VENUE AND PROCESS

Cuenco vs. Court of Appeals, 53 SCRA 360 , October 26, 1973 Case Title : ROSA CAYETANO CUENCO, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DIVISION, MANUEL CUENCO, LOURDES CUENCO, CONCEPCION CUENCO MANGUERRA, CARMEN CUENCO, CONSUELO CUENCO REYES. and TERESITA CUENCO GONZALEZ, respondents.Case Nature : PETITION for certiorari to review a decision and a resolution of the Court of Appeals. Syllabi Class : Settlement of estates|Venue|Jurisdiction|Venue Syllabi: 1. Settlement of estates; Jurisdiction; Venue; Residence of deceased not element of jurisdiction, but of venue.For purposes of determining what court has jurisdiction in the settlement of a deceaseds estate, the residence of the deceased or the location of his estate is not an element of jurisdiction over the subject matter but merely of venue. 2. Settlement of estates; Jurisdiction; Court first taking cognizance of settlement of the estate of a decedent.Section 1, Rule 73 on venue does not state that the court with whom the testate or intestate petition is first filed acquires exclusive jurisdiction. The Rule precisely and deliberately provides that the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. A fair reading of the Rule since it deals with venue and comity between courts of equal and coordinate jurisdictionindicates that the court with whom the petition is first filed, must also first take cognizance of the settlement of the estate in order to exercise jurisdiction over it to the exclusion of all other courts. Conversely such court, may upon learning that a petition for probate of the decedents last will has been presented in another court where the decedent obviously had his conjugal domicile and resided with his surviving widow and their minor children, and that the allegation of the intestate petition before it stating that the decedent died intestate may actually be false, may decline to take cognizance of the petition and hold the petition before it in abeyance, and instead defer to the second court which has before it the petition for probate of the decedents alleged last will. This is exactly what the Cebu court did. Upon petitioner-widows filing with it a motion to dismiss Lourdes intestate petition, it issued its order holding in abeyance its action on the dismissal motion and deferred to the Quezon City court, awaiting its action on the petition for probate before that court. Implicit in the Cebu courts

order was that if the will was duly admitted to probate by the Quezon City court, then it would definitely decline to take cognizance of Lourdes intestate petition which would thereby be shown to be false and improper, and leave the exercise of jurisdiction to the Quezon City court, to the exclusion of all other courts. 3. Settlement of estates;Where Quezon City court did not act without jurisdiction in admitting to probate will of decedent.Under the facts of the case and where respondents submitted to the Quezon City court their opposition to probate of the will, but failed to appear at the scheduled hearing despite due notice, the said court cannot be declared, as the appellate court did, to have acted without jurisdiction in admitting to probate the decedents will and appointing petitioner-widow as executrix thereof in accordance with the testators testamentary disposition. 4. Settlement of estates; Testate proceedings take precedence over intestate proceedings.ln accordance with settled jurisprudence in this jurisdiction, testate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of a deceased person take precedence over intestate proceedings for the same purpose. Thus it has been held repeatedly that, if in the course of intestate proceedings pending before a court of first instance it is found that the decedent had left a last will, proceedings for the probate of the latter should replace the intestate proceedings even it at that stage an administrator had already been appointed x x x. This, however, is understood to be without prejudice that should the alleged last will be rejected or is disapproved, the proceeding shall continue as an intestacy. 5. Settlement of estates; Jurisdiction; Opposition to jurisdiction of trial court in settlement proceedings should be by appeal.Under section 1, Rule 73, the Quezon City courts assumption of jurisdiction over the decedents estate on the basis of the will duly presented for probate by petitioner-widow and finding that Quezon City was the first choice of residence of the decedent, who had his conjugal home and domicile thereinwith the deference in comity duly given by the Cebu courtcould not be contested except by appeal from said court in the original case, except when want of jurisdiction appears on the record. 6. Settlement of estates; Jurisdictional facts in probate proceedings.The jurisdictional facts in probate proceedings under section 2, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court are the death of the decedent, his residence at the time of his death in the province where the probate court is sitting, or if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, his having left his estate in such province. 7. Settlement of estates; When proceedings for settlement of estate will not be annulled even if court had improper venue.-

The mischievous effect in the administration of justice of considering the question of residence as affecting the jurisdiction of the trial court and annulling the whole proceedings only to start all over again the same proceedings before another court of the same rank in another province is too obvious to require comment. 8. Settlement of estates; Same.lt would be unfair imposition upon petitioner as the one named and entitled to be executrix of the decedents last will and settle his estate in accordance therewith, and a disregard of her rights under the rule on venue and the law on jurisdiction to require her to spend much more time, money and effort to have to go from Quezon City to the Cebu court everytime she has an important matter of the estate to take up with the probate court. 9. Venue; Supreme Court may order change of venue under its supervisory authority over inferior courts.+ Docket Number: No. L-24742 Counsel: Ambrosio Padilla Law Office, Jalandoni & Jamir Ponente: TEEHANKEE Dispositive Portion: ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered reversing the appealed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals and the petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction originally filed by respondents with the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 34104-R) is ordered dismissed. No costs

.R. No. L-24742 October 26, 1973

ROSA CAYETANO CUENCO, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DIVISION, MANUEL CUENCO, LOURDES CUENCO, CONCEPCION CUENCO MANGUERRA, CARMEN CUENCO, CONSUELO CUENCO REYES, and TERESITA CUENCO GONZALEZ, respondents. Ambrosio Padilla Law Office for petitioner. Jalandoni and Jamir for respondents.

TEEHANKEE, J.:

Petition for certiorari to review the decision of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 34104-R, promulgated 21 November 1964, and its subsequent Resolution promulgated 8 July 1964 denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration. The pertinent facts which gave rise to the herein petition follow: On 25 February 1964 Senator Mariano Jesus Cuenco died at the Manila Doctors' Hospital, Manila. He was survived by his widow, the herein petitioner, and their two (2) minor sons, Mariano Jesus, Jr. and Jesus Salvador, both surnamed Cuenco, all residing at 69 Pi y Margal St., Sta. Mesa Heights, Quezon City, and by his children of the first marriage, respondents herein, namely, Manuel Cuenco, Lourdes Cuenco, Concepcion Cuenco Manguera, Carmen Cuenco, Consuelo Cuenco Reyes and Teresita Cuenco Gonzales, all of legal age and residing in Cebu. On 5 March 1964, (the 9th day after the death of the late Senator) 1 respondent Lourdes Cuenco filed a Petition for Letters of Administration with the court of first instance of Cebu (Sp. Proc. No. 2433-R), alleging among other things, that the late senator died intestate in Manila on 25 February 1964; that he was a resident of Cebu at the time of his death; and that he left real and personal properties in Cebu and Quezon City. On the same date, the Cebu court issued an order setting the petition for hearing on 10 April 1964, directing that due notice be given to all the heirs and interested persons, and ordering the requisite publication thereof at LA PRENSA, a newspaper of general circulation in the City and Province of Cebu. The aforesaid order, however, was later suspended and cancelled and a new and modified one released on 13 March 1964, in view of the fact that the petition was to be heard at Branch II instead of Branch I of the said Cebu court. On the same date, a third order was further issued stating that respondent Lourdes Cuenco's petition for the appointment of a special administrator dated 4 March 1964 was not yet ready for the consideration of the said court, giving as reasons the following: It will be premature for this Court to act thereon, it not having yet regularly acquired jurisdiction to try this proceeding, the requisite publication of the notice of hearing not yet having been complied with. Moreover, copies of the petition have not been served on all of the heirs specified in the basic petition for the issuance of letters of administration. 2 In the meantime, or specifically on 12 March 1964, (a week after the filing of the Cebu petition) herein petitioner Rosa Cayetano Cuenco filed a petition with the court of first instance of Rizal (Quezon City) for the probate of the deceased's last will and testament and for the issuance of letters testamentary in her favor, as the surviving widow and executrix in the said last will and testament. The said proceeding was docketed as Special Proceeding No. Q-7898. Having learned of the intestate proceeding in the Cebu court, petitioner Rosa Cayetano Cuenco filed in said Cebu court an Opposition and Motion to Dismiss, dated 30 March 1964, as well as an Opposition to Petition for Appointment of Special Administrator, dated 8 April 1964. On 10 April 1964, the Cebu court issued an order holding in abeyance its resolution on petitioner's motion to dismiss "until after the Court of First Instance of Quezon City shall have acted on the petition for probate of that document purporting to be the last will and testament of the deceased Don Mariano Jesus Cuenco." 3 Such order of the Cebu court deferring to the probate proceedings in the Quezon City court was neither excepted to nor sought by

respondents to be reconsidered or set aside by the Cebu court nor did they challenge the same by certiorari or prohibition proceedings in the appellate courts. Instead, respondents filed in the Quezon City court an Opposition and Motion to Dismiss, dated 10 April 1964,opposing probate of the will and assailing the jurisdiction of the said Quezon City court to entertain petitioner's petition for probate and for appointment as executrix in Sp. Proc. No. Q-7898 in view of the alleged exclusive jurisdiction vested by her petition in the Cebu court in Sp. Proc. No. 2433-R. Said respondent prayed that Sp. Proc. No. Q-7898 be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and/or improper venue. In its order of 11 April 1964, the Quezon City court denied the motion to dismiss, giving as a principal reason the "precedence of probate proceeding over an intestate proceeding." 4 The said court further found in said order that theresidence of the late senator at the time of his death was at No. 69 Pi y Margal, Sta. Mesa Heights, Quezon City. The pertinent portion of said order follows: On the question of residence of the decedent, paragraph 5 of the opposition and motion to dismiss reads as follows: "that since the decedent Don Mariano Jesus Cuenco was a resident of the City of Cebu at the time of his death, the aforesaid petition filed by Rosa Cayetano Cuenco on 12 March 1964 was not filed with the proper Court (wrong venue) in view of the provisions of Section 1 of Rule 73 of the New Rules of Court ...". From the aforequoted allegation, the Court is made to understand that the oppositors do not mean to say that the decedent being a resident of Cebu City when he died, the intestate proceedings in Cebu City should prevail over the probate proceedings in Quezon City, because as stated above the probate of the will should take precedence, but that the probate proceedings should be filed in the Cebu City Court of First Instance. If the last proposition is the desire of the oppositors as understood by this Court, that could not also be entertained as proper because paragraph 1 of the petition for the probate of the will indicates that Don Mariano Jesus Cuenco at the time of his death was a resident of Quezon City at 69 Pi y Margal. Annex A (Last Will and Testament of Mariano Jesus Cuenco) of the petition for probate of the will shows that the decedent at the time when he executed his Last Will clearly stated that he is a resident of 69 Pi y Margal, Sta. Mesa Heights, Quezon City, and also of the City of Cebu. He made the former as his first choice and the latter as his second choice of residence." If a party has two residences, the one will be deemed or presumed to his domicile which he himself selects or considers to be his home or which appears to be the center of his affairs. The petitioner, in thus filing the instant petition before this Court, follows the first choice of residence of the decedent and once this court acquires jurisdiction of the probate proceeding it is to the exclusion of all others. 5 Respondent Lourdes Cuenco's motion for reconsideration of the Quezon City court's said order of 11 April 1964 asserting its exclusive jurisdiction over the probate proceeding as deferred to by the Cebu court was denied on 27 April 1964 and a second motion for reconsideration dated 20 May 1964 was likewise denied. On 11 May 1964, pursuant to its earlier order of 11 April 1964, the hearing for probate of the last will of the decedent was called three times at half-hour intervals, but notwithstanding due

notification none of the oppositors appeared and the Quezon City court proceeded at 9:00 a.m. with the hearing in their absence. As per the order issued by it subsequently on 15 May 1964, the Quezon City court noted that respondents-oppositors had opposed probate under their opposition and motion to dismiss on the following grounds: (a) That the will was not executed and attested as required by law; (b) That the will was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence on the part of the beneficiary or some other persons for his benefit; (c) That the testator's signature was procured by fraud and/or that the testator acted by mistake and did not intend that the instrument he signed should be his will at the time he affixed his signature thereto. 6 The Quezon City court further noted that the requisite publication of the notice of the hearing had been duly complied with and that all the heirs had been duly notified of the hearing, and after receiving the testimony of the three instrumental witnesses to the decedent's last will, namely Atty. Florencio Albino, Dr. Guillermo A. Picache and Dr. Jose P. Ojeda, and of the notary public, Atty. Braulio A. Arriola, Jr., who ratified the said last will, and the documentary evidence (such as the decedent's residence certificates, income tax return, diplomatic passport, deed of donation) all indicating that the decedent was a resident of 69 Pi y Margal St., Quezon City, as also affirmed by him in his last will, the Quezon City court in its said order of 15 May 1964 admitted to probate the late senator's last will and testament as having been "freely and voluntarily executed by the testator" and "with all formalities of the law" and appointed petitionerwidow as executrix of his estate without bond "following the desire of the testator" in his will as probated. Instead of appealing from the Quezon City court's said order admitting the will to probate and naming petitioner-widow as executrix thereof, respondents filed a special civil action of certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction with respondent Court of Appeals (docketed as case CA-G.R. No. 34104-R) to bar the Rizal court from proceeding with case No. Q-7898. On 21 November 1964, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision in favor of respondents (petitioners therein) and against the herein petitioner, holding that: Section 1, Rule 73, which fixes the venue in proceedings for the settlement of the estate of a deceased person, covers both testate and intestate proceedings. Sp. Proc. 2433-R of the Cebu CFI having been filed ahead, it is that court whose jurisdiction was first invoked and which first attached. It is that court which can properly and exclusively pass upon the factual issues of (1) whether the decedent left or did not leave a valid will, and (2) whether or not the decedent was a resident of Cebu at the time of his death. Considering therefore that the first proceeding was instituted in the Cebu CFI (Special Proceeding 2433-R), it follows that the said court must exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of the Rizal CFI, in which the petition for probate was filed by the respondent Rosa Cayetano Cuenco (Special Proceeding Q-7898).

The said respondent should assert her rights within the framework of the proceeding in the Cebu CFI, instead of invoking the jurisdiction of another court. The respondents try to make capital of the fact that on March 13, 1964, Judge Amador Gomez of the Cebu CFI, acting in Sp. Proc. 2433-R, stated that the petition for appointment of special administrator was "not yet ready for the consideration of the Court today. It would be premature for this Court to act thereon, it not having yet regularly acquired jurisdiction to try this proceeding ... . " It is sufficient to state in this connection that the said judge was certainly not referring to the court's jurisdiction over the res, not to jurisdiction itself which is acquired from the moment a petition is filed, but only to the exercise of jurisdiction in relation to the stage of the proceedings. At all events, jurisdiction is conferred and determined by law and does not depend on the pronouncements of a trial judge. The dispositive part of respondent appellate court's judgment provided as follows: ACCORDINGLY, the writ of prohibition will issue, commanding and directing the respondent Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch IX, Quezon City, and the respondent Judge Damaso B. Tengco to refrain perpetually from proceeding and taking any action in Special Proceeding Q-7898 pending before the said respondent court. All orders heretofore issued and actions heretofore taken by said respondent court and respondent Judge, therein and connected therewith, are hereby annulled. The writ of injunction heretofore issued is hereby made permanent. No pronouncement as to costs. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied in a resolution of respondent Court of Appeals, dated 8 July 1965; hence the herein petition for review on certiorari. The principal and decisive issue at bar is, theretofore, whether the appellate court erred in law in issuing the writ of prohibition against the Quezon City court ordering it to refrain perpetually from proceeding with the testateproceedings and annulling and setting aside all its orders and actions, particularly its admission to probate of the decedent's last will and testament and appointing petitioner-widow as executrix thereof without bond in compliance with the testator's express wish in his testament. This issue is tied up with the issue submitted to the appellate court, to wit, whether the Quezon City court acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in taking cognizance and assuming exclusive jurisdiction over the probate proceedings filed with it, in pursuance of the Cebu court's order of 10 April 1964 expressly consenting in deference to the precedence of probate over intestate proceedings that it (the Quezon City court) should first act "on the petition for probate of the document purporting to be the last will and testament of the deceased Don Mariano Jesus Cuenco" - which order of the Cebu court respondents never questioned nor challenged by prohibition or certiorari proceedings and thus enabled the Quezon City court to proceed without any impediment or obstruction, once it denied respondent Lourdes Cuenco's motion to dismiss the probate proceeding for alleged lack of jurisdiction or improper venue, to proceed with the hearing of the petition and to admit the will to probate upon having been satisfied as to its due execution and authenticity. The Court finds under the above-cited facts that the appellate court erred in law in issuing the writ of prohibition against the Quezon City court from proceeding with the testate proceedings

and annulling and setting aside all its orders and actions, particularly its admission to probate of the deceased's last will and testament and appointing petitioner-widow as executrix thereof without bond pursuant to the deceased testator's express wish, for the following considerations: 1. The Judiciary Act 7 concededly confers original jurisdiction upon all Courts of First Instance over "all matter of probate, both of testate and intestate estates." On the other hand, Rule 73, section of the Rules of Court lays down the rule of venue, as the very caption of the Rule indicates, and in order to prevent conflict among the different courts which otherwise may properly assume jurisdiction from doing so, the Rule specifies that "the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts." The cited Rule provides: Section 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the Province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of the province in which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to theexclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence, of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record. (Rule 73) 8 It is equally conceded that the residence of the deceased or the location of his estate is not an element of jurisdiction over the subject matter but merely of venue. This was lucidly stated by the late Chief Justice Moran in Sy Oa vs. Co Ho 9 as follows: We are not unaware of existing decisions to the effect that in probate cases the place of residence of the deceased is regarded as a question of jurisdiction over the subject-matter. But we decline to follow this view because of its mischievous consequences. For instance, a probate case has been submitted in good faith to the Court of First Instance of a province where the deceased had not resided. All the parties, however, including all the creditors, have submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the court and the case is therein completely finished except for a claim of a creditor who also voluntarily filed it with said court but on appeal from an adverse decision raises for the first time in this Court the question of jurisdiction of the trial court for lack of residence of the deceased in the province. If we consider such question of residence as one affecting the jurisdiction of the trial court over the subject-matter, the effect shall be that the whole proceedings including all decisions on the different incidents which have arisen in court will have to be annulled and the same case will have to becommenced anew before another court of the same rank in another province. That this is of mischievous effectin the prompt administration of justice is too obvious to require comment. (Cf. Tanunchuan vs. Dy Buncio & Co., G.R. No. 48206, December 31, 1942) Furthermore, section 600 of Act No. 190, 10 providing that the estate of a deceased person shall be settled in the province where he had last resided, could not have been intended as defining the jurisdiction of the

probate court over the subject-matter, because such legal provision is contained in a law of procedure dealing merely with procedural matters, and, as we have said time and again, procedure is one thing and jurisdiction over the subject matter is another. (Attorney-General vs. Manila Railroad Company, 20 Phil. 523.) The law of jurisdiction Act No. 136, 11 Section 56, No. 5 confers upon Courts of First Instance jurisdiction over all probate cases independently of the place of residence of the deceased. Since, however, there are many courts of First Instance in the Philippines, the Law of Procedure, Act No. 190, section 600, fixes the venue or the place where each case shall be brought. Thus, the place of residence of thedeceased is not an element of jurisdiction over the subjectmatter but merely of venue. And it is upon this ground that in the new Rules of Court the province where the estate of a deceased person shall be settled is properly called "venue". It should be noted that the Rule on venue does not state that the court with whom the estate or intestate petition is first filed acquires exclusive jurisdiction. The Rule precisely and deliberately provides that "the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts." A fair reading of the Rule since it deals with venue and comity between courts of equal and co-ordinate jurisdiction indicates that the court with whom the petition is first filed, must also first take cognizance of the settlement of the estate in order to exercise jurisdiction over it to the exclusion of all other courts. Conversely, such court, may upon learning that a petition for probate of the decedent's last will has been presented in another court where the decedent obviously had his conjugal domicile and resided with his surviving widow and their minor children, and that the allegation of the intestate petition before it stating that the decedent died intestate may be actually false, may decline to take cognizance of the petition and hold the petition before it in abeyance, and instead defer to the second court which has before it the petition for probate of the decedent's alleged last will. 2. This exactly what the Cebu court did. Upon petitioner-widow's filing with it a motion to dismiss Lourdes' intestate petition, it issued its order holding in abeyance its action on the dismissal motion and deferred to the Quezon City court, awaiting its action on the petition for probate before that court. Implicit in the Cebu court's order was that if the will was duly admitted to probate, by the Quezon City court, then it would definitely decline to take cognizance of Lourdes' intestate petition which would thereby be shown to be false and improper, and leave the exercise of jurisdiction to the Quezon City court, to the exclusion of all other courts. Likewise by its act of deference, the Cebu court left it to the Quezon City court to resolve the question between the parties whether the decedent's residence at the time of his death was in Quezon City where he had his conjugal domicile rather than in Cebu City as claimed by respondents. The Cebu court thus indicated that it would decline to take cognizance of the intestate petition before it and instead defer to the Quezon City court, unless the latter would make a negative finding as to the probate petition and the residence of the decedent within its territory and venue.

3. Under these facts, the Cebu court could not be held to have acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of jurisdiction in declining to take cognizance of the intestate petition and deferring to the Quezon City court. Necessarily, neither could the Quezon City court be deemed to have acted without jurisdiction in taking cognizance of and acting on the probate petition since under Rule 73, section 1, the Cebu court must first take cognizance over the estate of the decedent and must exercise jurisdiction to exclude all other courts, which the Cebu court declined to do. Furthermore, as is undisputed, said rule only lays down a rule of venue and the Quezon City court indisputably had at least equal and coordinate jurisdiction over the estate. Since the Quezon City court took cognizance over the probate petition before it and assumed jurisdiction over the estate, with the consent and deference of the Cebu court, the Quezon City court should be left now, by the same rule of venue of said Rule 73, to exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. Under the facts of the case and where respondents submitted to the Quezon City court their opposition to probate of the will, but failed to appear at the scheduled hearing despite due notice, the Quezon City court cannot be declared, as the appellate court did, to have acted without jurisdiction in admitting to probate the decedent's will and appointing petitioner-widow as executrix thereof in accordance with the testator's testamentary disposition. 4. The relatively recent case of Uriarte vs. Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental 12 with facts analogous to the present case 13 is authority against respondent appellate court's questioned decision. In said case, the Court upheld the doctrine of precedence of probate proceedings over intestate proceedings in this wise: It can not be denied that a special proceeding intended to effect the distribution of the estate of a deceased person, whether in accordance with the law on intestate succession or in accordance with his will, is a "probate matter" or a proceeding for the settlement of his estate. It is equally true, however, that in accordance with settled jurisprudence in this jurisdiction, testate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of a deceased person take precedence over intestate proceedings for the same purpose. Thus it has been held repeatedly that, if in the course of intestate proceedings pending before a court of first instance it is found that the decedent had left a last will, proceedings for the probate of the latter should replace the intestate proceedingseven if at that state an administrator had already been appointed, the latter being required to render final account and turn over the estate in his possession to the executor subsequently appointed. This however, is understood to be without prejudice that should the alleged last will be rejected or is disapproved, the proceeding shall continue as an intestacy. As already adverted to, this is a clear indication that proceedings for the probate of a will enjoy priority over intestate proceedings. 14 The Court likewise therein upheld the jurisdiction of the second court, (in this case, the Quezon City court) although opining that certain considerations therein "would seem to support the view that [therein respondent] should have submitted said will for probate to the Negros Court, [in this

case, the Cebu court] either in a separate special proceeding or in an appropriate motion for said purpose filed in the already pending Special Proceeding No. 6344," 15thus: But the fact is that instead of the aforesaid will being presented for probate to the Negros Court, Juan Uriarte Zamacona filed the petition for the purpose with the Manila Court. We can not accept petitioner's contention in this regard that the latter court had no jurisdiction to consider said petition, albeit we say that it was not the proper venuetherefor. It is well settled in this jurisdiction that wrong venue is merely a waivable procedural defect, and, in the light of the circumstances obtaining in the instant case, we are of the opinion, and so hold, that petitioner has waived the right to raise such objection or is precluded from doing so by laches. It is enough to consider in this connection that petitioner knew of the existence of a will executed by Juan Uriarte y Goite since December 19, 1961 when Higinio Uriarte filed his opposition to the initial petition filed in Special Proceeding No. 6344; that petitioner likewise was served with notice of the existence (presence) of the alleged last will in the Philippines and of the filing of the petition for its probate with the Manila Court since August 28, 1962 when Juan Uriarte Zamacona filed a motion for the dismissal of Special Proceeding No. 6344. All these notwithstanding, it was only on April 15, 1963 that he filed with the Manila Court in Special Proceeding No. 51396 an Omnibus motion asking for leave to intervene and for the dismissal and annulment of all the proceedings had therein up to that date; thus enabling the Manila Court not only to appoint an administrator with the will annexed but also to admit said will to probate more than five months earlier, or more specifically, on October 31, 1962. To allow him now to assail the exercise of jurisdiction over the probate of the will by the Manila Court and the validity of all the proceedings had in Special Proceeding No. 51396 would put a premium on his negligence. Moreover, it must be remembered that this Court is not inclined to annul proceedings regularly had in a lower court even if the latter was not the proper venue therefor, if the net result would be to have the same proceedings repeated in some other court of similar jurisdiction; more so in a case like the present where the objection against said proceedings is raised too late. 16 5. Under Rule 73, section 1 itself, the Quezon City court's assumption of jurisdiction over the decedent's estate on the basis of the will duly presented for probate by petitioner-widow and finding that Quezon City was the first choice ofresidence of the decedent, who had his conjugal home and domicile therein with the deference in comity duly given by the Cebu court could not be contested except by appeal from said court in the original case. The last paragraph of said Rule expressly provides: ... The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record. (Rule 73) The exception therein given, viz, "when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record" could probably be properly invoked, had such deference in comity of the Cebu court to the Quezon City court not appeared in the record, or had the record otherwise shown that the Cebu court had taken cognizance of the petition before it and assumed jurisdiction.

6. On the question that Quezon City established to be the residence of the late senator, the appellate court while recognizing that "the issue is a legitimate one" held in reliance on Borja vs. Tan 17 that. ... The issue of residence comes within the competence of whichever court is considered to prevail in the exercise jurisdiction - in this case, the Court of First Instance of Cebu as held by this Court. Parenthetically, we note that the question of the residence of the deceased is a serious one, requiring both factual and legal resolution on the basis of ample evidence to be submitted in the ordinary course of procedure in the first instance, particularly in view of the fact that the deceased was better known as the Senator from Cebu and the will purporting to be his also gives Cebu, besides Quezon City, as his residence. We reiterate that this matter requires airing in the proper court, as so indicated in the leading and controlling case of Borja vs. Hon. Bienvenido Tan, et al., G.R. L-7792, July 27, 1955. In the case at bar, however, the Cebu court declined to take cognizance of the intestate petition first filed with it and deferred to the testate proceedings filed with the Quezon City court and in effect asked the Quezon City court to determine the residence of the decedent and whether he did leave a last will and testament upon which would depend the proper venue of the estate proceedings, Cebu or Quezon City. The Quezon City court having thus determined in effect for both courts at the behest and with the deference and consent of the Cebu court that Quezon City was the actual residence of the decedent who died testate and therefore the proper venue, the Borja ruling would seem to have no applicability. It would not serve the practical ends of justice to still require the Cebu court, if the Borja ruling is to be held applicable and as indicated in the decision under review, to determine for itself the actual residence of the decedent (when the Quezon City court had already so determined Quezon City as the actual residence at the Cebu court's behest and respondents have not seriously questioned this factual finding based on documentary evidence) and if the Cebu court should likewise determine Quezon City as the actual residence, or its contrary finding reversed on appeal, only then to allow petitioner-widow after years of waiting and inaction to institute the corresponding proceedings in Quezon City. 7. With more reason should the Quezon City proceedings be upheld when it is taken into consideration that Rule 76, section 2 requires that the petition for allowance of a will must show: "(a) the jurisdictional facts." Such "jurisdictional facts" in probate proceedings, as held by the Court in Fernando vs. Crisostomo 18 " are the death of the decedent, his residence at the time of his death in the province where the probate court is sitting, or if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, his having left his estate in such province." This tallies with the established legal concept as restated by Moran that "(T)he probate of a will is a proceeding in rem. The notice by publication as a pre-requisite to the allowance of a will, is a constructive notice to the whole world, and when probate is granted, the judgment of the court is binding upon everybody, even against the State. The probate of a will by a court having jurisdiction thereof is conclusive as to its due execution and validity." 19 The Quezon City court acted regularly within its jurisdiction (even if it were to be conceded that Quezon City was not the proper venue notwithstanding the Cebu court's giving way and deferring to it,) in admitting the decedent's last will to probate and naming petitioner-widow as executrix thereof. Hence, the Quezon city court's action should not be set aside by a writ of prohibition for supposed lack of jurisdiction as per the appellate court's appealed decision, and should instead be sustained in

line with Uriarte, supra, where the Court, in dismissing the certiorari petition challenging the Manila court's action admitting the decedent's will to probate and distributing the estate in accordance therewith in the secondproceeding, held that "it must be remembered that this Court is not inclined to annul proceedings regularly had in a lower court even if the latter was not the proper venue therefor, if the net result would be to have the same proceedings repeated in some other court of similar jurisdiction." As stressed by Chief Justice Moran in Sy Oa, supra, "the mischievous effect in the administration of justice" of considering the question of residence as affecting the jurisdiction of the trial court and annulling the whole proceedings only to start all over again the same proceedings before another court of the same rank in another province "is too obvious to require comment." 8. If the question of jurisdiction were to be made to depend only on who of the decedent's relatives gets first to file a petition for settlement of the decedent's estate, then the established jurisprudence of the Court that Rule 73, section 1 provides only a rule of venue in order to preclude different courts which may properly assume jurisdiction from doing so and creating conflicts between them to the detriment of the administration of justice, and that venue is waivable, would be set at naught. As between relatives who unfortunately do not see eye to eye, it would be converted into a race as to who can file the petition faster in the court of his/her choice regardless of whether the decedent is still in cuerpo presente and in disregard of the decedent's actual last domicile, the fact that he left a last will and testament and the right of his surviving widow named as executrix thereof. Such dire consequences were certainly not intended by the Rule nor would they be in consonance with public policy and the orderly administration of justice. 9. It would finally be unjust and inequitable that petitioner-widow, who under all the applicable rules of venue, and despite the fact that the Cebu court (where respondent Lourdes Cuenco had filed an intestate petition in the Cebu court earlier by a week's time on 5 March 1964) deferred to the Quezon City court where petitioner had within fifteen days (on March 12, 1964) after the decedent's death (on February 25, 1964) timely filed the decedent's last will and petitioned for letters testamentary and is admittedly entitled to preference in the administration of her husband's estate,20 would be compelled under the appealed decision to have to go all the way to Cebu and submit anew the decedent's will there for probate either in a new proceeding or by asking that the intestate proceedings be converted into a testateproceeding when under the Rules, the proper venue for the testate proceedings, as per the facts of record and as already affirmed by the Quezon City court is Quezon City, where the decedent and petitionerwidow had their conjugal domicile. It would be an unfair imposition upon petitioner as the one named and entitled to be executrix of the decedent's last will and settle his estate in accordance therewith, and a disregard of her rights under the rule on venue and the law on jurisdiction to require her to spend much more time, money and effort to have to go from Quezon City to the Cebu court everytime she has an important matter of the estate to take up with the probate court. It would doubly be an unfair imposition when it is considered that under Rule 73, section 2, 21 since petitioner's marriage has been dissolved with the death of her husband, their community property and conjugal estate have to beadministered and liquidated in the estate proceedings of the deceased spouse. Under the appealed decision, notwithstanding that petitioner resides in Quezon City, and the proper venue of the testate proceeding was in Quezon City and the Quezon City court properly took cognizance and exercised exclusive jurisdiction with the deference in comity and consent of the Cebu court, such proper exercise of

jurisdiction would be nullified and petitioner would have to continually leave her residence in Quezon City and go to Cebu to settle and liquidate even her own community property and conjugal estate with the decedent. 10. The Court therefore holds under the facts of record that the Cebu court did not act without jurisdiction nor with grave abuse of discretion in declining to take cognizance of the intestate petition and instead deferring to the testateproceedings filed just a week later by petitioner as surviving widow and designated executrix of the decedent's last will, since the record before it (the petitioner's opposition and motion to dismiss) showed the falsity of the allegation in theintestate petition that the decedent had died without a will. It is noteworthy that respondents never challenged bycertiorari or prohibition proceedings the Cebu court's order of 10 April 1964 deferring to the probate proceedings before the Quezon City court, thus leaving the latter free (pursuant to the Cebu court's order of deference) to exercise jurisdiction and admit the decedent's will to probate. For the same reasons, neither could the Quezon City court be held to have acted without jurisdiction nor with grave abuse of discretion in admitting the decedent's will to probate and appointing petitioner as executrix in accordance with its testamentary disposition, in the light of the settled doctrine that the provisions of Rule 73, section 1 lay down only a rule of venue, not of jurisdiction. Since respondents undisputedly failed to appeal from the Quezon City court's order of May 15, 1964 admitting the will to probate and appointing petitioner as executrix thereof, and said court concededly has jurisdiction to issue said order, the said order of probate has long since become final and can not be overturned in a special civic action of prohibition. 11. Finally, it should be noted that in the Supreme Court's exercise of its supervisory authority over all inferior courts,22 it may properly determine, as it has done in the case at bar, that venue was properly assumed by and transferredto the Quezon City court and that it is the interest of justice and in avoidance of needless delay that the Quezon City court's exercise of jurisdiction over the testate estate of the decedent (with the due deference and consent of the Cebu court) and its admission to probate of his last will and testament and appointment of petitioner-widow as administratrix without bond in pursuance of the decedent's express will and all its orders and actions taken in the testate proceedings before it be approved and authorized rather than to annul all such proceedings regularly had and to repeat and duplicate the same proceedings before the Cebu court only to revert once more to the Quezon City court should the Cebu court find that indeed and in fact, as already determined by the Quezon City court on the strength of incontrovertible documentary evidence of record, Quezon City was the conjugal residence of the decedent. ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered reversing the appealed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals and the petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction originally filed by respondents with the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 34104-R) is ordered dismissed. No costs.

. Uriarte vs. Court of First Instance of Negros Occ., 33 SCRA 252 , May 29, 1970 Case Title : VICENTE URIARTE, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL (12th Judicial District) THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, BRANCH IV, JUAN URIARTE ZAMACONA and HIGINIO URIARTE, respondents.Case Nature : ORIGINAL PETITION in the Supreme Court Certiorari. Syllabi Class : Judiciary Act of 1948|Special proceedings|Courts of First Instance|Settlement of estate of deceased persons|Venue Syllabi: 1. Judiciary Act of 1948; Courts of First Instance; Jurisdiction over probate matters defined.Under the Judiciary Act of 1948 (Section 44, paragraph [4]), Courts of First Instance have original exclusive jurisdiction over "all matters of probate," that is, over special proceedings for the settlement of the estate of deceased personswhether they died testate or intestate. 2. Special proceedings; Settlement of estate of deceased persons; Venue; General rule.The matter of venue, or the particular Court of First Instance where the special proceeding should be commenced, is regulated by former Rule 75, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, now Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides that the estate of a decedent inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, shall be in the Court of First Instance in the province in which he resided at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the court of first instance of any province in which he had estate. 3. Special proceedings; Settlement of estate of deceased persons; Testate proceedings enjoy priority over intestate proceedings.In accordance with settled jurisprudence in this jurisdiction. testate proceedings for the Settlement of the estate of a deceased person take precedence over intestate proceedings for the same purpose. Thus it has been held repeatedly that, if in the course of intestate proceedings pending before a court of first instance it is found that the decedent had left a last will, proceedings for 'the probate of the latter should replace the intestate proceedings even if at that stage an administrator had already been appointed, the latter being required to render final account and turn over the estate in his possession to the executor subsequently appointed. This, however, is understood to be without prejudice ,that should the alleged last will be rejected or is disapproved, the proceeding- shall continue as an intestacy,

4. Special proceedings; Settlement of estate of deceased persons; Where intestate proceedings had been commenced, the probate of will should be filed in same court; Reasons.Where intestate proceedings before a court of first instance had already been commenced, the probate of the will should be filed in the same court, either in a separate special proceeding or in an appropriate motion for said purpose filed in the already pending intestate proceeding. This is especially true where the party seeking the probate of the will had been informed or had knowledge of the pendency of the intestate proceedings. It is not in accord with public policy and the orderly and inexpensive administration of justice to unnecessarily multiply litigation, especially if several courts would be involved, which would be the result if the probate of will were f iled in another court. 5. Special proceedings; Settlement of estate of deceased persons; Venue; Waiver of improper venue by lachesIt is well settled in this jurisdiction that wrong venue is merely a waivable procedural defect, and. such waiver may occur by laches where, a party had been served notice of the filing of the probate petition for about a year and allowed the proceedings to continue for such time before filing a motion to dismiss the same. 6. Special proceedings; Settlement of estate of deceased persons; Question of acknowledgment as a natural child of testator may be presented to probate court.A party claiming to be an acknowledged natural child of testator is entitled to intervene in proceedings for the probate of will of testator if it is still open, or to ask for its reopening if it has already been closed, so as to be able to submit f or determination the question of his acknowledgment as a natural child of the deceased testator, said court having, in its capacity as a probate court, jurisdiction to declare who are the heirs of the deceased testator and whether or not a particular party is or should be declared his acknowledged natural child.

Dispositive Portion: IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, judgment is hereby rendered denying the writs prayed for and, as a result, the petition for certiorari filed in G.R. No. L-21938, as well as the supplemental petition for mandamus docketed as G.R. No. L-21939, are hereby dismissed. The writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued is set aside. With costs against petitioner,

VICENTE URIARTE, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL (12th Judicial District) THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, BRANCH IV, JUAN URIARTE ZAMACONA and HIGINIO URIARTE, respondents. Norberto J. Quisumbing for petitioner. Taada, Teehankee & Carreon for respondents.

DIZON, J.: On October 3, 1963 petitioner Vicente Uriarte filed an original petition for certiorari docketed as G.R. L-21938 against the respondents Juan Uriarte Zamacona, Higinio Uriarte, and the Courts of First Instance of Negros Occidental and of Manila, Branch IV, who will be referred to hereinafter as the Negros Court and the Manila Court, respectively praying: ... that after due proceedings judgment be rendered annulling the orders of 19 April 1963 (Annex 'H') and 11 July 1963 (Annex 'I') of respondent Negros court dismissing the first instituted Special Proceeding No. 6344, supra, and the order of 1 July 1963 (Annex 'K') of respondent Manila court denying petitioner'somnibus motion to intervene and to dismiss the later-instituted Special Proceeding No. 51396, supra, both special proceedings pertaining to the settlement of the same estate of the same deceased, and consequently annulling all proceedings had in Special Proceeding No. 51396; supra, of the respondent Manila court as all taken without jurisdiction. For the preservation of the rights of the parties pending these proceedings, petitioner prays for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining respondents Manila court, Juan Uriarte Zamacona and Higinio Uriarte from proceeding with Special Proceeding No. 51396, supra, until further orders of this Court. Reasons in support of said petition are stated therein as follows: 6. Respondent Negros court erred in dismissing its Special Proceeding No. 6344, supra, and failing to declare itself 'the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of' the deceased Don Juan Uriarte y Goite as prescribed in Rule 75 section 1 of the Rules of Court. Respondent Manila court erred in failing to dismiss its Special Proceeding No. 51396, supra, notwithstanding proof of prior filing of Special Proceeding No. 6344, supra, in the Negros court. The writ of preliminary injunction prayed for was granted and issued by this Court on October 24, 1963. On April 22, 1964 petitioner filed against the same respondents a pleading entitled SUPPLEMENTAL PETITION FOR MANDAMUS docketed in this Court as G.R. No. L-21939 praying, for the reasons therein stated, that judgment be rendered annulling the orders issued by the Negros Court on December 7, 1963 and February 26, 1964, the first disapproving his record on appeal and the second denying his motion for reconsideration, and further commanding said court to approve his record on appeal and to give due course to his appeal. On July 15, 1964 We issued a

resolution deferring action on this Supplemental Petition until the original action for certiorari (G.R. L21938) is taken up on the merits. On October 21, 1963 the respondents in G.R. L-21938 filed their answer traversing petitioner's contention that the respondent courts had committed grave abuse of discretion in relation to the matters alleged in the petition forcertiorari. It appears that on November 6, 1961 petitioner filed with the Negros Court a petition for the settlement of the estate of the late Don Juan Uriarte y Goite (Special Proceeding No. 6344) alleging therein, inter alia, that, as a natural son of the latter, he was his sole heir, and that, during the lifetime of said decedent, petitioner had instituted Civil Case No. 6142 in the same Court for his compulsory acknowledgment as such natural son. Upon petitioner's motion the Negros Court appointed the Philippine National Bank as special administrator on November 13, 1961 and two days later it set the date for the hearing of the petition and ordered that the requisite notices be published in accordance with law. The record discloses, however, that, for one reason or another, the Philippine, National Bank never actually qualified as special administrator. On December 19, 1961, Higinio Uriarte, one of the two private respondents herein, filed an opposition to the above-mentioned petition alleging that he was a nephew of the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite who had "executed a Last Will and Testament in Spain, a duly authenticated copy whereof has been requested and which shall be submitted to this Honorable Court upon receipt thereof," and further questioning petitioner's capacity and interest to commence the intestate proceeding. On August 28, 1962, Juan Uriarte Zamacona, the other private respondent, commenced Special Proceeding No. 51396 in the Manila Court for the probate of a document alleged to be the last will of the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite, and on the same date he filed in Special Proceeding No. 6344 of the Negros Court a motion to dismiss the same on the following grounds: (1) that, as the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite had left a last will, there was no legal basis to proceed with said intestate proceedings, and (2) that petitioner Vicente Uriarte had no legal personality and interest to initiate said intestate proceedings, he not being an acknowledged natural son of the decedent. A copy of the Petition for Probate and of the alleged Will were attached to the Motion to Dismiss. Petitioner opposed the aforesaid motion to dismiss contending that, as the Negros Court was first to take cognizance of the settlement of the estate of the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite, it had acquired exclusive jurisdiction over same pursuant to Rule 75, Section 1 of the Rules of Court. On April 19, 1963, the Negros Court sustained Juan Uriarte Zamacona's motion to dismiss and dismissed the Special Proceeding No. 6344 pending before it. His motion for reconsideration of said order having been denied on July 27, 1963, petitioner proceeded to file his notice of appeal, appeal bond and record on appeal for the purpose of appealing from said orders to this court on questions of law. The administrator with the will annexed appointed by the Manila Court in Special Proceeding No. 51396 objected to the approval of the record on appeal, and under date of December 7, 1963 the Negros Court issued the following order: Oppositor prays that the record on appeal filed by the petitioner on July 27, 1963, be dismissed for having been filed out of time and for being incomplete. In the meantime, before the said record on appeal was approved by this Court, the petitioner filed a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court entitledVicente Uriarte, Petitioner, vs. Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, et al., G.R. No. L21938, bringing this case squarely before the Supreme Court on questions of law which is tantamount to petitioner's abandoning his appeal from this Court.

WHEREFORE, in order to give way to the certiorari, the record on appeal filed by the petitioner is hereby disapproved. In view of the above-quoted order, petitioner filed the supplemental petition for mandamus mentioned heretofore. On April 15, 1963 Vicente Uriarte filed an Omnibus Motion in Special Proceeding No. 51396 pending in the Manila Court, asking for leave to intervene therein; for the dismissal of the petition and the annulment of the proceedings had in said special proceeding. This motion was denied by said court in its order of July 1 of the same year. It is admitted that, as alleged in the basic petition filed in Special Proceeding No. 6344 of the Negros Court, Vicente Uriarte filed in the same court, during the lifetime of Juan Uriarte y Goite, Civil Case No. 6142 to obtain judgment for his compulsory acknowledgment as his natural child. Clearly inferrable from this is that at the time he filed the action, as well as when he commenced the aforesaid special proceeding, he had not yet been acknowledged as natural son of Juan Uriarte y Goite. Up to this time, no final judgment to that effect appears to have been rendered. The record further discloses that the special proceeding before the Negros Court has not gone farther than the appointment of a special administrator in the person of the Philippine National Bank who, as stated heretofore, failed to qualify. On the other hand, it is not disputed that, after proper proceedings were had in Special Proceeding No. 51396, the Manila Court admitted to probate the document submitted to, it as the last will of Juan Uriarte y Goite, the petition for probate appearing not to have been contested. It appears further that, as stated heretofore, the order issued by the Manila Court on July 1, 1963 denied petitioner. Vicente Uriarte's Omnibus Motion for Intervention, Dismissal of Petition and Annulment of said proceedings. Likewise, it is not denied that to the motion to dismiss the special proceeding pending before the Negros Court filed by Higinio Uriarte were attached a copy of the alleged last will of Juan Uriarte y Goite and of the petition filed with the Manila Court for its probate. It is clear, therefore, that almost from the start of Special Proceeding No. 6344, the Negros Court and petitioner Vicente Uriarte knew of the existence of the aforesaid last will and of the proceedings for its probate. The principal legal questions raised in the petition for certiorari are (a) whether or not the Negros Court erred in dismissing Special Proceeding No. 6644, on the one hand, and on the other, (b) whether the Manila Court similarly erred in not dismissing Special Proceeding No. 51396 notwithstanding proof of the prior filing of Special Proceeding No. 6344 in the Negros Court. Under the Judiciary Act of 1948 [Section 44, paragraph (e)], Courts of First Instance have original exclusive jurisdiction over "all matters of probate," that is, over special proceedings for the settlement of the estate of deceased persons whether they died testate or intestate. While their jurisdiction over such subject matter is beyond question, the matter of venue, or the particular Court of First Instance where the special proceeding should be commenced, is regulated by former Rule 75, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, now Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides that the estate of a decedent inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, shall be in the court of first instance in the province in which he resided at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the court of first instance of any province in which he had estate. Accordingly, when the estate to be settled is that of a non-resident alien like the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite the Courts of First Instance in provinces where the deceased left any property have concurrent jurisdiction to take cognizance of the proper special

proceeding for the settlement of his estate. In the case before Us, these Courts of First Instance are the Negros and the Manila Courts province and city where the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite left considerable properties. From this premise petitioner argues that, as the Negros Court had first taken cognizance of the special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of said decedent (Special Proceeding No. 6344), the Manila Court no longer had jurisdiction to take cognizance of Special Proceeding No. 51396 intended to settle the estate of the same decedent in accordance with his alleged will, and that consequently, the first court erred in dismissing Special Proceeding No. 6344, while the second court similarly erred in not dismissing Special Proceeding No. 51396. It can not be denied that a special proceeding intended to effect the distribution of the estate of a deceased person, whether in accordance with the law on intestate succession or in accordance with his will, is a "probate matter" or a proceeding for the settlement of his estate. It is equally true, however, that in accordance with settled jurisprudence in this jurisdiction, testate proceedings, for the settlement of the estate of a deceased person take precedence over intestate proceedings for the same purpose. Thus it has been held repeatedly that, if in the course of intestate proceedings pending before a court of first instance it is found it hat the decedent had left a last will, proceedings for the probate of the latter should replace the intestate proceedings even if at that stage an administrator had already been appointed, the latter being required to render final account and turn over the estate in his possession to the executor subsequently appointed. This, however, is understood to be without prejudice that should the alleged last will be rejected or is disapproved, the proceeding shall continue as an intestacy. As already adverted to, this is a clear indication that proceedings for the probate of a will enjoy priority over intestate proceedings. Upon the facts before Us the question arises as to whether Juan Uriarte Zamacona should have filed the petition for the probate of the last will of Juan Uriarte y Goite with the Negros Court particularly in Special Proceeding No. 6344 or was entitled to commence the corresponding separate proceedings, as he did, in the Manila Court. The following considerations and the facts of record would seem to support the view that he should have submitted said will for probate to the Negros Court, either in a separate special proceeding or in an appropriate motion for said purpose filed in the already pending Special Proceeding No. 6344. In the first place, it is not in accord with public policy and the orderly and inexpensive administration of justice to unnecessarily multiply litigation, especially if several courts would be involved. This, in effect, was the result of the submission of the will aforesaid to the Manila Court. In the second place, when respondent Higinio Uriarte filed an opposition to Vicente Uriarte's petition for the issuance of letters of administration, he had already informed the Negros Court that the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite had left a will in Spain, of which a copy had been requested for submission to said court; and when the other respondent, Juan Uriarte Zamacona, filed his motion to dismiss Special Proceeding No. 6344, he had submitted to the Negros Court a copy of the alleged will of the decedent, from which fact it may be inferred that, like Higinio Uriarte, he knew before filing the petition for probate with the Manila Court that there was already a special proceeding pending in the Negros Court for the settlement of the estate of the same deceased person. As far as Higinio Uriarte is concerned, it seems quite clear that in his opposition to petitioner's petition in Special Proceeding No. 6344, he had expressly promised to submit said will for probate to the Negros Court. But the fact is that instead of the aforesaid will being presented for probate to the Negros Court, Juan Uriarte Zamacona filed the petition for the purpose with the Manila Court. We can not accept petitioner's contention in this regard that the latter court had no jurisdiction to consider said petition, albeit we say that it was not the proper venuetherefor. It is well settled in this jurisdiction that wrong venue is merely a waiveable procedural defect, and, in the light of the circumstances obtaining in the instant case, we are of the opinion, and so hold, that

petitioner has waived the right to raise such objection or is precluded from doing so by laches. It is enough to consider in this connection that petitioner knew of the existence of a will executed by Juan Uriarte y Goite since December 19, 1961 when Higinio Uriarte filed his opposition to the initial petition filed in Special Proceeding No. 6344; that petitioner likewise was served with notice of the existence (presence) of the alleged last will in the Philippines and of the filing of the petition for its probate with the Manila Court since August 28, 1962 when Juan Uriarte Zamacona filed a motion for the dismissal of Special Proceeding No. 6344. All these notwithstanding, it was only on April 15, 1963 that he filed with the Manila Court in Special Proceeding No. 51396 an Omnibus motion asking for leave to intervene and for the dismissal and annulment of all the proceedings had therein up to that date; thus enabling the Manila Court not only to appoint an administrator with the will annexed but also to admit said will to probate more than five months earlier, or more specifically, on October 31, 1962. To allow him now to assail the exercise of jurisdiction over the probate of the will by the Manila Court and the validity of all the proceedings had in Special Proceeding No. 51396 would put a premium on his negligence. Moreover, it must be remembered that this Court is not inclined to annul proceedings regularly had in a lower court even if the latter was not the proper venue therefor, if the net result would be to have the same proceedings repeated in some other court of similar jurisdiction; more so in a case like the present where the objection against said proceedings is raised too late. In his order of April 19, 1963 dismissing Special Proceeding No. 6344, Judge Fernandez of the Negros Court said that he was "not inclined to sustain the contention of the petitioner that inasmuch as the herein petitioner has instituted Civil Case No. 6142 for compulsory acknowledgment by the decedent such action justifies the institution by him of this proceedings. If the petitioner is to be consistent with the authorities cited by him in support of his contention, the proper thing for him to do would be to intervene in the testate estate proceedings entitled Special Proceedings No. 51396 in the Court of First Instance of Manila instead of maintaining an independent action, for indeed his supposed interest in the estate of the decedent is of his doubtful character pending the final decision of the action for compulsory acknowledgment." We believe in connection with the above matter that petitioner is entitled to prosecute Civil Case No. 6142 until it is finally determined, or intervene in Special Proceeding No. 51396 of the Manila Court, if it is still open, or to ask for its reopening if it has already been closed, so as to be able to submit for determination the question of his acknowledgment as natural child of the deceased testator, said court having, in its capacity as a probate court, jurisdiction to declare who are the heirs of the deceased testator and whether or not a particular party is or should be declared his acknowledged natural child (II Moran on Rules of Court, 1957 Ed., p. 476; Conde vs. Abaya, 13 Phil. 249; Severino vs. Severino, 44 Phil. 343; Lopez vs. Lopez, 68 Phil. 227, and Jimoga-on vs. Belmonte, 47 O. G. 1119). Coming now to the supplemental petition for mandamus (G.R. No. L-21939), We are of the opinion, and so hold, that in view of the conclusions heretofore stated, the same has become moot and academic. If the said supplemental petition is successful, it will only result in compelling the Negros Court to give due course to the appeal that petitioner was taking from the orders of said court dated December 7, 1963 and February 26, 1964, the first being the order of said court dismissing Special Proceeding No. 6344, and the second being an order denying petitioner's motion for the reconsideration of said order of dismissal. Said orders being, as a result of what has been said heretofore beyond petitioner's power to contest, the conclusion can not be other than that the intended appeal would serve no useful purpose, or, worse still, would enable petitioner to circumvent our ruling that he can no longer question the validity of said orders. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, judgment is hereby rendered denying the writs prayed for and, as a result, the petition for certiorari filed in G.R. No. L-21938, as well as the

. Heirs of Marcelino Doronio vs. Heirs of Fortunato Doronio, 541 SCRA 479 , December 27, 2007 Case Title : THE HEIRS OF MARCELINO DORONIO, NAMELY: REGINA AND FLORA, BOTH SURNAMED DORONIO, petitioners, vs. HEIRS OF FORTUNATO DORONIO, NAMELY: TRINIDAD ROSALINA DORONIO-BALMES, MODING DORONIO, FLORENTINA DORONIO, AND ANICETA ALCANTARA-MANALO, respondents.Case Nature : PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals. Syllabi Class : Evidence|Special Proceedings|Contracts|Quieting of Title|Judgments|Appeals|Pleadings and Practice|Marriages|Land Titles and Deeds|Documentary Evidence|Official Language|Presumptions|Probate|Settlement of Estate|Reconveyance|Void Contracts|Parties|Declaratory Relief|Reformation|Due Process|Res Judicata|Procedural Rules and Technicalities|Assignment of Errors|Donations|Statutes|Torrens System|Prescription Syllabi: 1. Evidence; Documentary Evidence; Official Language; Presumptions; Where a document in unoffic ial language, not so accompanied with a translation in English or Filipino, is offered in evidence and not objected to, either by the parties or the court, it must be presumed that the language in which the document is written is understood by all, and the document is admissible in evidence.+ 2. Same; Same; The torrens system is intended to guarantee the integrity and conclusiveness of the certificate of registration, and it cannot be used for the perpetration of fraud against the real owner of the registered land.+ 3. Land Titles and Deeds; Torrens System; Prescription; A title once registered under the torrens system cannot be defeated even by adverse, open and notorious possession, and neither can it be defeated by prescription.+ 4. Marriages; Donations; A donation of real estate propter nuptias is void unless made by public instrument.+ 5. Contracts; Donations; Statutes; It is settled that only laws existing at the time of the execution of a contract are applicable to it and not the later statutes, unless the latter are specifically intended to have retroactive effect.+ 6. Pleadings and Practice; Assignment of Errors; A rudimentary doctrine on appealed cases is that the Supreme Court is clothed with ample authority to review matters, even if they are not assigned as errors on appeal, if it finds that their consideration is necessary at arriving at a just decision of the case; An unassigned error closely related to an error properly assigned or upon which the determination of the

question raised by the error properly assigned is dependent, will be considered by the appellate court notwithstanding the failure to assign it as an error.+ 7. Appeals; Procedural Rules and Technicalities; The Supreme Court can suspend its own rules and except a case from their operation whenever the higher interests of justice so demand.+ 8. Judgments; Res Judicata; Elements.+ 9. Same; Parties; Due Process; Suits to quiet title, being against the person in respect of the res, are proceedings characterized as quasi in rem+ 10. Quieting of Title; Declaratory Relief; Reformation; An action for quieting of title is a case for declaratory relief.+ 11. Contracts; Void Contracts; Parties; A void contract is inexistent from the beginning, and the right to set up the defense of its illegality cannot be waived; Persons who are not parties in the deed of donation can set up its nullity if they are directly affected by the same.+ 12. Same; Same; Same; Before any conclusion about the legal share due to a compulsory heir may be reached, it is necessary that certain steps be taken first+ 13. Special Proceedings; Probate; Settlement of Estate; Reconveyance; A probate court, in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction, is the best forum to ventilate and adjudge the issue of impairment of legitime as well as other related matters involving the settlement of estate; An action for reconveyance with damages is a civil action, whereas matters relating to settlement of the estate of a deceased person such as advancement of property made by the decedent, partake of the nature of a special proceeding.Petitioners are correct in alleging that the issue regarding the impairment of legitime of Fortunato Doronio must be resolved in an action for the settlement of estates of spouses Simeon Doronio and Cornelia Gante. It may not be passed upon in an action for reconveyance and damages. A probate court, in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction, is the best forum to ventilate and adjudge the issue of impairment of legitime as well as other related matters involving the settlement of estate. An action for reconveyance with damages is a civil action, whereas matters relating to settlement of the estate of a deceased person such as advancement of property made by the decedent, partake of the nature of a special proceeding. Special proceedings require the application of specific rules as provided for in the Rules of Court. 14. Same; Same; Same; Evidence that was not objected to becomes property of the case, and all parties to the case are considered amenable to any favorable or unfavorable effects resulting from said evidence.Instead of objecting, petitioners admitted the contents of Exhibit A, that is, OCT No. 352 in their comment on respondents formal offer of

documentary evidence. In the said comment, petitioners alleged, among others, that Exhibits A, B, C, D, E, F and G, are admitted but not for the purpose they are offered because these exhibits being public and official documents are the best evidence of that they contain and not for what a party would like it to prove. Said evidence was admitted by the RTC. Once admitted without objection, even though not admissible under an objection, We are not inclined now to reject it. Consequently, the evidence that was not objected to became property of the case, and all parties to the case are considered amenable to any favorable or unfavorable effects resulting from the said evidence. 15. Same; Same; Same; The rule is that evidence not objected to may be deemed admitted and may be validly considered by the court in arriving at its judgment.Since petitioners did not object to the offer of said documentary evidence on time, it is now too late in the day for them to question its admissibility. The rule is that evidence not objected to may be deemed admitted and may be validly considered by the court in arriving at its judgment. This is true even if by its nature, the evidence is inadmissible and would have surely been rejected if it had been challenged at the proper time. Division: THIRD DIVISION Docket Number: G.R. No. 169454 Counsel: De Guzman, Marinas, Soriano and Uglay Law Offices, Public Dispositive Portion: WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. A new one is entered:
THE HEIRS OF MARCELINO DORONIO, NAMELY: REGINA AND FLORA, BOTH SURNAMED DORONIO,Petitioners, vs. HEIRS OF FORTUNATO DORONIO, NAMELY: TRINIDAD ROSALINA DORONIO-BALMES, MODING DORONIO, FLORENTINA DORONIO, AND ANICETA ALCANTARAMANALO, Respondents. DECISION REYES, R.T., J.: For Our review on certiorari is the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) reversing that2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 45, Anonas, Urdaneta City, Pangasinan, in an action for reconveyance and damages. The CA declared respondents as rightful owners of one-half of the

subject property and directed petitioners to execute a registerable document conveying the same to respondents. The Facts Spouses Simeon Doronio and Cornelia Gante, now both deceased, were the registered owners of a parcel of land located at Barangay Cabalitaan, Asingan, Pangasinan covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 352.3 The courts below described it as follows: Un terreno (Lote 1018), situada en el municipio de Asingan, Linda por el NE; con propriedad de Gabriel Bernardino; con el SE con propriedad de Zacarias Najorda y Alejandro Najorda; por el SO con propriedad de Geminiano Mendoza y por el NO con el camino para Villasis; midiendo una extension superficial mil ciento cincuenta y dos metros cuadrados.4 The spouses had children but the records fail to disclose their number. It is clear, however, that Marcelino Doronio and Fortunato Doronio, now both deceased, were among them and that the parties in this case are their heirs. Petitioners are the heirs of Marcelino Doronio, while respondents are the heirs of Fortunato Doronio. On April 24, 1919, a private deed of donation propter nuptias5 was executed by spouses Simeon Doronio and Cornelia Gante in favor of Marcelino Doronio and the latters wife, Veronica Pico. One of the properties subject of said deed of donation is the one that it described as follows: Fourth A piece of residential land located in the barrio of Cabalitian but we did not measure it, the area is bounded on the north by Gabriel Bernardino; on the east by Fortunato Doronio; on the south by Geminiano Mendoza and on the west by a road to Villasis. Constructed on said land is a house of light materials also a part of the dowry. Value 200.00.6 It appears that the property described in the deed of donation is the one covered by OCT No. 352. However, there is a significant discrepancy with respect to the identity of the owner of adjacent property at the eastern side. Based on OCT No. 352, the adjacent owners are Zacarias Najorda and Alejandro Najorda, whereas based on the deed of donation, the owner of the adjacent property is Fortunato Doronio. Furthermore, said deed of donation remained a private document as it was never notarized.7 Both parties have been occupying the subject land for several decades8 although they have different theories regarding its present ownership. According to petitioners, they are now the owners of the entire property in view of the private deed of donation propter nuptias in favor of their predecessors, Marcelino Doronio and Veronica Pico. Respondents, on the other hand, claim that only half of the property was actually incorporated in the said deed of donation because it stated that Fortunato Doronio, instead of Zacarias Najorda and Alejandro Najorda, is the owner of the adjacent property at the eastern side. Respondents posit that the donors respected and segregated the possession of Fortunato Doronio of the eastern half of the land. They are the ones who have been possessing said land occupied by their predecessor, Fortunato Doronio. Eager to obtain the entire property, the heirs of Marcelino Doronio and Veronica Pico filed, on January 11, 1993, before the RTC in Urdaneta, Pangasinan a petition "For the Registration of a Private Deed of Donation"9 docketed as Petition Case No. U-920. No respondents were named in the said petition10 although notices of hearing were posted on the bulletin boards of Barangay Cabalitaan, Municipalities of Asingan and Lingayen.11

During the hearings, no one interposed an objection to the petition.12 After the RTC ordered a general default,13 the petition was eventually granted on September 22, 1993. This led to the registration of the deed of donation, cancellation of OCT No. 352 and issuance of a new Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 44481 in the names of Marcelino Doronio and Veronica Pico.14 Thus, the entire property was titled in the names of petitioners predecessors. On April 28, 1994, the heirs of Fortunato Doronio filed a pleading before the RTC in the form of a petition in the same Petition Case No. U-920. The petition was for the reconsideration of the decision of the RTC that ordered the registration of the subject deed of donation. It was prayed in the petition that an order be issued declaring null and void the registration of the private deed of donation and that TCT No. 44481 be cancelled. However, the petition was dismissed on May 13, 1994 on the ground that the decision in Petition Case No. U-920 had already become final as it was not appealed. Determined to remain in their possessed property, respondent heirs of Fortunato Doronio (as plaintiffs) filed an action for reconveyance and damages with prayer for preliminary injunction15 against petitioner heirs of Marcelino Doronio (as defendants) before the RTC, Branch 45, Anonas, Urdaneta City, Pangasinan. Respondents contended, among others, that the subject land is different from what was donated as the descriptions of the property under OCT No. 352 and under the private deed of donation were different. They posited that spouses Simeon Doronio and Cornelia Gante intended to donate only one-half of the property. During the pre-trial conference, the parties stipulated, among others, that the property was originally covered by OCT No. 352 which was cancelled by TCT No. 44481. They also agreed that the issues are: (1) whether or not there was a variation in the description of the property subject of the private deed of donation and OCT No. 352; (2) whether or not respondents had acquired one-half of the property covered by OCT No. 352 by acquisitive prescription; (3) whether or not the transfer of the whole property covered by OCT No. 352 on the basis of the registration of the private deed of donation notwithstanding the discrepancy in the description is valid; (4) whether or not respondents are entitled to damages; and (5) whether or not TCT No. 44481 is valid.16 RTC Decision After due proceedings, the RTC ruled in favor of petitioner heirs of Marcelino Doronio (defendants). It concluded that the parties admitted the identity of the land which they all occupy;17 that a title once registered under the torrens system cannot be defeated by adverse, open and notorious possession or by prescription;18 that the deed of donation in consideration of the marriage of the parents of petitioners is valid, hence, it led to the eventual issuance of TCT No. 44481 in the names of said parents;19 and that respondent heirs of Fortunato Doronio (plaintiffs) are not entitled to damages as they are not the rightful owners of the portion of the property they are claiming.20 The RTC disposed of the case, thus: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby renders judgment DISMISSING the herein Complaint filed by plaintiffs against defendants.21 Disagreeing with the judgment of the RTC, respondents appealed to the CA. They argued that the trial court erred in not finding that respondents predecessor-in-interest acquired one-half of the property covered by OCT No. 352 by tradition and/or intestate succession; that the deed of donation dated April 26, 1919 was null and void; that assuming that the deed of donation was valid, only onehalf of the property was actually donated to Marcelino Doronio and Veronica Pico; and that respondents acquired ownership of the other half portion of the property by acquisitive prescription.22

CA Disposition In a Decision dated January 26, 2005, the CA reversed the RTC decision with the following disposition: WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision dated June 28, 2002 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Declaring the appellants as rightful owners of one-half of the property now covered by TCT No. 44481, the appellees are hereby directed to execute a registerable document conveying the same to appellants. SO ORDERED.23 The appellate court determined that "(t)he intention to donate half of the disputed property to appellees predecessors can be gleaned from the disparity of technical descriptions appearing in the title (OCT No. 352) of spouses Simeon Doronio and Cornelia Gante and in the deed of donation propter nuptias executed on April 24, 1919 in favor of appellees predecessors."24 The CA based its conclusion on the disparity of the following technical descriptions of the property under OCT No. 352 and the deed of donation, to wit: The court below described the property covered by OCT No. 352 as follows: "Un terreno (Lote 1018), situada en el municipio de Asingan, Linda por el NE; con propriedad de Gabriel Bernardino; con el SE con propriedad de Zacarias Najorda y Alejandro Najorda; por el SO con propriedad de Geminiano Mendoza y por el NO con el camino para Villasis; midiendo una extension superficial mil ciento cincuenta y dos metros cuadrados." On the other hand, the property donated to appellees predecessors was described in the deed of donation as: "Fourth A piece of residential land located in the barrio of Cabalitian but we did not measure it, the area is bounded on the north by Gabriel Bernardino; on the east by Fortunato Doronio; on the south by Geminiano Mendoza and on the west by a road to Villasis. Constructed on said land is a house of light materials also a part of the dowry. Value 200.00."25 (Emphasis ours) Taking note "that the boundaries of the lot donated to Marcelino Doronio and Veronica Pico differ from the boundaries of the land owned by spouses Simeon Doronio and Cornelia Gante," the CA concluded that spouses Simeon Doronio and Cornelia Gante donated only half of the property covered by OCT No. 352.26 Regarding the allegation of petitioners that OCT No. 352 is inadmissible in evidence, the CA pointed out that, "while the OCT is written in the Spanish language, this document already forms part of the records of this case for failure of appellees to interpose a timely objection when it was offered as evidence in the proceedings a quo. It is a well-settled rule that any objection to the admissibility of such evidence not raised will be considered waived and said evidence will have to form part of the records of the case as competent and admitted evidence."27 The CA likewise ruled that the donation of the entire property in favor of petitioners predecessors is invalid on the ground that it impairs the legitime of respondents predecessor, Fortunato Doronio. On this aspect, the CA reasoned out:

Moreover, We find the donation of the entire property in favor of appellees predecessors invalid as it impairs the legitime of appellants predecessor. Article 961 of the Civil Code is explicit. "In default of testamentary heirs, the law vests the inheritance, x x x, in the legitimate x x x relatives of the deceased, x x x." As Spouses Simeon Doronio and Cornelia Gante died intestate, their property shall pass to their lawful heirs, namely: Fortunato and Marcelino Doronio. Donating the entire property to Marcelino Doronio and Veronica Pico and excluding another heir, Fortunato, tantamounts to divesting the latter of his rightful share in his parents inheritance. Besides, a persons prerogative to make donations is subject to certain limitations, one of which is that he cannot give by donation more than what he can give by will (Article 752, Civil Code). If he does, so much of what is donated as exceeds what he can give by will is deemed inofficious and the donation is reducible to the extent of such excess.28 Petitioners were not pleased with the decision of the CA. Hence, this petition under Rule 45. Issues Petitioners now contend that the CA erred in: 1. DECLARING ADMISSIBILITY OF THE ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. 352 DESPITE OF LACK OF TRANSLATION THEREOF. 2. (RULING THAT) ONLY HALF OF THE DISPUTED PROPERTY WAS DONATED TO THE PREDECESSORS-IN-INTEREST OF THE HEREIN APPELLANTS. 3. (ITS) DECLARATION THAT THE DONATION PROPTER NUPTIAS IS INNOFICIOUS, IS PREMATURE, AND THUS IT IS ILLEGAL AND UNPROCEDURAL.29 Our Ruling OCT No. 352 in Spanish Although Not Translated into English or Filipino Is Admissible For Lack of Timely Objection Petitioners fault the CA for admitting OCT No. 352 in evidence on the ground that it is written in Spanish language. They posit that "(d)ocumentary evidence in an unofficial language shall not be admitted as evidence, unless accompanied with a translation into English or Filipino."30 The argument is untenable. The requirement that documents written in an unofficial language must be accompanied with a translation in English or Filipino as a prerequisite for its admission in evidence must be insisted upon by the parties at the trial to enable the court, where a translation has been impugned as incorrect, to decide the issue.31Where such document, not so accompanied with a translation in English or Filipino, is offered in evidence and not objected to, either by the parties or the court, it must be presumed that the language in which the document is written is understood by all, and the document is admissible in evidence.32 Moreover, Section 36, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Evidence provides: SECTION 36. Objection. Objection to evidence offered orally must be made immediately after the offer is made.

Objection to a question propounded in the course of the oral examination of a witness shall be made as soon as the grounds therefor shall become reasonably apparent. An offer of evidence in writing shall be objected to within three (3) days after notice of the offer unless a different period is allowed by the court. In any case, the grounds for the objections must be specified. (Emphasis ours) Since petitioners did not object to the offer of said documentary evidence on time, it is now too late in the day for them to question its admissibility. The rule is that evidence not objected may be deemed admitted and may be validly considered by the court in arriving at its judgment.33 This is true even if by its nature, the evidence is inadmissible and would have surely been rejected if it had been challenged at the proper time.34 As a matter of fact, instead of objecting, petitioners admitted the contents of Exhibit "A," that is, OCT No. 352 in their comment35 on respondents formal offer of documentary evidence. In the said comment, petitioners alleged, among others, that "Exhibits A, B, C, D, E, F and G, are admitted but not for the purpose they are offered because these exhibits being public and official documents are the best evidence of that they contain and not for what a party would like it to prove."36 Said evidence was admitted by the RTC.37 Once admitted without objection, even though not admissible under an objection, We are not inclined now to reject it.38 Consequently, the evidence that was not objected to became property of the case, and all parties to the case are considered amenable to any favorable or unfavorable effects resulting from the said evidence.39 Issues on Impairment of Legitime Should Be Threshed Out in a Special Proceeding, Not in Civil Action for Reconveyance and Damages On the other hand, petitioners are correct in alleging that the issue regarding the impairment of legitime of Fortunato Doronio must be resolved in an action for the settlement of estates of spouses Simeon Doronio and Cornelia Gante. It may not be passed upon in an action for reconveyance and damages. A probate court, in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction, is the best forum to ventilate and adjudge the issue of impairment of legitime as well as other related matters involving the settlement of estate.40 An action for reconveyance with damages is a civil action, whereas matters relating to settlement of the estate of a deceased person such as advancement of property made by the decedent, partake of the nature of a special proceeding. Special proceedings require the application of specific rules as provided for in the Rules of Court.41 As explained by the Court in Natcher v. Court of Appeals:42 Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure defines civil action and special proceedings, in this wise: x x x a) A civil action is one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong. A civil action may either be ordinary or special. Both are governed by the rules for ordinary civil actions, subject to specific rules prescribed for a special civil action.

xxxx c) A special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right or a particular fact. As could be gleaned from the foregoing, there lies a marked distinction between an action and a special proceeding. An action is a formal demand of ones right in a court of justice in the manner prescribed by the court or by the law. It is the method of applying legal remedies according to definite established rules. The term "special proceeding" may be defined as an application or proceeding to establish the status or right of a party, or a particular fact. Usually, in special proceedings, no formal pleadings are required unless the statute expressly so provides. In special proceedings, the remedy is granted generally upon an application or motion. Citing American Jurisprudence, a noted authority in Remedial Law expounds further: It may accordingly be stated generally that actions include those proceedings which are instituted and prosecuted according to the ordinary rules and provisions relating to actions at law or suits in equity, and that special proceedings include those proceedings which are not ordinary in this sense, but is instituted and prosecuted according to some special mode as in the case of proceedings commenced without summons and prosecuted without regular pleadings, which are characteristics of ordinary actions x x x. A special proceeding must therefore be in the nature of a distinct and independent proceeding for particular relief, such as may be instituted independently of a pending action, by petition or motion upon notice. Applying these principles, an action for reconveyance and annulment of title with damages is a civil action, whereas matters relating to settlement of the estate of a deceased person such as advancement of property made by the decedent, partake of the nature of a special proceeding, which concomitantly requires the application of specific rules as provided for in the Rules of Court. Clearly, matters which involve settlement and distribution of the estate of the decedent fall within the exclusive province of the probate court in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction. Thus, under Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court, questions as to advancement made or alleged to have been made by the deceased to any heir may be heard and determined by the court having jurisdiction of the estate proceedings, and the final order of the court thereon shall be binding on the person raising the questions and on the heir. While it may be true that the Rules used the word "may," it is nevertheless clear that the same provision contemplates a probate court when it speaks of the "court having jurisdiction of the estate proceedings." Corollarily, the Regional Trial Court in the instant case, acting in its general jurisdiction, is devoid of authority to render an adjudication and resolve the issue of advancement of the real property in favor of herein petitioner Natcher, inasmuch as Civil Case No. 71075 for reconveyance and annulment of title with damages is not, to our mind, the proper vehicle to thresh out said question. Moreover, under the present circumstances, the RTC of Manila, Branch 55, was not properly constituted as a probate court so as to validly pass upon the question of advancement made by the decedent Graciano Del Rosario to his wife, herein petitioner Natcher. We likewise find merit in petitioners contention that before any conclusion about the legal share due to a compulsory heir may be reached, it is necessary that certain steps be taken first.43 The net estate of the decedent must be ascertained, by deducting all payable obligations and charges from

the value of the property owned by the deceased at the time of his death; then, all donations subject to collation would be added to it. With the partible estate thus determined, the legitime of the compulsory heir or heirs can be established; and only then can it be ascertained whether or not a donation had prejudiced the legitimes.44 Declaration of Validity of Donation Can Be Challenged by an Interested Party Not Impleaded in Petition for Quieting of Title or Declaratory Relief or Where There is No Res Judicata. Moreover, This Court Can Consider a Factual Matter or Unassigned Error in the Interest of Substantial Justice. Nevertheless, petitioners cannot preclude the determination of validity of the deed of donation on the ground that (1) it has been impliedly admitted by respondents; (2) it has already been determined with finality by the RTC in Petition Case No. U-920; or (3) the only issue in an action for reconveyance is who has a better right over the land.45 The validity of the private deed of donation propter nuptias in favor of petitioners predecessors was one of the issues in this case before the lower courts. The pre-trial order46 of the RTC stated that one of the issues before it is "(w)hether or not the transfer of the whole property covered by OCT No. 352 on the basis of the private deed of donation notwithstanding the discrepancy in the description is valid." Before the CA, one of the errors assigned by respondents is that "THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE PRIVATE DEED OF DONATION DATED APRIL 26, 1919 WAS NULL AND VOID."47 The issue of the validity of donation is likewise brought to Us by petitioners as they stated in their Memorandum48 that one of the issues to be resolved is regarding the alleged fact that "THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THE DONATION INVALID." We are thus poised to inspect the deed of donation and to determine its validity. We cannot agree with petitioners contention that respondents may no longer question the validity of the deed of donation on the ground that they already impliedly admitted it. Under the provisions of the Civil Code, a void contract is inexistent from the beginning. The right to set up the defense of its illegality cannot be waived.49 The right to set up the nullity of a void or non-existent contract is not limited to the parties as in the case of annullable or voidable contracts; it is extended to third persons who are directly affected by the contract.50 Consequently, although respondents are not parties in the deed of donation, they can set up its nullity because they are directly affected by the same.51 The subject of the deed being the land they are occupying, its enforcement will definitely affect them. Petitioners cannot also use the finality of the RTC decision in Petition Case No. U-92052 as a shield against the verification of the validity of the deed of donation. According to petitioners, the said final decision is one for quieting of title.53 In other words, it is a case for declaratory relief under Rule 64 (now Rule 63) of the Rules of Court, which provides: SECTION 1. Who may file petition. Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, or ordinance, may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an action to determine any question of

construction or validity arising under the instrument or statute and for a declaration of his rights or duties thereunder. An action for the reformation of an instrument, to quiet title to real property or remove clouds therefrom, or to consolidate ownership under Article 1607 of the Civil Code, may be brought under this rule. SECTION 2. Parties. All persons shall be made parties who have or claim any interest which would be affected by the declaration; and no declaration shall, except as otherwise provided in these rules, prejudice the rights of persons not parties to the action. (Emphasis ours) However, respondents were not made parties in the said Petition Case No. U-920. Worse, instead of issuing summons to interested parties, the RTC merely allowed the posting of notices on the bulletin boards of Barangay Cabalitaan, Municipalities of Asingan and Lingayen, Pangasinan. As pointed out by the CA, citing the ruling of the RTC:
1wphi1

x x x In the said case or Petition No. U-920, notices were posted on the bulletin boards of barangay Cabalitaan, Municipalities of Asingan and Lingayen, Pangasinan, so that there was a notice to the whole world and during the initial hearing and/or hearings, no one interposed objection thereto.54 Suits to quiet title are not technically suits in rem, nor are they, strictly speaking, in personam, but being against the person in respect of the res, these proceedings are characterized as quasi in rem.55 The judgment in such proceedings is conclusive only between the parties.56 Thus, respondents are not bound by the decision in Petition Case No. U-920 as they were not made parties in the said case. The rules on quieting of title57 expressly provide that any declaration in a suit to quiet title shall not prejudice persons who are not parties to the action. That respondents filed a subsequent pleading58 in the same Petition Case No. U-920 after the decision there had become final did not change the fact that said decision became final without their being impleaded in the case. Said subsequent pleading was dismissed on the ground of finality of the decision.59 Thus, the RTC totally failed to give respondents their day in court. As a result, they cannot be bound by its orders. Generally accepted is the principle that no man shall be affected by any proceeding to which he is a stranger, and strangers to a case are not bound by judgment rendered by the court.60 Moreover, for the principle of res judicata to apply, the following must be present: (1) a decision on the merits; (2) by a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) the decision is final; and (4) the two actions involve identical parties, subject matter and causes of action.61 The fourth element is not present in this case. The parties are not identical because respondents were not impleaded in Petition Case No. U-920. While the subject matter may be the same property covered by OCT No. 352, the causes of action are different. Petition Case No. U-920 is an action for declaratory relief while the case below is for recovery of property. We are not persuaded by petitioners posture that the only issue in this action for reconveyance is who has a better right over the land; and that the validity of the deed of donation is beside the point.62 It is precisely the validity and enforceability of the deed of donation that is the determining factor in resolving the issue of who has a better right over the property. Moreover, notwithstanding procedural lapses as to the appropriateness of the remedies prayed for in the petition filed before Us, this Court can brush aside the technicalities in the interest of justice. In some instances, this

Court even suspended its own rules and excepted a case from their operation whenever the higher interests of justice so demanded.63 Moreover, although respondents did not directly raise the issue of validity of the deed of donation at the commencement of the case before the trial court, it was stipulated64 by the parties during the pretrial conference. In any event, this Court has authority to inquire into any question necessary in arriving at a just decision of a case before it.65 Though not specifically questioned by the parties, additional issues may also be included, if deemed important for substantial justice to be rendered.66 Furthermore, this Court has held that although a factual issue is not squarely raised below, still in the interest of substantial justice, this Court is not prevented from considering a pivotal factual matter. The Supreme Court is clothed with ample authority to review palpable errors not assigned as such if it finds that their consideration is necessary in arriving at a just decision.67 A rudimentary doctrine on appealed cases is that this Court is clothed with ample authority to review matters, even if they are not assigned as errors on appeal, if it finds that their consideration is necessary at arriving at a just decision of the case.68 Also, an unassigned error closely related to an error properly assigned or upon which the determination of the question raised by the error properly assigned is dependent, will be considered by the appellate court notwithstanding the failure to assign it as an error.69 Donation Propter Nuptias of Real Property Made in a Private Instrument Before the New Civil Code Took Effect on August 30, 1950 is Void We now focus on the crux of the petition, which is the validity of the deed of donation. It is settled that only laws existing at the time of the execution of a contract are applicable to it and not the later statutes, unless the latter are specifically intended to have retroactive effect.70 Accordingly, the Old Civil Code applies in this case as the donation propter nuptias was executed in 1919, while the New Civil Code took effect only on August 30, 1950.
1avv phi1

Under the Old Civil Code, donations propter nuptias must be made in a public instrument in which the property donated must be specifically described.71 Article 1328 of the Old Civil Code provides that gifts propter nuptias are governed by the rules established in Title 2 of Book 3 of the same Code. Article 633 of that title provides that the gift of real property, in order to be valid, must appear in a public document.72 It is settled that a donation of real estate propter nuptias is void unless made by public instrument.73 In the instant case, the donation propter nuptias did not become valid. Neither did it create any right because it was not made in a public instrument.74 Hence, it conveyed no title to the land in question to petitioners predecessors. Logically, then, the cancellation of OCT No. 352 and the issuance of a new TCT No. 44481 in favor of petitioners predecessors have no legal basis. The title to the subject property should, therefore, be restored to its original owners under OCT No. 352. Direct reconveyance to any of the parties is not possible as it has not yet been determined in a proper proceeding who among the heirs of spouses Simeon Doronio and Cornelia Gante is entitled to it. It is still unproven whether or not the parties are the only ones entitled to the properties of spouses Simeon Doronio and Cornelia Gante. As earlier intimated, there are still things to be done before the legal share of all the heirs can be properly adjudicated.75

Titled Property Cannot Be Acquired By Another By Adverse Possession or Extinctive Prescription Likewise, the claim of respondents that they became owners of the property by acquisitive prescription has no merit. Truth to tell, respondents cannot successfully invoke the argument of extinctive prescription. They cannot be deemed the owners by acquisitive prescription of the portion of the property they have been possessing. The reason is that the property was covered by OCT No. 352. A title once registered under the torrens system cannot be defeated even by adverse, open and notorious possession; neither can it be defeated by prescription.76 It is notice to the whole world and as such all persons are bound by it and no one can plead ignorance of the registration.77 The torrens system is intended to guarantee the integrity and conclusiveness of the certificate of registration, but it cannot be used for the perpetration of fraud against the real owner of the registered land.78 The system merely confirms ownership and does not create it. Certainly, it cannot be used to divest the lawful owner of his title for the purpose of transferring it to another who has not acquired it by any of the modes allowed or recognized by law. It cannot be used to protect a usurper from the true owner, nor can it be used as a shield for the commission of fraud; neither does it permit one to enrich himself at the expense of another.79 Where such an illegal transfer is made, as in the case at bar, the law presumes that no registration has been made and so retains title in the real owner of the land.80 Although We confirm here the invalidity of the deed of donation and of its resulting TCT No. 44481, the controversy between the parties is yet to be fully settled. The issues as to who truly are the present owners of the property and what is the extent of their ownership remain unresolved. The same may be properly threshed out in the settlement of the estates of the registered owners of the property, namely: spouses Simeon Doronio and Cornelia Gante. WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. A new one is entered: (1) Declaring the private deed of donation propter nuptias in favor of petitioners predecessors NULL AND VOID; and (2) Ordering the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan to: (a) CANCEL Transfer Certificate of Title No. 44481 in the names of Marcelino Doronio and Veronica Pico; and (b) RESTORE Original Certificate of Title No. 352 in the names of its original owners, spouses Simeon Doronio and Cornelia Gante. SO ORDERED. RUBEN T. REYES