Theories of Social Conflict Author(s): Anthony Oberschall Source: Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 4 (1978), pp.

291-315 Published by: Annual Reviews Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2945973 . Accessed: 07/12/2013 10:47
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Annual Reviews is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Annual Review of Sociology.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 193.219.94.133 on Sat, 7 Dec 2013 10:47:51 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Ann Rev. Sociol. 1978. 4.291-315 reserved Inc. All rights (3 1978 byAnnualReviews Copyright

THEORIES OF SOCIAL

*:.10557

CONFLICT

Anthony Oberschall
University, Vanderbilt of Sociology& Anthropology, Department Tennessee37235 Nashville,

INTRODUCTION
in parties twoor more among interaction from purposeful results Conflict for topotential than rather behavior It refers toovert setting. a competitive "competi(1973:10), toDeutsch According states. andtosubjective action such parties in thegoalsof... interdependent an opposition implies tion as theprobability for onedecreases ofgoalattainment that theprobability withexist situation might a competitive Whereas increases." theother for to Boulding according concerned, ofit bytheparties outanyawareness areaware the parties inwhich ofcompetition "isa situation conflict (1963:5) eachparty andinwhich future positions ofpotential ofthe incompatibility of the withthewishes thatis incompatible a position to occupy wishes other." arean aggregate in which theparties to conflict refers "Social"conflict and crowds, communities, organizations, suchas groups, ofindividuals, is usedas conflict Group as in roleconflict. individuals, single than rather in refers socialconflict Finally, in thisessay. ofsocialconflict a synonym in chosen bytheparties inwhich themeans common usageto interaction butnot or injury, harm damage, to inflict oftheir goalsarelikely pursuit ofsocial definition Coser's proviso, small this case.With inevery necessarily "socialconflict [is] a well(1967:232): its meaning very conflict conveys in and scarceresources, power, to status, overvaluesor claims struggle values, desired the togain arenotonly groups aims ofthe conflict which the encomSocialconflict rivals." or eliminate injure, butalso to neutralize, and class,racial,religious, passesa broadrangeof socialphenomena: andcivil disorders; strikes revolutions; rebellions, riots, communal conflicts; and thelike. gatherings, protest demonstrations, marches, 291
$01.00 0360-0572/78/0815-0291

This content downloaded from 193.219.94.133 on Sat, 7 Dec 2013 10:47:51 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

292

OBERSCHALL

THE SCOPE OF CONFLICT THEORIES

Any comprehensive do theories ofsocial conflict seektoexplain? Just what thefollowing topics: should encompass theory ofsocialconflict resources At likely. overvaluesand scarce make struggles nation that on stratification, willrely a theory ofsocialconflict heavily thisstage, willidentheories. Thesetheories socialchange, andmacrosociological in conflict theories. variables themost important explanatory tify action of forcollective 2. Conflict-group formation and themobilization theories ofcollective Forthis topic, groups andtheir targets. challenging and internal structure commitment, recruitment, participation, action,
will be especially useful. betweenconflict 3. The dynamicsof conflict: processes of interaction in particular structures ofdomi1. The structural sources ofsocialconflict,

andduration; escalascope, ofconflict; itsmagnitude groups; theforms theconseand resolution; tionand de-escalation; conflict regulation and thelarger for thecontending ofconflict outcomes groups quences variables of social Theseare themostimportant dependent society. conflict theories.

thetwo andevaluating is mainly concerned with describing Thisreview aptheory: the breakdown-deprivation to conflict principal approaches andthe classics approach. Theolder solidarity-mobilization proach andthe theories basedon themlike Dahrendorf (1959) and Coser well-known havebecome part because their contributions here, (1956)arenotreviewed I indicate ina short oftheshared fund ofsociological However, knowledge. intocurrent howtheclassics be more incorporated tightly might example conflict theories.1 insociologiThisreview ofthe conflict perspective alsoomits evaluations ofconflict cal thinking, because a perspective ororientation is nota theory For instance, RandallCollins'Conflict defined broadtopics. bythethree the Towards an Explanatory Science(1975),doesnotcontain Sociology, a workof general statement of a theory of socialconflict. It is rather little about from a conflict Collinswrites perspective. written sociology violence. He doesnot overt such as strikes, andcollective rebellion, conflict, mobilization, discuss theforms ofconflict, theformation ofconflict groups, resolution. Andhe andconflict andleadership, noroutcomes recruitment, conflicts suchas ethnic, dealsonly andcommon group briefly with major howstructures instead toexplain conflicts. He seeks racial, andcommunal havecome andagedifferences ofdomination basedonsocialclass, gender,
ofthe literature onsocial conflict 'A comprehensive review is provided byKriesberg (1973). andtheory construction. concerned with modes oftheorizing Thisessay is primarily

This content downloaded from 193.219.94.133 on Sat, 7 Dec 2013 10:47:51 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

SOCIAL CONFLICT

293

aboutandhowthey aremaintained. Thesestructures ofdomination have a potential forconflict, butthelinkbetween thesestructures and overt conflict is notexplicitly out. spelled I amconcerned However, with twoissues oftheory construction that are intheorizing salient particularly aboutsocialconflict. The first is levels of Sometheorists treat a conflict analysis. as a single collective group actor. Their theories consist ofstatements andthe about relations groups between groups. Other theorists start with individual behavior as the unit oftheorizing, andderive behavior from a summation ofindividual group tendencies andbehaviors. Still other theorists handle theproblem oflevels ofanalysis andofmoving from inmore theindividual tothegroup level complicated Does themodeoftheorizing leadto different and different ways. insights kinds ofconflict theory? Thesecond issue is theuseofdifferent about human behavassumptions ior.Some theorists utilize the rational-choice model derived from economic others andsocial analysis; incorporate complex psychological psychological into models. Arethese assumptions exclusive orcomapproaches mutually plementary? Do their conclusions differ? Bothofthese intheory issues as wellas theincorporation construction, of derived knowledge from theclassics into current arebest theory, discussed in thecontext ofa short example. Two frequently noted empirical generalizations analyzed at length by Coserconcern theinternal ofconflict structure "conflict with angroups: other leadsto ... increased group cohesion ofthegroup," and"close-knit in whichthere groups exists a highfrequency of interaction and high involvement personality ofmembers havea tendency to suppress conflict" that conflict (Coser1956:95, with 152).Granted creates cohesion outgroups and internal a group, within and granted also thatthese are conformity common ofconflict, howcansuchknowledge about consequences internal group structure contribute toexplanations about theprocess ofconflict and theforms it is likely to take? One important setofconsequences that to follow from Coser's appears wasdescribed inJanis' propositions work on "groupthink". (1972)recent It refers to a concurrence-seeking that in a deterioration tendency results ofmental and moral efficiency, reality testing, Janis' ideacan judgement. be summarized that "themore byhisproposition andesprit amiability de members ofa policy thegreater is thedanger corps among making group, that critical willbe replaced independent which is thinking bygroupthink, in irrational to result likely anddehumanizing actions against outgroups" fosters lackofvigilance, (1972:13). Groupthink andsloganoveroptimism, istic abouttheimmorality thinking ofoutgroups.

A Short Theory, Method, and theClassics: Example

This content downloaded from 193.219.94.133 on Sat, 7 Dec 2013 10:47:51 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

294

OBERSCHALL

tendencies resulting If conflict leadsto cohesion and concurrence-seeking in groupthink within theleadership circleofconflict groups, theleadership conflict and overestimate thechances willunderestimate thecostoffurther and willalso be morereadyto resort ofsuccess(overoptimism, risk-taking), in thegroup'ssuperior dehumanmorality, taking to coercive means(belief the moral consequencesof acizing actionsagainstoutgroups, ignoring groups undertakessuch actions, tions). If leadershipin both conflict willresult. Coser's proposiescalationof theconflict Thus, supplementing allows one to linkchangesin theinternal structure tionwithJanis'theory of conflict theyare likelyto choose and groupswiththe mode of conflict theform thatconflict under somecircumstances, is likely to take.Cohesion, in sucha waythatdestrucmaking lowersthequality ofleadership decision tivestrategies willbe chosenby bothsides,whichin turnwillescalatethe conflict. comments. The first The foregoing examplemerits two methodological intorational-choice theinclusion concerns ofsocial psychological processes thecondiJanis'groupthink modelsin conflict studies. proposition specifies arriveat "bad," tionsunderwhichrationaldecisionmakerscollectively in their and their ofdistortions perceptions "irrational" decisions as a result and costsof Rationaldecisionmakersweighthebenefits criticalfaculties. that maximizes alternative coursesof action,and choose the alternative i.e. theexcessofbenefit netbenefits, overcost.Janis'proposition expected in underestimation thatgroupthink results ofthecostsofcoercive suggests about its chances of success.Thus expected action and in overoptimism benefits of coerciveactionsare overestimated. the rational-choice model of decisionmakingin Rather than sacrifice in whichpsychological conflict Janis'worksuggests themanner situations, variables it. The framework ofthe and social psychological might improve rational-choice model can be kept. It is the actors' calculationof costs, and chancesofsuccessand failure thatare changedundervarious benefits, circumstances. Decision makerswho make "bad" decisionsseek to maximize expected and percepnetbenefits, as others do. It is the information tions utilizedin the calculationof costs and benefits thatbecome faulty undergroupthink conditions and lead to "unrealistic" decisions. exampleforconflict analysisconThe second lessonof the groupthink level of cerns the relationship betweenthe individualand the aggregate in thepolicymaking For Janis, each individual leaderanalysis. participant are "thebest moralindividual. As individuals they shipgroupis a rational, term.Yet the outputof and thebrightest," to use Halberstam's felicitous an averageof theseindividual tendencies. the groupis notsimply Groups tendencies have emergent herethe concurrence-seeking of the properties, cohesive group,that fundamentally alter the group's collectiveoutput.

This content downloaded from 193.219.94.133 on Sat, 7 Dec 2013 10:47:51 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

SOCIAL CONFLICT

295

strucattention togroup conflict willhavetopayspecial Theories ofgroup Groupbehavior shouldnot properties of group. tureand theemergent behavior. Social psychologtobeanalogous toindividual simply beassumed theoproperties for conflict help locate emergent group icalknowledge will rists.

Theory Does Mobilization Theory and Method: Make a Difference?

for it is possible to account A further theory is whether issuein conflict an analysis of structures of domination, forms of conflict directly from Rather than action theories. tomobilization andcollective without recourse (Paige Agrarian Revolution I evaluate discussing theissuein theabstract, andsystematic effort this because itis an ambitious 1975)from perspective, of inagriculture sectors with forms export tolink structures ofdomination An empirical test Thevariables areclearly stated. conflict. andhypotheses in70 underdeveloped factors ofthetheory basedon 135agriculture export in theperiod andis suppleis provided 1948-1970 countries andcolonies ofinteracthree casestudies. ForPaige, conflict is the product mented with that of twogroups, and their characteristics, tion:It is theinteraction action arenot andcollective determines theforms ofconflict. Mobilization in their ownright. Rather, treated analyzed processes byPaigeas distinct In his of domination. from the structures follow they deterministically a series ofdichotomies. beGroup Paigeemploys approach to theorizing, member ofthegroup areessentially ofthetypical havior andthebehavior atthe Thismode oftheorizing for ofexposition similar. allows great clarity and economies, socialclasses, thediversity ofrural price ofoverlooking ethnic groups. ofdomitheory is onstructures part ofPaige's Themost fully developed is export economies nation. The structure of domination in agriculture oftheprincipal sources according toPaige, bytheconjunction determined, haciofincome ofordinary cultivators andofrural elites. Thecommercial endaeconomy is characterized andelites both deriving their bycultivators and beand productivity, from land.Becauseoflowtechnology incomes in world more landmust be markets, causeofa competitive disadvantage hacienda for incomes. Thusthe economy increased group acquired byeither tends bitter conflicts land.The form suchconflict usually to provoke over income from takesis theagrarian Whencultivators derive their revolt. istypical ofmigratory andrural from which elites ofland, ownership wages ofrural thepower elites rests labor estates orofa sharecropping economy, tomaintain a holdover onpolitical control that enables them land, capital on control ofthepolitical andlabor. center Conflict willthen ultimately

This content downloaded from 193.219.94.133 on Sat, 7 Dec 2013 10:47:51 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

296

OBERSCHALL

or the socialist of either forms, and willtakeon revolutionary system variety. nationalist of the control from primarily income their Whenruralelitesderive and transportation), storage, machinery, marketing, capital(i.e. exports, of characteristic land,a situation from income derive their andcultivators thatcommodity Paige hypothesizes agriculture, export small-holdings Theplantatake place. will the ofmiddlemen power movements for limiting income deriving ofelites consists theremaining possibility, tioneconomy, over riseto conflicts It gives wages. earning andcultivators capital, from rural In sum when then, movements. oflabor the context levels within wage andaims ismore intense conflict control ofland, earn from living elites their derive When rural elites ofdomination. ofthestructure at theoverthrow pie share oftheeconomic is over a greater conflict capital, their living from character. thana revolutionary, rather and has a reformist, leadfrom that andprocesses thevariables specifies further theory Paige's conflict to overt bywayof sources) ofdomination (income thestructure For instance, culbehavior ff.). andpolitical (1975:21 behavior economic will tend todevelop heargues, their income from wages, who derive tivators and ofelites, willbe independent themselves, relations among cooperative inturn willlead which tostrike), a risk (e.g.willingness strategy willaccept on dependent action. Cultivators political collective solidary, to radical, and willtend tobe conservative hand, on theother landfor their income, Paige in individual actsofopposition. and willengage low on solidarity, he derives when action andcollective ofmobilization a theory short-circuits collective deterministically action) solidarity, behavior (ideology, political andoutlooks behaviors andtheeconomic ofdomination thestructure from it. associated with andinconsisinternal contradictions creates theory so,Paige's Bydoing that to variables an ad hoc canbe overcome appeal by only which tencies, in that the own It follows from theory Paige's tohistheory. areexogenous and that the control, elites willhavestrong political hacienda commercial weak on and individualist, willbe conservative, cultivator's opposition no be or peasant that "there will little the theory predicts Though solidarity. havebeena constant partof uprisings yet"periodic activity," political between the inconsistency To explain manorial economies" (Paige1975:42). in commercial hacirebellions that anddata,Paigenotes "peasant theory the landed the of power repressive onthe weakening of enda depend systems the from outside oforganizational strength theintroduction aristocracy, internal result from These usually or both" (1975:42). community, peasant duetoa major war, lossofmilitary thelanded power divisions within elite, kinds of these It is urban militants. drives precisely and organizing by action incorporate of collective and that of mobilization variables theories scheme. more intoan explanatory systematically

This content downloaded from 193.219.94.133 on Sat, 7 Dec 2013 10:47:51 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

SOCIAL CONFLICT

297

Onealsosuspects intherevolutionary that movements basedonsocialist and communist which ideologies, Paigefinds characteristic ofsharecropping systems, mobilizing groups from outside theagriculture export sector typically playan important andthat part, thesameis true for nationalist opposition incolonial movements landed estates basedonmigratory labor. Indeed, Paigerecognizes this when hewrites that "theexplanation ofthese revolts [in migratory laborsystems], like the explanation in of revolts commercial hacienda systems, must depend ontheintroduction ofpolitical organizations from outside theworkers' community" (1975:68). Structures ofdomination in theagriculture in many sector export parts oftheworld existed for a longtime tothepost-World WarII period prior Paigestudied. Oneseriously that for doubts, however, the1920s and 1930s he would havefound, as hedidfor the1950s and 1960s, that "most ofthe inthestudy events were population ornationalist, revolutionary, socialist, which altogether accounted for 70% ofthe total" (1975: 101).Theloosening inoverseas socialcontrol after World WarII andthe empires much greater likelihood ofoutside support, bothdomestic and international, forrural must movements, havebeendecisive. In conclusion, what canbe learned from an analysis that on strucrelies tures ofdomination as the cornerstone ofconflict itshows the theory? First, usefulness ofmacrosociological views ofstratification andofsocialchange forunderstanding thepotential for in a socialstructure, conflict whothe likely willbe, and their antagonists relative power. it signals to Second, conflict theorists thatto pass directly from structures of domination to group conflict, overlooking mobilization and collective action, makes the ofmany ofthe explanation ofconflict dimensions (e.g.magnitude, duration, timing, difficult. forms, outcomes)

Breakdown and Solidarity

With these preliminary remarks on theory construction completed, a comand evaluation parison ofthetwoprincipal approaches to conflict theory canbe undertaken. Whataccounts for theproduction ofconflict and the formation ofconflict Themost common insociology groups? view hasbeen the"breakdown" theory. Its socialpsychological foundation rests on the grievance-frustration notion.2 Briefly stated, breakdown theory points to thedissolution oftraditional socialformations and communal solidarities as a result of rapidsocial change. Socialdisorganization, demographic andecological impressures,
2Thesocial changeand modernization literature thatincorporates breakdown ideas is immense. Two sophisticated exponents ofbreakdown viewsare Huntington (1968) and Smelser (1968).

This content downloaded from 193.219.94.133 on Sat, 7 Dec 2013 10:47:51 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

298

OBERSCHALL

balancelead to theaccumulation ofstrains, frustrations, insecurity, and grievances, andtheresulting pressure cooker hasa tendency toexplode in collective violence andcivil disorders. a time, After processes ofintegration takethe upperhand.Individuals becomeincorporated intonew social formations andassociations. Strain decreases, and grievances arepursued through regular institutional channels. Forbreakdown theorists a sharp discontinuity exists between collective violence andmore institutionalized forms ofsocialconflict. Thetwoforms ofconflict require different conceptualization andtheory. Breakdown theorists stress thesimilarity between theroots ofcollective violence andother forms ofdeviant and anomic behavior suchas crime, mental illness, and suicide. Theyemphasize themarginality ofparticipants in collective violence.Theyexpect conflict to locatein growing industrial centers where anomie orelseinweakened, prevails, disorganized rural communities. Frequently, they seecollective violence as irrational tension release rather than as purposeful collective action to defend or obtain collective goods(Tilly et al 1975:4 ff.). In recent years, breakdown theories havebeenincreasingly criticized on theoretical as wellas empirical grounds, and a rival solidarity has theory taken shape(Tilly etat 1975).Solidarity theorists maintain that uprooted masses donot account for most collective protest; stress that conditions that leadto violent protest areessentially thesameas those that produce other of collective forms viewall forms of collective action; action, including violent as essentially ones, purposeful, rational ordefenses pursuits ofcollective interests; and notethatviolence is mostfrequently initiated and perpetrated of socialcontrol. by theagents theorists do not Solidarity minimize theeffects oflarge-scale socialchanges upontheincidence and forms of socialconflict, but theymaintain thattheir on social impact conflict does notderive from theproduction primarily of tensions and grievances. Grievances anddisaffection area fairly and recurpermanent ringfeature of thehistorical landscape. Social,economic, and political actindirectly change incidence andforms upon ofconflict the bychanging mobilization potential ofvarious socialformations, bychanging thesocial milieu andecological locusofconflict, andbychanging thesocialcontrol oftheauthorities. capabilities Still another ofcriticism line ofbreakdown theories itscentral challenges assertion that social rapid change traditional destroys social formations and communal solidarities. In a recent bookentitled Internal Colonialism: The Celtic inBritish Fringe National 1536-1966 Hechter Development, (1975) dealswith thepersistence of ethnic domination and stratification in the British Islesover four centuries despite thealleged andintegrating leveling effects ofthespread ofeducation and industry, administrative centraliza-

This content downloaded from 193.219.94.133 on Sat, 7 Dec 2013 10:47:51 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

SOCIAL CONFLICT

299

theexpansion ofcitizention, increased communications, labormobility, andpolicies In contrast assimilation. ship rights, oflinguistic andreligious thatthese which maintain trends to diffusionist and evolutionary views, the cultural, and economic foundations of ethnic undermine political, notion of"internal solidarities andidentifications, Hechter forward the puts colonialism." In this coregroup institutionalizes its view, thesuperordinate in a stratification ethnic minority original advantages overtheperipheral access basedon a cultural division oflaborinwhich theminority's system limited. The tocertain roles aredenied andtheir share ofsocietal resources are neutralized, becausethe leveling effects expected by diffusion theory ina dependent and oftheperiphery proceeds mode, economic development of because control ofpolitical and oftheadministrative apparatus power in corehands.In a stratification basedon the thestateremains system and lifestyles, cultural of religion, the observable differences language, and ethnic worth itsownculture disadvantaged group keepsreasserting assimilation. Thusa system of considerable costs andpressures for despite in theinternal ethnic stratification colonialist setting showsremarkable staying power. shows that incompariForthespecific caseoftheBritish Isles,Hechter and Northern Irishcounties, economic sonsofEnglish, Scottish, Welsh, showonly that long-term regional indices slight convergence andindicate Eventhough theuseoftheCeltic economic language inequalities persisted. ofcompulsory public education hasdeclined largely as a result ofthe spread intheEnglish inreligious coreand affiliation between language, differences ethnic have persisted to maintain and solidarity periphery and served ofelection returns alsoshows that theinstiboundaries. Hechter's analysis in theEnglish of class-based tutionalization and voting patterns politics in theCelticperiphery where coretookholdonlypartially status-group andnationalism andScottish, andIrish separatism voting persisted Welsh, periodically kept erupting. in old andnationality conflicts Thepersistence andresurgence ofethnic from states anddeveloped industrial societies aretroublesome toexplain the withthe thatassociate majorsocialconflicts vantage pointof theories dissolution oftraditional socialbonds.
RELATIVE DEPRIVATION AND BREAKDOWN AS A THEORY OF CONFLICT Becauseit is a well-known, recent statement of thebreakdown

I turn ofconflict, ofGurr's causalmodel to a critical examination theory strife isthat ofcivil Gurr's central relative hypothesis depriva(1968,1970). tion isthe basicprecondition andthat the thedeprivaofcivil strife, greater in turn is thegreater themagnitude of strife. Relative deprivation tion, to between what think areentitled people they produced bya discrepancy

This content downloaded from 193.219.94.133 on Sat, 7 Dec 2013 10:47:51 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

300

OBERSCHALL

frustration and increases, As deprivation areactually getting. andwhat they Atthe will produce aggression. states These psychological anger willensue. civil willproduce actsandtendencies many aggressive levelofaggregates, strife. however, by is mediated, discontent andstrife between Therelationship or inhibiting overt facilitating either conditions a number ofintervening willinhibit individual actualor threatened, as punishment, conflict. Just against regime increased sizeand use ofsocialcontrol agents aggression, effect on and depressing to havea deterrent can be expected opponents as the simply conditions to suchinhibiting Gurrrefers groupconflict. oftheregime. "coercive potential" refers tothe called"institutionalization" A second inhibiting condition, associations and solidarities beyond andstrong existence ofstable, enduring provide ForGurr, suchgroups group level (Gurr1968:1105). theprimary are what think entitled they they to obtain members with an opportunity else nonviolent will thus or provide to. Their lower deprivation, presence willinhibit In either case,institutionalization discontent. means ofvoicing civilstrife. of identified by Gurrare inaccessibility Otherfacilitating conditions thestrength inrugged terrain, transportation duetopoor regime opponents the external for such as theCommunist support party, ofsubversive groups a which climate of of create strife, past levels civil strife, and initiators of to discontent 1968:1106,1114, (Gurr ofviolent responses opinion tolerant is assumed to havean inhibiting legitimacy oftheregime 1115).Finally, effect on civilstrife. variables and these ofoperationalizing and measuring Manyproblems ofinterpreting There are also difficulties byGurr. processes areadmitted static comparitheresult ofmultivariate basedon cross-national, analyses model issues raised sons.HereI comment onthetheoretical byGurr's only outparts of ofconflict completely spelled as an example theory. Themost andinstitutionaliwith relative themodel arethose concerned deprivation of thebreakdownzation.Bothtogether makeGurr'smodela variant and of social conflict. The otherinhibiting frustration explanation in in themodel variables comefrom empirical generalizations facilitating aboutconflict, notions ofcivil or from accepted widely strife, paststudies rather thanfrom theory. notion lacks explanatory deprivation As used by Gurr,the relative think between what is thediscrepancy Relative people deprivation power. deprivation, by are entitled actually get.Relative to,and whatthey they what one Onedevelops notions about involves social comparison. definition, tosome isgetting, orrelative towhat some isentitled torelative other group Gurr's is silent on thechoiceofthecomparison norm ofequity. theory

This content downloaded from 193.219.94.133 on Sat, 7 Dec 2013 10:47:51 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

SOCIAL CONFLICT

301

group andequity norms. Robbed ofthis specificity, therelative deprivation notion reduces to little more thanthat hardship produces discontent and grievances (Salert1976:Ch. 3). Thatis plausible enough and agrees with common sense, butis notvery useful as a theory ofthesources ofconflict. Did blacks intheUS inthelate1950s feel deprived relative totheprogress being made byAfricans toward independence, relative totheir ownprogress immediately after the war, orrelative tothe growing affluence ofnonblacks? Did blacks outside thesouth in themid1960s become relatively deprived as a result oftheprogress madebysouthern being or were blacks, their expectations raised anddisappointed bythe promises ofthe waronpoverty? Gurr's doesnotprovide theory a means ofanswering these questions. Gurr's is basically theory psychological andindividualist. behavGroup iorand tendencies are theresult ofthesumofindividual behaviors and tendencies. The deprivation levelofa collectivity is theaverage levelof deprivation inthegroup. Thisconceptualization treats individuals as independent, isolated behavioral units. Butis thisrealistic? One might argue ifa frustrated that andangry individual (say,as a result ofpolice overuse offorce) is released in hisimmediate socialmilieu, others in it willalso become angered, not because they themselves have experienced that directly frustrating experience, butbecause they sympathize andidentify with the victim. Socialinteraction maywellhavesuch"multiplier" effects. Group or collective behavior cannot be deduced from individual behavioral assumptions alone.It must incorporate effects from resulting therelations of individuals in thegroup, i.e. theeffects ofgroup structure. Thisobservation and criticism is notjust a sterile controversy among theorists whohavedifferent oftheorizing. styles Important consequences for do follow theory from it.Thiscanbe clarified in an illustration. It has been observed that though considerable progress wasbeing made byblacks inthe1960s intheareaofcivil rights, themagnitude andfrequency ofrace riots at leastuntil1969.An explanation increased, basedon individualist psychological assumptions wouldbe thatracialprogress had increased expectations aboutfurther evenfaster. progress Thusrelative deprivation hadincreased, and hence also themagnitude ofcollective aggression. Butanother interpretation basedon socialinteraction andgroup structure is alsopossible. Thecivilrights movement increased cohesion, pride, communication, and shared symbols among blacks. Theybecame a more solidary group. the Though incidence ofgrievance-producing events against blacks did notsubstantially or might change evenhavedecreased, those events thatdid occurbecame morevisible to them and created a more intense collective reaction, becuase group cohesion hadincreased the shared concerns ofgroup members foreachother. I know ofno direct evidence todecide between these two views, andI certainly donotsuggest that either

This content downloaded from 193.219.94.133 on Sat, 7 Dec 2013 10:47:51 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

302

OBERSCHALL

view is byitself a satisfactory explanation ofthegrowing 1960s riot wave. What theillustration indicates is that neglect ofgroup structure inconflict willlead to quitea different theory perspective on conflict and different explanations ofit. Evensome ofthepolicy implications differ. Therising expectation view leadsto despair with eversatisfying minorities' aspirations. It might also leadto theviewthat in order to reduce expectations, racialprogress will havetobe slowed, which willultimately reduce expectations more rapidly than accomplishments, andthus alsolower relative deprivation. Theother modelviewsincreased conflict as a likelyby-product of the greater solidarity, andhence alsomobilizing ofthe capacity, challenging group, and thus as a "normal cost"to payfor racial progress. It doesnotmake sense to slowracialprogress in order to decrease overt norevento conflict, weaken group which cohesion, would increase overt inthe conflict short run almost certainly. Raising thecosts ofrioting firm bytaking action against rioters istheonly viable policy prescription from this viewpoint, since lower mobilization costs from resulting willhavetobe counincreased solidarity teracted byincreasing collective action costs.
CRITICS OF THE BREAKDOWN-FRUSTRATION

from different disciplinary backgrounds andviewpoints, several recent critics of thebreakdown-frustration theories of socialconflict have shown surprising agreement onwhat other approach I review might prove useful. three works in thiscontext. important In The Rebellious 1830-1930, the Tillyssquarely Century, confront breakdown theories with their on civilstrife in France, findings and Italy, Germany (Tillyet al 1975).In their and national view, local,regional, for struggles power, andespecially state account for a high making, proportion ofviolent rather than events, immediate to misery responses andeconomicdeprivation. There is no tendency for collective violenceto concentrate during orafter surges ofurban growth. Despite major changes in French socialstructure, Franceremained as violent in thetwentieth as itwasinthenineteenth. century violence Group outof ordinarily grows collective actions that arenot such as festivals, necessarily violent, meetings, anddemonstrations. strikes, Collective action isnotanomic tension release, butpurposive andpolitical. Periods ofstrong repression andfirm central control government little or no collective experience because all violence, collective action diminishes andthus alsotheoccasion for collective action violent. becoming tothe breakdown inthe Contrary short theory, run, rapid social change depresses the level ofsocialconflict, because itweakens many means ofmobilization groups' forcollective action faster thanit creates other with a high groups A case in point is that mobilizing capability. of

APPROACH

Writing

This content downloaded from 193.219.94.133 on Sat, 7 Dec 2013 10:47:51 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

SOCIAL CONFLICT

303

invillages groups and recent urban migrants. They aremembers ofsolidary in thecity butremain fora time milieu. smalltowns, unorganized ofgovernment stimuUrbanization, industrialization, andcentralization theauthorities claims ontheresources latepolitical conflict, because make that retain a viable arecapable of ofgroups socialorganization andhence ofthe earlier mobilization. collective actions 19th defensive century Typical inwhich the ofnational structures were the food participants resisted claims Thesites ofcollective riot, thetaxrebellion, andresistance toconscription. church actionwerethenatural markets, gathering placesof ruralfolk: As traditional festivals. weakened and newsolidarities, services, groups cameintobeing, collective actionshifted and trade unions associations, for thedefense ofexisting andresources toa claim more rights from rights andthe share ofsocietal resources. Thedemonstration, anda greater strike, inanurban the form ofcollective became deliberate assembly setting typical action. inexplainitdeficient Other critics find ofbreakdown-frustration theory in thecontemporary world. Laqueur (1976) inginternal warandrebellion theories andgeneralizations about is profoundly skeptical ofsocialscience ofthe warandcollective violence. He is even comparative internal skeptical in civilstrife "The guerrilla studies: phenomenon approach employed ... a comparison Chinaand Vietnam or endless between presents variety between theIRA andBasques between andMozambique, or even Angola in timeor space, further afield maybe ofvalueand ofinterest. Moving with ofcaution" canbe madeonly thegreatest (1976:386) generalizations (1976)is an exhausLaqueur's Guerrilla, a Historical and Critical Study ofsecondary andwars of tive examination on partisans, sources guerrillas, in geography Richin detail, national andtime. liberation, ranging widely ofsuchmovements. thebookstresses thegreat debunks Laqueur diversity isa recent notion that war historical a rare the event, guerrilla phenomenon, andan effective He holdsthatrecent doctrines ofrevolutionary weapon. warfare forsuccess are neither norable to account and failure. original toLaqueur, andseparatist ethnic sentiAccording nationalism, patriotism, ment havebeenthemostimportant of guerrilla force wars.He driving theusefulness ofthebreakdown-frustration ofpopular doubts explanation intraditional He questions societies change. the uprising undergoing rapid offorthat is deviant "as ifacceptance assumptions insurgency behavior, is thenorm, and thedecision and domestic to eignoccupations tyrants them a deviation" He notes that a consistent oppose (Laqueur1976:386). which biasoftheorists toanalyze "the forces ofinternal warhasbeen propel than which inhibit it"(1976:389). He societies towards violence rather those the targets thatmoreattention of the be paid to incumbents, suggests insurgents.

This content downloaded from 193.219.94.133 on Sat, 7 Dec 2013 10:47:51 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

304

OBERSCHALL

to make Laqueuris willing caseshe examines, Basedon thenumerous conflict useful onesfor The most generalizations. empirical somelow-key arethefollowing: theory jungles, (mountains, regions tendto locatein inaccessible 1. Guerillas opponent their to find andwhere where they aredifficult forests, swamps) occurin areas warsoften Moreover guerrilla full strength. deploy cannot the hold where regions i.e.peripheral have occurred, previously where they near however, operate, guerrillas weak. Successful hasbeen ofgovernments the from cutoff are notentirely ofpopulation where they somecenters for the thecostofsocialcontrol suggest that Thesegeneralizations people. ofsuccess. for thelikelihood explaining is animportant variable authorities ofguerrilla parts beenessential havealways 2. Propaganda andterror helpful to such has beenvery fringe a noncombatant Though warfare. and supplies, the intelligence, in providing with money, them movements between in thestruggle attitude ofpeople passive takea neutral, majority isusedtofrighten government terror Moreover, andincumbents. insurgents than thecasualties ofguerrillas often aremore Localpeople collaborators. In summary, "no guerrilla movement andsocialcontrol agents. foreigners Butinthe hostile population. ... against anoverwhelmingly can... survive required support ofactive popular themeasure experience ofhistorical light 1976:393-409). (Laqueur movements need notbeexaggerated" byguerrilla ofinsurgency bythe inspired thattheories suggest Theseobservations masses, as somebreakdowndisaffected oflarge, ofan uprising imagery in and viewofparticipation a mistaken theories are,provide frustration & Wolf ofLeites (1970)in Suchalsois theopinion for insurgents. support apand minds" the"hearts they contrast andAuthority where Rebellion to insurgency. with a systems approach proach ofthe breakdown-frustration isa variant approach Thehearts-and-minds and causesrebellion, In thatviewdeprivation ofsocialconflict. theories for sympaattitudes, andinequality account Popular deprivation. poverty their for therebels then roleinensuring andsupport playa decisive thies, ofthe and minds sidewillgainthehearts or failure. Whichever success a demandwillwin. Thehearts-and-minds represents approach population is thedriving for change bythepeople thedemand pullviewofrebellion: element ofrebellion. at thehearts-and-minds approach. & Wolf several criticisms Leites level in thecontemporary record that do notfind evidence LikeLaqueur, they a high that proportion ofwealth, thrives andinequality rebellion onpoverty the and with andsupport rebels, ofthe isrequired tosympathize population within therebel be broadand comefrom must thatthescopeofsupport a small In contrast, as Laqueur proporonly maintain did,that they region. to the Nondenunciation needbe active supporters. tionofthepopulation

This content downloaded from 193.219.94.133 on Sat, 7 Dec 2013 10:47:51 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

SOCIAL CONFLICT

305

authorities is theonly critical action required bythemajority ofpeople for rebel success. Rebels cancreate support andnondenunciation through coercionand thefear ofretaliation instead ofconquering people's hearts and minds. Theindividual caught between authorities andrebels willengage in short-term, damage-limiting behavior. His expectations about thewinning sidewilllargely determine thesidehe willcollaborate with. Leites & Wolf state an alternative systems approach to insurgency. Unlikethe hearts-and-minds approach, whichfocuses on the demand for on thepart change ofa population, they emphasize thesupply sideofthe rebellion's growth, i.e.the opportunities andcosts that determine the supply ofrebels and theamount ofopposition activity. Rebellion is a system of action. Resource inputs areusedto provide output activities bymeans of a conversion mechanism, theinsurgents' organization. Inputs arerecruits, information, shelter, andfood, usually secured from within the rebel region, andweapons, financing, and publicity, frequently obtained from without. Localinputs areobtained through persuasion andcoercion. Caught inthe conflict, thepopulation calculates thecosts andbenefit ofdifferent options andchooses a course ofaction that maximizes short-term over gains losses (Leites & Wolf1970:Ch. 3). For decreasing rebellion, thedemand view of insurgency prescribes costly, major reforms that aredifficult to implement in a conflict. The authors' cost-push version emphasizes factors thatincrease thecosts ofrebel activity: raising rebels' costs ofobtaining resources, impeding theconversion ofinputs intooutputs byreducing theefficiency ofrebel organizations, destroying rebel outputs, andblunting theeffects of outputs byincreasing thecapacity to absorb rebel activities. Leites & Wolf s systems approach andtheir conceptualization ofrebellionas a production process is a promising innovation for conflict theory. Bothchallenger and target havea resource base from which to mobilize inputs. Assembling resources for inputs in theconflict system arereferred toas mobilization intheliterature. Theoutput produced bytheconversion mechanism is collective action. Themechanism ofconversion, theproductionapparatus of theinsurgents, is the organizational structure of the challengers. Theconversion process itself willuse up resources: organization maintenance iscostly. Collective action that inconflict results will itself bedestructive ofresources. Outcome oftheconflict willdepend very much oneachparty's ability todeny ordestroy theother's resource base,andto increase theother's costof mobilization, organization maintenance, and collective action. Thecentral concern ofconflict theory becomes mobilization, organizaandcollective tion, action. Grievances, discontent, andsocietal breakdown arenotignored insofar as they willaffect theresource baseofthevarious parties and their mobilization, organization and collective actioncosts.

This content downloaded from 193.219.94.133 on Sat, 7 Dec 2013 10:47:51 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

306

OBERSCHALL

Peoplemayharbor intense grievances; yet they maypossess few resources and maybe vulnerable so thatthey can provide butnegligible inputs to challengers. Others with butmild grievances, yet plentiful resources, might makesubstantial contributions even ifthey provide buta fraction oftheir resources tochallengers. Societal breakdown is,tobe sure, associated with thegeneration ofdiscontent, butitsmainimpact on conflict is bywayof thecosts ofmobilization andcollective action. Mobilizing theresources of disorganized collectivities is farcostlier thandoingit within solidary groups, because the latter already possess well-defined leadership andorganization thatcanbe enlisted on behalf ofthechallenger. Whatarethesalient features ofa theory ofconflict that thrusts processes ofconflict formation into center As other group theories do as well, stage? sucha theory starts with an existing structure ofdomination that identifies the number andtype ofmajor inthe collective actors their collective system, interests, andthemajor resources attheir command. Mobilization refers to theprocesses which individual through members' resources aresurgroup rendered, assembled, andcommitted for obtaining common goalsandfor interests. Because mobilization isfacilitated defending group orimpeded by theinternal organization andstructure ofthecollectivity, group structure is a major intheanalysis. variable Theextent andforms ofcollective action taken inpursuit ofcollective on levels ofmobilization goalsdepend andon repertoires ofcollective action. A widely applicable general model ofstructures ofdomination hasbeen putforward It consists byTilly (1975,1978). ofa government that controls the ina population, means principal ofcoercion andcontending that groups their resources for apply theactions ofgovernment influencing andoutputs ontheir behalf. Contenders areoftwo kinds. Members ofthe favored polity, inthestructure ofdomination, haveroutine, lowcostaccess tothegovernment. Other called seek contenders, toobtain influence challengers, greater andmore thecosts ofchallenge areconsidergovernment outputs, though ablefor them. Backed members ofthepolity bythegovernment, resist the demands ofchallengers for a greater share A successofsocietal resources. ful challenger modifies the initialstructure of domination. When he becomes a member ofthepolity, thechallenger has hisinterests routinely recognized andshifts ofthecosts some ofobtaining resources onto institutionalized Forinstance, politics. thecivilrights movement in theUS was ableto shift thecostsofdesegregating and integrating eventually public facilities totheJustice andother instead Department government agencies ofbearing thecostofdirect action as it didin theearlier itself, challenge period.

Mobilization and Solidarity

This content downloaded from 193.219.94.133 on Sat, 7 Dec 2013 10:47:51 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

SOCIAL CONFLICT

307

inmobilization inOlson's A major issue theory hasbeen identified theory action seekto obtain a ofcollective (Olson1968).Challengers frequently collective good.A collective to one good is a good thatonce supplied member ofthegroup cannot be witheld from anymembers ofthegroup, it.According those whodidnotcontribute tothecostofobtaining to even inobtaining ofthecollectivity havea common interest all members Olson, inpaying collective havenocommon interest for thecost the good, yet they it.Thisgives riseto theso-called free-rider in large ofproviding problem that hisownefforts willhaveno noticeable groups. Eachindividual knows on thechances thecollective that effect ofobtaining good;he also knows he can enjoy thebenefits of others' collective efforts evenwhenhe has The rational will contributed to these efforts himself. individual nothing havea tendency to be a free rider. Butifall or most members ofthe thus to obtain group arefree riders, nojointaction willbe mounted collective goodsin thefirst place. inorder that this Olsonsuggests to circumvent dilemma groups seeking collective sanctions to noncontributors, or else goodsmeteout negative provide selective members. Selective incentives to contributing incentives benefits obtained members. areindividual exclusively bycontributing group with ofLaqueur andofLeites Olson's accords well the observations analysis & Wolfon insurgencies and guerrilla movements: ofthe onlya fraction thatmight benefit from successof theinsurgents' population goalswill onnegative voluntarily support the the insurgency; insurgents typically rely As for sanctions tosecure collaboration ofthepeople. theactive insurgents selective andopportuthemselves, positive incentives, e.g.future leadership nity for advancement should besuccessful, enter their calculation. The they notion ofselective incentives as a motivating force for leaders andpolitical whoinitiate mobilization hasbeensystematically entrepreneurs developed theframework within ofa rational-choice model ofcollective action (Frohlichetal 1971).Moreover, insofar as resources areprovided to mobilizing groups from without, which frequently occurs, thefree-rider hurdle ismore to be overcome likely (Oberschall 1973:Ch. 4). Nevertheless a mobilization based on the utilitarian rationaltheory choicemodelleavesone somewhat becausestrong unsatisfied, passions, group consciousness, ideological appeal, andappeals tosolidarity ingroup conflict arerelegated to secondary aretaken intoaccount place,ifthey at & Fireman all (Gamson from 1978).Psychological gratification participatingin a collective effort, or from personal commitment to a cause,must have some onrecruitment andparticipation. Andonewould surely bearing like toknow certain causes rather others enlist why than enthusiasm greater andloyalty, andwhy movements more some areabletoprovide satisfaction tojoiners thanothers.

This content downloaded from 193.219.94.133 on Sat, 7 Dec 2013 10:47:51 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

308

OBERSCHALL

theory. into mobilization doenter directly structure andsolidarity Group resources ofindividual tothe transfer refers itwill berecalled, Mobilization, may them to group goals.Groups commit that to agents or organizations ofindividual amounts insucha waythat substantial be organized already andleaderassociations existing through allocated areroutinely resources existing As the need arises, 1973:Ch. 4). ends (Oberschall for ship group resources mobilized commit rapidly canthen andorganizations leadership at effort mobilizing oftheir thereach andcanexpand goals, to newgroup For group members. among networks useofexisting bymaking lowcosts will cost muchmore:a mobilizing mobilization groups, nonsolidarity willhaveto be willhaveto be created; itslinkto thepopulation agency ofexisting is nota routine group by-product andsince organization forged; costswillbe considerable. maintenance organization structure, between group the basic relationship Tilly(1978:Ch.3) summarized orgaSolidary fashion. in a particularly useful structure andmobilization for short. Catness catnet andnetness, called is a product ofcatness nization andto thesharpness in a group ofa shared identity to thestrength refers a common characterallthose whoshare that boundaries comprise ofsocial members that group among ofnetworks refers tothedensity istic. Netness inbonds.Solidarity by meansofinterpersonal linkthem to eachother inturn canbe measured bytheamount with catness. Mobilization creased these that in a group bytheprobability multiplied andkinds ofresources The greater needed. when ofgroup goals, willbe delivered for thepursuit of delivery. theprobability of thecollectivity, thehigher the solidarity for itbygreater inthis view inresources compensate may Collectivities poor forgroup in resources delivered and mayexceed catness and solidarity, of morerichly low-solidarity resources endowed, goals the mobilized groups. of with theprobability is positively associated that solidarity Thenotion oneto enter to group endsallows ofindividual resources psychodelivery ofmobilization intoa theory from membership group gratification logical derive In solidary many people model. groups, basedontherational-choice which cannot they from membership, benefits material andpsychological sense socialsupport, Socialfellowship, individually. for themselves provide thepreservation arepossible through benefits only ofbelonging, andother between is a visible relationship itself. Because there ofthesolidary group in a high-solidarity group people and group solidarity, individual welfare more than oftheir andofitsqualities thepreservation cometovalue group ofhigh-solidarity members in low-solidarity Consequently, group. people ends, forcollective to allocatemoreresources can be expected groups oflowthanmembers qualities, thepreservation ofitssolidary including of conflict be truein situations Thiswouldespecially solidarity groups. not Andoneshould itself is at stake. thepreservation ofthegroup where

This content downloaded from 193.219.94.133 on Sat, 7 Dec 2013 10:47:51 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

SOCIAL CONFLICT

309

that on solidarity, andtherefore also on catnet, havea forget groups high ofidentifying free them better chance riders andpressuring to conform to sets group norms. Forboth these ofreasons then, themobilization capabilityof high-solidarity groupsare greater than thatof groupslow on solidarity. Though mobilization theory is relatively welldeveloped, muchwork In particular, remains to be doneto increase its explanatory power. it in conflict useful to differentiate ofparticipants appears several categories andtheir commitgroups, because their recruitment intoa conflict group will ment toa collective movement begenerated andsustained bya different mixofselective andideological incentives, psychological gratifications, apwork lineshas beendonebyMcCarthy & Zald peals.Useful alongthese (1973) who distinguish constituents (thosewho provide resources to a conflict group), adherents (those whovaluethecollective good), bystander andopponents. be divided into a leaderConstituents publics, mayfurther orfull-time teams cadre andtransitory ofpart-timers. ship activists, Finally, all these to thedirect benefits categories maydiffer according they expect to derive from therealization oftheconflict group's goals.Thesedistinchaveallowed & Zald to identify theimportant tions McCarthy categories i.e. participants ofconscience adherents andconscience and constituents, whoarenotdirect ofthecollective beneficiaries supporters good.Strategies canthen from ofview ofthedifferent ofmobilization be analyzed thepoint eachofthese contributes tothestruggle andthedifferresources categories incentives to ensure resource ingselective andappeals necessary delivery. Internal andfactionalism within conflict alsobe usefully splits groups may at theinternal understood ofconflict bylooking heterogeneity groups. Mobilization a potential forcollective action. Conflict however provides results from collective action, and in particular from theinteraction of and target's collective One party's challenger's actions. initial advantage mayspurtheother party to greater mobilizing efforts and to different inturn andforms ofcollective which induce strategies action, may changes inthe first party's mobilizing efforts, strategies, andcollective action. Unforofthedynamics notheory ofcollective action hasyet been formutunately in sociological lated theories ofconflict. Recent work byGamson (1975), however, showed that a static analysis linking mobilization variables and forms ofcollective action to outcome variables useful produces empirical Muchinteresting work hasalsobeen doneonan empirical generalizations. in the of theforms documentation and magnitudes of violent conflicts ofconflict, these tostructures ontypes andonlinking contemporary world, ofdomination andtomobilization variables (Gurr1969).At a microlevel,
Tilly's (1978) work on the repertoires of collectiveaction is especially

The Formsand Dynamicsof Conflict

This content downloaded from 193.219.94.133 on Sat, 7 Dec 2013 10:47:51 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

310

OBERSCHALL

promising for uncovering relationships between mobilization andforms of collective action. Finally there exist fragments oftheory on confrontation dynamics (Heirich 1971; Coleman 1957; Deutsch 1973; Oberschall 1978b). Theempirical inGamson's generalizations TheStrategy ofSocialProtest (1975) are basedon a sample of 53 challenging groups drawn from the American experience between 1800and 1945. Thecentral dependent variableis thedegree ofsuccess achieved bychallengers. Success is conceptualized alongtwodimensions: gaining fullacceptance, i.e. recognition as a member ofthe polity, andgaining newadvantages, i.e.achieving thecollectivegoods,objectives, and othergoals of the challenge. Amongother findings, Gamson shows that challenger's sizeis positively associated with butonly acceptance so with slightly newadvantages. whoseek Challengers tooverthrow a target havea much group lower success rate than challengerswholimit themselves to influencing a target. On theother chalhand, lengers whoresort toviolence orthe threat ofit,ortocoercive tactics, have somewhat successratesthanthosewho use noncoercive higher means alone.Moreover, there exists a fairly highpositive association between success andchallenger's useofselective as opposed toproviding incentives, members with psychological gratification alone.Finally, variables measuringtheinternal organization ofthechallenger in complex, areassociated yetsystematic with ways, success. Gamson demonstrated that for conflict someofthevariables theory inmobilization identified as important theory do indeed havesignificant observed associations with a central dependent variable ofconflict theory, success ofthechallenge. Much empirical work oncollective action isessentially descriptive, classificatory, andcross-national. Thecross-national literature on collective violencehas grown in recent immense years. HereI onlyselectively discuss somefindings from a representative ofthisschool(Gurr1969).For a set ofcountries, overa limited spanofyears, strife events arecoded specific from newssources for number and socialcategories ofparticipants, their goalsand their thehuman targets, costsofstrife, as wellas many other variables. Strife invarious events arecategorized ways the along dimensions ofinternal organization, popular andobjectives. participation, Thisprocedureallowsone to distinguish and internal turmoil, conspiracy, war,or someequivalent at theaggregate categories level. at thelevelofa Finally, country, indices ofpervasiveness, duration and intensity ofcivilstrife are calculated, and a summary index ofthemagnitude ofcivilstrife is computed. are madeofthese Comparisons indices and types ofconflict with countries grouped byworld regions, political levelofeconomic regimes, and other variables. Such studies development often and rank compare nations bymagnitude andtypes ofconflict as well.Findings arealso used to test models ofcivilstrife.

This content downloaded from 193.219.94.133 on Sat, 7 Dec 2013 10:47:51 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

SOCIAL CONFLICT

311

a variety ofcountries, a inquality ofdataacross Asidefrom differences investigated, because many time period further problem is theparticular A of collective violence. sharpspurts and declines countries experience and early1960swouldcertainly drawdifferent study basedon the1950s intheUS than onethat included the conclusions levels ofcivil strife about some will have countries quite time frame onechooses, late1960s. Whatever in a somewhat time levels ofstrife different span. different many insights intoconflict. studies provide Nevertheless, cross-national in Gurr's is expressed statement that conclusion One particularly useful for most often mobilize nations people political groups "among generally, is often nations more inthemore ... strife strife developed anddemocratic inother ... theimplications are than nations organized bypolitical groups of ofthepolitical andthat theeffect that strife is a recurrent facet process itinto istochannel andofpolitical economic democratization development from violence" (Gurr than to insulate politics thepolitical process rather the viewof empirically findings confirm 1969:558). These and similar whether ornonviviolent andmobilization theorists that conflict, solidarity in thelarger is firmly embedded political process. olent, studies from cross-national (e.g. the Specific empirical generalizations of civil size and magnitude coercive force relationship between regime in conflict Thedirection of difficult to utilize aresometimes theory. strife) on so many that even Nations variables be uncertain. differ causation may is obvious, ifthedirection ofcausation theobserved relationship maybe andforms ofcollecForconflict a study ofthemagnitude theory, spurious. within forces in relation to thesizeand utilization ofcoercive tiveaction would more thesamepolity over anextended oftime probably yield period about andauthorchallengers information interaction between interesting inFrance over somewhat ities. itis thestudy ofcollective violence Indeed, more than a century that allowed touncover the between relationships Tilly broadsocialtrends, mobilization socialcontrol, and collective variables, action thatI described above(Tillyet al 1975:Ch. 2). In accounting Tilly (1978)introduced for theforms ofcollective action, ofrepertoires action. Giventherange of theuseful ofcollective concept forms ofitaresurprisingly limited. collective theobserved action, possible For instance,
howto demonstrate. Theyknowthata Most"twentieth century Americans" know at a public place,identifies itself and its group that has a claimto makeassembles in a visible way,orients its common action to thepersons, demands or complaints thatis seeking to influence. Within those property, or symbols ofsomeother group ofdemonhowtocarry different forms on several general rules, most Americans know thetemporary themassmarch, with speechmaking, occupation stration: theassembly ofpremises (Tilly1978:Ch. 5).

This content downloaded from 193.219.94.133 on Sat, 7 Dec 2013 10:47:51 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

312

OBERSCHALL

in suchactions is learned or directly byparticipating Sucha repertoire in themassmedia. action that Other forms ofcollective witnessing them such as lynching, ofsome American groups, were oncepart ofthe repertoire havedropped outofit. ofcertain that theinnovation, diffusion, andincorporation Tillyargues action a group's collective action repertoire canbe into forms ofcollective itsinternal organizaroutines ofthepopulation, accounted for bythedaily ofrepression, itspastexperience with prior collective action, patterns tion, He shows howthegrowing and prevailing standards ofright andjustice. inthe modern erapromoted ofelectoral andassociations legality assemblies thedemonstration as a form of collective action becausetheprotection collective actions that assemblies spilled over to other enjoyed byelectoral thenlowered the to elections. Such protection weremarginally related compared to mobilization actioncostsof demonstrations and collective forms andled to itsincreased other 5). adoption (Tilly1978:Ch. ofstudying thedynamics Oneofthemost little-used yet ways promising ofcollective action ofconflict is theinvestigation ofthediffusion patterns theformulation of inphysical time, for itallows andsocialspaceandover A decadeofresearch on models to empirical subject testing. fairly precise that centers onthe that an atomistic ofriots urban riots hasshown analysis ofcities doesnothave characteristics ofparticipants andthecharacteristics Thesurge anddecline ofcollecmuch (Spilerman 1970). explanatory power ofitsown. occurs within a system that has dynamic tive action properties interaction among particibandwagon effects, strategic Contagion effects, are important focalpoints, and pacesetter-follower relationships pants, in their ownright study ofsuchsystems, which merit further properties (Oberschall 1978a,b). Much areaworth more study is escalation and de-escalation. Another action is essentially often threatencollective though legalandnonviolent, there is a convergence ing,to thetarget. Whyis it thatin someconflicts in others is successfully emon destructive whereas conciliation means, A useful andde-escalation is suggested by to escalation ployed? approach of destructive conflicts Deutsch's socialpsychological (Deutsch analysis 1973). causesand is Destructive conflict becomes ofitsinitiating independent of the Expansion to continue after thesehavebecomeirrelevant. likely thenumber of conflict occursalongthevarious dimensions of conflict: thenumber of issuesat stake;the drawn intotheconflict; participants theincreased reliance on of hostility towards theother party; intensity from theconjunction andcoercion. Thetendency toescalate results threats biasedperception, interrelated increased ofthree competition, processes:

This content downloaded from 193.219.94.133 on Sat, 7 Dec 2013 10:47:51 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

SOCIAL CONFLICT

313

Communication between (Deutsch1973:52). andheightened commitment becomes unreliable andimpoverished. Thecompetitheconflicting parties become more sensitive todifferences andthreats than tosimilarities and tors distortions arisefrom forselfpressures Perceptual conciliatory gestures. andsolidarity andsocial identity conformity. Heightened group consistency Actions acquire moral thecompeting outgroup. increase hostility against suchthat errors ofjudgments andmistakes basedon lackof connotations as intentional designed to harm and information areinterpreted measures of bad faith. norms accepted of as indications As a result the usually and morality that one'sbehavior become Desuspended. conduct govern ina spiraling effort todestroy each theparties persist spite mounting costs, other. obeys"Gresham's In Coleman's an escalating conflict view(1957:14), anddangerous drive elements outthose which LawofConflict: the harmful Thisprocess results from both attitudinal theconflict within bounds." keep ofthecommunity intotwosocially "thedivision and socialpolarization, it is absolutely each convinced and attitudinally right" camps, separate ofnewpartisan Polarization grows with theformation (Coleman 1957:13). while and theemergence ofnewextremist leaders, existing organizations Theissues unarecross-pressured into inaction. leaders andorganizations to general, newissues havea tendency tochange from derdispute specific setofpeople become drawn into the a wider areaddedtotheoriginal ones, Eventuanddisagreements antagonisms. givewayto bitter controversies, oftheinitial and disagreements independent allytheconflict maybecome andofharming eachother. goalofwinning is sustained bytheantagonists' in Heirich's sameprocesses arenoted and analyzed (1971) Manyofthese a theory conflict basedona detailed effort toprovide ofescalating elaborate full ofinsight oftheFreeSpeech Movement at Berkeley. Although study he develops theconceptual andtheoretical andvery apparatus suggestive, lackssimplicity and willbe difficult to apply. from theperspective Can escalation and de-escalation be analyzed of A start in thisdirection has beenmadebyObermodels? rational-choice havethree schall andtarget both confrontation, challenger (1978b). During make a conciliatheconflict andsubmit totheother side, abandon options: or makea coercive move.Theychoosethealternative that tory move, i.e.benefits As inmobilization maximizes net minus costs. benefit, expected can be collective incentives. Costsare benefits goodsand selective theory Thismodel costs andthe ofcollective action itself. shows costs opportunity incontinuing a variety under ofcircumstances, conflict persist groups that, inthefaceoflowsuccess chances. Because destructive conflict even highly ofhigh the conflict canbecostly. This ofthe penalties, abandoning certainty

This content downloaded from 193.219.94.133 on Sat, 7 Dec 2013 10:47:51 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

314

OBERSCHALL

thata It suggests as wellas to challengers. to targets applies conclusion to the has to be provided conflict from destructive exit low-cost relatively and foramnesty demands Frequent termination. forconflict protagonist thatthecost-benefit suggests conflicts in highly destructive safeconduct pursuing. is worth to escalation approach as a dynamic conflict has beenmade in modeling Onlya beginning thesocialpsychological to be doneto combine needs Muchwork system. necessary evenmore Thistaskis perhaps choice approaches. andrational of thanit is fora theory of conflict dynamics theory fora satisfactory tostratheory ofgame theapplication plagues Thisdifficulty mobilization. theintrorich insights, inrealistic yielding Although settings. analysis tegic intentions, commitment, suchas trust, concepts, ofpsychological duction of leadsto a proliferation intogametheory and promises expectations, which is their models, from formal deductions hinder precise variables that 1963). (Schelling advantage principal

CONCLUSION
to economics from ofdisciplines, a range cutsacross ofconflict The topic and anthropology, sociology, science, political bywayofhistory, biology and ofmethodologies bya number hasbeenstudied Conflict psychology. mathematical to abstract case studies detailed from ranging techniques, suchas internaclasses ofconflict, with particular Theories dealing models. and competition ecological race war, riots, guerrilla strikes, tional conflict, ofconflict that might theory than a general far more attention have received ofconflict. to all manner be applicable of timeare a mixture at thepresent theories of conflict Sociological observed empirical typologies, analyses, conceptual hypotheses, insights, Socialconmodeling. at systematic attempts modest andsome regularities, stratifiabout theories macrosociological with existing overlaps flict analysis action. Insofar as and collective formation, socialchange, group cation, between oftherelationship andtested theories areclearly formulated there links between andofthe ofconflict, andtheorigin ofdomination structures canbe knowledge this action, andcollective mobilization, structure, group intoconflict theory. incorporated and has beenreadily thinking ofsociological clusters that twocompeting I haveshown above andthemobilizareferred toas thebreakdown-frustration andtheorizing, for underpinning thesociological haveprovided tion-solidarity approaches, ofsocial andoutcomes theforms, incidence, andunderstanding explaining be it should merits ofthetwoapproaches, Whatever therelative conflict. as ofconflict a dynamic analysis closeto providing neither is yet saidthat illustrations in thediscussion and in several I havealso shown a process.

This content downloaded from 193.219.94.133 on Sat, 7 Dec 2013 10:47:51 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

SOCIAL CONFLICT

315

the oflevels ofanalysis vsindividual) andoffundamental that choice (group vsa more choice complicated psychology of behavior assumptions (rational At the doesmake a difference for theinterpretation ofconflict. theactor) theoretical controversy northetwo present time, neither thesubstantive And thatis all to the issuesare closeto being resolved. methodological willprobably theexistence ofcontrobetter result from good,for theory versy overconflict theory.
Literature Cited Boulding, K. 1963. Conflict and Defense. Janis,I. 1972. Victims of Groupthink. Bos349pp. NewYork: Harper Torchbooks. ton: HoughtonMifflin. 277 pp. L. 1973. The Sociology of Social Coleman, J. S. 1957.Community Conflict. Kriesberg, NJ: PrenNewYork:FreePress. 28 pp. Conflicts. EnglewoodCliffs, R. 1975.Conflict tice-Hall.300 pp. Collins, Towards Sociology, A Historical an Explanatory Science.New York: Laqueur, W. 1976. Guerrilla, and Critical Study. Boston: Little, Academic 584pp. Brown.462 pp. L. 1956.TheFunctions Coser, ofSocialConLeites, N., Wolf,C. J. 1970 Rebellionand flict. NewYork:FreePress.188pp. Authority. Chicago:Markham.174 pp. L. 1967.Continuities in the Coser, Study of SocialConflict. NewYork: FreePress. McCarthy,J.,Zald, M. 1973. The Trendof 272 pp. inAmerica. SocialMovements MorrisDahrendorf, R. 1959.Classand ClassContown,NJ: GeneralLearning.30 pp. A. 1973. Social Conflict and Soflict in Industrial Society. Stanford Oberschall, cial Movements. NJ: EnglewoodCliffs, Univ.Press, Calif. 336pp. M. 1973. Prentice-Hall. 371 pp. Deutsch, The Resolution ofConflict. New Haven,CT: Yale Univ. Press. Oberschall,A. 1978a. The decline of the In Research in 420 pp. 1960ssocial movements. Social Movements, Frohlich, N., Oppenheimer, J.,Young,O. Conflict,and As1971.Political and CollecJohnson Change,ed. L. Kriesberg. Leadership tive Univ. NJ. soc. In press Goods. Princeton Press, A. 1978b.Protracted 161pp. conflict. See Oberschall, W. 1975. The ProGamson & Fireman1978 Gamson, Strategy ofSocial test. Ill.: Dorsey. 217 pp. Olson, M. Jr. 1968. The Logic of Collective Homewood, Action.New York: Schocken.176 pp. B. 1978.Utilitarian Gamson, W., Fireman, mobilization logicin theresource per- Paige, J. 1975. AgrarianRevolution.New York: Free Press.435 pp. In The Dynamics spective. of Social B. Revolutions and Revolutionaries. Movements: Resource Mobilization,Salert, Tactics, and Social Control, ed. M. New York: Elsevier.161 pp. T. 1963. The Strategy of Conflict. Zald,J.McCarthy. Beverley Hills, CA: Schelling, New York: Oxford Univ.Press.309 pp. Sage.In press T. R. 1968.A causalmodel of civil Smelser,N. 1968. Toward a theory of modGurr, Am. Polit. Sci.Rev.62,4:1104-24 In Essays inSociological strife. ernization. ExT. 1969. A comparative ofcivil planation,ed. N. Smelser, pp. 125-46. Gurr, study strife. Violence inAmerica, NJ: Prentice-Hall ed.H. GraEnglewoodCliffs, ham, T. Gurr, pp.544-605. NewYork: Spilerman, S. 1970. The causes of racial disA comparison NewAmerican Library turbance: ofalternate exT. 1970. Why MenRebel.Princeton Am. Sociol. Rev. 35:627-49 planations. Gurr, Univ. NJ:421 pp. From toRevoluPress, Tilly, C. 1978. Mobilization M. Internal Colonialism: TheCeltic tion.Reeding,Mass.: Addison-Wesley. Hechter, Fringe inBritish National Development, In press 1536-1966. Berkeley:Univ. Calif. Tilly,C., Tilly,L., Tilly,R. 1975. TheRebellious Century, Press. 361pp 1830 to 1930. CamM. 1971. The Spiralof Conflict: Heirich, bridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press. Univ.Press, 354 pp. 1964.Columbia Berkeley viand collective Tilly,C. 1975.Revolutions NY. 462 pp. J. 1968. PoliticalOrderin olence. In Handbook of Political Huntington, N. Polsby, New Haven,CT: Changing Society. Science, ed. F. Greenstein, Vol. 3. New York: AddisonWesley Yale Univ. Press. 488 pp.

This content downloaded from 193.219.94.133 on Sat, 7 Dec 2013 10:47:51 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions