ot in 4el) -ir :illage to secure a P20,/>6,000 loan with 4<' to G.G. +porstwear. 1he parties amended the mortgages to include an additional P .0;/.000 loan "ut G.G. +portswear was una"le to pay. 4<' wrote to G.G +portswear saying that it had transferred the loan o"ligation to Philippine 2nvestment 'ne 7P2'8 and all the rights, titles etc. accrue to +P:)-MC 2 $ 4<' su"sequently applied for the foreclosure of the properties. 1he Ma#ati lot was auctioned to 4<' "ut "efore the auction of the 4el)-ir property, G.G. and Gidwani filed an action for 1,' and preliminary in9unction with the ,1C to annul the foreclosure saying that with the transfer of the loan receiva"les, 4<' lost the right to foreclose which the ,1C denied. 'n certiorari, the C- dismissed G.G. and Gidwani@s petition. Iss e: $'& the C- erred in finding that the ,1C did not gravely a"use its discretion when it denied petitioners G.G. +portswear and Gidwani@s application for 1,' and preliminary in9unction despite the "an#@s apparent assignment of its credit to another entity. !"#$r%ne: 1he test for issuing a 1,' or an in9unction is whether the facts show a need for equity to intervene in order to protect perceived rights in equity. 2n general, a higher court will not set aside the trial court@s grant or denial of an application for preliminary in9unction unless it gravely a"used its discretion as when it lac#s 9urisdiction over the action, ignores relevant considerations that stic# out of the parties@ pleadings, sees the facts with a "lurred lens, ignores what is relevant, draws illogical conclusions, or simply acts in random fashion. 2n9unction may "e issued only when the plaintiff appears to "e entitled to the main relief he as#s in his complaint. 1his means that the plaintiff@s allegations should show clearly that he has a cause of action. 1his means that he en9oys some right and that the defendant has violated it. -nd, where the defendant is heard on the application for in9unction, the trial court must consider, too, the weight of his opposition. -ccording to 4<'@s letter to GG, it seemed to have assigned all the loan receiva"les of GG to P2' so logically it should not longer had the right to foreclose "ut in its answer to the complaint, 4<' wanted that corrected, claiming that it 9ust assigned a small portion of the same to P2'. id the allegations of the parties and the documents they attached to their pleadings gi!e ample justification for the issuance of a T"# or preliminary injunction order to stop the foreclosure sale of the $el%Air property& Two considerations militate against it' Eirst. 1he mortgaged properties were due for foreclosure. -dmittedly, petitioner G.G. +portswear had defaulted on the loans secured "y the su"9ect mortgages. Petitioners had, therefore, no right to complain a"out losing their properties to foreclosure. +econd. 1he issue of which party owns the loan receiva"les and, consequently, had the right to foreclose the mortgages is essentially an issue "etween 4<' and P2'. 1his issue is the concern of petitioners G.G. +portswear and Gidwani "ut only to the e3tent that they are entitled to ensure that the proceeds of the foreclosure sale were paid to the right party. ,espondent P2', which had "een impleaded in the case, did not contest 4<'@s ownership of the loan receiva"les and its right to foreclose the mortgages. 2t would, therefore, ma#e no sense to insist that P2' "e the one to foreclose when it denounces such right 2t cannot "e said that G.G. and Gidwani have esta"lished a right to the main relief they want, namely, the arrest of the foreclosure sale of their mortgaged properties after they had admitted not paying their loans. -lso, the provisional remedy of preliminary in9unction may

only "e resorted to when there is a pressing necessity to avoid in9urious consequences which cannot "e remedied under any standard of compensation. +ince there is a valid cause to foreclose on the mortgages, petitioners G.G. +portswear and Gidwani cannot claim that the irrepara"le damage they wanted to prevent "y their application for preliminary in9unction is the loss of their properties to auction sale. 1heir real in9ury, if it turns out that the right to foreclose "elongs to P2' rather than to 4<', is payment of the proceeds of the auction sale to the wrong party rather than to their creditor. 4ut this #ind of in9ury is purely monetary and is compensa"le "y an appropriate 9udgment against 4<'. 2t is not in any sense an irrepara"le in9ury. (EIRS OF SARA( MARIE PALMA &)RGOS v. CO)RT OF APPEALS AN! ,O(NN' CO (2010) Refresher: -ssailants attac#ed the household of +arah Marie Palma 4urgos while all were asleep. +arah and her uncle Erasmo Palma were #illed. 1wo of the assailants were arrested and they pointed to respondent Aohnny Co as the mastermind. -fter 0 years, respondent surrendered to the &42 and later filed a petition for admission to "ail. ,1C granted "ail on the ground that the evidence of guilt of respondent Co was not strong. C- dismissed petitioners@ certiorari 7,ule 0>8 for having "een filed without involving the 'ffice of the +olicitor General 7'+G8. Iss e: $'& the C- correctly dismissed the petition, which questioned the ,1C@s grant of "ail to respondent Co, for having "een filed without the '+G@s intervention. &'. !"#$r%ne: 1he purpose of a criminal action is to determine the penal lia"ility of the accused for having outraged the state with his crime and, if he "e found guilty, to punish him for it. 2n this sense, the parties to the action are the People of the Philippines and the accused. 1he offended party is regarded merely as a witness for the state. 'nly the state, through its appellate counsel, the '+G, has the sole right and authority to institute proceedings "efore the C- or the +upreme Court. LEE v. CO)RT OF APPEALS (, 7/ 1B* 2010) Refresher: 1he children of (ee and Leh 7(ee)Leh children8 filed a petition for the deletion from the certificate of live "irth of the petitioner Emma (ee the name Leh and replace the same with the name 1iu to indicate her true mother@s name. 1he (ee)Leh children "elieved that Emma (ee was their father@s daughter with 1iu Chuan. 1he (ee)Leh children requested the issuance of a su"poena ad testificandum to compel 1iu, Emma (ee@s presumed mother, to testify in the case. 1iu claimed that the su"peona was oppressive and violated +ection 2>, ,ule /0 of the ,ules of Court, the rule on parental privilege, she "eing Emma (ee@s stepmother, and moved to quash the said su"poena. Iss e: $%& the su"poena should "e quashed on the grounds that it was oppressive and unreasona"le and that it violated the rule on parental privilege. ) &' !"#$r%ne: ORthe grounds citedNunreasona"le and oppressiveNare proper for su"poena ad duces tecum or for the production of documents and things in the possession of the witness, a command that has a tendency to infringe on the right against invasion of privacy.P O1he privilege cannot apply to them "ecause the rule applies only to !direct! ascendants and descendants, a family tie connected "y a common ancestry.#avvphi# - stepdaughter has no common ancestry "y her stepmother.!

PEOPLE v. (A&ANA (M-r#h 5* 2010) Refresher: 2n a "uy)"ust operation, the police seiDed from the accused three sachets of what appeared to "e sha"u and mar#ed "ills used "y the police to purchase drugs from the accused. -t the pre)trial, the parties stipulated 7 8 that the forensic chemist got the police request for e3amination of the su"stance and found it positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride and 728 that Moran was the police officer to whom the arresting officers turned over the seiDed items and was the one who prepared the referral slip, sworn affidavit of the arresting officers and the request for la"oratory e3amination Iss e: 1. $'& the forensic e3aminer and the police investigator are indispensa"le witnesses in a drugs case to esta"lish the chain of custody over the su"stance seiDed from the accused B &o. 2. $'& the prosecution failed to esta"lish the integrity of the seiDed su"stance ta#en from 5a"ana along the chain of custody. B *es. !"#$r%ne: 1. ORno rule requires the prosecution to present as witness in a drugs case every person who had something to do with the arrest of the accused and the seiDure of prohi"ited drugs from him. 1he discretion on which witness to present in every case "elongs to the prosecutor.P O1he non)presentation of the informant cannot pre9udice the prosecution@s theory of the case. 5is testimony would merely "e corro"orative since police officersR who witnessed everything already testified.P 2. 1he chain of custody rule requires that testimony "e presented a"out every lin# in the chain, from the moment the item was seiDed up to the time it is offered in evidence. 1o this end, the prosecution must ensure that the su"stance presented in court is the same su"stance seiDed from the accused. 71he prosecution did not adduce evidence on what the investigator on duty did with the seiDed articles, how these got to the la"oratory technician, and how they were #ept "efore "eing adduced in evidence at the trial.8 Pe"37e v. Per-7$- -7%-s ;Me4en>@ (2010) Refresher: Elmer Peralta was arrested after the <istrict <rug Enforcement Group 7<<EG8 staged a "y)"ust operation with one police officer 7+P' -l"erto +angalang8 acting as poseur)"uyer. -n informant introduced the police officer to Peralta and the former informed Peralta that the police officer was a dance instructor in need of sha"u for himself and his fellow dance instructors so they could endure the long nights. 1he police officer gave Peralta a mar#ed P>00.00 "ill for a sachet of sha"u. -t a signal, +angalang told his informant to go out and "uy cigarettes. 'n seeing the informant come out of the house, the police "ac#)up team rushed in. 1hey arrested accused Peralta, too# the mar#ed money from him, and "rought him to the police station. Meanwhile, the sachet of sha"u was mar#ed !-+) ) 2 0602! and ta#en to the Philippine &ational Police Crime (a"oratory for testing. 1he contents of the sachet tested positive for methylamphetamine hydrochloride or sha"u. 1he prosecution presented the police officer. 5e alone testified for the government since it was thought that the testimonies of the other police officers would only "e corro"orative. 1he prosecution also dispensed with the testimony of the forensic chemist after the parties stipulated on the e3istence and due e3ecution of Chemistry ,eport <)//2) 02, which showed that the specimen tested positive for sha"u.

Iss e: $hether or not the prosecution presented ample proof that the police officers involved caught accused Peralta at his home, peddling prohi"ited drugs. B &'. !"#$r%ne: 1he elements of the sale of illegal drugs are a8 the identities of the "uyer and seller, "8 the transaction or sale of the illegal drug, and c8 the e3istence of the corpus delicti. $ith respect to the third element, the prosecution must show that the integrity of the corpus delicti has "een preserved. 1his is crucial in drugs cases "ecause the evidence involvedNthe seiDed chemicalNis not readily identifia"le "y sight or touch and can easily "e tampered with or su"stituted. 1he prosecution must esta"lish the chain of custody of the seiDed prohi"ited drugs. 2t must present testimony a"out every lin# in the chain of custody of such drugs, from the moment they were seiDed from the accused to the moment they are offered in evidence. 4ut here the prosecution failed to show the chain of custody or that they followed the procedure that has "een prescri"ed in connection with the seiDure and custody of drugs. 1o "egin with, the prosecution did not adduce evidence of when the sachet of sha"u was mar#ed. Consequently, it could have "een mar#ed long after its seiDure or even after it had "een tested in the la"oratory. $hile the records show that the sachet "ore the mar#ings !-+) )2 0602,! indicating that +angalang pro"a"ly made the mar#ing, the prosecutor did not "other to as# him if such mar#ing was his. +angalang identified the seiDed drugs in a manner that glossed over the need to esta"lish their integrity. +ince the seiDing officer usually has to turn over the seiDed drugs to the des# officer or some superior officer, who would then send a courier to the police crime la"oratory with a request that the same "e e3amined to identify the contents, it is imperative for the officer who placed his mar#ing on the plastic container to seal the same, prefera"ly with adhesive tape that usually cannot "e removed without leaving a tear on the plastic container. 2f the drugs were not in a plastic container, the police officer should put it in one and seal the same. 2n this way the drugs would assuredly reach the la"oratory in the same condition it was seiDed from the accused. Eurther, after the la"oratory technician has tested and verified the nature of the powder in the container, he should seal it again with a new seal since the police officer@s seal had "een "ro#en. 2n this way, if the accused wants to contest the test made, the Court would "e assured that what is retested is the same powder seiDed from the accused. 1he prosecutor could then as# questions of the officer who placed his mar#ing on the plastic container to prove that the suspected drugs had not "een tampered with or su"stituted when they left that officer@s hands. 2f the sealing of the seiDed article had not "een made, the prosecution would have to present the des# officer or superior officer to whom the seiDing officer turned over such article. 1hat des# officer or superior officer needs to testify that he had ta#en care that the drugs were not tampered with or su"stituted. -nd if someone else "rought the unsealed sachet of drugs to the police crime la"oratory, he, too, should give similar testimony, and so on up to the receiving custodian at the crime la"oratory until the drugs reach the la"oratory technician who e3amined and resealed it.

!e7 R"s-r%" -n. !e7 R"s-r%" v. !"n-$" -n. G"nF->- (2010) Refresher: 'n Aanuary 2/, 2002 Philip Morris wrote to the &42, requesting assistance in curtailing the proliferation of fa#e Marl"oro cigarettes in -ngeles City, Pampanga. -fter doing surveillance wor# in that city, respondent <onato, the &42 agent assigned to the case, succeeded in confirming the storage and sale of such fa#e cigarettes at the house at > &ew

*or# +treet, :illasol +u"division, -ngeles City, that "elonged to petitioner -le3ander del ,osario. 'n March >, 2002 respondent <onato applied for a search warrant with 4ranch >6 of the ,1C of -ngeles City to search the su"9ect premises. 4ut it too# a wee# later for the ,1C to hear the application and issue the search warrant. -lthough <onato felt that the delayed hearing compromised the operation, the &42 agents led "y respondent ,afael :. GonDaga proceeded to implement the warrant. 1heir search yielded no fa#e Marl"oro cigarettes. +u"sequently, the <el ,osarios filed a complaint for P>0 million in damages against respondents &42 agents <onato and GonDaga and two others "efore the ,1C of -ngeles City, 4ranch 02. 'n -ugust 0, 200/ respondents &42 agents answered the complaint with a motion to dismiss on the grounds ofK a8 the failure of the complaint to state a cause of actionI "8 forum shoppingI and c8 the &42 agents@ immunity from suit, they "eing sued as such agents. ,1C ruled for the petitioners. 5owever, C-, upon the respondent &42@s special civil action of certiorari, ruled for the latter and annulled the ,1C decision. Iss es: $hether or not the complaint of the <el ,osarios did not state a cause of action. B *E+. !"#$r%ne: $n the issue of failure to state a cause of action% 1he test of sufficiency of a complaint is whether or not, assuming the truth of the facts that plaintiff alleges in it, the court can render 9udgment granting him the 9udicial assistance he see#s. -nd 9udgment would "e right only if the facts he alleges constitute a cause of action that consists of three elementsK 7 8 the plaintiff@s legal right in the matterI 728 the defendant@s corresponding o"ligation to honor or respect such rightI and 7/8 the defendant@s su"sequent violation of the right. -"sent any of these, the complaint would have failed to state a cause of action. Essentially, however, all that the <el ,osarios allege is that respondents &42 agents used an unlawfully o"tained search warrant against them, evidenced "y the fact that, contrary to the sworn statements used to get such warrant, the &42 agents found no fa#e Marl"oro cigarettes in petitioner -le3ander del ,osario@s premises. 4ut a 9udicially ordered search that fails to yield the descri"ed illicit article does not of itself render the court@s order !unlawful.! 1he <el ,osarios did not allege that respondents &42 agents violated their right "y fa"ricating testimonies to convince the ,1C of -ngeles City to issue the search warrant. 1heir allegation that the &42 agents used an unlawfully o"tained search warrant is a mere conclusion of law. $hile a motion to dismiss assumes as true the facts alleged in the complaint, such admission does not e3tend to conclusions of law. +tatements of mere conclusions of law e3pose the complaint to a motion to dismiss on ground of failure to state a cause of action.

FLOREN!O v. PARAMO)NT (,-n -r/ 20* 2010) Refresher:

Elorendos "ought agricultural lots from -guirre. 1he titles were not transferred in their name. -fter = years, the Elorendos discovered that Paramount managed to attach the properties in a case against -guirre. 1he Elorendos sought the annulment of liens over their lots against Paramount. Paramount opposed "y saying that the annotation in their favor was free from adverse claim. ,1C ruled in favor of Elorendo. Paramount appealed the decision to C-. 2n the meantime that the case was on appeal, ,1C issued a Ospecial orderP directing the e3ecution of 9udgment in favor of Elorendo on the condition that a P;M "ond "e posted. C- reversed the ,1C and issued temporary restraining order against the ,1C@s special order to e3ecute 9udgment. Iss e: $'& C- erred in giving due course to the petition. &o. !"#$r%ne: 1he case is an e3ception to the rule that a motion for reconsideration on an order must "e sought first "efore a special civil action of certiorari must "e given due course. 2n this case, the e3ception pertains to the urgency of the situation. 1he ,1C already issued a writ of e3ecution which made the enforcement of decision imminent. 7<octrine8 1he issue of validity of e3ecution pending appeal was a pure question of law. 1here is no forum shopping in this case. 1he certiorari action refers to grave a"use of discretion "y the ,1C 9udge in allowing the e3ecution pending appeal. 'n the other hand, the ordinary appeal refers to the merit of ,1C@s decision. E3ecution was not yet a matter of right. E3ecution pending appeal must "e strictly construed "y lower courts. 7<octrine8 5ere, the reasons such as old age, ailment, and opponent@s delaying tactics are not Ogood reasonsP sufficient to compel the immediate e3ecution of ,1C 9udgment. 1he "ond of P;M to answer for damages when the ,1C decision is possi"ly reversed is insufficient security "ecause the properties are valued at P;2M. 1he decision in main case turned out to "e favora"le to Paramount. 5ence, it gives the presumption of invalidity to the ,1C special order directing e3ecution of 9udgment. REP)&LIC OF T(E P(ILIPPINES v. SAN!IGAN&A'AN* TERNATE !EVELOPMENT CORP ET AL (, 7/ 1B* 2010) Refresher: 1his case is a"out the propriety of amending a complaint for recovery of alleged ill)gotten wealth "y impleading corporate entities already listed down in the original complaint as assets and shell corporations of the defendant individuals. PCGG issued various sequestration orders against the assets, records and documents of several corporations owned "y the EnriqueD group, alleged associates of +ps. Marcos. 1he ,epu"lic then filed a complaint with the +andigan"ayan against +ps. Marcos and the EnriqueD group for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution and damages. -nne3ed to the complaint was a list of corporations where the individual defendants allegedly owned shares of stoc#. -fterwards, the government moved for the admission of an amended complaint impleading the respondents in this case, allegedly "ecause these corporations were "eneficially owned or controlled "y the individual defendants. 1hey were allegedly

used as fronts to defeat pu"lic convenience, protect fraudulent schemes or evade o"ligations and lia"ilities under the law. ?pon petition of the respondents, the +andigan"ayan issued a writ of preliminary in9unction against the repu"lic reK sequestration orders, "ut the +andigan"ayan admitted the amended complaint. &evertheless, the +andigan"ayan dimissed the case, stating that impleading the corporations as defendants was unnecessary and that the amended complaint stated no cause of action against the defendant corporations. 1he government filed then a petition for certiorari under ,ule 0>. Iss e: 1. $%& 15E -ME&<E< C'MP(-2&1 $-+ P,'PE,(* <2+M2++E< E', ,E-+'& 'E E-2(?,E 1' +1-1E - C-?+E 'E -C12'&. 2. $%& CE,12',-,2 ?&<E, ,?(E 0> $-+ 15E P,'PE, ,EME<*. &'. !"#$r%ne: . 2n the more recent case of ?niversal 4roadcasting Corporation v. +andigan"ayan 7>th <vision8, the Court again said that when corporations are organiDed with ill)gotten wealth "ut are not themselves guilty of wrongdoing and are merely the res of the actions, there is no need to implead them. Audgment may simply "e directed against the shares of stoc# that were issued in consideration of ill)gotten wealth. . - cause of action has three elementsK 8 plaintiff@s right under the lawI 728 the defendant@s o"ligation to a"ide "y such rightI and 7/8 defendant@s su"sequent violation of the same that entitles the plaintiff to sue for recompense. 1he complaint ma#es no allegations that respondent corporations have done some acts that have violated a right vested "y law in the Government. 2ndeed, the amended complaint states that it is a civil action against the individual defendants for their alleged misappropriation and theft of pu"lic funds, plunder of the nation@s wealth, e3tortion, "lac#mail, "ri"ery, em"eDDlement and other acts of corruption, "etrayal of pu"lic trust and "raDen a"use of power. 5ere, the Government ma#es no allegations that respondent corporations as such committed these acts. 2. $ith respect to the threshold issue, the Government clearly availed itself of the wrong remedy in filing this special civil action of certiorari under ,ule 0> of the ,ules of Court . -n order of dismissal is a final order, which is the proper su"9ect of an appeal through a petition for review. $here appeal is availa"le, the special civil action of certiorari will not "e entertained even if it is filed on ground of grave a"use of discretion as in this case. 1he remedies of appeal and special civil action of certiorari are mutually e3clusive. 'ne cannot ta#e the place of the other. -nd, while there are #nown e3ceptions to this rule, none has "een shown here. S(ELL P(ILIPPINES E:PLORATION &.V. vs. EFREN ,ALOS* e$ -7. (I Se3. 2010) Refresher: +hell and the ,epu"lic of the Philippines entered into +ervice Contract /= for the e3ploration and e3traction of petroleum in northwestern Palawan where natural gas was discovered and developed under the Malampaya &atural Gas Pro9ect. Aalos, et. al., claiming to "e su"sistence fishermen, filed a complaint for damages in the ,1C, alleging that their livelihood was adversely affected "y the construction and operation of +hell@s natural gas pipeline. +hell filed M1< alleging lac# of 9urisdiction as it is a Opollution caseP which falls under the Pollution -d9udication 4oard 7P-48. ,1C granted and case was dismissed. C- reversed. +C ruled that there is cause of action "ut proper venue should "e P-4. Case dismissed without pre9udice to refilling with P-4.

Iss e: . &hether or not the complaint is a pollution case that falls 'ithin the primary "urisdiction of the ()B. 'ES* while the word Spollution@ was not actually used in the complaint, the allegations imputed re +hell@s pipeline constitutes !pollution! as defined "y law. 2n resolving resps claim, the proper tri"unal must determine $'& the operation of the pipeline adversely altered the coastal waters@ properties and negatively affected its life)sustaining function. 1he power and e3pertise needed to determine such issue lies with the P-4. *. &hether or not the complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action against Shell. 'ES* even if the complaint did not contain specific allegations on how the pipeline distur"ed the waters and drove the fish away, lac# of particulars is not a ground for dismissing the complaint. $hat is important is that all the elements of a cause of action are present. 1here is a r%>h$ guaranteed "y the Constitution ) the preferential use of marine and fishing resourcesI there is a . $/ on the part of +hell to refrain from acts or omissions affecting respondents@ use and en9oyment of the seaI there is a violation "y +hell when its pipeline disrupted and impaired the natural ha"itat of fish resulting in less catch and less income for resps. +. &hether or not the suit is actually against the State and is barred under the doctrine of state immunity. NO* Shell is not an agent of the ,epu"lic of the Philippines. 2t is "ut a service contractor for the e3ploration and development of one of the country@s natural gas reserves. Even if its petroleum operations are under the +tate@s full control and supervision, it does not follow that +hell has "ecome the +tate@s !agent! within the meaning of the law. +hell@s primary o"ligation under the contract is not to represent the Philippine government for the purpose of transacting "usiness with third persons. ,ather, its contractual commitment is to develop and manage petroleum operations on "ehalf of the +tate. !"#$r%ne: 1he test for determining the sufficiency of a cause of action rests on whether the complaint alleges facts which, if true, would 9ustify the relief demanded. REP)&LIC OF T(E P(ILIPPINES vs. !EVELOPMENT RESO)RCES CORPORATION -n. R! !AVAO CIT' (1I !e#. 200A) Refresher: ,espondent <evelopment ,esources Corporation is the owner of 2 lots with 1C1s issued under its name. +aid 1C1s were only two of the many derived from 'C1 ;./ issued "y ,< <avao pursuant to an ad9udication "y CE2 <avao sitting as cadastral court in .22 in favor of -ntonio Matute. Petitioner, though '+G, filed a petition for cancellation of title and reversion of lots to the pu"lic domain. 2t claimed that no valid title vested in Matute "ecause the two lots were still part of pu"lic forest and inaliena"le since .22. 2t presented a certification to this effect from the <epartment of Environment and &atural ,esources 7<E&,8 and (C Map ;6. <,C contended that the lots could no loner "e reverted to the pu"lic domain "ecause they are now private properties held "y purchasers in good faith. ,1C dismissed. ,epu"lic failed to prove su"9ect lots were still part of the pu"lic domain when the same were ad9udicated to -ntonio Matute. 1he ,1C ruled that (C Map ;6 has no pro"ative value "ecauseK 7 8 the copy presented in court was a reproduction and not the original or certified copyI and 728 it does not show that the land was declared aliena"le and disposa"le only as of -ugust 0, .2/I rather that it was certified on that date. Iss e: $'& (C Map ;6 has pro"ative valueJ $'& <,C@s titles can "e cancelledJ

N". +ince a complaint for reversion can upset sta"ility of registered titles thru the cancellation of the original title and others emanating from it, the +tate "ears a heavy "urden of proving the ground for its action. 1he ,epu"lic failed to discharge its "urden . 1he Court held in S)), )gro-Industries, Inc. v. Republic of the (hilippines that a mere photocopy of an (C Map is not a competent evidence of the e3istence of such map. 2n this case, a certified photocopy issued "y the pu"lic officer having custody thereof should have "een presented. Eor another, the courts "elow correctly held that (C Map ;6 does not state on its face that (ot >;; "ecame aliena"le and disposa"le only on the date appearing on that Map, namely, on -ugust 0, .2/, a"out 0 months after (ots and > of Pcs) 006= of the <avao Cadastre were ad9udicated to -ntonio Matute. 1he <E&, certification has no additional value since it was 9ust "ased on the same map. 1he ,1C was correct in dismissing the case for failure of the ,epu"lic to discharge its evidential "urden. !"#$r%ne: Mere photocopy is not competent evidence. TALLORIN v. (EIRS OF ,)ANITO TARONAS (N"ve42er 20* 200A) Refresher: ,espondents 1aronas "rought action against petitioner 1allorin for the cancellation of her and two other women@s ta3 declaration over a parcel of land. 1he 1aronas alleged that, un#nown to them, the -ssessor@s 'ffice cancelled 1a3 <eclaration in the name of their father, Auanito, "ased on an unsigned though notariDed affidavit that Auanito allegedly e3ecuted in favor of petitioner 1allorin and two others, who were not impleaded here. 2n place of the cancelled one, -ssessor@s 'ffice issued a new 1a3 <eclaration in the names of the latter three persons. 1he old man 1arona@s affidavit had "een missing. 1aronas filed a motion to declare petitioner 1allorin in default for failing to answer their complaint within the allowed time. 4ut, "efore the ,1C could act on the motion, 1allorin filed a "elated answer, alleging that she held a copy of the missing affidavit of Auanito who was merely an agricultural tenant of the. 1allorin also put up the affirmative defenses of non) compliance with the requirement of conciliation proceedings and prescription. ,1C denied the 1aronas@ motion for reconsideration that it received 1allorin@s answer "efore it could issue a default order and that the 1aronas failed to show proof that 1allorin was notified of the motion three days "efore the scheduled hearing. C- ruled that the ,1C gravely a"used its discretion in admitting 1allorin@s late answer in the a"sence of a motion to admit it. Even if petitioner 1allorin had already filed her late answer, said the C-, the ,1C should have heard the 1aronas@ motion to declare 1allorin in default. ?pon remand, ,1C heard the 1aronas@ motion to declare 1allorin in default, granted it, and directed the 1aronas to present evidence e3 parte. ,1C rendered 9udgment, a8 annulling the ta3 declaration in the names of 1allorin, "8 reinstating the ta3 declaration in the name of AuanitoI and c8 ordering the issuance in its place of a new ta3 declaration in the names of Auanito@s heirs. 1he trial court also ruled that

Auanito@s affidavit authoriDing the transfer of the ta3 declaration had no "inding force since he did not sign it. Iss e: $hether or not the C- erred in failing to dismiss the 1aronas@ complaint for not impleading Margarita Pastelero :da. de :aldeD and <olores :aldeD in whose names, li#e their co)owner 1allorin, the annulled ta3 declaration had "een issued. ) *E+ !"#$r%ne: 1he rules 7 ..6 ,ules of Civil Procedure, ,ule /, +ec. 68 mandate the 9oinder of indispensa"le parties. 2ndispensa"le parties are those with such an interest in the controversy that a final decree would necessarily affect their rights, so that the courts cannot proceed without their presence. Aoining indispensa"le parties into an action is mandatory, "eing a requirement of due process. Audgments do not "ind strangers to the suit. 1he a"sence of an indispensa"le party renders all su"sequent actions of the court null and void. 2ndeed, it would have no authority to act, not only as to the a"sent party, "ut as to those present as well. 1he responsi"ility for impleading all indispensa"le parties lies in the plaintiff. in riarte v. (eople, although not conclusive, a ta3 declaration is a telling evidence of the declarant@s possession which could ripen into ownership. 5ere, ,1C and C- annulled 1a3 <eclaration that "elonged not only to defendant 1allorin "ut also to those two persons had no opportunity to "e heard as they were never impleaded. 4ut in Butin (lasabas v. .ourt of )ppeals, the non)9oinder of indispensa"le parties is not a ground for dismissal. +ection , ,ule / of the ..6 ,ules of Civil Procedure prohi"its the dismissal of a suit on the ground of non)9oinder or mis9oinder of parties and allows the amendment of the complaint at any stage of the proceedings, through motion or on order of the court on its own initiative. 'nly if plaintiff refuses to implead an indispensa"le party, despite the order of the court, may it dismiss the action. &PI v. SPS NORMAN -n. ANGELINA ') J T)ANSON &)IL!ERS (,-n -r/ 20* 2010) Refresher: &orman and -ngelina *u doing "usiness as 1uanson 1rading, and 1uanson 4uilders Corporation "orrowed P6>m from Ear East 4an# and 1rust Company. Eor collateral, they e3ecuted real estate mortgages over several of their properties,including lands owned "y 1uanson 1rading. 1he *us, una"le to pay, requested a loan restructuring with the 4an# which now merged with 4P2. <espite the restructuring, however, the *us still had difficulties paying their loan. 1hey as#ed 4P2 to release some of the mortgaged lands since their total appraised value e3ceeded the amount of the remaining de"t. $hen 4P2 ignored their request, the *us withheld payments on their amortiDations. 1hus, 4P2 e3tra9udicially foreclosed the mortgaged properties. 1he winning "idder was Magnacraft <evelopment Corporation. 1he *us instituted a court action against Magnacraft and 4P2 to retrieve the properties. 1he *us then entered into a compromise agreement with Magnacraft, thus it instituted a new action against 4P2 alone for recovery of alleged e3cessive penalty charges, attorney@s fees, and foreclosure e3penses that the "an# caused to "e incorporated in the price of the auctioned properties.

1he *us moved for summary 9udgment which the ,1C partially granted 2 relation to the penalty charged which they reduced from /0T to 2T and the attorney@s fees which they held to "e reasona"le. 5owever the ,1C ruled it needed to receive evidence to resolve the remaining issues with regard to the foreclosure e3penses. 1he *us moved for partial reconsideration arguing that since 4P2 did not mar# in evidence any document in support of the foreclosure e3penses it claimed, it may "e assumed that the "an# had no evidence to prove such e3penses. 1hus, the court could already resolve without trial the issue of whether or not the foreclosure of the property was valid. 1he *us also sought reconsideration of the reduction of penalty charges claiming that they should "e deleted since 4P2 violated ,- /60> or the truth in lending ac for failure to state the rate of penalties on late amortiDations. 1he ,1C thus reconsidered its decision and rendered a summary 9udgment deleting the penalty charges. 4P2 appealed to the C- which affirmed the ,1C decision. 1hus 4P2@s present recourse. ISS)ES: . $%& the summary 9udgment rendered "y the ,1C was properJ *E+ 2. $%& the deletion of penalty charges was correctJ *E+ !"#$r%ne: . ,?(EK - summary 9udgment is apt when the essential facts of the case are uncontested or the parties do not raise any genuine issue of fact. -PP(2E<K 1he issue on e3cessive charges may "e resolved "y the ,1C "y loo#ing through the ff documentsK a8 the pleadings of the partiesI "8 the loan agreements, the promissory note, and the real estate mortgages "etween themI c8 the foreclosure and "idding documentsI and d8 the admissions and other disclosures "etween the parties during pre)trial. 2n this case since +ince the parties admitted not only the e3istence, authenticity, and genuine e3ecution of these documents "ut also what they stated, the trial court did not need to hold a trial for the reception of the evidence of the parties. 4P2 has failed to name any document or item of fact that it would have wanted to adduce at the trial of the case. 2. ,?(EK ?nder +ec ; of the 1ruth in (ending -ct, a penalty charge is considered a finance charge which represents the amount to "e paid "y the de"tor incident to the e3tension of credit.! 1he lender may provide for a penalty clause so long as the amount or rate of the charge and the conditions under which it is to "e paid are disclosed to the "orrower "efore he enters into the credit agreement. ?nder Circular >= of the Central 4an#, the lender is required to include the information required "y ,.-. /60> in the contract covering the credit transaction or any other document to "e ac#nowledged and signed "y the "orrower. 2n addition, the contract or document shall specify additional charges, if any, which will "e collected in case certain stipulations in the contract are not met "y the de"tor.! -PP(2E<K although 4P2 failed to state the penalty charges in the disclosure statement, the promissory note that the *us signed,contained data, including penalty charges, required "y the 1ruth in (ending -ct. 1hey cannot avoid lia"ility "ased on a rigid interpretation of the 1ruth in (ending -ct that contravenes its goal.

4ut ,the courts also have authority to reduce penalty charges when these are unreasona"le and iniquitous. 1hus in this case, considering that 4P2 had already received over P2.6 million in interest, the +C finds the deletion of the penalty charges reasona"le. CA&A!OR v. PEOPLE (O#$"2er 2* 200A) Refresher: 2n 2000, -ntonio Ca"ador was accused of murder in conspiracy with others, "efore ,1C of UC. 2n 2000, after presenting only > witnesses over > years of intermittent trial, the ,1C declared at an end the prosecution@s presentation of evidence and required the prosecution to ma#e a written or formal offer of its documentary evidence within > days from notice. 4ut the pu"lic prosecutor as#ed for three e3tensions of time. +till, the prosecution did not ma#e the required written offer. Ca"ador filed a motion to dismiss the case. ?n#nown to petitioner Ca"ador, however, ; days earlier the prosecution as#ed for another e3tension, which offer it eventually made on -ugust , 2000, the day Ca"ador filed his motion to dismiss. 'n -ugust / , 2000 the ,1C issued an 'rder treating petitioner Ca"ador@s motion to dismiss as a demurrer to evidence. -nd, since he filed his motion without leave of court, the ,1C declared him to have waived his right to present evidence in his defense. ,1CK denied Ca"ador@s motion for reconsideration C-K affirmed. Iss e: $%& Ca"ador@s M1< was a demurrer to evidence filed without leave of court, with the result that he effectively waived his right to present evidence in his defense and su"mitted the case for decision insofar as he was concerned. &o. !"#$r%ne: 1o determine whether the pleading filed is a demurer to evidence or a motion to dismiss, the Court must consider 7 8 the allegations in it made in good faithI 728 the stage of the proceeding at which it is filedI and 7/8 the primary o"9ective of the party filing it. 1he Court finds that petitioner Ca"ador filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of violation of his right to speedy trial, not a demurrer to evidence. 5e cannot "e declared to have waived his right to present evidence in his defense. P-#%f%#" R. Cr F v. The S-n.%>-n2-/-n* e$. A7. (Fe2r -r/ 12* 2010) Refresher: 1he 1as# Eorce found that certain officials of the <epartment of Einance had "een issuing ta3 credit certificates 71CCs8 to entities that did not earn them through ta3 overpayments. -ccording to respondent 1as# Eorce, the <iamond Lnitting Corporation 7<LC8 shut down its operations in ../ yet the <'E@s 'ne)+top Center issued to it 1CCs totaling P / M from ..; to ..6. <LC in turn sold a num"er of these 1CCs to Pilipinas +hell Petroleum Corporation 7Pilipinas +hell8 with the approval of the 'ne)+top Center. Pilipinas +hell then used these 1CCs to pay off its e3cise ta3 o"ligations to the 4ureau of 2nternal ,evenue 742,8.

4elieving that petitioner Pacifico ,. CruD, the General Manager of Pilipinas +hell@s 1reasury and 1a3ation <epartment, was a party to the fraud, the 1as# Eorce included him in its complaint for plunder "efore respondent 'ffice of the 'm"udsman 7'M48. 1he 'M4 dismissed the plunder charge "ut caused the filing of separate informations for multiple violations of +ection /7e8 of the -nti)Graft and Corrupt Practices -ct against petitioner CruD and the others with him. CruD sought the reinvestigation of the cases. -fter reinvestigation, the Prosecutor recommended the dropping of the charges against CruD. ?pon review, the 'M4 approved respondent '+P@s recommendation. More than five months later the '+P, acting through Prosecutor $arlito E. Galisanao, filed a motion with the +andigan"ayan to hold in a"eyance action on the '+P@s motion to drop petitioner CruD from the charges. -t the hearing of the motion when neither CruD nor his counsel was present, Prosecutor 5umphrey 1. Monteroso orally moved to withdraw the '+P@s motion to drop CruD from the informations. 1he +andigan"ayan promptly granted Monteroso@s oral motion. *et, later the '+P still filed a motion to withdraw its motion to drop CruD from the informations. Iss es:

$%& the '+P acted in violation of petitioner CruD@s right to due process of law when it impulsively and ar"itrarily disregarded its previous finding of lac# of pro"a"le cause without hearing and filed a motion to withdraw its motion to drop CruD from the 2nformations. *E+ .ommissioner of Internal Revenue that Pilipinas +hell was a transferee in good faith and for value of the 1CCs in question "ar the prosecution of CruD in the criminal cases su"9ect of this petition. *E+

2. $%& the findings of the Court in (ilipinas Shell (etroleum .orporation v.

!"#$r%ne: . 5ere, after respondent '+P considered the evidence anew at reinvestigation, it ruled that such evidence did not esta"lish pro"a"le cause against petitioner CruD. ,espondent '+P, therefore, recommended the dropping of petitioner CruD@s name from the charges already filed in court. -nd the 'M4 approved this recommendation. 1he necessary implication of this is that the 'M4 had, after reinvestigation, found no pro"a"le cause against CruD. 4ased on its finding, therefore, the +tate did not have the right to prosecute him. $ith this result, it was a matter of duty for respondent '+P to apply with the +andigan"ayan for the withdrawal of the charges against CruD. 2. 1he main issue in this case is whether or not CruD connived with the officials of the 'ne)+top Center and others in unlawfully giving, through manifest partiality and "ad faith, unwarranted "enefits to <LC "y processing and approving such transfers to Pilipinas +hell, #nowing that <LC, the transferee, had "een a dormant company. 1his Court resolved su"stantially the same issue in Pilipinas +hell Petroleum Corporation v. Commissioner of 2nternal ,evenue. 1he parties in the ta3 case and in the criminal cases also represent su"stantially identical interests. 1he principle of res

9udicata through conclusiveness of 9udgment applies to "ar the criminal actions against CruD. SANC(E+ v. REP)&LIC OF T(E P(ILIPPINES (O#$"2er A* 200A) Refresher: 1he ?niversity of (ife Comple3 7Comple38 was "uilt "y the G'CC 5uman +ettlements <evelopment Corporation 75+<C8 using pu"lic funds during the time of Pres. Marcos. Eventually the government gave the management and operation of the Comple3 to the ?niversity of (ife Eoundation, 2nc. 7?(E28 4ut 5+<C was to continue to construct and acquire equipment for it. -fter the Marcos regime, 5+<C was reorganiDed into +2<C',. 1he government realiDed that ?(E2 owed P/0M to 5+<C "ecause it never paid for the annual fee due the latter. +2<C', rescinded the 5+<C)?(E2 agreement. 2ronically, in its place, +2<C', entered into an 2nterim Management -greement with ?(E2, allowing it to continue managing and operating the Comple3. Government transferred Comple3 from ?E(2 to <EC+. ?nlaful detainer suit "y <EC+ against ?(E2 which was granted on appeal. <EC+ filed a complaint for collection of the unremitted rents and damages against 5enri Lahn, ?(E2@s President, and petitioner Manuel (uis +. +ancheD, its E3ecutive :ice)President, "ased on their personal lia"ility under +ection / of the Corporation Code. 1he latter two were Managing <irector and Einance <irector, respectively, of the corporation. 1he underlying theory of the case is that Lahn and +ancheD !operated ?(E2 as if it were their own property, handled the collections and spent the money as if it were their personal "elonging.! 2n a nutshell, +ancheD argues that he cannot "e made personally lia"le for ?(E2@s corporate o"ligations a"sent specific allegations in the complaint and evidence adduced during trial that would warrant a piercing of the corporate veil. 5e further argues that the <EC+ is "arred "y res "udicata and forum shopping from collecting from him what it could not get "y e3ecution from ?(E2 under the 9udgment in the e9ectment case. Einally, he claims that "ecause ?(E2 suffered losses in operations during the period ..2 up to ..0, there could have "een nothing left of the rentals it collected from the lessees of the Comple3. Iss e: $%& 1here was forum shopping ) &' !"#$r%ne: 1he essence of forum shopping is the filing of multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of o"taining a favora"le 9udgment. 1his is not the case with respect to the e9ectment suit vis) V)vis the action for damages. 1he <EC+ does not have to invo#e the doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate fiction. +ection / a"ove e3pressly lays down petitioner +ancheD and Lahn@s lia"ility for damages arising from their gross negligence or "ad faith in directing corporate affairs. LAN! &AN8 OF T(E P(ILIPPINES v. MONETKS E:PORT AN! MAN)FACT)RING CORP. Refresher: 'n Aune 2>, .= petitioner (and 4an# and respondent Monet@s E3port and Manufacturing Corporation 7Monet8 e3ecuted an E3port Pac#ing Credit (ine -greement under which the "an# gave Monet a credit line of P2>0,000.00. (and 4an# that Monet@s o"ligation had swelled toP ,;0;,2;0. .. +ince Monet failed to pay despite demands, the "an# filed a collection suit against Monet and the 1agles. Monet and the 1agles claimed that (and 4an# had refused to collect receiva"les on Monet@s e3port letter of credit and also that it made unauthoriDed payment on its import letter of credit to 4eautili#e 75.L.8 (td. 72n other words,

(and 4an# mismanaged its client@s affairs under the -greement.8,1C recogniDed Monet and the 1agles@ o"ligations to (and 4an# in the amount reflected in E3hi"it /., the "an#@s +chedule of -mortiDation from its (oans and <iscount <epartment, "ut sans any penalty. 1he ,1C ordered petitioners to pay (and 4an# the same. 'n appeal to the Court of -ppeals, the court affirmed the ,1C. - petition for review was sent to the +C and the court remanded the case noting that E3hi"it /., the +ummary of -vailment and +chedule of -mortiDation, on which "oth the ,1C and the C- relied, covered only Monet@s de"t of P2.> million under Promissory &ote P).= , a small amount compared to the P ,;0;,2;0. . that (and 4an# sought to collect from it. ,emanded to the ,1C, and no new evidence given "y the counsels, the ,1C stood "y E3hi"it /. as the "asis of its finding that Monet and the 1agles owed (and 4an# onlyP2.> million as opposed to the latter@s claim of P ,;0;,2;0. .. (and 4an# filed a motion for reconsideration to ena"le it to adduce in evidence a Consolidated 4illing +tatement to show how much Monet and the 1agles still owed the "an#. 4ut the trial court denied the motion. (and 4an# appealed the order to the C- affirmed the ,1C. (and 4an# moved for reconsideration, "ut the C- denied it hence, the present petition "y (and 4an#. Iss e: $%& the ,1C and the C- acted correctly in denying petitioner (and 4an#@s motion to reopen the hearing to allow it to present the "an#@s updated Consolidated 4illing +tatement that reflects respondents Monet and the 1agles@ remaining inde"tedness to it. B &' !"#$r%ne: +uch "illing statement, said the C-, did not constitute sufficient evidence to prove Monet@s total inde"tedness for the simple reason that this Court in G.,. 0 =0> regarded a prior Consolidated +tatement of -ccount for ..2 insufficient for that purpose. 4ut what the ,1C and the C- did not realiDe is that the original ,1C decision of Auly >, ..6 was an incomplete decision since it failed to resolve the main issue that the collection suit presentedK how much Monet and the 1agles e3actly owed (and 4an#. 2n reverting "ac# to E3hi"it /., which covers 9ust one of many promissory notes that Monet and the 1agles e3ecuted in favor of (and 4an#, the ,1C and the C- have shown an un9ustified o"stinacy and a lac# of understanding of what the Court wanted done to clear up the issue of how much Monet and the 1agles still owed the "an#. 1he "an# lawyer who claimed that (and 4an# had no further evidence to present during the hearing was of course in error and it pro"a"ly warranted a dismissal of the "an#@s claim for failure to prosecute. 4ut the "an#@s motion for reconsideration, as#ing for an opportunity to present evidence of the status of the loans, opened up a chance for the ,1C to a"ide "y what the Court required of it. 2t committed error, together with the C-, in ruling that a reopening of the hearing would serve no useful purpose.

REP)&LIC OF T(E P(ILIPPINES v. CATARRO,A Refresher: ,espondents filed a petition for reconstitution of lost original certificate of title covering two lots in Capang, 1ernate, Cavite. 1he Catarro9as alleged that they inherited these lands from their parents, Eermin and +ancha Catarro9a, who reportedly applied for their registration with the Court of Eirst 2nstance of Cavite sometime "efore the last world war. 1he (and ,egistration -uthority 7(,-8 issued a certification and a report confirming that the land registration court issued <ecree 6;../2 on May 2 , .; covering the su"9ect lots. - copy of this decree was, however, no longer availa"le in the records of the (,-. 1he (,- report

verified as correct the plans and technical descriptions of the su"9ect lots which had "een approved.1he Catarro9as alleged that, pursuant to the decree, the ,egister of <eeds of Cavite issued an original certificate of title to their parents. 4ut, as it happened, "ased on a certification issued "y the ,egister of <eeds, the original on file with it was lost in the fire that gutted the old Cavite capitol "uilding .1he Catarro9as also claimed that the owner@s duplicate copy of the title had "een lost while with their parents. ,1C issued an 'rder, granting the petition for reconstitution of title. 1he Court of -ppeals 7C-8 reversed the ,1C decision. 2t held that the evidence of the Catarro9as failed to esta"lish any of the sources for reconstitution enumerated in +ection 2 of ,epu"lic -ct 7,.-.8 20 7-n act providing a special procedure for reconstitution of 1orrens certificate of title lost or destroyed8. 1he Catarro9as did not have proof that an original certificate of title had in fact "een issued covering the su"9ect lots. 'n motion for reconsideration, however, the Crendered an amended decision finding sufficient evidence to allow reconstitution of the Catarro9as@ title. Iss e: $%& the C- erred in finding sufficient evidence to grant the petition for reconstitution of title. *E+ !"#$r%ne: 1his is a"out a petition for reconstitution of a lost original certificate of title in which the respondents have "een una"le to present evidence that such title had in fact "een issued "y an appropriate land registration court. ,.-. 20 governs the reconstitution of lost or destroyed 1orrens certificates of title. 2ts +ection 2 enumerates the following sources for the reconstitution of such titlesK 7a8 1he owner@s duplicate of the certificate of titleI 7"8 1he co)owner@s, mortgagee@s, or lessee@s duplicate of the certificate of titleI 7c8 - certified copy of the certificate of title, previously issued "y the register of deeds or "y a legal custodian thereofI 7d8 -n authenticated copy of the decree of registration or patent, as the case may "e, pursuant to which the original certificate of title was issuedI 7e8 - document, on file in the ,egistry of <eeds, "y which the property, the description of which is given in said document, is mortgaged, leased or encum"ered, or an authenticated copy of said document showing that its original had "een registeredI and 7f8 -ny other document which, in the 9udgment of the court, is sufficient and proper "asis for reconstituting the lost or destroyed certificate of title. -dmittedly, the Catarro9as have "een una"le to present any of the documents mentioned in paragraphs 7a8 to 7e8 a"ove. 1heir parents allegedly lost the owner@s duplicate certificate of title. 1hey did not have a certified copy of such certificate of title or a co)owner@s, a mortgagee@s, or a lessee@s duplicate of the same. 1he (,- itself no longer has a copy of the original decree or an authenticated copy of it. (i#ewise, the ,egister of <eeds did not have any document of encum"rance on file that shows the description of the property. 1he only documentary evidence the Catarro9as could produce as possi"le sources for the reconstitution of the lost title are those other documents descri"ed in paragraph 7f8. 1his Court has, in ,epu"lic v. 2ntermediate -ppellate Court, applied the principle of e9usdem generis in interpreting +ection 27f8 of ,.-. 20. !-ny other document! refers to relia"le documents of the #ind descri"ed in the preceding enumerations. 1his Court is not convinced that the documents the Catarro9as su"mitted fall in the same class as those enumerated in paragraphs 7a8 to 7e8. &one of them proves that a certificate of title had in fact "een issued in the name of their parents.

Moreover the Catarro9as failed to show that they e3erted efforts to loo# for and avail of the sources in paragraphs 7a8 to 7e8 "efore availing themselves of the sources in paragraph 7f8. -"sent a clear and convincing proof that an original certificate of title had in fact "een issued to their parents in due course, the Catarro9as cannot claim that their predecessors succeeded in acquiring title to the su"9ect lots. 1he nature of reconstitution of a lost or destroyed certificate of title denotes a restoration of the instrument in its original form and condition. 1hat cannot "e done without proof that such certificate of title had once e3isted. PANLILIO v. COMELEC Refresher: Panlilio8 and respondent <e Aesus ran against each other for Mayor. <e Aesus got /,.02 votes as against Panlilio@s /, >0 votes, with <e Aesus winning "y 6>2 votes. Panlilio filed an election protest with the ,1C. 1he ,1C declared Panlilio the winner over <e Aesus "y two votes. <e Aesus appealed the ,1C decision to the C'ME(EC. 5e filed a petition for certiorari with application for a temporary restraining order 71,'8 and preliminary in9unction with the C'ME(EC against the ,1C and petitioner <e Aesus, 0 see#ing to annul the order of e3ecution pending appeal. C'ME(EC@s +econd <ivision issued a 00)day 1,', en9oining the e3ecution pending appeal. 1he +econd <ivision did not find good reasons for allowing e3ecution of the ,1C decision pending an appeal from it to the C'ME(EC. 1hereafter, Panlilio as#ed the ,1C to implement the writ of e3ecution it earlier issued in his favor, given that the C'ME(EC@s 00)day 1,' had already e3pired. 1he Court granted the motion. C'ME(EC en "anc set aside the ,1C@s order. ISS)E: whether or not the C'ME(EC en "anc acted with grave a"use of discretion when it en9oined the implementation of the ,1C@s order of e3ecution pending appeal notwithstanding the lapse of the 00)day 1,' that the C'ME(EC +econd <ivision had earlier issued. (EL!: &'. !OCTRINE: 1he +econd <ivision may not have issued a preliminary in9unction "ut it did something even "etter than that. 2t issued after hearing its resolution of Auly >, 200=, already ad9udicating the merits of the case. 2t annulled the ,1C order that allowed the e3ecution of its decision pending appeal for lac# of good reasons to support its issuance. 1rue, the implementation of the main relief grantedNthe setting aside of the ,1C@s orders that allowed e3ecution pending appealNmay "e deemed suspended when petitioner Panlilio filed a motion for its reconsideration.22 4ut the preliminary in9unction component of the resolutionBthe maintenance of the status quo that e3isted "efore the ,1C issued its -pril 6, 200= orderNis not suspended. 2t is e3pressly #ept in force. PEOPLE OF T(E P(ILIPPINES v. ROM' FALLONES (MARC( 11* 2011) Refresher:

,omy Eallones was charged with the rape of O-liceP a mental retardate. -lice however died "efore she could testify in trial. 1he prosecution instead presented her father, sister, a police investigator and the two apprehending officers. -lice@s sister, -malia, testified that at a"out .K;> a.m. on Aune 2., 200;, her mother told her older sister, -lice, to loo# for their "rother -ndoy. +ince -ndoy arrived without -lice, her mother as#ed -malia to loo# for her. -malia loo#ed in places where -ndoy often played and this led her near accused Eallones@ house. -s she approached the house, -malia heard someone crying out from within, !1ama na, tama naW! ,ecogniDing -lice@s voice, -malia repeatedly #noc#ed on the door until Eallones opened it. -malia saw her sister standing "ehind him. -s -malia went in to ta#e her sister out, -lice held out a sanitary nap#in and, crying, said that Eallones had given her the nap#in. -lice@s shorts were wet and "lood) stained. Erightened and trou"led, the two girls went home. 'n their way home, -lice recounted to her sister that Eallones "rought her to his "athroom, pulled down her shorts, and ravished her. +he said that Eallones wet her shorts to ma#e it appear that she tripped and had her monthly period. Eallones denied the accusations against him. 'n Auly 0, 2006 the ,1C rendered a <ecision, finding the accused guilty "eyond reasona"le dou"t of simple rape. 1he ,1C sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and ordered him to pay P>0,000.00 as civil indemnity and P>0,000.00 as damages. 1he accused appealed to the Court of -ppeals 7C-8 "ut the latter court rendered 9udgment on Aune /0, 200., affirming the ,1C <ecision. -ccused Eallones moved for reconsideration "ut the C- denied his motion, hence, the present appeal to this Court. Iss e: $hether or not the C- erred in affirming the ,1C@s finding that accused Eallones raped -lice, a mental retardate. B &' !"#$r%ne: -lthough -lice died "efore she could testify, the evidence shows that she positively identified Eallones as her a"user "efore the "arangay officials and the police. -malia, her sister, testified of her own personal #nowledge that she had "een out loo#ing for -lice that midmorningI that she heard the latter@s voice from within Eallones@ house imploring her attac#er to stop what he was doing to herI that upon repeatedly #noc#ing at Eallones@ door, he opened it, revealing the presence of her sister, her shorts "loodied. -lthough with mental retardation, the prosecution also presented the psychologist who confirmed that -lice had "een se3ually a"used and suffered post)traumatic stress disorder. 'n cross)e3amination, the psychologist testified that while -lice may "e vulnera"le to suggestions, she had no a"ility to recall or act out things that may have "een taught to her. &either can anyone manipulate her emotions if indeed she was influenced "y others. -malia@s personal #nowledge not hearsay -ccused Eallones tried to discredit -malia@s testimony as hearsay, dou"tful, and unrelia"le. 4ut, although what -lice told -malia may have "een hearsay, the rest of the latter@s testimony, which esta"lished "oth concomitant and su"sequent circumstance, are admissi"le in evidence having "een given from personal #nowledge. ,es Gestae Eurther, the Court considers a res gestae -malia@s recital of what she heard -lice utter when she came and rescued her. ,es gestae refers to statements made "y the participants or the victims of, or the spectators to, a crime immediately "efore, during, or after its commission.

1hese statements are a spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired "y the e3citement of the occasion, without any opportunity for the declarant to fa"ricate a false statement. Eor spontaneous statements to "e admitted in evidence, the following must concurK 8 the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrenceI 28 the statements were made "efore the declarant had time to contrive or deviseI and /8 the statements concerned the occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances.

PEOPLE VS. ,AN MIC(AEL TAN (!e#e42er A 200A) Refresher: - new presiding 9udge reversed the order of the previous acting 9udge. 5e found pro"a"le cause against respondents and ordered the issuance of warrants for their arrest. Iss e: $hether the presiding 9udge gravely a"used his discretion when he ree3amined and reversed his predecessor@s finding of lac# of pro"a"le cause. &o. !"#$r%ne: Pro"a"le cause assumes the e3istence of facts that would lead a reasona"ly discreet and prudent man to "elieve that a crime has "een committed and that it was li#ely committed "y the person sought to "e arrested. 2t requires neither a"solute certainty nor clear and convincing evidence of guilt. 1he test for issuing a warrant of arrest is less stringent than that used for esta"lishing the guilt of the accused. -s long as the evidence shows a prima facie case against the accused, the trial court has sufficient ground to issue a warrant for his arrest. - trial, unli#e preliminary investigations, could yield more evidence favora"le to either side after the interrogations of the witnesses either on direct e3amination or on cross) e3amination. $hat is important is that there is some rational "asis for going ahead with 9udicial inquiry into the case.

ESPIRIT) V. PETRON AN! !OLOIRAS (N"ve42er 20 200A) Refresher: -n employee of LPE, e3clusive distri"utor of Petron Gasul in +orsogon saw loaded in one 4icol Gas truc# a Gasul tan# filled with 4icol Gas (PG. LPE and Petron then filed a complaint against 4icol Gas for violations of ,epu"lic -ct 7,.-.8 02/ 7illegally filling up registered cylinder tan#s8, as amended, and +ections >> 7infringement of trade mar#s8 and 0.. 7unfair competition8 of the 2ntellectual Property Code 7,.-. =2./8. C&E+ filed "y LPE and Petron "efore the C- was signed only "y Petron through an -tty. CruD. Iss e: $hether the C&E+ complied with what the rules require. *E+. !"#$r%ne: 4ut, while procedural requirements such as that of su"mittal of a certificate of non)forum shopping cannot "e totally disregarded, they may "e deemed su"stantially complied with under 9ustifia"le circumstances.6 'ne of these circumstances is where the petitioners filed a collective action in which they share a common interest in its su"9ect matter or raise a common cause of action. 2n such a case, the certification "y one of the petitioners may "e deemed sufficient.

5ere, LPE and Petron shared a common cause of action against petitioners Espiritu, et al., namely, the violation of their proprietary rights with respect to the use of Gasul tan#s and trademar#. Eurthermore, -tty. CruD said in his certification that he was e3ecuting it !for and on "ehalf of the Corporation, and co)petitioner Carmen A. <oloiras.!1hus, the o"9ect of the requirement B to ensure that a party ta#es no recourse to multiple forums B was su"stantially achieved. 4esides, the failure of LPE to sign the certificate of non)forum shopping does not render the petition defective with respect to Petron which signed it through -tty. CruD.

COMMERCIAL LAW
PN& v. CORP)+ (2010) Refresher: CorpuD delivered her owner@s duplicate copy of 1C1 to <agupan City ,ural 4an# as security against any lia"ility she might incur as its cashier. +he later left her 9o" and went to the +tates. 1he rural "an# cancelled its lien as CorpuD did not incur any lia"ility. 4ut the manager, in connivance with Camacho, Calle9o and someone from the assessor@s office prepared several deeds of sale that made it appear that the lot was transferred to different people, eventually to the +pouses +ongcuan, through a sale that originated from CorpuD. 1he +ps. +ongcuan o"tained a loan from P&4 and as security, they e3ecuted a ,EM on their title. P&4 granted the loan. CorpuD filed a complaint as#ing for annulment of the layers of deeds of sale and the cancellation of the 1C1s in the name of the O"uyersP and the reinstatement of the 1C1 in her name. Iss e: $%& petitioner P&4 is a mortgagee in good faith, entitling it to its lien on the title to the property in dispute. &' !"#$r%ne: 4an#s are e3pected to "e more cautious than ordinary individuals in dealing with lands, even registered ones, since the "usiness of "an#s is im"ued with pu"lic interest. 2t is of 9udicial notice that the standard practice for "an#s "efore approving a loan is to send a staff to the property offered as collateral and verify the genuineness of the title to determine the real owner or owners. NORT( &)LACAN v. P&COM (2010) Refresher: &4CXs parent company, C:2, entered into a A:- with E+P52 to develop the latter@s property into low and medium)cost housing pro9ects. E+P52 will supply the land and C:2 will develop it. 1he parties amended the A:- to ena"le &4C to su"stitute for C:2. P4Com offered to finance the whole pro9ect and immediately provide &4C a loan facility on the condition that the Pag)242G will directly pay P4Com for the houses upon completion of construction, whether or not these had "een sold. &4C accepted the "an#@s offer. &4C e3ecuted a deed of assignment, assigning to P4Com its rights and interests over all payments that may "e due it from the Pag)242G. 5owever, P4Com discontinued its financial support to &4C "ecause 4+P had issued a cease) and)desist order against the "an#. $hen it "ecame apparent that P4Com had no intention of complying with its commitment, &4C sought help from Cocolife and (and 4an# which e3pressed their intention to finance the pro9ect "y ta#ing out &4CXs loan from P4Com. 4ut the latter refused the offer, insisting on the supposed 4+P cease)and)desist order. &4C@s construction eventually stopped for lac# of funds. &4C filed a petition for corporate reha"ilitation. ,1C granted petition "ut C- reversed the decision. Iss e: $%& C- erred in dismissing &4C@s action for corporate reha"ilitation ) &' !"#$r%ne: 1he Court enacted the 2nterim ,ules of Procedure on Corporate ,eha"ilitation to provide a remedy for summary and non)adversarial reha"ilitation proceedings of distressed "ut via"le corporations. 1he intent is consistent with the commercial nature of reha"ilitation, which see#s to e3pedite its resolution for the "enefit, not only of the petitioner)corporation, "ut of all the parties involved and the economy in general. 1hese rules are to "e construed li"erally to o"tain for the parties a 9ust, e3peditious, and ine3pensive disposition of the

case. 1he parties may not, however, invo#e such li"erality if it will result in the utter disregard of the rules or cause needless delay in the administration of 9ustice. IEMELIF v. &IS(OP LA+ARO (01 , 7/ 2010 ) Refresher: 2n .0., the petitioner 2glesia Evangelica Metodista En (as 2slas Eilipinas, 2nc. 72EME(2E8 was esta"lished as a corporation sole. -pparently, although the 2EME(2E remained a corporation sole on paper 7with all corporate powers theoretically lodged in the hands of one mem"er, the General +uperintendent8, it had always acted li#e a corporation aggregate. +u"sequently, during its .6/ General Conference, the general mem"ership voted to put things right "y changing 2EME(2E@s organiDational structure from a corporation sole to a corporation aggregate. 'n May 6, .6/ the +ecurities and E3change Commission 7+EC8 approved the vote. Eor some reasons, however, the corporate papers of the 2EME(2E remained unaltered as a corporation sole. 2n response to +EC@s later o"9ection that conversion was not properly carried out and documented, 2EME(2E amended its articles of incorporation to reflect the conversion from corporation sole into corporation aggregate. Iss e: $'& a corporation may change its character as a corporation sole into a corporation aggregate "y mere amendment of its articles of incorporation without first going through the process of dissolution ) *E+ !"#$r%ne: 1here is no point to dissolving the corporation sole of one mem"er to ena"le the corporation aggregate to emerge from it. $hether it is a non)stoc# corporation or a corporation sole, the corporate "eing remains distinct from its mem"ers, whatever "e their num"er. 1he increase in the num"er of its corporate mem"ership does not change the comple3ion of its corporate responsi"ility to third parties. 1he one mem"er, with the concurrence of two)thirds of the mem"ership of the organiDation for whom he acts as trustee, can self)will the amendment. 5e can, with mem"ership concurrence, increase the technical num"er of the mem"ers of the corporation from !sole! or one to the greater num"er authoriDed "y its amended articles.

CRIMINAL LAW
LE,ANO v. PEOPLE (2011) Refresher: 1he +upreme Court reversed C- 9udgment and acquitted 5u"ert $e"" et al of the :iDconde murders. Ground B lac# of proof of guilt "eyond reasona"le dou"t. (auro :iDconde filed a motion for consideration, as#ing the +C to reverse the 9udgment of acquittal, claiming it denied the prosecution due process. Iss e: $%& a 9udgment for acquittal can "e reconsidered B &' !"#$r%ne: -rt 222, +ec. 2 of the Constitution provides, O&o person shall "e twice put in 9eopardy of punishment for the same offense.P T" re#"ns%.er - D .>4en$ "f -#? %$$-7 37-#es $he -## se. $=%#e %n De"3-r./ "f 2e%n> 3 n%she. f"r $he #r%4e "f =h%#h he h-s -7re-./ 2een -2s"7ve.. People v. +andigan"ayanK O1he provision therefore guarantees that the +tate shall not "e permitted to ma#e repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense... +ociety@s awareness of the heavy personal strain which a criminal trial represents for the individual defendant is manifested in the willingness to limit the government to a single criminal proceeding to vindicate its very vital interest in the enforcement of criminal laws.P On "##-s%"ns* - 4"$%"n f"r re#"ns%.er-$%"n -f$er -n -#? %$$-7 %s 3"ss%27e . 4ut the grounds are e3ceptional and narrow as when the court that a"solved the accused gravely a"used its discretion, resulting in loss of 9urisdiction, or when a mistrial has occurred. 2n any of such cases, the +tate may assail the decision "y special civil action of certiorari under ,ule 0>. ?ltimately, what the complainant actually questions is the Court@s appreciation of the evidence and assessment of the prosecution witnesses@ credi"ility. Concurring opinion, (ereno, ). 1he evidence tends to demonstrate that 5u"ert $e"" is innocent. 1he simple fact also is that the evidence demonstrates that not only had Aessica -lfaro failed to su"stantiate her testimony, she had contradicted herself and had "een contradicted "y other more "elieva"le evidence. $hile -s - >ener-7 r 7e* - $r%-7 D .>eEs f%n.%n>s -s $" $he #re.%2%7%$/ "f =%$ness -re en$%$7e. $" $4"s$ res3e#$ as he has had the opportunity to o"serve their demeanor on the witness stand, $h%s h"7.s $r e "n7/ %n $he -2sen#e "f 2%-s* 3-r$%-7%$/* -n. >r-ve -2 se "f .%s#re$%"n "n $he 3-r$ "f $he D .>e. <uring -lfaro@s cross e3amination, the defense counsel tried to impeach her credi"ility "y as#ing her a"out her 2= -pril ..> -ffidavit, which mar#edly differs from her 22 May ..> -ffidavit. 1he prosecution o"9ected Ron the "asis of the inadmissi"ility of the evidence o"tained allegedly without the assistance of counsel, pursuant to -rticle 222 +ection 27 8 and 7/8 of the .=6 Constitution.2

o 1his constitutional right, however, is a right reserved solely for the accused or a !person under investigation for the commission of an offense.! 1he prosecution@s o"9ection had no legal "asis "ecause -lfaro was clearly not the accused in the case. -lfaro was a witness who had a legal duty to !answer questions, although his 7her8 answer may tend to esta"lish a claim against him 7her8.!/ &otwithstanding this, the lower court sustained the prosecution@s o"9ection. o 1he law does not confer any favora"le presumption on "ehalf of a witness. The r%>h$ $" #r"ss9eC-4%ne - =%$ness %s - 4-$$er "f 3r"#e. r-7 . e 3r"#ess such that the testimony or deposition of a witness given in a former case !involving the same parties and su"9ect matter, may "e given in evidence against the adverse party! 3r"v%.e. the adverse party !had the opportunity to cross)e3amine him.! PEOPLE v. !ITONA (2010) Refresher: 1he <rug Enforcement Group of the 'longapo City Police had received reports of rampant selling of illegal drugs at Compound 6).th +treet, 4arangay 2lalim, 'longapo City. 'n Auly ., 2002, within the election period, the police conducted a "uy)"ust operation at the place. +P' -lfredo Elores, acting as a poseur)"uyer, and an informer met the accused Efren M. <itona in front of the latter@s house. +P' Elores gave <itona the mar#ed money consisting of two P 00 "ills in e3change for one plastic sachet of shabu. -t a signal, P'/ &or"erto :entura and P'2 -llan <elos ,eyes rushed towards the gate of the compound to ma#e the apprehension "ut, "efore they could reach +P' Elores and <itona, the latter noticed their movement and ran into his house. 1he officers arrested him there and four others who were then sniffing shabu and preparing aluminum tin foils. 1he police fris#ed them and found the mar#ed money on <itona@s person together with transparent plastic sachets containing what appeared to "e shabu su"stance and one cal. 22 magnum revolver with si3 live ammunitions. 1hey confiscated the mar#ed money, the suspected shabu su"stance in sachets, the gun, and the ammunitions. ?pon la"oratory e3amination, the su"stance proved positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. Eour separate informations were filed against <itona "efore the ,egional 1rial Court 7,1C8 of 'longapo City for selling and possessing illegal drug and illegal possession of firearms. 1he ,1C tried all four cases 9ointly. 1he ,1C found <itona guilty of all the charges and sentenced him to suffer the following penaltiesK imprisonment /reclusion perpetua0I imprisonment from 2 years and one day to 20 yearsI imprisonment from one year to si3 yearsI and imprisonment from four years, two months, and one day to si3 years of prision correccional and a fine ofP >,000. 1he Court of -ppeals affirmed the conviction for the crimes relating to the prohi"ited drugs "ut modified the ,1C ruling with respect to the other charges after o"serving that it erred in convicting <itona separately for illegal possession of firearms and violation of the 'mni"us Election Code. Iss e: $hether or not the prosecution was a"le to esta"lish "eyond reasona"le dou"t <itona@s guilt for illegal possession and sale of shabu. &'. !"#$r%ne: 1o successfully prosecute an accused for selling illegal drugs, the prosecution has to proveK 7 8 the identities of the "uyer and the seller, the o"9ect, and the considerationI and 728 the delivery of the thing sold and the payment for it. 'n the other hand, for an accused to "e convicted of possession of illegal drugs, the prosecution is required to prove thatK 7 8 the accused was in possession of prohi"ited drugI

728 such possession is not authoriDed "y lawI and 7/8 the accused freely and consciously possessed the prohi"ited drug. 2n "oth instances, the +tate has to prove as well the corpus delicti, the "ody of the crime. 2t must "e shown that the suspected su"stance the police officers seiDed from the accused is the same thing presented in court during the trial. PEOPLE v. ALEGRE (2010) Refresher: -legre was charged with frustrated murder and with qualified rape. :'& and -legre were acquaintances. -legre owned the house where his family and :'&@s relatives lived. 'ne evening :'& went to -legre@s house to visit her relatives. -legre as#ed her to 9oin him for drin#s inside a 9eep. -fter finishing a small "ottle of gin pomelo, :'& returned to her relatives@ quarters and told her cousin that she was going home. 4ut, as :'& stepped out, -legre invited her to meet his girl friends. +he could not say whether he was under the influence of drugs at that time. 'nce -legre lured :'& to the near"y a"andoned house, he proceeded to punch and sta" :'& with an ice pic#. 5e proceeded to se3ually ravish her. 1anods found :'& and too# her to a hospital. ,1C found -legre guilty of the rape. Caffirmed. Iss e: $'& -legre raped and murdered :'&J *E+. !"#$r%ne: 1he settled rule is the trial court@s findings respecting the credi"ility of witnesses and their testimonies deserve the highest respect. +ince the 9udge saw and heard the witnesses and o"served how they testified under intense questioning, he was in a "etter position to weigh what they said. 5ere, the trial court, concurred in "y the C-, found :'&@s testimony credi"le. -legre@s testimony was found too wea# and insufficient to overcome that of :'&. 5is ali"i and his claim that :'& filed the charges in retaliation for a past offense he committed against a relative remained uncorro"orated. 1here is also no showing that the trial court overloo#ed, misunderstood, or misapplied facts or circumstances which would affect the outcome of the case. 1he conflict in :'&@s testimony that -legre refers to concerns the position of her "ody when she fell on the ground and the order that the rape and the sta""ing followed. 4ut -legre improperly appreciated :'&@s testimony. -ctually, she maintained that he raped her "efore sta""ing her on the chest. 2n any case, any error in the sequence in which the rape victim narrated these two successive turn of events cannot erode the value of her testimony. Eor the most part, :'& remained consistent under repeated questioning regarding these details. 'ne must understand that rape is not 9ust an assault upon a woman@s "odyI it is also a derogation of her dignity. 2f there were inconsistencies in minute details, they may "e attri"uted to the emotions "rought to the surface "y the need for her to repeatedly narrate in detail the "rutality inflicted on her. :'& never once faltered in her declaration that -legre se3ually molested her. <r. -guirre corro"orated her claim with her testimony regarding :'&@s hymenal lacerations. <r. (agapa testified on her multiple sta" wounds. 2nevita"ly, when the rape victim@s straightforward testimony is consistent with the physical evidence of the in9uries she received, sufficient "asis e3ists for concluding that she has told the truth. ,egarding the penalty, "oth the C- and the ,1C failed to ta#e into account -legre@s use of a deadly weapon in the rape case, a fact specifically averred in the information and proved during the trial. 1his qualifies the rape he committed. -rticle 200)4 of the ,evised Penal Code provides that the penalty for rape committed with the use of a deadly weapon should "e reclusion perpetua to death. 4ut in view of the enactment of ,epu"lic -ct ./;0 which

prohi"its the imposition of the death penalty, the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligi"ility for parole as provided "y -ct ; 0/ should instead "e imposed. PEOPLE v. &A&ANGGOL (Se3$e42er 15* 2010) Refresher: 1he Philippine &ational Police &arcotics Group planed a "uy)"ust operation against the accused -cas +umayan and -rnel 4a"angol. 1he "uy)"ust team proceeded to the Coastal Mall where 4a"anggol was identified "y the informant upon getting off a "lue Lia 4esta :an. 5e was accompanied "y Cesar &aran9o, the driver of the van. -fter negotiating with the poseur)"uyer, 4a"angol and &aran9o went "ac# to the van and upon getting the OstuffsP, they were accompanied "y two other persons, later identified as Edwin +an Aose and -cas +umayan. -fter the e3change of the "oodle money, the "uy)"ust team arrested 4a"angol, &aran9o, +an Aose and +umayan. 1he arresting officers recovered from the accused 2.>.= grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride or sha"u. 1hey were convicted in the trial court for illegal possession of prohi"ited drugs, which decision was affirmed "y the Court of -ppeals. Iss es: . $hether the presentation of the informant to prove the offense charged is necessary) &' 2. $hether the testing of the entire contents of the pac#age confiscated is necessary to prove the offense charged) &' /. $hether &aran9o, the driver of the van, acted in conspiracy with the other accused) &' !"#$r%ne: . 1he presentation of the police informant is not necessary to prove the offense charged. 1he prosecution of criminal actions is under the pu"lic prosecutor@s direction and control. 5e determines what evidence to present. 1he "urden of showing the necessity of presenting the informant rests upon the accused. 2. - sample ta#en from a pac#age is logically presumed to "e representative of its entire contents unless the accused proves otherwise. /. - person@s mere presence when an illegal transaction had ta#en place does not mean that he was into the conspiracy. 1o "e guilty as a conspirator, the accused needs to have done an overt act in pursuit of the crime.

VICTORIA P. CA&RAL v. ,ACINTO )'* MIC(AEL )'* MARIL'N O. )'* RIC(AR! O. )'* RE' IGNACIO !IA+* ,OSE PO -n. ,)ANITO MALTO (,-n -r/ 20* 2010) Refresher: -n 2nformation was filed against respondents for violation of +ection >, P< .>6 prohi"iting the sale of su"division lots without a license from the 5(?,4. 1he respondents filed a motion to quash the 2nformation and motion for 9udicial determination of pro"a"le cause claiming that the trial court had no 9urisdiction over violations of P< .>6 7as 9urisdiction is with the 5(?,4 alone8 and that they could not "e held criminally lia"le "ecause the 5(?,4 su"sequently issued them a license to sell. Iss e: $%& the office of the pu"lic prosecutor and the trial court have 9urisdiction over criminal actions for violation of P< .>6J *E+

$%& the 5(?,4@s su"sequent issuance of a license to sell e3tinguished respondents@ criminal lia"ility for selling su"division lots prior to the issuance of such licenseJ &' !"#$r%ne: 1he trial court has power to hear and ad9udicate the action, the penalty "eing a P20,000.00 fine and imprisonment of not e3ceeding 0 years or "oth such fine and imprisonment. 1his penalty "rings the offense within the 9urisdiction of that court. +ection > of P< .>6 prohi"its such sale without the prior issuance of an 5(?,4 license and punishes those who engage in such selling. 1he crime is regarded as malum prohibitum. 2t is the commission of that act as defined "y law, not its character or effect that determines whether or not its provision has "een violated. Malice or criminal intent is immaterial in such crime. 2n crimes that are mala prohibita, the for"idden acts might not "e inherently immoral. +till they are punished "ecause the law says they are for"idden. $ith these crimes, the sole issue is whether the law has "een violated. +ince the 2nformation in this case sufficiently alleged that Molde3 sold a su"division lot when it did not yet have a license to do so, the crime was done. -ssuming the allegations to "e true, the su"sequent issuance of the license and the invocation of good faith cannot reach "ac# to erase the offense and e3tinguish respondents@ criminal lia"ility. PEOPLE v. L)E&RAL* ET AL. (N"ve42er 2H* 200A) Refresher: - police informer@s report that two men and a woman on "oard an owner type 9eep with a specific plate num"er would deliver shabu at a Gasoline +tation to co)accused +alvador, a drug pusher in the police watch list. Police officers watched out for them at the &(EM roadside, during which such a 9eep, with the reported plate num"er and with two men and a woman on "oard, came out. Police trailed the 9eep as it proceeded to a Petron gas station. -ccused +alvador arrived and wal#ed towards the 9eep and tal#ed to co)accused Uue"ral, who handed him a white envelope. 1hen police surrounded the 9eep. -n officer too# the envelope from +alvador, opened it, and saw five plastic sachets containing shabu. -ccused were charged with violation of +ection >, -rticle 22 of ,- . 0> 7Comprehensive <angerous <rugs -ct of 20028. ,1C found accused guiltyI C- affirmed. Iss es: . $%& C- erred in not e3cluding the evidence of the seiDed sha"u on the ground that, having illegally arrested the accused, the police officers@ su"sequent search of their persons incident to such arrest was also illegal. B &'. 2. $%& prosecution presented ample proof of appellants@ guilt "eyond reasona"le dou"t. B *E+. !"#$r%ne: 1. 1he law enforcers already had an in#ling of the personal circumstances of the persons they were loo#ing for and the criminal act they were a"out to commit. 1hat these circumstances played out in their presence supplied pro"a"le cause for the search. 1he police acted on reasona"le ground of suspicion or "elief supported "y circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man to "elieve that a crime has "een committed or is a"out to "e committed.
2.

1he lone declaration of an eyewitness is sufficient to convict if, as in this case, the court finds the same credi"le. Credi"ility goes into a person@s integrity, to the fact that he is worthy of "elief, and does not come with the num"er of witnesses. 1he non)presentation of the forensic chemist in illegal drug cases is an insufficient cause for acquittal. 1he corpus delicti in dangerous drugs cases constitutes the

dangerous drug itself. 1his means that proof "eyond dou"t of the identity of the prohi"ited drug is essential. 1he report of an official forensic chemist regarding a recovered prohi"ited drug en9oys the presumption of regularity in its preparation. Corollarily, under +ection ;; of ,ule /0, ,evised ,ules of Court, entries in official records made in the performance of official duty are prima facie evidence of the facts they state. Eailure to comply strictly with the requirements of law for handling will not render the seiDure of the prohi"ited drugs invalid for so long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated items are properly preserved "y the apprehending officers. PEOPLE V. CATENTA' (, 7/ 1* 2010) Refresher: 1his case is a"out the duty of the prosecution in a prohi"ited drugs case to prove the integrity of the corpus delicti "y esta"lishing the chain of custody of the allegedly illegal su"stance that the police officers seiDed from the accused. 'fficers who conducted a "uy)"ust operation su"mitted the sachets of drugs to the P&P Crime (a"oratory. Iss e: $%& the integrity of the evidence was preserved. &'. !"#$r%ne 1he "urden of the prosecution in a case of illegal sale of dangerous drugs is to prove 7 8 the identities of the "uyer and the sellerI 728 the sale of dangerous drugsI and 7/8 the e3istence of the corpus delicti or the illicit drug as evidence. 1he prosecution has to esta"lish the integrity of the seiDed article in that it had "een preserved from the time the same was seiDed from the accused to the time it was presented in evidence at the trial. +ince it is unavoida"le that possession of the su"stance changes hand a num"er of times, it is imperative for the officer who seiDed the su"stance from the suspect to place his mar#ing on its plastic container and seal the same, which he will identify at the trial. Eurther, after the la"oratory technician tests and verifies the nature of the su"stance in the container, he should put his own mar# on the plastic container and seal it again with a new seal since the police officer@s seal has "een "ro#en. 2n this case, although the plastic sachets that the forensic chemist received were heat) sealed and authenticated "y the police officer with his personal mar#ings, no evidence had "een adduced to show that the forensic chemist properly closed and resealed the plastic sachets with adhesive and placed his own mar#ings on the resealed plastic to preserve the integrity of their contents until they were "rought to court. &or was any stipulation made to this effect. 1he plastic sachets apparently showed up at the pre)trial, not "earing the forensic chemist@s seal, and was "rought from the crime la"oratory "y someone who did not care to testify how he came to "e in possession of the same. 1he evidence did not esta"lish the un"ro#en chain of custody. LE,ANO v. PEOPLE (!e#e42er 10* 2010) Refresher: . 'n Aune /0, .. Estrellita :iDconde and her daughters Carmela and Aennifer, were "rutally slain at their home in ParaYaque City. Eour years later, the &42 presented

their star witness Aessica -lfaro who pointed to accused. 4oth the 1C and C- found 5u"ert $e"" guilty and he was thus arrested. 2. 'n -pril 20, 20 0, the +C issued a ,esolution granting the request of $e"" to su"mit for <&- analysis the semen specimen ta#en from Carmela@s cadaver. ?nfortunately, on -pril 26, 20 0 the &42 informed the Court that it no longer has custody of the specimen. 1his outcome prompted accused $e"" to file an urgent motion to acquit on the ground that the government@s failure to preserve such vital evidence has resulted in the denial of his right to due process. ISS)ES: 7 8 $%& 5u"ert $e"" should "e acquitted due to government@s failure to preserve <&evidence.. &' 7 8 $%& -lfaro@s testimony overcomes $e""@s ali"i.. &' !OCTRINE: 7 8 -s held in ?+ case -riDona v. *oung"lood, due process does not require the +tate to preserve the semen specimen although it might "e useful to the accused unless the latter is a"le to show "ad faith on the part of the prosecution or the police Eor, another, when $e"" raised the <&- issue, the rule governing <&- evidence did not yet e3ist, the country did not yet have the technology for conducting the test, and no Philippine precedent had as yet recogniDed its admissi"ility as evidence. Consequently, the idea of #eeping the specimen secure even after the trial court re9ected the motion for <&- testing did not come up. 728 &ot all denials and ali"is should "e regarded as fa"ricated. - 9udge must #eep an open mind in deciding a case. - positive declaration from a witness that he saw the accused commit the crime should not automatically cancel out the accused@s claim that he did not do it. - lying witness can ma#e as positive an identification as a truthful witness can. 1he positive identification of a witness must at least meet two criteria 7 8 s%he must "e considered as a credi"le witness 728 , the witness@ story of what she personally saw must "e "elieva"le, not inherently contrived. 2n this case, -lfaro had prior access to the #nowledge she testified to through media and the &42. 1he inconsistencies in her testimony render it incredi"le. 'n the other hand, to esta"lish ali"i, the accused must prove "y positive, clear, and satisfactory evidence>6 that 7a8 he was present at another place at the time of the perpetration of the crime, and 7"8 that it was physically impossi"le for him to "e at the scene of the crime. 2n this case, $e"" was a"le to sufficiently esta"lish through documents and witnesses that he was at the ?+ at the time was committed. C'&C(?+2'&K +C reverses and sets aside C- decision and acquits 5u"ert $e"" and fellow accused. PEOPLE OF T(E P(ILIPPINES vs. ROM)LO T)NIACO* ,EFFRE' !AT)LA'TA -n. ALE: ALEMAN (,-n -r/ 1A* 2010) Refresher: 1his case is a"out the requirements of a valid e3tra9udicial confession and the esta"lishment of the e3istence ofcorpus delicti in murder cases. -ccused 1uniaco, <atulayta, and -leman were charged with murder "efore the ,1C of General +antos City. -ccused -leman raises two issuesK a8 whether or not the prosecution

was a"le to present evidence of corpus delictiI and "8 whether or not accused -leman@s e3tra9udicial confession is admissi"le in evidence. Iss e: $%& the accused -leman correctly invo#ed the Galit doctrine. &'. !"#$r%ne: .orpus delicti has "een defined as the "ody, foundation, or su"stance of a crime. 1he evidence of a dead "ody with a gunshot wound on its "ac# would "e evidence that murder has "een committed. .orpus delicti has two elementsK 7a8 that a certain result has "een esta"lished, for e3ample, that a man has died, and 7"8 that some person is criminally responsi"le for it. 1he prosecution is "urdened to prove corpus delicti "eyond reasona"le dou"t either "y direct evidence or "y circumstantial or presumptive evidence. 4ut corpus delicti need not "e proved "y an autopsy report of the dead victim@s "ody or even "y the testimony of the physician who e3amined such "ody. $hile such report or testimony is useful for understanding the nature of the in9uries the victim suffered, they are not indispensa"le proof of such in9uries or of the fact of death. &or is the presentation of the murder weapons also indispensa"le since the physical e3istence of such weapons is not an element of the crime of murder. LTC. RO&ERTO 8. G)ILLERGAN v. REP)&LIC OF T(E P(ILIPPINES (FE&R)AR' 2* 2011) Refresher: Guillergan and four others were charged with estafa under -rticle / >, par. 27a8 in relation to -rticle 6 of the ,PC for causing the anomalous preparation and dis"ursement of the payrolls of their civilian intelligence agents 7C2-s8. Guillergan directed 1echnical +ergeant &emesio 5. 4utcon 74utcon8, the 4udget and Eiscal &on)Commissioned 'fficer, to affi3 his initial on the !,emar#s%+ig! column intended for the payees@ signatures. Guillergan also instructed that the cash advances for the C2-s@ payrolls in ,egion 0 for .=6, totaling P6/2,000.00, "e made paya"le to Captain ,oland :. Maclang, Ar. 7Maclang, Ar.8. $hen ready, Guillergan received the corresponding cash or chec#s then turned them over to 4rigadier General <omingo 1. ,io. -t the end of .=6, ,io further received P6=6,000.00 in !administrative funds! to "e paid out to contractors for repairs in the men@s "arrac#s, the firing range, the guesthouse and others. 4ut ,io requested that this !administrative funds! "e re)aligned to !intelligence funds!. 'n Aune /0, 200=, the +andigan"ayan +econd <ivision rendered 9udgment, / finding Guillergan guilty of falsification penaliDed under -rticle 62 ; of the ,PC and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for 2 years and ; months as minimum to ; years, . months and 0 days as ma3imum. 1he court acquitted the other accused on the ground of lac# of proof of their guilt "eyond reasona"le dou"t. Iss e: $hether or not the +andigan"ayan can convict Guillergan of violation of -rticle 62 of the ,PC under an 2nformation that charged him with estafa in relation to -rticle 6 of the codeI !"#$r%ne: 1he Information alleged that Guillergan committed falsification "y ma#ing it appear in several pu"lic documents that P ,> .,000.00 in -EP funds intended for the C2-s@ payroll

were paid for that purpose when in truth these were 9ust given to ,io, resulting in damage and pre9udice to the government. -lthough the charge was for estafa in relation to -rticle 6 of the ,PC, the facts alleged in the information sufficiently made out a case for violation of -rticle 62 of which Guillergan was convicted. $hat is important is that the 2nformation descri"ed the latter offense intelligi"ly and with reasona"le certainty, ena"ling Guillergan to understand the charge against him and suita"ly prepare his defense. Given that some of the essential elements of -rticle 6 constitute the lesser offense of falsification of pu"lic documents under -rticle 62, then the allegations in the 2nformation were sufficient to hold Guillergan lia"le under -rticle 62.

LA&OR LAW
AGRIC)LT)RAL AN! IN!)STRIAL S)PPLIES CORPORATION e$ -7. v. SIA+AR (2010) Refresher: +iaDar filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and unfair la"or practice against petitioner -gricultural and 2ndustrial +upplies Corporation 7-2+C8 and others "efore the &ational (a"or ,elations Commission 7&(,C8. 2n early ..6, +iaDar discovered that his company was not remitting much of his +++ premiums although the computations appeared on his pay slips. $hen he told his co)

employees a"out it, they made their own inquiries, too. +u"sequently, +iaDar was refused entry when he arrived for wor#. 5e went to -2+C@s lawyer, who told him he was dismissed. Efforts at negotiation proved futile, so he filed a complaint with the la"or ar"iter. 1he (a"or -r"iter found that the company did not yet dismiss +iaDar from wor# since they were still negotiating for a financial pac#age for him. 5e rather stopped reporting for wor# of his own accord after learning of the plan to retrench him. 2ndeed, the company gave +iaDar no letter of dismissal or retrenchment. Consequently, the (a"or -r"iter dismissed the complaint "ut ordered the company to give +iaDar separation pay, his unpaid salary, and a proportionate /th month pay for ..6. 'n appeal, the &(,C affirmed the (a"or -r"iter@s finding that the company did not dismiss him from wor# and that, misunderstanding its action, he ceased to report for wor#. 2t was all a misunderstanding, said the &(,C, and each party must "ear his own loss to place them on equal footing. 1he &(,C sustained the award of separation pay, to "e rec#oned from Aune ..0 to Aune ..6, the time +iaDar wor#ed for -2+C. 1he &(,C also affirmed the grant to him of his unpaid salary and proportionate /th month pay. +iaDar as#ed for reconsideration "ut the &(,C denied it. 1he Court of -ppeals affirmed the &(,C decision. 'n motion for reconsideration, however, the C- rendered an -mended <ecision finding sufficient evidence that the company indeed illegally dismissed +iaDar from wor#. Iss es: $hether or not the company dismissed +iaDar from wor#I and *E+ 2n the affirmative, whether or not his dismissal was valid. &'. !"#$r%ne: 1he Court has held that, under -rticle 26. of the (a"or Code, separation pay may "e awarded to an illegally dismissed employee in lieu of reinstatement when continued employment is no longer possi"le where, as in this case, the continued relationship "etween the employer and the employee is no longer via"le due to strained relations "etween them and reinstatement appears no longer practical due to the length of time that had since passed. 2n awarding separation pay to an illegally dismissed employee, in lieu of reinstatement, the amount to "e awarded shall "e equivalent to one month salary for every year of service rec#oned from the first day of employment until the finality of the decision. Payment of separation pay is in addition to payment of "ac# wages. -nd if separation pay is awarded instead of reinstatement, "ac# wages shall "e computed from the time of illegal termination up to the finality of the decision. WILLIAM )' CONSTR)CTION CORP. v. TRINI!A! (M-r#h 10* 2010) Refresher: 1rinidad filed an illegal dismissal case against petitioner. 5e claimed that he signed several employment contracts with the company that identified him as a pro9ect employee although he had always "een assigned to wor# on one pro9ect after another with some intervals. 1he company, on the other hand, alleged that employment interva#s were inherent in the construction "usiness. 2n compliance with la"or rules, it su"mitted an esta"lishment termination report t the <'(E. 1he (a"or -r"iter dismissed 1rinidad@s complaint. 1he &(,C upheld the finding. 'n appeal, the C- reversed the &(,C.

Iss e: $%& the company@s repeated rehiring of 1rinidad over several years as pro9ect employee for its various pro9ects automatically entitled him to the status of a regular employee. B &' !"#$r%ne: 1he test for distinguishing a Opro9ect employeeP from a Oregular employeeP is whether or not he has "een assigned to carry out a Ospecific pro9ect or underta#ingP, with the duration and scope of his engagement specified at the time his service is contracted. 5ere, it is not disputed that the company contracted 1rinidad@s service "y specific pro9ects with the duration of his wor# clearly set out in his employment contracts. 5e remained a pro9ect employee regardless of thee num"er of years and the various pro9ects he wor#ed for the company. 1he repeated and successive rehiring of pro9ect employees do not qualify them as regular employees, as length of service is not the controlling determinant of the employment tenure of a pro9ect employee, "ut whether the employment has "een fi3ed for a specific pro9ect or underta#ing, its completion has "een determined at the time of the engagement f the employee. &AN!ILA S(IPPING* INC.* MR. REGINAL!O A. O&EN* &AN!ILA S(IPPING* INC. -n. F)'O( S(IPPING* INC. v. MARCOS C. A&ALOS (010) Refresher: 1his case is a"out a Eilipino seafarer@s claim for disa"ility "enefits from cholecystolithiasis or gallstone that was discovered when he suffered e3cruciating pain while wor#ing on "oard an ocean)going vessel, an illness that was not in the list of compensa"le diseases listed in the standard seafarer@s contract that he signed with the vessel owner. Iss e: $%& -"alos@ cholecystolithiasis or gallstone is compensa"le and, thus, entitles him to disa"ility "enefits and sic#ness allowance. ) &' !"#$r%ne: +ince cholecystolithiasis or gallstone has "een e3cluded as a compensa"le illness under the applica"le standard contract for Eilipino seafarers that "inds "oth respondent -"alos and the vessel@s foreign owner, it was an error for the C- to treat -"alos@ illness as !wor#)related! and, therefore, compensa"le. 1he standard contract precisely did not consider gallstone as compensa"le illness "ecause the parties agreed, presuma"ly "ased on medical science, that such affliction is not caused "y wor#ing on "oard ocean)going vessels. &or has respondent -"alos proved "y some evidence that the nature of his wor# on "oard a ship aggravated his illness. 2f the &(,C orders the payment of "enefits not found in that contract, the particular seaman might "e favored "ut the credi"ility of our standard employment contract will suffer. MALIG9ON v. EL)ITA&LE GENERAL SERVICES* INC. (2010) Refresher: -fter 0 years of "eing a 9anitress, Malig)on was told "y her company that she will "e assigned to another client. <espite follow)ups, she was not reassigned. -fter = months, the company told her that it is necessary for her to resign "efore she would "e reassigned. +he complied "ut the company reneged on its underta#ing. 1he company claimed that she stopped wor#ing for no reason, that they sent her 2 letters to e3plain her a"sence and that on 'cto"er >, 2002 she showed)up and su"mitted her resignation. 1he (- found the resignation valid and "inding. 1he &(,C reversed the (- and ruled that Malig)on was constructively dismissed and it ordered her reinstatement and payment of full "ac#wages. C- reversed the &(,C decision and reinstated that of the (-.

Iss es: . $%& Malig)on was constructively dismissed. *E+. 1he company evidently placed Malig)on on floating status. 4ut such act of !off) detailing! Malig)on was not the equivalent of dismissal so long as her floating status did not continue "eyond a reasona"le time. 4ut, when it ran up to more than si3 months, the company may "e considered to have constructively dismissed her from wor#, that is, as of -ugust 0, 2002. 1hus, her purported resignation on 'cto"er >, 2002 could not have "een legally possi"le. 1he notices cannot possi"ly ta#e the place of the notices required "y law. 1hey came more than si3 months after the company placed her on floating status and, consequently, the company gave her those notices after it had constructively dismissed her from wor#. 2. $%& she is entitled to reinstatement. *E+, 4?1 under the circumstances, her reinstatement to her former position would only result in a highly hostile wor# environment for the parties and might further worsen their relationship. 1he &(,C should have 9ust awarded Malig)on separation pay instead of ordering the company to reinstate her. 4ac#wages represent compensation that should have "een earned "ut were not collected "ecause of the un9ust dismissal. Malig)on can "e said to "e entitled to reinstatement from the time she was constructively dismissed in -ugust 2002 until the &(,C ordered her immediate reinstatement in Ee"ruary 200>, a period of two years and si3 months. Eor this she is entitled to "ac#wages. 4ut since the circumstances already rule out actual reinstatement, she is entitled to separation pay at the rate of one month for every year of service from ..0, when she "egan her employment to 200>, when she is deemed to have "een actually separated from wor#, a period of nine years, "oth amountsNthe "ac#wages and the separation payN to "ear interest of 0 percent per annum until fully paid. !"#$r%ne: 1he rule in termination cases is that the employer "ears the "urden of proving that he dismissed his EE for a 9ust cause. 2f the EE resigned from wor#, the "urden is on the E, to prove that he did so willingly. 1his would largely depend on the circumstances surrounding such alleged resignation. 1hose circumstances must "e consistent with the EE@s intent to give up wor#. !EPARTMENT OF LA&OR AN! EMPLO'MENT (!OLE) -n. NATIONAL MARITIME POL'TEC(NIC (NMP) vs. R)&EN '. MACE!A Refresher: 'n Aune 2=, .=., ,u"en *. Maceda, a dec# marine officer, 9oined the &ational Maritime Polytechnic 7&MP8, a government school, with a permanent appointment as 2nstructor 2. 5e rose to the permanent positions of -ssistant Professor 2 and later -ssociate Professor 2. 5e studied law in the meantime and passed the "ar. 5e was later designated as 'fficer)in) Charge 7'2C8 of the Maritime 1raining <ivision and as &MP@s legal counsel. 2n ..=, the &MP again promoted Maceda to the ran# of Professor 2 "ut this time under a mere temporary appointment. 5e then su"mitted 9ustifications, to the &MP E3ecutive <irector, to change his temporary status to permanent. 2n ... the 2nternational Maritime (aw sponsored his studies in the 2M')2nternational Maritime (aw 2nstitute in Malta. 5e finished his master@s degree in 2000. 5e later developed a module in maritime law for Marine 'fficers of the &MP and started teaching the su"9ect. *early, &MP renewed Maceda@s temporary appointment as Professor 2. 2n 200 he resigned from his position as &MP legal

counsel. 2n 2002 the &MP completed the revision of the Uualification +tandard 7U+8 for its staff. Maceda claimed, however, that nothing has since "een heard of that revised U+ after the &MP su"mitted the same to the C+C for approval. 2n 200/, the 5, of &MP wrote Maceda that the school would "e putting him under contractual employment until such time as the C+C shall have already approved the &MP Maritime 1raining ,evised Uualification +tandard. +u"sequently, &MP, through E3ecutive <irector <evanadera renewed the temporary appointment of Maceda as Professor 2. Maceda was also informed that the succeeding renewal of his appointment would "e su"9ect to his meeting the requirements of the position. 1he &MP considered Maceda first priority for the +hip"oard ,otation +cheme for 200/ and for holding the /rd 'fficer position on "oard ship. 5e answered the letter, ma#ing a num"er of requests, so he could avail of the +hip"oard ,otation +cheme. 4ut the &MP did not act on his letter. 'n <ecem"er 200/, the &MP '2C wrote Maceda that his appointment as Professor 2 would "e renewed on contractual status. Maceda agreed and signed a contract on Aanuary >, 200;. 'n the same date, however, Maceda filed a complaint with the C+C regarding his demotion in employment status. 1he -dministrative 'fficer of the C+C regional office convinced him, however, that the renewal of the appointments of temporary employees is a prerogative of the head of the agency. 'n Aune 200;, the &MP '2C informed Maceda that, on instructions from <evanadera, he was not to report for wor# anymore on the following day. 'n Auly /, 200;, however, <evanadera as#ed Maceda to "e a guest lecturer in Maritime (aw, thus ac#nowledging the need for his services and his e3pertise on the su"9ect. Maceda then wrote the &MP 4oard of 1rustees a"out his illegal termination as professor and <evanadera@s mismanagement of the school. Maceda also charged <evanadera and &MP, "efore <'(E, of oppression leading to his illegal termination. <'(E +ecretary dismissed his complaint. Maceda appealed to the C+C "ut the latter dismissed the same for lac# of 9urisdiction, pointing out that, since <evanadera was a presidential appointee, the power to discipline him "elonged to the President. Maceda filed a M, "ut C+C denied the same. 1he C+C held that, as a holder of a temporary and contractual employment, Maceda did not en9oy security of tenure. 1he C+C further held that it was his fault that he did not ta#e steps to remedy his deficiency, namely, a ship"oard e3perience on license, after holding the position of Professor 2 for five years. 1his prompted Maceda to see# recourse "y special civil action of certiorari with the C-. C- granted his petition, ordering &MP to reinstate Maceda to his previous position as Professor 2, and directing it to pay his salary and other "enefits from Auly , 200; until he is reinstated. <'(E and &MP filed a M, "ut the C- denied the same, hence, this petition. Iss es: . $hether or not the C- correctly gave due course to Maceda@s special civil action of certiorari for the correction of the alleged errors in the rulings of the C+CI and 2. $hether or not the &MP illegally terminated Maceda from employment as professor. !"#$r%ne: . &o. 2n determining whether the proper remedy is a special civil action for certiorari or a petition for review, it is not so much the nature of the questions raised that matters. $ith very rare e3ceptions, what is decisive is $'& the challenged order is a final order that disposes of the merit of the case. 1he Court held in 1etropolitan

1anila ,evelopment )uthority v. 2ancom 3nvironmental .orp. that the remedy for see#ing the reversal or modification of a 9udgment rendered on the merits of the case is appeal. 1his is true even if the error imputed to the officer, "ody, or tri"unal constitutes alleged lac# of 9urisdiction over the su"9ect matter of the case or grave a"use of discretion in ma#ing its findings of fact or of law. 1he Court cannot countenance the "lurring of the distinction "etween a special civil action for certiorari and a petition for review. 4esides, it cannot "e said that the C+C gravely a"used its discretion in dismissing Maceda@s complaint. Grave a"use of discretion e3ists where the pu"lic respondent acts in a manner so patent and gross that it amounts to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to do what the law en9oins on him. 2t is not sufficient that the C- disagreed with the findings of the C+C or considered them in errorI it had to determine that the C+C@s findings had run "erser#, prompted "y passion and personal hostility rather than "y reason. 1he Cdid not ma#e this determination. 2. &o, he was not illegally terminated. C- points out that the &MP ignored Maceda@s solid wor#, e3pertise, and e3perience when it said that he was not qualified to "ecome a permanent professor. 4ut Maceda@s so)called accomplishments cannot count for much where, as in this case, they do not in fact meet the uniform standards set "y the school for its permanent professors. &or can it "e said that the &MP did not give Maceda sufficient leeway to meet those standards. 1he C-@s finding that the &MP disregarded Maceda@s request that he "e allowed to avail himself of the school@s training privileges, so he could comply with the requirements of the +hip"oard ,otation +cheme, is not supported "y evidence. <evanadera approved Maceda@s request. Maceda simply did not avail himself of the school@s +hip"oard ,otation +cheme nor su"mit the papers needed under that program. C- also faults the &MP for not appointing Maceda as -dministrative 'fficer : or <E< 222 if he could not "e given a permanent appointment as professor. 4ut the power to appoint rests essentially on free choice. 1he appointing authority has the right to decide who "est fits the 9o" from among those who meet the minimum requirements for it. -s an outsider, quite remote from the day)to)day pro"lems of a government agency such as &MP, no court of law can presume to have the wisdom needed to ma#e a "etter 9udgment respecting staff appointments. (astly, the Cassumed the power and discretion to declare Maceda@s > years of teaching e3perience sufficient compliance with the !ship"oard e3perience on license! requirement of the &MP. 4ut under the relevant &MP U+ then in force, a Professor 2, who was a Marine Merchant 'fficer with a ran# of a /rd Mate 'fficer, must possess a two)year sea e3perience 7on license8 and three years of teaching e3perience. Maceda had sufficient teaching e3perience "ut he did not have the required ship"oard e3perience. 2n fact, he did not "oard any vessel as a licensed /rd Mate 'fficer. 1he records show that, despite the repeated efforts of the &MP 5, to get him on "oard, Maceda still did not "other to complete the required ship"oard e3perience. 4ecause of this, the &MP could only give him temporary appointment that did not provide any security of tenure. +uch appointment is of course termina"le at the pleasure of the appointing power with or without a cause. Maceda contends that the &MP demoted him from a temporary to a contractual position. 4ut, as "oth the <'(E and the C+C uniformly held, no such demotion too# place since a contractual appointment is of the same nature as a temporary appointment. 1hus, when the &MP did not further renew Maceda@s contractual appointment, the same cannot "e regarded as a dismissal "ut an e3piration of his term.

,AVELLANA v. &ELEN (M-r. 5* 2010) Refresher: 4elen filed a complaint against Aavellana for for illegal dismissal and underpayment or non) payment of salaries and other monetary claims. Petitioner claims he was hired as a company driver for Aavellana. 'n -ug. 20, ..., he was illegally dismissed. 'n &ov. 2>, 2002, the (a"or -r"iter found for 4elen and awarded him "ac#wages, separation pay, /th month pay, +2(P, holiday pay, salary differential, and attorneyXs fees. 'n appeal, the &(,C modified the decision, deleting the award of "ac#wages and separation pay and instead ordered Aavellana to pay him > days salary "y way of indemnity pursuant to -rticle ;. (C. 1he C- reverted to the decision of the (- "ut modified the award of "ac#wages and separation pay, finding the computation to "e erroneous. 4oth parties filed petitions "efore the +CK 1he petition filed "y Aavellana, questioned the C-Xs finding of illegality of dismissal while the petition filed "y 4elen, challenged the amounts of money claims awarded to him. 1he Court denied the first with finality in its resolution of +eptem"er 22, 200=I the second is the su"9ect of the present case. Iss e: $hether the monetary award in favor of 4elen should run until the finality of the decision of his caseJ *es, 4elen should "e entitled to "ac#wages from -ugust 20, ..., when he was dismissed, to +eptem"er 22, 200=, when the 9udgment for un9ust dismissal in G.,. = . / "ecame final. -rticle 26. of the (a"or Code, as amended providesK -rt. 26.. +ecurity of 1enure. ) 2n cases of regular employment, the employer shall not terminate the services of an employee e3cept for a 9ust cause or when authoriDed "y this 1itle. -n employee who is un9ustly dismissed from wor# shall "e entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full "ac#wages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other "enefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement. 1he law intends the award of "ac#wages and similar "enefits to accumulate past the date of the (a"or -r"iterXs decision until the dismissed employee is actually reinstated. 4ut if, as in this case, reinstatement is no longer possi"le, this Court has consistently ruled that "ac#wages shall "e computed from the time of illegal dismissal until the date the decision "ecomes final. +eparation pay, on the other hand, is equivalent to one month pay for every year of service, a fraction of si3 months to "e considered as one whole year. 5ere that would "egin from Aanuary / , ..; when petitioner 4elen "egan his service. 1echnically the computation of his separation pay would end on the day he was dismissed on -ugust 20, ... when he supposedly ceased to render service and his wages ended. 4ut, since 4elen was entitled to collect "ac#wages until the 9udgment for illegal dismissal in his favor "ecame final, here on +eptem"er 22, 200=, the computation of his separation pay should also end on that date. Eurther, since the monetary awards remained unpaid even after it "ecame final on +eptem"er 22, 200= "ecause of issues raised respecting the correct computation of such awards, it is "ut fair that respondent Aavellana "e required to pay 2T interest per annum on those awards from +eptem"er 22, 200= until they are paid. !"#$r%ne: 2n cases of illegal dismissal, the employee is entitled to monetary claims which should run until the finality of the decision of the case. ,emaining unpaid after the finality of such award, said amount earns interest at the rate of 2T per annum until it is fully paid.

G"4eF v. PNOC (N"ve42er 2H* 200A) Refresher: 1his case is a"out what distinguishes a regular company manager performing important e3ecutive tas#s from a corporate officer whose election and functions are governed "y the company@s "y)laws. EiloilXs president appointed GomeD as a corporate secretary, and then rehired her as administrator and legal counsel. -fter some time, the new "oard of directors questioned her continued employment, since it was without the "oardXs approval. 2t reasoned that, since her position was functionally that of a vice)president or general manager, her term could "e e3tended under the company@s "y)laws only with the approval of the "oard. Iss e: $%& GomeD was, in her capacity as administrator, an ordinary employee whose employment does not need "oard approval. *E+. !"#$r%ne Estoppel, an equita"le principle rooted on natural 9ustice, prevents a person from re9ecting his previous acts and representations to the pre9udice of others who have relied on them. 1his principle of law applies to corporations as well. 1he P<MC in this case is estopped from claiming that despite all the appearances of regular employment that it weaved around petitioner GomeD@s position it must have technically hired her only as a corporate officer. 1he "oard and its officers made her stay on and wor# with the company for years under the "elief that she held a regular managerial position. 2t is possi"le for one to have a dual role of officer and employee. A7#-n$-r- J S"ns V. CA (Se3$e42er 2A* 2010) Refresher: -lcantara F +ons is a company engaged in the manufacturing of plywood. 2t agreed to a C4- with the ?nion wherein there would "e Ono stri#e, no loc#outP during the course of the life of the C4-. 1he renegotiations ended with a deadloc# and the ?nion decided to file a notice of stri#e and went throught the proper procedures. 1he (a"or -r"iter decided the stri#e to "e illegal. 1he &(,C overturned the (- and ordered reinstatement. Iss e: $hether or not the Ono stri#e, no loc#outP provisionin a C4- is illegal J &' !"#$r%ne: - stri#e may "e regarded as invalid although the la"or union has complied with the strict requirements for staging one as provided in -rticle 20/ of the (a"or Code when the same is held contrary to an e3isting agreement, such as a no stri#e clause or conclusive ar"itration clause. . 5ere, the C4- "etween the parties contained a !no stri#e, no loc#out! provision that en9oined "oth the ?nion and the Company from resorting to the use of economic weapons availa"le to them under the law and to instead ta#e recourse to voluntary ar"itration in settling their disputes. &o law or pu"lic policy prohi"its the ?nion and the Company from mutually waiving the stri#e and loc#out maces availa"le to them to give way to voluntary ar"itration. 2ndeed, no less than the .=6 Constitution recogniDes in +ection /, -rticle M222, preferential use of voluntary means to settle disputes. 1hus B 1he +tate shall promote the principle of shared responsi"ility "etween wor#ers and employers and the preferential use of voluntary modes in settling disputes, including conciliation, and shall enforce their mutual compliance therewith to foster industrial peace.

The (er%$->e ("$e7 M-n%7- v. PIGLAS9(er%$->e (O#$"2er B0* 200A) Refresher: 1he 5eritage 5otel ran# and file employees filed a certificate of election in 2000 to "e the 5eritage 5otel Employees ?nion. -fter petitions "y the company against the formation of the union and the C- decision, the petition for cancellation was final when 55E union withdrew its petition for review. 2n 200/, the ran# and file employees formed the P2G(-+ union. 1he company opposed the petition for certificate of election "y the P2G(-+ union and alleged that it su"mitted fraudulent documents which misrepresented the num"er of mem"ers that it had and that it was the same union as the 55E union. Iss e: $'& the discrepancy in the num"er of mem"ers of the union is fatal 7as misrepresentation8 in the application for union registrationJ &' !"#$r%ne: E3cept for the evident discrepancies as to the num"er of union mem"ers involved as these appeared on the documents that supported the union@s application for registration, petitioner company has no other evidence of the alleged misrepresentation. 4ut those discrepancies alone cannot "e ta#en as an indication that respondent misrepresented the information contained in these documents. 1he charge that a la"or organiDation committed fraud and misrepresentation in securing its registration is a serious charge and deserves close scrutiny. 2t is serious "ecause once such charge is proved, the la"or union acquires none of the rights accorded to registered organiDations. Consequently, charges of this nature should "e clearly esta"lished "y evidence and the surrounding circumstances. 1here is also nothing essentially mysterious or irregular a"out the fact that only 26 mem"ers ratified the union@s constitution and "y)laws when 2= signed the attendance sheet. 2t cannot "e assumed that all those who attended approved of the constitution and "y)laws. -ny mem"er had the right to hold out and refrain from ratifying those documents or to simply ignore the process. -t any rate, the (a"or Code and its implementing rules do not require that the num"er of mem"ers appearing on the documents in question should completely dovetail. Eor as long as the documents and signatures are shown to "e genuine and regular and the constitution and "y)laws democratically ratified, the union is deemed to have complied with registration requirements. (a"or laws are li"erally construed in favor of la"or especially if doing so would affirm its constitutionally guaranteed right to self)organiDation. 5ere, the P2G(-+ union@s supporting documents reveal the unmista#a"le yearning of petitioner company@s ran# and file employees to organiDe. 1his yearning should not "e frustrated "y inconsequential technicalities. 1he fact that some of respondent P2G(-+ union@s mem"ers were also mem"ers of the old ran# and file union, the 55E union, is not a ground for canceling the new union@s registration. 1he right of any person to 9oin an organiDation also includes the right to leave that organiDation and 9oin another one. 4esides, 55E union is dead. 2t had ceased to e3ist and its certificate of registration had already "een cancelled.

L)+VIMIN!A ANG v. PN& (2010) Refresher: -ng claimed that respondent P&4, then a government)owned corporation, hired her as a pro"ationary cler#. +he eventually "ecame an -ssistant <epartment Manager 2, a

position she held when the P&4 was privatiDed on May 20, ..0 and when she, li#e her co) employees, was deemed automatically retired. 1he "an# computed -ng@s gratuity "enefits, the monetary value of her leave credits, and the other "enefits due her and cleared her of any accounta"ility. P&4 re)employed -ng as -ssistant Manager effective on May 26, ..0. (ess than four months later, the P&4 administratively charged her with serious misconduct and willful "reach of trust for ta#ing part in a scam, called !#iting operation,! where a depositor used a conduit "an# account for depositing several unfunded chec#s drawn against the same depositor@s other current accounts and from which conduit "an# account he later withdrew those chec#s. P&4 also heaped other charges against -ng of serious misconduct and gross violation of the "an#@s rules and regulations. +he raised her defenses, one of which was that it was not a !#iting operation,! "ut an accommodation of a very valued client. +he admitted that the chec#s were not funded and were converted into account receiva"les or accommodation loans that the client had settled, including interests, penalties, and other charges. Consequently, the P&4 did not suffer any loss from those transactionsI it even reaped enormous profits from them. -ng further pointed out that the causes for her termination too# place when she was yet a government official. 1he P&4 had since ceased to "e government)owned. 2f she were to "e charged for those causes, the 9urisdiction over her case would lie with the Civil +ervice Commission. Even then, since she already retired from the government service, the employment that could "e terminated no longer e3isted. 1he (- and &(,C held the dismissal was illegal. 1he C- reversed, holding it was valid. Iss e: $%& the C- erred in upholding -ng@s dismissal from the service for willful "reach of the trust reposed in her "y the P&4. &'. !"#$r%ne: -ng did not deny the acts and omissions constituting the offense. 5er defense consisted in her claim that she accommodated a client@s unfunded chec#s and issued false "an# certificates with the #nowledge and consent of the "ranch manager and comptroller. 4ut such uncorro"orated defense is unsatisfactory, revealing a mind that was willing to disregard "an# rules and regulations when other "ranch officers concurred. 1he P&4 rightfully separated her from wor# for willful "reach of the trust that it reposed in her under the (a"or Code. 5er defense that the P&4 did not suffer any loss is of no moment. 1he focal point is that she "etrayed the trust of the "an# in her fidelity to its interest and rules. -ng is entitled to the "enefits which accrued to her as of May 20, ..0.-lthough the transformation of the P&4 from a government)owned corporation to a private one did not result in a "rea# in its life as 9uridical person, the same idea of continuity cannot "e said of its employees. +ection 26 of Presidential Proclamation >0 provided for the automatic termination of employer)employee relationship upon privatiDation of a government)owned and controlled corporation. Eurther, such privatiDation cannot deprive the government employees involved of their accrued "enefits or compensation. 5ere, when P&4 was privatiDed, -ng@s employment with it as a government)owned corporation ceased. 2ndeed, the P&4 already computed the retirement and other "enefits to which she was entitled as a result of the cessation of her employment. +ince she had no

pending administrative case on the day she ceased to "e a P&4 employee and had "een cleared of any accounta"ility, all those "enefits already accrued to her on the date of her termination. -s for possi"le "enefits accruing to -ng after May 20, ..0, the same should "e deemed governed "y the (a"or Code since the P&4 that rehired her on May 26, ..0 has "ecome a private corporation. ?nder the 'mni"us ,ules 2mplementing the (a"or Code, 4oo# :2, ,ule 2, +ection 6, the employee@s separation from wor# for a 9ust cause does not entitle her to termination pay. 1hus, the P&4 may rightfully withhold -ng@s termination pay that accrued "eginning on May 26, ..0 "ecause of her dismissal.

CIVIL LAW
IMMAC)LATE CONCEPCION ACAM!EM' v. AMA COMP)TER COLLEGE* INC. (2011) Refresher: -M- leased a "uilding from 2C- after inspecting it and then signed the contract for 0 years where -M- paid earnest money and advance rentals. 4ut during their renovation of the "uilding, -M- found the "uilding to "e structurally unsafe for human occupancy, which was confirmed "y the municipal engineer@s office. 4ecause of this -Mwrote 2C- for a reim"ursement citing the deficiency, for violation of the implied warranty against hidden defects, as its ground and didn@t push through with the lease contract. $hen it was ignored "y 2C-, -M- filed for "reach of contract and damages with prayer for issuance of writ of preliminary attachment against 2C- with the allegation that 2C- didn@t provide them with certification for occupancy. Iss e: $%& -M- is 9ustified in rescinding the contract B &'. !"#$r%ne:

1he fact that -M-@s representatives inspected the "uilding to determine if it was suita"le for their school@s needs means there was no violation of the implied warranty against hidden defects. 1he crac#s on the floor and on the walls were too o"vious to suggest to them that something was amiss. 2t was their fault that they did not chec# the significance of such signs. - demand to repair the defects in the "uilding@s structure, a clearly difficult and costly proposition, cannot "e so easily implied from -M-@s demand that 2C- produce such certificate of occupancy. -M-@s outright rescission of the lease contract and demand that 2C- return the deposit and advance rentals it got within 2; hours from such demand precluded 2C-, first, from contesting the findings of the local "uilding official or getting some structural specialists to verify such findings or, second, from ma#ing the required repair. Clearly, -M-@s hasty rescission of the contract gave 2C- no chance to e3ercise its options. -M- also can@t invo#e -rt 000 for this article assumes that the defects are irremedia"le and that the parties had no agreement for repairing them. 1he lease contract implicitly gave 2C- the option to repair the defects. 2f this had "een done, the ris# to human lives would have "een removed and the right to rescind would "e irrelevant. -M- is entitled to reim"ursement though "ut not more than it has paid 2C-.

!OLINA v. VALLECERA (2010) Refresher: <olina filed a petition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary protection order against respondent :allecera for alleged woman and child a"use 7,-.2028 with prayer for financial support for their supposed child "asing her prayer on the child@s Certificate of (ive 4irth which listed :allecera as the child@s father. :allecera opposed the petition denying that he is not the child@s father. ,1C dismissed the petition after hearing since no prior 9udgment e3ists esta"lishing the filiation of <olina@s son and granting him the right to support as "asis for an order to compel the giving of such support Iss e: $%& <olina is entitled support for the child from :allecera ) &'

!"#$r%ne: <olina evidently filed the wrong action to o"tain support for her child. -lthough the issuance of a protection order against the respondent in the case can include the grant of legal support for the wife and the child, this assumes that "oth are entitled to a protection order and to legal support. 4ut contrary to her claim, neither she nor her child ever lived with :allecera. 1o "e entitled to legal support, petitioner must, in proper action, first esta"lish the filiation of the child, if the same is not admitted or ac#nowledged. +ince <olina@s demand for support for her son is "ased on her claim that he is :allecera@s illegitimate child, the latter is not entitled to such support if he had not ac#nowledged him, until <olina shall have proved his relation to him. 2llegitimate children are entitled to support and successional rights "ut their filiation must "e duly proved. 1he child@s remedy is to file through her mother a 9udicial action against :allecera for compulsory recognition. 5owever, that the ,1C should not have dismissed the entire case "ased solely on the lac# of any 9udicial declaration of filiation "etween :allecera and <olina@s child since the main issue remains to "e the alleged violence committed "y :allecera against <olina and her child and whether they are entitled to protection. 4ut <olina failed to raise this error. ESTAMPA v. CIT' GOVT OF !AVAO (2010) Refresher: <r. Estampa, Ar. was Medical 'fficer :2 at its City 5ealth 'ffice. 1his made him head of a 1as# Eorce ?nit assigned to deal with any untoward event ta#ing place in the city and <isaster Coordinator for the <avao City 5ealth 'ffice under the <avao City <isaster Coordinating Council.

'n March ;, 200/ a powerful "om" e3ploded at the passengers@ terminal of the <avao 2nternational -irport. <r. Estampa failed to respond. <r. Estampa was required to e3plain in writing. -pparently satisfied with the e3planation, the case considered the case closed "y the City 5ealth 'ffice '2C. 0 months later, the <avao City 5ealth 'fficer, queried the City@s 5uman ,esource Management 'ffice 75,M'8 regarding the status of the case. Case was endorsed to the City (egal 'fficeI -ssistant City (egal 'fficer required <r. Estampa to answer the charge against him. 4ut he did not do so.2nvestigation ,eport found a prima facie case against <r. Estampa for neglect of duty and recommending the filing of a formal charge against him. 1he city mayor approved the report and signed the formal charge. 'n receiving the same, <r. Estampa filed his answer and supporting documents. City (egal 'fficer found <r. Estampa guilty of !grave! neglect of duty and recommended his dismissal. City mayor approved the recommendation and dismissed <r. Estampa. C+C denied appeal, corrected the denomination of his offense to gross neglect of duty. C- also denied his appeal. Iss e: $'& Estampa is guilty of gross neglect of dutyJ *E+. !"#$r%ne: 1he claim of <r. Estampa that he could not "e found guilty of !gross! neglect of duty when he was charged only with simple neglect of duty is unmeritorious. 1he charge in an administrative case need not "e drafted with the precision of the information in a criminal action. 2t is enough that he is informed of the su"stance of the charge against him. -nd what controls is the allegation of the acts complained of. 5ere, the formal charge accused him of failing to respond, as was his duty as <isaster Coordinator of the City 5ealth 'ffice. 2t was a serious charge although the formal charge failed to characteriDe it correctly as !gross neglect of duty.! Gross neglect of duty denotes a flagrant and culpa"le refusal or unwillingness of a person to perform a duty. <r. Estampa cannot claim ignorance of his duties. 1he local government code, the provision of which he may "e assumed to #now, provides that a government health officer has the duty, among others, to "e in the frontline of the delivery of health services, particularly during and in the aftermath of man)made and natural disasters and calamities. -s Medical 'fficer :2, one of his duties was !to act as head of a tas# force unit for any untoward events in his area of responsi"ility.! $hen Estampa accepted his post he entered into a covenant with the city to act with dedication, speed, and courage in the face of disasters. Estampa 9ustified his a"sence with the claim that he needed to attend to his family first. 2nitially, he could not leave his one)year)old daughter "ecause they had no house help. $hen his wife arrived from wor# shortly, he also could not leave "ecause she was si3 months pregnant. Eurther, a "om" was found some meters from their apartment a few wee#s earlier. 1his is not accepta"le. - person@s duty to his family is not incompati"le with his 9o")related commitment to come to the rescue of victims of disasters. <isasters do not stri#e every day. 4esides, #nowing that his 9o" as senior medical health officer entailed the commitment to ma#e a measure of personal sacrifice, he had the choice to resign from it when he realiDed that he did not have the will and the heart to respond.

F)ENTES v. ROCA (A3r%7 21* 2010) Refresher: 1he father of the respondents, 1arciano ,oca, e3ecuted a contract to sell with the +ps. Euentes a property, which was part of the con9ugal property. 1he sale was consummated

after 1arciano, through his lawyer, allegedly secured a written authoriDation to sell the property from his estranged wife, ,osario. 1his was notariDed four months after the lawyer allegedly witness ,osario signing the document. - new transfer certificate of title was consequently issued in favor of the +ps. Euentes. Eight years later, the heirs of 1arciano and ,osario filed an action for annulment of sale and reconveyance of land against the +ps. Euentes. 1hey claimed that the signature of ,osario was forged and that no authoriDation for the sale of the con9ugal property was given as required "y the provisions of the Civil Code. 1he +ps. Euentes argued on the other hand that the action has prescri"ed since the complaint was "ased on fraud, which prescri"es in four years. 1he trial court ruled in favor of the +ps. Euentes. 1his was reversed "y the Court of -ppeals. Iss e: $hether the action for the declaration of nullity of the sale to the spouses already prescri"ed)&' !"#$r%ne: 2n contrast to -rticle 6/ of the Civil Code, -rticle 2; of the Eamily Code does not provide a period within which the wife who gave no consent may assail her hus"and@s sale of the real property. 2t simply provides that without the other spouse@s written consent or a court order allowing the sale, the same would "e void. ?nder the provisions of the Civil Code governing contracts, a void or ine3istent contract has no force and effect from the very "eginning. -nd this rule applies to contracts that are declared void "y positive provision of law, as in the case of a sale of con9ugal property without the other spouse@s written consent. - void contract is equivalent to nothing and is a"solutely wanting in civil effects. 2t cannot "e validated either "y ratification or prescription.2 4ut, although a void contract has no legal effects even if no action is ta#en to set it aside, when any of its terms have "een performed, an action to declare its ine3istence is necessary to allow restitution of what has "een given under it. 1his action, according to -rticle ; 0 of the Civil Code does not prescri"e. !ONA ROSANA REALT' V. MOLAVE !EVELOPMENT CORPORATION (2010) Refresher: Carmelita -ustria Medina 7Medina8 owned an =0.;.>.)hectare land in -nupil, 4am"an, 1arlac, <ec. 0, ..; ) she e3ecuted a contract to sell the land to respondent Molave <evelopment Corporation for ;M Molave <evelopment 7Molave8 paid P M to Medina upon the signing of the contract and P ./M more as first installment. 4ut it refused to pay the rest on "eing informed "y the <epartment of -grarian ,eform 7<-,8 of the e3istence of alleged tenants on the land. 2 years later, Medina wrote respondent Molave <evelopment a letter, res#%n.%n> the contract to sell "etween them.

Molave later learned that a month earlier or on <ec. =, ..0, Medina sold the land to petitioner <oYa ,osana ,ealty and <evelopment Corporation 7<oYa ,osana ,ealty8 to whom the ,egister of <eeds issued 1C1 2==0//. -fter learning of the sale respondent Molave <evelopment filed with ,1C of Capas, 1arlac, an action for specific performance, delivery of possession, and annulment of title 4y way of third party complaint, petitioner <oYa ,osana ,ealty sued Medina@s nephew, $ilfredo Miranda, and the latter@s lawyer, -tty. <elfin +upapo, Ar., for allegedly conniving with Medina in concealing from it the contract to sell that Medina entered into with respondent Molave <evelopment. RTC declared Medina in default. Pet. <oYa ,osana ,ealty, on the other hand, filed an claiming that it acted in good faith in purchasing the property and that respondent Molave <evelopment was estopped from questioning the sale "ecause it agreed to cancel the contract to sell and, after the complaint was filed, its president, 1initigan, received from Medina@s counsel - P1.BM 3-r$%-7 re%42 rse4en$ as shown "y a receipt dated March /, ..6. Molave <evelopment presented 1initigan@s letter to Medina dated March >, ..6, informing the latter that she 71initigan8 was treating the P1.B 4%77%"n -s 3-r$%-7 3-/4en$ f"r $he .-4->es she sought in the pending case "efore the trial court.#avvphi# ,1C denied petitioner <oYa ,osana ,ealty@s M1< "ut, on petition with C- the latter court directed the ,1C to conduct a preliminary hearing on <oYa ,osana ,ealty@s special affirmative defense of good faith. RTC dismissed the complaint insofar as <oYa ,osana ,ealty and +y La Lieng were concerned. 2t held that the latter were "uyers in good faith and, therefore, respondent Molave <evelopment had no cause of action against them. M, denied. C- held that contrary to the ruling of the trial court, respondent Molave <evelopment@s complaint in fact stated a cause of action against Medina and petitioner <oYa ,osana ,ealty. 1he C- thus remanded the case to the ,1C for further proceedings. Petitioner then filed the present case with the +C ISS)E: $'& C- erred in holding that no ground e3isted for dismissing respondent Molave <evelopment@s complaint against petitioner <oYa ,osana ,ealty given that such complaint stated a cause of actionJ *E+ !"#$r%ne: 1he C- seems to have missed the point in the ,1C decision. 2t will "e recalled that petitioner <oYa ,osana ,ealty filed a motion with the ,1C to hear and resolve its affirmative defenses. 1he ,1C did so and resolved to deny the motion. 'n a petition filed with the C-, however, the latter court directed the ,1C to hear and resolve <oYa ,osana ,ealty@s affirmative defense of good faith in "uying Medina@s property. 1he ,1C complied and, after hearing the evidence of the parties, dismissed the case, holding that <oYa ,osana ,ealty and its president were "uyers of the property in good faith and Molave <evelopment did not have a cause of action against them. Clearly, The RTC .%. n"$ .%s4%ss $he #-se "n $he >r" n. $h-$ $he #"437-%n$ .%. n"$ s$-$e - #- se "f -#$%"n* =h%#h %s -n en$%re7/ .%fferen$ 4-$$er.

+ec. , ,ule 0 of the ,ules of Civil Procedure provides that the trial court may dismiss a complaint on the ground that the claim or demand set forth in the plaintiff@s complaint has "een paid, waived, a"andoned, or otherwise e3tinguished. Th%s >r" n. essen$%-77/ -.4%$s $he "27%>-$%"n se$ " $ %n $he #"437-%n$ 2 $ 3"%n$s " $ $h-$ s #h "27%>-$%"n h-s 2een eC$%n> %she.* %n $h%s #-se -33-ren$7/ 2/ -2-n."n4en$ -f$er res3"n.en$ M"7-ve !eve7"34en$ re#e%ve. 3-r$%-7 re%42 rse4en$ fr"4 Me.%n- -s - #"nse? en#e "f $he #-n#e77-$%"n "f #"n$r-#$ $" se77 2e$=een $he4. 'n March /, ..6, 0 days after it filed its complaint with the ,1C, Molave ac#nowledged having received P ./M as a consideration for the cancellation of its contract to sell with Medina. 1initigan of respondent Molave of course later asserted that she signed the a"ove receipt "ecause Medina@s lawyer would not have released the chec# to her. & $ $h%s %s n"$ - v-7%. >r" n. f"r #7-%4%n> v%$%-$%"n "f #"nsen$. If she .%. n"$ =-n$ $" ->ree $" $he #-n#e77-$%"n* she h-. n" 2 s%ness s%>n%n> $he re#e%3$ -n. -##e3$%n> $he #he#<. +he could very well have stood her ground and pressed for complete performance of the contract to sell. 5aving received the P ./M, Molave <evelopment@s remaining remedy was to pursue a claim for the "alance of P million that it paid Medina upon the e3ecution of the contract to sell. Eurther, as the ,1C correctly held, respondent Molave <evelopment failed to overcome the presumption of good faith in favor of petitioner <oYa ,osana ,ealty. 1he title to the property was unencum"ered when it "ought the same. -nd the evidence shows that <oYa ,osana ,ealty learned of the e3istence of the unregistered contract to sell only after it had "ought the land. 2ndeed, it even filed a third party complaint against $illie Miranda and -tty. +upapo, Ar., for allegedly conniving with Medina in concealing that contract to sell. (EIRS -n.6"r ESTATE OF ATT'. ROLAN!O P. SIAPIAN v. INTESTATE ESTATE OF E)FROCINA MAC8A' (2010) Refresher: Eufrocina Maqc#ay died intestate in ..;, several heirs. 'ne of the heirs 7-ntonio8 filed a petition for the settlement of the estate and for appointment as administrator while the others opposed such appointment, pushing for the appointment of -rturo who engaged the services of -tty. ,olando +iapian under the agreement that he will "e paid the equivalent of T of what they will receive from the Estate. 1he parties later fi3ed the attorney@s fees at P/ Million. -ntonio and -rturo were appointed as co)special administrators and a"out a year and a half later, -rturo et al told the ,1C that they had terminated -tty. +iapian@s services which prompted the latter to file a motion claiming his attorney@s fees and moved that the court in the meantime not recogniDe any new counsel for -rturo. 1he estate opposed the motion, saying that it cannot "e held answera"le for the claimed attorney@s fees against his clients. ,1C denied -tty. +iapian@s motion B holding that it had limited 9urisdicition and could not resolve issues regarding attorney@s fees. +iapian then filed a motion for enforcement and annotation of his attorney@s lien which the court granted since it was shown that +iapian completely handled the case. -rturo appealed and his appeal was denied and the order of dismissal "ecame final. -tty. +iapian moved for the entry and inscription of his attorney@s lien on the titles of the Estate@s properties. -tty. +iapian died and was su"stituted "y his heirs "ut the intestate court issued an 'rder directing the ,egister of the different where the Estate@s properties

were located to annotate the lien and the court e3plicitly stated that the attorney@s lien would only affect the distri"utive shares of -rturo et al, which they did not question. 6 years later, however, -rturo et al filed a Petition for -nnulment of Audgment "efore the C- alleging that the intestate court did not have 9urisdiction to issue the orders regarding attorney@s fees. 1he C- ruled in favor of -rturo et al., holding that the Estate cannot "e held lia"le for attorney@s fees arising out of the dispute "etween the Estate@s "eneficiaries and their lawyer since they should "e lia"le in their perso9al capacities. Iss es: . $hether or not the C- erred in effectively setting aside the intestate court@s order of -pril /, ..6 for -rturo, et al to pay -tty. +iapian@s P/ million claim for attorney@s feesI and 2. $hether or not the C- erred in nullifying the Aune =, ..= order of the intestate court which directed the annotation of the attorney@s lien on the titles of the properties of the Estate. !"#$r%ne: *alanca !. *ecson' an attorney may cause a statement of his lien to "e registered even "efore the rendition of any 9udgment, the purpose "eing merely to esta"lish his right to the lien. 1he recording of an attorney@s lien is distinct from its enforcement, which may only ta#e place after the 9udgment is secured in favor of the client. (e7.: . - claim for attorney@s fees may "e asserted either in the very action in which a lawyer rendered his services or in a separate action. 4ut enforcing it in the main case "odes well as it forestalls multiplicity of suits. 1he intestate court in this case, therefore, correctly allowed -tty. +iapian to inter9ect his claim for attorney@s fees in the estate proceedings against some of the heirs and, after hearing, ad9udicate the same. -rturo, et al has failed to esta"lish any ground for the C- to annul the -pril /, ..6 order. 1hey allege no e3trinsic fraud committed in the issuance of that order. &or were they a"le to show that the intestate court lac#ed 9urisdiction to ad9udicate the claim of -tty. +iapian for attorney@s fees. 2. +ince the award of P/ million in attorney@s fees in favor of -tty. +iapian had already "ecome final and e3ecutory, the intestate court was within its powers to order the ,egister of <eeds to annotate his lien on the Estate@s titles to its properties. 1he Estate has no cause for complaint since the lien was neither a claim nor a "urden against the Estate itself. 2t was not enforcea"le against the Estate "ut only against -rturo, et al, who constituted the ma9ority of the heirs. 2t is a lien contingent on the intestate court@s final determination of -rturo, et al@s shares of what would remain of the estate@s properties after payment of ta3es and de"ts. -t any rate, the Estate@s petition under ,ule ;6 of the ,ules of Court was not the proper remedy for nullifying the Aune =, ..= order of the intestate court, which directed the annotation of -tty. +iapian@s lien on the titles of the Estate@s properties. 1hat order is interlocutory. -n interlocutory order refers to a ruling respecting some point or matter "etween the commencement and end of the suit, "ut is not a final ad9udication of the claims and lia"ilities of the parties that are in dispute in that suit REP)&LIC OF T(E P(ILIPPINES (REPRESENTE! &' T(E !EPARTMENT OF E!)CATION !IVISION OF LIPA CIT' (FOR PANINSINGIN PRIMAR' SC(OOL) v. PRIMO MEN!O+A AN! MARIA L)CERO (2010) Refresher: Paninsingin Primary +chool 7PP+8 is a pu"lic school operated "y the ,epu"lic through the <epartment of Education. 1he parcel of land which it had "een occupying since .>6 was part of a larger parcel registered under the 1orrens system in the name of respondents. $hen respondents had their land su"divided in .02, the parcel on which PP+

stood was earmar#ed in favor of the City Government of (ipa. 5owever, no new title was issued in favor of the latter. 2n ..=, respondents demanded that PP+ vacate the disputed property. $hen PP+ refused to do so, respondents filed a complaint for unlawful detainer. ,1C ordered PP+ to vacate the property. C- affirmed. Iss e: $'& the respondents were entitled to evict the ,epu"lic from the su"9ect property. &'. !"#$r%ne: 1he evidence on record, particularly the su"division plan, shows that the MendoDas intended to cede the property to the City Government of (ipa permanently. $here the owner agrees voluntarily to the ta#ing of his property "y the government for pu"lic use, he there"y waives his right to the institution of a formal e3propriation proceeding covering such property. 1hus, the MendoDas@ remedy is an action for the payment of 9ust compensation, not e9ectment. -s to the time when 9ust compensation should "e fi3ed, it is settled that where property was ta#en without the "enefit of e3propriation proceedings and its owner filed an action for recovery of possession "efore the commencement of e3propriation proceedings, it is the value of the property at the time of ta#ing that is controlling. GOL!EN (AVEN MEMORIAL PAR8* INC. v FILINVEST !EVELOPMENT CORPORATION (N"ve42er 1H* 2010) Refresher: *ap, the :ivars, CruD, -quino, CorpuD, +o"remesana, and some other relatives inherited a parcel of land in (as PiYas City covered "y 1C1 06;02 ,1) . +u"sequently, the heirs had the land divided into / lots and, in a 9udicial partition, the court distri"uted four of the lots as followsK a8 (ots and 2 to -quinoI "8 (ot 2 to CorpuD and +o"remesanaI and 7c8 (ot 0 to *ap, CruD, and the :ivars. 1he other lots were distri"uted to the other heirs. 'n March 0, .=. *ap, acting for herself and for CruD and the :ivars, e3ecuted an agreement to sell (ot 0 in favor of Golden 5aven Memorial Par#, 2nc. 7G5M8, paya"le in three installments. 'n Auly / , .=. another heir, -quino, acting for himself and for CorpuD and +o"remesana, also e3ecuted an agreement to sell (ots , 2, and 2 in favor of G5M, paya"le in the same manner. 2n "oth instances, G5M paid the first installment upon e3ecution of the contract. 'n -ugust ;, .=. G5M caused to "e annotated a &otice of -dverse Claim on 1C1 06;02 ,1) . 'n +eptem"er 20, .=. the sellers of the four lots wrote G5M that they were still wor#ing on the titling of the lots in their names and wanted to #now if G5M was still interested in proceeding with their agreements. G5M replied in the affirmative on +eptem"er 2 , .=. and said that it was 9ust waiting for the sellers@ titles so it can pay the second installments. +ometime in -ugust of .=., Eilinvest <evelopment Corporation 7E<C8 applied for the transfer in its name of the titles over (ots 2, ;, and > "ut the (as PiYas ,egister of <eeds declined its application. ?pon inquiry, E<C learned that (ot =, a lot "elonging to another heir and covered "y the same mother title, had "een sold to 5ousehold <evelopment Corporation 75<C8, a sister company of G5M, and 5<C held the owner@s duplicate copy of that title. E<C immediately filed against 5<C a petition for the surrender and cancellation of the co)owners@ duplicate copy of 1C1 06;02 ,1) . E<C alleged that it "ought (ots , 2, 0, and 2 of the property from their respective owners as evidenced "y three deeds of a"solute sale in its favor dated +eptem"er 0, &ovem"er =, and <ecem"er 2., .=. and that E<C was entitled to the registrations of such sales.

'n Aanuary ;, .. G5M filed against the sellers and E<C a complaint for the annulment of the deeds of sale issued in the latter@s favor "efore the ,1C of (as PiYas City. ,1C declared the contracts to sell e3ecuted "y some of the heirs in G5M@s favor valid and enforcea"le and the sale in favor of E<C null and void. E<C appealed. C- affirmed the ,1C decision with respect to the validity of the contract to sell (ot 0 in G5M@s favor. 4ut the C- declared the contracts to sell (ots , 2, and 2 in G5M@s favor void and the sale of the same lots in favor of E<C valid. 4oth parties filed their petitions for review "efore the +C. Iss e: $hether or not the contracts to sell that the sellers e3ecuted in G5M@s favor covering the same lots sold to E<C are valid and enforcea"le. *E+ !"#$r%ne: 1o prove good faith, the rule is that the "uyer of registered land needs only show that he relied on the title that covers the property. 4ut this is true only when, at the time of the sale, the "uyer was unaware of any adverse claim to the property. 'therwise, the law requires the "uyer to e3ercise a higher degree of diligence "efore proceeding with his purchase. 5e must e3amine not only the certificate of title, "ut also the seller@s right and capacity to transfer any interest in the property. 2n such a situation, the "uyer must show that he e3ercised reasona"le precaution "y inquiring "eyond the four corners of the title. Eailing in these, he may "e deemed a "uyer in "ad faith. 5ere, E<C was on notice that G5M had caused to "e annotated on 1C1 06;02 ,1) , the mother title, as early as -ugust ;, .=. a notice of adverse claim covering (ot 0. 1his notwithstanding, E<C still proceeded to "uy (ots , 2, 0, and 2 on +eptem"er 0, &ovem"er =, and <ecem"er 2., .=.. E<C contends that, although the title carried a notice of adverse claim, that notice was only with respect to seller *ap@s interest in (ot 0. 1he Court disagrees. 1he annotation of an adverse claim is intended to protect the claimant@s interest in the property. 1he notice is a warning to third parties dealing with the property that someone claims an interest in it or asserts a "etter right than the registered owner. +uch notice constitutes, "y operation of law, notice to the whole world. 5ere, although the notice of adverse claim pertained to only one lot and E<C wanted to acquire interest in some other lots under the same title, the notice served as warning to it that one of the owners was engaged in dou"le selling. -lso, upon inquiry with the ,egister of <eeds of (as PiYas, E<C learned that the heirs sold (ot = to 5<C and turned over the co)owner@s duplicate copy of the 1C1 to that company which had since then #ept the title. E<C admits this fact in its petition. E<C@s #nowledge that G5M, a competitor, had "ought (ot 0 in which E<C was interested, that G5M had annotated an adverse claim to that (ot 0, and that 5<C 7G5M@s sister company8 had physical possession of the title, should have put E<C on its toes regarding the prospects it faced if it "ought the other lots covered "y the title in question. E<C should have investigated the true status of (ots , 2, 0, and 2 "y as#ing G5M the siDe and shape of its interest in the lands covered "y the same title, especially since "oth companies were engaged in the "usiness of developing lands. 'ne who has #nowledge of facts which should have put him upon such inquiry and investigation cannot claim that he has acquired title to the property in good faith as against the true owner of the land or of an interest in it. 1he Court upholds the validity of the contracts "etween G5M and its sellers. -s the trial court aptly o"served, G5M entered into valid contracts with its sellers "ut the latter simply and #nowingly refused without 9ust cause to honor their o"ligations. 1he sellers apparently had a sudden change of heart when they found out that E<C was willing to pay more.

(EIRS OF PA)LINO ATIEN+A vs. !OMINGO P. ESPI!OL (A > s$ 11* 2010) Refresher: Petitioners own a registered agricultural land at Ca"anatuan which was acquired through an emancipation patent. Petitioners and respondent entered into a .ontract to Sell 4and 'ith a ,o'n (ayment covering the property. 1hey agreed on a price of 2MZZ, paya"le in three installmentsK 00L upon the signing of the contractI .6>M in <ecem"er 2002, and the rest on Aune 200/. Espidol paid 00L upon the e3ecution of the contract plus /0L "ro#er@s commission "ut he couldn@t pay the second installment of .6>M despite demand. 1hus petitioners filed a complaint for the annulment of their agreement with damages on grounds of "reach of o"ligations "efore the ,1C. ,espondent argued that, since their contract was one of sale on installment, his failure to pay the 2nd installment did not amount to a "reach. 1he non)payment of an installment is merely an event that authoriDed the vendor not to convey title, not a legal ground for annulling a perfected contract of sale. 5e argued that their remedy was to "ring an action for specific performance. ,1C agreed with respondent and ruled that petitioners@ cancellation of the contract would have to comply with the provisions of ,epu"lic -ct 7,.-.8 0>>2 or the ,ealty 2nstallment 4uyer Protection -ct 7,.-. 0>>28, which mandates the giving of the required notice of cancellation. C- affirmed, so petitoners filed M, where they impugned the validity of their contract with respondent, arguing that since the property was covered "y an emancipation patent, the sale was prohi"ited and void. ISS)ES: . $%& the petitioners could validly sell land acquired through land reform under P< 26. *E+ 2. $%& there was "reach when respondent failed to pay the 2nd installment already due and thus petitioners are entitled to cancel the contract. 75inged on the issue of $ contract to sell or contract of sale8. Contract to +ell so no "reach yet as payment is only a suspensive condition. 1hus petitioners not entitled to cancel. /. $%& action for cancellation of title was premature for noncompliance with the required notice of cancellation under ,.-. 0>>2. &' !OCTRINES: . 4ecause of the enactment of E3ecutive 'rder 22= in .=6, e4-n#%3-$%"n 3-$en$ 2enef%#%-r%es -re -7re-./ -77"=e. $" $r-nsfer "=nersh%3 "f $he%r 7-n.s 3r"v%.e. $h-$ $he%r -4"r$%F-$%"ns =%$h $he L-n. &-n< "f $he Ph%7%33%nes (L-n. &-n<) h-ve 2een 3-%. %n f 77. +ince the -tienDas already got their title, they must have already completed their amortiDations. 1herefore, they can already sell the land. 2. 2n a contract of sale 7C'+8, the title to the property passes to the "uyer upon the delivery of the thing sold. 2n a contract to sell 7C1+8, on the other hand, the ownership is, "y agreement, retained "y the seller and is not to pass to the vendee until full payment of the purchase price. 2n C'+, the "uyer@s non)payment of the price is a negative resolutory conditionI in C1+, the "uyer@s full payment of the price is a positive suspensive condition to the coming into effect of the agreement. 2n C'+, the seller has lost and cannot recover the ownership of the property unless he ta#es action to set aside the contract of sale. 2n C1+, the title simply remains in the seller if the "uyer does not comply with the condition precedent of ma#ing payment at the time specified in the contract. . 5ere, %$ %s ? %$e ev%.en$ $h-$ $he #"n$r-#$ %nv"7ve. =-s "ne "f - CTS s%n#e $he A$%enF-s* -s se77ers* =ere $"

re$-%n $%$7e "f "=nersh%3 $" $he 7-n. until respondent, the "uyer, has paid the agreed price. In - CTS* 3-/4en$ %s - 3"s%$%ve s s3ens%ve #"n.%$%"n: f-%7 re $" 3-/ %s n"$ re>-r.e. - 2re-#h hen#e $here #-n 2e n" res#%ss%"n "f -n "27%>-$%"n ($" $ rn "ver $%$7e). $hen Espidol failed to pay within the period provided in their agreement, the -tienDas were relieved of any o"ligation to reserve the property in his favor. 1he o"ligation is not rescindedI it simply did not arise. /. 1he notice of cancellation under ,.-. 0>>2 pertains to e3tra9udicial cancellation, and so does not apply to a 9udicial rescission as in this case. SPS. SALIM&ANGON vs. SPS. TAN (,-n -r/ 20* 2010) Refresher: CeniDa died intestate leaving a parcel of land at Mandaue City. 1wenty years later his > children e3ecuted an e3tra9udicial declaration of heirs and partition, dividing the land into > parcels for each of them. (ots -, 4, and C were ad9acent to a city street, while (ots < and E were not interior lots. 1o give these interior lots access to the street, the heirs esta"lished in their e3tra9udicial partition an e-se4en$ "f r%>h$ "f =-/ annotated on the individual titles and consisting of a B94e$er =%.e -77e/ 2e$=een L"$s ! -n. E $h-$ #"n$%n e. "n 2e$=een L"$s A -n. & and on to the streetI ,ealiDing that the partition resulted in an unequal division of the property, the heirs modified this and imposed - B94e$er =%.e right of way, e3clusively along the "oundary of (ot 4 from (ots < and E to the

street. 1husK 1he +alim"angons, owners of (ot -, one of the three lots ad9acent to the city street, constructed a house and two garages. 'ne garage used the alley or easement of right of way e3isting on (ot 4 to get to the street. :ictoria had this alley cemented and gated. +u"sequently, respondent spouses "ought (ots 4, C, <, E, "uilt improvements on (ot 4 that spilled into the easement area and closed the gate for the right of way. +o the +ps +alim"angons filed a complaint with the City Engineer of Mandaue against respondents. ,espondents in turn filed with ,1C for the e3tinguishment of the easement on (ot 4 with damages.

,1C upheld the right of way, holding that since this easement on (ot 4 was esta"lished "y agreement of the parties for the "enefit of (ots -, <, and E, such easement may only "e e3tinguished "y mutual agreement of the parties. C- reversed, finding that "ased on one of the > heirs@ testimony, the true intent of the parties was to esta"lish that easement for the "enefit of the owners of (ots < and E. 1hus when ownership of (ots 4, <, and E was transferred to the respondents, the easement ceased to have any purpose and "ecame e3tinct. ISS)ES: . $%& parol evidence rule precluded the parties from introducing testimony that tended to alter or modify the agreement for easement "etween the parties. &' 2. $%& the easement of right of way esta"lished "y the partition agreement among the heirs has "een e3tinguished. &' !OCTRINES: . 1he e3clusionary provision of the parol evidence rule admits of e3ceptions. +ection ., ,ule /0 of the ,evised ,ules on Evidence statesK +ec. .. Evidence of written agreements. ) $hen the terms of an agreement have "een reduced to writing, it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can "e, "etween the parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written agreement. ("=ever* - 3-r$/ 4-/ 3resen$ ev%.en#e $" 4".%f/* eC37-%n "r -.. $" $he $er4s "f $he =r%$$en ->ree4en$ %f he 3 $s %n %ss e %n h%s 37e-.%n>: (-) An %n$r%ns%# -42%> %$/* 4%s$-<e "r %43erfe#$%"n %n $he =r%$$en ->ree4en$G (2) The f-%7 re "f $he =r%$$en ->ree4en$ $" eC3ress $he $r e %n$en$ -n. ->ree4en$ "f $he 3-r$%es $here$"G (#) The v-7%.%$/ "f $he =r%$$en ->ree4en$G "r (.) The eC%s$en#e "f "$her $er4s ->ree. $" 2/ $he 3-r$%es "r $he%r s ##ess"rs %n %n$eres$ -f$er $he eCe# $%"n "f $he =r%$$en ->ree4en$. 5ere, the 1ans had put in issue the true intent of the parties when they alleged that the easement on (ot 4 was actually for the "enefit of (ots < and E only. 1hus they were entitled to introduce evidence to esta"lish the true intent and agreement of the parties although this may depart from what the partition agreement literally provided.

2. -s testified, the true agreement of the heirs was for the esta"lishment of an
easement of right of way f"r $he 2enef%$ s"7e7/ "f $he 7"$s $h-$ .%. n"$ h-ve .%re#$ -##ess $" $he s$ree$* n-4e7/ L"$s ! -n. E. (ots - and 4 did not need this alley since they were facing the street. Consequently, when the owner of (ots < and E also "ecame the owner of (ot 4, the easement of right of way on (ot 4 "ecame e3tinct "y operation of law. 7Civil Code, 0/ par. 8 1he e3istence of a dominant estate and a servient estate is incompati"le with the idea that "oth estates "elong to the same person. VEGA v. SSS (Se3$e42er 20* 2010) Refresher: ,eyes loaned from +++. $hen ,eyes could no longer pay for the loan, he as#ed +ps. :ega to assume the loan and "uy his land. :ega sought the opinion of +++ employee on the propriety of su"stitution of mortgage. 1he employee informed :ega that only an internal arrangement with the mortgagors may "e done "ut process will "e without the participation of +++.

:ega agreed to e3ecute the real property with assumption of mortgage in .= . ,eyes, through her sister completed to e3ecute the deed only on .=;. -fterwards, ,eyes failed to remit to +++ the payment for amortiDations given "y :ega. :ega updated the amortiDations themselves and paid P >,6/=.;=. Meanwhile, P<C filed action for sum of money against ,eyes and the house was attached "y ,1C. 2n response, :ega filed an action for consignation, damages and in9unction. :ega won in this case. 1he ,1C ordered P<C to deliver to :ega the certificate of title. +++ appealed to C-. Creversed. Iss e: $'& ,eyes validly sold her +++ mortgage property to :ega. *es. !"#$r%ne: +econdary evidence of deed of assignment is sufficient "ecause the original was lost in flood without "ad faith on part of :ega. :ega offered strong corro"oration of the fact of sale such as possession of properties and payment of amortiDation. - 2/6 of the Civil Code which states that whoever pays on "ehalf of the de"tor without #nowledge or will of the de"tor cannot compel the creditor to su"rogate him the rights over the mortgage) cannot apply in this case "ecause ,eyes consented to the transfer of ownership of mortgaged properties, and su"rogation in this case will contravene pu"lic policy. 7<octrine8 $hen a mortgagor sells the mortgaged property to a third person, the creditor may demand payment of principal o"ligation. 1his is "ecause mortgage credit is a real right. -fter payment of mortgage de"t to +++, it has no further 9ustification for withholding the release of property. ,eyes@ assignment of property to :ega did not "ind P<C. ,eyes has already lost ownership of the property as early as .= when the property was sold to :ega. -lso, P<C was not a "uyer in good faith "ecause it has notice of the sale of the property. SPS. FELIPE AN! ,OSEFA PARINGIT v. &A,ICT* PARINGIT -n. OR!ONO (Se3$. 2A* 2010) Refresher: Aulian and -urelia Paringit leased a lot in Manila, where they "uilt their home. 1he lessor, 1erocel ,ealty, offered to sell it to the couple "ut they didnXt have enough money to ma#e full payment upon deadline. 1hey sought the help of their child and his wife, Eelipe and Aosefa. 2n line with this, the couple e3ecuted a deed of assignment of leasehold right in favor of Eelipe and wife. ?pon full payment, 1erocel e3ecuted a <eed of -"solute +ale in the favor of Eelipe and Aosefa and turned over the title to them. 1he dad thereafter e3ecuted an affidavit clarifying the nature of the purchase of the lot, stating that it was "ought for the "enefit of all his children. 1his was signed "y all their children e3cept one. Aosefa, EelipeXs wife, signed on his "ehalf. 1he purchase of the lot was registered in the name of Eelipe and his wife, "ut they didnXt occupy the place. EelipeXs si"ling did. Eventually, Eelipe and his wife demanded that rental fees "e paid "y the occupants, to which EelipeXs si"lings refused. 1hey claimed that upon the death of their father, they had o"tained the right to occupy the lot, the same "eing their inheritance. -

case was filed "y the si"lings against Eelipe and his wife for annulment of title and reconveyance of property Iss e: $%& 15E ('1 $-+ P?,C5-+E< ?&<E, -& 2MP(2E< 1,?+1 E', 15E 4E&EE21 'E -(( 'E A?(2-&X+ C52(<,E&. *E+ !"#$r%ne: 2mplied trust under -rticle ;>0 presupposes a situation where a person, using his own funds, "uys property on "ehalf of another, who in the meantime may not have the funds to purchase it. 1itle to the property is for the time "eing placed in the name of the trustee, the person who pays for it, until he is reim"ursed "y the "eneficiary, the person for whom the trustee "ought the land. 2t is only after the "eneficiary reim"urses the trustee of the purchase price that the former can compel conveyance of the property from the latter -lthough no e3press agreement covered Eelipe and his wife@s purchase of the lot for the si"lings and their father, it came a"out "y operation of law and is protected "y it. 1he nature of the transaction esta"lished the implied trust and this in turn gave rise to the rights and o"ligations provided "y law. 2mplied trust is a rule of equity, independent of the particular intention of the parties. 2n an implied trust, the "eneficiary@s cause of action arises when the trustee repudiates the trust, not when the trust was created as Eelipe and his wife would have it.// 1he spouses of course registered the lot in their names in Aanuary .=6 "ut they could not "e said to have repudiated the implied trust "y that registration. 1heir purchase of the land and registration of its title in their names are not incompati"le with implied trust. 2t was understood that they did this for the "enefit of Aulian and all the children. Fe7%#%.-. T. M-r$%n* e$ -7. vs. !&S &-n< Ph%7%33%nes* In#.* e$ -7. (, ne 11* 2010) Refresher: Le-se ->ree4en$ "etween Martin, et al. 7lessors8 and <4+ 7lessee8 over a commercial warehouse and lots. Period is > years. 2n heavy rains flooded the leased property and su"merged into water the <4+ offices there along with its /20 repossessed vehicles. -s a result, <4+ wrote the Martins demanding that they ta#e appropriate steps to ma#e the leased premises suita"le as a par#ing yard for its vehicles. <4+ suggested the improvement of the drainage system or the raising of the property@s ground level. 2n response, the Martins filled the property@s grounds with soil and roc#s "ut did not level it. <4+ filed a complaint against the Martins for rescission of the contract of lease with damages. Claiming that the leased premises had "ecome untenanta"le, <4+ demanded rescission of the lease contract as well as the return of its deposit of P ,200,000.00. Iss e: $%& <4+, as lessee, is entitled to rescind the contract. ) *E+ !"#$r%ne: ?nder their lease agreement, the remedy of rescission would "ecome unavaila"le to <4+ only if the Martins, as lessors, made the required repair and reconstruction after the damages "y natural cause occurred, which meant putting the premises after the floods in such condition as would ena"le <4+ to resume its use of the same for the purposes contemplated in the agreement, namely, as office, warehouse, and par#ing space for <4+@ repossessed vehicles. 5ere, it is undisputed that the floods of May 2> and -ugust /, ..6 su"merged the <4+ offices and its /20 repossessed vehicles. 1he floods rendered the place unsuita"le for its intended uses. -nd, while the Martins did some repairs, they did not restore the place to meet <4+@ needs. 1hus <4+ may see# to rescinding the lease.

ALC IN!)STRIES* INC. v. !EPARTMENT OF P)&LIC WOR8S AN! (IG(WA'S (2010)

Refresher: <epartment of Pu"lic $or#s and 5ighways 7<P$58 awarded to petitioner -(C 2ndustries, 2nc. 7-(C8 the construction of a section of a road. -(C fell "ehind schedule and agreed with <P$5 to reduce the scope of wor#s 7an agreement called O,2+-P8, shrin#ing the pro9ect the reduction in scope of wor#, -(C continued to fall "ehind schedule. 1he <P$5 warned -(C a"out it thrice. 1he <P$5 proposed to -(C a +upplemental -greement, which -(C re9ected. 1his prompted the <P$5 to rescind the contract with -(C on the ground that it had incurred a negative slippage in e3cess of >T, the threshold set under P< =60. 1he Construction 2ndustry -r"itration Commission 7C2-C8 upheld the contract saying that, factoring in the delays attri"uta"le to "ad weather, the slippage should "e ad9usted to 2.=>T only. 1he C2-C also found that, while -(C was guilty of "reach of contract, the <P$5 was not without fault. 1he C2-C modified the rescission to a mutual termination. C- granted rescission. Iss e: $%& the C- erred in upholding the <P$5@s rescission of its contract with -(C. &'. !"#$r%ne: -(C failed to perform several o"ligations that the ,2+- required of it. +pecifically, -(C failed toK 8 su"mit a program of wor#I 28 su"mit its month)"y)month cash flow summaryI /8 complete the verification surveyI ;8 complete and maintain facilities for the resident engineerI >8 provide data for the resident engineer to process orders for power generatorsI 08 provide a service vehicleI and 68 delegate the necessary technical, financial and administrative authority to the Pro9ect Manager. 2n any case, aside from those "reaches of the contract, the <P$5 "ased its rescission of the same on -(C@s failure to comply with Clause 0 of the ,2+-. 1he .0T progress is a requirement imposed "y the parties. -s a contractual o"ligation, this supersedes the threshold imposed "y law. +ince the parties entered into the ,2+- primarily due to initial delays in the pro9ect, the timeta"le instituted in it "ecame an integral part of the agreement, an assurance that the pro9ect would "e completed on time. -(C@s failure to #eep up with the rate of progress as contractually mandated is a su"stantial and fundamental "reach which would defeat the very purpose of the ,2+-. 1hus, the <P$5 was entitled to terminate the pro9ect and e3pel -(C from it. $ith regard to -(C@s claim for stand"y costs for its equipment and manpower, -(C should "e deemed to have already waived whatever rights or interests it may have "een entitled to as a result of <P$5@s shortcomings "y virtue of entering into the ,2+-. 1he parties e3ecuted the ,2+- so the wor# on the pro9ect could continue despite the initial set"ac#s. -dmittedly, "oth sides incurred some delays. 2nstead of see#ing redress for such delays, each side waived whatever claims it had against the other arising from such delays as a ma9or consideration for their agreeing to enter into the ,2+-. REP)&LIC "f $he P(ILIPPINES vs. ROSILA ROC(E Refresher: 'n 0> <ecem"er ..0, ,osila ,oche applied for registration of title of her >,/>/)square) meter land in 4arrio &apindan, 1aguig, Metro Manila, denominated as (ot =0.=, "efore 4ranch >> of ,1C Pasig. ,oche alleged that she inherited the land in .00 from her father, Miguel, who in turn had held the land in the concept of an owner when ,oche was only a"out si3 years old. +he was "orn on that land on Aanuary 0, ./= and had helped her

father cultivate it. ,oche had also paid the realty ta3es on the land, which had an assessed value of P;.0,000.00. 1o support her application, she presented, among othersK 7 8 a certified true copy of the survey plan of the land, 728 its technical description, 7/8 a Certification from <E&, in lieu of the Geodetic Engineer@s Certificate, 7;8 ta3 declarations, and 7>8 real property ta3 receipts. +he also presented certifications that the (and ,egistration -uthority 7(,-8 and the &ational Printing 'ffice issued to show compliance with requirements of service of notice to ad9oining owners and pu"lication of notice of initial hearing. -s proof of her open, continuous, and uninterrupted possession of the land, ,oche presented Manuel -driano, who testified that he had "een a resident of the place where the land was located from .;. to ..0 when he moved to Pampanga. 5e drew a s#etch showing the location of (ot =0.= in relation to his own and identified the owners of the other ad9oining lots. 5e claimed to have #nown ,oche@s father since the latter had "een cultivating vegeta"les and rice on the land. 1he Government, through the '+G, opposed the application on the following groundsK 7a8 that neither ,oche nor her predecessor)in)interest had occupied the land for the required periodI and 7"8 that the land "elonged to the +tate and is not su"9ect to private acquisition. 1he (aguna (a#e <evelopment -uthority 7((<-8 also opposed ,oche@s application on the ground that "ased on technical descriptions, her land was located "elow the reglementary la#e elevation of 2.>0 meters and, therefore, may "e deemed part of the (aguna (a#e "ed under +ection ; of ,epu"lic -ct 7,.-.8 ;=>0. -fterwards, '+G filed a manifestation that since ,oche failed to prove that the land was part of the aliena"le land of the pu"lic domain, the Government did not need to present evidence in the case. 2t also adopted ((<-@s opposition. RTC ren.ere. D .>4en$ >r-n$%n> R"#heEs -337%#-$%"n. 1he ,1C held that ,oche had proved continued adverse possession of the land in the concept of an owner since Aune .;> or earlier, pursuant to P< .>.. -ssuming that the land was part of the pu"lic domain, ,oche and her predecessor@s "## 3-$%"n -n. # 7$%v-$%"n "f 4"re $h-n B0 /e-rs ves$e. $%$7e "n her, effe#$%ve7/ se>re>-$%n> %$ fr"4 $he 4-ss "f 3 27%# 7-n. . Moreover, the ((<- did not prove "y su"stantial evidence that the land was inaliena"le and part of the (aguna (a#e "ed. 'n appeal "y the Government, the CA -ff%r4e. $he .e#%s%"n "f $he RTC. 1he '+G filed a motion for reconsideration "ut the C- denied the same, prompting the Government to file the present petition. Iss e: $hether or not the land su"9ect of ,oche@s application is aliena"le or disposa"le land of the pu"lic domain. NO. R-$%": -n application for registration of title must, under +ection requirementsK ;7 8, P.<. >2., meet three

7a8 that the property is aliena"le and disposa"le land of the pu"lic domainI 7"8 that the applicants "y themselves or through their predecessors)in)interest have "een in open, continuous, e3clusive and notorious possession and occupation of the landI and 7c8 that such possession is under a bona fide claim of ownership since Aune 2, .;> or earlier.

5ere, ,oche did not present evidence that the land she applied for has "een classified as aliena"le or disposa"le land of the pu"lic domain. +he su"mitted only the survey map and technical description of the land which "ears no information regarding the land@s classification. +he did not "other to esta"lish the status of the land "y any certification from the appropriate government agency. 1hus, it cannot "e said that she complied with all requisites for registration of title under +ection ;7 8 of P.<. >2.. ?nder the ,egalian doctrine, all lands of the pu"lic domain "elong to the +tate and the latter is the source of any asserted right to ownership in land. 1hus, the +tate presuma"ly owns all lands not otherwise appearing to "e clearly within private ownership. 1o overcome such presumption, incontroverti"le evidence must "e shown "y the applicant that the land su"9ect of registration is aliena"le and disposa"le. ,especting the third requirement, the applicant "ears the "urden of proving the status of the land. 2n this connection, the Court has held that he must present a #er$%f%#-$e "f 7-n. #7-ss%f%#-$%"n s$-$ s issued "y the Community Environment and &atural ,esources 'ffice 7CE&,'8 or the Provincial Environment and &atural ,esources 'ffice 7PE&,'8 of the <E&,. 5e must also prove that the <E&, +ecretary had approved the land classification and released the land as aliena"le and disposa"le, and that it is within the approved area per verification through survey "y the CE&,' or PE&,'. Eurther, the applicant must present a copy of the original classification approved "y the <E&, +ecretary and certified as true copy "y the legal custodian of the official records. 1hese facts must "e esta"lished "y the applicant to prove that the land is aliena"le and disposa"le. +ince ,oche was una"le to overcome the presumption that the land she applied for is inaliena"le land that "elongs to the +tate, the Government did not have to adduce evidence to prove it. VILLAN)EVA vs. ROSL)ETA Refresher: ,espondent Emma ,osqueta is the formerly <eputy Commissioner of the ,evenue Collection and Monitoring Group of the 4ureau of Customs who tendered her courtesy resignation on 2/ Aanuary 200 , shortly after President Gloria Macapagal)-rroyo assumed office. 4ut five months later, she withdrew her resignation, claiming that she en9oyed security of tenure and that she had resigned against her will on orders of her superior. 'n / Auly 200 , President -rroyo appointed Gil :alera to respondent ,osqueta@s position. ,osqueta challenged such appointment and filed a 3e$%$%"n f"r 3r"h%2%$%"n, ? " =-rr-n$", and %nD n#$%"n against petitioner 1itus 4. :illanueva, then Commissioner of Customs, the +ecretary of Einance, and Gil :alera with ,1C Manila in Civil Case 0 ) 0 >/.. 'n 26 -ugust 200 , the ,1C issued a 1,' en9oining :illanueva and the Einance +ecretary from implementing :alera@s appointment. 'n 2= -ugust 200 , the ,1C superseded the 1,' with a writ of preliminary in9unction. Petitioner :illanueva, :alera, and the +ecretary of Einance challenged the in9unction order "efore the Court of -ppeals. 'n ; +eptem"er 200 , the C- issued its own 1,', en9oining the implementation of the ,1C@s in9unction order. 4ut the 1,' lapsed after 00 days and the C- eventually dismissed the petition "efore it. 'n 22 &ovem"er 200 , while the preliminary in9unction in the quo warranto case was again in force, petitioner :illanueva issued Customs Memorandum 'rder ;0)200 , authoriDing :alera to e3ercise the powers and functions of the <eputy Commissioner.

<uring the 4ureau@s cele"ration of its centennial anniversary in Ee"ruary 2002, its special Panorama magaDine edition featured all the customs deputy commissioners, e3cept respondent ,osqueta. 1he souvenir program, authoriDed "y the 4ureau@s +teering Committee headed "y petitioner :illanueva to "e issued on the occasion, had a space where ,osqueta@s picture was supposed to "e "ut it instead stated that her position was !under litigation.! Meanwhile, the commemorative "ill"oard displayed at the 4ureau@s main gate included :alera@s picture "ut not ,osqueta@s. 'n 2= Ee"ruary 2002, respondent ,osqueta filed a #"437-%n$ f"r .-4->es "efore the ,1C UueDon City against petitioner :illanueva, alleging that the latter maliciously e3cluded her from the centennial anniversary memora"ilia. Eurther, she claimed that he prevented her from performing her duties as <eputy Commissioner, withheld her salaries, and refused to act on her leave applications. 1hus, she as#ed the ,1C to award her P ,000,000.00 in moral damages, P>00,000.00 in e3emplary damages, and P/00,000.00 in attorney@s fees and costs of suit. RTC .%s4%sse. $he #"437-%n$. ,1C stated that petitioner :illanueva committed no wrong and incurred no omission that entitled her to damages. 1he ,1C found that :illanueva had validly and legally replaced her as <eputy Commissioner seven months "efore the 4ureau@s centennial anniversary. 4ut the CA reverse. $he RTCEs .e#%s%"n, holding instead that petitioner :illanueva@s refusal to comply with the preliminary in9unction order issued in the quo warranto case earned for ,osqueta the right to recover moral damages from him. Citing the -2 se "f r%>h$ 3r%n#%37e, the C- said that :illanueva acted maliciously when he prevented ,osqueta from performing her duties, deprived her of salaries and leaves, and denied her official recognition as <eputy Commissioner "y e3cluding her from the centennial anniversary memora"ilia. 1hus, the appellate court ordered :illanueva to pay P>00,000.00 in moral damages, P200,000.00 in e3emplary damages and P 00,000.00 in attorney@s fees and litigation e3penses. Iss e: $hether or not the C- erred in holding petitioner :illanueva lia"le in damages to respondent ,osqueta for ignoring the preliminary in9unction order that the ,1C issued in the quo warranto case, thus denying her of the right to do her 9o" as <eputy Commissioner of the 4ureau and to "e officially recogniDed as such pu"lic officer. NO* 2 $ $he -=-r. %s f" n. excessi!e 2/ $he S 3re4e C" r$ !"#$r%ne: ?nder the -2 se "f r%>h$ 3r%n#%37e found in Ar$%#7e 1A "f $he C%v%7 C".e, a person must, in the e3ercise of his legal right or duty, act in good faith. 5e would "e lia"le if he instead acts in "ad faith, with intent to pre9udice another. Complementing this principle are -rticles 20 and 2 of the Civil Code which grant the latter indemnity for the in9ury he suffers "ecause of such a"use of right or duty. Petitioner :illanueva claims that he merely acted on advice of the 'ffice of the +olicitor General 7'+G8 when he allowed :alera to assume the office as <eputy Commissioner since respondent ,osqueta held the position merely in a temporary capacity and since she lac#ed the Career E3ecutive +ervice eligi"ility required for the 9o". 4ut petitioner :illanueva cannot see# shelter in the alleged advice that the '+G gave him. S re7/* - >"vern4en$ "ff%#%-7 "f h%s r-n< 4 s$ <n"= $h-$ - 3re7%4%n-r/ %nD n#$%"n "r.er %ss e. 2/ - #" r$ "f 7-= h-. $" 2e "2e/e. , especially since the question of :alera@s right to replace respondent ,osqueta had not yet "een properly resolved. 1hat petitioner :illanueva ignored the in9unction shows 2-. f-%$h and %n$en$ $" s3%$e ,osqueta who remained in the eyes of the law the <eputy Commissioner. 5is e3clusion of her from the centennial anniversary memora"ilia was not an honest mista#e "y any

rec#oning. 2ndeed, he withheld her salary and prevented her from assuming the duties of the position. -s the Court said in Amonoy !. (pouses +utierre,, a party@s refusal to a"ide "y a court order en9oining him from doing an act, otherwise lawful, constitutes an a"use and an unlawful e3ercise of right. 1hat respondent ,osqueta was later appointed <eputy Commissioner for another division of the 4ureau is immaterial. $hile such appointment, when accepted, rendered the quo warranto case moot and academic, it did not have the effect of wiping out the in9uries she suffered on account of petitioner :illanueva@s treatment of her. 1he damage suit is an independent action. 1he C- correctly awarded moral damages to respondent ,osqueta. +uch damages may "e awarded when the defendant@s transgression is the immediate cause of the plaintiff@s anguish in the cases specified in -rticle 22 . of the Civil Code. 5ere, respondent ,osqueta@s colleagues and friends testified that she suffered severe an3iety on account of the speculation over her employment status. +he had to endure "eing referred to as a !squatter! in her wor#place. +he had to face inquiries from family and friends a"out her e3clusion from the 4ureau@s centennial anniversary memora"ilia. +he did not have to endure all these affronts and the angst and depression they produced had :illanueva a"ided in good faith "y the court@s order in her favor. Clearly, she is entitled to moral damages. 1he Court, however, finds the award of P>00,000.00 eC#ess%ve. -s it held in *hilippine Commercial -nternational $ank !. Alejandro, moral damages are not a "onanDa. 1hey are given to ease the defendant@s grief and suffering. Moral damages should reasona"ly appro3imate the e3tent of hurt caused and the gravity of the wrong done. 5ere, that would "e P200,000.00. 1he Court affirms the grant of e3emplary damages "y way of e3ample or correction for the pu"lic good "ut, in line with the same reasoning, reduces it to P>0,000.00. Einally, the Court affirms the award of attorney@s fees and litigation e3penses "ut reduces it to P>0,000.00.

!ALEON V. TAN (A > s$ 2B 2010) Refresher: <aleons and 1ans enter into a contract to sell a parcel of land which contract includes a provision which says that in the event that any of the chec# payments "ounce, the contract shall "e rescinded and the sellers shall forfeit >0T of the amount paid and return the other >0T to the 1ans. 1ans gave 0M as downpayment and issued postdated chec#s. Eight days after, a third party caused to "e annotated on the title of the su"9ect property an adverse claim. 1ans place a stop payment order on the chec#s and as#ed <aleons to cancel the claim. 1he chec#s "ounced. <aleons filed an action for rescission and enforcement of forfeiture clause, claiming "reach of contract on the part of the 1ans. Iss e: $hether the vendors are entitled to rescind the contract to sell pursuant to the forfeiture provision in the contract.

!"#$r%ne: -s a general rule, a contract is the law "etween the parties. 1hus, !from the moment the contract is perfected, the parties are "ound not only to the fulfillment of what has "een e3pressly stipulated "ut also to all consequences which, according to their nature,

may "e in #eeping with good faith, usage and law.! -lso, !the stipulations of the contract "eing the law "etween the parties, courts have no alternative "ut to enforce them as they were agreed GuponH and written, there "eing no law or pu"lic policy against the stipulated forfeiture of payments already made. 5owever, it must "e shown that the vendee failed to perform her o"ligation, there"y giving the vendor the right to demand the enforcement of the contract. 5ere, <aleon failed to prove the conditions that would warrant the implementation of this clause. - forfeiture clause in a contract of sale, which in a sense is punitive and confiscatory, is to "e construed strictissimi "uris and, in resolving a controversy involving it, the principles of equity must apply to the end that e3act 9ustice is achieved. 1he 1ans were 9ustified in placing a stop payment order on their chec#s to avoid greater loss since it may "e assumed that they did not want to "uy such an e3pensive property that had a cloud on its title.

!EL ROSARIO vs. FERRER (Se3$e42er 20* 2010) Refresher: -lthough denominated as a donation mortis causa, which in law is the equivalent of a will, the deed had no attestation clause and was witnessed "y only two persons. 1he named donees, however, signified their acceptance of the donation on the face of the document. -suncion opposed the petition, invo#ing his father (eopoldo@s assignment of his rights and interests in the property to her. -ccording to ,1C, donation was in fact one made inter vivos, the donors@ intention "eing to transfer title over the property to the donees during the donors@ lifetime, given its irrevoca"ility. Consequently, said the ,1C, (eopoldo@s su"sequent assignment of his rights and interest in the property was void since he had nothing to assign. 1he C- said that the donation, "eing one given mortis causa, did not comply with the requirements of a notarial will,= rendering the same void. Iss e: whether or not the spouses (eopoldo and Guadalupe@s donation to -suncion, Emiliano, and Aara"ini was a donation mortis causa, as it was denominated, or in fact a donation inter vivos.) inter vivos !"#$r%ne: Given that the donation in this case was irrevoca"le or one given inter vivos, (eopoldo@s su"sequent assignment of his rights and interests in the property to -suncion should "e regarded as void for, "y then, he had no more rights to assign. 5e could not give what he no longer had.

7 8 e3press !irrevoca"ility! of the donation is the !distinctive standard that identifies the 728 1he donors in this case of course reserved the !right, ownership, possession, and
administration of the property! "ut such reservation 7reddendum8 in the conte3t of document as a donation inter vivos.!

an irrevoca"le donation simply means that the donors parted with their na#ed title, maintaining only 2enef%#%-7 ownership of the donated property while they lived. 7/8 &ota"ly, the three donees signed their acceptance of the donation, which acceptance the deed required. ; 1his Court has held that an acceptance clause indicates that the donation is inter vivos. 7;8 Einally, in case of dou"t, the conveyance should "e deemed a donation inter vivos rather than mortis causa, in order to avoid uncertainty as to the ownership of the property su"9ect of the deed.

LIMANC(9O (OTEL AN! LEASING CORPORATION -n. CONRA!O TI) vs. CIT' OF OLONGAPO (,-n -r/ 1I* 2010) Refresher: 1he respondent City of 'longapo assessed petitioner Conrado 1iu his unregistered electricity consumption. Petitioner 1iu filed an action against the City "efore the ,egional 1rial Court 7,1C8 of 'longapo for in9unction with damages, which he won. Pending the ,1C@s resolution of its motion for reconsideration, the City filed criminal complaints against petitioner 1iu forK 7a8 theft of electrical current punished under Presidential <ecree 7P.<.8 ;0 I and 7"8 disengaging and tampering with his electric meter@s potential lin#, there"y resulting to a Dero)Dero power consumption in violation of City 'rdinance. 1his was dismissed. Claiming that petitioner 1iu suffered mental anguish, serious an3iety, "esmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shoc# and social humiliation and that petitioner (imanch)' 5otel suffered loss of "usiness goodwill, financial reverses, and in9ured reputation, "oth filed an action for damages against the City for having filed a malicious and unfounded charge of theft of electricity against them. 1he City denied any ill motive in filing the criminal complaint. 2t e3plained that it filed the criminal action following an e3amination of the electric meter installed at petitioner 1iu@s "uilding and registered in his name Iss e: whether or not petitioners 1iu and (imanch)' 5otel have proved the last two elements.) &'. !"#$r%ne: 1o "e entitled to damages for malicious prosecution, a person must prove not only the filing of the criminal case against him which ended in his acquittal "ut also the lac# of pro"a"le cause in the charges filed and the improper sinister motive in filing it. 1he "urden in suits for malicious prosecution is "eing a"le to prove the complainant@s deli"erate initiation of a criminal action #nowing the charge to "e false and groundless. 5ere, the complainant did not concoct from thin air the criminal charge for theft of electricity against petitioners. 2t filed the case "ased on the result of an investigation carried out at petitioner@s premises which indicated a tampering of the electric meter. 2t is not enough to say that, since the +upreme Court sustained the +ecretary of Austice@s finding that no pro"a"le cause for electricity theft e3isted against petitioners, a case for malicious prosecution already e3ists against the respondent.

TA:ATION LAW
LEPANTO CONSOLI!ATE! MINING v. AM&ANLOC (2010) Refresher: (epanto Consolidated Mining Company 7(epanto8 has a mining lease contract granting it the right to e3tract and use for its purposes all mineral deposits within the "oundary lines of its mining claim. ?pon inquiry, <E&, advised (epanto that, under its contract, it did not have to get a permit to e3tract and use sand and gravel from within the mining claim for its operational and infrastructure needs. 4ased on this advice, (epanto proceeded to e3tract and remove sand, gravel, and other earth materials from the mining site using it to construct and maintain concrete structures needed in its mining operation. -m"anloc, the provincial treasurer of 4enguet, sent a demand letter to (epanto, as#ing it to pay the province P ,.0 ,=./.22 as sand and gravel ta3, for the quarry materials that it e3tracted from its mining site from ..6 to 2000. (epanto questioned the assessment in the ,1C of 4enguet.,1C ruled that (epanto was lia"le for the amount assessed, with interest at the rate of 2T per month from the time the ta3 should have "een paid. 'n appeal, C1- 72nd <iv8 affirmed the ruling of the ,1C with the

modification that the interest of 2T per month shall not e3ceed /0 months. 1he C1- En 4anc affirmed the decision of the 2nd <ivision. ISS)E: $%& (epanto is lia"le for the ta3 imposed "y the Province of 4enguet on the sand and gravel that it e3tracted and used e3clusively in its mining operations. 'ES !"#$r%ne: 1he question of (epanto@s lia"ility for ta3 should "e determined "ased on the ,evised 4enguet ,evenue Code 7the revenue code8. 1he provincial revenue code provides that the su"9ect ta3 had to "e paid prior to the issuance of the permit to e3tract sand and gravel. 2ts -rticle <, +ection 2, enumerates four #inds of permitsK commercial, industrial, special, and gratuitous. +pecial permits covered only personal use of the e3tracted materials and did not allow the permitees to sell materials coming from his concession. -mong applicants for permits, however, only gratuitous permits were e3empt from the sand and gravel ta3. 2t follows that persons who applied for special permits needed to pay the ta3, even though they did not e3tract materials for commercial purposes. 1hus, the ta3 needed to "e paid regardless of the applica"ility of the administrative and reportorial requirements of that revenue code. (epanto invo#es the 4ureau of Mines and Geo)+ciences@ view that the mining company did not require it to get any of the permits that Mines -dministrative 'rder M,<)26 might require. 4ut that 4ureau@s view applied only to permits under M,<)26. 1he 4ureau has no authority to determine the applica"ility of local ordinances. 4esides, even the 4ureau itself states that the e3emption from M,<)26 is not a"solute as it shall not apply if the sand and gravel were to "e disposed of commercially. -n e3emption from the requirements of the provincial government should have a clear "asis, whether in law, ordinance, or even from the contract itself. ?nfortunately for (epanto, it failed to show its entitlement to such e3emption. Petition is <E&2E<. C1- En 4anc decision -EE2,ME<. CIR v. IRONCON &)IL!ERS (2010) Refresher: 2roncon sought the refund "y the 42, of its income ta3 overpayment and e3cess credita"le :-1. <ue to C2,Xs inaction, 2roncon filed a petition for review with the C1-. C1held that input :-1 payments should first "e applied to the reported output :-1 lia"ility. 'nly after this deduction has "een made will the 0T :-1 withheld "e applied to the amount of :-1 paya"le. +ince 2roncon had no more output :-1 against which the e3cess credita"le :-1 withheld may "e applied or credited, the :-1 withheld had "een e3cessively paid. 1hus, C1- ruled that the e3cess amount may "e refunded under +ection 20;7C8 in relation to +ection 22. of the &2,C. 4efore a refund may "e granted, however, it must "e shown that the claim was not used or carried over to the succeeding quarters. 4ut 2roncon did not present its :-1 returns for the succeeding quarters of 200 . $ithout this, C1- could not verify whether the ta3 credit was applied to output :-1 lia"ility in 200 . 1hus, C1- denied 2roncon@s claim for refund. 2roncon filed M, attaching the :-1 returns and C2, granted the application for refund. Iss e: $%& credita"le value)added ta3 7:-18 withheld from a ta3payer in e3cess of its output :-1 lia"ility may "e the su"9ect of a ta3 refund in place of a ta3 credit ) *E+ !"#$r%ne: 1he rule is that "efore a refund may "e granted, 2roncon must show that it had not used the credita"le amount or carried it over to succeeding ta3a"le quarters. 2roncon@s failure to offer in evidence its quarterly returns though fatal to its claim, may "e disregarded. Citing 4P2)Eamily +avings 4an# v. Court of -ppeals, the C1- ruled that once a claim for refund has "een clearly esta"lished, it may set aside technicalities in the presentation of evidence. Considering the C1-@s finding that 2roncon had e3cess credita"le :-1 withheld for which it was entitled to a refund, it ma#es no sense to deny 2roncon the

"enefit of the 4P2 ruling that overloo#s technicalities in the presentation of evidence. +u"stantial 9ustice dictates that the government should not #eep money that does not "elong to it at the e3pense of citiDens. PANASONIC COMM)NICATIONS v. CIR (Fe2. I* 2010) Refresher: Panasonic was engaged in the production and e3port of copiers. Claiming to "e Dero)rated and that its input :-1 remained unutiliDed, it filed applications for ta3 refund or credit for its e3port sales from -pril ..= to March .... 1hese applications were denied "ecause the word ODero)ratedP were not printed on Panasonic@s e3port invoices. Panasonic points out that in requiring the printing on its sales invoices of the word !Dero)rated,! the +ecretary of Einance unduly e3panded, amended, and modified "y a mere regulation 7+ection ;. 0=) of ,, 6).>8 the letter and spirit of +ections / and 2/6 of the ..6 &2,C, prior to their amendment "y ,.-. .//6, which did not include the inclusion of the word ODero)ratedP. Iss e: $hether Panasonic is entitled to the refund of its unutiliDed input :-1 notwithstanding the a"sence of the word ODero)ratedP on its invoicesJ &o. Eor the effective Dero)rating of transactions, the ta3payer has to "e :-1)registered and must comply with invoicing requirements. ,MC ;2)200/ providesK OEailure "y the supplier to comply with the invoicing requirements on the documents supporting the sale of goods and services will result to the disallowance of the claim for input ta3 "y the purchaser)claimant. 2f the claim for refund is "ased on the e3istence of Dero)rated sales "y the ta3payer "ut it fails to comply with the invoicing requirements in the issuance of sales invoices, its claim for ta3 credit%refund of :-1 on its purchases shall "e denied considering that the invoice it is issuing to its customers does not depict its "eing a :-1)registered ta3payer whose sales are classified as Dero)rated sales. -s to Panasonic@s contention, when petitioner Panasonic made the e3port sales su"9ect of this case, the rule that applied was +ection ;. 0=) of ,, 6).> 7Consolidated :alue)-dded 1a3 ,egulations8. 2t already required the printing of the word !Dero)rated! on the invoices covering Dero)rated sales. +ection ;. 0=) of ,, 6).> proceeds from the rule)ma#ing authority granted to the +ecretary of Einance under +ection 2;> of the .66 &2,C for the efficient enforcement of the ta3 code and of course its amendments. !"#$r%ne: 2n order to claim unutiliDed input :-1 for Dero)rated transactions, the invoices must contain the word ODero)ratedP.

ET(ICS
SPELMANS V OCAMPO (M-r#h 21* 2010) Refresher: ,oland +pelmans filed a complaint for theft and graft and corruption against M1C Audge Gaydifredo 'campo of Polomolo#, Cota"ato. Earlier, his Eilipina wife had filed a complaint for theft against the owners of the house that the +pelmans had rented, "ecause of which Audge 'campo conducted an ocular inspection of the said house and another house in which +pelmans #ept some of the personal "elongings of his mother. +pelmans alleged that the first case was merely a scheme of his wife to ta#e out properties from the said house, and that 'campo too# several pieces of antique and furniture after the inspection. 'campo said

+pelmans@s wife had entrusted the items to him for safe#eeping, and didn@t #now that the +pelmans were separated. +pelmans also alleged that 'campo requested him to sign an affidavit which would clear the 9udge and pray for the dismissal of the administrative complaint. 'C- found 'campo guilty of acts of impropriety and maintaining close affinity with a litigant in violation of Canons and ; of the &ew Code of Audicial Conduct. Iss e: $%& Audge 'campo@s ta#ing and #eeping of the personal properties "elonging to +pelmans "ut supposedly given to him "y the latter@s wife for safe#eeping violated the &ew Code of Audicial Conduct (e7.: *es. Eirst, Audge 'campo did not e3plain why of all people of Polomolo#, +pelmans@s wife would entrust the properties for safe#eeping. +econd, the purpose of the ocular inspection was suspect. 2t was not a ro""ery case where he might have an interest in personally loo#ing at where and how the "rea#)in too# place. 1hird, if Audge 'campo received the properties from +pelmans@s wife, it means a relation of trust e3isted "etween them. 5e should have inhi"ited himself from the "eginning. Eourth, 'campo returned the items only after four years when +pelmans filed the complaint. 5is years of possession o"viously went "eyond mere safe#eeping. 1he proper charge should "e gross misconduct, constituting violations of the &ew Code of Audicial Conduct, specifically +ection 0 of Canon , +ection of Canon 2, and +ection of Canon ;. 5is acts were motivated "y malice. 5e was not a warehouseman for personal properties of litigants in his court. 5e certainly would have #ept +pelmans@ properties had the latter not filed a complaint against him. 5e was guilty of covetousness. 2t affected the performance of his duties as an officer of the court and tainted the 9udiciary@s integrity.

You might also like