Cayetano vs Monsod 201 SCRA 210, 1991 FACTS Monsod was nominated by President Aquino to the position of Chairman

of the COMELEC on April 25, 1991. Cayetano opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not possess the required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Monsods nomination, petitioner filed a petition for Certiorari and Prohibition praying that said confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections be declared null and void because Monsod did not meet the requirement of having practiced law for the last ten years. ISSUE: Whether or not Monsod satisfies the requirement of the position of Chairman of the COMELEC. HELD: The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. A person is also considered to be in the practice of law when he: . . . for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person, firms, associations or corporations as to their rights under the law, or appears in a representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings pending or prospective, before any court, commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or commission constituted by law or authorized to settle controversies. Otherwise stated, one who, in a representative capacity, engages in the business of advising clients as to their rights under the law, or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court or outside of court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of law. Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar examinations of 1960 with a grade of 86.55%. He has been a dues paying member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines since its inception in 1972-73. He has also been paying his professional license fees as lawyer for more than ten years. Atty. Monsods past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyerentrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

In Re: Felipe Del Rosario 52 Phil 399 Legal Ethics Practice of Law is a Privilege Felipe Del Rosario took the bar in 1925 for the second time and he failed. He again took it in 1926 and he failed again. In 1927, he filed a motion before the Supreme Court in which he alleged that there was a mistake in the computation of his exam results in the 1925 bar exams. He was then admitted to the bar. HOWEVER, a subsequent investigation by the city fiscal uncovered that Del Rosario, together with one Juan Villaflor a former employee of the Supreme Court, falsified some documents to make it appear that Del Rosario actually passed the 1925 bar exams. The two were subsequently charged with falsification. Villaflor was convicted as he pleaded guilty but Del Rosario was acquitted for lack of evidence. The fiscal however recommended Del Rosario to surrender his certificate of attorney. ISSUE: Whether or not the recommendation by the fiscal is correct.

HELD: Yes. The mere fact that Villaflor was convicted proves that Del Rosario is unworthy of the certificate of attorney. The crime which Villaflor is proven guilty of has benefited only Del Rosario and it is impossible that the latter has no knowledge of this illegal machination. But shouldnt the Supreme Court just allow Del Rosario to take the bar exams again? No. The practice of the law is not an absolute right to be granted everyone who demands it, but is a privilege to be extended or withheld in the exercise of a sound discretion. The standards of the legal profession are not satisfied by conduct which merely enables one to escape the penalties of the criminal law. It would be a disgrace to the Judiciary to receive one whose integrity is questionable as an officer of the court, to clothe him with all the prestige of its confidence, and then to permit him to hold himself out as a duly authorized member of the bar.

IN RE CUNANAN [94 Phil 534; Resolution; 18 Mar 1954] In the Matter of the Petitions for Admission to the Bar of Unsuccessful Candidates of 1946 to 1953; ALBINO CUNANAN, ET AL., petitioners. Resoluti, 1954on March 18 Facts: Congress passed Republic Act Number 972, commonly known as the Bar Flunkers Act of 1953. In accordance with the said law, the Supreme Court then passed and admitted to the bar those candidates who had obtained an average of 72 per cent by raising it to 75 percent. After its approval, many of the unsuccessful postwar candidates filed petitions for admission to the bar invoking its provisions, while other motions for the revision of their examination papers were still pending also invoked the aforesaid law as an additional ground for admission. There are also others who have sought simply the reconsideration of their grades without, however, invoking the law in question. To avoid injustice to individual petitioners, the court first reviewed the motions for reconsideration, irrespective of whether or not they had invoked Republic Act No. 972. Issue: Whether or Not RA No. 972 is constitutional and valid. Held: RA No. 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit to the Bar, those candidates who suffered from insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate preparation. In the judicial system from which ours has been evolved, the admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of the profession and their supervision have been indisputably a judicial function and responsibility. We have said that in the judicial system from which ours has been derived, the admission, suspension, disbarment or reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of the profession is concededly judicial. On this matter, there is certainly a clear distinction between the functions of the judicial and legislative departments of the government. It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to grant license for the practice of law belongs exclusively to this Court, and the law passed by Congress on the matter is of permissive character, or as other

authorities may say, merely to fix the minimum conditions for the license. Republic Act Number 972 is held to be unconstitutional. CAN A NON-LAWYER REPRESENT THE ACCUSED DURING ARRAIGNMENT? > No, during the arraignment, it is the obligation of the court to ensure that the accused is represented by a lawyer because it is the first time when the accused is informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. > This is a task which only a lawyer can do.

> But during trial, there is no such duty. The accused must ask for a lawyer, or else, the right is deemed waived. He can even defend himself personally. MAY AN ACCUSED BE VALIDLY REPRESENTED BY A NON-LAWYER AT THE TRIAL? > If the accused knowingly engaged the service of the non-lawyer, he is bound by the non-lawyers actions > But if he didnt know that he was represented by a non-laywer, the judgment is void because of the misrepresentation N.B: In MTCs, one can defend himself or by a non-lawyer. WHAT ARE THE CONSEQUENCES IF REPRESENTED BY A NON-LAWYER? 1. 2. He is bound by the rules He cannot raise right to counsel

SUPPOSE X DEFENDS HIMSELF. IS THIS CONSIDERED A PRACTICE OF LAW UNDER THE DOCTRINE IN CAYETANO V. MONSOD? > No, this is an exercise of a constitutional right.

Admission requirements A bar candidate must meet the following academic qualifications:

Holder of a professional degree in law from a recognized law school in the Philippines[4] Holder of a bachelor's degree with academic credits in certain required subjects from a recognized college or university in the Philippines or abroad.[5]

He or she should also meet certain non-academic requisites:[6]

A Filipino citizen. At least twenty-one (21) years of age. A resident of the Philippines. Satisfactory evidence of good moral character (usually a certificate from the dean of law school or an immediate superior at work). No charges involving moral turpitude have been filed against the candidate or are pending in any court in the Philippines.

In March 2010 the Philippine Supreme Court Issued Bar Matter 1153 amending provisions in sec 5 and 6 of rule 138 of the rules of court now allowing Filipino foreign law school graduates to take the bar exam provided that they comply with the following: a. completion of all courses leading to a degree of Bachelor of laws or its equivalent b. recognition or accreditation of the law school by proper authority c. completion of all fourth year subjects in a program of a law school duly accredited by the Philippine Government d. present proof of completing a separate bachelors degree IN RE: VICENTECHING Bar Matter No. 914, October 1, 1999

Facts:

Vicente D. Ching, the legitimate son of the spouses Tat Ching, a Chinese citizen, and Prescila A. Dulay, a Filipino, was born in Tubao, La Union on 11 April 1964. Since his birth, Ching has resided in the Philippines.

In July 1998, Ching filed an application to take the 1998 Bar Examinations. TheSupreme Court allowed Ching to take the Bar Examinations, subject to the condition that he must submit proof of his Philippine citizenship. In compliance,Ching submitted PRC Certification, Voter Certification and Certification that he was elected Sanggunian Bayan Member of Tubao, La Union.

Ching passed the bar exams but he was not allowed to take the oath because of his questionable citizenship status. In the Resolution dated 20 April 1999, theSupreme Court required Ching to submit further proof of his citizenship. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) was also required to file a comment on Ching'spetition for admission to the bar and on the documents evidencing his Philippinecitizenship.

The OSG commented that Ching, being the "legitimate child of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother born under the 1935 Constitution was a Chinese citizen and continued to be so, unless upon reaching the age of majority he elected Philippinecitizenship" in strict compliance with the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 625. The clause "upon reaching the age of majority" has been construed to mean a reasonable time after reaching the age of majority which had been interpreted by the Secretary of Justice to be three (3) years. In Cuenco case, it was held that an election done after over seven (7) years was not made within a reasonable time.

OSG points out that Ching has not formally elected Philippine citizenship and, if ever he does, it would already be beyond the "reasonable time."

Ching then filed a Manifestation, attaching therewith his Affidavit of Election of Philippine Citizenship and his Oath of Allegiance, both dated 15 July 1999.

Issue:

Whether Ching has elected Philippine citizenship within a reasonable time and if so whether his citizenship has retroacted to the time he took the bar.

Held:

When Ching was born in 1964, the governing charter was the 1935 Constitution. Under Article IV, Section 1(3) of the 1935 Constitution, the citizenship of a legitimate child born of a Filipino mother and an alien father followed thecitizenship of the father, unless, upon reaching the age of majority, the child elected Philippine citizenship.

C.A. No. 625 which was enacted pursuant to Section 1(3), Article IV of the 1935 Constitution, prescribes the procedure that should be followed in order to make a valid election of Philippine citizenship. Under Section 1 thereof, legitimate children born of Filipino mothers may elect Philippine citizenship by expressing such intention "in a statement to be signed and sworn to by the party concerned before any officer authorized to administer oaths, and shall be filed with the nearest civil registry. The said party shall accompany the aforesaid statement with the oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of the Philippines."

The phrase "reasonable time" has been interpreted to mean that the election should be made within three (3) years from reaching the age of majority. However, we held in Cuenco vs. Secretary of Justice, that the three (3) year period is not an inflexible rule. We said:

It is true that this clause has been construed to mean a reasonable period after reaching the age of majority, and that the Secretary of Justice has ruled that three (3) years is the reasonable time to elect Philippine citizenshipunder the constitutional provision adverted to above, which period may be extended under certain circumstances, as when the person concerned has always considered himself a Filipino.

However, we cautioned in Cuenco that the extension of the option to elect Philippine citizenship is not indefinite:

Regardless of the foregoing, petitioner was born on February 16, 1923. He became of age on February 16, 1944. His election of citizenship was made on May 15, 1951, when he was over twenty-eight (28) years of age, or over seven (7) years after he had reached the age of majority. It is clear that said election has not been made "upon reaching the age of majority."

In the present case, Ching, having been born on 11 April 1964, was already thirty-five (35) years old when he complied with the requirements of C.A. No. 625 on 15 June 1999, or over fourteen (14) years after he had reached the age ofmajority. Based on the interpretation of the phrase "upon reaching the age ofmajority," Ching's election was clearly beyond, by any reasonable yardstick, the allowable period within which to exercise the privilege. It should be stated, in this connection, that the special circumstances invoked by Ching, i.e., his continuous and uninterrupted stay in the Philippines and his being a certified public accountant, a registered voter and a former elected public official, cannot vest in him Philippine citizenship as the law specifically lays down the requirements for acquisition of Philippine citizenship by election.

The Court, like the OSG, is sympathetic with the plight of Ching. However, even if we consider the special circumstances in the life of Ching like his having lived in the Philippines all his life and his consistent belief that he is a Filipino, controlling statutes and jurisprudence constrain us to disagree with the recommendation of the OSG. Consequently, we hold that Ching failed to validly elect Philippinecitizenship. The span of fourteen (14) years that lapsed from the time he reachedthe age of majority until he finally expressed his intention to elect Philippinecitizenship is clearly way beyond the contemplation of the requirement of electing "upon reaching the age of majority." Moreover, Ching has offered no reason why he delayed his election of Philippine citizenship. The prescribed procedure in electing Philippine citizenship is certainly not a tedious and painstaking process. All that is required of the elector is to execute an affidavit of election of Philippinecitizenship and, thereafter, file the same with the nearest civil registry. Ching's unreasonable and unexplained delay in making his election cannot be simply glossed over.

Philippine citizenship can never be treated like a commodity that can be claimed when needed and suppressed when convenient. One who is privileged to elect Philippine citizenship has only an inchoate right to such citizenship. As such, he should avail of the right with fervor, enthusiasm and promptitude. Sadly, in this case, Ching slept on his opportunity to elect Philippine citizenship and, as a result, this golden privilege slipped away from his grasp. In Re: Arthur Cuevas, Jr. 285 SCRA 59 Legal Ethics Lawyers Oath In 1991, a neophyte died during the initiation rites of Lex Talionis Fraternitas in the San Beda College of Law. Arthur Cuevas Jr was one of the persons charged (with murder) for the death of the neophyte. He pleaded guilty and was later convicted to the lesser crime of Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide. Thereafter, Cuevas was granted probation and he continued taking up law. In 1995, he was discharged from probation. In 1996, the Supreme Court allowed Cuevas to take the bar on the condition that in case

he will pass, his oath taking will have to be approved by the Supreme Court first. Cuevas did pass the 1996 bar exams and in 1997, he filed a petition before the Supreme Court asking the latter to allow him to take the Lawyers Oath. ISSUE: Whether or not Cuevas may be allowed to take the Lawyers Oath. HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court is duty bound to prevent the entry of undeserving aspirants, as well as to exclude those who have been admitted but have become a disgrace to the profession. Cuevas participation in the senseless killing of the neophyte is highly reprehensible however, the Supreme Court is willing to give him a chance considering that Cuevas has received various certifications regarding his good behavior while on probation. The Supreme Court also stressed that the lawyers oath is not a mere formality recited for a few minutes in the glare of flashing cameras and before the presence of select witnesses. As a lawyer, Cuevas shall be expected to abide by the oath strictly and to conduct himself beyond reproach at all times. As a lawyer he will now be in a better position to render legal and other services to the more unfortunate members of society. In Re: Al C. Argosino 246 SCRA 14 (1995) IN MATTER OF THE ADMISSION TO THE BAR AND OATH-TAKING OF SUCCESSFUL BAR APPLICANT AL C. ARGOSINO

DOCTRINES:

The practice of law is a high personal privilege limited to citizens of good moral character, with special education qualifications, duly ascertained and certified. Requirement of good moral character is of greater importance so far as the general public and proper administration of justice is concerned. All aspects of moral character and behavior may be inquired into in respect of those seeking admission to the Bar. Requirement of good moral character to be satisfied by those who would seek admission to the bar must be a necessity more stringent than the norm of conduct expected from members of the general public. Participation in the prolonged mindless physical beatings inflicted upon Raul Camaligan constituted evident rejection of that moral duty and was totally irresponsible behavior, which makes impossible a finding that the participant was possessed of good moral character. Good moral character is a requirement possession of which must be demonstrated at the time of the application for permission to take the bar examinations and more importantly at the time of application for admission to the bar and to take the attorney's oath of office.

FACTS: On February 4, 1992 ,Argosino, together with 13 others, was charged with the crime of homicide in connection with the death of one Raul Camaligan. The death of Camaligan stemmed from the affliction of

severe physical injuries upon him in course of "hazing" conducted as part of the university fraternity initiation rites. On February 11, 1993, the accused were consequently sentenced to suffer imprisonment for a period ranging from two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years. Eleven (11) days later, Mr. Argosino and his colleagues filed an application for probation with the lower court. The application was granted on June 18 1993. The period of probation was set at two (2) years, counted from the probationer's initial report to the probation officer assigned to supervise him. Less than a month later, Argosino filed a petition to take the bar exam. He was allowed and he passed the exam, but was not allowed to take the lawyer's oath of office. On April 15, 1994, Argosino filed a petition to allow him to take the attorney's oath and be admitted to the practice of law. He averred that his probation period had been terminated. It is noted that his probation period did not last for more than 10 months.

ISSUE: Whether Argosino should be allowed to take the oath of attorney and be admitted to the practice of law HELD: Mr. Argosino must submit to this Court evidence that he may now be regarded as complying with the requirement of good moral character imposed upon those who are seeking admission to the bar. He should show to the Court how he has tried to make up for the senseless killing of a helpless student to the family of the deceased student and to the community at large. In short, he must show evidence that he is a different person now, that he has become morally fit for admission to the profession of law. He is already directed to inform the Court, by appropriate written manifestation, of the names of the parents or brothers and sisters of Camaligan from notice.

IN RE: VICTORIO D. LANUEVO A.M. No. 1162 August 29, 1975 Facts: This is a disbarment matter with regards to Attorney Victorio Lanuevo, the Bar Confidant for the 1971 Bar Examinations. Supreme Court received a confidential letter that speaks of the exam notebooks of a examinee named Ramon Galang who has been re-evaluated and re-corrected such that he hurdled the Bar Exams and was admitted to the Bar. Lanuevo admitted having brought the five examination notebooks of Ramon E. Galang back to the respective examiners for re-evalution or re-checking. The five examiners admitted having re-evaluated or re-checked the notebook to him by the Bar Confidant, stating that he has the authority to do the same and that the examinee concerned failed only in his particular subject and was on the borderline of passing. Ramon Galang was able to pass the 1971 bar exam because of Lanuevos move but the exam results bears that he failed in 5 subjects namely in (Political, Civil, Mercantile, Criminal & Remedial). Galang on the otherhand, denied of having charged of Slight Physical Injuries on Eufrosino de Vera, a law student of MLQU.

The five examiners were led by Lanuevo to believe that it is the Bar Committees regular activity that when an examinee has failed in one subject alone, the rest he passed, the examiner in that subject which he flunked will review his exam notebook. Afterwards, Lanuevo gained possession of few properties, including that of a house in BF Homes, which was never declared in his declaration of assets and liabilities. Issue: WON Lanuevo was guilty of defrauding the examiners such that Galang passed the Bar? YES Held: It was plain, simple and unmitigated deception that characterized respondent Lanuevos well -studied and well-calculated moves in successively representing separately to each of the five examiners concerned to the effect that the examinee failed only in his particular subject and/or was on the borderline of passing. To repeat, the before the unauthorized re-evaluations were made, Galang failed in the five (5) major subjects and in two (2) minor subjects which under no circumstances or standard could it be honestly claimed that the examinee failed only in one, or he was on the borderline of passing. The Bar Confidant has absolutely nothing to do in the re-evaluation or reconsideration of the grades of examinees who fail to make the passing mark before or after their notebooks are submitted to it by the Examiners. The Bar Confidant has no business evaluating the answers of the examinees and cannot assume the functions of passing upon the appraisal made by the Examiners concerned. He is not the overall Examiner. He cannot presume to know better than the examiner. AS TO GALANGS CRIM CASE: The concealment of an attorney in his application to take the Bar examinations of the fact that he had been charged with, or indicted for, an alleged crime, is a ground for revocation of his license to practice law is well settled. The practice of the law is not an absolute right to be granted every one who demands it, but is a privilege to be extended or withheld in the exercise of sound discretion. The standards of the legal profession are not satisfied by conduct which merely enables one to escape the penalties of the criminal law. Under the circumstances in which respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, was allowed to take the Bar examinations and the highly irregular manner in which he passed the Bar, WE have no other alternative but to order the surrender of his attorneys certificate and the striking out of his name from the Roll of Attorneys. DECISION: Lanuevo disbarred, Galang stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.