COMPILATION OF CASE DIGESTS POLITICAL LAW

ATONG PAGLAUM V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS 4/2/2013

Facts: 52 party-list groups and organizations filed separate petitions totaling 54 with the Supreme Court (SC) in an effort to reverse various resolutions by the COMELEC disqualifying them from the May 2013 party-list race. The Comelec, in its assailed resolutions issued in October, November and December of 2012, ruled, among others, that these party-list groups and organizations failed to represent a marginalized and underrepresented sector, their nominees do not come from a marginalized and underrepresented sector, and/or some of the organizations or groups are not truly representative of the sector they intend to represent in Congress. Petitioners argued that the poll body committed grave abuse of discretion in denying some of the petitioners application for accreditation and cancelling the existing accreditation of the rest. They also lamented the poll bodys denial to accord them due process in the evaluation proceedings. Issue: Whether or not the said party-list groups were validly disqualified Held: The 54 petitions were remanded to the Comelec. The party-list groups and organizations covered by the 41 petitions that obtained mandatory injunction orders from the high court still stand a chance to make it to the 2013 party-list race as the high court ordered the poll body to determine whether petitioners are qualified to register under the party-list system and to participate in the 13 May 2013 partylist elections under the new parameters set forth in the Decision. The rest, meaning, the 13 other petitions, were remanded to the poll body merely for purposes of determining whether they may be granted accreditation under the new parameters but may not participate in the May 2013 elections. The Decision, however, clarified that the poll body (COMELEC) may not be faulted for acting on the basis of previous rulings (Ang Bagong Bayani, BANAT) of the high court regarding the party-list system. These earlier rulings enumerated guidelines on who may participate in the party-list system. There are three groups that may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or organizations. On the part of national parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations which intend to participate in the party-list race, the new guidelines state that these parties do not need to organize along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any marginalized or underrepresented sector. As for political parties, they may participate in the party-list race by registering under the party-list system and no longer field congressional candidates . These parties, if they field congressional candidates, however, are not barred from participating in the party-list elections; what they need to do is register their sectoral wing or party under the party-list system. This sectoral wing shall be considered an independent sectoral party linked to a political party through a coalition .

The question is: where does representation of marginalized and underrepresented sectors come in? The answer: on the SECTORAL PARTIES or organizations that intend to participate in the party-list system. The high court held that purely sectoral parties or organizations may either represent marginalized and underrepresented constituencies or those lacking well -defined political constituencies. The high court went on to enumerate marginalized and underrepresented sectors, as follows: labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors that lack well-defined political constituencies include professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth. The rule on nominees and members coming from the sector they intend to represent also applies only to the sectoral parties or organizations. The high court ruled that it is enough that [a] majority of the members of the SECTORAL PARTIES or organizations must belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sector they represent. The same is true for those who lack well -defined political constituencies. As for the nominees of these sectoral parties and organizations, the new guidelines provide that they must either be members of the sector or have a track record of advocacy for their sector . Should some of the nominees of these national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations be disqualified, the party or organization itself will not be disqualified provided that they have at least one nominee who remains qualified. The party-list system, according to the Decision Quoting Christian Monsod, the main proponent of the party-list system, the high court stated that it is not synonymous with that of the sectoral representation. The high court stressed that the framers of the 1987 Constitution did not intend to leave out non -sectoral parties in the party-list system and exclusively limit it to sectoral groups. The framers intended the sectoral parties to constitute a part, but not the entirety, of the party-list system In fact, the framers voted down , 19-22, a proposal to reserve the party-list system exclusively to sectoral parties. There can be no doubt whatsoever that the framers of the 1987 Constitution expressly rejected the proposal to make the party-list system exclusively for sectoral parties only, and that they clearly intended the party-list system to include both sectoral and non-sectoral parties, the Decision read. To amplify its position, the high court pointed out Sec. 5(1), Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution , which states:
Section 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations. WHAT IS THE PROOF THAT THE PARTY LIST SYSTEM IS NOT EXCLUSIVELY FOR SECTORAL PARTIES? SECTION 5(2), ARTICLE VI OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION WHICH MANDATES THAT, DURING THE FIRST THREE CONSECUTIVE TERMS OF CONGRESS AFTER THE RATIFICATION OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, ONE-HALF OF THE SEATS ALLOCATED TO PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVES SHALL BE FILLED, AS PROVIDED BY LAW, BY SELECTION OR ELECTION FROM THE LABOR,

PEASANT, URBAN POOR, INDIGENOUS CULTURAL COMMUNITIES, WOMEN, YOUTH, AND SUCH OTHER SECTORS AS MAY BE PROVIDED BY LAW, EXCEPT THE RELIGIOUS SECTOR. Moreover, Section 5(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution mandates that, during the first three consecutive terms of Congress after the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, one -half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector. This provision clearly shows again that the party-list system is not exclusively for sectoral parties for two obvious reasons. First, the other one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives would naturally be open to non-sectoral party-list representatives, clearly negating the idea that the party-list system is exclusively for sectoral parties representing the marginalized and underrepresented. Second, the reservation of one-half of the party-list seats to sectoral parties applies only for the first three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, clearly making the party-list system fully open after the end of the first three congressional terms. This means that, after this period, there will be no seats reserved for any class or type of party that qualifies under the three groups constituting the party-list system.

Hence, the clear intent, express wording, and party-list structure ordained in Section 5(1) and (2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution cannot be disputed: the party-list system is not for sectoral parties only, but also for non-sectoral parties. The Decision also pointed out pertinent provisions of Republic Act (RA) No. 7941, also known as the Party-list System Act, specifically from Sec. 3 (Definition of Terms): (b) A party means either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties (c) A political party refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of government and which, as the most immediate means of securing their adoption, regularly nominates and supports certain of its leaders and members as candidates for public office (d) A sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the sectors enumerated in Section 5 hereof whose principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector Again, the high court noted that defining these parties or groups, one from the others, could only mean that they are not one and the same. Previous rulings reversed by Atong Paglaum As earlier stated, there are previous rulings on the party-list system in the case of Ang Bagong Bayani v. Comelec (http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/jun2001/147589_decision.htm) and BANAT v. Comelec (http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/april2009/179271.htm). NOTES: SUBJECTS/DOCTRINES WHAT ESSENTIALLY WAS THE RULING OF THE COURT: that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in following prevailing decisions of this Court in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections. However, since the Court adopts in this Decision new parameters in the qualification of national, regional, and sectoral parties under the party-list system, thereby abandoning the rulings in the decisions applied by the COMELEC in disqualifying petitioners , we remand to the COMELEC all the present petitions for the COMELEC to determine who are qualified to register under the partylist system,

and to participate in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections, under the new parameters prescribed in this Decision. WHAT IS THE OBJECTIVE OF THE PARTY LIST SYSTEM UNDER THE 1987 CONSTITUTION? TO DEMOCRATIZE POLITICAL POWER BY GIVING POLITICAL PARTIES THAT CANNOT WIN IN LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT ELECTIONS A CHANCE TO WIN SEATS IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES. The 1987 Constitution provides the basis for the party-list system of representation. Simply put, the partylist system is intended to democratize political power by giving political parties that cannot win in legislative district elections a chance to win seats in the House of Representatives. The voter elects two representatives in the House of Representatives: one for his or her legislative district, and another for his or her party-list group or organization of choice. WHO ARE INCLUDED IN THE PARTY LIST SYSTEM? SECTORAL AND WELL AS NON-SECTORAL PARTIES. Indisputably, the framers of the 1987 Constitution intended the party-listsystem to include not only sectoral parties but also non-sectoral parties. The framers intended the sectoral parties to constitute a part, but not the entirety, of the party-list system. As explained by Commissioner Wilfredo Villacorta, political parties can participate in the party-list system [F]or as long as they field candidates who come from the different marginalized sectors that we shall designate in this Constitution.53 Thus, in the end, the proposal to give permanent reserved seats to certain sectors was outvoted. Instead, the reservation of seats to sectoral representatives was only allowed for the first three consecutive terms.55 There can be no doubt whatsoever that the framers of the 1987 Constitution expressly rejected the proposal to make the party-list system exclusively for sectoral parties only, and that they clearly intended the party-list system to include both sectoral and non-sectoral parties. WHAT IS THE COMMON DENOMINATOR BETWEEN SECTORAL AND NON-SECTORAL PARTIES? THEY CANNOT EXPECT TO WIN IN LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT ELECTIONS BUT THEY CAN GARNER, IN NATIONWIDE ELECTIONS. The common denominator between sectoral and non-sectoral parties is that they cannot expect to win in legislative district elections but they can garner, in nationwide elections, at least the same number of votes that winning candidates can garner in legislative district elections. The party-list system will be the entry point to membership in the House of Representatives for both these non-traditional parties that could not compete in legislative district elections. WHAT COMPOSE THE PARTY LIST SYSTEM? 3 DIFFERENT GROUPS: (1) NATIONAL PARTIES OR ORGANIZATIONS; (2) REGIONAL PARTIES OR ORGANIZATIONS; AND (3) SECTORAL PARTIES OR ORGANIZATIONS. Thus, the party-list system is composed of three different groups: (1) national parties or organizations; (2) regional parties or organizations; and (3) sectoral parties or organizations. National and regional parties or organizations are different from sectoral parties or organizations. National and regional parties or organizations need not be organized along sectoral lines and need not represent any particular sector.

WHAT IS THE PROOF THAT THE PARTY LIST SYSTEM IS NOT EXCLUSIVELY FOR SECTORAL PARTIES? SECTION 5(2), ARTICLE VI OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION WHICH MANDATES THAT, DURING THE FIRST THREE CONSECUTIVE TERMS OF CONGRESS AFTER THE RATIFICATION OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, ONE-HALF OF THE SEATS ALLOCATED TO PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVES SHALL BE FILLED, AS PROVIDED BY LAW, BY SELECTION OR ELECTION FROM THE LABOR, PEASANT, URBAN POOR, INDIGENOUS CULTURAL COMMUNITIES, WOMEN, YOUTH, AND SUCH OTHER SECTORS AS MAY BE PROVIDED BY LAW, EXCEPT THE RELIGIOUS SECTOR. Moreover, Section 5(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution mandates that, during the first three consecutive terms of Congress after the ratification of the 1987 C onstitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector. This provision clearly shows again that the party -list system is not exclusively for sectoral parties for two obvious reasons. First, the other one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives would naturally be open to nonsectoral party-list representatives, clearly negating the idea that the party-list system is exclusively for sectoral parties representing the marginalized and underrepresented. Second, the reservation of one half of the party-list seats to sectoral parties applies only for the first three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, clearly mak ing the party-list system fully open after the end of the first three congressional terms. This means that, after this period, there will be no seats reserved for any class or type of party that qualifies under the three groups constituting the party-list system. Hence, the clear intent, express wording, and party-list structure ordained in Section 5(1) and (2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution cannot be disputed: the party-list system is not for sectoral parties only, but also for non-sectoral parties. WHAT IS THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN A POLITICAL PARTY AND A SECTORAL PARTY. THE DIFFERENCE IS STATED IN R.A. NO. 7941. POLITICAL PARTY REFERS TO AN ORGANIZED GROUP OF CITIZENS ADVOCATING AN IDEOLOGY OR PLATFORM, PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES FOR THE GENERAL CONDUCT OF GOVERNMENT. A SECTORAL PARTY REFERS TO AN ORGANIZED GROUP OF CITIZENS BELONGING TO ANY OF THE SECTORS ENUMERATED IN SECTION 5 HEREOF WHOSE PRINCIPAL ADVOCACY PERTAINS TO THE SPECIAL INTEREST AND CONCERNS OF THEIR SECTOR. Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 7941 defines a party as either a po litical party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties. Clearly, a political party is different from a sectoral party. Section 3(c) of R.A. No. 7941 further provides that a political party refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of government. On the other hand, Section 3(d) of R.A. No. 7941 provides that a sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the sectors enumerated in Section 5 hereof whose principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector. R.A. No. 7941 provides different definitions for a political and a sectoral party. Obviously, they are separate and distinct from each other. DOES R.A. NO. 7941 REQUIRE NATIONAL AND REGIONAL PARTIES TO REPRESENT THE MARGINALIZED AND UNDERREPRESENTED SECTORS? NO. TO REQUIRE ALL NATIONAL AND REGIONAL PARTIES UNDER THE PARTY-LIST SYSTEM TO REPRESENT THE MARGINALIZED AND UNDERREPRESENTED IS TO

DEPRIVE AND EXCLUDE, BY JUDICIAL FIAT, IDEOLOGY-BASED AND CAUSE-ORIENTED PARTIES FROM THE PARTY-LIST SYSTEM. . To exclude them from the partylist system is to prevent them from joining the parliamentary struggle, leaving as their only option the armed struggle. To exclude them from the party-list system is, apart from being obviously senseless, patently contrary to the clear intent and express wording of the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941. Under the party-list system, an ideology-based or cause-oriented political party is clearly different from a sectoral party. A political party need not be organized as a sectoral party and need not represent any particular sector. There is no requirement in R.A. No. 7941 that a national or regional political party must represent a marginalized and underrepresented sector. It is sufficient that the political party consists of citizens who advocate the same ideology or platform, or the same governance principles and policies, regardless of their economic status as citizens . Section 5 of R.A. No. 7941 states that the sectors shall include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals. The sectors mentioned in Section 5 are not all necessarily marginalized and underrepresented. For sure, professionals are not by definition marginalized and underrepresented, not even the elderly, women, and the youth. However, professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth may lack well-defined political constituencies, and can thus organize themselves into sectoral parties in advocacy of the special interests and concerns of their respective sectors. Section 6 of R.A. No. 7941 provides another compelling reason for holding that the law does not require national or regional parties, as well as certain sectoral parties in Section 5 of R.A. No. 7941, to represent the marginalized and underrepresented. Section 6 provides the grounds for the COMELEC to refuse or cancel the registration of parties or organizations after due notice and hearing. WHAT IS THE CONSEQUENCE IF WE INTERPRET THAT ALL THE SECTORS MENTIONED IN SECTION 5 ARE MARGINALIZED AND UNDERREPRESENTED? IT WOULD LEAD TO ABSURDITIES. TO WHAT DOES THE PHRASE MARGINALIZED AND UNDERREPRESENTED REFER TO TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE BROAD POLICY DECLARATION IN SECTION 2OF R.A. NO. 7941 WITH ITS SPECIFIC IMPLEMENTING PROVISIONS, BEARING IN MIND THE APPLICABLE PROVISIONS OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION ON THE MATTER? THE PHRASE SHOULD REFER ONLY TO THE SECTORS IN SECTION 5 THAT ARE, BY THEIR NATURE, ECONOMICALLY MARGINALIZED AND UNDERREPRESENTED. WHAT ARE THESE SECTORS? THESE SECTORS ARE: LABOR, PEASANT, FISHERFOLK, URBAN POOR, INDIGENOUS CULTURAL COMMUNITIES, HANDICAPPED, VETERANS, OVERSEAS WORKERS, AND OTHER SIMILAR SECTORS. SHOULD ALL OF THE MEMBERS OF THE SECTORAL PARTY BELONG TO THE MARGINALIZED AND UNDERREPRESENTED? ONLY A MAJORITY. For these sectors, a majority of the members of the sectoral party must belong to the marginalized and underrepresented. HOW ABOUT THE NOMINEES OF THE THE SECTORAL PARTY? EITHER THEY MUST BELONG TO THE SECTOR OR MUST HAVE A TRACK RECORD OF ADVOCACY FOR THAT SECTOR.

The nominees of the sectoral party either must belong to the sector, or must have a track record of advocacy for the sector represented. Belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented sector does not mean one must wallow in poverty, destitution or infirmity. It is sufficient that one, or his or her sector, is below the middle class. More specifically, the economically marginalized and underrepresented are those who fall in the low income group as classified by the National Statistical Coordination Board.58 HOW ABOUT SECTORAL PARTIES OF PROFESSIONALS, THE ELDERLY, WOMEN AND THE YOUTH, DO THEY NEED TO BE MARGINALIZED? NO. THEY BELONG TO IDEOLOGY-BASED AND CAUSE ORIENTED PARTIES. ALLOWING THEM TO RUN AS PARTY LIST WILL GIVE GIVE SMALL IDEOLOGY-BASED AND CAUSE-ORIENTED PARTIES WHO LACK WELL-DEFINED POLITICAL CONSTITUENCIES A CHANCE TO WIN SEATS IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES. The recognition that national and regional parties, as well as sectoral parties of professionals, the elderly, women and the youth, need not be marginalized and underrepresented will allow small ideology -based and cause-oriented parties who lack well-defined political constituencies a chance to win seats in the House of Representatives. On the other hand, limiting to the marginalized and underrepresented the sectoral parties for labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and other sectors that by their nature are economically at the margins of society, will give the marginalized and underrepresented an opportunity to likewise win seats in the House of Representatives. This interpretation will harmonize the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 and will give rise to a multi-party system where those marginalized and underrepresented, both in economic and ideological status, will have the opportunity to send their own members to the House of Representatives. WHAT IS ONE RESULT OF THIS INTERPRETATION? IT WILL MAKE THE PARTY-LIST SYSTEM HONEST AND TRANSPARENT. This interpretation will also make the party-list system honest and transparent, eliminating the need for relatively well-off party-list representatives to masquerade as wallowing in poverty, destitution and infirmity, even as they attend sessions in Congress riding in SUVs. CAN POLITICAL PARTIES PARTICIPATE IN THE PARTY-LIST ELECTIONS? NO, EXCEPT THROUGH THEIR SECTORAL WINGS. THEY CANNOT DIRECTLY PARTICIPATE BECAUSE THEY NEITHER LACK WELL DEFINED POLITICAL CONSTITUENCIES NOR REPRESENT MARGINALIZED AND UNDDERPRESENTED SECTORS. The major political parties are those that field candidates in the legislative district elections. Major political parties cannot participate in the party-list elections since they neither lack well-defined political constituencies nor represent marginalized and underrepresented sectors. Thus, the national or regional parties under the party-list system are necessarily those that do not belong to major political parties. This automatically reserves the national and regional parties under the party-list system to those who lack well-defined political constituencies, giving them the opportunity to have members in the House of Representatives. WHY ARE POLITICAL PARTIES ALLOWED TO PARTICIPATE IN THE PARTY LIST ELECTIONS THROUGH THEIR SECTORAL WINGS? TO ENCOURAGE THEM TO WORK ASSIDUOUSLY IN EXTENDING THEIR CONSTITUENCIES TO THE MARGINALIZED AND UNDERREPRESENTED AND TO THOSE WHO LACK WELL -DEFINED POLITICAL CONSTITUENCIES.

The 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 allow major political parties to participate in party-list elections so as to encourage them to work assiduously in extending their constituencies to the marginalized and underrepresented and to those who lack well-defined political constituencies. The participation of major political parties in party-list elections must be geared towards the entry, as members of the House of Representatives, of the marginalized and underrepresented and those who lack well -defined political constituencies, giving them a voice in lawmaking. Thus, to participate in party-list elections, a major political party that fields candidates in the legislative district elections must organize a sectoral wing, like a labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, professional, women or youth wing, that can register under the party-list system. WHAT IS THE REQUIREMENT FOR A SECTORAL WING? IT MUST MUST HAVE ITS OWN CONSTITUTION, BY-LAWS, PLATFORM OR PROGRAM OF GOVERNMENT, OFFICERS AND MEMBERS, A MAJORITY OF WHOM MUST BELONG TO THE SECTOR REPRESENTED. Such sectoral wing of a major political party must have its own constitution, by-laws, platform or program of government, officers and members, a majority of whom must belong to the sector represented. The sectoral wing is in itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a major political party through a coalition. This linkage is allowed by Section 3 of R.A. No. 7941, which provides that component parties or organizations of a coalition may participate independently (in party-list elections) provided the coalition of which they form part does not participate in the party-list system. Section 9 of R.A. No. 7941 prescribes the qualifications of party-list nominees. This provision prescribes a special qualification only for the nominee from the youth sector. WHAT IS THE QUALIFICATION OF A PARTY-LIST NOMINEE? HE MUST BE A BONA-FIDE MEMBER OF THE PARTY OR ORGANIZATION WHICH HE OR SHE SEEKS TO REPRESENT. IN THE CASE OF SECTORAL PARTIES, TO BE A BONA FIDE PARTY-LIST NOMINEE ONE MUST EITHER BELONG TO THE SECTOR REPRESENTED, OR HAVE A TRACK RECORD OF ADVOCACY FOR SUCH SECTOR. A party-list nominee must be a bona fide member of the party or organization which he or she seeks to represent. In the case of sectoral parties, to be a bona fide party-list nominee one must either belong to the sector represented, or have a track record of advocacy for such sector. WHAT ARE NOW THE NEW PARAMETERS TO BE FOLLOWED BY COMELEC? THEY ARE AS FOLLOWS: 1. THREE DIFFERENT GROUPS MAY PARTICIPATE IN THE PARTY-LIST SYSTEM: (1) NATIONAL PARTIES OR ORGANIZATIONS, (2) REGIONAL PARTIES OR ORGANIZATIONS, AND (3) SECTORAL PARTIES OR ORGANIZATIONS. 2. NATIONAL PARTIES OR ORGANIZATIONS AND REGIONAL PARTIES OR ORGANIZATIONS DO NOT NEED TO ORGANIZE ALONG SECTORAL LINES AND DO NOT NEED TO REPRESENT ANY MARGINALIZED AND UNDERREPRESENTED SECTOR. 3. POLITICAL PARTIES CAN PARTICIPATE IN PARTY-LIST ELECTIONS PROVIDED THEY REGISTER UNDER THE PARTY-LIST SYSTEM AND DO NOT FIELD CANDIDATES IN LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT ELECTIONS. A POLITICAL PARTY, WHETHER MAJOR OR NOT, THAT FIELDS CANDIDATES IN LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT ELECTIONS CAN PARTICIPATE IN PARTYLIST ELECTIONS ONLY THROUGH ITS SECTORAL WING THAT CAN SEPARATELY REGISTER UNDER

THE PARTY-LIST SYSTEM. THE SECTORAL WING IS BY ITSELF AN INDEPENDENT SECTORAL PARTY, AND IS LINKED TO A POLITICAL PARTY THROUGH A COALITION. 4. SECTORAL PARTIES OR ORGANIZATIONS MAY EITHER BE MARGINALIZED AND UNDERREPRESENTED OR LACKING IN WELL-DEFINED POLITICAL CONSTITUENCIES. IT IS ENOUGH THAT THEIR PRINCIPAL ADVOCACY PERTAINS TO THE SPECIAL INTEREST AND CONCERNS OF THEIR SECTOR. THE SECTORS THAT ARE MARGINALIZED AND UNDERREPRESENTED INCLUDE LABOR, PEASANT, FISHERFOLK, URBAN POOR, INDIGENOUS CULTURAL COMMUNITIES, HANDICAPPED, VETERANS, AND OVERSEAS 62 RULE 64 IN RELATION TO RULE 65, 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. WORKERS. THE SECTORS THAT LACK WELL-DEFINED POLITICAL CONSTITUENCIES INCLUDE PROFESSIONALS, THE ELDERLY, WOMEN, AND THE YOUTH. 5. A MAJORITY OF THE MEMBERS OF SECTORAL PARTIES OR ORGANIZATIONS THAT REPRESENT THE MARGINALIZED AND UNDERREPRESENTED MUST BELONG TO THE MARGINALIZED AND UNDERREPRESENTED SECTOR THEY REP RESENT. SIMILARLY, A MAJORITY OF THE MEMBERS OF SECTORAL PARTIES OR ORGANIZATIONS THAT LACK WELL DEFINED POLITICAL CONSTITUENCIES MUST BELONG TO THE SECTOR THEY REPRESENT. THE NOMINEES OF SECTORAL PARTIES OR ORGANIZATIONS THAT REPRESENT THE MARGINALIZED AND UNDERREPRESENTED, OR THAT REPRESENT THOSE WHO LACK WELL DEFINED POLITICAL CONSTITUENCIES, EITHER MUST BELONG TO THEIR RESPECTIVE SECTORS, OR MUST HAVE A TRACK RECORD OF ADVOCACY FOR THEIR RESPECTIVE SECTORS. THE NOMINEES OF NATIONAL AND REGIONAL PARTIES OR ORGANIZATIONS MUST BE BONA-FIDE MEMBERS OF SUCH PARTIES OR ORGANIZATIONS. 6. NATIONAL, REGIONAL, AND SECTORAL PARTIES OR ORGANIZATIONS SHALL NOT BE DISQUALIFIED IF SOME OF THEIR NOMINEES ARE DISQUALIFIED, PROVIDED THAT THEY HAVE AT LEAST ONE NOMINEE WHO REMAINS QUALIFIED.

CITY OF MANILA VS. TE

FACTS: City of Manila instituted a complaint for expropriation against herein respondent. The latter filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that Ordinance 7951 (an expropriation measure enacted on February 3, 1998 by the city council authorizing him to acquire by negotiation or expropriation certain pieces of real property along Maria Clara and Governor Forbes Streets) was an invalid expropriation measure because it violated the rule against taking private property without just compensation and that it did not comply with the requirements of Sections 9 and 10 of RA 7279. Furthermore, respondent is qualified as a small property owner and, hence, exempt from the operation of RA 7279, the subject lot being the only piece of realty that she owned. Motion to dismiss was granted by RTC. Petitioners appeal to CA but to no avail. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the filing of a motion to dismiss by the respondent is improper. HELD: Yes, it was improper. The present state of Rule 67 dispenses with the filing of an extraordinary motion to dismiss such as that required before in response to a complaint for expropriation. The present rule requires the filing of an answer as responsive pleading to the complaint. Section 3 thereof provides:

If a defendant has any objection to the filing of or the allegations in the complaint, or any objection or defense to the taking of his property, he shall serve his answer within the time stated in the summons. The answer shall specifically designate or identify the property in which he claims to have an interest, state the nature and extent of the interest claimed, and adduce all his objections and defenses to the taking of his property. No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint shall be alleged or allowed in the answer or any subsequent pleading.

Thus, the trial court in this case should have denied respondents motion to dismiss and required her to submit in its stead an answer within the reglementary period.

Petition was granted. The dismissal was set aside and the case was remanded to the lower court. {Important notes}

Expropriation is a two-pronged proceeding: first, the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts which terminates in an order of dismissal or an order of condemnation affirming the plaintiff's lawful right to take the property for the public use or purpose described in the complaint and second, the determination by the court of the just compensation for the property sought to be expropriated. the concept of socialized housing, whereby housing units are distributed and/or sold to qualified beneficiaries on much easier terms, has already been included in the expanded definition of public use or purpose in the context of the States exercise of the power of eminent domain.

Del Castillo v. People January 30, 2012 (Presence of Barangay Tanod will NOT Validate an Illegal Service of Search Warrant)

Facts: Acting upon a confidential report that Del Castillo is engaged in the illegal sale of drugs, police officers secured search warrant. On their way to Del Castillo's house, someone shouted for "raid" which caused for the commotion in the place. Police officers hurriedly went to the house; the latter was able to escape. The wife was present. In the presence of the barangay tanods, the officers searched the house but they found nothing. It was a barangay tanod who found 4 plastic packs of a crystalline substance (shabu). [to cut the long story short] Del Castillo was convicted by the RTC, affirmed by CA. Hence, this appeal.

Del Castillo's contention: Search is invalid. The illegal substance was searched in the place not particularly described in the search. People's contention: Such defect was cured because it was not the police officers who searched the illegal substance, but the barangay tanod who is a private individual. Thus, Bill of Rights

(protection against unreasonable searches and seizures) will not apply, as the same may only be enforced against the State or its agents.

Issue: Is the contention of the People meritorious?

Held: No. A barangay tanod is not a private individual. The Local Government Code (RA 7160) contains provision which describes the function of a barangay tanod as an agent of persons in authority. Hence, constitutional guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizures is applicable as against government authorities.

Gamboa v. Chan, et.al. GR No. 193636. July 24, 2012

Constitutional Law; Right to Privacy; Liberty in the constitutional sense must mean more than freedom from unlawful governmental restraint; it must include privacy as well, it is to be repository of freedom. The right to be let alone is indeed the beginning of all freedom.

The right to privacy, as an inherent concept of liberty, has long been recognized as a constitutional right. This Court, in Morfe v. Mutuc (22 S 424) (1968), thus enunciated: The due process question touching on an alleged deprivation of liberty as thus resolved goes a long way in disposing of the objections raised by plaintiff that the provision on the periodical submission of a sworn statement of assets and liabilities is violative of the constitutional right to privacy. There is much to be said for this view of Justice Douglas: Liberty in the constitutional sense must mean more than freedom from unlawful governmental restraint; it must include privacy as well, it it is to be a repository of freedom. The right to be let alone is indeed the beginning of all freedom. As a matter of fact, this right to be let alone is, to quote from Mr. Justice Brandeis the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men. The concept of liberty would be emasculated if it does not likewise compel respect for his personality as a unique individual whose claim to privacy and interference demands respect.

Same; Same; The right to privacy is considered a fundamental right that must be protected from intrusion or constraint.

However, in Standard Chartered Bank v. Senate Committee on Banks (541 S 456) (2007), this Court underscored that the right to privacy is NOT ABSOLUTE, viz: With respect to the right of privacy which the petitioners claim respondent has violated, suffice it to state that privacy is not an absolute right. While it is true that Section 21, Art. VI of the Constitution, guarantees respect for the rights of persons affected by the legislative investigation, not every invocation of the right to privacy should be allowed to thwart a

legitimate congressional inquiry. In Sabio v. Gordon, we have held that the right of the people to access information on matters of public concern generally prevails over the right to privacy of ordinary financial transactions. In that case, we declared that the right to privacy is not absolute where there is an overriding compelling state interest. Employing the rational basis relationship test, as laid down in Morfe v. Mutuc, there is no infringement of the individuals right to privacy as the requirement to disclosure of information is for valid purpose, in this case, to ensure that the government agencies involved in regulating banking transactions adequately protect the public who invest in foreign securities. Suffice it to state the this purpose constitutes a reason compelling enough to proceed with the assailed legislative investigation.

Same; Writ of Habeas Data; The writ of habeas data is an independent and summary remedy designed to protect the image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of an individual, and to provide a forum to enforce ones right to the truth and informational privacy.

The writ of habeas datait seeks to protect a persons right to control information regarding oneself, particularly in instances in which such information is being collected through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends. It must be emphasized that in order for the privilege of the writ to be granted, there must exist a nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the other.

Same; Private Armies; The Constitution explicitly mandates the dismantling of private armies and other armed groups not recognized by the duly constituted authority.

The Constitution explicitly mandates the dismantling of private armies and other armed groups not recognized by the duly constituted authority. It also provides for the establishment of one police force that is national in scope and civilian in character, and is controlled and administered by a national police commission.

ISSUES:

1. WON the trial court erred in ruling that the Zenarosa Commission be impleaded as either a necessary or indispensable party; 2. WON the trial court erred in clearing in declaring that (Gamboa) failed to present sufficient proof to link respondents as the informant to the Zenarosa Commission; 3. WON the trial court failed to satisfy the spirit of Habeas Data; 4. WON the trial court erred in pronouncing that the reliance of the Zenarosa Commission to the PNP as alleged by Gamboa is an assumption;

WON the trial court erred in making a point that respondents are distinct to PNP as an agency.

Luz v. People February 29, 2012 (Search and Arrest for Traffic Violation)

Facts: While driving along a highway in Naga City, Rodelo Luz was flagged down by a policeman/traffic enforcer, who was then assigned in that area, for violation of a traffic ordinance, particularly driving without a helmet. Luz was invited to the nearby police station. While the policeman prepared for the citation ticket for the violation, he noticed Luz to be "uneasy and kept on getting something from his jacket." With this suspicion, he asked Luz to take out all the contents inside of his jacket. Among the things revealed was a metal container. Policeman asked him to open the same. It contained 2 sachets of shabu. [to cut the long story short] Luz was convicted by the RTC for violation of RA 9165, particularly for illegal possession of dangerous drugs. The CA affirmed the decision in toto. Hence, this appeal.

Luz's contention: search incidental to a LAWFUL arrest is inapplicable, because he was not lawfully arrested; thus, search was invalid. People's contention: there was a lawful arrest because Luz committed a violation of traffic ordinance right there and then; thus, search was also valid as it is incidental to a lawful arrest, and Luz consented to the search.

ISSUE 1: Was there a valid arrest? NO. [thus, search incidental to a lawful arrest not valid] Under RA 4136 or the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, the general procedure for dealing with a traffic violation is NOT the arrest of the offender, but the confiscation of the driver's license of the latter. In addition thereto, under the PNP Operations Manual, if the cause for the flagging down of a vehicle is a traffic violation, the officer's duty is only to issue Traffic Citation Ticket (TCT) or Traffic Violation Report (TVR), and never to indulge in prolonged, unnecessary conversation or argument with the driver violator. The roadside questioning of a motorist does not fall under custodial interrogation, nor can it be considered a formal arrest.

ISSUE 2: Were Luz's constitutional rights violated? YES. At the time a person is arrested, the latter shall be informed of their constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that any statement they might make could be used against them. In the case at bar, the police officers informed Luz of his aforementioned rights only after he had been arrested for illegal possession of dangerous drugs.

 Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 US 420 (1984) Miranda warnings must also be given to a person apprehended due to a traffic violation. Knowles v. Iowa, 525 US 113 (1998) When a police officer stops a person for [traffic violation] and correspondingly issues a citation, this procedure does not authorized the officer to conduct a full search of the car.

ISSUE 3: Was there a consented search? NO. Whether consent to the search was in fact voluntary is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the circumstances. Relevant to this determination are the following characteristics of the person giving consent and the environment in which consent in given: (1) the age of the defendant; (2) whether the defendant was in a public or a secluded location; (3) whether the defendant objected to the search or passively looked on; (4) the education and intelligence of the defendant; (5) the presence of the coercive police procedures; (6) the defendant's belief that no incriminating evidence would be found; (7) the nature of the police questioning; (8) the environment in which the questioning took place; and (9) the possibly vulnerable subjective state of the person consenting. It is the State that has the burden of proving that the necessary consent was given freely and voluntarily given. In this case, all that was alleged was that the petitioner was alone at the police station at 3:00 AM, accompanied by several police officers. These circumstances weigh heavily against the finding of valid consent to a warrantless search.

- IN SUM, Luz acquitted of the offense charged.

Magallona, et.al. v. Sec. Ermita, et.al. GR No. 187167. August 16, 2011 (Archipelago's Separate Baseline from that of the "Regime of Islands" is Constitutional)

Facts: In March 2009, Congress passed RA 9522 (the present Philippine Baselines Law), as compliance to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea ( UNCLOS III). RA 9522 shortened one baseline, optimized the location of some basepoints around the Philippine archipelago and classified the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) and the Scarborough Shoal, as "regimes of islands" whose islands generate their own applicable maritime zones. Petitioners (as citizens, taxpayers, and/or legislators) assail the constitutionality of RA 9522 on two principal grounds: (1) the law reduces Philippine maritime territory, and logically, the reach of the Philippine state's sovereign power in violation of Art. 1 of the 1987 Constitution, and (2) the law opens the country's waters landward of the baselines to maritime passage by all vessels and aircrafts, undermining Philippine sovereignty and national security.

Respondents defended RA 9522 as the country's compliance with the terms of UNCLOS III.

Issue: Whether or not RA 9522 is unconstitutional.

Ruling: UNCLOS III has nothing to do with acquisition or loss of territory. It is a multilateral treaty regulating, among others, sea-use rights over maritime zones, i.e. territorial waters (12 nautical miles from the baselines); contiguous zone (24 na); exclusive economic zone (200 na); and continental shelves that UNCLOS III delimits. Baselines laws are nothing but statutory mechanisms for UNCLOS III State parties to delimit with precision the extent of their maritime zones and continental shelves. Far from surrendering the PH's claims over the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal, Congress' decision to classify them as "rgime of islands" consistent with Art. 121 of UNCLOS III manifests the State's responsible observance of its pacta sunt servanda obligation under UNCLOS III. Art. 121 thereof states, any "naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is above water at high tide," such as portions of the KIG, qualifies under the category of "regime of islands," whose islands generate their own applicable maritime zones. Petitioner's assertion of loss of "about 15,000 square nautical miles of territorial waters" under RA 9522 is similarly unfounded both in fact and law. On the contrary, RA 9522, by optimizing the location of basepoints, increased the PH's total maritime space by 145, 216 square nautical miles. UNCLOS III creates a sui generis maritime space the EEZ - in waters previously part of the high seas. However, it preserves the traditional freedom of navigation of other States that attached to this zone beyond the territorial sea before UNCLOS III. Absent an UNCLOS III compliant baselines law, an archipelagic State like the PH will find itself devoid of internationally acceptable baselines from where the breadth of its maritime zones and continental shelf is measured. RA 9522 is therefore a most vital step on the part of the PH in safeguarding its maritime zones, consistent with the Constitution and our national interest.

NPC vs. Heirs of Macabangkit Sangkay Promulgated August 24, 2011 Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. Section 9, Article III, 1987 Constitution

The Case

NPC (petitioner), seeks review on certiorari of CA decision which affirmed RTC decision (1999) ordering NPC to pay just compensation to respondents.

Facts

NPC constructed several underground tunnels to be used in diverting water flow from the Agus River to the hydroelectric plants, to generate electricity for Mindanao (pursuant to its mandate under RA 6395).

In 1997, respondent claimed they had belatedly discovered the construction of the tunnels and sued NPC in the RTC for recovery of damages and of the property, with alternative prayer for just compensation, alleging that the tunnels deprived them of the use and value of their land, also creating their land unsafe for habitation.

NPC countered that the heirs of Macabangkit had no right to compensation under section 3(f) of Republic Act No. 6395, under which a mere legal easement on their land was made.

RTC denied the request for removal or dismantling of the tunnel but ordered NPC to pay plaintiffs Php113,532,500.00. NPC appealed to CA. CA rendered decision affirming RTC decision.

Issue

WON the act constructing tunnels constituted taking of property (as against a mere easement) entitling the landowners to just compensation.

Ruling

We uphold the liability of NPC for payment of just compensation. NPCs construction of the tunnel constituted taking of the land and entitled owners to just compensation.

NPC constructed a tunnel underneath the land of the Heirs of Macabangkit without going through formal expropriation proceedings and without procuring their consent or at least informing them beforehand of the construction. NPCs construction adversely affected the owners rights and interests because the subterranean intervention by NPC prevented them from introducing any developments on the surface, and from disposing of the land or any portion of it, either by sale or mortgage.

Did such consequence constitute taking of the land as to entitle the owners to just compensation?

We agree with both the RTC and the CA that there was a full taking on the part of NPC, notwithstanding that the owners were not completely and actually dispossessed. It is settled that the taking of private property for public use, to be compensable, need not be an actual physical taking or appropriation.
[36]

Indeed, the expropriators action may be short of acquisition of title, physical possession,
[37]

or occupancy but may still amount to a taking.

Compensable taking includes destruction, restriction,

diminution, or interruption of the rights of ownership or of the common and necessary use and enjoyment of the property in a lawful manner, lessening or destroying its value.
[38]

It is neither necessary that the

owner be wholly deprived of the use of his property,

[39]

nor material whether the property is removed from

[40]

the possession of the owner, or in any respect changes hands.

Ouano vs Republic, February 9, 2011 Expropriation; abandonment of public purpose.

FACTS:

In this case, the Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA) and/or its predecessor agency had not actually used the lots subject of the final decree of expropriation in Civil Case No. R-1881 for the purpose they were originally taken by the government, i.e., for the expansion and development of Lahug Airport. In fact, the Lahug Airport had been closed and abandoned. Furthermore, it was established by evidence that the National Airport Corporation, MCIAAs predecessor, through its team of negotiators, had given assurance to the affected landowners that they would be entitled to repurchase their respective lots in the event they are no longer used for airport purposes.

ISSUE: Whether or not the former owners of expropriated lands- not used for the purpose intended be allowed to recover the same.

HELD:

The SC held that the government only acquires the rights in expropriated parcels of land as may be allowed by the character of its title over the properties. This means that in the event the particular public use for which a parcel of land is expropriated is abandoned, the owner shall not be entitled to recover or repurchase it as a matter of right, unless such recovery or repurchase is expressed in or irresistibly deducible from the condemnation judgment. In the present case, the above final decree of expropriation allows the recovery or repurchase, upon abandonment of the Lahug airport project, as a condition of approving expropriation. In effect, the government merely held the properties condemned in trust until the proposed public use or purpose for which the lots were condemned was actually consummated by the government. Since the government failed to perform the obligation that is the basis of the transfer of the property, then the lot owners can demand the reconveyance of their old properties after the payment of the condemnation price. A condemnor should commit to use the property pursuant to the purpose stated in the petition for expropriation, failing which it should file another petition for the new purpose. If not, then it behooves the condemnor to return the said property to

its private owner, if the latter so desires. The government cannot plausibly keep the property it expropriated in any manner it pleases and, in the process, dishonor the judgment of expropriation.

Political Law Review

Republic vs Rural Bank of Kabacan, Inc. (GR No. 185124 January 25, 2012) 664 SCRA 233

Facts: National Irrigation Authority (NIA) is a government-owned-and-controlled corporation created under Republic Act No. (R.A.) 3601 on 22 June 1963. It is primarily responsible for irrigation development and management in the country. Its charter was amended by Presidential Decree (P.D.) 552 on 11 September 1974and P.D. 1702 on 17 July 1980. To carry out its purpose, NIA was specifically authorized under P.D. 552 to exercise the power of eminent domain. NIA needed some parcels of land for the purpose of constructing the Malitubog-Marigado Irrigation Project. On 8 September 1994, it filed with the RTC of Kabacan, Cotabato a Complaint for the expropriation of a portion of three (3) parcels of land covering a total of 14, 497.91 square meters. On 25 September 1995, NIA filed a Second Amended Complaint to allege properly the area sought to be expropriated, the exact address of the expropriated properties and the owners thereof. NIA further prayed that it be authorized to take immediate possession of the properties after depositing with the Philippine National Bank the amount of 19, 246.58 representing the provisional value thereof. On 31 October 1995, respondents filed their Answer with Affirmative and Special Defenses and Counterclaim. They alleged, inter alia, that NIA had no authority to expropriate portions of their land, because it was not a sovereign political entity; that it was not necessary to expropriate their properties, because there was an abandoned government property adjacent theirs, where the project could pass through; that Lot No. 3080 was no longer owned by Rural Bank of Kabacan; that NIAs valuation of their expropriated properties was inaccurate because of the improvements on the land that should have placed its value at % million; and that NIA never negotiated with the landowners before taking their properties for the project, causing permanent and irreparable damages to their properties. On 11 September 1996, RTC issued an Order forming a committee tasked to determine the fair market value of the properties. On 10 October 1996, the lower court issued an Order stating it would issue a writ of possession in favor of NIA upon the determination of the fair arket value of the properties. The lower court later amended its ruling and, on 21 October 1996, issued a Writ of Possession in favor of NIA. On 15 October 1996, the committee submitted a Commissioners Report to the RTC. The report, however, stated that the committee members could not agree on the market value of the subject properties and recommended the appointment of new independent commissioners to replace the ones coming from the parties only. On 25 November 1996, the new committee submitted its Com missioners Report to the lower court. The committee had agreed that the fair market value of the land should be 65 per square meter based on the zonal valuation of the Bureau if Internal Revenue (BIR.) On 3 December 1997, the committee submitted to the RTC another report, which had adopted the first Committee Report, as well as the formers 25 November 1996 report. However, the committee

added to its computation the value of the earthfill excavated from portions of Lot. Nos. 3039 and 3080. Petitioner objected to the inclusion of the value of the excavated soil in the computation of the value of the land.

Issue: Whether or not the CA seriously erred in affirming the trial courts finding of just compensation of the land and the improvements thereon based on the report of the commissioners.

Held: Expropriation Proceedings; Just Compensation --- In expropriation proceedings, just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. The measure is not the takers gain, but the owners loss. The word just is used to intensify the meaning of the word compensation and to convey thereby the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full and ample. The constitutional limitation of just compensation is considered to be the sum equivalent to the market value of the property, broadly defined as the price fixed by the seller in open market in the usual and ordinary course of legal action and competition; or the fair value of the property; as between one who receives and one who desires to sell it, fixed at the time of the actual taking by the government. In National Power Corporation vs. Diato-Bernal, this Court emphasized that the just-ness of the compensation could only be attained by using reliable and actual data a bases for fixing the value of the condemned property. The reliable and actual data we referred to in that case were the sworn declarations of realtors in the area, as well as tax declarations and zonal valuation from the BIR. In disregarding the Committee Report by the National Power Corporation in the said case, we ruled thus: It is evident that the above conclusions are highly speculative and devoid of any actual and reliable basis. First, the market values of the subject propertys neighboring lots were mere estimates and unsupported by any corroborative documents, such as sworn declarations of realtors in the area concerned, tax declarations or zonal valuation from the BIR for the contiguous residential dwellings and commercial establishments. The report also failed to elaborate on how and by how much the community centers and convenience facilities enhanced the value of respondents property. Finally, the market sales data and price listings alluded to in the report were not even appended thereto. As correctly invoked by NAPOCOR, a commissioners report of land prices which is not based on any documentary evidence is manifestly hearsay and should be disregarded by the court. The trial court adopted the flawed findings of the commissioners hook, line and sinker. It did not even bother to require the submission of the alleged market sales data and price listings. Further, the RTC overlooked that fact that the recommended just compensation was gauged as of September 10, 1999 or more than two years after the complaint was filed on January 8, 1997. It is settled that just compensation is to be ascertained as of the time of the taking, which usually coincides with the commencement of the expropriation proceedings. Where the institution of the action precedes entry into the property, the just compensation is to be ascertained as of the time of the filing pf the complaint. Clearly, the recommended just compensation in te commissioners report is unacceptable. We also uphold the CA ruling, which deleted the inclusion of the value of the excavated soil in the payment for just compensation. There is no legal basis to separate the value of the excavated soil from that of the expropriated properties, contrary to what the trial court did. In the context of expropriation proceedings, the soil has no value separate from that of the expropriated land. Just compensation ordinarily refers to the value of the land to compensate for what the owner actually loses . Such value could only be that which prevailed at the time of the taking.

Ownership of lands are indivisible, the ownership of land extends to the surface as well as to the subsoil under it.

Note: Just compensation is to be ascertained as of the time of the taking, which usually coincides with the commencement of the expropriation proceedings. Where the institution of the action precedes entry into the property, the just compensation is to be ascertained as of the time of the filing of the complaint.

Political Law Review

Sto. Tomas vs Salac (G.R. No. 152642 November 13, 2012) 685 SCRA 245

Facts: On June 7, 1995 Congress enacted Republic Act (R.A.) 8042 or the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995bthat, for among other purpose, sets the Governments policies on overseas employment and establishes a higher standard of protection and promotion of the welfare of migrant workers, their families, and overseas Filipinos in distress. Sections 29 and 30 of the Act commanded the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) to begin deregulating within one year of its passage the business of handling the recruitment and migration of overseas Filipino workers and phase out within five years the regulatory functions of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA.) On January 8, 2002 respondents filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with application for temporary restraining order (TRO) and preliminary injunction against petitioners before RTC of Quezon City, Branch 96. Salac, et al. sought to: (1) nullify DOLE Department Order 10 and POEA Memorandum Circular 15; (2) prohibit the DOLE, POEA, and TESDA from implementing the same and from further issuing rules and regulations that would regulate the recruitment and placement of overseas Filipino workers; and (3) also enjoin them to comply with the policy of deregulation mandated under Sections 29 and 30 of RA 8042.

Issue: Whether or not R.A. 8042 is constitutional as a valid exercise of police power.

Held: Constitutional Law; Police Power --- As the Court held in People vs. Ventura, the State under its police power may prescribe such regulations as in its judgment will secure or tend to secure the general welfare of the people, to protect them against the consequence of ignorance and incapacity as well as of deception and fraud. Police power is that inherent and plenary power of the State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety, and welfare of society.

R.A. 8042 is a police power measure intended to regulate the recruitment and deployment of OFWs. It aims to curb, if not eliminate, the injustices and abuses suffered by numerous OFWs seeking to work abroad. The rule is settled that every statute has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. The Court cannot inquire into the wisdom or expediency of the laws enacted by the Legislative Department. Hence, in the absence of clear and unmistakable case that the statute is unconstitutional, the Court must uphold its validity.