After reading this excerpt from Hegels Phenomenology of Mind, please write a 2-3 page essay explaining how

Hegels theories fit with some of the other major thinkers we ha e disc!ssed "consider especially Ho##es, $acon, and %o!ssea!&

The Phenomenology of Mind B Self Consciousness

A' (ndependence and )ependence of *elf+onscio!sness' ,ordship and $ondage

178. *-,.-+/0*+(/1*0-** exists in itself and for itself, in that, and #y the fact that it exists for another self-conscio!sness2 that is to say, it is only #y #eing acknowledged or 3recogni4ed5& 6he conception of this its !nity in its d!plication, of infinit!de reali4ing itself in self-conscio!sness, has many sides to it and encloses within it elements of aried significance& 6h!s its moments m!st on the one hand #e strictly kept apart in detailed distincti eness, and, on the other, in this distinction m!st, at the same time, also #e taken as not disting!ished, or m!st always #e accepted and !nderstood in their opposite sense& 6his do!#le meaning of what is disting!ished lies in the nat!re of self-conscio!sness' 7 of its #eing infinite, or directly the opposite of the determinateness in which it is fixed& 6he detailed exposition of the notion of this spirit!al !nity in its d!plication will #ring #efore !s the process of %ecognition&

1. Duplicated Self-Consciousness
179. *elf-conscio!sness has #efore it another self-conscio!sness2 it has come o!tside itself& 6his has a do!#le significance& .irst it has lost its own self, since it finds itself as an other #eing2 secondly, it has there#y s!#lated that other, for it does not regard the other as essentially real, #!t sees its own self in the other& 180. (t m!st cancel this its other& 6o do so is the s!#lation of that first do!#le meaning, and is therefore a second do!#le meaning& .irst, it m!st set itself to s!#late the other independent #eing, in order there#y to #ecome certain of itself as tr!e #eing, secondly, it there!pon proceeds to s!#late its own self, for this other is itself& 181. 6his s!#lation in a do!#le sense of its otherness in a do!#le sense is at the same time a ret!rn in a do!#le sense into its self& .or, firstly, thro!gh s!#lation, it gets #ack

itself, #eca!se it #ecomes one with itself again thro!gh the cancelling of its otherness2 #!t secondly, it likewise gi es otherness #ack again to the other self-conscio!sness, for it was aware of #eing in the other, it cancels this its own #eing in the other and th!s lets the other again go free& 182. 6his process of self-conscio!sness in relation to another self-conscio!sness has in this manner #een represented as the action of one alone& $!t this action on the part of the one has itself the do!#le significance of #eing at once its own action and the action of that other as well& .or the other is likewise independent, sh!t !p within itself, and there is nothing in it which is not there thro!gh itself& 6he first does not ha e the o#ject #efore it only in the passi e form characteristic primarily of the o#ject of desire, #!t as an o#ject existing independently for itself, o er which therefore it has no power to do anything for its own #ehalf, if that o#ject does not per se do what the first does to it& 6he process then is a#sol!tely the do!#le process of #oth self-conscio!snesses& -ach sees the other do the same as itself2 each itself does what it demands on the part of the other, and for that reason does what it does, only so far as the other does the same& Action from one side only wo!ld #e !seless, #eca!se what is to happen can only #e #ro!ght a#o!t #y means of #oth& 183. 6he action has then a double entente not only in the sense that it is an act done to itself as well as to the other, #!t also in the sense that the act simpliciter is the act of the one as well as of the other regardless of their distinction& 184. (n this mo ement we see the process repeated which came #efore !s as the play of forces2 in the present case, howe er, it is fo!nd in conscio!sness& 8hat in the former had effect only for !s 9contemplating experience:, holds here for the terms themsel es& 6he middle term is self-conscio!sness which #reaks itself !p into the extremes2 and each extreme is this interchange of its own determinateness, and complete transition into the opposite& 8hile qua conscio!sness, it no do!#t comes o!tside itself, still, in #eing o!tside itself, it is at the same time restrained within itself, it exists for itself, and its selfexternali4ation is for conscio!sness& Consciousness finds that it immediately is and is not another conscio!sness, as also that this other is for itself only when it cancels itself as existing for itself , and has self-existence only in the self-existence of the other& -ach is the mediating term to the other, thro!gh which each mediates and !nites itself with itself2 and each is to itself and to the other an immediate self-existing reality, which, at the same time, exists th!s for itself only thro!gh this mediation& 6hey recogni4e themsel es as m!t!ally recogni4ing one another&

2. The Conflict of Self-Consciousness in Selfopposition

185. 6his p!re conception of recognition, of d!plication of self-conscio!sness within its !nity, we m!st now consider in the way its process appears for self-conscio!sness& (t will, in the first place, present the aspect of the disparity of the two, or the #reak-!p of the

middle term into the extremes, which, qua extremes, are opposed to one another, and of which one is merely recogni4ed, while the other only recogni4es& 18 . *elf-conscio!sness is primarily simple existence for self, self-identity #y excl!sion of e ery other from itself& (t takes its essential nat!re and a#sol!te o#ject to #e -go2 and in this immediacy, in this #are fact of its self-existence, it is indi id!al& 6hat which for it is other stands as !nessential o#ject, as o#ject with the impress and character of negation& $!t the other is also a self-conscio!sness2 an indi id!al makes its appearance in antithesis to an indi id!al& Appearing th!s in their immediacy, they are for each other in the manner of ordinary o#jects& 6hey are independent indi id!al forms, modes of +onscio!sness that ha e not risen a#o e the #are le el of life "for the existent o#ject here has #een determined as life;& 6hey are, moreo er, forms of conscio!sness which ha e not yet accomplished for one another the process of a#sol!te a#straction, of !prooting all immediate existence, and of #eing merely the #are, negati e fact of self-identical conscio!sness2 or, in other words, ha e not yet re ealed themsel es to each other as existing p!rely for themsel es, i&e&, as self-conscio!sness& -ach is indeed certain of its own self, #!t not of the other, and hence its own certainty of itself is still witho!t tr!th& .or its tr!th wo!ld #e merely that its own indi id!al existence for itself wo!ld #e shown to it to #e an independent o#ject, or, which is the same thing, that the o#ject wo!ld #e exhi#ited as this p!re certainty of itself& $y the notion of recognition, howe er, this is not possi#le, except in the form that as the other is for it, so it is for the other2 each in its self thro!gh its own action and again thro!gh the action of the other achie es this p!re a#straction of existence for self& 187. 6he presentation of itself, howe er, as p!re a#straction of self-conscio!sness consists in showing itself as a p!re negation of its o#jecti e form, or in showing that it is fettered to no determinate existence, that it is not #o!nd at all #y the partic!larity e erywhere characteristic of existence as s!ch, and is not tied !p with life& 6he process of #ringing all this o!t in ol es a twofold action 7 action on the part of the other and action on the part of itself& (n so far as it is the others action, each aims at the destr!ction and death of the other& $!t in this there is implicated also the second kind of action, selfacti ity2 for the former implies that it risks its own life& 6he relation of #oth selfconscio!snesses is in this way so constit!ted that they pro e themsel es and each other thro!gh a life-and-death str!ggle& 6hey m!st enter into this str!ggle, for they m!st #ring their certainty of themsel es, the certainty of #eing for themsel es, to the le el of o#jecti e tr!th, and make this a fact #oth in the case of the other and in their own case as well& And it is solely #y risking life that freedom is o#tained2 only th!s is it tried and pro ed that the essential nat!re of self-conscio!sness is not #are existence, is not the merely immediate form in which it at first makes its appearance, is not its mere a#sorption in the expanse of life& %ather it is there#y g!aranteed that there is nothing present #!t what might #e taken as a anishing moment 7 that self-conscio!sness is merely p!re self-existence, #eing-for-self& 6he indi id!al, who has not staked his life, may, no do!#t, #e recogni4ed as a Person2 #!t he has not attained the tr!th of this recognition as an independent self-conscio!sness& (n the same way each m!st aim at the death of the other, as it risks its own life there#y2 for that other is to it of no more worth than itself2 the others reality is presented to the former as an external other, as o!tside

itself2 it m!st cancel that externality& 6he other is a p!rely existent conscio!sness and entangled in manifold ways2 it m!st iew its otherness as p!re existence for itself or as a#sol!te negation& 188. 6his trial #y death, howe er, cancels #oth the tr!th which was to res!lt from it, and therewith the certainty of self altogether& .or j!st as life is the nat!ral 3position5 of conscio!sness, independence witho!t a#sol!te negati ity, so death is the nat!ral 3negation5 of conscio!sness, negation witho!t independence, which th!s remains witho!t the re<!isite significance of act!al recognition& 6hro!gh death, do!#tless, there has arisen the certainty that #oth did stake their life, and held it lightly #oth in their own case and in the case of the other2 #!t that is not for those who !nderwent this str!ggle& 6hey cancel their conscio!sness which had its place in this alien element of nat!ral existence2 in other words, they cancel themsel es and are s!#lated as terms or extremes seeking to ha e existence on their own acco!nt& $!t along with this there anishes from the play of change the essential moment, i4& that of #reaking !p into extremes with opposite characteristics2 and the middle term collapses into a lifeless !nity which is #roken !p into lifeless extremes, merely existent and not opposed& And the two do not m!t!ally gi e and recei e one another #ack from each other thro!gh conscio!sness2 they let one another go <!ite indifferently, like things& 6heir act is a#stract negation, not the negation characteristic of conscio!sness, which cancels in s!ch a way that it preser es and maintains what is s!#lated, and there#y s!r i es its #eing s!#lated&

3. !o"d and #onds$an

189. (n this experience self-conscio!sness #ecomes aware that life is as essential to it as p!re self-conscio!sness& (n immediate self-conscio!sness the simple ego is a#sol!te o#ject, which, howe er, is for !s or in itself a#sol!te mediation, and has as its essential moment s!#stantial and solid independence& 6he dissol!tion of that simple !nity is the res!lt of the first experience2 thro!gh this there is posited a p!re self-conscio!sness, and a conscio!sness which is not p!rely for itself, #!t for another, i&e& as an existent conscio!sness, conscio!sness in the form and shape of thinghood& $oth moments are essential, since, in the first instance, they are !nlike and opposed, and their reflexion into !nity has not yet come to light, they stand as two opposed forms or modes of conscio!sness& 6he one is independent, and its essential nat!re is to #e for itself2 the other is dependent, and its essence is life or existence for another& 6he former is the Master, or ,ord, the latter the $ondsman& 190. 6he master is the conscio!sness that exists for itself; #!t no longer merely the general notion of existence for self& %ather, it is a conscio!sness existing on its own acco!nt which is mediated with itself thro!gh an other conscio!sness, i&e& thro!gh an other whose ery nat!re implies that it is #o!nd !p with an independent #eing or with thinghood in general& 6he master #rings himself into relation to #oth these moments, to a thing as s!ch, the o#ject of desire, and to the conscio!sness whose essential character is thinghood& And since the master, is "a; qua notion of self-conscio!sness, an immediate relation of self-existence, #!t "b; is now moreo er at the same time mediation, or a #eingfor-self which is for itself only thro!gh an other 7 he 9the master: stands in relation "a;

immediately to #oth, "b; mediately to each thro!gh the other& 6he master relates himself to the #ondsman mediately thro!gh independent existence, for that is precisely what keeps the #ondsman in thrall2 it is his chain, from which he co!ld not in the str!ggle get away, and for that reason he pro ed himself to #e dependent, to ha e his independence in the shape of thinghood& 6he master, howe er, is the power controlling this state of existence, for he has shown in the str!ggle that he holds it to #e merely something negati e& *ince he is the power dominating existence, while this existence again is the power controlling the other 9the #ondsman:, the master holds, par consequence, this other in s!#ordination& (n the same way the master relates himself to the thing mediately thro!gh the #ondsman& 6he #ondsman #eing a self-conscio!sness in the #road sense, also takes !p a negati e attit!de to things and cancels them2 #!t the thing is, at the same time, independent for him and, in conse<!ence, he cannot, with all his negating, get so far as to annihilate it o!tright and #e done with it2 that is to say, he merely works on it& 6o the master, on the other hand, #y means of this mediating process, #elongs the immediate relation, in the sense of the p!re negation of it, in other words he gets the enjoyment& 8hat mere desire did not attain, he now s!cceeds in attaining, i4& to ha e done with the thing, and find satisfaction in enjoyment& )esire alone did not get the length of this, #eca!se of the independence of the thing& 6he master, howe er, who has interposed the #ondsman #etween it and himself, there#y relates himself merely to the dependence of the thing, and enjoys it witho!t <!alification and witho!t reser e& 6he aspect of its independence he lea es to the #ondsman, who la#o!rs !pon it&

(a). Lordship
191. (n these two moments, the master gets his recognition thro!gh an other conscio!sness, for in them the latter affirms itself as !nessential, #oth #y working !pon the thing, and, on the other hand, #y the fact of #eing dependent on a determinate existence2 in neither case can this other get the mastery o er existence, and s!cceed in a#sol!tely negating it& 8e ha e th!s here this moment of recognition, i4& that the other conscio!sness cancels itself as self-existent, and, ipso facto, itself does what the first does to it& (n the same way we ha e the other moment, that this action on the part of the second is the action proper of the first2 for what is done #y the #ondsman is properly an action on the part of the master& 6he latter exists only for himself, that is his essential nat!re2 he is the negati e power witho!t <!alification, a power to which the thing is na!ght& And he is th!s the a#sol!tely essential act in this sit!ation, while the #ondsman is not so, he is an !nessential acti ity& $!t for recognition proper there is needed the moment that what the master does to the other he sho!ld also do to himself, and what the #ondsman does to himself, he sho!ld do to the other also& /n that acco!nt a form of recognition has arisen that is one-sided and !ne<!al& 192. (n all this, the !nessential conscio!sness is, for the master, the o#ject which em#odies the tr!th of his certainty of himself& $!t it is e ident that this o#ject does not correspond to its notion2 for, j!st where the master has effecti ely achie ed lordship, he really finds that something has come a#o!t <!ite different from an independent conscio!sness& (t is not an independent, #!t rather a dependent conscio!sness that he has achie ed& He is th!s not ass!red of self-existence as his tr!th2 he finds that his tr!th is

rather the !nessential conscio!sness, and the fort!ito!s !nessential action of that conscio!sness& 193. 6he tr!th of the independent conscio!sness is accordingly the conscio!sness of the #ondsman& 6his do!#tless appears in the first instance o!tside itself, and not as the tr!th of self-conscio!sness& $!t j!st as lordship showed its essential nat!re to #e the re erse of what it wants to #e, so, too, #ondage will, when completed, pass into the opposite of what it immediately is' #eing a conscio!sness repressed within itself, it will enter into itself, and change ro!nd into real and tr!e independence&

(b). Fear
194. 8e ha e seen what #ondage is only in relation to lordship& $!t it is a selfconscio!sness, and we ha e now to consider what it is, in this regard, in and for itself& (n the first instance, the master is taken to #e the essential reality for the state of #ondage2 hence, for it, the tr!th is the independent conscio!sness existing for itself, altho!gh this tr!th is not taken yet as inherent in #ondage itself& *till, it does in fact contain within itself this tr!th of p!re negati ity and self-existence, #eca!se it has experienced this reality within it& .or this conscio!sness was not in peril and fear for this element or that, nor for this or that moment of time, it was afraid for its entire #eing2 it felt the fear of death, the so ereign master& (t has #een in that experience melted to its inmost so!l, has trem#led thro!gho!t its e ery fi#re, and all that was fixed and steadfast has <!aked within it& 6his complete pert!r#ation of its entire s!#stance, this a#sol!te dissol!tion of all its sta#ility into fl!ent contin!ity, is, howe er, the simple, !ltimate nat!re of selfconscio!sness, a#sol!te negati ity, p!re self-referrent existence, which conse<!ently is in ol ed in this type of conscio!sness& 6his moment of p!re self-existence is moreo er a fact for it2 for in the master it finds this as its o#ject& .!rther, this #ondsmans conscio!sness is not only this total dissol!tion in a general way2 in ser ing and toiling the #ondsman act!ally carries this o!t& $y ser ing he cancels in e ery partic!lar aspect his dependence on and attachment to nat!ral existence, and #y his work remo es this existence away& 195. 6he feeling of a#sol!te power, howe er, reali4ed #oth in general and in the partic!lar form of ser ice, is only dissol!tion implicitly2 and al#eit the fear of the lord is the #eginning of wisdom, conscio!sness is not therein aware of #eing self-existent& 6hro!gh work and la#o!r, howe er, this conscio!sness of the #ondsman comes to itself& (n the moment which corresponds to desire in the case of the masters conscio!sness, the aspect of the non-essential relation to the thing seemed to fall to the lot of the ser ant, since the thing there retained its independence& )esire has reser ed to itself the p!re negating of the o#ject and there#y !nalloyed feeling of self& 6his satisfaction, howe er, j!st for that reason is itself only a state of e anescence, for it lacks o#jecti ity or s!#sistence& ,a#o!r, on the other hand, is desire restrained and checked, e anescence delayed and postponed2 in other words, la#o!r shapes and fashions the thing& 6he negati e relation to the o#ject passes into the form of the o#ject, into something that is permanent and remains2 #eca!se it is j!st for the la#o!rer that the o#ject has independence& 6his negati e mediating agency, this acti ity gi ing shape and form, is at

the same time the indi id!al existence, the p!re self-existence of that conscio!sness, which now in the work it does is externali4ed and passes into the condition of permanence& 6he conscio!sness that toils and ser es accordingly attains #y this means the direct apprehension of that independent #eing as its self& 19 . $!t again, shaping or forming the o#ject has not only the positi e significance that the #ondsman #ecomes there#y aware of himself as fact!ally and o#jecti ely selfexistent2 this type of conscio!sness has also a negati e import, in contrast with its moment, the element of fear& .or in shaping the thing it only #ecomes aware of its own proper negati ity, existence on its own acco!nt, as an o#ject, thro!gh the fact that it cancels the act!al form confronting it& $!t this o#jecti e negati e element is precisely alien, external reality, #efore which it trem#led& 0ow, howe er, it destroys this extraneo!s alien negati e, affirms and sets itself !p as a negati e in the element of permanence, and there#y #ecomes for itself a self-existent #eing& (n the master, the #ondsman feels self-existence to #e something external, an o#jecti e fact2 in fear selfexistence is present within himself2 in fashioning the thing, self-existence comes to #e felt explicitly as his own proper #eing, and he attains the conscio!sness that he himself exists in its own right and on its own acco!nt "an und fr sich). $y the fact that the form is o#jectified, it does not #ecome something other than the conscio!sness mo!lding the thing thro!gh work2 for j!st that form is his p!re self existence, which therein #ecomes tr!ly reali4ed& 6h!s precisely in la#o!r where there seemed to #e merely some o!tsiders mind and ideas in ol ed, the #ondsman #ecomes aware, thro!gh this re-disco ery of himself #y himself, of ha ing and #eing a 3mind of his own5&

(c). The Formative Process of Self-Enfranchisement

.or this reflection of self into self the two moments, fear and ser ice in general, as also that of formati e acti ity, are necessary' and at the same time #oth m!st exist in a !ni ersal manner& 8itho!t the discipline of ser ice and o#edience, fear remains formal and does not spread o er the whole known reality of existence& 8itho!t the formati e acti ity shaping the thing, fear remains inward and m!te, and conscio!sness does not #ecome o#jecti e for itself& *ho!ld conscio!sness shape and form the thing witho!t the initial state of a#sol!te fear, then it has a merely ain and f!tile 3mind of its own52 for its form or negati ity is not negati ity per se, and hence its formati e acti ity cannot f!rnish the conscio!sness of itself as essentially real& (f it has end!red not a#sol!te fear, #!t merely some slight anxiety, the negati e reality has remained external to it, its s!#stance has not #een thro!gh and thro!gh infected there#y& *ince the entire content of its nat!ral conscio!sness has not tottered and shaken, it is still inherently a determinate mode of #eing2 ha ing a 3mind of its own5 "der eigene Sinn; is simply st!##ornness "Eigensinn;, a type of freedom which does not get #eyond the attit!de of #ondage& As little as the p!re form can #ecome its essential nat!re, so little is that form, considered as extending o er partic!lars, a !ni ersal formati e acti ity, an a#sol!te notion2 it is rather a piece of cle erness which has mastery within a certain range, #!t not o er the !ni ersal power nor o er the entire o#jecti e reality&