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International Journal of

Journal of Media & Cultutal Politics | Volume Four Number One

Volume Four Number One


ISSN 1740-8296
Media & Cultural Politics
Volume 4 Number 1 – 2008
Special issue: Globalisation, communications and political action
4.1
Introduction
3–8 Globalisation, communications and political action: Special issue introduction
Gillian Youngs and Juliann Emmons

Articles
International Journal of

Media &
9–26 From global village to global marketplace: Metaphorical descriptions
of the global Internet
Nisha Shah
27–49 Distributed deliberative citizens: Exploring the impact of cyberinfrastructure

Cultural
on transnational civil society participation in global ICT policy processes
Derrick L. Cogburn, Jane Finnerup Johnsen and Swati Bhattacharyya
51–69 Improving the prospects for sustainable ICT projects in the developing world
Laura Hosman and Elizabeth Fife

Politics
71–85 The ‘Lady’ revolution in the age of technology
Janni Aragon

Commentaries
87–103 Does affluenza spread quickly? A historical case study from Spain
Mark D. Harmon and Nuria Cruz-Camara
European film archives at the threshold of the digital era:
Museums or data banks?
Maria Komninos
Becoming Hello Kitty: A Deleuzian Study
Amy TY Lai

Reviews
105–121 Reviews by Matt Stahl, Nathaniel I. Cordova, Brian Thornton, Debra M. Clarke,
P. David Marshall and Norma Pecora

intellect Journals | Media & Culture


ISSN 1740-8296
41
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MCP_4_1-00_FM 1/23/08 12:39 PM Page 1

International Journal of
Media and Cultural Politics
Volume 4 Number 1
The International Journal of Media and Cultural Politics (MCP) is committed Editors
to analyzing the politics of communication(s) and cultural processes. It Katharine Sarikakis
addresses cultural politics in their local, international and global University of Leeds
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International Journal of Media and Cultural Politics Volume 4 Number 1.


© Intellect Ltd 2008. Introduction. English language. doi: 10.1386/macp.4.1.3/2

Globalisation, communications and


political action: Special issue introduction
Gillian Youngs University of Leicester, UK
Juliann Emmons Allison University of California,
Riverside, USA

Abstract Keywords
This article introduces the special issue and argues that the contributions in it globalisation
lead us to think more deeply about the need for endogenous rather than exogenous communications
approaches to information and communications technologies (ICTs) in our analy- political action
sis of globalisation, communications and political action. The argument covers information and
three areas: globalisation – virtual and material processes; communications as communications
integral to politics; political action and new virtual forms. technologies
vitual processes
social change
Introduction new economy
Globalisation, communications and political action are increasingly three information society
areas that need to be analysed interactively in contemporary times. The networking
aim of the theoretical debates and case studies contained in this special
issue is to demonstrate the potential for such integrated analysis from suf-
ficiently wide-ranging perspectives to offer signposts of broad relevance to
future research in this area. It can be argued that such evidence signals
demonstrable intellectual and concrete shifts in the spheres of globalisa-
tion, communications and political studies. In other words, one of the
major directions in which these spheres are moving is in relation to one
another. The purpose of this introductory article is to unfold some discus-
sion of why and how this is happening. It will do so under three headings:
globalisation – virtual and material processes; communications as integral
to politics; political action and new virtual forms. There is no suggestion that
what is happening is entirely new, nor that discontinuities are necessarily
more important than continuities. The intention is merely to draw out some
of the general implications of the specific case studies and arguments associ-
ated with them, and to reflect on some of their broader meanings.

Globalisation: virtual and material processes


Looking across the articles in this issue, it is clear that globalisation must
increasingly be viewed through information and communications technolo-
gies (ICTs) and their diverse roles in contributing to restructuring or creating
new institutional forms and patterns of governance. Globalisation has pri-
marily been seen to concern political, economic and cultural change, but
approaches to technology are all too often ‘exogenous’ in these contexts

MCP 4 (1) 3–8 © Intellect Ltd 2008 3


MCP_4_1-01_Intro 1/23/08 6:57 PM Page 4

rather than ‘endogenous’. In other words, technology is treated as outside of,


rather than integral to, social processes (for a wide discussion of this area in
relation to ICTs see, for example, Youngs 2007. See also Tomlinson 1999
and Mosco 2004). Globalisation studies writ large have not adequately
treated technological change as an intrinsic part of understanding what is
happening in the world or given it a central place in addressing the whole
meaning of the concept of globalisation. This exogenous tendency identifies
technologies as merely tools or instruments, means to ends, in other more
important social processes. This tendency to locate technology outside of
social dynamics is arguably a long-standing problem in social science that
has limited analysis of social change in the past as much as in the present
(see, for example, Talalay, Farrands and Tooze 1997).
In the light of the expanding functions of ICTs in everyday life and all
forms of communication associated with it, as well as, equally impor-
tantly, the reshaping of corporate wealth structures and their bases in
relation to ICTs, it can be argued that the strain on this exogenous
approach is beginning to show. Insufficient attention to the implications
of technological innovations and the changes associated with them may
lead to inadequate frameworks for our understanding of what is happen-
ing and why. Take the recent headline news that the internet search
engine Google had moved to 5th position on the US stock market, with
those ahead of it including Microsoft and the telecoms company AT&T.
‘Google is 10 times as valuable as America’s biggest carmaker, General
Motors, and is worth 30% more than the world’s largest drugs firm,
Pfizer. Long established “old economy” brands pale into comparison –
Coca-Cola’s capitalisation is just $142 bn, while McDonald’s can only
command a value of $70bn’ (The Guardian 2007).
While we are definitely in the early stages of the new ICT economy and
no-one knows exactly how it will develop into the medium and long-term
future, its significance as a driver of globalisation cannot be ignored or
underestimated. One of the implications of this significance is the virtual
as well as material nature of globalisation, which cannot simply be
reduced to the myriad forms of communication that take place in the
virtual sphere of ICTs, including through mobile devices such as phones
and wireless-enabled palmtops and laptops. We now have to focus increas-
ingly on the economic value new ICT processes are generating and how
this value is emphasising the shift to an information economy, which has
links to the earlier service economy stages of globalisation, but also fea-
tures new developments.
Online searching as one of the major services of the new economy
applies comprehensively to everyday life functions right across work and
leisure, public and private activities, interests and preoccupations. Whole
ranges of specialist information services – including in relation to finance,
news, entertainment, health, transport, education – are drawing ever
larger numbers of people online for ever growing numbers of reasons and
purposes. The virtual delivery systems that ICTs enable are not only inte-
gral to changing characteristics of global corporate patterns, but also at
the user end, what it means to be active as a consumer. Even when virtual
activity concerns traditional material goods, it may be an integral part of
the picture in terms of online shopping or ordering, or just surfing to

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compare prices and brands, for example. The informational services and
functions of the new economy are equally about changes in patterns
related to the old economy (for example, shopping) as they are about intro-
ducing entirely new goods and services (social networking being the latest
boom development).
As a report in The New York Times (2007) stated recently: ‘. . . Internet
start-ups are drawing investment based on their ability to build an audi-
ence, not bring in revenue . . .’. For both globalisation and communica-
tions scholars this shifting focus, it could be argued, should prompt a
whole lot of thinking about whether and how audience is the new
revenue. Or, to put it another way, consider how ICTs are contributing to
generating new forms of value from the audience factor and the varied
contributions of different ICTs to this. The article by Hosman and Fife in
this special issue touches on themes that indicate such considerations are
as relevant to ICT-related developments in the less as well as the most
developed parts of the world.

Communications as integral to politics


It may be a bold statement to say that we cannot think about politics today
without thinking about globalisation and communications. However ICTs,
as several contributions in this special issue show, have taken this debate
onto whole new – symbolic as well as material, institutional and activist –
levels. The boundary-crossing age of the Internet has given new and varied
life to the long-standing debate in globalisation studies about the status of
the nation state as a territorial (among other things) focus of political
authority and legitimacy. Shah’s article reminds us that we must investi-
gate such areas on a discursive as well as an institutional basis. Her discus-
sion signals how governance extends to the virtual realm of the Internet,
and that this realm, and interests and activities associated with it, now
form part of thinking about political community, changing or otherwise.
The implications of such analysis are far reaching. For instance, we
can recognise the Internet in spatial terms in relation to politics and polit-
ical processes (see, for example, Youngs 2007). This approach helps us to
understand that although the Internet is a virtual arena its spaces have
real material and political effects. Organisations and communities that are
present online may be there in virtual form, but their campaigns and
senses of belonging extend to the more familiar physical and concrete
realms. Contemporary political processes are increasingly a fusion of
online and offline interactions, effects and interest and community build-
ing. And while the web may not be territorial in the usual physical sense,
entities on it can be considered ‘bounded’ or discrete in many ways.
The Internet may cross many physical boundaries but it has many
boundaries of its own, and the web is as much a new realm of ownership
and profit-driven intellectual property creation, as it is a series of networks of
free flowing information and communication. As Shah’s discussion of the
global marketplace in relation to the Internet indicates, commodification is
the name of the game (see Mosco 2004 for associated discussion). It is possi-
ble to argue that ICTs are expanding and compounding dominant aspects of
the traditional capitalist market, facilitating not only its continual growth
into new areas of everyday life, with constant production and marketing of

Globalisation, communications and political action: Special issue introduction 5


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new goods and services, but also its geographic and, equally important, its
symbolic reach. Online spaces are multimedia and offer a potentially rich
symbolic environment, where access to audiences for marketers and brand
purveyors is automatically a 24 hours a day/7 days a week possibility.
The political economy of the online world and the symbolic wealth of
opportunities it offers advertisers in terms of time and space are part of the
new ways in which communications is integral to politics. This is a point
that takes us beyond traditional views of politics and their relation to the
online world. Such traditionally oriented work, for example, investigates
how politicians and political parties are harnessing the benefits of the web
and email to reach their audiences, connect with them, get feedback, and
campaign. Such areas of study are undoubtedly important, but they can
often take an exogenous rather than an endogenous view of the technolo-
gies. In other words they look at how ICTs are being used as tools, rather
than looking at what ICTs are and how they are contributing to changing
the overall environment for communications and politics, and what kinds
of new political questions they may be raising.

Political action and new virtual forms


So if we are taking the integral role of communications to politics seriously
in relation to ICTs we are not only looking at how ICTs are being used in
traditional political structures, such as elected parliaments, councils and
political parties, important as such focus is. We are also looking at political
action afresh in direct relation to ICTs, to see how perhaps new kinds of
technological applications and new forms of political action might be con-
sidered mutually constitutive in certain ways. Across very different con-
texts, the article by Cogburn, Johnsen and Battacharrya, and the article by
Aragon, could be considered to be working in this terrain.
The Cogburn et al. article, in looking at new virtual organisational
structures such as a policy collaboratory that can be supported by com-
puter-mediated communication tools, considers the problems as well as the
possibilities involved in integrating new technologies into political network-
ing processes. One thing among others that this research highlights is that
melding ICTs with particular aims is not a straightforward affair. Context
and capacity are always influential and highly differentiated. This article
prompts thinking about the potential of networking tools for new forms of
more effective and empowering political networking across different set-
tings, especially in the developing world. Cogburn et al. emphasise that
people are linking to each other, as well as to information, and the facilities
available to them must be taken into account as part of the process.
There are multiple and diverse meanings of participation, electroni-
cally and otherwise, and some of the earliest research on Internet use for
networking purposes revealed that the journeys of discovery involved were
not just one way. In other words, the use of ICTs produced reflections
about the people and organisations using them, their identities and the
way they worked and related to one another, including across cultural and
professional boundaries, as much as raising questions and problems about
the technologies themselves (the range of discussions in Harcourt 1999
remain interesting in this regard). Research about ICTs is frequently as
much a sociological endeavour as it is a technical one and the discoveries

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related to both, or importantly the relationship between the two, the socio-
technical dimension, can be surprising.
The article by Aragon indicates the extent to which ICTs are contribut-
ing to new forms of activism, which do not necessarily fit neatly into tradi-
tional definitions such as the political, but partly, in their community
building, mix political, social and cultural activism. In focusing on the
Ladyfest phenomenon, her research also highlights another key challenge
in ICT studies: new kinds of generational politics which can disrupt tradi-
tional age-related hierarchies and position young people as highly able to
take most creative advantage of the interactive potential of the online
world to network and campaign. This case study demonstrates how new
horizontal processes of activism can be self-defining rather than fitting
into existing categories. Again, it is clear that such developments are as
much about social as technological change and the intricate connections
between the two that are now increasingly part of the world we live in.
The Cogburn et al. and Aragon articles offer much detailed food for
thought about ICTs and political action, and their contrasts in terms of
focus and results are as interesting as their connections. While they are
considering rather different kinds of civil society activism, together they
range across the collective and individual spectrums. We can take from
them useful insights about how political processes and ICT use are woven
together, and in certain ways, are informing one another. Will the kinds of
developments they discuss lead us ultimately to new understandings of
both political action and ICTs? Do they suggest that online environments
could become as important to the birth of new types of political enthusiasm
and the triumph over political apathy as the more familiar offline environ-
ments? These are the kinds of questions such research helps to validate.

Conclusion
The diverse content of this special issue aims to represent more than the
sum of just its individual articles. The guest editors anticipate that by
reading the issue as a whole, researchers, students and practitioners will
draw something from the wider connections suggested. The individual case
studies raise specific points about particular areas of political action, illus-
trating the breadth of application of ICTs, and the need to examine their
meanings in context, in precise terms. If we look across the issue as a whole
we can see the different levels on which analysis of ICTs can take place from
the macro through to the micro, indicating not only the central place of
ICTs in the study of globalisation, communications and political action, but
the varied institutional, collective and individual aspects of such study.
The guest editors would like to think that this issue makes some direct
contribution to fresh thinking about endogenous characteristics of ICTs,
and endogenous rather than exogenous perspectives on them. As virtual
(online) processes increasingly become embedded in more and more facets
of daily life, this thematic, we would argue, will or should find its way onto
a growing number of political agendas, large and small, at global and local
levels. With the flurry of attention to Web 2.0 developments and the burst
of social networking that is constantly making the headlines as the latest
ICT phenomenon, the role of ICTs in defining the social is likely to con-
tinue to be a hot topic.

Globalisation, communications and political action: Special issue introduction 7


MCP_4_1-01_Intro 1/23/08 6:57 PM Page 8

Critical thinking in relation to such developments will include the


kinds of questions about the nature of political action and communica-
tions and commodification that this special issue raises. The commercial
innovations and activities linked to Web 2.0 keep to the fore that ICTs are
connecting political and economic processes as much as they are connect-
ing people. Indeed, this is part of the picture of fusion of political economy
and communications in public and private areas of life. We expect this
special issue will not only provide answers linked to such themes but will
also help to generate many new questions. For virtual politics is not only
old politics in new forms but also, we would argue, new politics in new
forms, or at least we should be open to such possibilities.

Acknowledgements
Gillian Youngs and Juliann Emmons Allison are grateful to the International Studies
Association for a workshop grant to hold the event from which the papers in this
special issue are drawn, and would also like to thank all those who took part in the
workshop in Chicago in March 2007 for their involvement and support of this work.
Gillian Youngs also wishes to acknowledge the support of the Department of
Political Science, the Program on Global Studies, and the Blakely Center for
Sustainable Surburban Development, University of California, Riverside, where she
was a visiting scholar in summer 2007 and enjoyed research space and support to
work on this special issue.

References
Harcourt, W. (ed.) (1999), Women@Internet, London: Zed.
Mosco, V. (2004), The Digital Sublime: Myth, Power and Cyberspace, Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press.
Talalay, M., Farrands, C. and Tooze, R. (eds.), Technology, Culture and Competitive-
ness: Change and the World Political Economy, London: Routledge.
The Guardian (2007), Google hits $219bn in success search, November 1, p. 3.
The New York Times (2007), Silicon Valley Start-Ups Awash in Dollars, Again,
October 17, accessed online November 5 2007 at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/
10/17/business/media/17bubble.html?_r⫽1&oref⫽slogin&pagewanted⫽print.
Tomlinson, J. (1999), Globalization and Culture, Cambridge: Polity Press.
Youngs, G. (2007), Global Political Economy in the Information Age: Power and
Inequality, London: Routledge.

Contributor details
Gillian Youngs researches and teaches in the areas of globalisation, information
society and new media studies. She is a Senior Lecturer and Course Director of
MA Globalization and Communications. Contact: Department of Media and
Communication, University of Leicester, University Road, Leicester, LE1 7RH, UK.
E-mail: gy4@le.ac.uk
Juliann Emmons Allison is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University
of California, Riverside, USA, where she teaches international political economy,
global environmental politics, environmental policy and law, and gender and inter-
national relations. She is also Director of the Political Science Honors Program, Co-
Director of the Program on Global Studies, and Associate Director of the Center for
Sustainable Suburban Development. Contact: Department of Political Science,
University of California, 900 University Avenue, Riverside, CA 92503, USA.
E-mail: juliann.allison@ucr.edu

8 Gillian Youngs and Juliann Emmons Allison


MCP_4_1-02_Shah 1/23/08 6:25 PM Page 9

International Journal of Media and Cultural Politics Volume 4 Number 1.


© Intellect Ltd 2008. Article. English language. doi: 10.1386/macp.4.1.9/1

From global village to global


marketplace: Metaphorical descriptions
of the global Internet
Nisha Shah University of Toronto, Canada

Abstract Keywords
Prevailing analyses of globalisation and the Internet posit global politics as the globalisation
outcome of the Internet’s physical-geographical reach. This reach is assumed to Internet
compromise the traditional sources of political power associated with the sover- metaphor
eign state by transgressing its territorial boundaries. The shortcoming of this discourse
approach is that it fails to acknowledge the degree to which the state and its sover- global politics
eignty are discursively constituted as normative principles that legitimate a par- legitimacy
ticular type of political order. Thus, in order to locate the transformative potential
of globalisation, attention must be directed to globalisation’s ‘discursive’ dimen-
sions. To do this I focus on two metaphors of globalisation – ‘global village’ and
‘global marketplace’. In this paper, I outline how these metaphors constitute and
legitimate global political order and the impact this has on the ‘global’ character of
the Internet. I specify how each metaphor shapes what the Internet is, who it is
for, what kind of global potential it represents according to its understanding of
what constitutes legitimate global political order. The structure of global political
order cannot, therefore, be easily derived from the Internet’s physical reach. We
can still study the Internet as emblematic of globalisation and global politics;
however, doing so necessitates exploring how the structure and character of the
Internet is tied to, and changes with, the production of new systems of global
legitimacy and political order.

Introduction
The Internet has become emblematic of globalisation. Its planetary system
of fibre optic cables and instantaneous transfer of information are consid-
ered, by many accounts, key to understanding the transformation of world
order and the ability to imagine the world as a single, global space. As
Goldsmith and Wu (2006: 179) note, ‘the Internet has widely been viewed
as the essential catalyst of contemporary globalisation, and it has been
central to debates about what globalisation means and where it will lead’.
This type of analysis often assumes that the Internet’s physical–geographical
reach across the globe compromises the traditional sources of political
power associated with the sovereign state: new actors – from activists to
terrorists – have been empowered and new networks of authority have
been created that operate beyond the borders of the state in a novel global
context. From this perspective, the Internet represents how the constituent

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units, actors and institutions of world politics have shifted from the inter-
national system of sovereign states to a post-sovereign global political field
(Cairncross 1997; Castells 2000b; Catells 2001; Deibert 1997b; Der
Derian 2003; Dodge and Kitchin 1998; Friedman 2000; Herrera 2003;
Kobrin 2002; Ohmae 2001; Rosenau and Singh 2002).
It is not the conclusion of this position that is contested here, but
rather its analysis. Its shortcoming is that it posits global politics as an
outcome facilitated by the Internet’s physical geographical reach. It
assumes that because the Internet is not circumscribed by territorial
boundaries, the state and its sovereignty are compromised – and, subse-
quently, political order is transformed from territorialist geometries of
political authority to more global ones. This assumption, however, fails to
acknowledge that sovereignty is discursively constituted as a normative
principle that legitimates a particular organisation of political authority,
identity, and community in mutually exclusive units represented by terri-
torial states. Along these lines, the state is an authoritative locus of politi-
cal order not because of its territorial integrity, but its political legitimacy, a
normative understanding about the location (and by extension, the limits)
of the field of political and social relations.
Consequently, in making claims about (or against) the emergence of a
new global political order, globalisation’s deconstruction of the state must
entail more than the physical transcendence of territorial boundaries, or
deterritorialization. This does not dispute that globalisation in different
forms has challenged the topography of conventional political life in tangi-
ble and empirical ways. Rather, my claim is that without the power to
delegitimate sovereignty and relegitimate political order in some different –
some global – way, globalisation lacks the capacity to transform political
order. It is therefore necessary to consider how a global political field is dis-
cursively articulated, according to which normative principles, and how, if
at all, they contest and change the norms of legitimacy and institutional
frameworks of the sovereign states-system. In short, delineating globalisa-
tion’s capacity to generate a new sphere of political authority and action
requires an exploration of its discursive dimensions (Steger 2003, 2004).
The discursive power of globalisation is evident in the pervasive use of
metaphors in discussions of globalisation in general, and of globalisation
and the Internet in particular (albeit not exclusively). Two of the most
prominent metaphors are the global village and the global marketplace. The
metaphors are not inconsequential. On the one hand, the Internet is said
generate a global political order rooted in a common humanity and delib-
erative democracy – a global village – that overcomes the violent differences
engendered by sovereignty. On the other, the Internet is met with the
enthusiasm for a new global marketplace, in which a global political order is
organised around private authorities that ensure prosperity by promoting
competition. We can thus study the Internet as emblematic of globalisation –
not through its physical diffusion, but by examining how the Internet
embodies the discursive re-articulation and normative reconstitution of
political order through different global metaphors.
Evidently, metaphors of globalisation do not illustrate or reflect a
certain configuration of political order originating in the Internet. What

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the Internet is, who it is for, what kind of global potential it represents –
answers to these questions are produced by the metaphor of globalisation
that ‘describes’ the Internet. Drawing from Rorty’s (1989) notion of
metaphorical description, this article contends that the discursive dimen-
sions of globalisation can be explored through metaphors that disrupt the
metaphors that legitimate the sovereign states-system and re-describe
political order in global terms.
Applied to the Internet, this paper draws from Lessig’s (1999) insight
that the Internet is constituted by its governance principles and practices.
Elaborating on the role of metaphors in producing these governance
frameworks, it looks specifically at how metaphors of globalisation impli-
cate the governance of the Internet, thereby constituting its global charac-
ter. In short, if the Internet’s political orders are a product of its governance
frameworks, and if governance frameworks are generated by metaphors,
the global political orders associated with the Internet are produced by
metaphors of globalisation. We can thus accept an intimate relationship
between the Internet and globalisation, with the connection located in the
discursive power of metaphors rather than solely the physical reach of
Internet hardware.
My analysis of the Internet’s ‘global’ character revolves around two
Internet decision-making bodies – the Internet Engineering Task Force (the
IETF) and the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers
(ICANN). Each is examined as a product of the prevailing metaphor of the
time – the global village and the global marketplace, respectively. This explo-
ration does not justify or establish the prominence of these organisations;
they are considered well-established ‘facts’ in the Internet governance
literature (Hofmann 2005; Mueller 2002). Rather, this method explains
how and why each was legitimated as an important organisation. It is, in
a sense, to account for what are taken as facts of the Internet’s global
governance and to illustrate the basis of their legitimacy within discourses
of globalisation. Simply put, it treats them less as facts to be assumed and
more as metaphorical effects to be explained.
This analysis has three overlapping aims. A primary objective is to shed
light on the normative reconstitution of political legitimacy through the
discursive dimensions of globalisation. This requires recasting the conven-
tional formulation of globalisation and the Internet as a set of trends oper-
ating in a physical–geographical space, and explores the role of metaphors
in shaping the Internet and its global governance. A second objective is to
examine metaphors of globalisation in order to raise awareness about how
the Internet is constructed as a ‘global’ technology. Finally, because differ-
ent metaphors circulate, neither globalisation (even if viewed discursively)
nor the Internet can be seen as having one political structure or teleology.
Different metaphors, each with their own vision of global political order,
produce a particular kind of globalisation and a particular kind of
Internet. This further illuminates the discursive dimensions of globalisa-
tion, revealing that global political order is open to capture by different
metaphors.
Interrogating metaphors of globalisation through the Internet is not
intended to account for the full array of global events and forces and their

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discursive effects. Rather, given the privileged position of the Internet in


discussions of contemporary globalisation, the Internet provides a fruitful
case for exploring the role of metaphors of globalisation and to reflect on
globalisation’s discursive power to transform political order. The argument
proceeds as follows: it first delineates the importance of the discursive
dimensions of globalisation and the particular role of metaphors in the
normative reconstitution of political legitimacy and political order. Second,
it elaborates on the significance of two popular metaphors of globalisation –
global village and global marketplace – in shaping the governing protocols
that constitute the Internet. Stated in brief, by exploring the different visions
of political order specified by each metaphor, it examines how the ways in
which the Internet comes to emblematise globalisation is intertwined with
the production of new systems of global legitimacy and political order.

Globalisation’s discursive dimensions


Globalisation signifies a wide-range of processes and forces that have made
it possible to conceive of the world in global terms. Although depictions of
globalisation’s driving logics and key features vary, most proffer the view
that globalisation entails a transformation of political geography beyond
its usual association with the territorial state. If not eroding the state,
globalisation’s deterritorialising elements are at minimum seen to funda-
mentally restructure what the state is and how it operates.
Within these analyses, sovereignty loses its political caché. There are
many dimensions and theories of sovereignty: theories of popular sover-
eignty, for instance, are not as much focused on the territorial dimensions
of political order as they are on how legitimate decision-making occurs
within the state. Of course, this is not to say that territory is irrelevant.
These theories assume that the state’s territorial borders demarcate the
legitimate constituency that makes decisions. Assessments of globalisation
and its challenge to sovereignty from this perspective therefore focus
how globalisation’s deterritorialising effects compromise the ability of a
given state population to self-govern (Archibugi et al. 1998; Held 1995).
Discussions of the Internet and globalisation, however, put more explicit
emphasis on the territorial-spatial dimensions of sovereignty. This clarifi-
cation and specification is necessary in order to understand both the
claims about the transformation of political authority accorded to the
Internet’s global reach and also to assess its shortcomings.
As stated, depictions of the Internet and globalisation tend to focus on
the political transformations generated from the transcendence of the
state’s territorial borders. Although borders have never made states com-
pletely hermetic, the ‘unprecedented speeds and unprecedented extents’ of
the contemporary globalisation moment are considered to be ‘qualitatively
new, complex and different’ (Luke 1995: 100). In this new constellation of
forces, the regulative capacity of states is increasingly undermined, putting
its sovereign authority in question.
As such analyses tend to privilege a view of globalisation in which
material factors – pollution, money, technology – easily move across the
planetary surface, the global in globalisation takes on a primarily a physi-
cal description. Such descriptions, however, make it easy for critics to

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dismiss the significance of globalisation. As these assessments rely on a 1. This type of analysis
physical-material description of the dispersal of flows and processes, the often focuses on the
technical design of
continued action of and allegiance to the state is considered evidence that the Internet. A
globalisation’s transformative impulse is overrated and overstated (Hirst commonly held view
and Thompson 1999). From this perspective, even if globalisation is politi- is that ‘the Internet
was designed without
cally relevant, the continued activity and power of the state suggests that any contemplation of
globalisation is the product of state power not a threat to it (Weiss 1998). national boundaries.
An even more damning criticism comes from those who argue that The actual traffic in
the Net is totally
while the de facto sovereignty of the state may be challenged, what imbues unbound with respect
the state with its political import and legitimacy is its de jure sovereignty. to geography.’ (Cerf
So long as de jure principles hold, the near or complete absence of de facto qtd. by Goldsmith and
Wu 2006: 58) Again,
sovereignty does little to undermine the state as the defining political this only puts
framework of political life today (Krasner 1999; Thompson and Krasner emphasis on the
1989). In the context of globalisation, what matters is whether the dis- physical reach of the
Internet and says
courses of legitimacy that sanction state sovereignty as the appropriate nothing about how its
principle of political life are firmly in place. Disputing a notable change global reach
in these footings, these scholars contend that globalisation is of little constitutes a new
normative geography
significance. of politics.
The obverse of the emphasis on de jure sovereignty is that the continued
existence of the state is not by itself evidence that the norms and practices
of political legitimacy remain connected to, and even protective of, the state
and its sovereignty. The state may continue to persist without remaining
the locus of political legitimacy. This also suggests that it is insufficient to
point to the physical reach of globalising forces, such as those associated
with the Internet, as evidence of the diminished significance of the state.1
Without attention to legitimacy, the continued existence of the state is not
evidence against globalisation (and support for sovereignty). Neither is the
physical extent of globalising flows evidence against sovereignty (and
support for global political transformation).
For globalisation to be a moment of political reconstruction it must
entail a set of discursive oppositions that force a reconsideration of the
state and its sovereignty as the limits of political order by constituting
global space as a legitimate site of governance and authority. From this
view, globalisation must be a constitutive discourse that delegitimates ter-
ritoriality and reshapes the normative basis of political order by legitimat-
ing another. Steger (2003: preface) describes globalisation’s discursive
dimensions as:

. . . narratives that put before a public a particular agenda of topics for dis-
cussion, questions to ask, and claims to make. The existence of these narra-
tives shows that globalization is not merely an objective process, but also a
plethora of stories that define, describe and analyse that very process. The
social forces behind these competing accounts of globalization seek to endow
[globalization] with norms, values, and meanings that . . . legitimate and
advance specific power interests . . .
see also Steger 2004, 2005

Endorsing the view that globalisation is a transformative process, I


delineate the discursive dimensions of globalisation and their political

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relegitimations and reconstructions through different metaphors of global-


isation. Following Steger, this discursive approach is not meant to demon-
strate that globalisation is a single legitimating discourse expressed
through different metaphors. A plethora of metaphors of globalisation
offer varying legitimating frameworks and therefore do not participate in
the construction of the same global political order. The flip side of this is
that the discourses of sovereignty contested and changed by different
metaphors also differ. Different metaphors will provide different analyses
of how sovereignty as the standard of legitimacy is thrown into crisis by
globalisation, and subsequently what kind of global political order is
emerging and what its legitimating conditions should be. Their divergent
interpretations make evident that neither globalisation nor sovereignty –
and by implication the Internet – can be discussed in any definitive way.
Simply put, even if we can speak intelligibly about global as a physical
descriptor, its political significance is subject to varying determinations
and designations. What are the different metaphors of global political
order that have emerged and how and why do they construct and legiti-
mate political order beyond sovereignty differently?

Metaphors and political order


Metaphors are generally understood to be tropes of resemblance between
different things – a grafting process whereby one field is used to describe
another. Read (2006: 1–2) argues that: ‘Something about globalisation
appears to compel the production of metaphors.’ This claim is not only
about the pervasive use of metaphor in discussions of globalisation, such as
global village, global marketplace, etc. For Read, globe or global is only a geo-
metric abstraction, something used to map and understand a physical
space and is thereby not by definition a normative political order.
Distinguishing between ‘world’ (a normative-philosophical concept without
a fixed spatial referent) and ‘globe’ (a geometric abstraction used to under-
stand a physical space), Read contends that the action of metaphor lies pre-
cisely in how a normative world is grafted onto the globe such that ‘global’
is produced as a horizon of political order. On this reading, metaphors of
globalisation are not meaningless rhetoric. Instead, they assemble global
space as a political order. All this is to say that globe or global by itself does
not provide the blueprint for political action – it must be constituted as a
political order through normative visions and ideals. Subsequently, if glob-
alisation is a moment of political transformation that makes possible a
global political space, investigating such transformations requires interro-
gating the prevailing metaphors of globalisation.
Metaphors accordingly are not simply literary devices. They are
imbued with a normative operation that constructs and imposes political
order. Richard Rorty (1989) provides the most direct entry point into
understanding the role of metaphors in establishing the normative foun-
dations of political order. Following Donald Davidson (1978), Rorty asserts
that metaphors are not a matter of meaning. Being literally false, they
disrupt conventional practices of language and thus appear absurd. This
absurdity, however, is not grounds for dismissing metaphors as inconse-
quential. On the contrary, metaphor’s absurdity is a source of creativity. If

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not producing meanings, metaphors produce effects (non-verbal images or 2. This is also evidenced
pictures) that generate novel and imaginative possibilities and understand- in discussions ranging
from Plato’s notion of
ings. For instance, the commonly used metaphor ‘Juliet is the sun’ is liter- the polis as a soul to
ally false (and accordingly absurd). However, by redescribing Juliet through feudal society’s ‘Great
the sun the metaphor inscribes sun-like features onto Juliet, constituting Chain of Being’ to
Hobbes’s ‘state is a
her in a novel way. In this sense, metaphors operate as a performative man’ in which the
speech-act and have little to do with semantics (c.f. Black 1981; Davidson different metaphors
1978). Attention is therefore directed to the power of metaphorical legitimate the virtue
of philosopher kings,
descriptions to evoke new imaginative possibilities that generate new divine right, the rights
insights and understandings. This notion of description, however, is not a of man, or absolute
reflection of ‘reality’ out there that is then reflected through metaphors. sovereignty.
Rather, description has a constitutive function that constructs reality by
defining its distinctive features.
Applying this understanding of metaphor to politics more generally,
Rorty contends that by disrupting assumptions about political order the
descriptions put forward by a metaphor redefine and create new under-
standings of the reality of political life. Rorty makes this argument by com-
bining his understanding of metaphor with Wittgenstein’s notion of
language games. As the world comes to adopt a given language game Rorty
argues that language games are the prevailing cultural metaphors that
define and constitute a society in a particular time and place – and, of
course, space. In this way, Rorty demonstrates how the suggestion of a
metaphor, which at first only represents a potential, becomes inscribed in
thought and action. As metaphors become entrenched they provide the
grounds for the creation of non-linguistic social institutions. For instance,
taking the example of the French Revolution, the metaphor of the nation
with its principles of liberty and equality created a new political order in
which legitimacy was rooted in the people, parliaments and democratic
process and not the divine right of kings. The more general point to be
derived from this example is that political relations in a given social milieu
are created and understood through the metaphors used to describe them.2
Following Rorty’s theory of metaphor, metaphors matter politically for
their legitimation of specific constellations and relationships of authority.
Broadly understood as the ‘capacity of the system to engender and main-
tain belief that the (. . .) political institutions are the most appropriate for
the society’ (Lipset qtd. by Connolly 1984: 10), legitimacy is a normative
justification of political authority that garners allegiance. Applied to Rorty’s
analysis, legitimacy is a discursive property embedded in the metaphors
that constitute political orders. More importantly, metaphors’ legitimating
action gives them the power to constitute political orders (c.f. Foucault
1977, 1978). The varying effects (i.e. political orders) of different metaphors
also reveal that legitimacy is a contingent standard, with its character and
community of adherents uniquely defined by different metaphors.
But as a disruption of existing practices a metaphor is not only a means
of legitimating political order. Coming back to the performative function of
metaphor, a new metaphor is a moment of political transformation in
which existing discursive practices are used in novel and unprecedented
ways through which new possibilities become imaginable. In more con-
crete terms, political change occurs when legitimacy breaks down and

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3. See also Ringmar reaches a point of crisis as social actors call into question existing forms of
(1996) and ‘Forum political order and promote others. What brings about the crisis are con-
on the state as a
person’ in Review of tingent and arbitrary forces of history, what resolves it is the need for new
International Studies grounds, new horizons of legitimacy (c.f. Näsström 2003). In short, politi-
(2004), 30(2). cal change is a moment of metaphorical redescription when new metaphors,
4. Although Hobbes those that do not conform to established or literalised language games, are
does point out that advocated for the adoption of new institutions of authority. It is a call to
the state of nature
between men is speak of and see – and ultimately experience – political life in a different
hardly as pernicious way (Calder 2003; Deibert 1997a; Rorty 1989, 1991).
as the state of nature The legitimacy crisis associated with globalisation entails a disruption
between states, it
remains a conflictual of the metaphors that legitimate the sovereign state. Hobbes’s theory of
space of ‘gladiators’ the state is perhaps the best expression of sovereignty’s metaphors. Hobbes
(Hobbes, 1996: 90). inscribes normative meaning onto the territorial state through the inter-
5. Hobbes, of course, play of thee metaphors: the state of nature between individuals, the state is a
was not the only state man and the state of nature between states. Assuming a state of nature
of nature theorist.
Lockean (1988) and between autonomous individuals, Hobbes argues that in the absence of an
Kantian (1996) overarching authority the autonomy of individuals is a source of insecu-
accounts equally rity: in the state of nature equal entitlements to security result in the con-
propound this
metaphor, albeit with stant possibility of war. For the sake of their security individuals transfer
different focus (see their autonomy to the Leviathan. By transferring their autonomy, the
also Wendt, 1992, state is individuated, vitalised by its sovereignty: The ‘great LEVIATHAN
1999). The
differences thereby called a COMMON-WEALTH, or STATE, (in latine CIVITAS),’ asserts Hobbes
amount only to (1996: 9), ‘is but an Artificall Man; (. . .) and in which, the Sovereignty is
different accounts of an Artificiall Soul, as giving life and motion to the whole body.’ Like indi-
the state of nature
rather than different viduals, the state exists in a state of nature with other states, as the auton-
metaphorical omy-cum-sovereignty at the core of the state is a man metaphor gives way –
renderings of political or perhaps reverts – to a corporatised version of the state of nature metaphor.
order.
As Hobbes (1996: 90) claims, states (as men), ‘because of their Independency,
are in continual jealousies, and in the state and posture of Gladiators; . . . ,
which is a posture of War.’3 Hobbes, however, does not advocate a global
Leviathan.4 Accordingly, states maintain their autonomy and are respon-
sible for their own security against one another. In turn, sovereignty – the
soul of the state and the expression of its autonomy – becomes the fore-
most legitimating condition in a world where political order is defined by
the territorial state.5
Two implications of these metaphors and the political order they legiti-
mate are worth mention. First, they imply that citizens will find security
inside the state but face the constant threat of war from enemy outsiders
(Walker 1993). Second, endowed with the responsibility of ensuring secu-
rity from the outside, sovereigns are also responsible for the welfare of
their citizenry. As Hobbes’s puts it, sovereigns ‘uphold . . . the Industry of
their Subjects’, which allows citizens to obtain a ‘commodious living’
(Hobbes 1996: 90). Over time, this has legitimated the state as an entity
responsible for the provision of social services (Castells 2000a: 386;
Castells 2004: 363–5). Taken together, citizens defer to sovereigns in
exchange for the ‘protection’ – both physical and social – afforded to them.
Responding to a sense that processes associated with globalisation
undermine the legitimating metaphors of the sovereign state through the
emergence of a global sphere, metaphors of globalisation re-describe and

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therefore transform entrenched understandings and institutions of politi-


cal order by specifying new legitimating principles and thus new forms of
political order. Importantly, these re-descriptions do not imply that states
no longer exist or should be done away with. They simply suggest that
even if states persist, legitimacy can no longer be exclusively described
through metaphors of sovereignty. Seen in this light, globalisation is not
simply about the physical transcendence of state boundaries. More signifi-
cantly, it is about what such processes come to mean normatively and
politically. In a word, as seen through its metaphors, globalisation is not
just about the dismantling or deconstruction of the state; it is also a recon-
structive process, reshaping the normative foundations of political order.

Describing the ‘global’ Internet


This discussion of metaphors pertains directly to the Internet. Lawrence
Lessig (1999) provides particular insight here. He argues that: ‘. . . no
single architecture defines the nature of the Net. The possible architec-
tures of the . . . Net are many, and the character of life within those differ-
ent architectures is diverse’ (Lessig 1999: 24). Lessig’s main conclusion is
that the political orders associated with the Internet are socially con-
structed, not inherent in the Internet’s physical characteristics.
Specifically he argues that the governance ‘cultures’ that surround the
Internet – defining what it should be used for, how it should be used and
by whom – determine the kind of political order the Internet represents
(c.f. Hofmann 2005). With metaphors providing the legitimating princi-
ples of political order, studying the kind of ‘global’ political order associ-
ated with the Internet draws attention to the role of metaphors of
globalisation in constituting the principles and practices of the Internet’s
global governance.
The physicalist-materialist biases in many understandings of globalisa-
tion are thus thrown into sharp relief not simply by showing that the
Internet is socially constructed and thus capable of different architectures
and protocols through the action of different metaphors (Lessig establishes
the point; see also Abbate 1999). More to the point, this illustrates that
globalisation is not the outcome of the Internet; through its metaphors,
discourses of globalisation play a role in establishing the Internet as an
object and feature of globalisation.
Although a particular metaphor prevails at a given moment, this does
not imply that other metaphors fade from view. Other metaphors will be
displaced into subordinate, marginal or peripheral positions of power. The
analysis of the global village and global marketplace metaphors is therefore a
snapshot of when each metaphor prevailed. It is not intended as a full-
scale survey of all the activities that define the metaphor in that time and
continue, perhaps in different form, into the present. Instead, I explore the
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) and the Internet Corporation for
Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) as a way to focus on a seminal
moment of each metaphor’s articulation and get a sense of the key patterns
and practices that were established with respect to the use and governance
of the Internet. Although there is an element of mutual disruption
between these metaphors (for instance, the global marketplace disrupts the

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6. For a useful analysis global village), given the focus of this article on the discursive delegitima-
of the disruption tion of sovereignty, and also given the limits of space, the analytical focus
between metaphors of
globalization, is placed on each metaphor’s disruption of sovereignty.6 Assessing the rel-
especially the ative power of different metaphors of globalisation at particular moments
disruption of the is certainly an important question and requires further investigation.7
global village by the
global marketplace, An objection at this point might be that it is one thing to note the
see Lessig (1999) and malleability of the Internet’s governance cultures and another to state that
Strangelove (2005). this affects its basic technical protocols. Just because the Internet’s more
7. The question of power formal systems of management might be subject to change does not mean
also emerges with the that its fundamental technical design changes. Protocols, however, are not
focus on English-
language metaphors. objective laws or natural phenomenon. Rather, they are agreed upon con-
As the intelligibility of ventions about how inter-networked communication should be organised.
each metaphor Computer protocols, Galloway (2004: 7) describes, are sets of ‘conventional
requires a shared
community of rules . . . [that] govern how specific technologies are agreed to, adopted,
language, this raises implemented, and ultimately used by people around the world’ (my empha-
questions about the sis). Consequently, protocols are not value free. They are ‘designed in par-
purported global
scope of the ticular ways to achieve particular ends in particular contexts’ (Thacker
metaphors and their 2004: xii).
legitimating power. Consequently, the definition of protocol can be expanded beyond its
For instance, are
these metaphors meaning as a technical specification and used to reflect the governance
adopted by or routines that are put in place by metaphors of globalisation. It builds on
translated into the conventional aspect of protocol by elaborating the legitimating princi-
different languages?
Being in English, do ples that are put into place by different metaphors, in turn illuminating
they only legitimate how protocol is ‘designed in particular ways to achieve particular ends in
Anglo-American particular contexts’. Protocol thus becomes shorthand for the inscription
conceptions of
political order and of metaphors into Internet, delineating what is to be governed, how it is to be
Internet governance? governed, who governs, and where they govern. In this way, exploring the shift
Two important from global village to the global marketplace, I illustrate how the changing
qualifications are in
order. First, global in configuration of Internet protocol is intertwined with the production of
my analysis is not new systems of legitimacy. This does not dispute the significance of the
intended to imply technological protocols. It puts the focus on how technological protocols
universal. This is
important because are enrolled and translated in ways that build and support the legitimacy
certain metaphors of a given political order.
can prevail over Given the limits of space, my argument does not trace how metaphors
others. Different
members of a global of globalisation as broader discursive patterns emerged and were estab-
community (whether lished. I take as given the popularity and prevalence of the global village
they share the same and global marketplace metaphors and focus on specifying their particular
language or not) can
thus ascribe to impact on the Internet’s global scope and character.
different metaphors.
What accounts for Global village
the prominence and
legitimacy of a given In the late 1980s and early 1990s, commentators from different ends of
metaphor is its ability the political spectrum converged around a view that ‘global communica-
to put alternative tion will be used to transcend the differences between cultures and soci-
metaphors into
subordinate positions eties to create a new global village where people will come together and
of power. Legitimacy, work towards mutual trust and understanding, [and] create a world that
accordingly, is a is “smaller” and more “democratic”’ – and more peaceful (Dodge and
function of power,
rather than Kitchin 1998: 33). The Internet’s ability to transcend the barriers of space
universality. Second, and time and enhance individual interaction was considered the cutting
my analysis has edge of globalisation – the creation of a global polity marked by consensus,
examined documents

18 Nisha Shah
MCP_4_1-02_Shah 1/23/08 6:25 PM Page 19

individual freedom of expression and radical participatory politics from the key sites of
(Anderson 2005; Cairncross 1997; Cairncross 2001; Dibbell 1993; Dodge Internet governance
in which participants
and Kitchin 1998; Negroponte 1995).8 from all over the
Reflecting on the violence of nationalisms that followed the Cold War, world have been
the global reach of the Internet was viewed with the ‘hope that connecting involved, not simply
members of Anglo-
every human on earth might make the world a better place. Humanity American countries.
united might do better than our lousy systems of government’ (Goldsmith Why English was
and Wu 2006: 27; Mosco 2004: 30–31). The normative impulse was to preferred as the
correspondence
contest the ‘gladiatorial’ concern for security in the state of nature. language certainly
Sovereignty’s concern for security was seen to create hostile distinctions has much to say
between members of humanity, grouping them into ‘(national)citizen- about the relative
power dynamics in
friends’ and ‘foreign-foes’ (c.f. Held 1995; Linklater 1998; Walker 1993). In world politics more
pursuit of a united humanity and peaceful world order, proponents of this generally speaking, a
metaphor moved away from systems of authority and association demar- question outside the
scope of this analysis.
cated by borders and argued that legitimate political order was constituted That this translates
by individuals as the key political units who would work together as into the prevalence of
members of humanity through bottom-up deliberative democratic processes Anglo-American
perspectives seems
that spanned the globe, rather than being limited by sovereign jurisdictions obvious. However,
(c.f. Bohman 2004). that the metaphors
Democracy was essential to achieving peace. In order to overcome are accepted and
disseminated amongst
prejudices and cultural biases, individuals had to be able to interact on an the diverse
equal footing and freely express and discuss their views. A direct democracy participants again
was thus promoted to create a space free from the designation of citizens reflects how power
can enforce
and foreigners instituted by sovereignty. With these aspirations in mind, the legitimacy. I thank
Internet was seen with the potential to allow individuals the world over to one of the paper’s
‘communicate and deliberate with each other, forming the basis of a single, reviewers for raising
these questions and
vibrant global village polity’ (Deibert 2003: 504; see also Klein 2002; forcing me to address
Naughton 2001). In addition, the Internet was considered a tool to empower the point.
individuals by thwarting governmental authority (both democratic and 8. Although the global
authoritarian) that compromised freedom of speech and association. This village metaphor is
not only created greater democracy within authoritarian regimes, but also popularly associated
with Marshall
facilitated a global civic dialogue prevented by the divisions generated by McLuhan (1964),
sovereignty (Barlow 1996; Godwin 2003). when used in
Alongside the global village’s democratic thrust was a belief that the reference to the
Internet the term
Internet was a commons, shared by all and free of proprietary and com- rarely replicates the
mercial interests (Lessig 2001).9 As information was freely available, the exact logic of
Internet’s potential as a democratic agora was achieved (Mosco 2004: McLuhan’s thesis.
30–31; Mueller 2002: 256; Wolin 1993). Values of unfettered free 9. A poster tacked onto
speech and commitments to non-proprietary principles constructed an a computer
administrator’s door
Internet that made possible a new political order on a global scale that in 1991 summarises
was defined by the language and objectives of inclusion, empowerment, the prevailing attitude
freedom, and democracy. Although claims about a new democratic and at the time: ‘The
Internet is like an
peaceful world order were initially articulated as features of the Internet’s ocean. It is a great
‘virtual communities’, over time the Internet’s role in facilitating and resource. It is huge.
empowering global civil society networks was understood as a force that No one owns it’ (qtd.
in Mueller 2002: 57).
could override the ‘real world’ of states. As individuals began to act as
members of a new global citizenry, they challenged the state’s monopoly
over legitimate authority (Anheiner et al. 2001; Deibert 1997b: 163;
Lipschutz 1992).

From global village to global marketplace: Metaphorical descriptions of the global . . . 19


MCP_4_1-02_Shah 1/23/08 6:25 PM Page 20

Under the description of the global village, the Internet was seen as an
antidote to state power both in its divisive and repressive capacities. As this
metaphor became more pervasive, efforts converged around the Internet
Engineering Task Force (IETF). Described as the ‘kind of direct populist
democracy that most of us have never experienced’, the IETF was evidence
of the Internet’s capacity for ushering in unprecedented forms of global
governance and political authority (Barsook 1995; Goldsmith and Wu
2006: 23; Johnson and Crawford 2000). The progressive tenor of the global
village metaphor is still reflected in the IEFT’s mission statement, which
asserts that the IEFT community wants the Internet to be a success
‘because [it believes] that the existence of the Internet . . . will help build a
better human society’ (Alvestrand 2004). Thus, although a technical
standards body, the IETF’s technical management was from the outset
normatively driven and defined in a particular way. As the community
continues to state:

The Internet isn’t value-neutral, and neither is the IEFT. We want the
Internet to be useful for communities that share our commitment to open-
ness and fairness. We embrace technical concepts such as decentralized
control, edge-user empowerment and shaping of recourses because those
concepts resonate with the core values of the IETF community.
Alvestrand 2004

Adopting the mantle of the global village, the open, decentralised architec-
ture of the Internet was therefore not just a matter of its strictly technical
protocols, but how the community of Internet users operated. Defining the
Internet as a ‘global phenomenon’ including people ‘from every culture . . .
and from all walks of life . . .’ (Alvestrand 2004), IETF membership was
open – anyone with something to contribute was invited to join. To main-
tain openness and decentralised control and to empower individual users,
IETF decisions were made by individuals as individuals (not representatives)
through a system of functionally defined working groups (also with open
membership) rather than a central secretariat. The explicit decision-
making credo rejected ‘kings, presidents and voting’ and instead rested in
‘rough consensus and running code’ (Clark qtd. by Hofmann 2005: 4). In
avoiding state bureaucracy, the IETF implemented a system of discussion
and collective self-governance. Moreover, the standards it generated were
considered open and non-proprietary.
As its governing practices constituted a global participatory democracy,
the IETF was considered the perfect articulation of the global village
metaphor and thus the example to be followed (Goldsmith and Wu 2006:
24–25; see also Barsook 1995). This not only legitimated the IETF’s gov-
ernance structure – it buttressed the public prominence of the IETF, foster-
ing the view that radical participatory politics was not a utopic aspiration,
but the Internet’s modus operandi.
Internet protocol as described in the global village stresses individuals/
users as the who that governs, a free, democratic and non-proprietary space
as the what to be governed, decentralised and open sites of collective self-
governance as the where, and direct democracy as the how of governance.

20 Nisha Shah
MCP_4_1-02_Shah 1/23/08 6:25 PM Page 21

This kind of political order is underwritten by the de-legitimation of sover-


eignty as a unified principle of rule based on deference to a bureaucratic
government – representative or not – that creates violent divisions between
members of humanity. The Internet was embraced in this metaphor not
because its cables and codes disregarded territorial borders, but because it
provided the potential to re-describe political life beyond the state of nature
and to create a political order that worked through communitarian consen-
sus between members of humanity. It further permitted a means of escape
from the repressive authority of states, empowering individuals with
greater freedoms of speech and association. Under this description of global
political order, the IETF became the insignia of the kind of post-sovereign
global politics made possible by the Internet. And, it was not only a feature
of virtual communities – it was seen as a model for governing globalised
political community.

Global marketplace
From the mid-to-late 1990s, the global marketplace became the defining
metaphor of globalisation. The Internet was not simply subsumed within
the global marketplace but synonymous with it: the global marketplace was
described as ‘an Electronic Herd of . . . stock, bond, and currency traders
and multinational investors, connected by screens and networks’
(Friedman 2000: 36), lending support to the view that the Internet was
‘born as a global marketplace’ (‘Joint Statement’ 1997). Governments,
corporations, and international organisations alike subsequently articu-
lated their globalisation policies with a new fervour for global electronic
commerce.
In this metaphor, the ‘self-regulating market [was] the normative basis
for . . . global order’ (Steger 2003: 33). Underwritten by a commitment to
neoliberalism, emphasis was placed on deregulation, competition, prop-
erty rights and privatisation (Harvey 2005). In a global marketplace states
had to abandon their national economic autonomy. Not only was national
regulation in the name of sovereignty an impediment to the free flow of
goods and services, the state was considered functionally incapable of reg-
ulating their flow (Castells 2000b). Under global marketplace descriptions,
globalisation was an inevitable, inexorable and irreversible force guided by
a self-regulating market that had global reach. Sovereignty not only ham-
pered competition in this global market and the prosperity it afforded, but
it was an inefficient way to manage economic growth. Subsequently,
although public management had once been closely tied to the state, the
deepening commitment to neoliberalism generated a system in which
‘private sector markets, market actors, non-governmental organisations,
multinational actors and other institutions [could] exercise forms of legiti-
mate authority.’ (Cutler 2002; Hall and Biersteker 2002: 4) Sovereignty
was thus willingly surrendered by states to other self-regulating ‘private’
agencies and organisations whose legitimacy was based on their ability to
foster a competitive global market and a more sound global financial
architecture (Cutler et al. 1999; Porter 2005).
This market mentality did not abandon the global village’s aspirations of
democracy. But it did cast them in a different way. The assumption was

From global village to global marketplace: Metaphorical descriptions of the global . . . 21


MCP_4_1-02_Shah 1/23/08 6:25 PM Page 22

10. Domain names are that as governments promoted competition and the market’s self-regulation,
more user-friendly there would be an automatic move away from the more authoritarian and
ways to remember IP
addresses. For bureaucratic practices of governance to more popular and democratic
instance, ones (Steger 2005). But the commitment was to representative democracy,
1234.5678.1234.56 not direct democracy. This had the effect of purportedly legitimating the
78 can be translated
as an email address authority of private agencies because the decision to transfer the manage-
(i.e. nisha.metaphor@ ment of public services from government agencies to private organisations
global.org) or as was made by elected officials. In turn, as private agencies gained promi-
Universal Resource
Locators (URLs) such nence, their focus on competition and the absence of any explicit or direct
as www.google.com. democratic processes by which to hold them accountable, was evidence
The DNS is organised that the new vocabulary of the global marketplace was displacing the global
around top-level
domains (such as village metaphor as the framework for global governance.
.com, .org, .ca, etc.) So that the ‘Internet would grow as a seamless . . . global marketplace
and subdomains where competition and consumer choice are the main drivers of economic
(such as the ‘google’
in www.google.com). activity,’ its ‘global’ character was defined through objectives of fostering
When locating competition and trademark and intellectual property protection (“Joint
www.google.com the Statement” 1997). In the context of the Internet a specific instance of this
communication path
first goes through a redefinition had to do with the ability to use the Internet to market global
database (a server) brands. This transformed website addresses (domain names)10 from their
holding .com intended function as simple locators of resources stored on the Internet to
addresses and is then
appropriately routed lucrative commodities. Owning the ‘right’ website address could designate
to the ‘google’ a popular brand and result in a profitable business. As individuals and cor-
address. porations raced to lay claim to parts of the global marketplace, website spec-
11. See Mueller’s (2002) ulation, defamation, and squatting became rampant (Mueller 2002).
Ruling the Root for an Ensuring fair rules of competition and trademark protection became key
excellent analysis of
ICANN’s formation. policy concerns. Without institutional and legal frameworks to navigate
these new challenges the marketplace was in danger of being undermined.
The initiative to create a new system of competition and trademark pro-
tection came from the US government. Given its historical role in supporting
the creation of the Internet, it held formal responsibility for the distribution of
Internet names. Up until the mid-1990s the US government preferred to con-
tract out the management of Internet resources to the engineering and user
community. However, with the penchant for e-commerce and disputes over
the relevance of trademark protection on the Internet, on 1 July 1997 the US
government moved to ‘support efforts to make governance of the domain name
system private and competitive and to create a contractually based self-regulation
regime that deals with potential conflicts between domain name usage and
trademark laws on a global basis’ (‘Presidential Directive on Electronic
Commerce’ 1997, my emphasis; see also ‘Framework on Global Electronic
Commerce’ 1996). In this arrangement, governments, seen to stymie compe-
tition through unnecessary regulation in the name of sovereignty, were to be
kept as far away as possible, participating only in an advisory capacity.
The result was the creation of a private Internet authority – the
Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN).11
Although officially branded as a technical organisation with no policy
oversight, the rules and processes surrounding domain name registration
were structured to protect intellectual property interests and to foster
competition in domain name registration and ownership. Mueller (2002),
for instance, points to the maintenance of artificial scarcity in top-level

22 Nisha Shah
MCP_4_1-02_Shah 1/23/08 6:25 PM Page 23

domain names and the explicit integration of representatives from trade-


mark protection agencies into the ICANN system. Also, unlike the direct
and deliberative process of the IETF, ICANN was structured to work
through a series of supporting organisations – skewed in favour of intellec-
tual property and corporate interests – that advises a Board of Directors,
which was given final decision-making authority. The privileging of intel-
lectual property and corporate interests through a private authority,
premised on fostering a competitive market for Internet names, made
ICANN a clear example of the inscription of the global marketplace metaphor
into the Internet and its governance. It represented the commodification of
web addresses, a concern for intellectual and private property, and the pri-
vatisation of the administration of crucial aspects of the Internet.
In the global marketplace, Internet protocol’s who of governance privileges
corporate and private authorities; the what to be governed revolves around
ensuring the Internet is a space of competitive commercial activity – not
only by allowing electronic commerce, but also by transforming address
locators into lucrative real estate in the global market; the how of governance
is located in discussions dominated by corporate and trademark interests;
and the where private authorities. A sovereign world order is redescribed and
displaced by objectives of economic harmonisation, market competition and
efficiency that disregard territorially circumscribed political jurisdictions.
Under this description, the Internet’s global geometry was taken as the ulti-
mate platform for this new economic-political order. The creation of ICANN
was thus not simply a product of the perceived needs of the system (competi-
tion and trademark protection), but more a matter of how those needs
should be legitimately managed. Once this system of governance was in
place, the global marketplace was more than what the Internet could aspire to
become – it was how the Internet was structured.

Conclusion
By delineating the constitutive effect of different metaphors of globalisation –
global village and global marketplace – on the governance and character of the
Internet, I have argued that the Internet’s contribution to political transfor-
mation is not simply a function of its hardware and technical specifications.
Just as important, if not more so, are the ways in which we have come to
describe the Internet’s contribution to global politics through the
metaphors of globalisation that are adopted and inscribed in political prac-
tice. My broader objective has therefore been to claim that insofar as glob-
alisation is a transformation of political order beyond the state to a more
global realm it is not a functional challenge to state capacity but a disrup-
tion of the discursive practices of sovereignty that legitimate the state. To
this end, I have tried to show that a proper understanding of globalisation’s
implications for political order requires attention to its discursive dimen-
sions. By illustrating the discursive constitution of the global Internet, I have
demonstrated that globalisation has manifested in a transformation of polit-
ical order not simply through observed empirics but through a reconstitu-
tion and re-articulation of political legitimacy.
In short, in the study of globalisation we cannot assume that physically
global processes necessarily reveal the structures of global politics. We

From global village to global marketplace: Metaphorical descriptions of the global . . . 23


MCP_4_1-02_Shah 1/23/08 6:25 PM Page 24

must consider how we engage in the constitution of that space as politi-


cally meaningful and legitimate. Concomitantly, in the study of the
Internet, we must consider how understandings of globalisation and
global political order are produced and how they become embedded in
how the Internet is governed and subsequently what the Internet is taken
to be. Moreover, by demonstrating that globalisation is not a univocal dis-
course but open to capture by different metaphors, the power politics of
globalisation rests in the metaphors that not only capture our political
imagination but also our political action.

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Suggested citation
Shah, N. (2008), ‘From global village to global marketplace: Metaphorical descrip-
tions of the global Internet’, International Journal of Media and Cultural Politics 4: 1,
pp. 9–26, doi: 10.1386/macp.4.1.9/1

Contributor details
Nisha Shah is a doctoral candidate at the University of Toronto. She has published
in the journal Globalizations and is co-editor of Metaphors of Globalization: Mirrors,
Magicians and Mutinies (Palgrave, forthcoming). Contact: Department of Political
Science, University of Toronto, Sidney Smith Hall, Room 3018, 100 St. George
Street, Toronto, Ontario M5S 3G3, Canada.
E-mail: vnisha.shah@utoronto.ca

26 Nisha Shah
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International Journal of Media and Cultural Politics Volume 4 Number 1.


© Intellect Ltd 2008. Article. English language. doi: 10.1386/macp.4.1.27/1

Distributed deliberative citizens: Exploring


the impact of cyberinfrastructure
on transnational civil society participation
in global ICT policy processes
Derrick L. Cogburn Syracuse University, USA
Jane Finnerup Johnsen United Nations Association, Denmark
Swati Bhattacharyya Syracuse University, USA

Abstract Keywords
This study explores the impact of a virtual organisational structure called a multistakeholder
‘policy collaboratory’ on a transnational NGO network participating in the UN participation
World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS). A collaboratory is a ‘center global governance
without walls’, which uses computer-mediated communication (CMC) tools to virtual collaboration
support geographically distributed knowledge work (Wulf 1989). The interdisci- WSIS
plinary conceptual framework draws primarily on Roger’s (1995) diffusion of cyberinfrastructure
innovation thesis. To explore the conceptual framework, we asked four ‘grand collaboratories
tour’ research questions: (1) How is a policy collaboratory introduced into a
transnational policy network?; (2) how is the collaboratory used?; (3) what
impact does it have on participants?; and (4) to what degree can it be institution-
alised? Using the second phase of WSIS as the setting for this longitudinal mixed-
methods study, we purposefully selected the participants from the active WSIS
civil society networks. After collecting baseline data in December 2003, we
designed and implemented the collaboratory in January 2004, continuing to
collect multi-modal data (surveys, interviews, email, computer logs) until
shortly after the Tunis WSIS in November 2005. Key findings include: (1) train-
ing and a visionary change-agent are critical to successful diffusion; (2) partici-
pants may not utilise the full potential of the collaboratory; (3) even with limited
use, the collaboratory can help to empower network members, especially those
from developing countries, (4) institutionalisation of the collaboratory requires
at least medium-term commitment and financial support. The study points to
some of the challenges and opportunities of using the Internet and CMC tools to
enhance geographically distributed participation in global governance processes.

Introduction
Since 1945, the United Nations has played a central role in convening the
majority of world’s governments to address problems of global concern.
These have included such diverse issues as war, poverty, gender equality
and outer space. The organisation has grown from the original 51 member
nations to the current 192. The diversity of membership includes both

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developed and developing countries, and a range of governmental and eco-


nomic systems. For most of its history, the formal policy processes associ-
ated with the issues addressed by the UN have been largely state-centric.
Non-governmental organisations (NGOs), when they participated at all,
were relegated to the sidelines and to alternative venues. Frequently, they
have seen their best strategy as using these alternative venues as platforms
from which to protest against and contest the deliberations occurring in
the official UN-sponsored meetings.
However, in recent years, two parallel developments have occurred.
The UN has started to increasingly recognise the important role of infor-
mation and communication technologies in socio-economic development,
and the emergence of a global information society. Simultaneously, there
has been a growing recognition by the UN that non-state actors, such as
NGOs and the private sector, can play a critical role in helping it to achieve
its mission. As a result of these two developments, the UN has been explor-
ing ways to broaden participation in its global policy processes by non-
state actors and civil society in particular (Cardoso 2004).
This ‘multistakeholder’ approach, as it has become known, was given a
significant boost when in December 2001 the United Nations General
Assembly approved the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS).
WSIS was heralded as a major step forward in the inclusion of diverse
multistakeholder actors in global policy formulation processes (UNGA
Resolution 56/183). In fact, the structure of WSIS was explicitly multi-
stakeholder, and attempted to facilitate participation by governments,
private sector and civil society in its multi-year deliberations (Klein 2004).
However, effectively including the diverse and heterogeneous voices of
transnational civil society actors into these deliberative UN processes is not
easy, even when the efforts to do so may be completely genuine (Cogburn
2004). Most UN meetings are highly structured and designed to facilitate
governmental participation. They are not designed to incorporate the par-
ticipation of civil society, or the private sector. Although specifically
designed as a multistakeholder summit, WSIS provided numerous exam-
ples of how the structure of these meetings does not facilitate active civil
society involvement. For example, a world summit almost always includes
a multi-layered, multi-year preparatory process, including global and
regional Preparatory Committee (Prepcom) meetings. Frequently, these
meetings are held in expensive cities like Geneva, Switzerland, often
lasting for two or more weeks. The structure of most governments is
designed to handle this process. They have embassies, consulates, and
diplomats based in these cities, and even with limited numbers are capable
of attending many of these planning meetings.
On the other hand, civil society organisations, for the most part, are
not structured in this way. Most of them do not have offices and staff based
in Geneva, and it is very expensive for them to field a delegation capable of
attending and participating actively in a series of three, two-week prepara-
tory meetings, which was the case in both phases of WSIS.
Even further, during the meetings, there are numerous examples of
where the structural processes of WSIS made it very difficult for transna-
tional civil society organisations to participate actively in the process. For

28 Derrick L. Cogburn, Jane Finnerup Johnsen and Swati Bhattacharyya


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example, during the 3rd Prepcom for the Geneva WSIS, the civil society
sector (as well as the private sector) were allowed only 10 minutes per day
(five minutes in the morning, and five in the afternoon) to speak to each
section of the draft documents being negotiated. In contrast, governments
could take the floor at any time to address any point, or sub-point they
desired. Further, civil society delegates were not allowed to participate fully
in some of the working group meetings where key, and sometimes con-
tentious, issues of the draft WSIS Declaration of Principles and the WSIS
Action Plan were being discussed. Frequently, civil society delegates were
actually asked by some governments to ‘please leave the room’.
These systematic limitations on and exclusion of civil society input into
the deliberations marred the much-vaunted ‘multistakeholder’ approach
and led to considerable frustration within the sector. One analysis of civil
society participation in the WSIS preparatory process argued that more
than 60 per cent of the civil society recommendations to the final declara-
tion had been completely ignored (Global Contract Foundation 2003).
As a result of these developments, many were calling the WSIS
preparatory process a failure, and there were continued suggestions that
civil society should disengage from the process and refuse to continue
being ‘pawns’ in a multistakeholder process that would not fully consider
and integrate their perspectives.
Another way of looking at WSIS was that it served as a catalyst to
stimulate the creation of dense, robust, transnational NGO networks
amongst developed and developing country civil society. From this per-
spective, even with limited civil society impact on the final summit docu-
ments, it was not a failure. However, to be effective, these new civil society
networks would have to create new transnational institutional forms
capable of engaging in sustained policy.

Purpose
The purpose of this article is to explore the potential of these new, net-
worked institutional forms by reporting on a strategic intervention into
the WSIS processes. This was based on a collaborative action research
model (Oja and Smulyan 1989; Whyte 1991). The aim was to explore the
extent to which computer-mediated communication tools and collabora-
tion practices could be used to enhance the ability for civil society and
developing countries to participate effectively in these global information
and communication technology (ICT) policy formulation processes
(Cogburn 2004). From previous work, we understand that ‘participation’
alone (simply showing up) in an international conference is insufficient to
effectively influence outcomes. A range of strategic measures must be
pursued during key phases of a global ICT policy process, which include
preparatory committee meetings (PrepComs), during the conference,
drafting committees, conference follow-up, and presence in key nodal
cities for global ICT policy also has a role to play (Cogburn 2003, 2004).
In order to address each of these areas, this study was specifically created
to design, develop and introduce a new virtual organisational form – a
‘policy collaboratory’ – into a transnational social network of NGO actors
participating in WSIS. The aim was also to explore the impact of the

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collaboratory on the administrative capacity, research productivity, confer-


ence preparation, and outreach, of those involved.

Research questions
As a strategic intervention, it is hypothesised that the policy collaboratory
will have a significant effect on the ability of members of civil society from
both developed and developing countries to organise amongst themselves
and to engage in the complex knowledge work required for effective prepa-
ration and participation in WSIS. Drawing heavily on theories on the dif-
fusion of innovation (Rogers 1962), our goal was to design, develop,
deploy, and evaluate the impact of a policy collaboratory on four areas
that our conceptual framework would suggest are critical to the effective
transnational NGO participation in a global policy process (see Table 1,
p. 40). As such, four broad research questions, and several subsidiary
questions, guided this study:

RQ1: To what extent can the socio-technical infrastructure of a collabora-


tory be introduced into a transnational NGO network and what
factors hinder or promote this introduction?
RQ2: How is collaboratory infrastructure used within a transnational
NGO network?
RQ3: What impact does the collaboratory have on the character and
structure of a transnational NGO network, especially in the following
four areas: (1) administrative capacity, (2) planning and conducting
of research; (3) capacity building; and (4) outreach.
RQ4: In what ways can collaboratory infrastructure be institutionalised
within a transnational NGO network?

Structure
In the next section, we outline the analytical framework for the study, fol-
lowed by a brief overview of the research design and methods. In the
penultimate section, we present the findings from the study, organised by
the research questions. Finally, we discuss these findings and point to
future research.

Analytical framework
This study is grounded in an interdisciplinary literature that includes:
political science, international relations, communication, information
studies, and computer-supported cooperative work. From political science
and international relations we draw upon the literature on global gover-
nance (Gourevitch 1978; Keohane and Nye 1989; Krasner 1983;
Keohane 1984; Axelrod 1985), especially on international regime theory
(Krasner 1983; Rittberger 1995), and specifically work on the interna-
tional telecommunications regime (Drake 1989; Cowhey 1990; Zacher
and Sutton 1996; Frieden 1996). This literature helps us to understand
the role that a conference like WSIS plays in facilitating the ‘convergence
of expectations of actors’ taken as indicating the emergence of an interna-
tional regime (Krasner 1983; Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger 2000).
We see the WSIS process as an explicit international regime formation

30 Derrick L. Cogburn, Jane Finnerup Johnsen and Swati Bhattacharyya


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process into which, the United Nations has injected a ‘multistakeholder’


dynamic.
From the literature on transnational civil society networks and policy
actor networks (Young 1995; Slaughter 2001; Keck and Sikkink 1989;
Bockman and Eyal 2002), we understand better the potential dynamics of
civil society participation in these international conferences. Specifically, this
literature helps us to focus on the importance for these transnational net-
works to identify and mobilise knowledge resources within these policy
processes, as well as linkages with epistemic communities (Haas 1980,
1990). Of these stakeholders, civil society is seen as a highly diverse and het-
erogeneous actor, with significant knowledge and information resources,
but with very limited financial resources. Since civil society did not have the
institutional resources of national governments (even developing country
governments, meaning, embassies, consulates, etc), nor the combined finan-
cial and institutional resources of the private sector (e.g. highly organised
international structures, such as the International Chamber of Commerce,
coming into the process), they were at a significant disadvantage.
We have also drawn upon the literature on deliberative democracy
(Bonner 2005; Button and Ryfe 2005; Gastil and Levin 2005), and partic-
ularly the Habermasian concept of the public sphere (Bohman 1988;
Habermas 1991). This literature has helped us to conceptualise what
types of activities might be helpful for the networked organisation to
engage in regarding the policy formulation processes. The structural limi-
tations of the WSIS processes were biased in support of governments, and
hindered the ability for civil society to participate fully in the physical
WSIS processes. As such, civil society actors had to maximise every oppor-
tunity for input into the process. Those civil society actors that were more
organised and tapped into their global knowledge resources the best,
including harnessing expertise from both developed and developing coun-
tries had the highest likelihood of being successful in the policy formula-
tion processes. Given that most of civil society was organised around loose,
diverse, transnational networks, which used mostly e-mail to communi-
cate and organise their work, new virtual organisational structures might
better enable them to harness their knowledge and information resources.
Finally, to help us consider the possibilities for designing the technology
infrastructure for the policy collaboratory, we turned to the voluminous
literature on computer-supported cooperative work (CSCW) and com-
puter-mediated communication. In particular, we drew upon the interdis-
ciplinary literature that explains the design and evaluation of
collaboratories (Wulf 1989; Finholt and Olson 1997; Finholt 2001). This
literature shows that working in a distributed environment poses numer-
ous challenges (Olson and Olson 2000), some of which include building
trust and common ground (Rocco 1998); coordinating the activities and
communications of distributed teams (Kiesler et al. 1984); and discussion
control (Kraut et al. 1982). With the inclusion of participants from both
developed and developing countries, these problems are further compli-
cated, by for example: managing inter-institutional and cross-national cul-
tural differences (McCroskey 1990) and differential experience with
computer-mediated communications (CMC) tools (Gersick 1988). We

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drew upon this literature to assist with the design and evaluation of the
technical infrastructure for the collaboratory.
Researchers studying collaboratories have identified three overarching
domains of activity around which many collaboratories have coalesced.
We characterise these domains as: (1) people-to-people; (2) people-to-
information; and (3) people-to-facilities (see Figure 1). We believe that
each of these domains is critical to the needs of transnational civil society
networks, and have designed the cyberinfrastructure for the World
Federation of United Nations Associations (WFUNA) Collaboratory to
address each of these three domains.
However, the work of Everett Rogers (1983) points to the significant
challenges of technological diffusion into social networks. Rogers sees dif-
fusion as the process by which an innovation is communicated through
certain channels over time among the members of a social system. In his
approach, Rogers identifies six steps in the innovation development
process: (1) need or problem identification; (2) research; (3) development;
(4) commercialisation; (5) diffusion and adoption; and (6) consequences
(Rogers 1983: 135–147). These six phases may not occur sequentially,
and some of the phases may not be present, depending upon the innova-
tion (Rogers 1983). In this study, our research questions are designed to
assess the degree to which these six steps identified by Rogers are present
in the WFUNA Collaboratory project.

Research design and methodology


This study uses the second phase of UN World Summit on the Information
Society and its preparatory processes as the setting for longitudinal,
mixed-methods, qualitative-dominant research (Cresswell 2002). This is
an in-depth case study of the design, implementation, and evaluation of a
virtual organisational structure for a civil society network engaged in
WSIS. The qualitative-dominant design for this study allowed us to
harness the richness of in-depth ethnographic research to explain the par-
ticipant’s experience of the intervention, while drawing upon limited

Figure 1: Typical domains of collaboratory activity.


Source: www.scienceofcollaboratories.org

32 Derrick L. Cogburn, Jane Finnerup Johnsen and Swati Bhattacharyya


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quantitative data to aid in description. Initially, we planned for an elabo- 1. A large number of
rate quasi-experimental design, with multiple policy collaboratories and civil society
organizations were
control groups. However, in the end, the complexity and political chal- involved in the WSIS
lenges of working in the field forced us to limit our study to only one col- processes. We used
laboratory for one transnational NGO network. Obviously, this approach flyers distributed at
the WSIS preparatory
limits our ability to generalise much beyond our sample, but it did enable committee meetings
us to deepen our engagement with our case and we feel the lessons to inform NGOs about
learned from this empirical study will provide meaningful insights rele- the policy
collaboratory project,
vant for other transnational NGO networks active in global policy and to invite them to
processes. information sessions.
From amongst those
interested NGOs, we
Procedure selected our
After securing approval from the University of Michigan (and subse- participants.
quently Syracuse University) Institutional Review Board (IRB), the com-
mittee that approves university-based research involving human
participants, we purposefully selected the participants from amongst the
multiple transnational NGO networks active in the WSIS processes.1 After
collecting baseline data through surveys, interviews, participant observa-
tion, and content analysis, in December 2003, we designed and imple-
mented the collaboratory in January 2004, continuing to collect multiple
forms of data (e.g., participant observation, interviews, e-mail archives,
computer logs, and focus groups) until the Tunis WSIS in November
2005. An unexpected opportunity emerged in February 2006 to conduct
a follow-up focus group of all Task Force members in Copenhagen.

Participants
The participants chosen for this study are the thirteen members of the
World Federation of United Nations Associations (WFUNA) participating
in a Task Force on WSIS and its attendant preparatory processes
(Preparatory Conferences, or PrepComs, and Regional Meetings). The
United Nations Association of Denmark coordinated the WFUNA Task
Force. Partial funding for the Task Force (and the Collaboratory) came
from the Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA) and their
support is gratefully acknowledged. The thirteen task force members come
from eleven different countries, both developed and developing: Denmark,
Switzerland, Finland, China, Pakistan, Kenya, Uganda, Mozambique,
Venezuela, Ecuador, and the United States. Members of the WFUNA Task
Force were active in the WSIS processes from their inception.

Findings
This study was organised around four grand tour research questions. We
will now explore those four questions by analysing the available data.

Diffusion of the collaboratory innovation


Our first research question asks: To what extent can the socio-technical
infrastructure of a collaboratory be introduced into a transnational NGO
network and what factors hinder or promote this introduction? To answer
this question, we will first provide context by describing the overall struc-
ture of the WSIS civil society.

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Since the policy issues addressed by WSIS were so diverse, the corre-
sponding civil society organisations it attracted were equally assorted.
Unlike the private sector, they did not come into the WSIS processes with
pre-organised institutional structures (the private sector participation in
WSIS was organised by the International Chamber of Commerce). On the
contrary, the structures used by the WSIS civil society emerged more, or
less, organically over time. As a result, they were somewhat complex,
messy, and chaotic. These structures include multiple caucuses and
working groups, which were ‘self-constituting’, meaning that they organ-
ised themselves around various themes addressed in the WSIS process,
and became formalised as long as someone was willing to volunteer to
lead the caucus.
Some examples include: the ‘Cultural and Linguistic Caucus’, the
‘Human Rights Caucus’, and the ‘Environment and ICTs Working Group’.
In addition, the broader, administrative structures that evolved were the
Civil Society Plenary, a mailing list that was seen as the highest authority
in the WSIS civil society, and the Civil Society Content & Themes Working
Group (C&T), which was responsible for collecting, aggregating, and inte-
grating input from the diverse working groups and caucus statements into
a coherent civil society statement. The one major exception to these
organic emergent structures was the civil society bureau (CSB), which was
imposed upon civil society by the governmental organisers of WSIS, who
operated through a governmental Bureau. Their desire was to have one
civil society ‘structure’ with which to engage on a ‘Bureau-to-Bureau’
level, and found the complex, plethora of structures too difficult to deal
with. For an overview of these structures, please see http://www.wsis-
cs.org/caucuses.html.
While this complexity reflects the diversity and nature of civil society, it
makes it particularly difficult for the sector to organise itself for effective
participation in an equally complicated global ICT policy process. This dif-
ficulty is compounded by the more limited financial resources available to
civil society delegates, relative to other sectors such as the Coordination
Committee of Business Interlocutors (CCBI) representing global and multi-
national corporations (Cogburn 2004).
However, we hypothesised that many of these apparent liabilities could
perhaps be turned into assets through the use of collaboratory tools and
practices. Also, according to the note on basic structures for civil society at
WSIS, the first principle for the sector is that ‘there must be multiple
avenues and means for participation, and that all civil society entities can
select the nature, level and extent of participation according to their needs
and interests’ (Ó Siochrú Kleinwaechter and Bloem 2003). We believed
that the collaboratory would be seen as one such means for participation.
Previous research on scientific collaboratories has shown that one of
the most important indicators of potential success of a collaboratory is
‘collaboration readiness’ (Olson and Olson 2000; Olson, Finholt and
Teasley 2000; Olson et al. 2003). This concept of Collaboration Readiness
has three important dimensions: (1) Collaboration Orientation Readiness;
(2) Collaboration Infrastructure Readiness; and (3) Collaboration Technol-
ogy Readiness. In general, Collaboration Orientation refers to the willingness

34 Derrick L. Cogburn, Jane Finnerup Johnsen and Swati Bhattacharyya


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and desire on the part of participants in a collaboratory to work together.


Collaboration Infrastructure readiness tries to identify the degree to which
the network has some existing collaboration tools and techniques for col-
laboration. Finally, Collaboration Technology readiness tries to measure the
degree to which the participants are experienced in various kinds of infor-
mation and communication technologies. These skills could be utilised or
built upon in the collaboratory, so the pre-existing skills are an important
predictor of success as well.
Based on our baseline data collection, particularly our survey and
interviews, both of which contain items specifically measuring these three
dimensions of collaboration readiness, the overall WSIS Civil Society
Sector has a high degree of collaboration readiness on all of these dimen-
sions. However, as we will see below, the degree of readiness for the collab-
oratory was perhaps highest amongst the selected group of participants,
the WFUNA Task Force.

Recruitment of participants: presenting the concept:


In order to introduce the members of the WSIS civil society to the concept
of the collaboratory, a series of high-profile presentations and meetings
were organised during the WSIS preparatory meetings and the Summit
itself. The first major recruitment/informational meeting was held in
Geneva, Switzerland on 12 November 2003 during Prepcom 3 WSIS
Geneva. The organisational meeting was held at the International
Telecommunication Union (ITU) and organised by Cotelco and
International Possibilities Unlimited (www.ipunlimited.org), a non-govern-
mental organisation in consultative status with the United Nations
Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). Flyers were distributed to invite
prospective participants to the meeting.
This initiative was presented as a compliment to the excellent efforts
already underway within the civil society sector to use some ICT tools to
support their work. These efforts were supported, in large part, by organi-
sations such as the Association for Progressive Communications (APC).
The overall goal was to enhance the effective participation of civil society
actors from around the world – those actively involved in global policy
processes, and those who were yet to participate in the multiple and
complex processes of global governance.
Our approach to the policy collaboratory focused on a user-centred
design approach. This approach allowed the researchers to develop a deep
understanding of users’ needs in order to design and deploy the appropri-
ate socio-technical infrastructure. We envisaged that the socio-technical
infrastructure of the collaboratory could enable real-time collaboration
between civil society members geographically distributed around the
world. Participants were told that the specific features of the collaboratory
would be developed in consultation with the participants.
The meeting in Geneva was accompanied by an online meeting, using
a commercially available webconferencing tool (Centra Symposium)
provided by Cotelco. Space in the virtual seminar room was open to the
first forty participants from around the world. Unfortunately, and a major
lesson learned from this project, the webconferencing application was only

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2. Those using compatible with the Windows operating system.2 Not only did this
Macintosh computers, Windows-only application frustrate some civil society stakeholders who
or running Solaris or
Linux operating would otherwise have liked to participate, but it laid the foundation for an
systems could not ongoing and simmering conflict within the project. Some advocates of free
participate; Macs and open source software later opposed the project on ideological grounds,
running Virtual PC
could participate, but even when we switched to a webconferencing application (Elluminate
with a fairly Live) that was cross-platform, and capable of accommodating Microsoft
substantial Windows, Mac OS X, Solaris, and several variants of Linux. Later, during
degradation in
performance. the Summit program in December 2003, the lead author delivered two
formal presentations on the collaboratory; one was during WSIS-Online
Networkshop, under Multi-stakeholder Events (Plenary Session 5), and
another during the session on Online Negotiations on 12 December 2003.
Two civil society leaders from United Nations Association of Denmark
(UNA-Denmark) attended the initial collaboratory meeting during
Prepcom 3, and every subsequent project meeting. UNA-Denmark had
started planning for a Task Force on WSIS that brought together civil
society leaders from both developed and developing countries. All of the
participants in the Task Force represented their national United Nations
Associations (UNAs), which hold membership in WFUNA.
Rogers’ (1983) framework for the diffusion of innovation suggests that
‘need or problem identification’ is the first step towards initiating the diffu-
sion. This stage seems to have been significant in terms of the collaboratory
diffusion to the WFUNA Task Force. From the creation of their transna-
tional network, the Task Force organisers (including the second co-author
on this paper) recognised the challenge of building such a geographically
distributed network, which would be effective in the WSIS processes, and
with only a limited budget. These Task Force leaders were interested in
using online tools to enhance democratic deliberation and participation of
their Task Force in the WSIS processes, especially to more actively include
participants from developing countries. For example, despite a basic
common political point of departure (working for the realisation of the
United Nations Charter) the group members had specific national interests
and identities, and were geographically and culturally very diverse (span-
ning five continents and numerous time-zones). In addition, the group
faced limitations in terms of financial, technical, and human resources.
These obstacles led the Task Force organisers to recognise the potential for
the collaboratory to enhance the Task Force’s internal group dynamics and
democratic deliberations, and in turn, to strengthen the overall impact of
the Task Force on the WSIS processes. They then engaged in the second
step of Rogers’ diffusion model, which was to conduct research to look for
solutions to their problem. After attending the collaboratory presentations,
and internal deliberation, they agreed to participate in the study.

Developing the collaboratory infrastructure


The third stage of the Rogers diffusion model is development. This stage
also played an important role in the diffusion of the collaboratory model to
the WFUNA Task Force. From the beginning, the study was designed in
the collaborative action research model, so intensive consultations began
with the Task Force leadership about their objectives for the collaboratory,

36 Derrick L. Cogburn, Jane Finnerup Johnsen and Swati Bhattacharyya


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and how their transnational network was structured. We also adminis-


tered a web-based survey to collect baseline data on the Task Force
members, which included measures of all three dimensions of collabora-
tion readiness.
Training is a critical component in the introduction of a collaboratory,
so several training sessions, both face-to-face and online, were conducted
with the Task Force coordinators to prepare them for the introduction of
the collaboratory, and to help them continue to envision how the collabo-
ratory tools and approaches might assist them in meeting their objectives
for the Task Force during the WSIS processes.
Initial development of the socio-technical collaboration infrastructure
for the virtual organisation, collectively known now as cyberinfrastructure
(Atkins et al. 2004), included the principled assembly of several synchro-
nous and asynchronous tools. The cyberinfrastructure supporting the
WFUNA Collaboratory used cross-platform, low-bandwidth, and open
source software to the greatest extent possible. These tools were integrated
into the existing Task Force collaboration infrastructure (which consisted
mostly of email listservs), and supported the three overarching domains of
collaboratory activity identified above: (1) people-to-people; (2) people-to-
resources; and (3) people-to-facilities. While the specific instantiation of
the cyberinfrastructure was intended to be dynamic, and evolving through
iterative evaluation, it included the following components.

1. People-to-people – this component of cyberinfrastructure is designed to


enhance the awareness of colleagues amongst distributed network
members, as well as the ability to engage with each of them individu-
ally, and in small groups, in real time, using text, voice, and video over
the Internet. To meet these objectives, our infrastructure development
focused on presence awareness packages and listervs.

Easy and regular communication between individual Task Force members


and small project teams was an important goal of the project. To facilitate
this first level of people-to-people interaction, we developed an integrated
strategy for the use of presence awareness (instant messaging – IM) systems.
Centralising on Yahoo!, for IM communication, IDs were collected and dis-
seminated amongst the Task Force members. This IM strategy was designed
to compliment the ongoing use of email listervs within the Task Force.

2. People-to-resources – this component of cyberinfrastructure is


designed to focus on the acquisition and dissemination of knowledge
and information throughout the distributed network, through the
storage and access of digital information and knowledge resources. To
meet these objectives, our infrastructure development focused on build-
ing a content management system (CMS) for the network.

To serve as the primary entry point for the WFUNA Collaboratory, we


developed a portal using an open source content management system
(DotNetNuke). The goal of this web-accessible portal was to serve as the
primary data repository for the Task Force and to maintain all of the

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digital artefacts generated by the project (e.g. data sets, drafts of manu-
scripts, proposals, planning documents, schedules, contact lists, record-
ings of sessions, photos, working space for teams, and shared calendars).
The CMS was designed with public access to an overview of the project
and some of its public documents; and with granular access control on the
rest of the site for Task Force members and Cotelco researchers based on
their involvement in the project.

3. People–to-facilities – finally, this component of the cyberinfrastructure


is designed to focus on enabling virtual participation in Task Force
meetings, both planned and ad hoc. The goals here were to allow the
Task Force to meet regularly, to develop strategies and written inputs
into the WSIS process, and to allow those limited number of Task Force
members able to participate physically in the WSIS meetings and
preparatory processes to report back, in real time, to the remaining
members of the network. To meet these objectives, our infrastructure
development focused on web-conferencing.

To enable the high levels of interaction and geographically distributed col-


laboration (both people-to-people and people-to facilities) desired by the
Task Force, we developed a coherent strategy for the use of web-conferenc-
ing. These tools allowed us to create a rich-media, web-based environment
for synchronous communication and collaboration. The initial capacity of
the web-conferencing server was up to 40 persons who could be virtually
‘present’ in the room at any given time. Connecting to the server required
only a 28.8 kbps Internet connection. Once in the room, participants
could communicate using voice or video over IP, they could ‘see’ who was
speaking at any given time, raise their hands to gain the floor, and use
quick voting or polling to aid in decision-making. In addition, participants
could collectively see PowerPoint slides, mark-up those slides or a shared
white board, share any application on participating computers, or go into
break-out rooms for separate working group meetings.

Implementation, training, and iterative re-design


The first major collaboratory meeting of the WFUNA WSIS Task Force
took place during the first Preparatory Meeting (Prepcom 1) for the Tunis
Phase of the WSIS. Prepcom 1 took place in Hammamet, Tunisia from
24–26 June 2004. At that time, the platform for webconferencing, which
started with Centra, was switched to Elluminate. The main reason for this
change was the limitation of Centra as a Windows-only platform. As the
Task Force members were using various computing platforms, and to be
more politically acceptable to the Task Force members (and to the larger
WSIS civil society community), a cross-platform software solution was
necessary. During the transition, the lead co-authors conducted several
rounds of training, troubleshooting, and comparison between the features
of Centra and Elluminate.
From 11–13 February 2005 a major breakthrough occurred for the
Task Force. In preparation for Prepcom-2 for WSIS Tunis, the first face-to-
face meeting was scheduled. Held in Maputo, Mozambique, the two-days

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of Task Force meetings were supplemented with presentations from the


lead author on the collaboratory concept, and included two hands-on
training sessions on the collaboratory tools.
However, due to a failure of the local Internet Service Provider, the
session could not be conducted ‘live’ online. Instead, through the creativ-
ity and innovation of the organisers and participants, the training was
conducted offline, using screenshots inserted into PowerPoint slides, and
individual laptops. Nearly all of the Task Force members attended the
Maputo meeting, and asserted that the training sessions and presentations
helped them to become much more comfortable with the collaboratory
tools and approach. During the Maputo meeting, recorded interviews
where organised with Task Force participants.
The Maputo meeting was followed by five of the Task Force members
and the project director traveling to Geneva for the Prepcom 2 of the WSIS
Tunis phase from 17–25 February 2005. Following the training in
Mozambique, these members were in far greater control of the technolo-
gies, and were able to have several successful sessions linking members of
the Task Force who were unable to attend the Prepcom, with events on the
ground in Geneva. In fact, during one of these meetings, one of the
members from Asia was finally able to communicate with and ‘see’
another member from Latin America, for the first time.
Another series of major Task Force collaboratory meetings took place
during Prepcom 3, from 19–30 September 2005, at Geneva. Issues of
Internet governance dominated this Prepcom, and the Task Force wanted
to engage the debate. Building on relationships developed by the lead
authors, the Task Force decided to co-sponsor a Global Deliberative
Dialogue on Internet governance (http://tinyurl.com/ys8gen), which was
a huge success. Over 143 persons from 53 different countries registered
and participated in the two-week online event, which combined synchro-
nous and asynchronous tools to facilitate a robust policy discussion about
the numerous and complex issues of global Internet governance.

Using the WFUNA collaboratory


The second research question asks: how is collaboratory infrastructure
used within the Task Force? Based on our literature review and concep-
tual framework, we identified at least four areas in which the collabora-
tory could be of use to the Task Force: (1) administrative capacity; (2)
planning and conducting research; (3) affiliate capacity building; and
(4) enhancing outreach capacity. Examples of these areas are illustrated
in Table 1, p. 40.
Our analysis of the focus group and observation notes, survey data,
meeting recordings, and computer logs, revealed that Task Force members
had a fragmented perception and usage of the collaboratory tools. For
example, one area that indicated a high level of variance was in access to the
Internet. One Task Force member indicated that they ‘had to go 3 km from
his office to a cybercafé where he could use the email [Internet], which was
very slow’. This is in contrast to some members of the Task Force that had
relatively high-speed connections to the Internet in their offices and at
home. Beyond this basic Internet access, a similar disparity existed amongst

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MCP_4_1-03_Cogburn 1/23/08 12:44 PM Page 40

Table 1: Key collaboratory impact metrics/objectives.

Transnational Network Objectives Illustrative Collaboratory Activities


1. Administrative Capacity 1. Holding distributed meetings
2. Deliberative and decision-making
processes
3. Drafting of project documents
4. Training for the participants
2. Planning and Research 1. Collaborative knowledge sharing within
the network
2. Hosting seminars for the benefit of the
network
3. Drafting of research documents and
articles
3. Affiliate Capacity Building 1. Knowledge acquisition
2. Technical skill and ability
3. Identification with the network
4. Density of collaboration within the
network
4. Enhancing Outreach Capacity 1. Hosting seminars to involve other in
the network
2. Hosting public meetings to increase
involvement
3. Expansion of participation in network
conferences

those members who had a fairly detailed knowledge of the various tools
being used in the collaboratory and felt comfortable using them, and those
that had very little familiarity with these tools. Nonetheless, we expected to
find collaboratory activity in each of the four areas described above. We will
now review our findings in each of these four areas.

Administrative capacity
The expected collaborative activities in this area were: holding distributed
meetings, deliberation and decision making, drafting of project docu-
ments, and conducting training for the participants. An examination of
listserv and webconferencing records show that the members have sur-
passed our expectations in this regard. Members have used the collabora-
tory for a wide range of activities such as communicating with other
members on the progress of work and forthcoming events, intimate
preparatory processes, discussing the structure of forthcoming events
(Prepcom 3), scheduling a meeting, invitations to join the listserv, circu-
lating guidelines on how to submit a proposal, briefing absentees on the
outcome of webconferencing, collecting addresses for instant messaging,
exchanging ideas on the issues to be discussed in side events, circulating
documents as attachments to mails, sending monthly updates on various
UNA activities, travel organisation, providing information on hotel
booking, providing fellow Task Force members with technical support to
attend collaboratory meeting, slogan creation, updating other members on

40 Derrick L. Cogburn, Jane Finnerup Johnsen and Swati Bhattacharyya


MCP_4_1-03_Cogburn 1/23/08 12:44 PM Page 41

visits/meeting/preparation of papers, negotiation for decision making,


invitation to attend meetings, giving directions for hotel and venue. As the
Tunis Summit approached, the listserv became a particularly useful forum
for communicating travel related information, discussing and finalising
events in the summit and preparing and sharing important documents
and brochures.
In addition to the listserv, the webconferencing facility was been used to
conduct seven meetings of WFUNA Task Force members, since January
2005. In addition the tool has been used to conduct training sessions and to
interview several of the Task Force members, in an earlier data collection
process. One of the Task Force members has expressed the following opinion:

The communication within the Task Force has been much improved as a
result of both the listserv and the collaboratory tools. However, we still need
to step up our communication and work on including everyone in the col-
laboratory.

Comments like these coming from Task Force members help to emphasis
the point that the collaboratory, while useful in many respects for the Task
Force members, requires ongoing training, iterative development and
patience.

Planning and conducting research


Generally this area stresses knowledge sharing within the Task Force and
various ad hoc teams and working groups, hosting seminars for the
benefit of the research teams, drafting of research documents, and articles.
As mentioned earlier, the extensive use of this platform to create and share
documents relevant to the WSIS preparatory processes can be viewed as
an indicator that the Task Force members have successfully developed the
culture of creating and sharing knowledge within their network.

Affiliate capacity building


In this area, we explored the extent to which members of the Task Force
used the cyberinfrastructure to acquire knowledge and information and to
develop technical skills and abilities. From the data available we are able to
determine that members of the Task Force did enhance their own knowl-
edge, skills and abilities by participating in the project, and frequently
‘taught each other’ as they extended their own newly acquired technical
skills to others in troubleshooting connectivity problems and other
matters. A few of the members also introduced new collaboration tech-
nologies into the network and started their own websites, thus opening a
new channel for communication.
In an unexpected development, several of the Task Force participants
requested the opportunity to participate in the Global Graduate Seminar
on Globalization and the Information Society, convened by the lead author.
This seminar uses some of the same collaboration tools and involves
graduate students from South Africa, the United States and around the
world. The addition of these Task Force members was a phenomenal,
mutually beneficial, experience as they learned more of the theoretical

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MCP_4_1-03_Cogburn 1/23/08 12:44 PM Page 42

approach to WSIS and shared their invaluable practical experiences with


the students.

Enhancing outreach capacity


We had expectations that the cyberinfrastructure would be used to involve
the Task Force members in academic seminars (as above), to host public
meetings, and to expand participation of Task Force members in the
WFUNA annual conferences and other Task Force activities. Thus far in
our analysis, there is growing evidence that the Task Force has indeed
engaged in many of these types of activities, though not quite at the level
we had predicted. In addition to their participation in the Globalization
Seminar, few other formal requests emerged for participation in other aca-
demic seminars. However, the Task Force coordinator, a co-author on this
article, has been able to engage in more academic discussions about the
project. Also, a number of the Task Force members have used their indi-
vidual positions to talk about the collaboratory, during formal and infor-
mation presentations around the world. In particular, one participant
from Latin America was able to showcase the collaboratory approach at a
major academic conference in the Andean region.

Impact of the WFUNA collaboratory


The third research question asks: what impact does the collaboratory have
on the character and structure of the WFUNA Task Force, including its
ability to meet stated objectives, and on the collaboration practices of par-
ticipants? Here, we were again interested in the four areas mentioned in
the previous section: (1) administrative capacity; (2) planning and con-
ducting research; (3) affiliate capacity building; and (4) enhancing out-
reach capacity. To fully answer this question goes beyond the scope of this
article. However, briefly, we have found that in each of these areas, there
was a noticeable increase in the confidence of the WFUNA Task Force
members to plan and organise their work in a geographically distributed
manner. For example, in terms of administrative capacity, they moved from
primarily using email lists to communicate all administrative matters, to
holding virtual business meetings using the webconferencing tools pro-
vided by the collaboratory. Being able to make decisions in synchronous/
real-time was of huge benefit to the administrators, including decisions
about project funding, and priorities of the network. The ability for the
Task Force to use the collaboratory tools for planning and conducting
research also proved to be important. They were able to utilise both the
synchronous meetings, paired with the listserv for asynchronous policy
discussions, as the network prepared its written inputs into the WSIS
policy processes. Each of the affiliate members of the Task Force reported
increasing confidence in their ability to work collaboratively with Task
Force members who were not physically present with them in their
various cities and countries. This confidence was evident in both the face-
to-face and online training sessions conducted by the project. Finally, the
collaboratory helped to position the Task Force as a leader in the use of
ICTs within the WSIS civil society sector. In fact, after the conclusion of
WSIS with the closing of the Tunis summit, the Task Force was able to

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MCP_4_1-03_Cogburn 1/23/08 12:44 PM Page 43

partner with other civil society organisations in convening the first post-
WSIS international follow-up meeting, held in Denmark. In the process of
planning and implementing the conference, the Task Force made great use
of the available cyberinfrastructure. One major contribution was for out-
reach, and to use the webconferencing tools to enable remote participa-
tion in the Denmark conference by Task Force members and others from
as far away as Venezuela to give presentations and participate in confer-
ence working group sessions.

Institutionalisation of the WFUNA policy collaboratory


Finally, we asked: in what ways can collaboratory infrastructure be insti-
tutionalised within a transnational NGO network such as the WFUNA
Task Force? Here, we find substantial evidence of attempted institutionali-
sation and planning for long-term inclusion of the collaboratory approach
within the Task Force. The follow-up meeting in Copenhagen included an
evaluation of the project, its overall impact, and discussion of ongoing
funding mechanisms. The post-WSIS funding proposals also included
explicit references to organising members’ ongoing work and engagement
in other policy processes, such as the WTO and other on-going policy dis-
cussions along the lines of a policy collaboratory.

Conclusion
What do these findings mean for transnational policy networks and the
potential to enhance civil society and developing country participation in
global ICT policy processes?
First, there is clearly tremendous potential to use information and
communication technologies to facilitate the participation by transna-
tional NGO networks in global policy processes. However, as Rogers
(1962) would predict, the diffusion of these new technologies and organi-
sational forms is quite difficult. Successfully introducing the socio-techni-
cal infrastructure of a collaboratory presents tremendous challenges that
can only be overcome by training and visionary leadership. In the case of
the WFUNA Collaboratory, the Task Force had a high degree of ‘collabora-
tion readiness’ and clearly identified the benefits of using information and
communication technologies to work together more closely with their col-
leagues around the world. Because of this realisation, they were willing to
put the time in for training , and going the ‘extra mile’ to find internet
cafes or to get help participating in the synchronous online sessions.
In addition, both the coordinators of the Task Force and the
researchers were tireless in pursuing their common objectives. Both
groups could see the potential value of the collaboratory and worked to
ensure that the project had every possible chance to succeed. If at any
time, either of the two groups had expended less energy, time, or attention
to the collaboratory, it would have most likely lost momentum.
Also, as Henderson (2002) identified, there is the potential danger that
national or local NGOs (as the organisational members of the WFUNA
Task Force remain) will pay more attention to developing these ‘horizontal
networks’, along with their corresponding virtual communities and geo-
graphically distributed colleagues, and might pay relatively less attention

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to their own national priorities and delivering services to their local con-
stituency. Henderson saw examples of this phenomenon in Russian NGOs,
who were reorienting themselves and their work to appear more ‘western-
ized’. These issues are also related to questions of ‘legitimacy’ of the NGO,
raised by Ganesh (2003) and others who find that some local NGOs
engaged in transnational networks may ignore their relevance locally.
However, within the Task Force, this seems not to be the case. In fact,
many of the organisational participants were able to see so clearly the ben-
efits of the collaboratory approach not only for their transnational collab-
oration, but have also lobbied hard to have these technologies and
approaches used at national levels. Quite the opposite of getting more
drawn into transnational priorities, they have taken transnational ideas
and innovations and attempted to introduce them at local levels.
Second, even with the recognised benefits and the willingness to par-
ticipate in training, and find internet access points, the Task Force
members did not utilise the collaboratory to its full potential. Researchers
can envision numerous ways in which the collaboratory infrastructure
could contribute to organisational development, but it takes longer than
expected to introduce these technologies into the real transnational net-
works. Further, clearly some network members are able to grasp and
harness the power of the collaboratory more readily than others.
However, even with limited use, the collaboratory can serve to empower
network members, especially those from developing countries. As one par-
ticipant responded, one of the most interesting aspects of this study is that
members of the Task Force were not ‘alone’ in these policy processes. They
always felt like they had their network members with them, either in
person or virtually. This served to strengthen their participation in the
ongoing discussions and debates even more. These findings are very much
in line with the earlier work of Contractor et al. (1996) who found that
‘interactional influence’ was a better predictor of one’s perceptions of media
use than were individual demographic characteristics.
When thinking about the impact of the collaboratory, it is interesting that
the use of CMC tools makes the extraordinary seem ordinary. With the Task
Force, we have a wide range of geographically distributed policy actors from
both developed and developing countries, with significantly varying degrees
of technology expertise and support, and yet, they are able to function fairly
well as an organised institution. Bimber, Flanagin and Stohl (2005) might
argue that this seemingly extraordinary feat is possible perhaps because the
new CMC tools are able to reduce the significant and costly burdens of geo-
graphically distributed collective action. They argue that:

As most studies of emerging media have shown, the unique and wide-
ranging effects of new technologies do not arise from the attributes of the
technology themselves, but from the manner in which people appropriate
them initially to substitute for and accomplish previously established com-
munication practices. (384)

So, as the policy collaboratory emerged, it was able to significantly support


the previously established communication patterns of the WFUNA WSIS

44 Derrick L. Cogburn, Jane Finnerup Johnsen and Swati Bhattacharyya


MCP_4_1-03_Cogburn 1/23/08 12:44 PM Page 45

Task Force, and helped to facilitate what they already wanted to do within
the WSIS processes.
Finally, it is important for us to discuss another factor in the limited
success of the WFUNA policy collaboratory, one that has implications for
the ability to generalise the model to other transnational non-governmen-
tal organisation networks. The technologies and organisational infrastruc-
ture required for the WFUNA collaboratory were expensive. The Danish
International Development Agency (DANIDA) funded the Task Force, but
even this funding did not cover all of the costs associated with the collabo-
ratory. As other organisations move to take advantage of this collaboratory
approach, sources of funding and organisations that can benefit from
economies of scale as they support collaboratories for transnational NGOs,
will be essential.

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Suggested citation
Cogburn, D., Finnerup, J., & Battacharrya, J. (2008), ‘Distributed deliberative citi-
zens: Exploring the impact of cyberinfrastructure on transnational civil society
participation in global ICT policy processes’, International Journal of Media and
Cultural Politics 4: 1, pp. 27–49, doi: 10.1386/macp.4.1.27/1

Contributor details
Dr. Derrick L. Cogburn is Assistant Professor in the School of Information Studies
at Syracuse University and Senior Research Associate at the Moynihan Institute of
Global Affairs at the Maxwell School of Citizenship & Public Affairs. He serves as
Director of the award-winning Centre for Research on Collaboratories and
Technology Enhanced Learning Communities (Cotelco) investigating the socio-
technical factors that influence geographically distributed collaborative knowledge
work, particularly between developed and developing countries. Cotelco is an affil-
iated centre of the Burton Blatt Institute, Centers of Innovation on Disability.
Professor Cogburn is an expert on global information and communication technol-
ogy policy and in the use of ICTs for socio-economic development. Contact:
Syracuse University, School of Information Studies, 346 Hinds Hall, Syracuse
University, Syracuse, NY 13244-4100, USA.
E-mail: dcogburn@syr.edu
Jane Finnerup Johnsen is Project Coordinator at the Danish United Nations
Association and coordinates the WFUNA Task Force on WSIS and the Danish
WSIS Network. She holds an MA in history and American studies from the
University of Aarhus, Denmark, and has done thesis research at the Eisenhower
Library in Kansas. The Task Force project is a capacity building project, supported
by the Danish Ministry of Foreign affairs and the Danish Development Agency
DANIDA. Contact: United Nations Association—Denmark, Store Kongensgade 36,
4.th. – 1264 København.
E-mail: jane@una.dk

48 Derrick L. Cogburn, Jane Finnerup Johnsen and Swati Bhattacharyya


MCP_4_1-03_Cogburn 1/23/08 12:44 PM Page 49

Swati Bhattacharyya is currently in her third year of the doctoral program in the
School of Information Studies at Syracuse University, USA. She has been a librar-
ian for many years in India and was instrumental in transforming several libraries
into an automated and digital environment. Her areas of research interest are
digital libraries, knowledge organization and representation, users’ behavior and
adoption of change in libraries. As part of the doctoral program she was involved
in the work of WFUNA collaboratory under the supervision of Dr. Derrick L.
Cogburn. Contact: Syracuse University, School of Information Studies, 245 Hinds
Hall, Syracuse University, Syracuse, NY 13244-4100, USA.
E-mail: swbhatta@syr.edu

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MCP_4_1-04_Hosman 1/23/08 12:45 PM Page 51

International Journal of Media and Cultural Politics Volume 4 Number 1.


© Intellect Ltd 2008. Article. English language. doi: 10.1386/macp.4.1.51/1

Improving the prospects for sustainable


ICT projects in the developing world
Laura Hosman University of California, Berkeley, USA
Elizabeth Fife University of Southern California, USA

Abstract Keywords
Projects that bring information and communications technology (ICT) to the information and
developing world – and especially to rural areas – have the potential to empower communications
the disenfranchised, foster economic opportunity, and narrow the digital divide technology (ICT)
that threatens to widen global disparity between the haves and the have-nots. development
However, given the remarkable growth of such undertakings around the world, public–private
there has been little corresponding effort made to address the vital issues of long- partnerships
term project sustainability and the diverse motivations and incentives facing the stakeholder theory
actors involved. As a result, these projects continue to be implemented sporadi- sustainability
cally and in a piecemeal fashion, which in turn hinders our ability to define telecenters
success and recommend best practices for implementing and/or scaling them.
Through an analysis of public–private partnerships (PPPs), the prevailing vehicle
for project implementation today, the article addresses the issue of sustainability
through partnerships, and also asserts that developing world technology recipi-
ents must be considered as stakeholders, as they hold the key to project sustain-
ability. Following an overview of both theory and the current state of ICT-related
development projects, the article provides a case study of a Sri Lankan-based pilot
project involving multiple stakeholders. This case reveals important success
factors that can be applied to future developing world ICT projects.

Introduction
The level of interest and investment in projects that bring information and
communications technology (ICT) to the developing world has skyrocketed
in recent years. This trend reflects the high and ever-increasing expecta-
tions placed on ICT in terms of quality of life improvement, empowerment
and economic development for the affected communities. A better under-
standing of the key components of successful projects remains elusive,
however. Such projects have not yet been examined in the literature
(London and Hart 2004), and are undertaken in an uncoordinated, piece-
meal fashion. This lack of coordinated, well-planned efforts hinders our
ability to gauge benefits and outcomes and, even, to define success.
Numerous multinational firms, particularly in the ICT sector, have
begun to recognise the economic potential represented by the four billion
people occupying the ‘bottom of the pyramid’ (Prahalad 2004) in the
developing world. They are initiating ambitious projects aimed at serving

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and developing these markets. Yet, given the high failure rate for such
ventures and the absence of a business model proven to function in such
uncharted territory, the demand for an enumeration of best practices is
extremely high.
Public–private partnerships (PPPs) – agreements between private-
sector, for-profit businesses and developing country public sector actors –
are currently held in extremely high esteem by those seeking ICT solutions
to development challenges. These partnerships enjoy broad support and
are promoted by governments, international organisations, non-govern-
mental organisations (NGOs) and private firms alike. In fact, the United
Nations Millennium Declaration specifically recommends the creation of
PPPs to ‘ensure that the benefits of new technologies, especially informa-
tion and communications technologies . . . are available to all’ (Weigel and
Waldburger 2004:XV).
Because there are numerous potential benefits – increases in efficiency,
financial resources, human capital, technology, market access, and techni-
cal expertise, as well as the ability to scale projects – when public and
private actors join forces, these partnerships are coming to be seen as the
most efficient method for bridging the digital divide. Whether the reality
matches the potential and whether the pilot projects become sustainable
and scalable is, however, another issue deserving analysis.
The article addresses the following questions: if the success of such pro-
jects is judged by long-term sustainability, how can this best be pursued? If
the long-term success of a project is determined by whether ICT is adopted
by the recipients, and whether their quality of life improves as a result,
how can projects be designed with these as their ultimate goals?
Two paradigm-shifting requisites for doing business with the poor of the
developing world are identified: the first is to plan for the long-term sus-
tainability of projects through focusing on the wants, needs, and character-
istics of the local communities, and to consider the residents as project
stakeholders. The second is to form partnerships to carry out the projects.
In this article we begin with a discussion of the topic’s importance, as
well as a review of relevant literature. Next, the methodology is presented.
Following that, we highlight the need for a better understanding of what
contributes to successful projects by discussing the (paucity of) existing
theory, to which we both add and critique. We follow this section with a
case study, based in Sri Lanka. The case reveals important success factors
that can be applied to future digital divide projects. We conclude with an
overview of best practices and a call for future research.

ICT for development: the current debate


Some critics question the value of ICT to address the needs of the develop-
ing world – why not focus on a nutritional, educational, opportunities, or
health care divide? This is the essence of the ‘bread vs. broadband’ debate.
Given the more basic needs not being met in poor countries, how much of
the government’s limited funds (or international aid efforts, for that
matter) should be devoted to technology issues?
While acknowledging the above query, we believe the bread vs. broad-
band dichotomy to be a false one: basic needs and the utilisation of

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technology should not be thought of as an either/or, which-comes-first


proposition. They are not mutually exclusive. ICT may correctly be thought
of as an enabling tool: it is the practical application of knowledge in the areas
of information and communications. From a long-term historical perspec-
tive, economic development has been a story of technological change – both
invention and application. To claim that development without technology is
possible is to turn a blind eye to reality. Therefore, perhaps the more appro-
priate question in this debate is: why not utilise technology to effect change,
if the status quo is one in which basic needs are not being met?
Others question whether partnerships involving the private sector are
the best way for public entities in the developing world to advance with
infrastructural endeavours or to provide public goods. Our response to this
concern is that such projects often do not advance at all when left to devel-
oping country governments’ own resources and initiatives. For the public
partner, PPPs offer attractive advantages, such as increased private invest-
ment, technological experience and expertise, risk-sharing, and a potential
decrease in governmentally subsidised programs. A further argument for
PPPs on economic grounds concerns the benefits associated with a liberal-
ising of regulations and markets (at least in the telecom sector), increased
exposure to technology and more efficient ways of doing business, and a
stronger incentive to adhere to the policies of fiscal discipline required to
do business with global companies. An additional motivation for govern-
ments, and certainly for the recipients of the technology, is the value-
adding potential of ICT, not just in terms of economic growth, but also
through improvement of social and political capital.
Possible negative outcomes for governments include asymmetries of
power and information, and political and financial risks in the event of
failed projects, with the possibility of private partners pulling up stakes
and departing in the case of an unsuccessful project. Even so, citizens’
increase in demands for governmental services, paired with stagnant gov-
ernment revenues, points to the likelihood of more PPPs being created in
the future, particularly in developing countries.
Of course, for a given ICT project to be successful, locally appropriate
technology must be deployed. ‘Locally appropriate’ in this case refers both
to the stated wants and needs of the technology recipients as well as to
what is possible given the physical, geographical, and/or infrastructural
reality on the ground. Yet, once again, technology, through both invention
and application, has rendered some traditional stumbling blocks to ICT
implementation obsolete. An example will illustrate the concept: in a
recent USAID Last Mile Initiative in rural Vietnam (see Fife and Hosman
2007), the project’s emphasis was on enabling voice communications, as
this was the capability the local residents expressed the most desire to
have.
The projects made use of three notable technological innovations to
lower costs and increase effectiveness for the ICT recipients: Voice over
Internet Protocol (VoIP), Satellite and/or WiMAX technology, and solar
power. VoIP represents the least expensive method of voice communication
known today. The WiMAX technology enabled the network to be available
across a larger geographical area than was previously possible, and

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avoided the prohibitively expensive costs of laying telephone lines. Solar


powered modems and Wi-Fi towers obviated the need for a reliable elec-
tricity source (solar mobile phone chargers are also available). These tech-
nological innovations effectively minimised both short-term and long-term
costs by enabling both voice communications – the locally desired capability –
and Internet service, for which demand may increase over time, with a
single technology deployment. They also found a way around what had
previously been considered a necessity: a reliable source of electricity.
When projects are well thought out, technologically appropriate, and
designed with long-term sustainability and the empowerment of the local-
ities in mind, they can bring about real socio-economic benefit in the basic
needs areas mentioned above.
We argue that this subject is worthy of academic analysis because the
phenomenon is already taking place: numerous Western-based technology
multinationals have already launched ambitious development-related
agendas and have formed PPPs to do so. And it is a cause for concern that,
to date, there has been a lack of systematic, unbiased research guiding
and/or assessing the significant and growing amount of activity in this area.

Methodology
This research employs a qualitative, case study methodology, which is par-
ticularly relevant for researchers examining strategies in emerging
economies. In addition, the case study is the most appropriate method for
studying the ‘many variables-small N’ type of subject presented here
(Lijphart 1971). The case study is best employed when there are a limited
number of cases for analysis, as it allows the researcher to examine the
study intensively.
One additional strength of the case study methodology is the contribu-
tion it can make to theory building, and to best practices identification. We
adopt Gerring’s (2004: 342) definition of a case study as ‘an intensive
study of a single unit for the purpose of understanding a larger class of
similar units’. The case under consideration will be utilised to identify best
practices. These findings will also be informed by existing theory and by
the experiences of firms doing business in emerging economies.
Of equal necessity, however, is the ability to test the applicability of find-
ings across similar cases. Though such testing will remain a challenge for
future research, it is the authors’ intention to apply these findings across
future cases to test their applicability. Relevant cases do exist, and given
the fervent and growing interest in bridging the digital divide, we are con-
fident the number of such cases will grow.
The case presented here was chosen because it possesses many charac-
teristics that will be addressed in the article. The Sri Lanka project brings
broadband ICT access to rural areas of this developing state. It is a pilot
project undertaken with an eye to potential scaling and expansion on a
nation-wide and even international basis. It will encourage local entrepre-
neurship and offer a variety of value-adding training courses to address
the socio-economic desires of the local technology recipients. Additionally,
it features a PPP involving numerous partners, with the main coordinator
being a small, US-based firm.

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The case will be compared and contrasted with existing theory and an
overview of MNC involvement at the bottom of the pyramid as well as the
discussion of PPP presented in the article. It will also serve to inform the
best practices section.

Theories, concepts and research


The topic of ICT for development comprises a number of academic subject
and interest areas, including, but not limited to, economics, business
(ethics) studies, information systems, technology studies, sociology, poli-
tics, and development. Accordingly, it may not be surprising that there is
no agreed-upon theoretical framework for analysis, nor any main reposi-
tory for acquired knowledge or best-practices. As a result, our brief
overview draws from a wide range of sources.
A number of academic studies from the field of economics have
researched the role that ICT can play to fight poverty and catalyse socio-eco-
nomic development and growth. There have been a number of macro-level
studies demonstrating the positive impact of ICT on economic growth and
development (see, e.g., Roller and Waverman 2001; Cronin et al. 1993). To
date, however, these studies have utilised data from the developed world.
There is still a need to replicate these studies using data from the developing
world – although at this time, such data remains prohibitively limited.
In the literature of theoretical economics, endogenous growth theory (or
new-growth theory) stipulates that it is technology and human capital,
when endogenously present, that contribute to continuous economic
growth and play an essential role in a country’s development (Easterly et
al. 1994; Barro 1997). Logically, workers who are better-educated, better-
fed, healthier and technologically capable can produce more than those
who are illiterate, hungry, unhealthy and unskilled.
Robert Barro’s (1991) statistical analysis of the difference in growth
rates across a large number of countries reveals that a high initial level of
human capital has a significant positive effect on growth. This growth, in
turn, further raises the level of human capital, and so forth, thus forming
a virtuous circle. We can predict that ICT penetration – the ability to use
technology to increase efficacy and efficiency – would have the same rein-
forcing effect.
Other research has considered the social impact of telecommunications
technology in the developing world. De Silva and Zainudeen (2007: 2)
rightly point out that such ‘social’ use of ICT is not to be considered frivo-
lous – the ability of family members to stay in touch with one another con-
tributes to a better quality of life.
Yet research at both the theoretical and micro level is still notably
lacking (London and Hart 2004; de Silva and Zainudeen 2007). This
article contributes to the research agenda in both areas, providing an
analysis and critique of current theories regarding the use of ICT for devel-
opment purposes, with a particular focus on multinational ICT corpora-
tions, to do so.
The article contributes to the case-study/empirical evidence body of liter-
ature, presenting an illustrative ICT-for-development project taking place in
Sri Lanka that features a multi-stakeholder PPP. Ideally, such partnerships

Improving the prospects for sustainable ICT projects in the developing world 55
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are thought to create synergistic results by combining the expertise and


resources of the private partner with the administrative and political
power of the governmental partner.
The partners in such initiatives may come to these projects with diver-
gent motivations – profit on the one hand and the provision of public ser-
vices on the other – but at the end of the day, the interests of the partners
that are symbiotic can, and indeed should, be aligned to ensure successful
long-term projects. Still, not a great deal is known about the PPP business
model; this helps to explain the large number of unsuccessful initiatives
(Angerer and Hammerschmid 2005). The fact that many failed cases go
unreported does not help the learning process, either.
We argue that when these types of ventures are well thought out and
designed with the empowerment of localities as their priority they can
bring about long-term socio-economic benefits in numerous areas. In the
field of ICT, broadband connectivity can enable local small business entre-
preneurship, provide crop pricing information in advance of sales, increase
knowledge of successful farming techniques and of labour opportunities
and going wage-rates, and allow for the institution of tele-education and
tele-health. These are just a few of the value-adding benefits communica-
tions connectivity can provide, but their potential is more likely to be
realised when projects are designed with sustainability and local needs
and desires in mind. This primary focus has been missing from numerous
digital divide projects and analyses to date.
Since there is no theoretical framework that focuses specifically on
partnerships of this kind (Stewart and Gray 2006), the article presents a
hybrid overview of stakeholder theory and policy networks theory, as these
are the two most relevant frameworks for understanding the case under
consideration.
The concept of a ‘stakeholder’ in academic theory finds widest par-
lance, and indeed has its origins, in business (ethics) and management lit-
erature, although economists, political scientists and development
scholars are increasingly making use of it. At base, it differentiates its own
theory of the firm from neoclassical, behavioural, transaction cost, or
cooperative game theory by claiming that there are other stakeholders
besides management, owners, and shareholders affecting and being
affected by the firm’s business decisions, and that these other stakeholders’
interests (should) matter.
In terms of the case study, the stakeholder concept has been essential
to the project’s implementation. Synergy Strategies Group (SSG), the firm
charged with implementing the project, and USAID, a co-funder of the
project, took into consideration the desires of the local residents in the
cities where the project’s telecentres were to be located by asking them
whether they would be interested in telecentre services, and if so, which
ones. In doing so, it treated them as stakeholders.
Additionally, in laying out a business plan for the project, SSG identi-
fied numerous other stakeholders, including local and international firms
necessary to the project’s success. The firms identified represented the fol-
lowing sectors: banking, hardware and software technology, service and
training support, a telecom provider and an NGO. However, rather than

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simply considering these parties as stakeholders, SSG took a step further


and asked each to become contractual partners in the project with stakes
in the long-term outcome. This degree of partnering is the unique and
groundbreaking aspect of the case at hand and the reason we now turn to
the concept of partnership.
As mentioned above, the concept of partnership has come into favour
among many organisations that promote development, but a theoretical
framework for understanding how they work or what a partnership busi-
ness model should look like has not yet been developed. The concept of
partnership has its origins – and finds its widest usage – among environ-
mental and development scholars. For these scholars, the notion of sus-
tainability has been a key concept since the 1970s (Stewart and Gray
2006), while other fields of study have rather recently adopted the notion.
Partnership, as it is used here, describes a business relationship
between individuals (or firms) who (which) unite in a profit-making enter-
prise. In 2002, the United Nations held a World Summit on Sustainable
Development where a number of guiding principles for sustainable devel-
opment partnerships were put forward (Kara and Quarless 2002). The
main concept underlying any partnership is that it is established to
achieve goals that could not be realised by a single party acting alone. The
following principles were also enumerated:

• Partnerships are based on mutual respect and the shared responsibility


of those involved.
• Each partner’s role, as well as its objectives, intended outcomes, and
benefits, should be clearly defined and transparently reported on a
regular basis.
• Partnerships should integrate the economic, social and environmental
dimensions of sustainable development in their design and implemen-
tation and should be consistent with poverty reduction strategies
where their implementation takes place.
• Partnerships should have a multi-stakeholder approach and involve a
range of significant actors in a given area of work. They can be arranged
among any combination of partners, including governments, regional
groups, local authorities, NGOs, and those from the private sector. All
partners should be involved from an early stage, so that the approach is
genuinely participatory. Yet, as partnerships evolve, there should be an
opportunity for additional partners to join on an equal basis.
• Partnerships should add value in terms of human development goals.

These principles can serve as valuable guidelines for future partnerships


undertaken in the developing world; they will serve to inform our review
of best practices in the case presented below.

Doing business with the world’s poor: models, theories and


experiences
As developed world markets for goods and services have matured, multi-
national corporations increasingly look to the developing world to find or
create new high-growth markets for their products. Up until recently,

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these MNCs’ business strategies generally could be characterised as repli-


cations of what had worked for them in developed markets: partnering
with established local firms, retaining existing products, and focusing on
the wealthy elites of developing world countries (London and Hart 2004).
Although this strategy expanded MNCs’ global reach, it proved limited in
terms of increasing profitability, and, in fact, has contributed to widening
the divide between the haves and the have-nots within these countries,
leaving MNCs open to criticism of neo-imperialism.
Over the past few years, however, in large part due to the work of
C.K. Prahalad (2004), there has been a growing recognition of a largely
untapped potential market: the four billion people at the ‘bottom of the
(economic) pyramid’ (BOP). The acknowledgement of this segment of the
population as a potential market represents an attitudinal shift on the part
of large, western MNCs, which are now eager to expand their reach to
include it.
However, given the large number of ‘early mover’ failed initiatives in
recent years, there is also a growing comprehension that reaching this
group and realising successful ventures will require a new business
strategy – one heretofore not addressed in the literature or theory of
emerging market business models. Thus, while reaching the bottom of the
pyramid holds enormous opportunities, it also presents unique challenges
requiring corresponding solutions. As a result, there is great demand on
behalf of these corporations both to do business with the world’s poor and
to understand how best to do so.
In seeking to understand which factors will contribute to the success of
BOP strategies, two salient points have emerged from the literature. The
first is that the developing world often conducts business according to dif-
ferent rules and norms than those to which western firms are accustomed.
In the absence of efficient, formal markets and the rule of law to uphold
property rights, social norms and informal contracts form the structure
for transactions and the respect of outcomes (London and Hart 2004).
For example, in the widely cited Grameen Bank (and Grameen Phone)
program, the success of its micro-lending initiative was dependent on
social pressure: if one person defaulted on a loan, no others in his or her
peer group would be eligible for a future loan. It is doubtful that this par-
ticular incentive model would work well in a (western) society that values
the individual above the community, nor in one in which the individual or
the business has recourse to reliable legal means by which to recover prop-
erty. As a result of this fundamental difference in societal expectations,
western-based firms need to discover a fundamentally different way to
conduct business – in precisely the way that developing country residents
cultivated their own methods for getting things accomplished and having
outcomes respected, given a lack of law and order and transparent, func-
tioning markets.
This will require corporations to reinvent their current ‘competitive
advantages’, particularly in terms of branding, contract enforcement, and
patents (London and Hart 2004). But in addition to re-thinking the ways
business is conducted, there must also be a shift in mentality in order to
understand the importance of society to those at the bottom of the

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pyramid. This point is two-pronged: since society is paramount to these


groups, social issues must be considered even in economic endeavours. In
essence, Milton Friedman’s (1970) take on the requirements of business –
‘The social responsibility of business is to increase its profits’ – may not fly
in the developing world, where the emphasis is on society.
MNCs interested in doing business with BOP residents may be wise to
consider projects that add societal as well as economic value. In practical
terms, this also means that a bottom-up rather than a top-down approach
will lead to greater chance of project success. By understanding what the
technology recipients in the developing world truly want and need – what
their pressure and pain points are, as well as what their unique societal
concerns may be – the projects proposed are more likely to address real
existing needs and, as such, stand a much better chance of succeeding
than those thought up by a research and development team in a far-off
locale with the aim of selling a product that their company already makes.
The second major change required of western companies seeking to
penetrate the BOP market is that an entirely new paradigm for doing busi-
ness must be adopted: one of partnering. This may include contracting
with local businesses and entrepreneurs, civil society groups, non-govern-
ment organisations, intergovernmental organisations, the national gov-
ernment, the local government, and/or ministries and is a structure that is
likely far less efficient than that to which the multinational is accustomed,
but one that is necessary if they are to understand and be accepted by
their ‘target audience’. The partners in a given project must be determined
by the particular project under consideration, and may not be seen as a
one-size-fits-all proposition.
PPPs between ICT companies and the governments of developing
nations are increasingly formed with the support of international organi-
sations like USAID, the World Bank, and the UN. In 2002, UN Secretary-
General Kofi Annan challenged the technology corporations of Silicon
Valley to do more in the public/private partnership arena; to unleash their
creative energies to bring wireless technologies to the developing world
and narrow the gap between technological ‘haves’ and ‘have-nots’ (Annan
2004). Accordingly, ambitious projects aimed at bridging the digital divide
have been announced by such companies as Microsoft, AMD, Intel, and
Cisco. Substantial investments have been proposed and projects are
already underway. Microprocessor manufacturer AMD, for example, is in
the second year of its 50 ⫻ 15 initiative, which seeks to provide Internet
access to half of the world’s population by 2015 (about 15% of the world’s
population presently has Internet access).
This emphasis on addressing basic needs represents a paradigm shift:
in the past, basic improvements in daily life – when they took place at all –
were assumed to be a by-product of multinational involvement in emerg-
ing markets. The enthusiasm of governments and non-governmental
organisations to support private enterprise-led projects also marks a signif-
icant change in perspective regarding corporate involvement in growth
plans.
Yet, despite the numerous potential benefits and an increase in the
number of PPPs around the globe, the academic community reports mixed

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results for such undertakings. There are numerous cases of failed PPPs.
These partnerships are often misunderstood and work well only under
certain conditions. Because of this, a good deal of organisational and
instructional literature has been created with the goal of enumerating and
promoting best practices to ensure successful joint ventures (see, e.g.
United Nations Foundation 2003).
Complicating matters has been the fact that corporations have been
both sending and receiving mixed signals regarding their motivations for
becoming involved in such endeavours. AMD’s website announces its
World Ahead Program intentions. ‘Making a profit and making the world
a better place do not have to be mutually exclusive goals.’ Yet even the
United Nations recognises that private sector companies are not philan-
thropic organisations and that PPPs are formed out of self-interest. Firms’
core objective remains profit.
Even so, corporations take advantage of the positive externalities asso-
ciated with the perceived philanthropic nature of these projects and utilise
them as a marketing tool on their websites. They also report immediate
tangible benefits, such as improved morale among their own workforce
and the creation of a positive company image at home and abroad.
The literature addressing this topic has been similarly divided in its rec-
ommendations and findings in terms of whether corporations should act
out of a sense of social responsibility or merely pursue profits. Often, the
exhortation for corporations to act out of both motivations appears, sepa-
rately, within the same article (Prahalad and Hammond 2004; London
and Hart 2004). This bifurcated approach stems from the complicated
reality in which the world’s poor desire an opportunity for (socio-)eco-
nomic growth that is currently not available to them, yet the large corpo-
rations that may provide them this potential seemingly need convincing
that the poor comprise an attractive market that is worth their economic
investment and risk.
Although at face value this may seem a benign argument, there is, in
fact, at its very base a conflicting logic that will be difficult for MNCs to over-
come. On the one hand, many authors point out that, due to the important
notion of society among the world’s poor and their expectations for what
may be called a multifarious concept of development, an integrated
approach to economic growth, poverty alleviation, and environmental sensi-
bility must be respected in any development efforts (see, e.g. Sen 1999;
Stiglitz 2002; World Bank 2001). These authors want the corporations to
know this and change their ways of doing business to ensure that social
value will be created for the people who are the target of their projects. In
this way the bias against corporations as being ‘foreign’ can be overcome.
On the other hand, but in a similar vein, corporations are warned
against either expecting that developing country citizens will ‘evolve’
eventually in their ways to resemble a western-style market economy or
pattern of development, or of trying to force them into said style. In other
words, ‘MNC managers and academics must move beyond the “imperialist
mindset” that everyone must want to look and act like Westerners’
(London and Hart 2004: 354, citing Prahalad and Lieberthal 1998; see
also Arnold and Quelch 1998).

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If scholarly recommendations for western corporations (to best do busi-


ness with those at the bottom of the pyramid) are to stop behaving like
western corporations in both their actions and expectations, what does this
say about the appropriateness of these MNCs as the best or even most likely
candidates for the job? If the goal is not to make over the developing world
in the west’s image, then perhaps encouraging even greater global reach
and domination by these corporations is not the best solution available.
If the goal is truly to respect the BOP’s desires to grow in a holistic
socio-economic way, then, at the very least, we argue that small firms – as
well as local, indigenous companies – may be better positioned to under-
stand and create opportunities for the BOP.
This is not to argue that there should not or cannot be a valuable role
for western MNCs in the development picture. Our case study provides evi-
dence of such partnering that is productive and fruitful. Yet we still intend
to question the notion that world-dominant MNCs should be relied upon
to lead the charge to global development, and argue that small and local
companies can be effective as well.
In the end, however, whether the instigating partner is large or small,
the focus must still remain on the recipients of local technology and on
formulating effective, sustainable partnerships. For most partners, sustain-
ability will translate into the need for profitability or a return on invest-
ment. The local residents must be treated as stakeholders as well; when
this means that they will also have a stake in the financial outcome and/or
will be able to see an improvement in their quality of life, the prospects for
a given project’s success will improve.

Case study: EasySeva in Sri Lanka


The case presented here serves to illustrate a number of the best practice
characteristics discussed throughout the article. As such, it contributes to
the empirical evidence for addressing our research questions of how best
to formulate sustainable, scalable partnership projects aimed at bringing
ICT to rural areas of the developing world.
EasySeva (or Easy Service in the local languages) is the name given to a
for-profit franchise service center project to bring affordable broadband
wireless telecommunications and Internet technology to rural areas of
Sri Lanka. It is a PPP with multiple local and international partners from
numerous sectors of relevant industries. The aim of the EasySeva project is
to empower the rural communities to avail themselves of ICT in order to
improve their quality of life, as well as their economic status (Synergy
Strategies Group [SSG] 2007).
The EasySeva business strategy is built around a franchising model.
Local entrepreneurs – generally those already employed in mobile phone
‘top-up’ shops or in dial-up cyber cafes – are identified (by the local phone
companies through which they are employed), interviewed, and recruited
to establish village-level kiosk franchises that provide Internet and tele-
phone access to the local population. Through EasySeva the potential
franchisees are offered the opportunity to start a business by purchasing a
low-priced kiosk package, or ‘Center/Franchise-in-a-box’, which consists
of four reconditioned personal computers (PCs) with a licensed suite of

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1. WiMAX is defined as Microsoft Office products, an all-in-one printer/copier/fax machine, broad-


Worldwide band connection via Dialog Telekom (which is either through WiMAX1 or
Interoperability for
Microwave Access. HSDPA2 technology), and one or two Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP)
The difference enabled telephones (SSG 2007).
between Wi-Fi and There are two major technological advances that have enabled this
Wi-Max is that the
WiMAX specification project’s realisation and hold promise for revolutionising similar ICT
provides symmetrical undertakings across the developing world: wireless broadband and VoIP.
bandwidth over many These technologies are both revolutionary and enabling in a number of
kilometers and range
with stronger ways. Utilising wireless broadband means that the expense of laying fixed-
encryption and line wires or cables is avoided, bringing cost savings for all parties
typically less involved. WiMAX and HSDPA are also relevant technological advances:
interference. Wi-Fi
has shorter range they increase the distance that modems can supply an Internet connec-
(approximately 10’s of tion, which translates into cost savings.
meters,) weaker VoIP technology is this project’s primary voice communications appli-
encryption and
suffers from cation. As a result, both Internet connectivity and voice-related communi-
interference, as in cations are enabled through a single technology deployment. This
metropolitan areas combined provision of Internet and voice in a single technology minimises
where there are many
users, or when there both short-term and long-term costs, as VoIP over broadband presently
are obstacles to its represents the least-expensive method of communicating over long dis-
line-of-sight. tances. It also addresses the issue of providing the service currently the
2. HSDPA is defined as most in-demand in the developing world – voice communications – while
High-Speed Downlink simultaneously providing Internet connectivity, for which demand may
Packet or Protocol
Access, which allows increase over time. Enabling residents of rural villages to make both local
networks based on and long-distance calls at minimal cost provides increased efficiency in
Universal Mobile planning and communication; this can lead to economic growth.
Telecommunications
System (UMTS) to In addition to the equipment, setup and connectivity, the franchise
have higher data package also includes IT/business training, business plan support, a
transfer speeds and micro-loan and lease program, marketing support, and a 24/7 help desk.
capacity.
The majority of these items and services are provided directly by the
numerous partners in the EasySeva project, which benefits from economy
of scale and buying in bulk: it is able to provide technology, support and
prices/rates well below those which any single operator, entrepreneur, or
company could negotiate by itself. Additionally, the franchisee’s required
capital outlay (obtained through a start-up cost loan) reduces the up-front
capital outlay burden for the main project partner, Synergy Strategies
Group (SSG 2007).
While EasySeva provides kiosk owners with training, support, techni-
cal assistance, and access to financial assistance they otherwise would not
have, in the end, the local franchise owners themselves are responsible for
generating the income and profit to pay back their initial loan in a timely
fashion (30 months). In other words, they are responsible for putting into
practice the marketing strategies they are provided as part of their assis-
tance, and for developing additional product and service offerings of their
own. This is intended to challenge and stimulate the creative, entrepre-
neurial spirit.
At the service centre level, EasySeva provides extremely low rates for
Sri Lankans to call relatives both in neighbouring villages as well as those
far away. This is a valuable service, as the Sri Lankan expatriate work-
force is extremely large. While estimates vary, in 1999 the Central Bank

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of Sri Lanka estimated that there were over 788 million expatriate
workers, 90 per cent of whom are employed in the Middle East (Central
Bank 1999; this statistic is no longer officially reported). Given the high
rate of depression and even suicide among these workers (Toumi 2007),
affordable overseas communication may truly be said to provide a ‘life-
line’ between loved ones.
EasySeva service centre franchisees also have the capacity to provide
computer training services in the local languages (Tamil and Sinhalese) in
order to make Internet access an effective development tool. Local towns-
people were surveyed prior to the commencement of the project and initial
feedback evinced community members’ interest for taking ICT training
courses in areas such as English as a second language (ESL), agricultural
techniques, and so forth.
Since the Sri Lankan literacy rate in the local languages is 91 per cent,
such Internet training programs are a locally appropriate technology
application. Relevant local content will generate usage and additional
revenue sources for the telecentres and franchisees, as well as significant
socio-economic benefits for local users. The high literacy rate within the
state also bodes well for Internet uptake – and adoption in general – as
many of the more advanced technology applications, such as email and
information gathering, require the ability to read and write. In this
respect, Sri Lankans are better poised to realise a wide range of ICT-related
benefits than many others in developing countries, and the expectations of
this project regarding their abilities for and interests in taking computer
training courses appear to be in line with the reality of the situation.
In addition to the above, in the near future, EasySeva customers will be
able to apply for loans, make payments, and receive remittances in the
centres. They will also be able to receive remote diagnoses from regional or
national hospital doctors and nurses, which will improve local health con-
ditions, as well as save patrons the time and travel costs of journeys to
distant hospitals. EasySeva has a built in network for franchisees to share
best practices and lessons learned that will add value as the number of
franchises expands (SSG 2007).
The implementing partner of the EasySeva project is Synergy Strategies
Group (SSG), a small, Vermont-based American firm. In the summer of
2006, SSG beat out a considerable number of established competitors for a
USAID-sponsored Last Mile Initiative grant.
USAID’s Last Mile Initiative (LMI) is its global program, launched in
2003, to bring modern telecommunications infrastructure to farmers and
small businesses in traditionally underserved rural areas. In doing so, it
has been funding a number of country-specific ICT projects that make use
of new, creative, and promising approaches for expanding telecommunica-
tions access.
One of the unique aspects of USAID’s mission for such projects is that
LMI programs are designed to be self-sustainable and subsidisation-free
once they are up and running. USAID promotes this sustainability: it
generally has an end-date for its participation in these projects, after
which it departs, its funding stops, and the remaining partners fully take
over the project.

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In the Sri Lanka Last Mile Initiative, USAID stipulated a number of


project requirements with an eye to promoting long-term sustainability.
Among these was 2-to-1 matching of project funds, wherein for every
dollar provided by USAID the private sector partner had to match it with
$0.50 – with either its own or partner funds. To promote project scalabil-
ity, USAID required a minimum of 20 centers to be fully operational
within one year of the project award date, to ensure a ‘proof of concept’ for
scalability. In addition, USAID encouraged and facilitated SSG’s forming of
alliances with both public and private sector partners.
At the end of September, 2006, SSG was awarded the contract and
began implementation, which involved partnering with numerous organi-
sations. From the beginning, SSG has viewed this project as a business
development opportunity. Yet, rather than seeking to maximise profit off of
the initial contract’s realisation, as has been the case for USAID con-
tractees traditionally, SSG will be utilising these funds as seed money – or
venture capital – to fund, eventually, the opening of hundreds of EasySeva
centres across the nation, and even internationally. Not only does this
provide SSG a true long-term stake in the project, it also creates the incen-
tives for contracted partners to realise profitability as well, promoting
desire for continued participation in the project’s expansion.
All of these characteristics contribute to the potential for the project’s
long-term sustainability. This performance-based contract model marks a
shift on the part of USAID, which now recognises that correct incentives
should be in place for aid-based funding to be effective; a project is more
likely to be a success once all parties have a (financial) stake in the
outcome. In fact, such incentivising represents a radical departure for
USAID: traditionally, US firms merely extracted aid fees from the initial
implementation of a project, and had little-to-no interest in the impact or
sustainability of the project after the funding dried up.
The partners involved in the EasySeva project include public, private, local
and international firms dealing in hardware, software, finance, technology
and services provision. In addition to SSG and USAID, the partners include:

• Dialog Telekom, the largest mobile phone operator in Sri Lanka, pro-
viding internet connectivity and support, infrastructure, and technical
expertise, and will ensure that regulatory requirements are met. It is
also committing a project team of engineers and project managers to
support the undertaking.
• InfoShare, a Sri Lankan NGO that will provide training and content
support.
• Lanka Orix Leasing Company, providing leasing and financial support
for franchisees to enable their purchase of the requisite hardware.
• National Development Bank of Sri Lanka, which has provided fran-
chisees with working capital financing support ($40,000 to date).
• Qualcomm, a global wireless communications company, which is pro-
viding both funding and the permission to use its HSDPA technology.
• Microsoft, a global computer technology corporation, has provided
training materials and workshops on IT use (through their Unlimited
Potential program, run in partnership with InfoShare).

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Synergy Strategies Group registered EasySeva, the franchisor, as a Sri


Lankan Private company in early 2007. The company has exceeded the
stipulated requirements of the LMI contract, opening 25 service centres by
the August, 2007 deadline. The company plans to open 400–500 centres
within Sri Lanka over the next 3–4 years, and an additional 1,000 centres
around the South Asian region in the future. In order to make this a
reality, they will need to attract sufficient private financing, which, in this
case, means that the current partners must realise a sufficient profit to
remain involved and, possibly, to expand their involvement as the project is
scaled (SSG 2007).

Success factors
It may be too soon to comment on the long-term outcome of this case for
the communities involved; whether the technology has been adopted and
used in training courses, for loans and health-related matters, and so
forth, and whether it has led to economic activity and growth. Even so, the
project has been deemed successful on several fronts. It provides a ground-
breaking example of partnering in line with a number of the guiding prin-
ciples for partnerships.
First, the project took advantage of the intersection of common inter-
ests by the parties involved. SSG identified stakeholders, and invited them
to become partners. All partners had a long-term stake in the project,
driving both their participation and motivation.
As for the physical project, the PPP contract made clear that resources
were not handouts but were provided in a collaborative-supportive approach
which was based on the agreed-upon plan. Treating PPPs like the business
ventures that they are gives parties incentive to stay involved, while the
diversity of the parties forces participants to be flexible in their interactions.
In fact, until recently, community telecentres have suffered from a high
failure rate for a number of reasons. Such projects have traditionally been
initiated by NGOs with development assistance or government funds, but
have not been treated as for-profit business ventures with long-term sus-
tainability incentives in place. They often did not meet local needs, failed
to provide local content or relevant training opportunities, and were not
able to take advantage of the advanced technologies currently available
(wireless broadband and VoIP) that have fundamentally altered the eco-
nomic dynamic of rural connectivity. Lastly, with a lack of partners partic-
ipating in such projects, they were not able to buy in bulk to bring down
prices or negotiate for lower rates, nor were they able to share investment
costs, or spread risk among partners, and thus they involved a heavy up-
front investment by the donor organisation.
The EasySeva project has turned the former model on its head, revers-
ing virtually all of the factors that contributed to the previous model’s
failure. Numerous partners were involved, ranging from local to interna-
tional actors, from all sectors relevant to the successful rollout of the
project. The partnership had clear objectives, transparent agreements, and
measurable targets and timeframes. The partners were treated as equals,
and were involved from the initial stages of the project, with room for
future partners to become involved as the pilot is scaled.

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Finally, the local residents have been treated as stakeholders at all


stages of this project. Targeted community members were consulted before
the project began, to determine whether such a project would meet a
desire or need. When the response was positive, the project moved
forward. EasySeva provides the opportunity for economic benefit to partic-
ipants, as well as the possibility to enhance the quality of their lives.

The nexus: success factors that matter


Re-shifting the focus to the bigger picture, several success factors have
been identified for integrating ICT services into a community, both in the
literature and in our case study. One of these factors is starting out small
with a pilot project that can demonstrate scalability, whether the project is
a partnership between top levels of government and a large multinational
corporation or between multiple partners and spearheaded by a small
firm. Modest efforts that are in line with local realities and are appropriate
to local socio-economic conditions – as was the case in the EasySeva
project – are more likely to be adopted by the local residents. Smaller pro-
jects also have more flexibility for changing conditions. There can be large
returns from low-cost projects.
Services that are seen to be useful, and demonstrate their utility
quickly, will be used in everyday life; this encourages further adoption.
Buy-in by citizens is much more likely if services demonstrate an improve-
ment over the status quo. Unexpected benefits can occur upon adoption of
technology, and creativity may be unleashed when the entrepreneurial
spirit is promoted.
The presence of a third party intermediary, here USAID, was also found
to be extremely useful at identifying and bringing together potential part-
ners. This actor’s focus – not on profits, but on crafting a sustainable
project in the long-term – was particularly fruitful during the contract-for-
mulation stage, when each player involved was given a long-term (finan-
cial) stake in EasySeva’s outcome. Forming a solid contract tends to benefit
all players throughout the life of the project. In this case, the ground-
breaking contract took into consideration the long-term sustainability of
the project by giving all partners an incentive, not just for a successful
project, but for one that would ultimately be scaled, as well.
Finally, starting from the bottom-up and not the top-down helps reveal
the wants and needs of the people who will ultimately determine whether
any project is successful in the short- and long term. Locally relevant pro-
grams can only be designed with an in-depth knowledge of the potential
technology recipients; this includes such diverse considerations as the
understanding of societal norms, literacy levels, employment options,
weather-related concerns, factional/religious/ethnic sensitivities, govern-
ment openness or repression, and so forth. The list – which could continue
without end – serves to illustrate that digital divide projects can never be
considered a one-size-fits-all proposition. The local stakeholders must be
the central focus of any and all such undertakings.
The digital divide was once considered merely an issue of access. A
more meaningful distinction currently understood involves the disparity in
real access, defined in terms of both physical access and usability, or

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adoption into one’s daily life (UN 2004: 8). Developing a beneficial
‘culture of use’ is most likely to take place when success factors are
present: services are visible, frequently used, context specific, have a
human face, and meet tangible needs. ICT investments in the developing
world will continue to grow in the coming years. Thus, there is great
opportunity for careful investigation into how these resources can best be
used to fight poverty, empower and promote development.

Conclusion
While progress has been made in the gathering of information about ICT-
related PPPs in the developing world, much remains to be done in terms of
the accumulation of empirical evidence, building of theories, and identifi-
cation of best practices. The multitude of related projects currently under-
way provides an unprecedented opportunity to learn about how social and
economic change can be furthered through technological advance. These
lessons may be applicable in contexts other than that of information and
communication technology, but the expectations placed on this particular
realm are high, given its ability to drive and enable efficiency and develop-
ment in all of the areas to which it is applied.
Serving the needs of emerging markets and those at the bottom of the
pyramid offers many challenges and opportunities to the private sector.
Developing country governments, and other organisations acting alone,
have not been able to mount an effort comprehensive enough to eradicate
poverty in the lowest tiers of the economic pyramid (Hart 2005). PPPs
thus offer great opportunities for technological advancement in the devel-
oping world. Still, there is a need for careful study of these initiatives, in
order to ensure successful projects and to encourage the use of ICTs to
further human development.

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Suggested citation
Hosman, L., & Fife, E. (2008), ‘Improving the prospects for sustainable ICT projects
in the developing world’, International Journal of Media and Cultural Politics 4: 1,
pp. 51–69, doi: 10.1386/macp.4.1.51/1

Contributor details
Laura Hosman holds a Ph.D. in Political Economy and Public Policy from the
University of Southern California (USC). She is currently a Ciriacy-Wantrup
Postdoctoral Fellow at the University of California, Berkeley, and a Postdoctoral
Researcher with the Center for Telecom Management through the Marshall School
of Business at USC. Her work focuses on sustainable development issues, particularly
in the areas of ICT and natural resources. Contact: Department of Environmental
Science, Policy & Management, 118 Giannini Hall, University of California,
Berkeley, 94720, USA. Tel: 1 (510) 665-5612.
E-mail: hosman@berkeley.edu
Elizabeth Fife, Ph.D., is Principal Researcher at the Center for Telecom
Management of the Marshall School of Business at the University of Southern
California (USC). She also teaches technical communications in the Engineering
Department at the USC. Her work focuses on the role for information and commu-
nications technology (ICT) in developing countries, particularly in terms of its
potential effects on socio-cultural factors, human development, and economic
growth. Contact: Marshall School of Business, University of Southern California,
444 South Flower Street, Suite 1000, Los Angeles, CA 90089, USA. Tel: 1 (213)
740-9347, Fax: 1 (213) 740-1602.
E-mail: fife@marshall.usc.edu

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International Journal of Media and Cultural Politics Volume 4 Number 1.


© Intellect Ltd 2008. Article. English language. doi: 10.1386/macp.4.1.71/1

The ‘Lady’ revolution in the age


of technology
Janni Aragon University of Victoria, Canada

Abstract Keywords
Girls and young women are participating in unconventional forms of political par- feminisms
ticipation through Ladyfests. The first Ladyfest took place in 2000 in Olympia, ICTs
Washington, United States. Ladyfests are activist-oriented festivals that include Ladyfest
art, spoken word, music, workshops, artisan fairs, and other performances. Since Riot Grrrl
the first Ladyfest there have been approximately one hundred and twenty spanning third wave feminism
the globe. I argue that Ladyfests provide the organisers and attendees alternative
communities to network, educate, share information, and build offline and online
communities. This form of contemporary cultural activism relies heavily on
engaging culture – as a means of both commentary and action. The use of Infor-
mation and Communication Technologies (ICTs) by girls and young women is on
the rise, including as activist and networking tools. ‘Ladyfesters’ are web savvy
and use ICTs to organise the events, share information about their Ladyfest and
others, as well as build networks after the event.

Introduction
Girls and young women are involved in grassroots organising and political 1. The main focus of my
protest, however, one would not know that from reviewing mainstream current research is
about girls and young
press and scholarly journals. When girls and young women engage in women in the United
political work their activities are often ignored or at best misunderstood. States. I hope to
Girls and young women actively engage in political work against sexism, expand this research
at a later date.
racism, homophobia, poverty, global capitalism, restrictions on reproduc-
tive rights, and so much more.1 This contemporary cultural activism relies 2. ‘Ladyfest is a non-
profit, cultural-social
heavily on engaging culture – music, art, the spoken word, and other political event run by
means of both commentary and action. The use of Information and women.’ http://www.
Communication Technologies (ICTs) by girls and young women is on the ladyfestamsterdam.
org/id1.html.
rise, including activist tools. In particular, girls and young women are con-
nected to social networking sites such as MySpace and Facebook in an 3. Some locales have
held multiple festivals,
unprecedented manner. such as the Bay
One reason for the rise in contemporary feminist cultural activism is the Area Ladyfest,
advent of Ladyfests. Ladyfests are activist oriented, art, and music festivals.2 Lansing Ladyfest,
Winnepeg Ladyfest
They can be conceived as a contemporary example of the accruing collective and Ottawa Ladyfest.
3
political identification amongst young women. Many Ladyfest events take
place with a concentrated reliance on technology in terms of the organising,
networking, and activism and ICT networking continues afterwards.
This research project began with a systematic review of Ladyfest sites
found at www.ladyfest.org in 2003 and 2004. This included examining

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4. The growth of each site and noting when and where the event was going to be held and
Ladyfest ‘hits’ in any references to other Ladyfests. I also looked for explicit references to the
2007 alone on
MySpace went from original Ladyfest mission or their own Ladyfest mission in order to ascer-
almost 3,000 on tain if this was a typical political, cultural, artistic event or merely a
February 14 to about concert being headlined under the Ladyfest flag. At that point in time, the
5,800 during the
month of August. site listed each of the past, current, and upcoming Ladyfests and provided
links to them. However, in late 2005 or early 2006 the site was no longer
5. See Jackson (2002).
regularly updated. Social networking sites, such as MySpace, Blogspot,
6. The age of women and others began to fill this void. There were Ladyfest pages on MySpace
involved in this
subculture varies sites prior to the inactivity on the ‘original’ Ladyfest site; however, today
from girls in their there are more Ladyfest pages not listed on the Ladyfest.org site. During
teens through women the last eighteenth months, I have periodically run searches and reviews
about forty.
of the websites by searching for Riot Grrrl, Grrrl, Grrl and Ladyfest. The
most useful ‘hits’ are the actual Ladyfest sites and not artist or fan sites.
The Ladyfest sites network of friends typically list many other Ladyfests.4
Thus, the sites serve as their best networking tactic and allow for commu-
nication between organisers and attendees.
This article is organised to first examine women and web savvy girls
explaining that girls and young women today use ICTs as a form of online
community building and as part of their activist tool kit. It then explores
feminisms. I have found that different feminist viewpoints and attitudes
are adopted by younger feminists. I then address Riot Grrrl and Ladyfest
and the discrepant ways that the girls and young women are using ICTS in
their activist projects.

Studying women and web savvy girls


There is a dearth of research examining girls and young women’s uncon-
ventional political participation. In looking only at conventional political
participation we miss other types of political or quasi-political participa-
tion. Historically, we have witnessed that women’s activities such as vol-
unteering and charitable work are often categorised as apolitical rather
than political. This gendering influences the manner in which we think of
political participation.
Marc Hooghe and Dietlind Stolle (2004) examined the anticipated
gender gap among 14-year-old American teens. In their article, ‘Good girls
go to the polling booth, bad boys go everywhere’, they considered whether
youth would exhibit gendered differences in anticipated levels of political
participation, and the type of political activities they would undertake.
While the girls surveyed were slightly more likely to participate in politics,
the boys were more likely to participate in confrontational political
demonstrations and other forms of unconventional politics (10–11). Their
study also suggests that more research about youth and political partici-
pation is needed in order to fully understand the future rates of political
participation of women and men.5
Inequalities within mainstream political and culture have caused some
girls and women varying in ages from 14 to 356 to seek a space of their
own to discuss political activism, political participation and different forms
of artistic expression. To fill this gap in the research, it is fruitful to look at
young women and their involvement in alternative forms of political

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participation. ‘Young women have been a longstanding problem for politi- 7. See Sampaio and
cal science in terms of their distance from formal politics (although this is Aragon (1997:
145–167, 2001: 3
in itself a point of contention)’ (Harris 2004: 135). & 4, 126-147),
To take the political pulse of many of today’s left leaning young women Tarrow (2005) and
one first needs to delve into cultural mores and specifics about this group Tilly (2004).
and not use the traditional means of research to understand them. 8. See Newitz and
Looking at the Internet and the proliferation of websites and other action Anders (2006) and
Cohoon and Aspray
networks is crucial to understanding the political ethos and participation (2006).
of young women today in these different political spaces.
Girls are a sub-group of political actors in their own right and within
their own communities. Today, these stretch into the online landscape
with the creation of communities in well-established spaces such as AOL,
MSN, Yahoo and other multi-service Internet Service Providers (ISPs).
However, girls are also establishing communities elsewhere, on social net-
working sites, through blogs, ezines and other youth oriented sites. The
online girl culture can play with the prescribed norms for girlhood, but it
can also subvert the dominant paradigm. As Catherine Driscoll (1999:
183) explains, ‘Cybergirls constitute a significant mode of cyberfeminism,
utilising the Internet against “hegemonic” constructions of that technol-
ogy, learn how to negotiate your way around patriarchy and the net.’ This
does not mean that all of the girls are self-identified feminists or cyberfem-
inists, but that this possibility exists.
Previous research has examined the ways in which cyberspace is
becoming a new location for resisting cultural, linguistic and discursive
practices.7 Cyberspace provides opportunities for resisting cultural ideals
from the offline world. In cyberspace girls and young women can critically
resist the mainstream and make their own communities. Cyberspace also
provides girls an effective medium for undermining the gatekeeping role of
traditional print media and allows for new opportunities for the publication
and dissemination of their ideas. New technology has allowed unforeseen
social change and girls and young women are part of the so-called net-gen-
eration or cybergeneration (Kelly, Pomerantz and Currie 2006: 4).
Consequently, ICTs are a normal part of their daily life: they see establishing
online communities and networks as a part of their feminist activism. They
clearly view themselves as feminist netizens or perhaps, feminetizens.
In The Wealth of Networks (2006: 1) Yochai Benkler explains,
‘Information, knowledge, and culture are central to human freedom and
human development. How they are produced and exchanged in our
society critically affects the way we see the state of the world as it is and it
might be’. These web savvy girls and women do find ICTs liberating and
central to their freedom. More research is also explaining that women and
girls are using ICTs in the same numbers as men and boys. Some sources
argue that women and girls are more likely to spend their time communi-
cating with others online, whereas men and boys are more likely to be
gaming. While other sources are critical of these gendered, if not sexist
assumptions.8 These online ‘Cyberellas’ are ‘fluent in the uses of technol-
ogy, comfortable using and designing computer technology and communi-
cation equipment and software, and in working in virtual spaces’ (Hafkin
and Huyer 2006: 1). These youth are for the most part from developed

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9. Richard Langhorne nations or are part of the feminist digerati due to their technological
(2006:161) notes savvy.9
that, ‘Today, 80
percent of the 700 But of course not all girls are web savvy or have the opportunity to use
million Internet users ICTs. Perusing the pages of most Facebook, MySpace pages and other
around the globe are Ladyfest related websites, the posted photos appear to be primarily of a
in the developed
world’. homogenous group of young women.10 Susanna Passonen (2005: 210)
notes that within the Riot Grrrl community many of the adherents are
10. This is not based on
an empirical analysis, white, lesbian and queer women, who question heteronormativity. The
but merely digital divide is not as vast as it once was; it appears that class or region is
observation. However, now the major determinant of ICT use. Michelle M. Wright notes in her
further research will
be conducted to essay ‘Finding a place in cyberspace: black women, technology, and iden-
ascertain the diversity tity’ that black women, in particular, are finding their own online commu-
of organisers. nities that cater specifically to black women or offer a positive affirming
11. The term was actually space of networking.
used a number of Regional access also varies, as such it is now more common for those
years earlier. See
Henry (2004). in the Global North to have access to ICTs; whereas, those in the Global
South might work in factories making some of the technology, but do not
12. See Johnson (2002)
or Bust Magazine. have ready access for personal use. Access to ICTs and overall literacy still
13. See Alexander
prove problematic for girls and women. Access and literacy, in all its forms,
(1998). are the two main areas necessary for improvement across the globe. Thus,
14. There are also many
at this time the web savvy girls are typically those with class privilege or at
young feminists who the very least with access to libraries or schools where ICTs are available.
refuse to refer to
themselves as being
part of any waves and
Feminisms
choose to identify Today many young women continue to identify as feminists; however,
merely as feminists. some girls and young women are choosing to self-identify as third wave
feminists. A third wave framework seems more common amongst the
young women examined in the Riot Grrrl and Ladyfest communities. In
1992, Rebecca Walker allegedly coined the term ‘Third Wave’ in her
Ms. Magazine article ‘Becoming the Third Wave’.11 Third wave feminism
has caused debate confusion and contestation among feminists and
others. The popular media often malign and misrepresent feminisms and
third wave feminists. For many, third wave feminism calls to mind the
stereotype of the hapless ‘girl-feminists’ more concerned with sex than
substance; others think of apathetic, apolitical Generation X’rs.12
While many will agree that there is not one standard definition of third
wave that will satisfy all, most third wave feminists explain that the
impetus for this movement came from American women of colour who, in
the 1970s and 1980s, were unhappy with the lack of diversity in the
second wave.13 Third wave feminists also state that their feminism is more
varied in identity and political scope thanks to the gains made by second
wave feminists. Second and third Wave feminists both overlap and differ.
Many third wave feminists have noted that they do not like the ‘wave’
metaphor because it differentiates between the generations.14 The term
positions the two generations at odds with each other, which is not always
the case. The wave metaphor is appropriate: waves undulate and work
within one another without being completely separate entities.
Most contributors to third wave anthologies acknowledge that
‘younger’ includes people under forty. Astrid Henry (2004: 34) explains

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that third wave feminism refers to three concepts, ‘generational age, ideo-
logical position, and historical moment’. This explains why discussions
about third wave repeatedly address the age, ideas, and historical context
issues. Admittedly, many agree that the wave metaphors are contested and
are usually used in a Western context to refer to the different feminist
generations.
Sara Evans speaks of the tenuous relationship between some second
wave feminists encapsulating the debates succinctly:

They [third wave activists] also came of age when feminism was primarily
visible as a stereotype, however. Introduced to feminist theory in college, the
most powerful writers among them were women of color who challenged
what they perceived to be a monolithic, white, middle-class ‘sisterhood.’
They never experienced feminism as a sisterhood of sameness.
Evans, S. 2004: 230

Second wave activists made the movement; while third wave activists
merely inherited it with its successes and failures. However, arguing this
point does a disservice to feminisms since they are not static entities. For
many young women who identify as feminists second wave or third wave
labels are not an issue, as they eschew being categorised. The second wave
movement was inherently political; while at times the third wave move-
ment is segmented and at times inherently cultural and immersed in
popular culture. Lisa Jervis argued in a Ms. Magazine article that the third
wave is more of a cultural phenomenon than a political identity. Others
consistently argue that there is no clear third wave agenda, but instead a
repackaging of a sexed up liberal feminism or at worst a cultural phenom-
enon without any political teeth.
In her book The F Word: Feminism in Jeopardy, Rowe-Finkbeiner (2004:
105) asks, ‘What happens when cultural change doesn’t include political,
legislative, and electoral advocacy to support the agenda of the third wave?
What happens when women stop voting?’ While this question is important,
it also dismisses the other important forms of political participation that
young women are engaged in and places the vote at the pinnacle of political
action. There is an assumption that young feminists or third wave feminists
are only a cultural phenomenon; however, their activist work contradicts
this notion. We can look to several recent books that outline young feminist
activism or give a primer on how to be a young feminist activist namely: The
Fire This Time (Labaton and Martin 2004), Grassroots (Baumgardner and
Richards 2004), We Don’t Need Another Wave (Berger 2006), Fight Like A Girl
(Megan 2007), Sisterhood Interrupted (Siegel 2007) and Full Frontal Feminism
(Valenti 2007). Likewise we also need to expand our definition of political
participation and activist work, since some youth are suspicious of partici-
pating in what they feel are mainstream political activities. And, this also
does not acknowledge how some feminists of the various generations or
waves have been interested in popular culture. Catherine Driscoll (1999:
173) makes this point, ‘Feminism, in the sense in which the term is used in
the late 1990s, has always focused on popular culture because feminists are
interested in the impact of modern life on women’.

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15. See Quinn (1997). We might be better served examining girls’ forms of political participa-
tion to identify the ways that these stakeholders want to engage in and
begin a two-way conversation about politics. Leslie Heywood and Jennifer
Drake (2004: 17 in Gillis, Howie and Munford 2007) make an important
distinction, ‘The third wave, then, refers both to a feminist generation and
to emerging forms of feminist activism’. Dismissing third wave feminists
also does not pay attention to their critique of some of the jargon-laden
second wave theories and their efforts towards accessible examination of
feminisms. The early third wave anthologies (such as To Be Real (Walker
1995) and Listen Up (Findlen 1995)) attempted to remind the reader
about the complicated messiness of women’s lives at the turn of the
century in the United States. One of the pitfalls of this genre has been the
tendency to position the second wave and third wave as merely genera-
tions or to use the ‘matrophor’ metaphor between the angry daughter and
dutiful mother.15 It does not help that many of the early third wave
anthologies were more referential than reflexive in both tone and analysis.
Third Wave Agenda (1997) edited by Leslie Heywood and Jennifer Drake has
been credited with being the more theoretically dense of the early genre of
third wave writing.
Many of the more recent anthologies penned by so-called third wave
activists also explore the varied ways that they and their peers are getting
involved in politics. In Defending Our Dreams (Wilson, Sengupta and Evans
2006), the editors sought to present a diverse group of authors exploring a
wide variety of global issues from a third wave feminist or next generation
of feminist viewpoints. In The Fire This Time (Labaton and Martin 2004)
readers find that the activists are grappling with their activism and there
are more than just the reflections of growing up as a feminist or having the
tell-tale feminist epiphany. Instead, both of these anthologies take more
time to explore the issues and the analyses weave in more of a global or
international examination. These anthologies share a common commit-
ment to young feminists participating in different forms of political action.
In We Don’t Need Another Wave (Berger 2006), we read about the
myriad ways in which each of the contributors engages in feminist work;
however, this anthology is focused more on personal narratives like its
early predecessors. With the second edition of Third Wave Feminism (Gillis,
Howie and Munford 2007), the contributors interrogate the third wave
and offer a more theoretical and sceptical examination of it. The genre
continues to grow and take much needed introspective twists and turns. A
major strength of third wave work has been the challenge to the culture
and politics divide, by arguing that their criticism and use of culture is
political and is feminist cultural activism in much the same way that the
Guerrilla Girls comment on the state of art today with their biting posters
or the way that ACT UP stages die ins. Many third wave feminists attempt
to artfully beg, borrow, and steal from popular culture and comment on
and criticise mainstream culture in their own way. There is a keen use of
technoculture and mainstream or popular culture by third wave feminists.
They also use technology as part of their emerging form of activism.
Contemporary feminist activism, Riot Grrrl or Ladyfest, are situated in
marginal places, even within the larger women’s movement, thus it

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should not be surprising that some young feminists adhere to more of a 16. See Zobl (2004).
third wave politics. 17. See Piano (2002) at
http://www.rhizomes.
Riot Grrrl: the precursor to the Lady net/issue4/piano.html
last accessed on
The Riot Grrrl phenomenon started in Olympia, Washington and 28 August 2007.
Washington, DC in the early 1990s with young women interested in punk
18. See Elke Zobl’s website
music and punk culture feeling alienated by the punk music scene and www.grrrlzines.net
punk boys, as they called them, at punk concerts. The mosh pits and
19. See Garrison (2000).
overall culture exemplified a more masculine ethos, where the girls or
20. See Experience Music
women were meant to participate as observers. There was an ethos of Project (EMP) ‘Riot
grrrls taking charge and being involved within the punk music scene. This Grrrl Retrospective:
stemmed from more than wanting to be in the mosh pit, but also to being Media Beast and
Blessing’ at
a musician. Reclaiming the term girl, but with rrr’s to represent a growl or http://www.empsfm.
gritty power to the term was part of the philosophy behind Riot Grrrl. org/exhibitions/index.
Riot Grrrl was more than a punk music phenomenon: it also offered a asp?articleID⫽670
last accessed on
political ideology to the grrrls. Riot Grrrl is also an international phenom- August 28, 2007.
enon with Riot Grrrl groups (chapters), webrings, and meet ups all over Vail is credited with
the globe. At one time Riot Grrrl in the United States boasted that virtually coining the term grrrl
in her zine Jigsaw.
every major city in the United States had a Riot Grrrl chapter.16 The Riot
Grrrl activism culminated with a Riot Grrrl Convention held in
Washington DC in 1992. Once the popular press began to pay attention a
media ‘grrrlcott’ was instituted to prevent the press from misrepresenting
Riot Grrrl.
Riot Grrrls moved girlhood away from consumption as they intention-
ally shirked mainstream culture and capitalism. They sought to create their
own alternative economies by making their own clothing, crafts, zines,
music and more. At concerts and other Riot Grrrl meet ups it was not
uncommon for the girls to barter or share their zines and crafts with
others. Part of this subculture was the tendency to attempt to make their
community self-sustaining as a ‘women-run economy’ and you can still see
this within the larger third wave community.17 Their music, zines and blogs
were critical of sexism, racism, homophobia, global capitalism and the
insidious ways that popular culture portrayed anorexic, ‘stupid’ girls and
young women. That is, Riot Grrrls were critical of mainstream culture.
The Riot Grrrl groups were inherently multi-focal in their issues of
concern and reviewing their zines,18 websites, and other materials it is
refreshing to note that their activism varied from fighting against racism,
sexism, classism, and trying to support positive body image for women,
support for survivors of rape, incest and other abuse. Many Riot Grrrl
groups were (and continue to be) organised online via web rings, yahoo
groups, listservs, message boards, email lists and social networking sites.19
However, today those involved are more likely to be the second generation
of Riot Grrrls. Tobi Vail, former Bikini Kill singer and zinester, notes, ‘Riot
grrrl still exists all over the world.’20 Today it is more common to find Riot
Grrrl groups on MySpace, Live Journal, Blogspot, and Facebook, as well as
the other noted online forums. While the Riot Grrrl scene first began
approximately 17 years ago, there are a new crop of teenagers and young
women who are self-identifying as Riot Grrrls today across the United
States, Canada, Europe, Australia and New Zealand.

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21. See Garrison (2000). Within the Riot Grrrl culture the grrrls also exhibited a familiarity
22. Garrison (2000: with feminism and sought to affiliate their struggle with part of the femi-
162). nist struggle against patriarchy. Most of the Riot Grrrl writings are infused
23. Tapscott and Williams with references to feminist books and other literature that was both
(2006) dedicate a moving to the author or for others to read. ‘We are Angry! We are pissed
solid chapter to the off how we as grrrls (females) are treated in society’ (Green and Taormino
Net Gen and their use
of social networking 1997: 195). This exemplifies the emotionality of activists involved in the
sites like MySpace and Riot Grrrl movement. The various manifestos and other Riot Grrrl writing
Facebook in their attest to the sense of urgency to combat the ill treatment faced by grrrls
book Wikinomics: How
Mass Collaboration and women in popular culture and politics.21 These grrrls are not
Changes Everything. whining, but reacting with their fists in the air as they resist mainstream
They note that more social expectations of girlhood.
than 100 million
people ‘hang out’ on Riot Grrrls are also particularly adept at using ICTs to not only connect
MySpace (48). with one another, but also to disseminate their message to other grrrls.
24. This was not the first Younger feminists are more used to these new technologies and use them
time that a music more than their predecessors by virtue of being part of the ‘Net
festival was meant to Generation’. This Net Generation is well-known for its use of different
exhibit the artistic
and political energy of technologies in daily lives at home and school. The use of ICTs by the pre-
women. The National vious generation (Gen X) was also well known. Ednie Kaeh Garrison
Women’s Music states, ‘Technology is a major discursive repertoire in the cultural geogra-
Festival and the
Michigan Womyn’s phy of Third Wave feminism . . .’.22 This translates into younger feminists
Music Festival are two using ICTs as part of their In Real Life (IRL) culture and online lives. Kristy
other important Evan’s explicates in ‘Cyber Girls: Hello . . . Are you out there?’
annual music festivals
that have a history of
music, art, and For my generation, and the upcoming generation of young feminists, ICTs
activism. The first is have drastically changed the way in which we communicate with each other,
thirty years old and
took a planning and the ways in which we strategize and the issues that we pay attention to.
fundraising hiatus for Evans 2006:171–2
the 2005 year, but is
now active. The latter
is also thirty years The girls and young women communicate through their blogs, websites,
old, but a woman zines, text messaging, listservs, instant messaging, and IRL in face to face
only event, which has conversations or at their meet ups, which are often organised online. Their
led to increased
controversy during IRL and online activism are viewed as a fundamental part of their social
the last ten years. justice activism and defines this generation. They are also active online on
the various social networking sites, which they use to help facilitate their
activism and social lives.23 There is more taking place on these sites and
these web savvy girls are using ICTs to their advantage.

Ladyfest
In 1997, Canadian singer Sarah McLachlan spearheaded Lilith Fair and it
ultimately was the most successful touring music festival for the year.
Lilith Fair toured across the United States and raised funds for various
non-profits. During their three-year run, the music festivals raised more
than seven million dollars for various charities. Many organisers of
Ladyfest refer to Lilith Fair as either being the Ladyfest predecessor or a
politically weak version of what they envisioned for Ladyfest.24
The first Ladyfest took place in August 2000 in Olympia, Washington.
Ladyfest is a festival that includes music, art, spoken word, dance, work-
shops, presentations, and other forms of camaraderie that is both woman

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positive and queer friendly. At present more than 120 have taken place 25. See EMP ‘Riot Grrrl
and there are more than three dozen that took place in the 2005 and Retrospective:
Perspectives in
2006 calendar year with more than half slated in Europe. This is a world- Retrospect’ at
wide phenomenon with festivals taking place around the globe. In 2004 http://www.empsfm.
various Ladyfests took place in the United States, United Kingdom, org/exhibitions/index.
asp?articleID⫽671
Luxembourg, Brazil, Sweden, Austria, Denmark, Germany, Canada, last accessed on
Poland and Australia. At the 2004 Bay area Ladyfest, there were work- 28 August 2007.
shops like the Young Women in Politics organised by the League of Pissed
off Voters, the Know your Auto (mobile) workshop, Video Activism Now!,
Indie (Independent) Publishing, Reproductive Rights, and Silk Screen
Yourself Silly, as well as many other workshops and panels. In much the
same way, other Ladyfests have also held workshops and panels focused on
Radical Motherhood, Womyn in Prison, Radical Cheerleading, Carpentry,
Post Punk Kitchen, Self Defense, and Video Production. Approximately one
dozen are slated for 2007 in Europe and North America.
The various Ladyfest missions might vary some; however, the overar-
ching theme is to both support women artists and educate attendees.
Another common trait they share is their use of ICTs to circulate informa-
tion about the festival, the artists, charities, any related projects they are
concerned with and other useful stuff, like listing suggested reading mate-
rial. The mission statements are decidedly pro-woman and pro-queer. One
of the biggest differences within this movement is the collaborative work
between the queer community. In ‘Making space for the movement, DIY-
Lady style’, Jessica Hoffman (2006: 95) comments on the importance of
cooperation and community building, ‘And because Ladyfests are deter-
minedly decentralised and emerge from different local communities that
are themselves diverse, Ladyfest represents a model of community-building
that allows for difference. . . .’ In fact, the outreach to women and men in
the queer community and the inclusion of transgender people at Ladyfest
events is truly unprecedented. The mission statements all adhere to a fem-
inist sensibility of sorts that in some cases is more reminiscent of second
wave typology than third wave.
Many of the young women involved in Ladyfest state that they were
involved in Riot Grrrl groups or came to Riot Grrrl shortly after groups
started to dissipate in their area, however, they had an affinity for the Riot
Grrrl ethic. This is why they have reclaimed the term Lady. Some of the
grrrls felt like it was a natural progression to move from grrrl to lady. ‘For
some, they felt like they grew out of the grrrl moniker and then began to
identify as a lady.’25 Others attest that they might have never identified as
a grrrl but choose to identify as a ‘lady’. It is worth noting that both
movements (Riot Grrrl and Ladyfest) were borne in the Pacific Northwest
in the United States, specifically in Olympia, Washington. Some of the
original musicians involved in Riot Grrrl were associated with the forma-
tion of the first Ladyfest, in particular Allison Wolfe (Bratmobile) and Tobi
Vail (Bikini Kill).
Ladyfest attempts to put the fun back in fundraising for feminist pur-
poses and more importantly establish a local feminist community. It is an
international movement composed by young women and teens familiar
with their political rights and attempting to reclaim their own forms of

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26. For a discussion about power to educate and instigate action, and claiming their own space in
the DIY ethic see cyberspace. Ladyfest organisers and attendees meld theory into political
Duncombe (1997).
and social action, while Ladyfest is merely one snapshot of the current
27. Future research activism and political energy that young women are engaged in today. It
should include
surveying Ladyfest also offers a queer positive space and showcases an inclusive collaboration
attendees to better between girls, young women, men and queer youth.
understand the Most Ladyfests have zine workshops or self-publish a Ladyfest zine to
demographics of the
group and gauge how commemorate or celebrate their particular festival. The zines which are
they view the political small, self-published (maga)zines not only highlight the festival, but also
efficacy of the discuss the politics of the particular Ladyfest committee and the reasons
Ladyfest
phenomenon. for organising the event.

These kinds of cultural politics – zines, e-zines, comics, and webpages – have
often been misinterpreted as girls just ‘having fun’. Rather I would argue
that they hold real promise for feminist work precisely because they consti-
tute ‘other spaces’ for politics.
Harris 2001

Grrrls looked to making their ‘other spaces’ and conducted inherently


political acts within these spaces. Many Ladyfests document their event
planning online on their blogs, MySpace, Facebook, LiveJournal or other
web sites. The sites also remain active after the festival for networking pur-
poses or to help plan the next smaller event, Ladyfest or as a place to con-
tinue their communication.
For many of the women involved in Ladyfest and its attendant culture
there is a punk ethos permeating the politics in terms of a grass roots polit-
ical atmosphere and the allegiance to a do-it-yourself (DIY) ethic.26 The
DIY ethic is actually borrowed from punk culture and the want for self-
reliance and the avoidance of mainstream, popular culture. The activists
involved are taking the ethic to heart and look to DIY as more than just
crafting and other artistic expressions, but also a sense of political com-
munity among women, gender queers, and left leaning men. Ladyfest
embodies an important political sub-culture where girls and young
women varying from the teenaged to the middle aged are actively working
together to empower, educate, agitate and have fun. Debbie Stoller (2007),
editor of Bust Magazine, notes that, ‘Pop culture is our culture’. Stoller is
partially correct, popular culture is important, however, the girls and
young women involved in Ladyfest are resisting popular culture and
making their own forms of alternative culture.
At many of the Ladyfests, people register to vote and get other perti-
nent political information at the various non-profit tables, workshops and
discussion forums. In many instances, performing artists will also remind
the audience to vote and get involved in their communities. Attendees
state in various message forms that they feel a sense of belonging to a fem-
inist community.27 This embodies what Cheryl Hercus (2005: 165) refers
to as becoming and being feminist usually involves knowing, feeling,
belonging and doing. This feminist consciousness is evidenced within the
tracts presented at many Ladyfests on the Ladyfests websites, and from the
attendees.

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To fully understand the Ladyfest we need to understand the reasons for 28. Some of the Ladyfests
organising and hosting an event of this scale. Many of those involved with in the United States
are registered
Ladyfest note cynically that mainstream politics, music, art and culture do non-profits.
not represent their particular preferences. Ladyfest represents a way to
29. Ladyfest Seattle 2004
showcase new artists, spread the word about issues, have fun, and raise raised money for the
money for non-profits, other organisations, or particular issues. Ladyfests Arcadia Woman’s
is also deemed a political venue immersed in a feminist mission.28 Many of Health Center
and Amnesty
the Ladyfests have one or more agencies that they are raising funds for as International and
part of the festival’s mission.29 Since Ladyfest celebrates multiple genres of Ladyfest Cambridge
the arts and activism, it is of no surprise that the festivals eschew the 2007 is raising
money for Action for
mainstream and celebrate new, upcoming, and even well-known cutting Southern Africa.
edge artists and the more edgy types of political protest styles from making
30. This might be
wheat paste and how to avoid getting caught while using the wheat paste explained by the fact
to poster to learning how to silk screen canvas bags and t-shirts. Their that many third wave
spin on activism and their political work is one that celebrates creating feminists attribute
feminists of colour as
their own culture and at the same time commenting on the problems with being the early
mainstream culture and mainstream politics. foremothers of the
Many involved in Ladyfest wholeheartedly identify as feminists, as cul- third wave movement.
Feminists of colour
tural workers, as activists engaging in crucial work that is inherently politi- were actually
cal. In terms of the political content of the websites, pamphlets, posters, criticising the
zines, and other ephemera related to Ladyfest and those involved in Ladyfest, monoculture within
the larger feminist
there is a tendency to shy away from high theory or the more academic, framework. See
jargon-filled theory. There are consistent references to bell hooks, and other Heywoood and Drake
women of colour feminist activist scholars.30 These young feminists are (1997) for an in
depth discussion.
involved in politics in an important manner on a small scale. They are also
applying certain feminist theories to their lives. The Ladyfest experience is
part of the political socialisation process for many of the participants.
Today young activists are involved in different struggles that vary from
fighting against the Prison Industrial Complex, for fair wages, sound
labour conditions, against sweatshops, reproductive rights, transgender
rights, queer rights, mother’s rights and the like. With the multi-issue
activism found at the hands of Third Waver or younger feminists, the
crossover from movement to movement also plays into the different
agendas of women involved in grassroots activism like Ladyfest. What we
can learn from Ladyfest is that alternative political culture can make a dif-
ference among its stakeholders in immeasurable ways. Within the alterna-
tive culture we can look to Ladyfest as a way that young women and men
are reacting to political isolation and attempting to combat it on their own
terms with a mixture of culture and politics.
The Ladyfest networks are non-hierarchical; however, they do
acknowledge a connection or relationship with one another via their
Facebook, MySpace, Blogspot, LiveJournal or regular webpages. In partic-
ular, with most of the Ladyfests’ MySpace pages the ‘friends’ or networks
are listed and other Ladyfests sites links or pages are listed. This network
increases the flow of communication between the groups and also allows
for the building of the social communities for these young activists. Thus,
they are constructing their own Network Society and relying heavily on
ICTs to communicate with one another and maintain an online feminist
community.

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31. See Vogt and Chen Ladyfests are not the only young feminist festivals or conferences
(2004). taking place in the United States. The Southern Girls Convention marked
its ninth annual meeting June 2007. The conference is, ‘An annual grass-
roots meeting of pro-woman activists devoted to networking, organizing,
educating, agitating, to empower women and girls in the South’. Across
the United States there are other events and festivals taking place with
similar missions like Ladyfest or the Southern Girls Conference, such as
the Army of S/he (S/he Collective), and Grrrl Zines A Go-Go in San Diego,
as well as national Mamagathering meetings during the last few years. In
Belgium, there are also Riot Grrrl events. There have been various grrrl
and lady events throughout Europe during the last several years. Many
sites list other events that are more political focused, as well as list impor-
tant links. These are all part of a grassroots feminist movement that estab-
lishes their own communities, but acknowledges that they are part of a
global feminist community and continue to connect with one another in
real life and in their online communities.31
Ladyfests provide the place to make connections for many of those
involved. Some of these connections will continue online via the Ladyfest
website or MySpace page with the continued networking of the girls and
young women. The organisers and attendees can continue their networking
and friendship via their ICT usage, as well as notifying one another about
their favourite bands’ dates, and local political events. That is, Ladyfest can
continue to politicise at the event and after the event by using their tools of
trade, ICTs. Thus, the ICTs provide the backbone for networking and organ-
ising, but all of this culminates in the actual face-to-face action, the Ladyfest.

Conclusion
Women involved in Ladyfests are doing important political work through
the Ladyfest planning, organisation and participation. For many this work
provides an avenue for them to get involved in their community and make
a difference for other girls and women. For some the Ladyfest experience
helps with their political identification as a grrrl, lady or woman and con-
sequently hones their recognition as a feminist activist. They are proudly
off the radar of traditional political protests. There are no highly organised
press conferences and superstar leaders, but these young women perse-
vere and give back to their community. Many note that these festivals are
not affiliated with a university program or a research centre, but are
grassroots organisations staffed completely by volunteers in the DIY spirit.
Young women and girls today are involved politically IRL and online
and are making a difference in their communities. Ladyfest gets them
involved in their local community and also helps connect them to the
larger international Ladyfest network. These Ladyfesters are transferring
their energies into multiple forms of political participation, both the
unconventional and conventional. They are at home using online commu-
nities as part of their IRL activism and they are in solidarity with other
Ladyfesters around the globe. The conundrum for social scientists is to not
only place young women (and young men) in a data set to study. Anita
Harris (2004: 150) states, ‘Improving participation and civic engagement
has become a project to draw young people into appropriate modes of

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expression with very little real shaping of the agenda by youth them-
selves’. The scope of research needs to include the myriad ways that girls
and young women are politically active today and understand their
increased reliance on ICTs as part of their activist tool kit. Our job as social
scientists is to work with youth in order to learn about them, their needs,
and more importantly learn from them. Once we do this, we can move to
the next step, whatever that may be.

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Suggested citation
Aragon, J. (2008), ‘The ‘Lady’ revolution in the age of technology’, International
Journal of Media and Cultural Politics 4: 1, pp. 71–85, doi: 10.1386/macp.4.1.71/1

Contributor details
Janni Aragon is a sessional instructor of Women’s Studies and Political Science at
the University of Victoria in BC, Canada. She is interested in feminist methodology,
women and technology, feminisms and women and politics. Contact: UVIC
Women’s Studies, POB 3045 STN CSC, Victoria, BC, Canada, V8W3P4.
E-mail: jaragon@uvic.ca

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Commentaries
International Journal of Media and Cultural Politics Volume 4 Number 1.
© Intellect Ltd 2008. Commentaries. English language. doi: 10.1386/macp.4.1.87/3

Does affluenza spread quickly?


A historical case study from Spain
Mark D. Harmon University of Tennessee, Knoxville
Nuria Cruz-Camara University of Tennessee, Knoxville

Affluenza is a recently invented term, a combination of affluence and


influenza designed to highlight excess craving for material possessions
as a disease or disorder. De Graaf et al. (2001: 2) describe it as a rapidly
expanding disease of the mind, a ‘painful, contagious socially-transmitted
condition of overload, debt, anxiety, and waste resulting from the dogged
pursuit of more’. Affluenza encourages a self-perspective as a consumer
rather than as a citizen. Several researchers and authors have explored
affluenza from an American perspective. Two secondary analyses of large
databases found an association of heavy TV viewing with materialistic
values (Harmon 2001). Schor (1998: 80–81) notes that heavy TV viewers
overestimate the standards of living enjoyed by others, and report being
heavily in debt. She postulates TV ads leave a lingering and inflated
impression of what is normal; the more a person watches TV, the more he
or she spends. Spain offers a good case study to explore whether affluenza
takes hold quickly following a rapid expansion of TV advertising. Spanish
audiences witnessed a quick proliferation of TV channels and TV ads in
the 1980s. By the 1990s a trio of national polls asked questions about
values and about TV exposure. Thus, this is a historical project, a sec-
ondary analysis of the affluenza effect in the unique laboratory of the
Spanish experience.

Spain’s explosive growth of commercial television


‘In a little more than fifteen years, Spanish television made the transition
from absolute state control to a regulated, competitive system of national and
regional networks of mixed private and public ownership’ (Maxwell 1995:
xxiv). Until 1988 Spain offered only two state-owned TV stations, but two
years later it had two additional channels, both nationwide, private, com-
mercial and available free over the airwaves. A third was available as a
coded/scrambled signal acquired by monthly fee. Regional stations, pirate
stations, imported signals and direct broadcast satellite would soon
expand Spanish TV offerings (Zabaleta 1997: 289). Maxwell (1995) traces
the Spanish TV explosion to major legal changes that let a vast array of
commercial TV options burst forth. The state-run TVE system boosted

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advertising income by 1,200 per cent between 1975 and 1985, an increase
surpassing any European television firm (Bustamante 1989: 71–72).
After this burst of commercial expansion, the average yearly increase in
TV advertising in Spain was about 27 per cent from 1985 through 1990.
Between 1989 and 1991 the TVE share of viewing fell from 90 per cent to
less than 56 per cent as viewers switched to the new private broadcasters
(Villagrasa 1992: 390–392). Towns and villages that had one or two
channels in 1989 could choose among six or seven in 1990. The regional
and private broadcasters pumped the programming hours total to 57,000,
double the past year (Maxwell 1995: 132). By the late 1980s the
American trade press took notice, calling Spain ‘Europe’s sleeping giant’
because of its rapidly expanding program and advertising markets
(Maxwell 1997: 274). The giant did not sleep for long. Advertisers poured
into the markets. Advertising made up only 0.7 per cent of the Spanish
Gross Domestic Product in 1975; by 1990 it was 2.1 per cent (Maxwell
1995: 171). The number of TV ads broadcast daily jumped 30 per cent
from 1991 to 1992, and 36 per cent from 1992 to 1993. The flood of
TV ads was so great that Spain regularly was in violation of European
Community and Spanish government directives limiting commercial
TV messages (Anon 1993: 21). Spain would not adopt the EC’s 1989
Television Without Frontiers commercial-limiting directive until December
1993, the last European government to do so (Maxwell 1995: 175). If
Spanish viewers demonstrate symptoms of affluenza, that finding would fit
research that takes a global, not just a United States’, cultural view of the
phenomena (Sirgy et al 1998; Reimer and Rosengren 1990; Shrum et al.
2004). Although by no means unanimous, most past work suggests a cor-
relation between television viewing and materialism, one that should be
tested in a place such as Spain. If the television-consumerism link is robust
and quick, then heavy television viewers, compared to light TV viewers,
should give more materialistic answers to value questions (even if queried
only a few years after the explosion of commercial TV programming).

Materialist values after the commercial TV boom in Spain


The researchers obtained three surveys conducted by the Centre for Research
on Social Reality (Centro de Investigaciones Sobre la Realidad Social 1992,
1994, 1995) available through the Inter-university Consortium for Political
and Social Research. The studies consisted of personal interviews with indi-
viduals [or people] aged 18+ living in Spain in April 1994, February 1995
and December 2002: each was stratified by autonomous regions and munic-
ipalities according to their size. The studies were imported into the Statistical
Package for the Social Sciences. The 1992 survey asked, ‘On the whole, for
how long did you watch TV the last time you did, counting all the times you
watched it during the day?’ The interviewers converted hours into minutes.
Respondents were also asked to evaluate the influence of TV on their lives.
The 1994 survey used two measures of television viewing. Respondents were
asked if they engaged in Watching TV frequently (every or most days), some-
times (once a week), rarely (several times a month/once a month), or never.
Respondents were also asked to rate how much they like TV viewing on a
scale from zero (not like at all) to ten (like very much). The 1995 survey used

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the same time-spent-viewing measure as in 1992, and the same zero-to-ten


like TV viewing scale as in 1994.

TV commercials do not immediately zap your values


The television time to materialism received scant support in this analysis.
In the 1992 survey those who claimed TV had no influence on their
lives had fewer self-reported viewing minutes than those who admitted
‘regular’ influence (mean difference of 32.74 minutes) and those who
admitted ‘bastante’ (enough) influence (mean difference of 23.98 minutes).
The 32 respondents who admitted to great TV influence in their lives were
not enough to allow effective comparison. The self-reported number of
daily TV viewing minutes did not yield statistically significant links to
several other ‘affluenza’ variables. These included life satisfaction, state of
mind, and happiness. Those who generally disagreed with the phrase ‘the
most important thing is not to succeed in this world but rather what
happens beyond’ reported watching about twenty minutes less daily TV
than those who generally agreed with the phrase. Thus, those more
focused on an afterlife (a spirituality/religiosity factor) watched a bit more
TV than those not so focused. Those focused on life success now (a possi-
ble materialism factor) watched comparatively a bit less. This runs
contrary to a general materialism-to-viewing link. The 1994 survey also
showed few TV-viewing-to-materialism correlations with one notable
exception. Respondents who found most satisfaction in being able to buy
the things they wanted, rated TV more positively on a 0–10 scale than
respondents who rated higher satisfaction from free time or a healthy envi-
ronment. However, those whose highest satisfaction came from another
material need, that is a house in which to live, rated TV most positively of
all. In fact, the difference between mean TV positive ratings was only sta-
tistically significant between a home at the high end of the scale and a
healthy environment at the low end. The 1995 survey had roughly the
same pattern only slightly stronger (Table 1). One initially perplexing
finding was to see the same patterns in the liking TV ratings of those who
reported least satisfaction from being able to buy what they want. Once
again the only statistically significant difference was between least satis-
faction from buying power at highest TV liking and least satisfaction from
a healthy environment at lowest TV liking (Table 2). Those who reported
themselves bored were highest on liking TV (7.327 on a ten-point scale)

Table 1: Things leading to most satisfaction compared to liking TV (0–10).

Liking television/1994 Liking television/1995


(Mean 1–10) N (Mean 1–10) N
Home in which to live 6.909* 508 6.431 464
Be able to buy what I want 6.677 86 6.647** 39
Free Time 6.563 256 6.130** 248
Healthy Environment 6.129* 174 6.416 145
*Statistically significant difference between groups, p ⬍ .05.
**Statistically significant difference between groups, p ⬍ .05.

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Table 2: Things leading to least satisfaction compared to liking TV (0–10).

Liking television/1994 Liking television/1995


(Mean 1–10) N (Mean 1–10) N
Be able to buy what I want 6.875* 574 6.738** 443
Home in which to live 6.629 62 6.506 52
Free Time 6.622 155 6.249 161
Healthy Environment 6.153* 233 6.132** 240
*Statistically significant difference between groups, p ⬍ .05.
**Statistically significant difference between groups, p ⬍ .05.

and, at statistically significant levels were more positive towards TV than


those who were sad (6.062) and euphoric (5.208). Those who agreed
strongly with ‘the most important thing is not to succeed in this world but
rather what happens beyond’ reported liking TV at higher levels than
those who disagreed or strongly disagreed. This replicates the same sur-
prising connection between afterlife-orientation and liking TV identified in
the 1992 survey. The overall absence of clear correlations between minutes
of television viewing and materialist values means that the affluenza
hypothesis in this historical case study was not supported.

Affluenza: not instantaneous, still troublesome


It is clear that any relationship between television viewing and materialist
values is neither linear nor instantaneous. Although Spanish viewers sud-
denly had available to them a plethora of televised commercial messages,
heavy viewers did not respond with more materialistic values than those
exhibited by their light-viewing counterparts. It may well be that eventu-
ally such a correlation may emerge, but even if this link appears, three
points must be made. Initially, correlation is not causality; others factors
may be at play in any purported effect. Secondly, any relationship may be
circular and self-reinforcing. Bored people may view TV to ‘kill time’ and
eventually pick up a value system that proclaims material goods can make
you feel better about yourself. The bored viewers then either go into debt
to acquire goods or feel inadequate by their inability to attain goods. Either
way, they plop down before a television set for another dose of the same
thematic and frustrating message. This fits Kasser’s (2002: 81) contention
that persons with materialistic values spend much of their lives in rela-
tively unsatisfying ‘low flow’ activities such as watching TV. Finally, as the
previous example demonstrates, viewers are not sponges sitting around
waiting to soak up the influence of media messages. They bring to their
television viewing certain attitudes, experiences and expectations. Thus, it
may be best to redirect this secondary analysis towards the communica-
tion tradition generally called Uses and Gratifications. If one takes the
viewer as more of an active participant in the communication process,
then a clearer explanation of the findings becomes evident.
Take the examples of those who find great satisfaction in being able to
buy what they want, and those who find least satisfaction in being able
to buy what they want. Both groups give a higher score for liking TV than
groups who opted for free time or a pleasant environment as more or least

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satisfying. It may well be that two distinct groups are at work here. One
consists of relatively wealthy viewers who like television because it is a
useful guide to trends in fashion and material goods that they wants and
are able to buy. The other comprises relatively poor viewers who have little
use for the value ‘to be able to buy what I want’ because that is not a
reality or even a possibility in their life. Television is liked simply because it
is a source of cheap entertainment. The ‘two groups approach’ received
some support when the authors ran an Analysis of Variance statistical
measure of association on monthly income in pesetas against the time
watching and liking TV variables. In the 1994 survey, the relationship was
curvilinear. Those who watched the most TV were the poor and the
wealthy, with the middle groups watching less. This supports the two-groups
approach, but the pattern did not repeat at statistically significant levels in
the 1995 survey. In both the 1994 and 1995 surveys a statistically signif-
icant and linear relationship was evident, the higher the income the lower
the preference for TV. Means for the poor and working class were in the
five and six range, falling to ratings of three or four for upper-income
respondents. Thus, the poor and upper-class watch TV at similar levels but
the poor value TV more highly.
The two distinct groups hypothesis could also help explain the curious
findings about how those who are oriented in their thinking towards an
after-life, more than those not so oriented, give TV higher marks. Those
oriented towards an after-life might be at least partially motivated towards
that view by rough economic times in their current life. They join the
other relatively poor viewers for whom TV is a cheap and easy diversion.
In summary, one should only take slight comfort in the fact that the rapid
introduction of multiple, commercial television viewing options in Spain
did not lead to a sudden outbreak of materialist ‘affluenza’ values. While a
long-term effects model might have some merit, the dominant paradigm
here is one of consumer selectivity. The inverse correlation between liking
TV and income, however, could have long-term implications. If the poor
are both heavy viewers and devotees of television, eventually there will be
disappointments from not being able to achieve the lifestyle shown on TV.
One also could see a subtle shift from civic-oriented values and self-identi-
fication to consumer-driven concerns.

References
Anon M. (1993), ‘Spain: Media Revolution Takes Another Turn’, Media Week, May 28,
London, p. 21.
Bustamante, E. (1989), ‘TV and Public Service in Spain: A Difficult Encounter’,
Media, Culture & Society, 11:1, pp. 67–87.
Centro de Investigaciones Sobre la Realidad Social (CIRES). Center for Research on
Social Reality [Spain] Surveys, December 1992, April 1994, and February 1995:
Mass Media, Culture as Consumption, and Culture as Leisure [Computer files].
ICPSR version. Madrid, Spain: Analisis Sociologicos, Economicos Y Politicos, S.A.
(A.S.E.P.) [producer], 1992, 1994, and 1995. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university
Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 1993 and 1997.
De Graaf, J., Wann, D. and Naylor, T.H. (2001), Affluenza: the All Consuming Epidemic,
San Francisco, CA: Berrett-Koehler.

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Harmon, M.D. (2001), ‘Affluenza: Television Use and Cultivation of Materialism’,


Mass Communication & Society, 4: 4, pp. 405–418.
Kasser, T. (2002), The High Price of Materialism, Cambridge, Massachusetts: The
MIT Press.
Maxwell, R. (1995), The Spectacle of Democracy: Spanish Television, Nationalism, and
Political Transition, Minneapolis, Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press.
——— (1997), ‘Regionalist TV and Identity Politics’, in M. Kinder (ed.), Refiguring
Spain, Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, pp. 260–283.
Reimer, B. and Rosengren, K.E. (1990), ‘Cultivated Viewers and Readers: A Life-Style
Perspective’, in N. Signorelli and M. Morgan (eds.), Cultivation Analysis: New Direc-
tions in Media Effects Research, Newbury Park, California: Sage, pp. 181–206.
Schor, J.B. (1998), The Overspent American, New York: Basic Books.
Shrum, L.J., Burroughs, J.E. and Rindfleisch, A. (2004), ‘A Process Model of
Consumer Cultivation: The Role of Television is a Function of the Type of
Judgment’, in L. Shrum (ed.), The Psychology of Entertainment Media: Blurring
the Lines Between Entertainment and Persuasion, Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum,
pp. 177–191.
Sirgy, M.J. et al. (1998), ‘Does Television Viewership Play a Role in the Perception
of Quality of Life?’, Journal of Advertising, 27: 1, pp. 125–142.
Villagrasa, J.M. (1992), ‘Spain: the Emergence of Commercial Television’, in A. Silj
(ed.), The New Television in Europe, London: John Libbey and Company, Ch. 12.
Zabaleta, I. (1997), ‘Private TV vs. Political Diversity’, in M. Kinder (ed.), Refiguring
Spain, Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, pp. 284–300.

Contributor details
Dr. Mark D. Harmon is associate professor at the School of Journalism and Electronic
Media, College of Communication and Information, University of Tennessee, Knoxville.
His research concerns political communication and mediated effects. Contact
information: Mark D. Harmon, 333 Communications & UEB, Knoxville, TN
37996-0333 USA. Tel: 865-974-5122.
E-mail: mdharmon@utk.edu
Dr. Nuria Cruz-Camara is associate professor of Modern Foreign Languages,
University of Tennessee, Knoxville. Her research focuses on feminist readings of
20th-century Spanish writers, Carmen Martín Gaite, Ana María Matute, Carmen
Laforet, among others. Contact information: Nuria Cruz-Camara, 701 McClung
Tower And Plaza, 1115 Volunteer Boulevard, Knoxville, TN 37996-0470 USA.
Tel: 865-974-7009.
E-mail: ncruzcam@utk.edu

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European film archives at the


threshold of the digital era:
Museums or data banks?
Maria Komninos National and Kapodistrian
University of Athens

Cinema is itself a medium for writing history; cinema creates its own history
in the making. It provides suggestions about how to write history, a history of
men, a history of women, a history of children, a history of classes, a history
of cultures. . . . The archive is the appropriate site for the realization of such
projects and the fact that this does not happen is not without consequences.
Jean Luc Godard, 1980

The role of archives in post-modernity is rapidly changing. The coming of


the new media age has marked a transition from a coherent, stable and
rational subject to one challenged by heterogeneity, dispersion, instability
and multiplicity. The symbolic has itself become the site of ongoing struggles
as we are experiencing a transition from the politics of class to the politics of
identity (Poster 1996: 22, 23). Cinema has celebrated its centenary in the
end of the twentieth century and with it came the realisation that moving
images could no longer be treated simply as artefacts but that they were
through digitisation acquiring a new status as data. Subsequently, the dilem-
mas and choices deriving from that realisation have important repercussions
for shaping the policies of film archives, which had to decide whether to con-
tinue as museums or focus on their new role as digital libraries.
In his famous book, Archive fever: a Freudian impression, Derrida raises
many crucial questions on the role of archives as keepers of memory. The
issue of the archive is therefore intrinsically related to memory and its
technologies either as depository for future artists or as part of collective
memory. Thus Derrida writes:

Must not we begin by distinguishing the archive, from what we too often
reduce it to . . . the experience of memory, the return to the origin . . .
remembrance, excavation, the search for time remembered? . . . Because the
archive, if this word or this figure can be stabilised as to take on a significa-
tion, will never be either memory or anamnesis as spontaneous, alive and
internal experience. On the contrary, the archive takes place at the place of
origin and structural breakdown of the said memory. There is no archive
without a place of consignation, without a technique of repetition, and
without a certain exteriority. No archive without outside.
Derrida 1996: 11

The realisation that film is an intrinsic part of national collective memory


had guided policymakers to earmark funds for preservation and restora-
tion of their national film collections. Such thoughts may seem relevant

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1. In Europe, there is for cultural institutions, which seek to strike a balance between the
usually more than ideals of a critical curatorial role and the exigencies of the market which
one archive in each
country, holding vast demands that archives be transformed to data banks accessible to users –
official collections, while at the same time allows them to make their collections accessible
as in the case of both to other archives and to scholars alike. This is the prevalent view at
the Bundesfilarchiv
in Germany or the Association des Cimematheques Europeenes (ACE), arguing that such
the Cineteca a dual role is not incompatible and that archives can act both as libraries
Italiana in Rome. and museums.
There are eight archives in the world with holdings that exceed
100 million meters. Six of those can be found in Europe (Brussels, Bois
d’Arcy, Moscow, Lausanne, London and Belgrade). Of the next eight with
collections exceeding 50 million metres, five are European (found in
Sophia, Prague, Budapest, Rome, and Madrid). In 1991, a number of
European Film archives founded the Association of Film Archives of the
European Community (ACCE). These archives set up the Projetto Lumiere
which was funded by the European Programme MEDIA I.
Projetto LUMIERE focussed on three main areas: the restoration of
European films; the search for ‘lost’ European films; the compilation of a
European filmography. As a result, 1,000 European films, predominantly
from the silent era, were restored by the joint efforts of archives in two or
more countries; some 700 films in various collections were identified; and
the national filmographies of all EU member-states – some of which had to
be compiled from scratch – were assembled in a single massive database.
In 1996, MEDIA I was succeeded by Media II and the Projetto LUMIERE
had to come to an end. The name of the Association was then changed to
Association des Cimematheques Europeenes (ACE), which accounted for
approximately sixty archives and included the officially recognised cine-
matheques and film archives of EU-15.1 These collections represented
some 4.3 million feet of film or an estimated 350.000 European film titles.
The aims of ACE were to create a second Lumiere Project, also funded by
the European Community, aiming at the valorisation of European film her-
itage; and the formation of two or more European television channels,
which would mainly broadcast new European films and the restored
European film heritage (ACE Presentation: 53).
Both projects were, however, rejected within a climate where European
audio–visual policy had not reached a degree of coherence and European
industries were not rallying because of a common identity but rather
because of ‘a shared situation and a set of problems which certain forms of
European collaboration might help alleviate’ (Jackel 2003: 88). There is
no doubt that the MEDIA programme could have been the appropriate
vehicle for aiding the European audiovisual industry, which unfortunately
did not concede with the ACE’s argument that funding restoration pro-
grams would also benefit the industry. Consequently, ACE secured funds
only for the Archimedia project which run between 1998 and 2003, and
focussed on training both students and professionals in various aspects of
film preservation. There were three partners in the Archimedia network:
universities, archives and laboratories. In 1998 there were nine universi-
ties with a serious commitment to the development of film studies in their
countries paying particular emphasis to the history of cinema.

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Nine archives were coordinating the project, some representing countries 2. MEDIA’s contribution
with powerful industries such as France, Italy and Germany, and others was always limited
to 50% of the total
with smaller film industries, such as Holland, Belgium and Portugal. These budget; the other
archives had all considerable resources and strong subsidies from their 50% was paid by
respective governments. They also had a common wish to encourage the the archives and the
universities who run
use of new technologies in the areas of cataloguing, preservation, restora- the training courses.
tion, management and valorisation of their collections. The laboratories, They contributed
including Soho Images in London, CineAudioLab in Paris, Haghefilm- by providing staff
members and
Cineco in Amsterdam and L’Immagine Ritrovato in Bologna, had all high equipment. The
expertise on how to apply new technologies to film (Presentation du problem was that
Reseau Europeen ARCHIMEDIA de Formation pour la valorisation du pat- no archive could
provide invoices
rimoine cinematographique: 75-76). for the use of
The training program Archimedia, was operating smoothly until 1999. equipment at its
At this point the Commission was no longer willing to accept the financial own premises.
arrangement concerning the 50% contribution of the partners.2 As a result,
the final activity of the Archimedia project, scheduled for November 2004,
was cancelled. Thus, film heritage was eliminated from MEDIA II and in
2003 training came at a standstill after having faced insurmountable obsta-
cles from the new accounting procedures. The only outlet left was digitisa-
tion. In the 1990s there was considerable optimism that the Information
Technologies would act as the deus ex machina propelling the Union towards
the road of growth and prosperity. In Jacques Delors’ White Book, it was esti-
mated that two million new jobs would be created by the application of IT
across the Union (Kaitatzi-Whitlock 2003: 329–330). As this never materi-
alised, Europe was caught in the vicious circle of a redundant information
society: new jobs were created because of the expansion of IT, yet, plenty
more jobs were lost as workers and technicians in the sectors relying on
previous technologies became redundant (Kaitatzi-Whitlock 2000). The
message from the Commission was ‘digitise or perish’. As a result, FIRST
project was set up in June 2002. The aims of FIRST focussed on two areas:
the first was aimed at taking a snapshot of the situation in the field at the
moment of its publication in spring 2003. It provided information about
where the field stood, the technological solutions available to archives, and
what appeared to be the most significant issues worth of further analysis and
research. The second one – in the form of Guidelines and Recommendations –
provides guidance for public and commercial film archives that are faced
with the necessity to plan, introduce or experiment with IT solutions in their
activities (‘European film heritage on the threshold of the digital era’ 2004).
It is the case that the technophiliacs and the technophobics have
exchanged heated arguments about the optimal strategies to be adopted
by film archives (Horwath 2005: 5–9). The confrontation in the 61st FIAF
(FEDERATION INTERNATIONALES DES ARCHIVES DE FILM) Congress in
Ljubljana between Nicola Mazzanti, Project Manager of FIRST and director
until May 2006 of the laboratory Immagine Ritrovato, and Alexander
Horwath, curator of the Austrian Film Archive, as presented in the Journal of
Film Preservation, sums the battle amongst curators within FIAF. Mazzanti
is an expert who wants to see the archives reverse their seclusion and make
their collections accessible both to other archives, scholars and cinephiles.
Horwath’s argument is a technophobic critique of that position – yet one

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3. It should be noted that merits careful analysis. Horwath argues that the new terms disguise
that one of FIRST’s a shift of policies that are at the heart of the Commission’s thinking: by
recommendations
is that Digital using content instead of collections, it privileges a policy to get rid of the
Technologies do material artefact such as film in which the collections are based on.3
not offer reliable Horwath’s critique can be summed up as follows: the word ‘access’ is pivotal
solutions to long
term conservation. for the shift in curatorial policies since in the neo-liberal rhetoric it connotes
As a consequence consumption. Thus instead of curating that focuses on creating forms of
access is the keyword engagement with the artefact itself, the goal is to turn archives into image
in digitisation. This
also implies that film banks for intermediary dealers and consumers. The word ‘user’ instead of
collections must be ‘visitor’ or ‘cinephile’ connotes either the disinterested consumer or the
conserved on film, lurking dealer or provider who grazes at data banks with the aim to grab
and that investment
is needed to improve and swallow the most valuable items (Horwath 2005: 6).
the conservation Mazzanti, from his point of view, argued that he was never in favour of
of analogue film. film archives abandoning their role as museums. However, he advocates that
(‘European film
heritage on the film archives should have a dual function both as libraries and as film
threshold of the museums. Many archives have neglected ‘access on demand’ which is an
digital era’ 2004: 15). important aspect of the library function. He suggests that the way out of this
‘landscape of devastation’ into which archives were plunged in the 80s,
would be the use of digital technologies. ‘They would be creating the condi-
tions for archives to change and improve their access strategies, reducing the
costs . . . of opening their collections to other archives . . . allowing easier
ways for researchers and for an enlarged public to access their collections,
and for their holdings to become available for research in a wide range of dis-
ciplines’ (Mazzanti 2005: 14). The introduction of digital technologies has
prompted, in the words of Laura Mulvey, a new wave of cinephilia:

With the spread of digital technologies . . . textual analysis ceases to be a


restricted academic practice and returns, perhaps, to its origins as a work of
cinephilia, of love of the cinema. A tension begins to emerge, however,
between cinephilia that is more on the side of a fetishistic investment in the
extraction of a fragment of cinema from its context and a cinephilia that
extracts and then replaces a fragment with extra understanding back into
context. At each extreme, the pleasures of the possessive spectator are in
opposition to the more meditative, pensive spectator (2006: 144).

It is thus the case that, as curators and academics we have to try to tame
the new digital wave and hope that by adopting the right strategies we will
be able to multiply the numbers of pensive spectators and thus produce
more meditative European cinephiles. As an academic and as General
Secretary of the Greek Film Archive I would like to dwell on with some
details on the Greek case. This small archive has participated energetically
in digitisation programmes with the aim of making its collection accessible
to both cinephiles and users. However, this activity has not prompted the
government to increase funding for the preservation of its collection.
Policymakers seem to ignore what is common knowledge among film
curators that ‘preservation today’ may avoid ‘restoration tomorrow’.
The Greek film archive is participating in two Digitisation programmes:
Information Society and MIDAS. The first project has the twin aims of
transferring in digital form its cataloguing system and digitising a part of

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both the film and non-film collections. Already 50 hours of films from the
Archives collection have been digitised, including movies from the silent
era and talkies, features, newsreels and documentaries. In addition, a
significant part of the non-film collections has been digitised, including
periodicals, steels and programmes. The items from the non-film collec-
tions and the filmography can be accessed in www.tainiothiki.gr. The
MIDAS project had created film archives online (www.filmarchivesonline),
providing access to the moving image collection of currently five European
film archives for cultural and commercial purposes. The archives include
Deutshes Film Institute – DIFev, which is acting as the project coordinator,
BFI, Cineteca di Bologna, and Filmovy Arvhiv Prague (NFA). The Greek
film archive has already joined in 2007 film archives online and is prepar-
ing to make accessible part of its newsreel and documentary collection.
The curatorial dilemmas set forward in this paper sum up the changing
trends in contemporary film archives. The technophiliac argument has its
merits to the extent that the dual role of the museum and library will be a
viable option for European archives. On the other hand, the technophobic
argument underlines a real danger of prioritising cultural policies aimed at
satisfying the consumer and the commercial producer. Particularly in
countries such as Greece, where the valorisation of film heritage has not
yet entered the agenda of policymakers, there is a very real danger that
funds will be earmarked for digitisation. Following the gist of Mulvey’s
argument, the proliferation of the European pensive spectators is a task
that should be placed at the top of the policymakers’ agenda.

References
‘European film heritage on the threshold of the digital era. First Project’s Final
Report. Conclusions–Guidelines –Recommendations’, June (2004). Also accessible
in www.-film-first.org.
‘ACE Presentation’ in Archimedia, introductory course reader, unpublished reader for
the use of trainees, with the support of Media 2 Programme of the European
Union (in the possession of the author).
Derrida, J. (1996), Archive Fever: a Freudian Impression, Chicago and London: University
of Chicago Press.
Godard, J.L. (1980), ‘Les Cinematheques et l’Histoire du cinema’ Travelling, 56–57,
pp. 119–136.
Horwath, A. (2005), ‘The market vs. the museum’, Journal of Film Preservation, 11: 70,
pp. 5–9.
Jackel, A. (2003), European Film Industries, London: BFI.
Kaitatzi-Whitlock, S. (2000), ‘A Redundant Information Society for the European
Union?’, Telematics and Informatics, 17: 1–2, pp. 39–75.
Kaitatzi-Whitlock, S. (2003), The Information Dominion (in Greek), Athens: Kritiki.
Mazzanti, N. (2005), ‘Response to Alexander Horwath’, Journal of Film Preservation,
11: 70, pp. 10–14.
Mulvey, L. (2006), Death 24x Second, London: Reaction Books.
Poster, M. (1996), The Second Media Age, Cambridge: Polity Press.
‘Presentation du Reseau Europeen ARCHIMEDIA de Formation pour la valoris
ation du patrimoine Cinematographique’ in Archimedia, introductory course
reader, unpublished reader for the use of trainees, with the support of Media 2
Programme of the European Union (in the possession of the author).

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Contributor details
Maria Komninou is the General Secretary of the Greek Film Archive, and an elected
member of the Executive Committee of ACE. She is the author of From Agora to
Spectacle: the transformation of the public Sphere in Greece 1950-1998, in Greek,
Papazissis 2001. She works on cinema and Greek political culture. Contact:
Dr. Maria Komninou, Assoc. Professor, Faculty of Communication and Mass Media,
National and Kapodistrian University of Athens, 5 Stadiou Avenue, Athens, Greece.
E-mail: tain@otenet.gr.

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Becoming Hello Kitty: A Deleuzian Study


Amy TY Lai University of Vienna, Austria

Despite the huge popularity of Hello Kitty, surprisingly few scholarly 1. It refers to the case of
studies have been conducted on it. Existing research has compared its con- a night club hostess
who was kidnapped
sumptions in the United States, Japan and Hong Kong, arguing that the and tortured in an
cat is a teen icon in the United States, and its popularity among American apartment in
adults has been fuelled by nostalgia (Lai 2005: 244–245). Its appeal to Tsimshatsui in 1999,
before she eventually
Japanese people of all age groups hinges on its ‘cute’ (in Japanese, kawaii) died a month later,
factor (246), and owing to the inextricable relationship between cuteness either by drug
and sex, it is sometimes used to enhance the sex appeal of its owner (247). overdose or at
the hands of
Finally, research brings in a well-known murder case in Hong Kong,1 as her abductors.
well as the pre-mature entry of both torturer and victim into a world of sex The abductors
and violence (254), to suggest that the cat mirrors the changing mean- dismembered her
body and stuffed the
ings of tween and girlhood, being a ‘fine symbol of the constructed – and head into a huge
particularly shifting and unstable – categories of “tween” and “girlhood” Hello Kitty doll.
in Asian cultures’ (255).
Belson and Bremner (2004) nonetheless underplay the cultural speci-
ficities in the attractiveness of Hello Kitty, deeming that it represents ‘one of
the more ridiculous examples around of the need to fill up our leisure time
in pleasurable ways, no matter how small and trivial’, particularly among
female consumers in the market-driven economies of the rich world (192).
Regardless of culture, its being of ‘pure imagery’, with very little story to her
life – and therefore ‘Zen-like’ – readily transforms her into a ‘princess of
purity to toddlers, a cuddly playmate for young girls and a walk down
memory lane for adults yearning for another taste of childhood’ (Belson and
Bremner 2004: 4). That a lot of Japanese women in their twenties and early
thirties crave for the cat has made up a ‘cute movement’ transgressive of
established social norms, and poses a threat to a reigning ideology accord-
ing to which they best serve their society and families by being good wives
and mothers (Belson and Bremner: 22). Even in Western countries, Hello
Kitty has become a statement for mocking at male-dominated establish-
ments, and women executives have been known to flash Hello Kitty pens to
‘add whimsy and irony to corporate meetings’ (Belson and Bremner: 107).
What is widely considered to be a sign of childishness therefore turns
out to be a social and cultural phenomenon worthy of exploration by brand
managers, sociologists and cultural critics. Nonetheless, no study has
probed the pleasure of using Hello Kitty products, particularly young
women dressing up in Hello Kitty fashion, or even in Hello Kitty costumes –
‘cosplaying’ as Hello Kitty – in parties and other special occasions. What
exactly is entailed in such processes? How does ‘cosplaying’ as the cartoon
cat differ from ‘cosplaying’ other anime characters? It would be interesting
to adopt a Deleuzian model of ‘becoming’, an unprecedented critical angle,
to shed light on the relationship between women and the cat, its intrica-
cies and subtle variations.
‘Becoming’ is the central concept in the works of Deleuze and Gauttari,
in their refutation of a coherent selfhood and a distinctive boundary

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2. Baker’s work between the inner self and the outer reality. Steve Baker (2000),2 in the vein
discusses the of Deleuze and Gauttari, stresses that ‘becoming-animal’ provides a creative
abundance of animals
in postmodern arts escapism for human beings from a repressive society and other conservative
by contrasting it with forces: it is not the same as ‘resembling, imitating or identifying with’ an
its absence in the animal, nor does it happen in the imagination, dreams or fantasies, or nec-
modern age. He
claims that modernity essarily entail a bodily metamorphosis (120–121). As Deleuze and Gauttari
was a repressive (1987) claim in A Thousand Plauteaus, ‘becoming-animal produces nothing
process of purification other than itself. What is real is the becoming itself ’ (121), he defines
which ensured that
any monster ‘becoming-animal’ as ‘human beings’ creative opportunity to think of them-
threatening to selves other-than-in-identity’, stating that the precise relationship between
transgress the border the human and the animal is one of ‘alliance’ (125–126). In the light of this
between human and
non-human was framework, consuming Hello Kitty does not so much suggest identity confu-
reclassified to either sion (Ko 2003), as it denotes an active agency in taking charge of one’s life
the human or the and leading a more meaningful and/or enjoyable existence.
non-human sphere;
in the cyborg world Yuko Yamaguchi, chief designer of Hello Kitty since 1980, describes
of post-industrial and her relationship with the cat throughout the years in an interview: in the
postmodern society, early years, it served as her ‘alter ego’, or the other self that did the things
such creatures or
creations have she liked or wanted to do. As its popularity soared in the following years
become increasingly and it became larger than life, her role turned into a ‘supervisory’ one, and
common; the she thought of ‘how to promote her and in what way’, like a ‘manager or
embrace of impurity,
hybridity, even producer’ does to a ‘star’ (Benson and Bremner 2004: 78). Despite these
monstrosity could different roles, her relationship with Kitty is one of alliance, and the
be a positive and ‘becoming’ process has earned her enough satisfaction, despite the fact that
creative trend, and
the ‘humanist politics she had first wanted to work in the advertising industry as a fresh gradu-
of norms and identity’ ate, and had initially expected her work at Sanrio to be full of constraints.
might give way to In a workplace that was dominated by men,3 and arguably still being so,
‘a politics of hybrids’
(Baker: 99–100). Yamaguchi’s ‘becoming-Kitty’, which has occurred neither in her dream
nor in her fantasy, enabled her to transgress her traditional role as a
3. As Yamaguchi
recalled in a personal woman in a highly creative way.
interview on 10 That Yamaguchi’s creative alliance with Hello Kitty takes on a feminist
September 2002, tone is not purely coincidental. As Jerry Aline Flieger (2000) describes, the
when she was
studying at Joshibi male realm of Deleuzian criticism might make his name and feminism sound
University of Art like an ‘odd couple’ (39), but he actually makes ‘becoming-woman’ the
and Design in Tokyo, centre of his feminist criticism.4 Although women tend to struggle for ‘their
she already aspired
to work for an own organism, their own history, their own subjectivity’, in short, a ‘subject
advertising agency, of enunciation’ (Deleuze 1987: 276, cited in Flieger 2000: 42), Deleuze
but in those days forms no clear-cut distinction between sexes in his ‘becoming’, which is ‘not
Japan still had not
introduced the equal a question of interaction between subjects, but of multiple assemblages’.
opportunities law and (Deleuze 1987: 242, cited in Flieger 2000: 42-3). Although feminists have
a woman could not be struggled for a ‘becoming-ourselves’ throughout history, ‘becoming-women’
an art director at an
advertising agency does not aim at ‘the emancipation of a homogeneous collectivity, but tensile
(Benson and Bremner transformation and transgression of identity’ (Flieger 2000: 44).
2004: 73). ‘Becoming-Kitty’ is not only enjoyed by the designer, but also by those
4. Chapter Ten who love the products. Two chain stores, Just Diamond and Kilara, obtained
of Deleuze’s A the license to sell Hello Kitty accessories and fashion respectively: the
Thousand Pleateaus
introduces this former is a major jewellery store based in Hong Kong,5 the latter became
notion, though the the first boutique that sells Hello Kitty fashion in Taiwan, and subsequently
chapter bears the title opened a chain in Hong Kong in 2005. According to the sales manager of
‘Becoming-Intense,
Becoming-Animal, Just Diamond, as their products are not cheap, except for some mothers

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who purchase accessories for their daughters, most of their customers are Becoming-
young women in their twenties and thirties (The Epoch Times, 17 August Imperceptible’.
2006). The same applies for the customers of Kilara. The manager describes 5. It is a subsidiary of
the two broad categories of clothes available as those with a huge Kitty the Henry Jewellery
Group which was
logo, and the ones with a much smaller – hence much less noticeable – logo, established in Hong
to cater for the needs of the young women who feel too embarrassed to go Kong in 1976.
to work with a big Hello Kitty on their body. The latter designs therefore
enable these adult customers to subvert stereotypes of the Hello Kitty logo
as girlish and immature: clothed in their beloved Hello Kitty fashion, yet
remaining capable professionals, these young women feel cute, indepen-
dent and free all at the same time.
Casual wear and work clothes aside, recently Hello Kitty costumes tailored
for parties, including Halloween, have come out, targeting not only children,
but adults too. Cosplayers are given a lot of choices – they might decide to
don the whole set of Hello Kitty costumes and appear like those cartoon
characters in Sanrio Puroland, the Sanrio Theme Park, and in other Hello
Kitty exhibitions and publicity functions. Alternatively, they might choose
to wear a Hello Kitty plastic face mask, or a large Hello Kitty hat. Those
who do not wish to make their hair and faces invisible might want to wear
a headband with a pair of Kitty ears on top, while wearing the fashionable
make-up and remaining ‘normally’ dressed otherwise.
The ways with which Asian women dress up themselves in a Hello
Kitty fashion point to a recent trend in Japan and other Asian countries,
which is that of the blurring of the distinction between costumes based on
characters from anime and manga, and ‘original’ costumes based upon a
general theme or existing fashions – an example being the trend of Gothic
Lolita, where the dressers might not have the inclination, or courage, to
wear very distinctive clothes around town, but who would, nevertheless,
like to dress in such a manner on some occasions. Indeed, the infinite
ways with which Hello Kitty fans mix and match Kitty fashion and acces-
sories necessitate a re-definition of ‘cosplay’, its functions as well as its
social implications.
No longer are these newly defined ‘cosplayers’ seen only at public events
such as video game shows and cosplay parties: women in Hello Kitty
fashion are found anywhere and at anytime. Contrary to what a lot of
people think, cosplaying can no longer be regarded as ‘a form of escapism’,
and it does not solely intend to give the participant a chance to ‘vent pent-
up feelings’ (Cosplay Underground 2006). Neither is it used exclusively by
introvert or autistic young people who would find it hard to relate to other
people if they do not pretend to be some famous characters. Hello Kitty
fans may be obsessed with the cat, even to the extent of carrying her logo
in every facet of their lives; as much as I believe in the pleasure brought by
the cat, I doubt there are many fans who think they should become cat-like
in thoughts, words and actions. True, other researchers have defended the
‘eccentric conduct’ of cosplayers in fandom conventions, arguing that they
try to express the significance of, and the ongoing need for community, in
fandom (Duchesne 2005); the pursuit of whimsiness and freedom by
allying with Hello Kitty, nonetheless, is not so much for the sake of com-
munity, as it is for the sake of the person.

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6. According to Shintaro Interestingly, Hello Kitty fashion and its different cosplay costumes
Tsunhi, founder of illustrate the principle of ‘becoming’ in yet another way: the fact that all
Sanrio Company,
red was chosen to these come in many different forms, and can be mixed and matched in
be Hello Kitty’s various ways, flesh out the concept of ‘difference’ in ‘becoming’. Hello
key colour for its Kitty lovers do not worry about the monotony of staying faithful to one
femininity, for its
popular combination cartoon character over a long period of their lives. As Deleuze (1968)
with white and its argues, difference is the essence of all beings, and it is only when beings
potential to go well are repeated as something other that their disparateness is preserved:
with other light
colours such as even what is known as ‘the eternal return’ is the repetition of that which
yellow. ‘Red-oriented differs-from-itself, of those beings whose being is becoming: ‘The subject
colours symbolize of the eternal return is not the same but the different, not the similar but
warmth, little girls,
little animals and the dissimilar, not the one but the many . . .’ (126). As Hello Kitty
love, so is most suited ‘returns’ in different attires and costumes, Hello Kitty fans do manage to
for characters’ entertain themselves with the spices of variety while engaged in the
(Belson and Bremner
2004: 69). process of becoming.
What must be brought in at this point are the continuous metamor-
phoses in the designs of Hello Kitty, that fact that Hello Kitty is not just
the object, but also the subject of ‘becoming’ and cosplaying. In the past,
she was not only seen riding on the rocking horse and later on the big
white swan and the Pegasus in her 25th Anniversary editions, but
she actually donned the skins of other animals. Quite recently, we found
her dressed up as Lolita – and a punk one for that matter. If Baker’s
‘becoming-animal’ ultimately hinges on the separation between animal
and human as distinct categories, then Kitty’s metamorphoses further
break down these boundaries, therefore enabling those who ally with
her to generate versions of the ‘becoming-animal-becoming-animal’ and
‘becoming-animal-becoming-human’. She has also appeared in various
funky images, including the funky versions of the Sailormoon and the
rock-star: while the former enhances her supposed ‘femininity’,6 the latter
blurs what is ‘feminine’ about her, until she becomes ‘degendered’.
Perhaps inspired by John Sachs’ installation of the kitchen window of
Barnes Co. in New York, which turns Hello Kitty into baby Jesus, and
despite the potential accusation from Christian fanatics, Kitty has indeed
metamorphosed into ‘Hello Jesus’ as part of the latest collection.
It is a pity that Deleuze, who passed away in 1995, did not live long
enough to witness how Hello Kitty managed to stay popular for more than
three decades – one cannot help wondering how he would have com-
mented on such a character, and in what ways he would have appropri-
ated her heterogeneity, her ever-changing and ever-renewed nature as well
as her limitless potential for expansion for his theorisation. There is no
other character more Deleuzian than Kitty – enabling her female fans to
attain a state of ‘becoming’ and liberate themselves from their mundane
existences. Hello Kitty is ‘itself ’ the very epitome of ‘becoming’: it trans-
verses the borders between human and animal, male and female, and in
a manner both naive and provocative, it signifies the human attempt to
re-conceive one’s being-in-the-world, even to the extent of aspiring to be
the forbidden and of ‘becoming’ God.

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References
Baker, S. (2000), The Postmodern Animal, London: Reaktion Books, 2000.
Belson, K. and Bremer, B. (2003), Hello Kitty: The Remarkable Story of Sanrio and the
Billion Dollar Feline Phenomenon, New York: John Wiley & Sons.
Cosplay Underground (2006), ‘COSTUME PLAY: From Underground Trend to
Mainstay of Subculture’, http://www.cosplayunderground.com/
Deleuze, G. (1994), Difference and Repetition, (trans. Paul Patton), New York:
Columbia University Press, c1968.
Deleuze, G. and F. Guattari (1987), A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia
(trans. Brian Massumi), Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Duchesne, S. (2005), ‘Little Reckonings in Great Rooms: The Performance of
“Cosplay”’, Canadian Theatre Review, 121, pp. 17–26.
The Epoch Times, ‘The Unbeatable Charm of Hello Kitty (Hello Kitty),’ 17 August
2006, http://www.epochtimes.com/gb/6/8/17/n1424055.htm.
Flieger, J.A. (2000), ‘Becoming-Woman: Deleuze, Schreber and Molecular
Identification’, in Ian Buchanan and Claire Colebrook (eds.), Deleuze and Femi-
nist Theory, Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh Press, pp. 38–63.
Hir@gana Times (2006), ‘Escape into Cosplay?’ http://hirag329.rsjp.net/hp/
scenes/kiji/kiji221-6e.html.
Ko Yu-fen (2003), ‘Consuming differences: “Hello Kitty” and the identity crisis in
Taiwan,’ Postcolonial Studies: Culture, Politics, Economy, 6.2, pp. 175–189.
Lai, Amy T.Y. (2005), ‘Consuming Hello Kitty: Tween Icon, Sexy Cute, and the
Changing Meaning of Childhood,’ in C. Mitchell and J. Reid Walsh (eds.), Seven
Going on Seventeen: Tween Studies in the Culture of Girlhood, New York: Peter
Lang, pp. 242–256.

Contributor details
Amy TY Lai obtained her Ph.D. in postcolonial literature from the University of
Cambridge, U.K. She is now a visiting scholar at the University of Vienna, Austria.
She has published widely on the consumption of Hello Kitty, Asian English-language
literature, modern and contemporary Chinese literature, Chinese women writers in
diaspora, and world cinema. Contact: Amy Lai, Flat A, 1/F, Blk 27, City One Shatin,
NT, Hong Kong. Contact: Amy Lai, Nussdorferstrasse 1/125, A-1090 Wien, Austria.
E-mail: cantabamy@hotmail.com

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MCP_4_1-07_Reviews 1/23/08 12:48 PM Page 105

Reviews
International Journal of Media and Cultural Politics Volume 4 Number 1.
© Intellect Ltd 2008. Reviews. English language. doi: 10.1386/macp.4.1.105/5

Conglomerate Rock: The Music Industry’s Quest to Divide


Music and Conquer Wallets, David J. Park (2007)
Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 160 pp.,
ISBN: 0739115006, $60.00 (hbk)
Reviewed by Matt Stahl, Muhlenberg College

The popular music industry, as is well known, has been extremely vocal
concerning what it claims are its declining sales. Through its trade group,
the RIAA, the industry has for the last several years been publicly laying
the blame for this decline almost entirely at the feet of individual music
fans. These fans, it argues, are infringing upon the industry’s monopoly
control over the right to copy and distribute music (to which record labels
hold title) by sharing music over the Internet. This, they argue, allows
people to enjoy music without paying for it, which, the argument contin-
ues, is illegal and threatens the survival of the industry.
David J. Park’s timely new book Conglomerate Rock takes aim at the
music industry at this critical historical juncture, focusing on changes in
the ways in which the world’s largest record companies produce and
market popular music. In it, Park explores new strategies by which these
companies seek to protect and increase the value of their investments.
Drawing data from print and electronic trade publications such as Bill-
board and Music Industry News Network (supplemented by several inter-
views with industry participants), Park demonstrates that, contrary to
industry complaints, the recent decline in music sales is not mainly due
to Internet file sharing by fans. Rather, the decline – which has been used
to support claims on government for unprecedented advances in copyright
control and enforcement and to legitimate absurdly punishing lawsuits
aimed at consumers – has to do with a number of other factors, including
the end of CD replacement (of vinyl LPs and cassettes) and new forms of
music selling that are not counted as normal sales. Conglomerate Rock
offers detailed discussions of legal, technological and marketing strategies
employed by the industry to protect their failing profits, including the pro-
duction and promotion of new playback technologies that will embed the
industry’s desire to control music in the playback devices themselves
(known as ‘digital rights management’), as well as the extension of music
marketing and commercialisation into a range of new and existing media
and commercial spaces. Park’s overall point is that the music industry,
faced with a range of challenges to its profit margins and legitimacy, seeks
to ‘divide’ music by diversifying channels of marketing and distribution,
extending copyright owners’ control over how music may be used by its
purchasers, thereby ‘conquering’ wallets – increasing the number of

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bottlenecks and tolls that restrict access to an increasing number of


narrow distribution streams.
Given the contentious political issues surrounding digital distribution
and the concurrent intensification of conglomerate consolidation and
control in the music industry, the time is right for penetrating studies along
these lines. Despite Conglomerate Rock’s timeliness and detail, however, the
book misses many opportunities and disappoints in many ways, limiting its
usefulness, in my view, largely to those readers who are already sufficiently
familiar with the music industry to know exactly what they are looking for.
Apart from poor editing (just a few of the many examples: twice spelling
‘counterfeiters’ as ‘counter-fitters’, the possessive form ‘its’ appearing as ‘it’s’
three times on a single page, misspelling the names of performers Avril
Levigne and Josh Groban) the book suffers from much greater problems that
will, it seems, disserve scholarly, student and lay readers. Most significantly,
its focus is so narrow and its connection to more general disciplinary con-
cerns so tenuous that some of the most important social scientific framing
questions – such as ‘so what?’ and ‘of what is this an example?’ – go almost
completely unaddressed. There is only glancing acknowledgement of the
fields of sociology of media, media studies, communication and popular
music and cultural studies, in which varying but overlapping approaches to
the questions raised in this book have been framed by scholars for decades.
This lack of theoretical and historical context unfortunately renders the
book little more than an untheorised and uncontextualised digest of indus-
try spokespersons’ statements as reported in the trade press.
The book bills itself as a work of ‘political economy’, and in the second
chapter, entitled ‘Theoretical Perspectives on Technology and Methodology’,
Park acknowledges the work of Golding and Murdock, Garnham, Mosco and
McChesney; scholars who are justly renowned for investigating the relation-
ships of institutions and actors within the world of media production, as well
as the relationships between media and other social institutions. After this
promising start, however, the political–economic theoretical frame all but
disappears in the subsequent chapters of the book. Instead, the author
simply alludes to political economic concerns here and there in the text,
suggesting for example that the record companies’ practices of moving
toward subscription services and the marketing of exclusive content
through video games will make it more difficult for consumers in straight-
ened financial circumstances to purchase music. The focus for Park’s
critique here is framed in terms of consumer sovereignty, and not in terms of
fundamental political–economic issues of power and social reproduction.
There is little indication here that the contemporary music industry might
(let alone should, as the political economic frame would suggest) be under-
stood to be a part of any larger or historical world of copyright-driven
commercial entertainment, not to mention a broader social, economic,
political, historical, cultural system. The suggestions that do crop up along
these lines tend to be vague and misleading. For example, in chapter three
(‘Description of the Music Industry’), Park discusses general trends that
have been analysed, categorised and theorised by major thinkers under
the headings of ‘rationalization’, ‘management of risk’, and ‘post-Fordism’
without engaging these important lines of thought in communication or

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related disciplines in any significant way. Where the author does mention
other research on outsourcing, he suggests that the music industry is
merely ‘following suit’ with respect to other industries in recent years. In
fact, music industry outsourcing began in the late 1950s and early 1960s
with the rise of the independent producer, as has been well documented in
Kealy (1979), as well as in a number of popular music histories (such as
Szatmary’s Rockin’ in Time, 1991). Indeed, the political economy of media
production is centrally concerned with historical specificity and social
theory (e.g., the selections in edited volumes such as Calabrese and Sparks
2004; Curran 2000; Curran and Gurevitch 1991, not to mention more
specialised works such as Hesmondhalgh 2002; Miege 1989; Ryan 2002;
Toynbee’s 2000 study of musical creation).
Moreover, Conglomerate Rock’s unstated assumptions contradict its stated
approach. In its introductory framing section, Conglomerate Rock quotes
McChesney’s articulation of the central tenet that ‘a political economy
approach does not presuppose capitalist society as a given and does not
discount structural factors in explaining media behavior’ (18). In spite of
this, the book’s narrow focus on changes in the music industry since the
last major wave of consolidation, and its assertions that people with less
money will enjoy less access as a result, betray a presupposition that capi-
talist society is a given and that the structural factors basic to a capitalist
music industry do not bear examination. The underlying assumption here
is that a properly functioning market (though the contours of such a
market are not articulated) is the best system for producing and distribut-
ing music. Given the general thrust of most work in the political economy
of communication approach Park espouses, such a position would seem to
require clear explanation and support.
In the conclusion to the book, Park makes some suggestions for reme-
dying the increasing centralisation of control over music production and
distribution, but these are so farfetched and unsupported by his analysis as to
be unrealistic. For example, he writes, ‘why not make access to healthcare,
education, and culture a constitutional right, then actually enforce it?’ (121).
More specifically, he recommends the construction of a ‘public library’ for
music. ‘In order to provide remuneration to musicians and labels that
share their music with the library’, he writes, ‘one possibility could entail
considering “checked out” music a public performance’ for which the
library would pay royalties to collections agencies like ASCAP and BMI.
Where would these fees come from? He doesn’t say.
Finally, although Conglomerate Rock was likely published with an under-
graduate market in mind, particularly given that population’s widespread
and well-known interest in the conditions of music production and reception,
it is difficult to recommend the book for that audience. Specifically, the book’s
unclear discussions of institutions and concepts such as copyright and fair
use, for example, would likely confuse students lacking well-developed
knowledge of these topics. More generally, the author’s failure to connect
the logics at work in the music industry in any systematic way with those
operating in other areas of the entertainment industry, not to mention with
those operating in capitalist society more generally – as a political economic
approach would do – would disserve educators hoping to provide their

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students with transportable analytical tools that could be readily adapted to


the analysis of other media and social contexts. Books that do offer such
tools at an undergraduate level (which could have served as general models
for a work focusing specifically on the music industry) include Croteau and
Hoynes (2003) and Mosco (1996). An exemplary analysis of precisely the
target at which Park aims is Leyshon et al. (2005).
While Conglomerate Rock does provide some handy charts and a wealth
of useful detail on contemporary changes in the music industry, and while
it does show an admirable commitment to social justice, its overly narrow
focus and lack of disciplinary context would seem to limit its usefulness to
the specialist already in possession of advanced knowledge of the subject.
Despite a great need for research on the political economy of cultural pro-
duction, this book misses an opportunity to connect historic shifts in the
production and distribution of popular music to the broader issues of
power, culture, and social structure that are the requirements of political
economic analysis of media production.

References
Calabrese, A. and Sparks, C. (eds.) (2004), Toward a Political Economy of Culture,
New York: Rowman and Littlefield.
Croteau, D. and Hoynes, W. (2003), Media/Society, London: Pine Forge.
Curran, J. (ed.) (2000), Media Organizations in Society, London: Arnold.
Curran, J. and Gurevitch, M. (eds.) (1991), Mass Media and Society, London:
Edward Arnold.
Hesmondhalgh, D. (2002), The Cultural Industries, London: Sage.
Kealy, E. (1979), ‘From craft to art: The case of sound mixers and popular music’,
Sociology of Work and Occupation, 6, pp. 3–29. (Anthologized in S. Frith and A.
Goodwin (eds.) On Record: Rock, Pop, and the Written Word, Pantheon Books
1990, pp. 207–220.)
Leyshon, A., Webb, P., French, S., Thrift, N. and Crewe L. (2005), ‘On the Reproduction
of the Musical Economy after the Internet’, Media, Culture & Society 27/2,
pp. 177–209.
Miege, B. (1989), The Capitalization of Cultural Production, New York: International
General.
Mosco, V. (1996), The Political Economy of Communication, London: Sage.
Ryan, B. (1992), Making Capital from Culture: The Corporate Form of Capitalist Cul-
tural Production, New York: de Gruyter.
Szatmary, D.P. (1991), Rockin’ in Time: A Social History of Rock-and-Roll, Englewood
Cliffs: Prentice Hall.
Toynbee, J. (2000), Making Popular Music: Musicians, Creativity and Institutions,
London: Arnold.

Contributor details
Matt Stahl is an Assistant Professor of Media and Communication at Muhlenberg
College. His research focuses on the politics of cultural production and their repre-
sentation in law and popular culture. Contact: Matthew Stahl, Ph.D., Assistant
Professor, Department of Media and Communication, Muhlenberg College,
2400 W. Chew Street, Allentown, PA 18104 USA.
E-mail: mstahl@muhlenberg.edu

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Troubled Pasts: News and the Collective Memory of


Social Unrest, Jill A. Edy (2006)
Philadelphia: Temple University Press, ISBN: 1592134963,
$71.50 (hbk); ISBN: 1592134971, $23.95 (pbk)
Reviewed by Nathaniel I. Cordova, Willamette University

Jill A. Edy’s new book Troubled Pasts resides at the intersections of public
discourse, memory, history and journalism. As such it is a substantial and
insightful contribution to our understanding of what ultimately are quite
interdisciplinary and plurivocal questions of how we construct shared
representations of the past. In six substantive chapters (and a conclusion)
she examines, from a sustained perspective, the process whereby news
stories of social conflict are framed and negotiated, and how they influ-
ence the public understanding of the past. In short, Edy focuses on how
collective memories of troubled pasts are shaped through the mnemonic
agency of the news media.
While each chapter takes a slightly different angle on the topic, each
revolves around the central question of how news media as mnemonic
agents establish and maintain the meaning of past social conflict. She
centres on mass media’s role as concocters and disseminators of stories,
arguing that here is where negotiations over the meaning of the past take
place in our society. The news media, responsible for the creation, reporting,
and dissemination of stories of ‘real’ events plays a crucial role as incuba-
tor and disseminator of cultural products and narratives that facilitate our
adoption of collective memories of divisive and conflictual moments in
history. Throughout the book, Edy focuses on how such collective repre-
sentations of particular pasts unfold in the news, and how newsmaking
practices and our relationship to such media systems not only affect the
development of collective memories, but also how they influence the reso-
lution of how these conflicts are to be remembered. Consequently, Edy’s
account implicitly treats how the news media play a crucial role as media-
tors of the intelligibility of these social conflicts.
To accentuate such processes, Edy highlights two divisive social conflicts
in the American past: the 1965 riots that broke out in South Central Los
Angeles, specifically known as the Watts riots; and the violence and riots
that erupted during the 1968 Democratic Party National Convention held
in Chicago. The Watts riots were clearly marked by the imprint of racial
tension, and this raises some intriguing questions for Edy’s analysis. The
Democratic National Convention riots were perhaps an alchemic mixture
of diverse social tensions, including countercultural social movements,
Vietnam war protest, poverty advocates, and more. The complexities of
these events reaffirms the plurivocal nature of the issues raised by our col-
lective representations of the past. Although she does not dedicate specific
chapters to each event, she addresses both comprehensively in a number of
ways: through the lenses of how official reports and stories were crafted by
political officials and news outlets; and through such vehicles as trials as
redressive rituals, investigations and public policy. Chapters two and three
address with more directness the historical record, while the rest of the

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chapters attend to very important newsmaking questions of fragmentation,


framing, managing salience, and the use of the past as context. Engaging,
straightforward, and clearly written, the book carries the reader forward
easily in what it promised: the discernment of how news media builds and
shapes collective memories of moments of social unrest.
Most approaches to the study of collective memory are grounded in
the process of remembrance itself, in mnemonic techniques, or in the
dissemination of memories. Edy’s account is refreshing precisely because
her focus is on the process of construction of news stories about the past.
In other words, Edy guides us through the process of not only how such
stories are written, but how news media stories continually revisit and
reshape our understanding of memories themselves; of an already remem-
bered past. From this perspective, newsmaking practices re-member troubled
pasts continually. Although this meta-perspective is implicit in the text, and
at times emerges with more clarity, I wish she had spent more time directly
on just how such a meta-perspective informs our understanding of collec-
tive memory. Moreover, such a perspective could be enriched by attention
not just to news story writing, but to mediation processes, technologies of
circulation of the stories themselves, and a convergence culture that has
resulted in significant changes in how audiences interact with news media
and encounter collective memories. For instance, critical attention to the
development of new cultural interfaces for dissemination of news stories
and their representation of the past would be beneficial to Edy’s account.
Further, although Edy’s treatment of the Watts riots is sensitive to
issues of race, I found little in her analysis about how questions of race
themselves shape collective memory. This is regrettable as such a treat-
ment can prompt us to reconsider the basic assumptions and limitations of
our own study of collective or public memory. While Edy correctly ques-
tions how these events are re-membered, she falls short of examining how
race or ethnicity shape our understanding of what is remembered, how it
is remembered, and how dominant narratives subsume ethnic or racial
understanding of past events. To be fair, Edy approximates some of these
concerns, for instance, when she speaks of how during the Watts riots
some African American businessmen wrote ‘Blood’ or ‘Blood Brother’ on
their businesses in order to protect them from looting and arson. In my
estimation, Edy moves too quickly into how such events facilitate the
framing of the news story, and leaves unaddressed persistent and troubling
questions about the study of collective memory within racialised contexts
of domination. Lest I leave the impression that this is a major flaw, the fact
that Edy seems aware of these issues is important, even if within the scope
of her analysis they do not obtain the attention I think they deserve.
The book offers a rich and insightful discussion of the crucial role news
media plays as mnemonic agents, and as such, as engaging in a process
of mnemonic socialisation. This mnemonic socialisation is a constant
interpretive performance central to our understanding of how these events
are remembered, and how multiple and competing versions of the past are
integrated into collective memory. Edy provides what I think is a very
helpful framing of concepts and theoretical insights that will prove useful
for students and researchers alike. As a result, her work commands a wide

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audience and stimulates productive debate and discussion about historical


instances of social unrest and how we remember them.

Contributor details
Nathaniel I. Cordova, Ph.D. is Assistant Professor in the Rhetoric and Media
Studies program at Willamette University, Oregon. His pedagogical and scholarly
work revolves around the formative power of public discourse, and the construc-
tion of political subjectivity. Contact: Nathaniel I. Cordova, Ph.D., Assistant
Professor, Rhetoric and Media Studies, Willamette University, 900 State Street,
Salem, OR 97301, USA.
E-mail: ncordova@willamette.edu

Journalists and the Public: Newsroom Culture, Letters to the


Editor, and Democracy, Karin Wahl-Jorgensen (2007)
Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press, 165 pp., $47.50 (pbk),
ISBN 9781572737372
Reviewed by Brian Thornton, University of North Florida

The handful of pioneering scholars who have been studying letters to the
editor and publishing articles in this field will certainly celebrate Karin
Wahl-Jorgensen’s book, Journalists and the Public. But so should scholars
everywhere. This landmark book means that the study of letters to the
editor has finally arrived, thereby recognising the value of an area of study
where only a few have gone before. But like explorers on a brave new
continent, there is plenty of territory for others to roam, and there is much
to learn about what has been discovered and what is still uncharted. As
someone who first started publishing articles about the historical content
of letters to the editor (found in newspapers between 1902 through 1912,
to be specific), it’s hard to describe how satisfying it is now, at last, to find
a book-length study of letters to the editor. Since a complete book now
focuses solely on letters to the editor, there is a convenient, central loca-
tion to find a clear, if incomplete, bibliography on the subject. The book
also includes a brief history of letters to the editor from colonial times.
Clearly, the book’s publication also means authors exploring this field will
no longer have to labor to defend the academic value of such studies. Now
scholars can refer critics of letters instead to Journalists and the Public to
understand the historical importance and depth such letters can provide.
Over the years many scholars, often ex-journalists, have complained
about letters to the editor as a field of study, claiming that, for instance,
letters to the editor are just not worth studying because they are so trivial.
Other critics have claimed, without supporting evidence that letters to the
editor are often made up by the editors so therefore their study is bogus.
When an editor gets too much space on an editorial page, the argument
goes, he just dashes off a phony letter to himself. Although there has been
no documented case of such letter fakery, there have been plenty of Jayson
Blair, Stephen Glass and Janet Cooke-style fake news stories that have been
exposed in the press. Certainly, these forgeries don’t negate the academic

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study of news stories, do they? In another critique, one former journal


editor even said ‘we published an article about letters to the editor once a
few years ago. Isn’t that enough?’ It is difficult to imagine a journal editor
stating today, ‘We printed a feminist scholarship article a few years ago.
Isn’t that sufficient?’
Exciting as it may be for scholars to discover a whole new subject for
discourse in this book, another response to this book can be sadness.
Wahl-Jorgensen’s main point is particularly distressing: that, although
newspaper editors give lip service to the value of letters to the editor as
‘wide open forums’ for free speech, the reality is quite different. The dozens
of editors she interviewed over several years at a San Francisco weekly
newspaper and elsewhere really don’t like either letters or letter writers.
Unfortunately, these editors often regard printing letters to the editor as
grunt work, or ‘getting the pages out’. They also often see letter writers as
‘cranks, nuts’, or ‘crazy bastards’. Wahl-Jorgensen describes how editorial
staffers assign code letters to submissions from the public. O3, for instance,
means a letter writer is ‘way out in the Ozone’. Unfortunately, she writes,
‘the idiom of insanity was one of the rallying points of the editorial page
staff ’s community of interpretation’. What this boils down to is that the
editorial page staff who publish the letters often ‘laugh in the face of public
discourse, of democracy; letter writers are rarely discussed in a language
other than the idiom of insanity’.
This is the sad heart of the book, then. After talking at length to scores
of editors at several California newspapers, surveying others, and then
working in a newsroom in an ethnographic study over two summers,
Wahl-Jorgensen demonstrates just how shabbily most letters to the editor
are treated, at least in the publications she examined. The editorial page
staff members she interviewed jokingly say at one point that ‘3 out of
5 letter writers should be in a [mental] hospital’. These editors are quick to
add that it’s all in jest, but Wahl-Jorgensen asserts their comments are
Freudian slips that reveal a great deal about the editors. She concludes that
many ‘cool, ironic and detached’ editorial staff writers and editors tend to
censor ‘uncivil’, if passionate letters they see as ‘mad, bad and dangerous’.
Often these letters demand political activism, both on the left and right. In
theory, the job of newspaper editors is to enhance the process of deliberative
democracy, according to Wahl-Jorgensen, but this ideal is difficult to put
into practice when the editors who are supposed to serve the public view
these letter submissions with contempt, indifference or ridicule.
Journalists and the Public is a solidly researched, germinal book that
offers concrete evidence of poor treatment of letters to the editor. The
book’s writing is not particularly flashy – but with a strong message,
poetry is not necessary. The author’s findings are so important in so many
ways that many people will use this book as a solid foundation – and
much can be built on it.
At the conclusion of Wahl-Jorgensen’s book the author provides some
ways to ‘reconstruct the public’. Her plans sound promising. First she sug-
gests newspapers need two regular daily columns from readers – one for
criticism of the paper and the other for reader exchanges, where community
debate moves beyond simple response to include discussions of larger

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issues. That’s easy to implement, although it means editors would have to


give up some space now assigned for their own editorial opinions. But her
major suggestion is that newsroom practices must be changed to fight ‘the
tyranny of time and space’. In these financially-strapped times, when news-
papers are cutting back, Wahl-Jorgensen suggests heresy. Rather than
spend less, she urges more staff be assigned to edit letters so the voice of the
people can get more care and respect, no matter how O3 they seem. Extra
editors for letters would be charged with not only ‘grinding out pages of
letters’, but also ‘proactively seeking out voices in the community’. Letters
should be solicited from a wide array of citizens, she argues. Additional
letter editors, with more time at their disposal, could be writing coaches,
who salvage letters presently deemed ‘too long’ but full of important and
valuable ideas nonetheless. Letter writers have hidden resources for politi-
cal debate that deserve to be treated with dignity, Wahl-Jorgensen asserts.
The author further argues that, because newspapers have been granted
special privileges under the First Amendment, they have special obligations
to advance freedom, democracy and the voice of the people. Thus, editors
are obligated to push forward and try to reconstruct the public voice. Wahl-
Jorgensen concludes that simply adding editorial staff to help mine the
resources of letter writers might seem like one small step for newspapers,
but it could be a giant leap towards a more democratic society.

Contributor details
Dr. Brian Thornton is an associate professor at the University of North Florida and a
former newspaper and magazine reporter. He earned his Ph.D at the University of
Utah. Since 1994 he has been studying the history of the content of letters to the
editor in magazines and newspapers. He has studied letters from 1835 through 1992.
He welcomes comments and input from other scholars pursuing research in this area.
Contact: Dr. Brian Thornton, 1974 Ibis Point Lane, Jacksonville, FL 32224 USA.
E-mail: thornton.b@comcast.net

Canadian Television Today, Bart Beaty and


Rebecca Sullivan (2006)
Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 168 pp.,
ISBN 9781552382226 (pbk), $24.95
Reviewed by Debra M. Clarke, Trent University, Canada

Despite its title, this slender and generously spaced book should not be
mistaken as one that offers a concise overview of the current state of tele-
vision broadcasting in Canada. The title is unfortunate in that the book
is, after all, little more than ‘an extended essay’ as the authors describe
it in their preface and, as such, there are inevitable limits to what can be
achieved. Other limits are imposed by the authors, it seems, in light of
their intent to attract readers from beyond the academic market, including
federal policymakers and the Canadian population at large – or at least,
the population outside of Quebec. Curiously, in a book that is ultimately
concerned to raise issues about cultural citizenship and the significance of

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language in television production and reception, the case of television


broadcasting in Quebec is largely excluded from their examination.
The introduction does not introduce a clearly formulated theoretical
framework. Rather, a mélange of concepts are selected from various frame-
works to introduce the essential polemic, a very deliberate if not deliberative
argument, complete with policy recommendations. The recommendations
include a restoration and expansion of television production at the local
level; the expansion of foreign-language programming purchases, which
the authors expect to enable the cultural empowerment of the ethnically
marginalised in Canadian society; as well as a broadcasting policy free of
economic and technological considerations, one that is more directly if not
exclusively focused upon the cultural, particularly the encouragement of
cultural citizenship. Anyone even remotely familiar with the history of
television broadcasting in Canada is likely to regard these as shockingly
polemical notions. The ‘essay’ proceeds through three primary chapters –
titled simply ‘Regulation’, ‘Programming’, and ‘Technology’ – to a surpris-
ingly abrupt and largely unsupported set of conclusions. In the end, it
makes a brave and reckless case for a reconceptualisation of television
and its audiences in Canada, and a radical transformation of the ways
in which television is understood by scholars and utilised by audiences. As
scholars, we are advised to abandon our attention to economic imperatives
and instead to re-think television as a cultural form that can be divorced
from its underlying political economy. As audiences, we are encouraged to
set aside any symbolic loyalties to the ‘anglocentric’ nation of Canada, in
favour of greater engagement with local cultural formations as well as the
pursuit and celebration of our ethnic histories through more extensive
viewing of subtitled foreign-language programmes. This particular
proposal seeks to extend and revitalise the state’s official commitment to
multiculturalism.
It may be that their vision of the intended audiences for the book led
the authors to a range of other exclusions. For example, along with their
exclusion of Quebec, they also exclude history. The nearest reference is the
statement that ‘the changing face of Canada as a nation through immi-
gration, urbanisation and globalisation has placed the issue of national
identity firmly at centre stage once again’ (p. 25), which leaves the seriously
mistaken impression that all three are ‘new’ phenomena. In reality, of
course, all three are deeply embedded components of the very foundations
of Canadian society. Overall, the arguments are too preoccupied with
‘today’ to the neglect of ‘yesterday’ and with insufficient attention to
‘tomorrow’ – that is the site of their projections for the transformation of
broadcasting together with the transformation of ethnic relations.
Also excluded here is economics, which the authors insist must be
divorced from the cultural dimensions of television broadcasting. This is in
itself a revolutionary argument where analyses of broadcasting in Canada
are concerned. Regardless of their theoretical stripes, most analysts have
been forced to at least concede, if not emphasise, that the trajectory of the
broadcasting industry and the state’s various broadcasting policy formula-
tions cannot be understood without attention to the economic requisites
that have persistently fed both.

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Moreover, the arguments might have been researched somewhat more


extensively. ‘Data’ are derived in some cases from polls conducted by news-
papers. Academic sources are far outnumbered by newspaper articles,
news releases and other non-scholarly sources in a remarkably limited list
of works cited. At one point, a newspaper journalist is called upon to
explain the initial reticence of private Canadian broadcasters to purchase
foreign ‘reality’ programming, while the authors counter with their belief
that it represented a ‘failure of creativity’ (p. 76).
Yet more disappointing is the tendency to present arguments that remain
largely untheorised. In view of the highly contentious nature of the argu-
ments that are set forth – and the authors readily acknowledge that their
arguments are highly contentious – conceptual clarity is vital. Other than a
token reference to Habermas’ public sphere, there is no articulated vision of
‘cultural citizenship’, a concept which, in itself, continues to be subject to a
multiplicity of interpretations; see, for example, all of those found within the
Stevenson (2001) collection. The word ‘globalization’ is frequently invoked
and it figures centrally within the arguments of Beaty and Sullivan, yet at the
outset the authors state their refusal to participate in the debates about its
meanings. It appears that, from their perspective, globalisation is akin to the
transnational flow of capital, commodities, human beings and ideas. There
are also references to ‘massive shifts in the global technoscape, ethnoscape,
finanscape, ideoscape, and crucially, the mediascape’ (p. 25). Meanwhile,
multiculturalism is discussed only briefly as a ‘form of hegemony’ (p. 13), and
we are left to conclude that, in their view, it should be sustained. At the same
time, however, there is plenty of mediacentrism, technophobia, and gender
blindness, while class analysis extends no further than the use of ‘highbrow’
and ‘lowbrow’ to describe television programmes. Above all, there is no expla-
nation of why ethnic inequalities are seemingly perceived by the authors to be
the most problematic of all social inequalities.
A somewhat more cogent version of the book’s arguments appears in the
authors’ recent contribution to the latest Taras et al. (2007) collection.
Nevertheless, many readers will still be left to wonder how ethnic inequalities
can possibly be ameliorated by changes in television broadcasting policies and
viewership practices. Some may also be led to ask why multiculturalism, a
state policy rarely seen as true to its declared objectives by more than a third
of the Canadian population, should be ‘revitalized’ at all. In the view of many,
it has never been anything more than a clever marketing strategy designed to
promote immigration and the illusion of social harmony.
Finally, how might broadcasters in particular be expected to respond to
the provocative recommendations advocated by Beaty and Sullivan? If a
review by one prominent and well-experienced network executive is any
indication, these ideas will be considered ‘startling’ as well as ‘probably
wrong and perfectly impractical’ (McQueen 2007: 29).

References
Beaty, B. and Sullivan, R. (2007), ‘Canadian Television and the Limits of Cultural
Citizenship’, in D. Taras, M. Bakardjieva and F. Pannekoek (eds.), How Canadi-
ans Communicate II: Media, Globalization, and Identity, Calgary: University of
Calgary Press, pp. 65–82.

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McQueen, T. (2007), ‘A Window or a Mirror?’, Literary Review of Canada, 15:4,


pp. 29–31.
Stevenson, N. (ed.) (2001), Culture and Citizenship, London: Sage.

Contributor details
Debra M. Clarke is an Associate Professor in the Department of Sociology at Trent
University, Peterborough, Ontario, Canada and editorial board member of the
Canadian Journal of Communication and The Electronic Journal of Communication. Her
research has been directed at media ownership convergence, state regulation of
broadcasting, local and network television news production, professional journal-
istic practices, and news audiences. Contact details: Debra M. Clarke, Ph.D.,
Associate Professor, Department of Sociology, Trent University, Peterborough,
Ontario, Canada K9J 7B8.
E-mail: dclarke@trentu.ca

Framing Celebrity: New Directions in Celebrity Culture,


Su Holmes and Sean Redmond (eds.) (2006)
London: Routledge, 384 pp., ISBN: 0415377099,
$125.00 (hbk); ISBN: 0415377102, $33.95 (pbk)
Reviewed by P. David Marshall, University of Wollongong, Australia

Over the last decade, the study of celebrity has become a burgeoning
growth area that has rivalled the expansiveness of celebrity culture itself.
Academics (including myself) and academic presses have more than dipped
their toes in its investigation. Coming from backgrounds including social
psychology, media studies, sociology and cultural studies, the analysis of
celebrity has provided scholars with a window on the organisation of
meaning and significance in contemporary culture. It has allowed a deeper
investigation of fame and more nuanced reading of fandom through its
close readings of particular case studies and wider theoretical treatises. The
study of celebrity has ultimately been a very useful launching point for the
investigation of individuality, the body and body-image, the way that media
images work on publics, the appropriation/celebration of personalities by
audience groups and subcultures, the psychological intersections of fame,
narcissism and the self, the study of infamy, the political economy of culture
and a host of other intersecting issues and concerns.
Framing Celebrity takes that history of celebrity study as its starting
point, making it a very valuable collection. The 20 articles collected by the
editors Su Holmes and Sean Redmond are not from re-issues or resur-
rected from the past, but appear to be commissioned specifically for this
collection. The forward-looking quality of the book is given clear evidence
in the introduction where they establish the groundwork from which the
book emerged. They also establish something that is often more difficult to
pull together: a provocative playfulness with the idea of fame couched in
the seriousness of an academic discourse that has framed its study. The
two editors have drawn very much from a cultural studies and film studies

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approach to understanding the pleasures of the (celebrity) text and inhab-


iting the celebrity ‘body’.
The book is divided into four sections with editors’ introductions to
allow the selections to cohere. ‘Fame Now’, the first section, deals with a
distinct effort to update the impact of celebrity on culture. For instance,
Redmond’s article identifies fame as a ubiquitous discourse privileged in its
pervasive play of intimacy and distance. Su Holmes’ chapter on celebrity
reality television programs similarly explores the way that these kinds of
shows play in the interstices of what draws audiences to celebrity more
generally; specifically, that these shows are structured to identify (as Dyer
has explained) what celebrities are ‘really’ like by documenting their every-
day trials and extraordinary situations. Deborah Jermyn’s study attempts
to update the meaning of television stardom as it has been articulated
through both the persona of ‘Carrie Bradshaw’ and Sara Jessica Parker.
Implicated in this change is not only the place of television in producing
public personalities, but also the circulation of celebrity image and knowl-
edge via the proliferation of celebrity magazines. Philip Drake’s and Michael
Higgins’ work on politics and celebrity outlines the different relationships
produced by celebrities in political settings and develops the inside/outside
power of the celebrity as they cross into the political world. Matt Hills’ study
of subcultural celebrity within a niche setting is probably an area that is in
need of greater exploration as celebrity culture morphs quite dramatically
into the micro-systems of future social networking.
Section Two, perhaps with less coherence, addresses the idea of the
famed body and the various ways that the body is deployed in contemporary
culture. Articles on jazz age white masculinity abut a very usefully developed
article by John Mercer on stardom in gay pornography. Two other articles
deal with the magazine trade: the chapter on celebrity skins is particularly
interesting about the use of often poor quality nude photos of celebrity to
both de-authorise the production of the image and through their poorer
quality authenticate that the images are closer to the truth through their
revelation of ‘skin’ of the star herself. Heat magazine forms the template for
Rebecca Feasey’s investigation of the way celebrities are used in the dis-
course of projection and desire. The final article of the section by Ramona
Coleman-Bell is more suggestive of how the black female tennis personal-
ity Serena Williams’ body and image have represented an often compli-
cated and contradictory challenge to idealisations of blackness and
femininity in contemporary culture.
Less successful than the previous sections is the third part of the book
entitled ‘Fame Simulations’. The editors hoped to capture the changes that
new media forms have produced in the meaning of celebrity. Theorisation
in this area still needs further development and there is no question that
some of the articles begin that process, but this section is not a connected
coherent group of readings and has to be understood more clearly as
stand-alone articles. There is a uniqueness and value in the history of
celebrity portraiture detailed in Adrienne Lai’s study of Jurgen Teller’s
work as celebrity photographer. Likewise, I have often thought that more
needs to be written about animation in its relationship to celebrity: Suzanne

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Rintoul’s piece on mockery and parody in the deployment of celebrities


in The Simpsons begins that journey. Catherine Fowler’s reading of ‘how
to’ view David, a film that observes the football star David Beckham
sleeping, is as alluring as attending the semi-private screening in the
National Portrait Gallery of the film. Fowler’s work moves to capture a
sense of the power of proximity to celebrity as a way to discover truth –
all within an art gallery setting and sensibility. Two other articles that
relate celebrity to new expressions of fandom cross into the Internet gen-
eration and expand fruitfully from the work pioneered by Henry Jenkins.
Popslash is investigated through the denigrated trope of boybands by
Kristina Busse. Internet fan communities are explored through a study
of ‘langsters’, those fans of various forms of loyalty to the lesbian music
icon k.d. lang.
The final section, entitled ‘Fame Damage’ captures the negentropy
of celebrity culture. Here David Schmid’s work on the celebrity quality of
serial killers is presented, paralleling his longer book-length publication on
the same theme. The second article by Stephen Harper expertly fills in a
gap in celebrity studies in perhaps the best article of the collection:
through a sophisticated study of madness and fame, Harper talks about
how madness has contributed to the aura of the famed as well as provid-
ing an entrée for the fans of celebrities to affectively connect to their
pain. In ‘The Killing Fields of Popular Music’, Sheila Whitely develops the
destructive elements that have contributed to the many suicides that are
part of popular music lore. Sofia Johansson’s work on tabloid readership
completes the book and echoes the Joke Hermes study of magazine reader-
ship: through interviews Johansson analyses the way that celebrities and
their often sensationalistic and scandal-ridden stories are used by readers
of tabloid papers.
Collectively, the book is a valuable contribution to what can be called
celebrity studies, celebrity culture studies, or perhaps persona studies.
Given the range of contributions, what is remarkable is that they are all
generally strong pieces of research and writing. There is no question that
further research needs to be pursued in specific areas that are under-
addressed here – I am thinking of how new media forms are changing our
relationship to celebrity culture quite profoundly – but on the whole
Holmes and Redmond’s edited volume provides the groundwork for future
investigations in the celebrity subfield and is essential reading for students
and researchers looking for insights on the different dimensions of popular
culture.

Contributor details
David Marshall is currently Professor and Chair of New Media and Cultural
Studies at the University of Wollongong. His most recent publication is the Celebrity
Culture Reader (Routledge, 2006). Contact: P. David Marshall, Ph.D. Professor and
Chair, New Media and Cultural Studies, School of Social Sciences, Media and
Communication, Faculty of Arts, University of Wollongong, NSW 2522, Australia.
Phone: 61 +2 4221 4068.
E-mail: davidm@uow.edu.au

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Kids Rule!: Nickelodeon and Consumer Citizenship,


Sarah Banet-Weiser (2007)
Durham: Duke University Press, ISBN: 9780822339762,
$79.95 (cloth); ISBN: 9780822339939, $22.95 (pbk)
Reviewed by Norma Pecora, Ohio University

Kids Rule! offers us an interestingly new way of considering children’s


culture. Second to Disney, Nickelodeon perhaps most represents children’s
mediated world. In this book Banet-Weiser claims to examine Nickelodeon
for the way it creates children and youth as ‘citizens within a commercial
context’ (emphasis added; Backpage). Using a Habermasian definition of
citizenship as ‘rational discourse, rights and liberties, and political freedom’
Banet-Weiser frames the discussion around the branding of Nickelodeon
Nation. Children are seen as citizens with training wheels and not
included in the discourse of public, political thought. In the past it has
been the responsibility of the family, schools, and media to socialise them
as political citizens. However, she states,

in contemporary culture, formal education, while maintaining a peripheral


role in the training of citizens, has been superseded by the reach and influ-
ence of consumer culture and popular media, and children are increasingly
addressed as particular kinds of “citizens” in these context. (8)

She goes on to say,

The tension within citizenship between consumer and political identities, for
young people is between the media address of children as increasingly impor-
tant consumers in and ever-widening ‘youth’ market, and the simultaneous
desire for children to be noncommercial but active in another sense, as par-
ticular political subjects. (8)

According to Banet-Weiser, this is played out most clearly in Nickelodeon


which at once empowers children and youth as consumers and as citizens.
Her’s is a complex argument that bears reading closely for the nuances
that cannot be presented in a brief book review.
The discussion on citizenship as both consumer and political partici-
pant is laid out in the first chapter, ‘We, the people of Nickelodeon’. Here
Banet-Weiser offers a wide-ranging discussion of the public interest and
educational obligations of television (education as political citizenship)
and the commercial and entertainment consequences (consumption
as consumer citizenship; branding and the creation of a Habermasian
community of consumers (not citizens); the relationship between citizen-
ship and consumerism; and the way language is used to define citizenship.
Throughout the chapter is a discussion of the media audience.
Using interviews with Nick viewers and industry professionals along
with textual analyses of Nickelodeon programming, the remainder of the
book is structured around the way Nickelodeon constructs children’s
citizenship. Chapter Two, ‘The success story: Nickelodeon and the cable

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industry’, explores the evolution of Nickelodeon in the context of the history


of cable television. While I might disagree with the role the blue skies opti-
mism of the cable industry in the early days to shaping Nickelodeon, it is
an interesting history. Banet-Weiser argues that media activism, specifi-
cally Action for Children’s Television, ‘was a key-factor in Nickelodeon’s
self-identity as a rebel’ (40). However, as I have argued elsewhere, the
development of Nick as a cable network was the result of Time Warner’s
drive to move into the new cable distribution systems. In fact, the early
programs on Nickelodeon relied heavily on whatever programming was
available to fill air-time at no or minimal cost. The notion of Nickelodeon
as a ‘rebel’ space to empower children was found mainly through the
branding of the channel, which offered the orange splat and green slime
as symbols of Nickelodeon. Chapter Three, ‘The Nickelodeon brand:
Buying and selling the audience’, moves the book into the discussion of
citizenship and the branding of Nickelodeon both in terms of consumer
citizenship and political citizenship. According to Banet-Weiser, it is the
language that Nickelodeon uses that most clearly establishes political citi-
zenship. With the opening of studios in Florida for the in-house production
of programming, Nickelodeon released the Declaration of Kids’ Rights:

We, the People of Nickelodeon,


in order to form a more perfect world for kids,
promise to:
provide the best in kids’ entertainment
protect kids’ rights, and
promote the cause of kids everywhere. (69)

This manifesto clearly frames the new brand in the language of political cit-
izenship. In many ways, Nickelodeon does promote political citizenship,
first by the language used (kids’ rights and Nickelodeon Nation, for
example) and second through a sense of empowerment (kids rule!). While
the chapter acknowledges the sense of Habermasian community that
Nickelodeon creates, the discussion is framed totally in the context of the
consumer citizen. At one point, Banet-Weiser states: ‘Consumer citizenship
is built around this kind of identification [identifying with the kids on tele-
vision], where shared consumption of products provides for a kind of safe
liberal practice’ (91). Banet-Weiser means here that children are ‘liberated’
from the ‘real world’ (98). This limited notion of consumer citizenship over-
looks the attempts at political citizenship, small though they may be, that
Nickelodeon works to instill in children. For example, Linda Ellerbee’s news
program is the longest running, and only, news show for children that
involves them in difficult discussions about political and social issues.
Nickelodeon campaigns also encourage children to become actively
involved in their own health, in on-going stories about Hurricane Katrina
or the Indonesian tsunami, and in the political process, evidenced in the
Kids Pick a President campaign held during presidential election years.
Banet-Weiser claims that, for the ideal citizen created by Nickelodeon,
‘generation is the only dividing marker of identity’ (101) and that
Nickelodeon has been in the forefront of bringing girl power and race to

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MCP_4_1-07_Reviews 1/23/08 12:48 PM Page 121

children’s entertainment. Chapter Four, ‘Girls rule! Gender, feminism, and


Nickelodeon’, and Chapter Five, ‘Consuming race on Nickelodeon’, both
examine the contributions made by the network in bridging these divides.
In ‘Girls rule!’ we learn that girl power, using feminist rhetoric, was a part
of programming in the early 1990s beginning with shows like Clarissa
Explains it All and As Told by Ginger. More recent programming however
reflects a gender neutrality that is more in line with current marketing and
political thought. Banet-Weiser states: ‘As with so much of popular culture,
the political “edge” of girl power shows of the 1990s has been appropriated
as girl power becomes normalized into mainstream consumer culture’
(139). In Chapter Five, it is ‘racial ambivalence [that] works within the
context of Nickelodeon at the levels of programming, production, and the
network’s branding strategies’ (144) – Or, in other words, race happens
(170). Unfortunately there is no consideration for what any of this means
in a global world where SpongeBob Squarepants is available to much of the
world’s population. Chapter Six, ‘Is Nick for Kids? Irony, Camp, and
Animation in the Nickelodeon Brand’, explores the ‘double coding’ within
several of Nickelodeon’s most popular animated series.
In the end Banet-Weiser argues, it is ‘not a question of either consumerism
or citizenship but how consumerism and consumption habits inform and
shape a dominant notion of citizenship’ (212). It is through the rhetoric of
Nickelodeon’s branding strategies that these two come together, giving us
a political rhetoric that brings a different logic: When the language of
rights and empowerment is appropriated as the language of a commercial
brand, it becomes quite clear that the boundaries between these two
realms of social life are not necessarily distinct and oppositional (101).
Redefining citizenship around the language of marketing, as Banet-Weiser
appears to argue is acceptable, is a dangerous thing to do. Unfortunately
we see the consequence in leaders, particularly in the United States, who
are selected based on image and rhetoric, not rational discourse. One is left
wondering what this means for a political future, local or global, that is
defined by the language of consumption.

Contributor details
Norma Pecora is a Professor at Ohio University in the School of Telecommunications.
She earned her Ph.D. from the University of Illinois Institute of Communication
Research. Her research focuses on the economics of the children’s entertainment
industry, girls culture, and issues of gender. She is the author of The Business of
Children’s Entertainment (2002) and the editor (with Sharon Mazzarella) of Growing
Up Girls: Popular Culture and the Structure of Identity (1999). Contact: Dr. Norma
Pecora, Professor, School of Telecommunications, Scripps College of Communications,
Ohio University, Athens, OH 45701, USA. Tel: 740-593-4864.
E-mail: pecora@ohio.edu

MCP 4 (1) Reviews © Intellect Ltd 2008 121


MCP_4_1-07_Reviews 1/23/08 12:48 PM Page 122
International Journal of

Journal of Media & Cultutal Politics | Volume Four Number One

Volume Four Number One


ISSN 1740-8296
Media & Cultural Politics
Volume 4 Number 1 – 2008
Special issue: Globalisation, communications and political action
4.1
Introduction
3–8 Globalisation, communications and political action: Special issue introduction
Gillian Youngs and Juliann Emmons

Articles
International Journal of

Media &
9–26 From global village to global marketplace: Metaphorical descriptions
of the global Internet
Nisha Shah
27–49 Distributed deliberative citizens: Exploring the impact of cyberinfrastructure

Cultural
on transnational civil society participation in global ICT policy processes
Derrick L. Cogburn, Jane Finnerup Johnsen and Swati Bhattacharyya
51–69 Improving the prospects for sustainable ICT projects in the developing world
Laura Hosman and Elizabeth Fife

Politics
71–85 The ‘Lady’ revolution in the age of technology
Janni Aragon

Commentaries
87–103 Does affluenza spread quickly? A historical case study from Spain
Mark D. Harmon and Nuria Cruz-Camara
European film archives at the threshold of the digital era:
Museums or data banks?
Maria Komninos
Becoming Hello Kitty: A Deleuzian Study
Amy TY Lai

Reviews
105–121 Reviews by Matt Stahl, Nathaniel I. Cordova, Brian Thornton, Debra M. Clarke,
P. David Marshall and Norma Pecora

intellect Journals | Media & Culture


ISSN 1740-8296
41
intellect

9 771740 829008 www.intellectbooks.com

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