AFF ANSWERS TO CHINA DA

NO UNIQUENESS

US Influence Resilient
US influence in Latin Americas resilient and the thesis of the DA is wrong
Duddy & Mora, 5/1 [Patrick US Ambassador to Venezuela until 2010 and Senior Lecturer at
Duke. And Frank Director of Latin American Center at Florida Intl University and former Assistant Secretary of Defense Western Hemisphere (09-13). Latin America: Is U.S. influence waning? 5/1/13 http://www.miamiherald.com/2013/05/01/3375160/latin-america-is-usinfluence.html#storylink=cpy]
As Moises Naim notes in his recent book, The End of Power, there

has been an important change in power distribution in the world away from states toward an expanding and increasingly mobile set of actors that are dramatically shaping the nature and scope of global relationships. In Latin America, many of the most substantive and dynamic forms of engagement are occurring in a web of crossnational relationships involving small and large companies, people-to-people contact through student exchanges and social media, travel and migration. Trade and investment remain the most enduring and measurable dimensions of U.S. relations with the region. It is certainly the case that our economic interests alone would justify more U.S. attention to the region. Many observers who worry about declining U.S. influence in this area point to the rise of trade with China and the presence of European companies and investors. While it is true that other countries are important to the economies of Latin America and the Caribbean, it is also still true that the United States is by far the largest and most important economic partner of the region and trade is growing even with those countries with which we do not have free trade agreements. An area of immense importance to regional economies that we often overlook is the exponential growth in travel, tourism and migration. It is commonplace to note the enormous presence of
foreign students in the United States but in 2011, according to the Institute of International Education, after Europe, Latin America was the second most popular destination for U.S. university students. Hundreds of thousands of U.S. tourists travel every year to Latin America and the Caribbean helping to support thousands of jobs. From 2006-2011 U.S.

non-government organizations, such as churches, think tanks and universities increased the number of partnerships with their regional cohorts by a factor of four. Remittances to Latin America and the Caribbean from the United States totaled $64 billion in 2012. Particularly for the smaller economies of
Central America and the Caribbean these flows can sometimes constitute more than 10 percent of gross domestic product. Finally,

one should not underestimate the resiliency of U.S. soft power in the region. The power of national reputation, popular culture, values and institutions continues to contribute to U.S. influence in ways that are difficult to measure and impossible to quantify. Example: Despite 14 years of
strident anti-American rhetoric during the Chvez government, tens of thousand of Venezuelans apply for U.S. nonimmigrant visas every year, including many thousands of Chvez loyalists. Does this mean we can feel comfortable relegating U.S. relations with the hemisphere to the second or third tier of our international concerns? Certainly not. We

have real and proliferating interests in the region. As the president and his team head to Mexico and Costa Rica, it is important to recognize the importance of our ties to the region. We have many individual national partners in the Americas. We dont need a new template for relations with the hemisphere as a whole or another grand U.S.-Latin America strategy. A greater commitment to work more intensely with the individual countries on the issues most relevant to them would be appropriate. The United States still has the economic and cultural heft in the region to play a fundamental role and to advance its own interests.

US Influence wont be challenged its resilient.

Keck & Nye Jr. 11 (Zachary Keck, Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Research Interns at CNAS, Chinas
Growing Influence in Americas Backyard: The Trends Policymakers Should be Watching, January 19, http://www.cnas.org/blogs/naturalsecurity/2011/01/china-s-growing-influenceamerica-s-backyard-trends-policymakers-shoul) While American policymakers should be mindful of these growing trends in their own backyard, one shouldnt expect China to usurp U.S. influence in the region anytime soon. The United States is still far more active in the region than China; in 2009 U.S.-Latin America trade 4.75 times that of PRCLATAMs trade, at $530 billion and $111.5 billion respectively. Beijing has also been relatively cautious asserting itself in Americas backyard. Finally, significant barriers between LATAM and China remain, including the lack of historical ties between the two as well as significant cultural differences. In fact, some countries in LATAM have grown increasingly suspicious of China in recent years. For instance, although
China has become Brazils largest trading partner, and the two countries form half of the BRIC alliance, Brazil has accepted Chinas presence only grudgingly, consistently reaffirming tariffs directed against Beijing. Brazil

has also emerged as one of the most vocal critics of Chinas currency manipulation. But while these suspicious countries may rebuff continued
Chinese expansion into Latin America, Beijings not likely to quit making the sell (literally and figuratively) for building strong ties with an ascendant China.

China will never overtake the US in Latin America because of proximity.

George 11 (Tarun, Chinas Influence in Latin America: How Far Can it Go? February 17th,
2011, http://www.nearshoreamericas.com/chinas-influence-latin-america/
When Chinese President Hu Jintao visited Obama in Washington month, its safe to say that one item on the agenda was the trade implications of Chinas increasingly influential economic footprint, especially in emerging markets. The fact that China is replacing the US as the main trading partner in countries like Brazil should make American policymakers take notice. Until very recently, Latin America has been a low priority for the US, both in terms of foreign policy and commerce. Trade agreements like DR-CAFTA have received a mixed response from Latin America, and the results are slow in coming, especially for professional services. So China has been filling the vacuum. But will

Chinese investment in the LatAm outsourcing industry replace the US? Highly unlikely. Advantages like proximity, time zone and access to technically skilled labor ensure that the Nearshore will continue to be an extremely attractive location for US buy-side clients. In
turn, the US will continue to be an attractive market for LatAm vendors. But one thing is clear as China increasingly moves into the tech services industry, its LatAm business links will increase just as they have for natural resources. In the years to come, US buyers may face Nearshore competition.

Competition Now
China and the U.S. competing for resources now link is inevitable.
Regenstreif 06/12 (Gary is the editor at large at Reuters. The looming U.S.-China rivalry over Latin America
http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2013/06/12/the-looming-u-s-china-rivalry-over-latin-america/ June 12 2013)

Though the U.S. and Chinese presidents heralded a new model of cooperation at their weekend summit, a growing competition looks more likely. The whirlwind of activity before President Barack Obama met
with President Xi Jinping in the California desert revealed that Beijing and Washingtons sights are set on a similar prize and face differing challenges to attain it.Their focus

is Latin America and the prize is increased trade and investment opportunities in a region where economic reforms have pulled millions out of poverty and into the middle class. Latin America is rich in the commodities and energy that both China and the United States need, largely stable politically and eager to do deals. Consider the travel itinerary: Obama visited
Mexico and Costa Rica last month. Vice President Joe Biden recently went to Colombia, Trinidad and Tobago and Brazil. Chiles president paid Obama a visit last week, Perus leader arrived Tuesday and Brazils is due in October.Meanwhile, just after Biden left Trinidad, Xi arrived, part of a tour that also took him to Costa Rica and Mexico to promote trade and cooperation. Both U.S. and Chinese officials, however, are finding a more self-confident Latin America, able to leverage its new strength to forge better agreements and find multiple trading partners. That will likely force Washington to work harder to maintain its leading trade position against China which has money to burn in the region.

No Mexico Cooperation
China has a long way to go before reaching good relations with Mexico.
Wu 5/1 (Chunsi is a M&T Professor of Banking and Finance Department of Finance and Managerial Economics at University of
Buffalo. U.S.-Mexico-China Relations in the Context of Regional Cooperation: A Chinese Perspective China and the New Triangular Relationships in the Americas May 1 2013)

In order to improve Chinese-Mexican cooperation, China must strengthen its efforts in various areas. Firstly, building a mutually beneficial economic relationship is the central pillar to developing relations between China and Mexico. As presented above, both China and Mexico have taken numerous measures to coordinate their policies, and trade disputes between them are not as serious as one might imagine. However, this has not been sufficient. In accordance with the strategic importance view of China-Mexico relations, China must create a larger blueprint for its economic cooperation with Mexico. Moreover, China should encourage its academic and research communities to
communicate with their counterparts in Mexico to plan proposals for bilateral coopera- tion. Through measures like this, China and Mexico may come to agree on more points vital to their sustained cooperation, and make joint efforts to move forward in the same direction.

Lots of boundaries between Chinese and Mexican cooperation Sun 5/1 (Hongbo is a Senior Principal Member Research Staff at Mitsubishi Electric Research Laboratories. The Strategic
Partnership Between China and Mexico: A Multilateral Perspective China and the New Triangular Relationships in the Americas May 1 2013)

Several economic issues stand out in Chinese-Mexican policy analysis. For one, Mexico still does not rec- ognize Chinas economic status. The two countries also have not reached a consensus on the discrepancy in bilateral trade volume. Mexico argues that Chinas direct investment there is too scarce, yet the risk of investing in Mexico is often too high for Chinese investors. China hopes to enter into
talks concerning a possible free trade agreement, while Mexican manufacturing groups are concerned with their own incompetence - an issue that had been touched upon during the second Mexican presidential election debate in June of 2012.

China and Mexico are not engaged as much as they could be in the status quo
Armony 5/1 (Ariel C. is the director of the University of Miamis Center for Latin American Studies and is also the Weeks
Professor in Latin American Studies and Professor of International Studies. Conclusions and Debates on the US-Mexico-China Relationship China and the New Triangular Relationships in the Americas May 1 2013) A careful reading of the chapters in the volume provides clues as to the features of the TR among the United States, Mexico, and China. The following list summarizes some of the most relevant features: The stability of each of the bilateral ties in the triangle:

the fundamental relations in the triangle are US-Mexico and US-China. These ties play a vital role for the
countries involvedin particular for Mexicos relationship with the United States. One way in which China can affect the stability of US-Mexico ties is by posing a hegemonic challenge to the United States, that is, by seeking peer status or attempting to become the new hegemon (Paz 2012:19). Chinas consistent strategy of restraint in Latin America and the US-China institutionalized dialogue on Latin America, among other factors, suggest that China

will not rise to challenge the hegemony of the United States in Latin America any time soon.2 The dominant strategies of each of the parties and how these
strategies evolve over time: Mexicos regional and global position is being shaped by an increasing accent on diplomatic and trade diversification. The decline in US influence and the expected reforms in the Mexican energy sector may open more room for Mexico to adjust to a growth strategy less dependent on the United States. Chinas rising role as a regional and global power and the new economic scenario marked by higher wages and growing concentration in industrial commodities and products are likely to affect the pace of change according to which Chinas going out strategy will develop in the near future. If

Mexico and China reorient their strategies, it is likely that there will be an adjustment in the triangles dynamic, which may result in a closer relationship between these two countries.

Mexico and China have a lot of differences, prevents them from being close trading partners
Armony 5/1 (Ariel C. is the director of the University of Miamis Center for Latin American Studies and is also the Weeks
Professor in Latin American Studies and Professor of International Studies. Conclusions and Debates on the US-Mexico-China Relationship China and the New Triangular Relationships in the Americas May 1 2013)

Political relations between Mexico and China are less central but still relevant, particularly when viewed in the context of rising powers and a restructuring of alliances in international politics. Convergence/divergence in international relations (e.g., voting behavior in the UN General Assembly and new dynamics of influence in the IMF and World Bank), trade disputes (especially before the WTO), and bilateral political tensions (the H1N1 health crisis in 2009 and the 2011 visit of the Dalai Lama to Mexico) are important factors defining the Mexico-China side of the triangle. As Sun Hongbo explains in his chapter, the divergence between Mexico and China in voting patterns in the UN General Assembly has increased since 2004.6 If one considers votes on controversial matters (such as nuclear policy, Palestine, Korea, Iran and so on), Mexico has voted more in line with its northern neighbor than with China. While Mexicos positions in the United Nations are aligned with the US-led Western bloc, there
are other areas in which Mexico is close to China. The two developing countries have benefitted from power realignment in the IMF and World Bank. They share similar concerns about South-South cooperation, energy security, and UN reform. Even though

Mexico and China have had important trade frictions, Mexico initiated fewer trade disputes against China before the WTO than the United States did during the period 2003-2011.Taken as a whole, these dimensions suggest a relationship in which Mexico stays firmly in the US sphere of influence, while maintaining its autonomy, and a pattern of interaction with China that is shaped by periodic disagreements and gaps in preferences (for example, in their respective preferences concerning mechanisms to address trade disputes). Still, the
nonstrategic nature of the triangle provides both countries with the environment to find a common framework for a closer, and mutually rewarding, relationship.

NO IMPACT
Negs impact is overhyped, CCP wont resort to nuclear weapons
Hachigian 9 (Nina Hachigian is a Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress. Chinas
New Engagement in the International System Center for American Progress, pg 34, November 2009, A_Yu) Today, China is a member of nearly every major nonproliferation organization and has signed every international treaty meant to stem proliferation of nuclear weapons, including those with intrusive inspection regimes. China has become an active member and even an advocate of the nonproliferation regime. This history is all the more remarkable given that China often acted against its own short-term economic and security interests by curbing its proliferation. It agreed to give up
profitable sales of nuclear weapons technologies in the 1980s and 1990s at the same time it was already making drastic cuts to its military budget to free up resources for economic development and could have used the extra revenue. Further, China could not offer this valuable technology as a strategic sweetener to friendly states any longer. Gill argues that this shift in behavior has occurred for three reasons. First, and most significant, China

now views nonproliferation as in its best interests.

Helping to create a stable external security environment allows Beijing to concentrate on its domestic concerns. Second, Chinas

involvement in nonproliferation helps project a benign image to nations potentially anxious about its rise. Third, Chinas involvement serves to mollify U.S. fears about potential conflict while
constraining U.S. influence by sometimes lobbying for alternative positions in international negotiations. But just as importantly, as Evan Medeiros, now director for China at the National Security Council, has argued, U.S. policy intervention played a significant and enduring role in fostering Chinas increasing commitment to nonproliferation. Americas use of rewards and sanctions repeatedly led China to expand its commitments and comply with them. American policymakers prioritized nonproliferation at the highest levels of the relationship, and U.S. policy became instrumental in many of Chinas nonproliferation milestones, particularly during periods when Beijing sought improved U.S.-China relations for trade and stability, as well as access to U.S. technology. Medeiros also points to the increasing sophistication and expertise of Chinas nonproliferation officials, who consolidate the norms of nonproliferation from the inside.

IMPACT TURNS
Their scholarship is biased need to be realist and kick China out!
Farnsworth, 12 (Eric Farnsworth is vice-president of the Council of the Americas in
Washington DC and from 1995 to 1998 was senior adviser to the White House special envoy for the Americas. Memo to Washington: China's Growing Presence in Latin America, Americas Quarterly, Vol. 6, No. 1, Winter, 2012, http://www.americasquarterly.org/Farnsworth)
Should the United States React? Can It? To the extent that simple commercial exchange dominates the China story in the Americas, the implications for the United States are minimal. A rational and appropriate response would simply be to promote a level, transparent playing field for U.S. business and investors to compete effectively with a new, well-financed competitor. This is exactly the way Chinese leaders have presented their efforts: as benign economic actions that offer little challenge to U.S. interests. Indeed, the stock of U.S. investment in the region continues to dwarf Chinese investment, and regional trade with the United States continues to surpass trade with China by a factor of almost four to one. At this point, neither Chinese pronouncements nor concrete actions establish a reason to believe that China has strategic designs on Latin America from a military or security perspective, either to project power into the region or to challenge U.S. military predominance from a hemispheric platform. Nonetheless,

Chinas entrance into the Americas does have strategic implications for the U.S., and from this perspective Washington has been overly complacent. In part, this is because most Latin America specialists in the policy community are not well versed in international relations theory or practice, and therefore do not focus on geostrategic issues (Sabatini, MarchApril 2012, Foreign Affairs). They are development
specialists, historians, human rights advocates, sociologists, Spanish (though generally not Portuguese) linguists, community activists, and the like.

Some are uncomfortable with the idea that the U.S. has legitimate national interests to pursue or values to promote, viewing the region through a historical filter that highlights the U.S. as the primary threat to the region rather than as a critical if imperfect driver of democratic governance and economic growth and opportunity. As a result, there may be a tendency to be suspicious of actions that promote U.S. economic and national security interests, including trade and investment
expansion, counternarcotics programs, security assistance, and even democracy promotion in relation to Cuba and elsewhere. It is within this intellectual construct that they place the growing influence of extra-regional actors and also rising regional actors such as Brazil. This

overwhelming bias in the policy and academic communitiesa bias that does not generally inform U.S. policy in other regionscontinues to put U.S. policy in the region at a disadvantage. It focuses on things we cannot fully change while neglecting initiatives that would accrue to our benefit.

US Econ Turn
China dangerous to the US growth in the future
Palley 12 (Thomas I. Palley is an economist who currently holds a B.A degree from Oxford
University and a PhD in International Relations and a PhD in Economics from Yale University. The Economic and Geo-Political Implications of China-Centric Globalization. New American Foundation). HyeongMoney
Looking into the future, the current path of China-centric globalization poses a threat to both U.S. economic recovery and global growth and development. It has not only hindered American

attempts to escape from the post-bubble recession that began in December 2007 but it has also threatened to block future attempts to recalibrate and improve the globalization process. If anything, U.S. policy has failed to come to grips with the problems associated with China-centric globalization. Especially troubling is the U.S. Treasurys policy toward Chinas exchange rate. The
Treasurys past policy can be accused of dereliction of duty in its failure to protect the U.S. manufacturing sector. Its current policy of encouraging China to introduce a flexible yuan exchange rate with free capital mobility promises to compound that damage. It is important to remember that China-centric globalization has been largely the product of U.S. policymakers and U.S. corporations. It therefore should be subject to review. As it is now, China-centric globalization has set in motion a momentous process that is causing changes of historical proportions. This process has developed rapidly with little public consideration of its implications. It was put in place in the late 1990s by a triumphant corporate sector, at a time when the public was caught up in the euphoria of a long-running cycle of asset bubbles that created illusory prosperity. Change of this proportion would be dangerous even if the U.S. and China were close allies, which they are not. At the end of the 19th century, a similar seismic shift of economic power between Great Britain and Germany, whose monarchs shared a common lineage, contributed to the tragedy of World War I. That history speaks to the dangers of such developments and should be a caution to U.S. policymakers. The troubling developments already in place and in prospect should be an alarm. Yet, U.S. policymakers do not seem to have fully grasped the dangers inherent in Chinese-centric globalization.

China involvement crushes US exporters and jobs.

Brandt 12 (Jon et. el. Masters in US Foreign Policy), Chinese Engagement in Latin America and
the Caribbean: Implications for US Foreign Policy December 2012 American University Page 9) Essentially, Latin American countries, which have long been big buyers of US goods, are increasingly making a larger proportion of their purchases from China. 5 Assuming this trend continues, there are huge implications for US exporters and jobs. Although US exports do not necessarily compete
with Chinas (the United States primarily sells high technology goods such as aircraft, and medical equipment to the region, while China sells mostly apparel and consumer electronics), US

exporters face the challenge of competition not only from Chinas undervalued currency but also from Chinas manufacturing sector. 6 For example, Chinese automakers are making valuable gains in emerging auto markets by focusing less on quality and design and more on ruthless cost - cutting. These measures significantly challenge companies like General Motors that are looking to emerging markets for growth but have considerably higher sticker prices on their cars.

China engagement is terrible for the US

Palley 12 (Thomas I. Palley is an economist who currently holds a B.A degree from Oxford
University and a PhD in International Relations and a PhD in Economics from Yale University. The Economic and Geo-Political Implications of China-Centric Globalization. New American Foundation). HyeongMoney This pattern of China-centric globalization has two negative effects for the United States. First, it reduces source diversity in the U.S. global supply chain, thereby making the U.S. more dependent on China and more vulnerable to interruptions of supply by China. Second, it makes countries in East Asia more dependent on China as a market for their exports. This latter effect has been almost entirely over-looked. Making the countries of East and Southeast Asia more economically dependent on China increases Chinas geo-political power. Given that Southeast Asia is an important region of geo-political competition between the U.S. and China, this economic reorientation weakens the U.S. position in the region.

Chinese competition hurts the US

Palley 12 (Thomas I. Palley is an economist who currently holds a B.A degree from Oxford
University and a PhD in International Relations and a PhD in Economics from Yale University. The Economic and Geo-Political Implications of China-Centric Globalization. New American Foundation). HyeongMoney For the U.S., Chinas resource diplomacy entails significant economic costs. Chinas competition for resources has driven up the price of virtually every resource at a cost to U.S. producers and consumers. As importantly, Chinas resource diplomacy also has potentially significant geo-political costs as resource rich countries form new commercial alliances with China that diminish new america foundation U.S. geo-political standing. That might be of little consequence if the new
alignments were unambiguously beneficial for the countries and the global economy, but they are not. Though countries have benefited from higher commodity prices and higher commodity incomes owing to China, there are also significant downsides that harm their economic and political development. All of these concerns are visible in Africa where Chinas rise has produced both positive and negative effects. With regard to the postive, Chinas rise has had t hree major economic benefits for Africa. First, China has increased demand for African commodity exports, which has contributed to higher commodity prices. Second, Chinas rise has triggered a surge in FDI in Africa, particularly in the commodity productio n sector, to which China has contributed. Third, Chinas rise has increased the global supply of manufactured goods that Africa imports and consumes, which has lowered the price of manufactured goods. These developments have raised Africas national income, loosened the external financial constraint on development, and increased economic growth.

US Security Turn
Chinese presence in Latin America threatens stability and security
Hilton 13 (Isabel Hilton, writer and broadcaster and editor for chinadialogue China in Latin
America: Hegemonic Challenge? NOREF Expert Analysis February 2013)-Karla Latin American countries face trade imbalances: Chinese products are flooding domestic markets to the detriment of local manufacturers, and Latin America is losing out to Chinese competition in export markets. Mexico is the outstanding example: Kevin Gallagher, of Boston University, calculated in 2009 that 97% of Mexicos manufacturing exports were threatened by Chinese competition. In addition, China enjoyed the competitive advantage of price and local supply chains, which, after China joined the World Trade Organization in 2001, stimulated the transfer to China of Mexican electronics assembly plants (maquiladoras) that served the U.S. market. More recently, as Chinas currency has appreciated and labour costs have risen by an annual 10%, the Mexican position has begun to recover. Central American nations suffered too, losing textile industries to China. This is of concern to the United States, which is anxious to protect manufacturing in some of its poorest neighbours, such as Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador, in order to promote stability and maintain the U.S.-led War on Drugs. Nations such as Argentina, Brazil and Colombia which has a 10:1 trade deficit with China are also exposed. Only Chile,
which runs a trade surplus, and Peru, which has a near surplus on China trade, are exceptions. Brazil and Argentina, which have substantial capitalist middle classes and strong labour unions, have the strongest potential for anti-China policies. The Brazilian Industrial Association, for example, has lobbied President Dilma Rousseff to take a stronger line against Chinese imports. On September 15th 2011, Brazil announced a 30-point increase in its industrial-product tax on cars, with the notable exceptions of cars manufactured in Mexico and Mercosur. The policy was effectively aimed at China. Brazil, in fact, runs a slightly smaller risk from China than many other Latin American nations because of its relatively closed economy and substantial domestic market. Although Rousseff is under strong pressure to protect domestic sectors, she must also balance the benefits of commodity exports to China. As Brazil continues to grow, it may decide, as the United States has in the past, that across the economy the benefits from trading with China equal or outweigh the costs of dumping. Argentina

was forced to accept a difficult lesson in 2010 when it was forced to reverse the attempt to impose a tariff on light manufactured goods after China responded with countervailing duties on Argentinian soy beans. Up to 74% of Argentinas soy beans
go to China.

China economic influence spills over to military influence.

Brandt 12 (Jon et. el. Masters in US Foreign Policy), Chinese Engagement in Latin America and
the Caribbean: Implications for US Foreign Policy December 2012 American University Page 9) The last decade has witnessed substantial growth in military relations among China, Latin America and the Caribbean region, taking the form of rising arms sales, high - level defense visits, and military student exchanges. While these developments warrant close future monitoring, they presently
do not threaten US national security interests, and may even represent an opportunity for trilateral cooperation among China, the United States, and the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean. A

number of high - level defense visits have occurred between China and Latin American nations. 45 While these interactions have not resulted in groundbreaking bilateral strategic initiatives, they serve as confidence building measures and provide openings for arms transactions. 46 47 Defense visits are coupled with a rise in military personnel exchanges, which build upon Chinas objectives to establish goodwill in Latin America. Chinese entities like the PLA Defense Studies Institute, Army Command College, and Navy Command School welcome officers from about 18 Latin American countries, offering Spanish and English courses on military planning, special forces operations, aerial communication, artillery repair and security strategy. 48 These exchanges are supplemented with port visits

by military training ships and warships by each side. 49 In 2009, a Chinese naval flotilla visited Chile, Peru, and Ecuador and, though benign in character, such visits benefit the PLA Navy, helping it to identify requirements for the use of Latin Ameri can ports by its ships in the future for maintenance, resupply, or other purposes. 50 Furthermore, while presently inconsequential to US interests, it is important to note that both China and Chile have military facilities located next to each other in Antarctica. 5

Chinas search for energy poses a threat to the US

Blumenthal 08(Dan Blumenthal, director of Asian studies at the American Enterprise Institute
specializing in East Asian security issues Concerns with Respect to Chinas Energy Policy July 1, 2008)-Karla The speculation game is a perilous one, but given Chinas importance it is necessary to engage in it. China is a dynamic country with a highly skilled population. As its economy continues to grow, so too does its defense industrial and technological base, as well as the capabilities of its military personnel. The PRC has developed its military in ways not predicted by analysts less than a decade ago. No longer can China watchers say that the PRCs armed forces are not very good and not getting better fast.55 Most national security analysts now believe that China can pose serious challenges to an American military trying to come to the defense of Taiwan or other allies in the region. In the past decade a very small arsenal of ballistic missiles has grown into an arsenal of some nine hundred more accurate and lethal ballistic and cruise missiles. A decade ago China had just a few modern Kilo-class diesel submarines; today China
has Kilos, Songs, and Yuans as well as two nuclear submarine programs. A decade ago, Chinas fleet of fourth-generation aircraft was minimal, today it is significant: an increasing percentage incorporate fourth- generation technology.56 China

has made additional strides in mine warfare and information warfare, and is contesting the United States in space. China has also grown bolder in using its military capabilities as evidenced by its activity in and around the East China Sea. A decade ago few if any analysts predicted that China would provoke Japan in this way. There is no reason to believe that China will stop improving its military capabilities. Its defense industrial base is improving, it has money to spend on military projects, and it has the ambitions of a country anxious to retake its place in the sun. The ongoing energy debate will obviously
influence the PLAs course. If China continues to tend toward the energy-mercantilist side of the energy policy spectrum, as compared to relying solely on the open market, then the PLA will increase in importance to Beijings energy strategy.

Democracy Turn
China bad for democracy
Sanborn, 11 (Cynthia is professor of social sciences and the director of the Center of
Investigation of the Universidad del Pac fico, China, Latin America, and the United States: The New Triangle, January 2011, Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars Institute of the Americas)
Cynthia Sanborn of the Universidad del Pac fico in Lima, Peru, situated

the presence of Chinese state-owned firms in Latin America in the context of the region s still fragile political democracies. These democracies are characterized by an increased concern for industry diversification, changing roles for
the state and political institutions, and the presence of new actors such as global NGOs, the Catholic Church, indigenous communities, and environmental organizations that demand a voice in natural resource policy. In many countries of the region,

new or expanded democratic space enables these groups to question who has the right to subsoil property, whether local communities can veto concessions and how they can benefit from revenue distribution, and
how to control the environmental im- pacts created by these industries. In response, global programs such as the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) and the

International Council on Mining and Minerals (ICMM) have created new industry standards for addressing revenue transparency, improv- ing relationships with the communities where companies mine, and using cleaner technologies in the extraction process. Many Western companies have voluntarily acceded to these regulatory bodies. By contrast, Sanborn classified agreements between China and Latin American governments as accommodationist. China does not belong to the EITI, and one has only to look to Venezuela and Ecuador to ob- serve that China adapts to changing rules of the game more successfully than its Western counterparts. China is not only looking for trade op- portunities, but is also interested in the stability of
Latin American soci- eties and seeks local capacities for negotiation. Sanborn specifically ad- dressed the case of Peru and its evolving relationship with China. In Peru, mineral exploitation accounts for one-fourth of tax revenues and 6 percent of GDP, though in certain regions mineral revenue constitutes up to half of GDP. Thirty-four percent of mineral investments in Peru are from China, and Peru represents 26 percent of Chinas global mergers and acquisitions (M &A). Indeed, 40 percent of oil production in Peru is owned by China investors through a partnership between China National Petroleum Company (CNPC) and the Argentine firm Pluspetrol. Eight large Chinese firms are present in Perus extractive in- dustries, and while six of them are purely state-owned, there are also private Chinese investors purchasing lots. Given that China is expected to invest $7 billion in minerals over the next five years, this trend is unlikely to wane.

Taiwan Turn
Chinas diplomatic battle in Latin America hurts US soft power and military superiority in the Taiwan straight.
Erikson & Chen, 7 (Daniel is a Senior Associate of US Policy at the Inter-American Dialogue.
Janice is a degree candidate at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. China, Taiwan, and the Battle for Latin America, Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, Vol. 31:2, Summer 2007, pg. 71)
The United States has been reflexively wary of any potential Chinese incursions into a region that it has long considered its domain. While for the most part Washington does not see Chinese economic penetration of Latin America as inherently antithetical to American interests, there is genuine concern over how the accelerating interactions might lead to mili- tary or strategic cooperation at a later stage. Few can doubt that China's capacity for mischief in the Americas has greatly increased over the past several years. The deployment of Chinese peacekeepers in Haiti-the first in the Western Hemisphere-has particularly inflamed these anxieties. Beijing has already attempted to sell arms to Venezuela;40 the Chinese gov- ernment also reportedly conducts intelligence activities in Latin America through visitors, students, and front companies, and there are concerns about the PRC using Cuba as a listening post to monitor developments in the United States.4' In April 2005, then-Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs Roger Noriega testified before the House International Relations Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere that "[r]ivalry with Taiwan plays into Chinas courting of Latin American countries.... A

key Chinese political objective is to isolate Taiwan, and China will actively court those 12 countries in this Hemisphere that recognize Taiwan dip- lomatically. '42 Against this backdrop, conservative voices in Washington argue that the United States has a
vital interest in aiding Taiwan in main- taining its alliances in Central America and the Caribbean, if only to check the expansion of Beijing's geopolitical reach. In the spring of 2006, U.S. assistant secretary Tom Shannon traveled to Beijing to discuss China's activities in Latin America, marking the first such visit by a U.S. official for this purpose. Some analysts advocate taking measured but proactive steps in reaction to widening Chinese influence in Latin America, for example by lowering tariffs on U.S. cotton exports to the region through the pas- sage of CAFTA. Making Central American textiles more competitive in the American market reduces U.S. dependence on Chinese imports while strengthening the export sectors of Central American economies.43 Aside from the strategic concerns articulated by the conservative side of the political spectrum, there is also arguably a normative dimension to U.S. support of Taiwan. Failure

to protect a country that achieved economic prosperity and political stability under its tutelage would undermine American credibility. Yet, on the whole, the United States finds itself in an
awkward position with respect to the cross-strait dispute. The U.S.'s official position is, understandably, that other governments' decisions to maintain or sever diplomatic relations with Taiwan are for those govern- ments to make." Moreover, since Washington also officially recognizes the PRC, it has little moral authority with which to lobby other governments on Taiwan's behalf, and little apparent motivation to do so. While Beijing clearly hopes to win over diplomatic holdouts in Central America and the Caribbean, there are some indications that China does not view this as an urgent task, but rather as a long-term goal. The

issue of Taiwan's recognition is certainly never absent from the calculations of the Chinese leadership, and China will not feel its rise to power is complete without returning Taiwan to the mainland's political control.45 As a matter of pure financial leverage, the PRC undoubtedly has the capacity to outbid Taiwan ifit so
desired. Yet observers have noted a recent softening in Beijing's stance toward Taiwan.46 The apparent willingness to accept the status quo in the short term may reflect, in part, the rising confidence of Chinese officials that time will favor their ultimate triumph in the cross-strait conflict-and perhaps, consequently, that the project of pursuing new allies in the Western Hemisphere can move to the backburner for the time being.47 Indeed, de- spite Chinas stunning economic growth and newfound global influence, more than two years have passed since it gained a new ally in Latin America, which last occurred when Grenada threw its support to the PRC in January 2005. By contrast, in May 2007, the newly elected administration ofconser- vative Sir John Compton in St. Lucia reversed the prior government's 1997 decision and resumed ties with Taiwan.48 But if the estimation of Chinese officials is correct, Taiwanese diplo- mats stationed throughout Central America and the Caribbean are fighting a losing battle. The

eventual turning of the diplomatic tide in the PRC's favor, and the resulting embrace of Beijing by Latin America's remaining holdouts, would leave Washington even more isolated in its support for Taiwan while giving China greater influence over a crucial part of the de- fensive perimeter of the United States. At present, the United States has publicly reacted with nonchalance towards the prospect that Taiwan's
hemispheric alliances will continue to unravel. But as Chinas growing reach into Central America and the Caribbean continues to undermine Taiwan, Washington's

silence will become ever more puzzling to its closest neighbors-and ever more pleasing to Beijing.

AFF ANSWERS TO CHINA CP

You can obviously use a lot of the aff answers to the DA. For example, not zero sum is a great perm argument. Also, any of the impact turns are disads to the CP.

Says No
Latin America says No to China no cultural connection.
Hilton 13 (Isabel Hilton, writer and broadcaster and editor for chinadialogue China in Latin
America: Hegemonic Challenge? NOREF Expert Analysis February 2013)-Karla The environmental and ethical practices of Chinese companies have drawn unfavourable comment. The first major Chinese mining company in the hemisphere was Shougang Group, which began operations in Peru in
1992 with the purchase of the state-owned Hierro Peru for 14 times an independent valuation. Shougang has contributed heavily to the poor reputation of Chinese

companies, over fines for environmental damage for the contamination of water sup- plies, low wages and dangerous working conditions. It has been the object of frequent strikes and protests. Other companies have experienced problems with community relations. After buying the Canadian company Corriente in 2010,
Tongling and China Railway Construction Corporation proposed an open-pit mine in the province of Zamora Chinchipe in Ecuador. National protests followed an agreement with the government, including a march on the capital by the countrys most powerful Indigenous movement, Confederacin de Nacionalidades Indgenas del Ecuador (CONAIE). Chinese

companies lack experience of compliance with much higher environmental or community relations standards than prevail at home. Some are adapting, hiring local managers, public relations (PR) and law firms, but they are likely to struggle for some time with the cultural gaps and the lack of understanding of local concerns and political considerations. One example of an attempt to meet those concerns is the Chinese mining company Chinalcos
relocation of 5,000 residents of the town of Morococha, 150 kilometres east of the Peruvian capital, Lima, to remove them from an area likely to be contaminated by the new $2.2 million Toro- mocho opencast copper mine. Advised by local managers and PR consultants, Chinalco is investing $50 million in an entirely new town nearby, a project it describes as the biggest privately-funded social project in Perus history (http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/ people.cfm?authorID=580). Two-thirds of the residents have moved, although the project has also been dogged by complaints about inadequate housing and compensation. Although some dispute the claim that Chinese conduct is worse than U.S. or local equivalents, China

suffers from widespread negative perceptions and the identification of Chinese companies with the Chinese state. Local labour groups, some government officials and many indigenous and social groups in the region make little distinction between private Chinese companies and state-owned enterprises. Local opinion surveys reveal that most companies, whether large or small, state owned or private, suffer from anti- Chinese sentiment and the perception that they put profit above environmental and social concerns. In several African countries, Chinese security guards have been deployed to defend companies interests and have even, on occasion, killed Africans. Both the Peruvian president, Ollanta Humala, and the Bolivian president, Evo Morales, political allies of China, have felt obliged to insist to their electorates that Chinese troops would never be allowed to set foot in their countries.

Solveny Turns
China involvement causes Dutch Disease (unstable commodity dependence)
Brandt 12 (Jon et. el. Masters in US Foreign Policy), Chinese Engagement in Latin America and
the Caribbean: Implications for US Foreign Policy December 2012 American University Page 9)
Since 2000, LAC exports of commodities have constituted 70 percent of export growth. The China - LAC relationship is predominated by natural resource extraction. This has led to near - term boon for Latin American countries; foreign currency reserves have increased, governments have been far more financially secure and there has been a rise in investment and development. However,

the long - term projection of this commodity trading is risky. Latin American countries are dependent on sustained commodity prices to uphold an economy that has yet to develop into a more modern, dynamic level. If commodity prices fall, countries could fall back into chronic debt. Furthermore, many Latin American countries have not used the influx of capital from China to invest in manufacturing, research and development and other value - added stages of production to elevate the quality of economic output. If these Latin American countries are lulled into Dutch disease, they run the risk of not advancing socio - economically and putting continued strain on the primary commodity sector to perform year in and year out. This socio economic concern is of the US national interest as future trade, research and development is contingent on

Chinese presence in Latin America net worse trades off with local economies
Feinberg 11 Richard Feinberg Graduate School of International Relations and Pacifi c Studies
University of California, San Diego. 2011. Latin American Research Review, Vol. 46, No. 2 by the Latin American Studies Association. C H I N A , L AT I N A M E R I C A , A N D T H E U N I T E D S TAT E S : C O N G RU E N T I N T E R E S T S OR TECTONIC TURBULENCE? http://lasa2.univ.pitt.edu/LARR/prot/fulltext/vol46no2/Feinberg_215-224_46-2.pdf At the same time, the volume is not oblivious to the threats that Chinas economy poses to certain countries and sectors in Latin America. The impact is varied, clashing most directly with producers of manufactured goods. Chinese exports directly compete with Mexican textiles, electron- ics, and telecommunications equipment in third markets, notably in the United States. The removal of quotas for textiles and apparel (a change the volume does not fully capture) has hit maquilas in Central America and the Caribbean hard, as efficient Chinese firms employing cheap labor seize a greater share of global markets. A particularly interesting and innova- tive chapter by Robert C. Feenstra and Hiau Looi Kee argues that every 1 percent increase in the variety of Chinese exports reduces that of Mexi- can exports by 0.5 percent (table 8.3, 258). Chinas expansion constrains the dynamic gains that might otherwise be available to Mexico as a result of U.S. tariff liberalization under the North American Free Trade Agree- ment. This adverse impact is of particular concern because the growth of export varieties benefits aggregate productivity in the exporting country. However, the dominant constraint on Latin American manufacturing exports comes not from Chinese competition but from domestic shortcom- ings. Examining Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and Chile, Gordon H. Hanson and Raymond Robertson point to local constraints on manufacturing growth, such as relatively high energy prices, poor telecommunications infrastructure, and slow growth in the supply of skilled labor. In response to those problems, the editors of Chinas and Indias Chal- lenge to Latin America propose a series of policies. Latin American work- ers who lose their jobs to Chinese imports should be retrained, and countries should focus on innovation and expanded capabilities in sci- ence and technologyadmittedly, improvements easier said than done. In this regard, cooperation with China might be a good option, as the joint Brazilian-Chinese program in satellite development exemplifies. But Latin Americans should eschew protectionism; rather, firms should seek integration into global production networks, including those that involve Chinese (and Indian) firms. Some countries can concentrate on sectors in which geographical proximity gives them an edge, such as tourism and health-care services. In his contribution to Chinas Expansion into the Western Hemisphere: Im- plications for Latin America and the United States, Robert Devlin accepts that China is more opportunity than threat; nevertheless, he is agitated by the threat and daring in the policies that he proposes. The

prowess of the Asian giant is a loud

wake-up call for the region, Devlin warns, and a motivation for Latin America to make better and more systematic use of its inherent
advantages. A former manager at the Inter-American Development Bank, Devlin does not want Latin America to return to heavy-handed statism of the sort that generated gross inefficiencies in the earlier era of import sub- stitution; but he does see an important lesson in the success of East Asia and China: after the market-oriented reforms of the Washington Consen- sus, the state should be brought back into development strategy.

Perm
China and United States seeks to cooperate with each other in Latin America and Cubanot a zero sum game.
Hearn 9 (Dr. Adrian H. Hearn is a researcher at the School of Social and Political Sciences at the
University of Sydney, he has conducted research in both Cuba and China for a couple of years. Cuba and China: Lessons for the United States Commissioned report for the Cuban Research Institute, June 2009, A_Yu) For the United States, the value added by the above process lies in its promotion of trilateral cooperation. Both China and the United States favor more open markets in Cuba, and considering the attempts of Chinese enterprises to
build Cubas export capacities and develop its transport, manufacturing, and resource sectors, the United States is a logical source of management services and marketing expertise. Building on existing U.S. activities in agriculture, medicine, and telecommunications, expansion into these sectors would bring both economic benefits for U.S. firms and opportunities for harmonizing approaches to governance and information sharing. Indeed, the

Obama administrations relatively conciliatory stance toward Cuba could lay the foundation of a much-needed mutually reinforcing diplomacy with China in the region (Wilder 2009:4). A defining challenge for U.S. foreign policy in the 21st century will be the development of mutually beneficial partnerships with China. With sensible diplomacy, Chinese projects in Latin America could become a source of deeper cooperation, for as Daniel Erikson concisely put it to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, trade is not a zero sum game (2008:3). Hu Jintaos proposal at the 2009 G-20 to jointly develop financial monitoring mechanisms reflects Chinas desire for cooperative relations with the United States. With legal authorization, Cuba could become a platform for advancing responsibly governed trilateral projects that demonstrate awareness of regional diversity and a commitment to international cooperation. Accommodating diversity is critical to effective
diplomacy, for although Confucius may have stated, have no friends not equal to yourself, in his pragm atic wisdom he also taught his followers to be firm in the right way, and not merely firm.