PHIL 160 Sample Test II 1.

The first premise of Hempels unpacked account of the logic of confirmation maintains that If H, then I is really shorthand for: If [H & (A1 & An)], then (if C then E) If this is the correct way to understand If H, then I, then from Not E a. No result follows. b. One can conclude not H. c. One can conclude (Not H OR .. not An) OR not C (in the inclusive sense of or at least one is false/wrong). d. One can conclude Not H or not An or not C (in the exclusive sense of or at most one is false/wrong). 2. Select all that apply. On Hempels model of the test of a hypothesis, if Semmelweis initial test of the hypothesis, Cadaveric material causes childbed fever had failed (the death rate did not go down as predicted), Semmelweis reasonably (in light of the evidence) could have a. As Popper argues, immediately abandoned the hypothesis viewing the evidence as decisive. b. Question his assumption about chlorinated lime solution being able to kill the infectious agent. c. Stick to the hypothesis even though it was apparently falsified. d. Question whether the med students had washed their hands in the solution. 3. For Hempel, auxiliary hypotheses (A1 An) a. Are always irrational. b. Are always at work, even if they just include ceteris paribus. c. Are never recognized by scientists as being at work. 4. Hempel and Popper agree that a. Individual hypotheses are tested in isolation and can be conclusively falsified using reasoning of the form, Modus Tollens. b. Freudian theory is pseudo-scientific. c. Only the context of justification, in which hypotheses or theories are tested, matters; how a hypothesis is arrived at initially, does not. 5. Poppers argument for falsifiability assumes a. The deductive validity of arguments of the form Modus Tollens. b. That to be genuinely scientific, a hypothesis or theory must be falsified. c. That we need a criterion to demarcate or distinguish between science and pseudo-science.

6.

In explicating and advocating Falsificationism, Popper claims to a. Provide a criterion for distinguishing science from pseudo-science. b. Solve the problem of induction by dissolving it. c. Both a and b.

7.

Select all that apply. Popper's falsificationism is a. His account of scientific reasoning. b. Like Hempels account, insists that auxiliary hypotheses/assumptions are crucial in tests of any hypothesis or theory, and so any apparent falsification is not necessarily so. c. Intended to demonstrate that scientific reasoning is not inductive in any way. d. Just offered to show that Marxist theory is pseudo-science.

8.

If Duhem is correct, a failed prediction of a hypothesis, H, a. Forces a choice on the part of scientists as to what to hold firm, either (H), an individual hypothesis apparently being tested, or some or all of a theory (T) that entails if H, then I. b. Condemns the hypothesis, H, from which the prediction of I is derived. c. Is completely irrelevant to the truth or falsity of H because only T matters. Suppose that we have two theories, T1 and T2, which although trying to explain the same phenomena, differ in their explanations about them. Suppose that, because of their differences, T2 predicts not x but T1 does not. Suppose we decide to perform a crucial test to decide between the theories, and we reason this way: Either T1 or T2 If T2, then not x x ------------------T1 According to Duhem, the above experiment is an example of what is or is taken to be: a. b. c. d. An argument of the form reductio ad absurdum A deductively valid argument A so-called crucial experiment All of the above.

9.

10. According to Duhem, the conclusion T1 drawn in the previous example is a. The correct conclusion. b. Not justified because we dont know what T1 predicts. c. Is not warranted because we can never be sure that there isnt some theory, T3 we havent yet thought of that could explain the relevant phenomena.

11. Select all that apply. An example discussed in lecture to illustrate a problem facing Poppers Falsificationism involved a. A case of planetary misbehavior that conclusively falsified Newtons law of gravity. b. A case of planetary misbehavior in which scientists used Newtons law of gravity to explain it, rather than assuming Newtons law was falsified. c. Brahes assumption that stellar parallax could be seen by the naked eye. d. The unwillingness of astronomers to abandon the Copernican theory in light of Brahes apparent falsification of it. 12. Select all that apply. Holism, as Duhem argues for, is a thesis that entails that a. b. c. d. We can never prove an empirical hypothesis or theory. It is bodies of theory, not individual hypotheses or statements in isolation, that are tested by experiment. Although we can choose to decide some test falsifies an individual hypothesis, neither the logic nor the experimental result forces us to do so. It is not just If H, then I that is actually at work or under test, but If T, then (if H, then I)

13. Briefly explain the important difference between Hempels challenge to Poppers Falsificationism, and Duhems challenge to it. Hempel only cites auxiliary assumptions and initial conditions as factors that could be wrong (rather than the hypothesis being tested). But Duhem cites a whole body of theory as being in the mix when a hypothesis is tested. For the forthcoming questions, assume that Kuhns paradigms are theories (plus some stuff about accepted technologies), in the way Hempel, Popper, and Duhem talk about them: a group or set of claims/hypotheses that include some generalizations (law-like statements, as is All As are Bs). 14. According to Kuhn, normal science a. b. c. d. Is science guided by a paradigm/accepted theory which is not questioned. Seeks to discover novelties. Never uncovers anomalies. Both a and c

15. Select all that apply. According to Kuhn, what makes normal science more successful than prenormal science includes the fact that, in normal science, a. There is little or no disagreement over fundamentals. b. Scientists take the paradigm/theory for granted and pursue detailed and esoteric research that is based on, assumes, it c. Both a and b.

16. In Kuhns account of normal science, a failure to solve a puzzle (to confirm a hypothesis one assumes is entailed by the paradigm), until such time as there are many such failures a. Is viewed as a fundamental challenge to the paradigm. b. Leads to the abandonment of the paradigm, on the basis of its being falsified, as Popper maintains. c. Is viewed as a failure of the scientist(s) assuming some hypothesis will solve a specific puzzle. 17. According to Kuhn, a crisis in a normal science tradition occurs (and can only occur): a. When a paradigm offers too many opportunities for investigation. b. When a paradigm is (successfully) challenged by a large number of important anomalies. c. When the physics department runs out of funds for new lab coats and goggles. 18. A paradigm/theory explored in lecture to illustrate how a new paradigm/theory is both promising and leaves lots of work to do was a. Semmelweis hypothesis that childbed fever is caused by cadaveric material. b. Paleys Design Hypothesis c. Darwins hypothesis of Natural Selection 19. What scientific and political revolutions have in common, according to Kuhn, is that a. Both inevitably end in stalemate. b. Both bring out the irrational in everyone involved. c. In neither case, is there some higher level to appeal to for a resolution. 20. One of the philosophical assumptions Hanson challenges is that a. There is any reason to trust our senses. b. There are no facts that different cultures can agree about. c. Facts are directly given to unprejudiced observers with normal sensory receptors. 21. Hanson argues that a. There are two senses of seeing, and although we may all see the same thing in one of these senses, we never see the same thing in the second sense. b. There are two senses of seeing, and although we may all see the same thing in one of these senses, we may not see the same thing in the second sense. c. All visual experiences involve interpretations. 22. The interlocutor in Hansons article is introduced by Hanson a. To show what is wrong with his argument(s). b. To introduce objections Hanson cannot respond to. c. To anticipate and respond to potential objections to his arguments that Hanson thinks he can respond to and does.

23. Select all that apply. According to Kuhn, the choice scientists make between competing paradigms/theories in the context of a scientific revolution a. Cannot be made on the basis of observation. b. Are based on evidence and logic. c. Is like a religious conversion. d. Cannot be made on the basic of logic or observation because competing paradigms/theories lead to different observations and one does not contain the other and just add more. 24. Select all that apply. In arguing for the incommensurability of competing paradigms/theories during a scientific revolution, Kuhn a. Maintains that scientists who disagree about which paradigm is correct, do not disagree about what they observe. b. Appeals to Hansons arguments and the history of science to argue that one basic difference between competing paradigms/theories is a difference in what their advocates observe. c. Provides examples that demonstrate that what Europeans observed before and after the Copernican revolution did not change. d. Uses the example of what Europeans observed before and after the revolution in which the Copernican theory replaced the geocentric theory to argue that observations are in part shaped by an accepted paradigm/theory. 25. Select all that apply. In the film, The Ghost Particle, we learn that a. Neutrinos were proposed precisely to save the law of The Conservation of Energy, and that law was not abandoned despite evidence that seemed to contradict it. b. Neutrinos were discovered by an experimental accident. c. As Kuhn argues, scientists loathe to abandon the paradigm/theory of The Standard Model for a long time blamed either (Rays) experimental results or (Johns) mathematical predictions about the number of neutrinos rather than the Standard Model. d. In contrast to Kuhns account of scientists commitment to the paradigm/theory of their discipline, at least one physicist said she hoped and had looked for a chink in The Standard Model and was happy when one was found.