excerpts from the book

The Splendid Blond Beast

by Christopher Simpson
Common Courage Press, 1995 riedrich !iet"sche called the aristocratic predators #ho #rite society$s la#s %the splendid blond beast% precisely because they so often beha&e as though they are beyond the reach of elementary morality' (s he sa# things, these elites ha&e cut a path to#ard a certain sort of excellence consisting mainly of the exercise of po#er at the expense of others' )hen dealing #ith ordinary people, he said, they %re&ert to the innocence of #ild animals'''' )e can imagine them returning from an orgy of murder, arson, rape and torture, *ubilant and at peace #ith themsel&es as though they had committed a fraternity prank+con&inced, moreo&er, that the poets for a long time to come #ill ha&e something to sing about and to praise'$$ Their brutality #as true courage, !iet"sche thought, and the foundation of social order' Today genocide+the deliberate destruction of a racial, cultural, or political group+is the paramount example of the institutionali"ed and sanctioned &iolence of #hich !iet"sche spoke' ,enocide has been a basic mechanism of empire and the national state since their inception and remains #idely practiced in %ad&anced% and %ci&ili"ed% areas' -ost genocides in this century ha&e been perpetrated by nation+states upon ethnic minorities li&ing #ithin the state$s o#n borders. most of the &ictims ha&e been children' The people responsible for mass murder ha&e by and large gotten a#ay #ith #hat they ha&e done' -ost ha&e succeeded in keeping #ealth that they looted from their &ictims. most ha&e ne&er faced trial' ,enocide is still difficult to eradicate because it is usually tolerated, at least by those #ho benefit from it' The Splendid Blond Beast examines ho# the social mechanisms of genocide often encourage tacit international cooperation in the escape from *ustice of those #ho perpetrated the crime''' (ccording to psychologist /r&in Staub, #ho has studied do"ens of mass crimes, genocidal societies usually go through an e&olution during #hich the different strata of society literally learn ho# to carry out group murder' 0n his book The 1oots of /&il, Staub contends that genocidal atrocities most often take place in countries under great political, economic, and often military stress' They are usually led by authoritarian parties that #ield great po#er yet are insecure in their rule, such as the !a"is in ,ermany or the 0ttihad 2Committee of 3nion and

Progress4 in Turkey' The ideologies of such parties can &ary in important respects, but they are nonetheless often similar in that they create unity among %in+group% members through dehumani"ation of outsiders' ,enocidal societies also sho# a marked tendency to#ard #hat psychologists call %*ust#orld% thinking5 6ictims are belie&ed to ha&e brought their suffering upon themsel&es and, thus, to deser&e #hat they get' But the ideology of these authoritarian parties and e&en their sei"ure of state po#er are not necessarily enough to trigger a genocide' The leading perpetrators need mass mobili"ations to actually implement their agenda' or example, the real spearheads of genocide in ,ermany+the !a"i party, SS, and similar groups+ by themsel&es lacked the resources to disenfranchise and e&entually murder millions of 7e#s' They succeeded in unleashing the 8olocaust, ho#e&er, by harnessing many of the other#ise ordinary elements of ,erman life+of commerce, the courts, uni&ersity scholarship, religious obser&ance, routine go&ernment administration, and so on+to the speciali"ed tasks necessary for mass murder' !ot surprisingly, many of the leaders of these %ordinary% institutions #ere the existing notables in ,erman society' The !a"i genocide probably #ould not ha&e been possible #ithout the acti&e or tacit cooperation of many collaborators #ho did not consider themsel&es !a"is and, in some cases, e&en opposed aspects of 8itler$s policies, yet nonetheless cooperated in mass murder' Put bluntly, the !a"is succeeded in genocide in part through offering bystanders money, property, status, and other re#ards for their acti&e or tacit complicity in the crime' The actions of !a"i ,ermany$s business elite illustrate ho# this #orks' Prior to 1999, ,erman business leaders did not sho# a marked impulse to#ard genocide' (nti+Semitism #as present in ,erman commercial life, of course, but #as often less pronounced there than in other /uropean cultures of the day': (mong the !a"is$ first acts in po#er, ho#e&er, #as the introduction of incenti&es to encourage persecution of 7e#s' !e# (ryani"ation la#s created a profitable business for banks, corporations, and merchants #illing to enforce !a"i racial preferences' Tens of thousands of ,ermans sei"ed businesses or real estate o#ned by 7e#s, paying a fraction of the property$s true &alue, or dro&e 7e#ish competitors out of business' 7e#ish #ealth, and later 7e#ish blood, pro&ided an essential lubricant that kept ,ermany$s ruling coalition intact throughout its first decade in po#er' By 19:: and 19:5, leaders of ma*or ,erman companies such as automaker ;aimler Ben", electrical manufacturers (/, and Siemens, and most of ,ermany$s large mining, steelmaking, chemical, and construction companies found themsel&es deeply compromised by their exploitation of concentration camp labor, theft, and in some cases complicity in mass murder' They committed these crimes not so much out of ideological con&iction but more often as a means of preser&ing their influence #ithin ,ermany$s economy and society' or much of the ,erman economic elite, their cooperation in atrocities

#as offered to 8itler$s go&ernment in exchange for its aid in maintaining their status' ( some#hat similar pattern of re#ards for those #ho cooperate in persecution can be seen in other genocides' ;uring the Turkish genocide of (rmenians, the 0ttihad go&ernment extended economic incenti&es to Turks #illing to participate in the deportation and murder of (rmenians' ;uring the nineteenth century, the 3'S' go&ernment offered bounties for murdering !ati&e (mericans and, perhaps more fundamentally, pro&ided free farmland and other business opportunities to settlers #illing to encroach on !ati&e (merican territories'9 ( similar process continues today, particularly in Central and South (merica' Thus, in genocidal situations, mass &iolence can become ent#ined #ith the &ery institutions that gi&e a society coherency' This has important implications for ho# perpetrators and their collaborators are treated once most of the killing is o&er' By the time the genocide has ended, it is usually clear that the ordinary, integrati&e institutions of society remained centers of po#er during the killing and shared responsibility for it' These institutions usually hold on to some measure of authority in the #ake of any economic or political crisis of legitimacy created by their actions' /&en if the regime is brought do#n by a military defeat, as #as the case in Turkey and in !a"i ,ermany, the residual po#er of these institutions means that there are likely to be factions among the &ictors, and e&en among the &ictims, #ho percei&e an interest in allying themsel&es #ith the old po#er centers' Such cli<ues #ill conceal the old guard$s complicity in crime and exploit their relationship #ith the old po#er centers for political or economic ad&antage' === p> %)ar consists largely of acts that #ould be criminal if performed in time of peace+killing, #ounding, kidnapping destroying or carrying off other people$s property,% said Telford Taylor, the chief 3'S' prosecutor at the second round of the !uremberg trials' ?ften such conduct is not regarded as criminal if it takes place in the course of #ar, Taylor continued, %because the state of #ar lays a blanket of immunity o&er the #arriors'% === p@ The fact is that no clear international ban against crimes against humanity existed prior to 19:5, due in large part to 3'S' opposition' 3nlike #ar crimes, crimes against humanity= are usually something a go&ernment does to its o#n

people, such as genocide, sla&ery, or other forms of mass &iolence against ci&ilians' (lthough such crimes #ere defined in detail at the 0nternational -ilitary Tribunal at !uremberg and in later 3nited !ations action, e&en today they remain a relati&ely ne# concept in international la# and often run counter to more established legal custom' Crimes against humanity remain considerably harder to prosecute than #ar crimes, narro#ly defined, in part because criminal nation+states are unlikely to prosecute themsel&es, and because international diplomatic practice+particularly by the 3nited States+has blocked the creation of an international criminal court that #ould a&e *urisdiction to try perpetrators of these atrocities' /&en the most horrific cases of human rights abuses are often protected from international *ustice' === P@ (llied Control Council Aa# !o' 1B, promulgated at Berlin in ;ecember 19:5' )ar crimes + %atrocities and offenses ' ' ' constituting &iolations of the la#s or customs of #ar,% such as murder or ill treatment of prisoners of #ar, plunder, #anton destruction, or de&astation that is %not *ustified by military necessity'% Crimes against humanity + %atrocities and offenses including but not limited to murder, extermination, ensla&ement, deportation, imprisonment, torture, rape, or other inhumane acts committed against any ci&ilian population,% or %persecution on political, racial or religious grounds #hether or not in &iolation of the domestic la#s of the country #here perpetrated'% Crimes against peace + %initiation of in&asions of other countries and #ars of aggression in &iolation of international la# and treaties,% including the planning of such #ars' p9 Budapest 7e#ish ghetto sur&i&or %?nly by understanding the roots of e&il do #e gain the possibility of shaping the future so that it #ill not happen again'% === p11 8itler$s sei"ure of po#er in ,ermany presented 3'S' and ,erman business groups #ith complex opportunities and challenges The !a"i+sponsored

(ryani"ation campaigns, clandestine rearmament, industrial bailouts, and public+#orks programs created a gold rush for businesses fa&ored by the !a"i go&ernment' The chau&inistic !a"is tended to &ie# 3'S'+based multinational companies #ith suspicion, but encouraged them to in&est in ,ermany #hen it seemed to be in their interest to do so' Soon 3'S' corporate in&estment #as expanding more rapidly in 8itler$s ,ermany than in any other country in /urope despite the #orld#ide economic depression' === p19 0n the #ake of )orld )ar 0, the ;ulles brothers helped construct the international treaties and legal definitions that shut do#n efforts to bring mass murderers of that time to *ustice' Bet#een the #ars, both #ere acti&e in 3'S'+ ,erman trade and diplomatic relations, particularly in de&eloping ornate corporate camouflage intended to frustrate efforts to increase public accountability of ma*or companies' Aike many other corporate leaders in the 3nited States, the t#o brothers also disagreed for a time on ho# best to respond to the ne# #ar unfolding bet#een ,ermany and Britain' They did agree, ho#e&er, on #hat #as to them the pi&otal issue5 the preser&ation of the influence of /uropean business and diplomatic elites, including that of ,ermany, #hen the conflict #as o&er' (llen ;ulles exploited his post in the ?ffice of Strategic Ser&ices 2?SS4 to <uash #ar crimes prosecutions of senior !a"i of ficials and ,erman business leaders #ho cooperated #ith him in a series of clandestine schemes to secure 3'S' ad&antage in Central /urope' 8e personally inter&ened to ensure the escape from prosecution of ma*or ,erman bankers and industrialists complicit in the !a"is$ extermination+through+labor program, according to archi&al records brought to light here for the first time' ;ulles also protected SS ?bergruppenfuhrer Carl )olff, the highest+ranking SS officer to sur&i&e the #ar and one of the principal sponsors of the Treblinka extermination camp, as #ell as a number of )olff$s senior aides, #ho #ere alleged to ha&e been responsible for deportation of 7e#s to (usch#it" and massacres of 0talian partisans' -ean#hile, 7ohn oster ;ulles helped forge consensus on )all Street and in the 1epublican party in fa&or of an %internationalist% 3'S' foreign policy based on rebuilding the ,erman economic elite into a rene#ed bul#ark against re&olution in /urope' (s #ill be seen, a key element in his effort #as the extension of a de facto amnesty to most of ,ermany$s business leadership, regardless of their acti&ities during the Third 1eich'

8erbert Pell$s 3!)CC became one of the first targets for the (llied factions fa&oring clemency for (xis notables #ho had collaborated in !a"i crimes' State department legal chief ,reen 8ack#orth succeeded in engineering Pell$s dismissal in early 19:5, then in shutting do#n the 3!)CC altogether #ithin thirty+six months after the end of the #ar' Then a 3'S' intelligence agent named 0&an Cerno, #ho had #orked #ith (llen ;ulles since the 19DBs and #ho ser&ed as senior legal counsel to the ne# 3nited !ations ?rgani"ation, sealed the 3!)CC records, keeping them l off+limits to #ar+crimes in&estigators for more than forty years' 0t E took the scandal surrounding the #artime career of 3! Secretary ,eneral Curt )aldheim to break these files open at last'

Foung Turks
'''The concept of a crime against humanity #as not #ell defined at this point, e&en by its ad&ocates' But the definition had at least t#o important elements that set it apart from earlier understandings of #ar crimes, #hich #ere limited to acts that a go&ernment might take against the population or troops of a foreign po#er' irst, crimes against humanity included atrocities that #ere criminal not only under ci&il la# but also under the most elementary morality, yet #ere not technically #ar crimes' The ne# definition included domestic campaigns to exterminate a particular ethnic or religious group as #ell as institutionali"ed sla&ery, e&en though neither of these #as considered a #ar crime under the 8ague of ,ene&a co&enants' Second, many atrocities committed by a go&ernment against its o#n people #ere defined as crimes against humanity' 0t #as the Turkish go&ernment$s attempted genocide of that country$s large (rmenian population that had led to the demand for a clear international ban on crimes against humanity' Turkey #as the center of the ?ttoman /mpire, and the (rmenians #ere a large minority group #hose ancestral home clustered around -ount (rarat in eastern Turkey' ;uring the last decades of the nineteenth century, Turkish religious extremists and security forces seeking racial and religious purity in Turkey had repeatedly instigated pogroms, murdering tens of thousands (rmenians' ?ne result #as that militant (rmenians took up arms and began pressing for political independence' Shortly before )orld )ar 0, a secreti&e and disciplined cabal of young Turkish military officers kno#n as the 0ttihad took po#er in Turkey and brought the country into an alliance #ith ,ermany' These #ere the original %Foung Turks,%

and their capacity for cruelty and &iolence still re&erberates in that phrase today' 0n the first months of )orld )ar 0 the Foung Turks instigated a national effort to exterminate the (rmenian population under the guise of moderni"ation, suppressing domestic dissent, and securing Turkey$s borders' The 0ttihad bent the po#er of the Turkish state to their purpose' Beginning in late 191: and accelerating o&er the next three years, the Turkish go&ernment rounded up (rmenian men for forced labor, #orked many to death building a trans+Turkish rail#ay for ,erman business interests, then shot the sur&i&ors' The go&ernment then secretly ordered mass executions of (rmenian intellectuals and political leaders in the spring of 1915' The state also uprooted (rmenian #omen and children from their homes and dro&e them into &ast resettlement camps that #ere barren of supplies or shelter' )hen the camps became full, the Turks expelled the people into the deserts of #hat is today Syria and 0ra<' 8undreds of thousands of (rmenians died from shootings, star&ation, exposure, and disease' The state declared that all the property of deported (rmenian families had been %abandoned,% then confiscated it and used it to re#ard 0ttihad party acti&ists and others #ho participated in the extermination process' -any Turks prospered by li<uidating (rmenians$ businesses, stealing their stocks, and sei"ing (rmenian farms and real estate' The genocide #as particularly cruel to (rmenian #omen and girls, #ho became the ob*ects of a per&asi&e, tacitly sanctioned campaign of rape' Turkish police encouraged gangs of thugs to prey upon the deportees as a means of humiliating and destroying these #omen' -ean#hile, some (rmenian girls #ere able to escape deportation by announcing a religious con&ersion to 0slam, and in this #ay some Turkish men secured (rmenian concubines and house sla&es' Sur&i&ing Turkish, ,erman, and 3'S' documents establish that the 0ttihad expected to strike <uickly, to keep the deportations and massacres secret, and to exterminate the (rmenians as a race before the outside #orld learned of the atrocities' The 0ttihad also persecuted substantial numbers of ,reeks, 7e#s, and other minority groups, in some cases deporting them along #ith the (rmenians' The Turkish go&ernment made a careful effort to explain a#ay leaks that appeared in the press as nothing more than exaggerated accounts of the usual casualties of #ar' But the 0ttihad miscalculated' Their empire #as primarily 0slamic, and the (rmenians #ere largely Christians' )hen the genocide began, a number of )estern diplomats and Christian missionaries in Turkey 2including a ,erman, Pastor 7ohannes Aepsius4 made determined efforts to record the massacres and deportations and to mobili"e #orld opinion against Turkish actions' The 3'S'

ambassador to Turkey, 8enry -orgenthau, and se&eral 3'S' consuls publicly protested the deportations and began to aid refugees+an unusually courageous gesture by diplomats, #ho ordinarily make a point of #ashing their hands of such matters' These efforts struck a responsi&e chord in the countries of the )estern (lliance and, to a lesser degree, inside ,ermany as #ell' Publicity against the atrocities became particularly strong in countries #here the ne#s media remained hungry for #artime atrocity stories in&ol&ing ,ermans and their clients and #ere #illing to gi&e full play to deeply rooted Christian pre*udices against -uslims' Tragically, (rmenia could supply an almost unlimited number of such accounts' 3nlike some #ar propaganda, most of the stories #ere true' 0n the end, ho#e&er, the (rmenians and their supporters failed to mobili"e enough international support to halt the mass killings and deportations, although they did succeed in placing the crime of genocide clearly on the public agenda for the first time in modern history' (t the height of the pogroms in 1915, the go&ernments of rance, ,reat Britain, and c"arist 1ussia issued a *oint declaration denouncing the mass killings of (rmenians as %crimes against humanity and ci&ili"ation% and #arning the leaders of the Turkish go&ernment that they #ould be held %personally responsible'% But too often there #as little of substance behind the indignant rhetoric' (t the height of the genocide, a factional split among the Foung Turks opened the possibility that Turkey might put an end to the massacres in exchange for an agreement from the (ssociated Po#ers to abandon their claims on Turkey and the ?ttoman /mpire' ;*emal Pasha, a member of the trium&irate that ruled Turkey, had settled into ;amascus and exercised local control o&er much of #hat is today Syria, 7ordan, and 0srael' 0n late 1915, #hile Turkish efforts to exterminate (rmenians #ere at their height, ;*emal sought out an (rmenian emissary and con&inced him to carry an offer to the go&ernments of the (ssociated Po#ers' 0f c"arist 1ussia, rance, and Britain #ould back him, ;*emal promised, he #ould undertake a coup d$etat against his Foung Turk ri&als, end the massacres, and take Turkey out of the #ar' ;*emal himself #ould then emerge as sultan' The price for the plan #as that the /uropean po#ers #ould abandon imperial claims to #hat is today 0ra< and Syria and pro&ide reconstruction assistance to ;*emal$s go&ernment after the #ar' ;*emal, for his part, #as #illing to concede control of Constantinople and the ;ardanelles to 1ussia' %;*emal appears to ha&e acted on the mistaken assumption that sa&ing the (rmenians+as distinct from merely exploiting their plight for propaganda

purposes+#as an important (llied ob*ecti&e,% #rites ;a&id romkin, a historian speciali"ing in ?ttoman affairs' The 1ussians fa&ored ;*emal$s plan and for a time assured him that the other (ssociated Po#ers #ould cooperate' But in early 191G, rance re*ected ;*emal$s offer and claimed southern Turkey, Syria, and parts of 0ra<' ,reat Britain follo#ed suit, claiming 0ra< on behalf of a local %0ra<i% go&ernment created by Aondon' %0n their passion for booty,% romkin #rites, %the (llied go&ernments lost sight of the condition upon #hich future gains #ere predicated5 #inning the #ar'''' ;*emal$s offer afforded the (llies their one great opportunity to sub&ert the ?ttoman /mpire from #ithin%+and to sa&e innocent li&es+%and they let it go'% !or did the (llies exploit ;*emal$s attempted betrayal of his colleagues for propaganda or intelligence purposes' (s far as can be determined, the other Foung Turks ne&er learned of ;*emal$s secret correspondence #ith the enemy, and he remained part of the ruling trium&irate for the remainder of the #ar' The pro+(rmenian publicity may not ha&e changed the )est$s basic policy to#ard Turkey, but it did ha&e a significant impact on public opinion in the (ssociated Po#ers' By the time the Paris Peace Conference began, there #as #idespread sentiment among the &ictorious nations that *ustice re<uired some form of trial and punishment for those #ho had perpetrated atrocities in Turkey' The 0ttihad dictatorship crumbled as the #ar dre# to a close, and a ne#, )estern+backed Turkish go&ernment signed an armistice #ith the (ssociated Po#ers in late ?ctober 191@' T#o days later, most of the senior 0ttihad leaders fled their country for ,ermany, #hich granted them asylum' They left behind many #ho had collaborated in the genocide, ho#e&er, including state and local administrators, party acti&ists, Turkish businessmen and farmers #ho had sei"ed (rmenian property, policemen, and a &ariety of specialists in mass &iolence' The ne# Turkish go&ernment arrested se&eral hundred former party leaders #ho #ere suspected of direct roles in the mass deportations and killings, and began to prepare cases against them for murder, treason, theft, and similar offenses under Turkish la#' The ne# Turkish authorities carried out a series of such trials during 1919 and 19DB, placing on the public record an important collection of confessions by former 0ttihad leaders, secret state and party papers concerning the tactics of deportation and mass murder, and an e&identiary outline against se&eral hundred 0ttihad leaders #ho had been instrumental in the crime' -uch of this e&idence #as published in the official Turkish parliamentary ga"ette, Taky0mi 6ekayi' The trials #ere strongly opposed by a rising Turkish nationalist mo&ement, ho#e&er, #hich regarded the prosecutions as a symbol of foreign efforts to dismember Turkey' Aed by military strongman -ustapha Cemal 2later kno#n

as (taturk4, the ne# mo&ement #elcomed 0ttihadists to its ranks and placed some party &eterans in leading posts' Cemal$s mo&ement en*oyed great influence in the post#ar Turkish military, interior ministry, and particularly the police' Cemalist sympathi"ers systematically delayed and obstructed Turkey$s criminal prosecutions, destroyed e&idence, organi"ed escapes, and sparked large demonstrations and public protests against the trials' 0mportantly, Britain, rance, and the 3nited States #ere at that time &ying #ith one another to di&ide up the &ast oil and mineral #ealth of Turkey$s ?ttoman /mpire' Cemal skillfully played the three po#ers against each other and insisted on amnesty for the 0ttihadists as part of the price for his support in the di&ision of the defunct empire' Though often o&erlooked today, the ?ttoman holdings #ere of extraordinary &alue, perhaps the richest imperial treasure since the /uropean sei"ure of the !e# )orld four centuries earlier' The empire had been eroding for decades, but by the time of the Turkish defeat in )orld )ar 0, it still included most of #hat is today Turkey, 0ra<, Saudi (rabia, Syria, Aebanon, 0srael, 7ordan, and the oil sheikdoms of the Persian ,ulf' The /uropean go&ernments sensed that the time had come to sei"e this rich pri"e' The British had been the dominant foreign po#er in the -iddle /ast prior to )orld )ar 0' Their (nglo+Persian ?il Company 2later kno#n as British Petroleum, or BP4 and the Turkish Petroleum Company effecti&ely controlled most of the oil reser&es in the region' But the rench ac<uired an important mandate in the area during the #ar, and by 1919 they #ere seeking substantial concessions from the British' Both countries preferred to keep the 3'S'+backed Standard ?il Company of !e# 7ersey 2today kno#n as /xxon4 out of the area' The 3'S' go&ernment mean#hile opposed many aspects of the /uropean colonial rule in the -iddle /ast, preferring instead #hat it termed %open+door% policies+ those that facilitated 3'S' penetration of ne# markets and ac<uisition of ne# sources of supply' Senior officials of all three )estern po#ers became preoccupied #ith oil politics in the -iddle /ast' 0t e&en led to an a#k#ard ne# term, %oleaginous diplomacy,% that #as used for years to refer to go&ernment initiati&es on behalf of oil companies' %?il,% said rench Premier ,eorges Clemenceau, %is as necessary as blood'$$ or a short time after the #ar, the three allies pressed the ne# Turkish go&ernment on t#o fronts5 irst, they supported tough punishment for 0ttihadist criminals, payment of damages to (rmenians and ,reeks for the li&es and property lost during the massacres, establishment of an independent (rmenian republic in northeastern Turkey, and transfer to ,reece of the port city of

Smyrna' Second, they demanded that the Turks surrender all claims to the resources of the former ?ttoman territories outside of Turkey proper, particularly the -osul oil fields in #hat is today northern 0ra<' (lthough many Turks sa# these terms as humiliatingly onerous, the first post#ar Turkish go&ernment agreed to them in the Treaty of Se&res, signed in (ugust 19DB' That agreement #as hailed at the time as the formal conclusion of )orld )ar 0' But the (ssociated Po#ers could not agree among themsel&es on the terms of the di&ision of the -osul oil fields, and ne# fighting broke out bet#een the (rmenian nationalists, #ho sought to establish the republic they belie&ed they had been guaranteed at Se&res, and the Turkish Cemalists, #ho still regarded (rmenia as a part of Turkey' Cemal$s embrace of the 0ttihadists contributed to an escalating cycle of re&enge killings and rene#ed massacres in Turkey' By the end of 19DB, the Cemalists #ere clearly in the ascendance, ha&ing established a ri&al go&ernment at (nkara, in the center of the country' The increasingly shaky Turkish go&ernment at 0stanbul, under intense Cemalist pressure to abrogate the Treaty of Se&res, abruptly shut do#n the criminal trials of 0ttihadists' The )estern allies then stepped up their *ockeying for influence in the Cemalist camp' The 3'S' 8igh Commissioner to Turkey #as (dmiral -ark A' Bristol, a man #ith a reputation as a bigot and a determined ad&ocate of 3'S' alliance #ith -ustafa Cemal' %The (rmenians,% Bristol #rote, %are a race like the 7e#s+they ha&e little or no national spirit and poor moral character'% 0t #as better for the 3nited States, he contended, to *ettison support for the (rmenian republic as soon as possible, stabili"e 3'S' relations #ith the emerging Turkish go&ernment, and to enlist Cemal$s support in gaining access to the oil fields of the former ?ttoman /mpire' Bristol$s argument found a recepti&e audience in the ne# 8arding administration in )ashington, #hose affinity for oil interests e&entually blossomed into the famous Teapot ;ome bribery scandal' (s 8igh Commissioner to Turkey, Bristol had considerably more po#er than might be en*oyed by any con&entional ambassador' (s the ci&il #ar unfolded inside Turkey, Bristol barred ne#spaper reporters from access to areas #here rene#ed massacres of (rmenians #ere taking place, purportedly to a&oid inciting further atrocities against ci&ilians' 8is correspondent at the State ;epartment in )ashington #as (llen ;ulles' (fter the Paris conference, ;ulles had ser&ed briefly as chief of staff to Bristol, then mo&ed on to )ashington to become chief of the State ;epartment$s !ear /ast desk *ust as %oleaginous diplomacy% #as reaching its heyday'

;ulles supported Bristol$s initiati&es' %Confidentially the State ;epartment is in a bind' ?ur task #ould be simple if the reports of the atrocities could be declared untrue or e&en exaggerated but the e&idence, alas, is irrefutable,% ;ulles #rote in reply to Bristol$s re<uests for State ;epartment inter&ention #ith 3'S' publishers to shift the tone of ne#s reports still dribbling out of Turkey and (rmenia' $ HTIhe Secretary of State #ants to a&oid gi&ing the impression that #hile the 3nited States is #illing to inter&ene acti&ely to protect its commercial interests, it is not #illing to mo&e on behalf of the Christian minorities'% ;ulles #ent on to complain about the agitation in the 3'S' on behalf of (rmenians, ,reeks, and Palestinian 7e#s' %0$&e been kept busy trying to #ard off congressional resolutions of sympathy for these groups'$$ The change in the 3'S' go&ernment$s response to the (rmenian massacres presents an acute example of the conflicts that often shape 3'S' foreign policy' rom 191: to 1919, the 3'S' go&ernment and public opinion sharply condemned the Turkish massacres' (mbassador 8enry -orgenthau repeatedly inter&ened #ith the Turkish go&ernment to protest the killings, raised funds for refugee relief, and mobili"ed opposition to the genocide' ( close re&ie# of the declassified State ;epartment archi&es of the period sho#s that much of the go&ernment$s internal reporting on Turkey #as strongly sympathetic to the (rmenians throughout the #ar and the first months after the #ar' The )estern press, too, #as o&er#helmingly fa&orable to the (rmenians and hostile to the Turkish go&ernment' ?ne recent study by -ar*orie 8ousepian ;obkin found that bet#een (pril and ;ecember of 1915, the !e# Fork Times published more than 1BB articles concerning the massacres #hen the killings #ere at their height' (ll of the Times co&erage #as sympathetic to the (rmenians, and most of the ne#s stories appeared on the front page or the first three pages of the ne#spaper' ( roughly similar pattern can be found in publications such as the !e# Fork 8erald Tribune, Boston 8erald, and (tlantic -onthly and in the *ournals of &arious Christian missionary societies' The &olume of ne#s co&erage rose and fell #ith e&ents o&er the next fi&e years, but on the #hole it remained strongly sympathetic to the (rmenians' Fet a remarkable shift in 3'S' media content and go&ernment beha&ior took place as the ne# 8arding administration established itself in 19D1' %Those #ho underestimate the po#er of commerce in the history of the -iddle /ast cannot ha&e studied the post#ar situation in Turkey bet#een 191@ and 19D9,% ;obkin #rites' %There #ere, of course, other political factors that pro&ed disastrous for the (rmenians ' ' ' but the systematic effort 2chiefly by the 8arding administration4 to turn 3'S' public opinion to#ards Turkey #as purely and simply moti&ated by the desire to beat the Hri&al (ssociatedI Po#ers to #hat #ere thought of as the &ast, untapped resources of that country, and chiefly the oil'%

%0t #as not possible to bring about the desired change in public opinion #ithout denigrating #hat the (rmenians had suffered,% she continues' 1etired 3'S' (dmiral )illiam Colby Chester *oined (dmiral -ark Bristol as a leading public spokesman for reconciliation #ith Turkey' Chester #as not a disinterested party' The Turkish go&ernment had granted him an oil concession in 0ra< that #as potentially #orth hundreds of millions of dollars' )riting in the influential *ournal Current 8istory, Chester contended that the (rmenians had been deported not to deserts, but to %the most delightful and fertile parts of Syria ''' at great expense of money and effort%+a claim that #ent #ell beyond e&en #hat the Cemal go&ernment #as #illing to argue' ;obkin reports that missionary leaders such as Cle&eland ;odge and ,eorge Plimpton, #ho had once been instrumental in documenting the genocide, began to lend their names to publicity insisting that the reported Turkish excesses had been %greatly exaggerated'% By mid+19D9, the complex and interlocking challenges created by the demands for *ustice in the #ake of the (rmenian ,enocide, on the one hand, and 3'S' political and commercial interests in Turkey, on the other, had been settled in fa&or of a de facto 3'S' alliance #ith the ne# Cemalist go&ernment' The day+to+day details of the 3'S' diplomatic shift in fa&or of Cemal #ere handled by (mbassador 7oseph ,re# 2#ho #ill reappear later in this narrati&e as acting secretary of state during a pi&otal moment in )orld )ar 004 and the chief of the !ear /ast desk at State, (llen ;ulles' The 3'S', #hich had been the principal international supporter of the nascent (rmenian 1epublic, #ithdre# its promises of aid and protection' -ustafa Cemal soon succeeded through force of arms in suppressing (rmenia and in establishing a ne# Turkish go&ernment at (nkara' 0n 7uly 19D9, the Turks and the /uropean allies signed a ne# agreement, replacing the aborted Treaty of Se&res #ith the Treaty of Aausanne' )estern go&ernments agreed to ne# Turkish borders, officially recogni"ed Cemal$s go&ernment, abandoned any claim on behalf of an (rmenian republic, and specifically agreed to an amnesty for all 0ttihadists #ho had been con&icted in the earlier trials' (s things turned out, many of the top 0ttihadists #ho fled Turkey in 191@ #ere assassinated by (rmenian commandos' Talaat, the minister of internal affairs and grand &i"ier of the 0ttihad state, #as shot in Berlin on -arch 15,19D1' Behaeddin Sakir 2Chakir4, a senior member of the %Commission of Supply,% #hich had coordinated much of the extermination campaign, and ;*emal ("my, military go&ernor during the height of the killings in Trebi"ond, #ere killed in Berlin on (pril 1>, 19DD' /n&er, the former minister of #ar, is said to ha&e been killed by the So&iet army in Bukhara in 19DD, though many of the details of his death remain uncertain' ;*emal, #ho #ith Talaat and /n&er had constituted the ruling trium&irate of the 0ttihad state, #as gunned do#n in 7uly 19DD in Tiflis' 8e #as on his #ay to a trade conference in Berlin, #here he #as to buy #eapons for the (fghan army'

(rmenians lost a great deal under the terms of the Aausanne treaty #hile )estern commercial interests prospered' The ne# Turkish leader Cemal agreed to relin<uish all claims on the territories of the old ?ttoman /mpire outside Turkish borders, thus formally opening the door to the (nglo+(merican control of -iddle /ast oil that #as to continue #ith minimal change for the next fifty years' This #as not a simple <uid pro <uo, of course' The agreement also in&ol&ed other important elements, notably a settlement of most reparation claims against Turkey and an agreement bet#een ,reece and Turkey to repatriate thousands of ethnic ,reeks and Turks to their respecti&e countries of origin' There #ere to be se&eral more years of s<uabbles before the 3'S'+ /uropean disputes o&er the -osul oil fields #ere finally settled' The point #as nonetheless clear' )estern go&ernments had discarded #artime promises of action against the 0ttihadists #ho had murdered about a million people in order to help their political maneu&ering o&er oil concessions in the -iddle /ast' The dominant faction in Turkish society ne&er accepted (rmenian claims as legitimate, despite the strong e&idence of genocide established by Turkey$s o#n courts' 0n fact, the Turkish go&ernment e&en today continues to refuse to ackno#ledge 0ttihadist responsibility for the (rmenian massacres, and has instead in recent years financed a large and sophisticated publicity campaign aimed at re#riting the history of the #ar years'

Bankers, Aa#yers and Ainkage ,roups

''' ;uring the second half of the 19DBs, the most important international market for recycling the ne# pri&ate 3'S' #ealth #as ,ermany' This in&estment #as carried out mainly through loans to ,erman industry, direct 3'S' in&estment in ,erman companies, de&elopment loans to ,erman cities, and millions of dollars #orth of ;a#es Plan credits that indirectly financed ,erman #ar reparations' The scope of 3'S'+,erman capital flo#s during the 19DBs has ne&er been fully documented, but the fraction of it that can be traced totals close to J1'5 billion, not including ;a#es Plan credits' 0n today$s currency this sum #ould be measured in the tens of billions of dollars' There #as considerable direct 3'S' in&estment in ,erman companies as 3'S' companies sought to buy into /uropean markets at bargain prices' 0TT purchased a half+do"en ,erman telecommunications e<uipment manufacturers during the late 19DBs and early 199Bs, #hile ,eneral -otors bought control of the (dam ?pel corporation 2and #ith it about :B percent of the ,erman automoti&e market4 in 19D9' rit" ?pel *oined ,-$s board of directors as part of the deal' ord -otor Company built a &ast factory at Cologne, then used it to manufacture cars for all of Central and /astern /urope' There #ere also *oint &entures, such as 0, arben$s pacts #ith Standard ?il of !e# 7ersey, some of #hich #ere subse<uently found to be &iolations of 3'S' la#' ,eneral /lectric

purchased substantial shares of the ,erman electronics giants (/, and Siemens, and entered *oint &entures #ith both companies' = 2= 3'S' corporate in&estment in ,ermany during the 19DBs and 199Bs #as concentrated in the hands of fe#er than t#o do"en ma*or companies, reports economic historian -ira )ilkins' (ccording to her data, 3'S' industrial leaders in ,ermany included oil and chemical companies such as du Pont, Standard ?il of !e# 7ersey, and Texaco. food and consumer products companies such as Corn Products 1efining Co' 2today CPC 0nternational4 and 3nited ruit. and mining companies such as (merican -etal 2today (-(K4, (naconda, 0nternational !ickel 2based in Canada, but (merican o#ned4 and the large ,uggenheim mining interests The most acti&e category of 3'S' industrial in&estors appears to ha&e been automoti&e and light industrial manufacturing companies, including ord, ,/, ,-, ,oodrich, 0B-, 0nternational 8ar&ester, 0TT, !ational Cash 1egister 2*oint &enture #ith Crupp4, Singer, and se&eral smaller companies'4 Speciali"ed banks, la# firms, and trading companies that focused on opening the ,erman market to 3'S' capital sprang up on both sides of the (tlantic' Practically #ithout exception, the giant 3'S'+,erman capital flo#s #ere administered by a small group of specialists at the &ery top of the social structure of both countries' ( number of institutions and indi&iduals #ho #ere prominent in this trade #ent on to play po#erful roles in 3'S'+,erman affairs o&er the next fi&e decades'

''' (ll told, these and more than a do"en similar transactions had a combined &alue in excess of a billion dollars' or 7ohn oster ;ulles, international banking seemed to be a distinctly noble and humanitarian profession' %0t is the highest function of finance to mo&e goods from the place #here they constitute a surplus to the place #here they #ill fill a deficit,% he told a sympathetic audience at the oreign Policy (ssociation as the economic boom of the 19DBs sho#ed the first signs of unra&eling' %H(Ind in performing this ser&ice during the past nine years our bankers ha&e gi&en an extraordinary demonstration of the beneficent use of financial po#er,% principally by opening /uropean markets to 3'S' goods through the extension of loans to /uropean customers' 0nternational banking, he said, %is a simple story ' ' ' the story of ho# /urope has been sa&ed from star&ing and #e from choking'% Banker and latter+day diplomat Paul !it"e describes a 19D9 incident in his autobiography that captures much of the financial community$s sense of its role'

!it"e #as in those years a protLgL of ;illon, 1ead chairman Clarence ;illon' (s !it"e tells the story, the elder executi&e explained to him that o&er the pre&ious fifty years %the !e# Fork banking community had #ielded more influence than politicians in )ashington'% Throughout history, ;illon continued, %societies ha&e been dominated by one element of society or another+by priests, by royalty, by the military, by politicians either from the common folk or from the aristocracy, and from time to time by #ealthy financiers' This last element had found its #ay to the top of the hierarchy for a #hile in ancient ,reece, in 1ome in the days of Aucullus, in the city+states of 0taly during the days of the -edici, for a #hile in rance, and ' ' ' in the 3nited States'% (t this time, ;illon belie&ed that a ma*or economic depression #as on the #ay and that the ensuing political crisis #ould signal the %end of an era'% The 3'S' financial elite had great influence on 3'S' foreign affairs, often manifested most directly in the oreign Ser&ice, the career staff of the ;epartment of State' (s !it"e$s o#n career #as to demonstrate, there #as a re&ol&ing door bet#een international ser&ice for ma*or banks and la# firms and positions in the 3'S' State ;epartment' There #ere many family ties, too, as #hen (llen ;ulles remained in the oreign Ser&ice and his brother returned to Sulli&an M Crom#ell' The top oreign Ser&ice officers and in&estment bankers had often trained at the same prep schools and 0&y Aeague uni&ersities. they belonged to the same social clubs and often shared similar preconceptions on issues ranging from social class and geopolitics to men$s fashions' %Style, grace, poise, and abo&e all, birth #ere the key to success% in the oreign Ser&ice, #rites historian -artin )eil' %The standards #ere similar to those of a fashionable )ashington club5 $0s he our kind of personN$ !o one #ho clearly #as not #ould pass' %0f a black slipped through the net, he #as sent to Aiberia until he resigned' )omen #ere sent to the *ungles of South (merica' 7e#s could not be handled as crassly, but they #ere made to feel un#elcome and shut out of the better assignments' Those #ho had the proper background, ho#e&er, had a great time'% !ot e&eryone in the oreign Ser&ice actually trained at ,roton and 8ar&ard, of course, noted Supreme Court 7ustice elix rankfurter in his diary' But like some people %#ho ha&e not had the ad&antages of the so+called #ell+ born, but #ish they had them, Hthey becomeI more $,rotty$ than the men #ho actually #ent to ,roton in the State ;epartment'%

''' The industrial and financial sectors of the ,erman economy during the 19DBs and 199Bs #ere tightly interlocked and controlled by a handful of po#erful interests' (ntimonopoly and antitrust la#s such as those used in the 3nited

States to encourage competition #ere unkno#n' ,erman economic tradition had long encouraged industrial cartels, trusts, and similar organi"ations designed to dictate prices, exclude competitors from established markets, and coordinate bids for political po#er' This resulted in a closely inter#o&en net#ork of fe#er than 9BB men #ho made up the senior managers and the boards of directors of &irtually e&ery large+scale enterprise in the country' )ithin this group po#er #as further concentrated in the &ery largest banks, insurance companies, and manufacturing concerns' The general contours of this elite can be illustrated through the interlocking directorships and financial ties among ,ermany$s t#o principal banks and their associated industrial concerns, #hich ser&ed as a central meeting ground and policy+coordination point for much of ,erman industry' ;eutsche Bank and ;resdner Bank exercised an %influence and control o&er H,ermanI industry to a degree unparalleled in modern (merican banking,% as a later 3'S' go&ernment study put it' They exerted po#er through interlocking directorships, control of &oting rights to large blocks of company stock, authority o&er the financing and credits necessary for day+to+day business, and the banks$ ser&ice as a go+bet#een among the ,erman state and pri&ate enterprises' The 3'S' go&ernment calculated shortly after )orld )ar 00 that the ;eutsche Bank$s board of directors and senior management sat on the boards of some 5D5 other ma*or ,erman companies, and that this pattern had been true since the 19DBs' ;eutsche Bank had no fe#er than three *oint directors #ith the (llian" 0nsurance group 2the largest insurance company in the #orld4. six *oint directors #ith ;aimler Ben". four #ith ;aimler$s ostensible competitor, B-). fi&e #ith the -annesmann steel combine, four #ith the electrical giant (/,. three #ith coal and steel specialists 8oesch (,. six #ith one of ,ermany$s largest armament manufacturers, ;/-(,. and no fe#er than eight #ith the Siemens group of companies, #hich has dominated ,erman electrical engineering and communications e<uipment markets for generations' 0ndeed, ;eutsche Bank, -annesmann, and Siemens can fairly be said to ha&e gro#n up as a single economic unit' ,ermany$s second largest bank, the ;resdner Bank, #as also allied #ith key businesses during the 19DBs and 199Bs, including the Crupp empire and steel magnate riedrich lick$s' 0n later years, ;resdner bankrolled the SS concentration camp system and the go&ernment+sponsored 8ermann ,oring )erke, #hich ser&ed as a &ast holding company for do"ens of mining, steel, and armaments companies sei"ed by the !a"is' The Crupps had used the ;resdner as a &irtual in+house bank since the end of the nineteenth century, in much the same manner that the Siemens interests had dominated ;eutsche Bank' These t#o ma*or ,erman financial institutions had long competed for business and political influence' (t the same time, they often cooperated in dealing #ith

business trusts that #ere simply too big to fit under any one bank$s umbrella, such as the chemical combine 0, arben and 6ereinigte Stahl#erke, or 3nited Steel#orks' ?b&iously, there #ere other prominent ,erman and (merican financial leaders in addition to those mentioned here, but this brief list is characteristic' They #ere, first of all, a relati&ely small group, e&en #ithin the closed #orld of 3'S' and ,erman la# and banking' They speciali"ed in foreign affairs and ha&e had a substantial influence on 3'S'+,erman relations and on both countries$ conduct of foreign affairs, emerging at the core of a foreign policy establishment acti&e in groups such as the Council on oreign 1elations' They built strong relationships o&er a period of ten, t#enty and e&en thirty years' They often shared similar con&ictions on issues such as class, business, and the importance of 3'S'+,erman economic ties' 0n many cases, they shared business partnerships and in&estments as #ell' This does not mean that they had a single point of &ie# concerning 8itler, either before or after the !a"is$ climb to po#er in 199B99' Contrary to the popular myths concerning the ;ulles brothers, for example, (llen ;ulles #as a relati&ely early ad&ocate of 3'S' backing for the British in their sho#do#n #ith ,ermany, #hile 7ohn oster ;ulles remained considerably more tolerant of !a"ism' ?thers #ere prominent 7e#s #ho #ere destined to be dispossessed by the !a"is' Banker /ric )arburg #as forced to sell off most of his ,erman properties in the early 199Bs, but he returned for the reconstruction after 19:5' Some members of the elite did become creatures of 8itler, ho#e&er, such as ;resdner Bank$s Carl Aindemann, #ho #as characteri"ed as a %rabid !a"i% by one of the bank$s senior executi&es, 8ans Schippel' The cement that bound these groups together #as trade, not politics+or at least not politics in the narro# sense of the term' 3'S' business maga"ines became regular critics of 8itler$s politics during the 199Bs, for example' But a re&ie# of the internal records of 3'S' companies made public during #artime %trading #ith the enemy$$ scandals sho#s that, despite pious comments to the press, a do"en ma*or corporations pro&ed to be enthusiastic partners in trade and technology cartels exploited by the !a"is' /&en (llen ;ulles, #ho #as among the more &ocal on )all Street in #arning that ,erman military ad&entures #ould come to no good, found himself caught up in this contradiction' Captured ,erman records sho# that the 3nited ruit Company, #here ;ulles maintained a long and acti&e directorship, became an international pacesetter in de&ising #ays to expand trade #ith ,ermany despite obstacles from the 3'S' and 3'C' go&ernments' Similarly, #hile publicly ad&ocating 3'S' economic backing for the British on the e&e of the #ar, ;ulles #as pri&ately representing ,erman corporate clients in their efforts to buy out

the (merican Potash and Chemical Corporation, an important potential source of strategic chemicals and foreign currency' = 2= Sulli&an M Crom#ell maintained strong ties to ,erman corporate interests at the outbreak of )orld )ar 00, not#ithstanding (llen ;ulles$s public comments' (s far back as the 19DBs, 7ohn oster ;ulles and Sulli&an M Crom#ell had represented -etallgesellschaft (, of rankfurt, the largest nonferrous metals company in the #orld' ;ulles$s task at that time #as to reestablish the rankfurt company$s control of the (merican -etal Company, a 3'S' subsidiary of -etallgesellschaft that had been sei"ed as enemy property during the #ar' 8e succeeded' (lmost t#o decades later, in 199@, 0, arben director 8ermann Schmit", #ho had played a ma*or role in the -etallgesellschaft affair, hired Sulli&an M Crom#ell to deal #ith the )orld )ar 00 &ersion of 3'S' (lien property regulations' (ccording to 3'S' 7ustice ;epartment and Securities and /xchange Commission 2S/C4 in&estigators, 0, arben$s photographic film subsidiary ,( #as at that time engaged in complex financial maneu&ers designed to conceal its relationship to the 0,' ,( #ished to a&oid the Treasury ;epartment$s strict regulations on control of foreign funds, and to head off the possibility that it, too, might be sei"ed as enemy property if #ar broke out' (ccording to Chester T' Aane, the general counsel of the S/C in the 199Bs, %The ,erman go&ernment, acting through its representati&es here, its financial counselors and attorneys, #ho, as 0 remember, #ere Sulli&an M Crom#ell, filed a registration statement #ith us looking to#ards refunding of many of its securities held in the 3nited States,% Aane recalled' %0t #as ob&iously designed as a public relations gesture'% Aane and the S/C responded #ith a demand that the !a"i state %gi&e us a complete blueprint of HitsI economy, including all its indirect assessments through party dues, its indirect taxes, and its #hole financial structure'% rustrated, the ,ermans e&entually abandoned the effort'4 ;espite their differences, these 3'S'+,erman %reference groups% or %linkage groups,% as they became kno#n to sociologists, shared common con&ictions that #ere to them far more fundamental5 the central importance of maintaining the &iability of capitalism as a national and #orld economic system, and the key role of 3'S' and ,erman producti&e capacity and markets #ithin that effort' -easured against these more basic &alues, the !a"is and their #hole brutal apparatus #ere seen by much of the elite as transitory, at least during the 19DBs and 199Bs' rom the standpoint of corporate ideology, this elite sa# itself as a ne# generation of the so+called managerial re&olution. they considered themsel&es to be %for#ard thinking% and unencumbered by the stuffy formalism of earlier times'

)ho Still Talks of the (rmeniansN

''' 8itler #as #ell a#are of Turkey$s genocide of (rmenians and of the failure of the international community to respond ade<uately to it' (s early as 7une 1991, 8itler commented in an inter&ie# that the %extermination of the (rmenians% had led him to %the conclusion that masses of men are mere biological plasticine% o&er #hich (ryans #ould e&entually triumph' 8e returned to this theme in a formal talk to his commanding generals on the e&e of their in&asion of Poland in 19995 %?ur strength is in our <uickness and our brutality,% he exclaimed' %,enghis Chan had millions of #omen and children killed by his o#n #ill and #ith a gay heart' 8istory sees only in him a great state builder'''' Thus for the time being 0 ha&e sent to the /ast ' ' ' my ;eath$s 8ead 3nits #ith the order to kill #ithout pity or mercy all men, #omen, and children of the Polish race or language' ?nly in such a #ay #ill #e #in the &ital space that #e need' )ho still talks no#adays of the extermination of the (rmeniansN% ?n at least three other occasions, 8itler pointed to the brutality of Turkey$s regime and its #illingness to strike #ithout mercy as a #orthy model for his o#n go&ernment' ( ne# and more terrible #a&e of slaughter began #hen the ,ermans in&aded the 3SS1 during 7une of 19:1' Special SS troops dedicated to mass murder no# follo#ed close behind the ad&ancing ,erman army' )ithin thirty+six months, these /insat"gruppen and their sub+units, the /insat"kommandos and Sonderkommandos, shot about t#o million people, according to the !uremberg -ilitary Tribunal' The large ma*ority of the dead #ere 7e#s, although the /insat"gruppen$s net also caught hundreds of thousands of Communists, Sla&s, 1omanis, Poles, homosexuals, hospital patients, unarmed prisoners of #ar, and e&en orphan children' These t#o million murders, moreo&er, do not include the gassings at (usch#it", Treblinka, and other death factories that began in the #ake of the in&asion' ( 19:D report on the fate of 7e#s in eastern Poland smuggled out of )arsa# by the 7e#ish Aabor Bund pro&ided remarkably detailed and accurate early documentation of the #ork of the /insat"kommandos' rom the day the 1usso+,erman #ar broke out, the ,ermans embarked on the physical extermination of the 7e#ish population on Polish soil, using the 3krainians and Aithuanian fascists for this *ob' 0t began in /astern ,alicia in the summer months of 19:1' The follo#ing system #as applied e&ery#here5 men, fourteen to sixty years old, #ere dri&en to a single place+ a s<uare or a cemetery, #here they #ere slaughtered, or shot by machine+guns, or killed by

hand grenades' They had to dig their o#n gra&es' Children in orphanages, inmates in old+age homes, sick in hospitals #ere shot, #omen #ere killed on the streets' 0n many to#ns 7e#s #ere carried off to an %unkno#n destination%, and killed in the ad*acent #oods' Thirty thousand 7e#s #ere killed in A#o# HA&o&I,15,BBB in Stanisla#o#, 5,BBB in Tarnopol,D,BBB in Oloc"o#,:,BBB in Br"e"any 2there #ere 1@,BBB 7e#s in this to#n, no# only 1,>BB are left4' The same has happened in Oboro#, Colomy*a, Sambor, Stry*, ;rohobyc", Obara", Pr"emyslany, Cuty, Sniatyn, Oales"c"yki, Brody, Pr"emysl, 1a#a 1uska, and other places'''' The number of the 7e#s murdered in a beastly fashion in the )ilno H6ilnaI area and in Aithuania is put at 9BB,BBB' The extermination campaign gathered momentum by integrating itself #ith the day+to+day acti&ities of 8itler$s go&ernment and ,erman society' 0n 7anuary 19:D, fourteen senior ,erman go&ernment bureaucrats met at SS offices at Aake )annsee, in the suburbs of Berlin, to coordinate efforts to exterminate the 7e#s of /urope' 3p to that point, the &arious ,erman ministries had often #orked at cross+purposes in their approach to the %7e#ish Puestion'% ?fficials in charge of the economic exploitation of the !a"i+occupied territories in the /ast had sometimes ad&ocated retention of able+bodied 7e#s as sla&e laborers, #hile 1einhard 8eydrich of the SS had pushed for mass execution by the /insat"gruppen' Still other ministries had fa&ored a &ariety of deportation and resettlement schemes, though they #ere unable to agree on exactly #here to relocate the refugees and the extent of terror to #reak upon them' The )annsee meeting changed all that' There, SS security chief 1einhard 8eydrich enlisted the support of each of the ma*or go&ernment ministries and !a"i party organi"ations in a concerted effort to %clear ' ' ' the ,erman Aebensraum H%li&ing space%I of 7e#s in a legal #ay,% Hemphasis addedI' The tactics #ere relati&ely simple' %/urope #ill be cleaned up from the )est to the /ast,% 8eydrich commented' %(ble+bodied 7e#s #ill be taken in large labor columns to these districts Hi'e'5 !a"i+occupied territories on the /astern rontI for #ork on roads ' ' ' in the course of #hich action a great part #ill undoubtedly be eliminated by natural causes' The possible final remnant #ill, as it must undoubtedly consist of the toughest, ha&e to be treated accordingly, as it #ould, if liberated, act as a bud cell of a 7e#ish reconstruction'% (ll ,erman go&ernment agencies #ere to cooperate #ith the SS in this plan. it #as to be the %final solution of the 7e#ish problem in /urope'% 8eydrich$s assistant, (dolf /ichmann, estimated that there #ere approximately 11 million 7e#s to be %cleaned up% in this fashion he pro&ided a country+by+ country breakdo#n of 7e#ish populations to help plan tactics' There #ere 5 million 7e#s to murder in the !a"i+occupied 3SS1, according to his list, and D'9 million more in the former territories of Poland' Aong+range plans called for the SS to eliminate all :,BBB 7e#s in 0reland once the ,erman troops arri&ed'

8eydrich$s emphasis on %legality% #as crucial to the social psychology of the extermination program and to its functioning on a practical le&el' or (dolf /ichmann, the )annsee decisions dispelled his lingering doubts about the propriety of mass murder' %8ere no#, during this conference, the most prominent people had spoken, the Popes of the Third 1eich,% /ichmann said' %!ot only 8itler, not only 8eydrich, or H,estapo chiefI -uller, or the SS, or the Party, but the elite of the Ci&il Ser&ice had registered their support'''' (t that moment, 0 sensed a kind of Pontius Pilate feeling, for 0 #as free of all guilt,% /ichmann testified at his later trial for crimes against humanity' %)ho #as 0 to *udgeN )ho #as 0 to ha&e my o#n thoughts in this matterN% ?n an operational le&el, each ,erman go&ernment ministry took responsibility for only part of the o&erall program+the registration of 7e#s, the sei"ure of their property, physical transportation across /urope, and so on+and each part had an easy appearance of legality, of sanction by the state and e&en of a certain sort of normality' /ach act of the extermination program, except for the actual gassing, came complete #ith a more or less reasonable explanation a&ailable to the perpetrators and to the #orld at large' The go&ernment #as deporting 7e#s as a security measure and to put them to #ork, the story #ent' This #ould benefit ,erman society and perhaps e&en benefit the 7e#ish deportees 2as in the case of aged 7e#s #ho #ere to be sent to a special ghetto at Theresienstadt4' By di&iding up responsibility for extermination into explicable, functional parts, the !a"i party and SS enlisted and united the ,erman state and most of ,erman society in the countless little tasks necessary to conduct mass murder' They openly promoted the slogan % inal Solution to the 7e#ish Puestion% as a rallying cry in the !a"i+controlled press' Cno#ledge of the true meaning of the phrase seeped slo#ly through the informal net#orks of the go&ernmental, business, and police elites' !ote that e&en at )annsee the truth that millions of 7e#s #ere to be gassed and shot rather than #orked to death #as not openly discussed' (lmost all of the 7e#s #ere said to be %eliminated by natural causes,% as 8eydrich put it, rather than simply killed' This simple deceit can be traced to the police security surrounding the gassing installations and to the psychological need of most people to e&ade open complicity in murder' The SS did not fool ,erman bureaucrats into cooperation' 1ather, the )annsee conference illustrates ho# !a"i+dominated society created a social consciousness that both facilitated the extermination program and denied its existence' The %legali"ation% established at )annsee 2and in related la#s and decrees4 achie&ed a relati&ely smooth linkage bet#een the surface #orld of #artime life and the officially denied #orld of mass extermination' -any more people kne# of 2or suspected4 the extermination program than could directly ackno#ledge it, in part because this #as a classified go&ernment program during #artime' Fet,

#idespread possession of unofficial or %denied% kno#ledge became crucial to the success of the extermination effort. #ithout it, the Third 1eich #ould ha&e failed to coordinate its constantly s<uabbling ministries #ell enough to carry out the massi&e effort'

p@> ''' ,erman industry$s unprecedented exploitation of sla&e labor became a crucial element of the 8olocaust' But it is often o&erlooked in the popular imagination and in media portrayals of !a"i crimes, #hich tend to stress the role of the political police or the grotes<ue and horrifying extermination camps' orced labor in ,ermany can be di&ided into three o&erlapping categories5 press+ganged foreign #orkers, P?)s, and concentration camp inmates' /ach group is fre<uently described as sla&es or e&en, as Ben erenc" has elo<uently described 7e#ish forced laborers, as less than sla&es' Still, there #ere important differences among these categories as far as the laborers themsel&es #ere concerned' The foreign #orkers became #hat amounted to chattel sla&es' -ost #ere Poles, 3krainians, rench, and 1ussians, though &irtually e&ery /uropean nationality #as represented' The !a"i go&ernment effecti&ely o#ned these #orkers and leased them out to pri&ate industry for #ar production or agricultural labor' %(ll of the men must be fed, sheltered and treated in such a #ay that they produce to the highest possible extent at the lo#est concei&able degree of expenditure,% Aabor -inister Sauckel ordered' 2Sauckel refers here only to men, but in fact about D5 percent of these #orkers #ere female'4 (s ominous as Sauckel$s phrase #as, it ne&ertheless suggested that industry and the ,erman state #ould make some minimal effort to keep most of these #orkers ali&e, if only to use them a bit longer' The #orkers #ere often euphemistically referred to as %foreign #orkers% or e&en as gostorbeiters+%guest #orkers'% 0n contrast, 7e#ish concentration camp inmates and many So&iet P?)s #ere set to #ork in order to extract some labor from them during the process of destroying them' This procedure typically re<uired bet#een one and six months' The SS, #hich ran the concentration camps, teetered uneasily bet#een contradictory policies of deri&ing &aluable labor from camp inmates or of simply murdering 7e#s and other targeted groups as <uickly as possible, regardless of the economic conse<uences' 0n practice, the police agency pursued both ends simultaneously, selecting some inmates for death+through+labor #hile immediately killing others #holesale' The prisoners #orked to death #ere primarily 7e#s, though they #ere in time *oined by groups of Polish and 1ussian

P?)s homosexuals, %guest #orkers% #ho had attempted to escape from corporate #ork gangs, and others' The ,ermans created a hierarchy among those they declared to be subhuman, and this structure+combined #ith hea&y doses of police terror+contributed to keeping the system of forced labor and mass murder &iable for se&eral years' Typically, the ,ermans sent those at the bottom of the pyramid to be gassed5 7e#s #ho #ere old, #eak, or &ery young. handicapped persons. and in*ured prisoners' They murdered millions of healthy 7e#s as #ell, as part of their inal Solution' p9D ''' 0n the opening years of the #ar, #hen the 3'S' #as still officially neutral, President ranklin 1oose&elt had forcefully condemned as a #ar crime any airborne bombing of undefended cities and to#ns' ,reat Britain and the 3'S' #ere signatories to the 19B> 8ague con&ention, 1oose&elt said, #hich had banned %attack or bombardment by any means #hate&er of to#ns, &illages, habitations or buildings #hich are not defended'% The phrase %by any means #hate&er% had been inserted specifically to deal #ith bombardments of undefended ci&ilian targets from airplanes or+as had seemed more likely in 19B>+from balloons' 3'S' ackno#ledgment that bombing ci&ilians constituted a #ar crime disappeared from (llied #ar propaganda after 19:B' ,reat Britain and ,ermany began an escalating series of air strikes against one another in #hich each described its actions as legally sanctioned reprisals intended to deter attacks from the enemy' By the time the 3'S' entered the #ar, the (llies had already concluded that British and 3'S' air raids against ,erman cities #ould remain among their most important tactics' Before )orld )ar 00 #as o&er, both sides had killed hundreds of thousands of ci&ilians in this fashion, each blaming the other for initiating the carnage' (s the (llies gained control of the skies o&er /urope, they stopped claiming that these acts of bombing #ere crimes''' p9@ -ost ''')estern experts had difficulty coming to grips #ith the gro#ing e&idence of !a"i criminality' %0t cannot be said that ,erman policy is moti&ated by any sadistic desire to see other people suffer under ,erman rule,% #rote ,eorge Cennan in (pril 19:1, #hen he #as chief administrati&e officer of the 3'S' consulate in Berlin' 28e #rote this after almost t#o years of #ell+publici"ed pogroms in Poland and mass deportations of ,erman, rench, and ;utch 7e#s to concentration camps'4 %,ermans are most anxious that their ne# sub*ects should be happy in their care. they are #illing to make #hat seems to them important compromises to achie&e this result, and they are unable to understand

#hy these measures should not be successful'% Cennan #as out of step #ith President ranklin 1oose&elt$s hard+line policies to#ard the !a"is, but he #as not alone' The public pattern of !a"i crimes fell outside the realm of #hat these men considered criminal' or them, ,ermany$s forced labor seemed little more than a particularly harsh solution to problems that #ere common to 3'S' and ,erman elites' They ignored the reports of the 8olocaust that had begun to come out of !a"i occupied /urope, and some e&en #ent out of their #ay to discredit E accurate information about #hat the !a"is #ere up to'

%The 0mmediate ;emands of 7ustice%

2Punishment of defeated po#ers for #ar crimes and crimes against humanity #as the first item on the agenda ''' in Paris in 1919'4 p1G ''' Ci&ilians sacrificed the most' 0n Turkey, the ruling *unta attempted to exterminate that country$s largest minority group, the (rmenians, through pogroms, mass murder, and deportation' They killed about one million people bet#een 1915 and 191@' -ore than half of the dead #ere children, and almost all the casualties #ere ci&ilians''' /pidemics of tuberculosis and influen"a during the #ar killed at least three times as many people as did the fighting itself, and most of the afflicted #ere children and the elderly' Cholera and typhus ripped through ci&ilian populations, particularly in southeastern /urope, despite impro&ements in public health measures among soldiers' The 3'S' ederal 1eser&e Board found that by the spring of 191@ the belligerents had spent about Jl:B billion on the execution of the #ar, #ith the expectation that another JDB billion #ould be spent before the year #as out' This #as strictly for soldiers$ pay, military hard#are, and other direct costs' These #ere almost unimaginable outlays for that era, representing the bulk of existing producti&e capacity of all )estern society' p1> ''' )hen fighting broke out in 191:' there had been plenty of nationalist enthusiasm among the citi"ens of the belligerents' But this support diminished as the number of casualties mounted and the futility of the fighting became apparent' Pacifist and Communist arguments that blamed the #ar on an imperial s<uabble among the rich #on a #idening audience as the months passed' By 191G, /uropean go&ernments on both sides of the conflict faced increasing difficulties mobili"ing their populations to fight'

)ar administrations in each country turned to atrocity stories, promises of re&enge, and inspiring tales about fallen heroes as a means of bolstering public enthusiasm for continued fighting' ( tight, symbiotic relationship soon emerged bet#een the national media and the intelligence ser&ices of each ma*or po#er, as both groups had an interest in #ide dissemination of mo&ing stories that demoni"ed the enemy and sanctified each country$s o#n #ar effort' ;o"ens of men #ho later emerged as prominent *ournalists and public relations specialists, among them )alter Aippmann and (rthur S#eetser of the 3nited States, pioneered modern tactics for organi"ed media campaigns, early radio broadcasting, staged e&ents, and other #ar propaganda' 2/ach of the belligerents had signed the 8ague con&entions of 1@99 and 19B> and the ,ene&a con&entions of 1@G: and 19BG 2also kno#n as the 1ed Cross con&entions4 #hich set basic standards for military conduct during #ars'4 p1@ ''' The 3nited States ''' specifically exempted anything it might choose to do in Central and South (merica and the Philippines from the terms of the 8ague agreements' pDB )ar crimes and crimes against humanity thus emerged at the Paris Conference as a pi&otal issue, both in symbolic and practical terms' This #as more than simply as important *udicial matter. it became a focus of a #ide+ranging debate o&er #hat sort of society /urope #ould build in the #ake of the #ar H)) 0I' pD9 /d#ard 8ouse, presidential ad&isor about Secretary of State 1obert Aansing %8e belie&es that almost any form of atrocity is permissible pro&ided a nation$s safety is in&ol&ed'% )hen 8ouse asked Aansing #ho should best determine the le&el of atrocity appropriate to protect the nation, Aansing replied, %the military authorities of the nation committing the atrocities'% Thus, the leaders of the armed forces accused of committing a crime should be the final *udge of #hether the act #as *ustified in the interests of the nation' pD5 0nternational la# HSecretary of State 1obert Aansing contendedI regulated relations among nations. it had no *urisdiction o&er #hat a state chooses to do to its o#n people'

The /nd of the )ar Crimes Commission

?riginally, a second international trial at !uremberg #as to focus primarily on the acti&ities of ,erman finance and industry during the Third 1eich' The %industrialists trial,% as it #as called at the time, #as #idely regarded as of e<ual importance to the prosecution of the !a"i and SS high command' 8ermann (bs and other ma*or bankers #ere important targets, at least *udging from the recommendations made by 3'S' #ar crimes in&estigators at the time' But 7ustice 7ackson &etoed this plan, declaring in the autumn of 19:5 that the 3nited States #ould refuse to participate in any further international trials of ,erman defendants and #ould instead hold separate prosecutions on its o#n' These trials became the %Subse<uent Proceedings% organi"ed under the leadership of ,eneral Telford Taylor' ''' Taylor$s three 3'S' trials of Hof ,ermanI industrialists lasted slightly more than a year altogether, resulting in nineteen con&ictions and fourteen ac<uittals' The 3'S' *udges tended to be hostile to the prosecution, particularly in the riedrich lick case' The court %#as apparently unable to feel that offenses by industrialists fell into as se&ere a category as #hen committed by a common man,% as noted legal historian 7ohn (lan (ppleman put it' lick$s successful defense depended directly on the social dynamics of international la# and of genocide' lick beat all but one of the sla&e labor and plunder charges, because three prominent 3'S' *udges concluded that the director and o#ner of a corporation should not be held accountable for sla&ery and looting by his companies, unless the prosecution could pro&e that he personally ordered each particular crime to be carried out' )ithout proof of that type, e&ery bit of ambiguous e&idence had to be interpreted by the court in fa&or of the indi&idual defendants, namely lick and his circle of executi&es' )orse, the lick case established a legal precedent for a corporate defense of %necessity%+a close cousin to the defense of acting under orders+that #ent beyond e&en #hat lick had argued on his o#n behalf and that contradicted many aspects of the earlier ruling on this issue by the 0nternational -ilitary Tribunal' (ma"ingly, the legal precedent left by this series of trials seems to be that a nineteen+year+old draftee accused of #ar crimes cannot successfully plead that he #as acting under orders, but the o#ners and directors of multi+billion+ dollar companies can'

The 3'S' go&ernment cut off funding for the prosecution staff at !uremberg in mid+l9:@, bringing the Subse<uent Proceedings to an abrupt end' The staff abandoned pending in&estigations and potential prosecutions, sometimes #ith little more than a note to the files indicating the case had been closed' Aess than t#o and a half years after that, the ne# 3'S' high commissioner for ,ermany, 7ohn -cCloy, granted clemency to e&ery single industrialist #ho had been con&icted at !uremberg'

-oney, Aa#, and ,enocide

''' the e&ents of the (rmenian ,enocide and of the 8olocaust ''' re&eal a basic dynamic in the relationship of great po#ers to mass crimes' The problem is fundamentally structural. it is built into the system and not simply a product of a particularly e&il or inept group of men' The terms of international la# concerning #ar crimes #ere articulated at the turn of the century primarily by the countries then dominating international affairs5 the ma*or /uropean po#ers, c"arist 1ussia, and the 3nited States' The big po#ers crafted the 8ague and ,ene&a con&entions to help manage the expensi&e arms race of the day and to set ne#, ostensibly more rational rules for #ars and occupation of disputed territories' The conferees limited %legal% #ars to those fought among regular, uniformed armies+a pro&ision that greatly fa&ored the larger and established po#ers, for they had the clear ad&antage in such conflicts' They asserted the absolute so&ereignty of nationstates o&er their sub*ects. declared most re&olutions, most forms of ci&ilian resistance to occupying armies, and colonial rebellions to be #ar crimes. and strengthened the claims of heads of state to legal immunity for acts in office' They set out detailed rules for commerce during #artime that tended to insulate business and trade from the disruptions of #ar to the greatest degree possible' !e&ertheless, these treaties did lead to some important humanitarian ad&ances, particularly in impro&ing treatment of prisoners of #ar' This structure for international la# #as put to the test during )orld )ar 0, and failed' ;espite some amelioration of the conditions for soldiers on the battlefield, the ne# frame#ork of la# did not confront or contain one of the signal crimes of the day5 the Turkish 0ttihod go&ernment$s destruction of some one million (rmenians' !or did existing international la# achie&e *ustice for the (rmenians #hen the killing #as o&er, in part because Britain, rance, and the 3nited States sa# greater ad&antage in cooperating #ith Turkey in a ne# di&ision of -iddle /astern oil than they did in bringing 0ttihad criminals to *ustice' The failure to do *ustice in the (rmenian ,enocide can be traced in important part to the o&erlapping, interlocking dynamics of economics, international la#, and mass murder' The more predatory aspects of international la# do&etailed #ell #ith the destructi&e social patterns of the Turkish killing' The la# pro&ed to

be incapable of prosecuting genocide #ithout dra#ing more %con&entional% aspects of colonialism, national de&elopment, and international trade into the dock as crimes as #ell' The legal and economic precedents set in the #ake of )orld )ar 0 had considerable impact on the course of the 8olocaust during )orld )ar 00, *ust as the more #idely understood political precedents did' 8itler himself repeatedly raised the international community$s failure to do *ustice in the #ake of the (rmenian ,enocide to explain and *ustify his o#n racial theories, and the ,ermans$ pattern of %learning through doing% genocide #as similar in important respects to that of the Turks' )hile the t#o crimes #ere different in important respects, they both #ere led by ideologically dri&en, authoritarian political parties that had come to po#er in the midst of a deep social crisis' Both the 0ttihad and the !a"is+each originally a marginal political party+managed to perpetrate genocide by enlisting the established institutions of con&entional life+ the national courts, commercial structures, scholarly community, and so on+in the tasks of mass persecution and e&entually mass murder' 0n both cases, the ruling party achie&ed its genocidal aims in part by offering economic incenti&es for persecution, the most basic of #hich #ere the opportunity to share in the spoils of deported people and the ability to transfer the costs of economic crisis onto the shoulders of the despised group' ''' The 3'S' State ;epartment and its allies orchestrated an effort preser&e and rebuild ,ermany$s economy as <uickly as possible as an economic, political, and e&entually military bul#ark against ne# re&olutions in /urope, e&en though much of the corporate and administrati&e leadership of ,erman finance and industry that they #ished to preser&e had been instrumental in 8itler$s crimes' -any critics, not least of #hom #as the 3'S' secretary of the treasury, accused this State ;epartment faction of anti+Semitism, blocking rescue of refugee 7e#s, appeasement of 8itler, and protection of !a"i criminals in the #ake of the #ar' ''' The similarities bet#een the (rmenian ,enocide and the 8olocaust suggest that the %!a"i problem% in post#ar ,ermany is only partially traceable to the pressures of the cold #ar' Throughout the t#entieth century, regardless of the pre&ailing atmosphere in /ast)est relations, most po#erful states ha&e attended to genocide only insofar as it has affected their o#n stability and short+term interests' (lmost #ithout exception, they ha&e dealt #ith the aftermath of genocide primarily as a means to increase their po#er and i preser&e their license to impose their &ersion of order, regardless of the price to be paid in terms of elementary *ustice' Se&eral do"en ne# international treaties intended to defend human rights ha&e been signed since the end of )orld )ar 00, including con&entions against sla&ery, torture, race and sex discrimination, apartheid, and genocide' /ach ne# agreement suggests that there is broad popular support for fundamental change

in this aspect of state beha&ior and international relations' This sentiment is embodied, albeit imperfectly, in the 3nited !ations, the /uropean Commission on 8uman 1ights, the 0nter(merican Commission on 8uman 1ights, a similar intergo&ernmental organi"ation in (frica, the pri&ate association (mnesty 0nternational, and many other groups that monitor human rights issues and publici"e offenses' Today$s popular resistance to crimes against humanity is more sophisticated, better e<uipped, and better informed than e&er before in human history' But the actual implementation of these treaties and the legal frame#ork supporting human rights efforts remains notoriously #eak' The horror of the !a"i gas chambers #as unambiguously condemned in the #ake of the 8olocaust, for example, but both sides$ practice of bombing ci&ilians 2and its tactical cousin, missile attacks on cities4 has not only escaped criminal prosecution, it has become the centerpiece of the ma*or po#ers$ post#ar national security strategies' 3sually there is little effecti&e protest on behalf of the people li&ing under the bombs'9 Similarly, after dragging its heels for four decades, the 3'S' Senate in 19@G nnally appro&ed a simple international con&ention declaring genocide to be a crime' (t the same time, ho#e&er, the senators #rote a restriction into their endorsement that effecti&ely barred any 3'S' court from actually enforcing the measure until the Congress passed ne# implementing legislation+#hich it has yet to do': Such loopholes are present in &irtually all international agreements concerning crimes against humanity' 0n each of these examples, the institutions purportedly regulated by international agreements ha&e succeeded in creating a legal structure that permits abuses to thri&e' or many senior policymakers in the 3'S' and abroad, international la# remains %a crock,% as former Secretary of State ;ean (cheson put it, #hen it imposes any limit on one$s o#n go&ernment' The logical <uestion, then, is, )hat should reasonable people make of the defects in international la# on issues of #ar, peace, and mass murderN or some, there #ill be a temptation to conclude that humanity might be better off discarding the present body of international la# altogether and someho# start again #ith a fresh slate' But there is no such thing as a truly fresh slate, of course' The gutted and imperfect form of international la# concerning #ar crimes and crimes against humanity that is presently embraced by the ma*or po#ers is better than none at all, at least so long as those #ho seek the la#$s protection ha&e no illusions about its scope' Compassion and good sense demand that the best features of international la# be preser&ed and extended, e&en #hen existing treaties pro&ide for little more than moral suasion in defense of human rights'

0nternational la# has often been a kind of pact bet#een strong and #eak nations' !ot surprisingly, the po#erful ha&e stipulated most of the terms' But the #eaker nations and peoples are not po#erless, and for manifold reasons they are today gathering force' This means that they can at times obtain the rights and responsibilities #ritten into international la#s and legal precedents such as the !uremberg Charter' The same is true, though to a much lesser degree, for indi&iduals facing brutality at the hands of their go&ernments' 0nternational la# has to that extent become a tool for human progress. it has sometimes ameliorated the suffering of prisoners, helped contain those #ho #ould resort to aggression, and pro&ided some platform, ho#e&er fragile, for the assertion of basic rights by indigenous peoples' Perhaps some additional hope for the future can be deri&ed from the #ay in #hich the frustrated ideals of an earlier era are sometimes taken <uite seriously by later generations' True, many aspects of the !uremberg principles ha&e yet to be implemented by national and international courts' But millions of people ha&e nonetheless accepted some sense of these principles as a reasonable standard of *ustice that they ha&e a right to expect' Thus, !uremberg$s impact has sometimes been felt in popular demands for human rights, *ustice, and humane treatment for the &ictims of #ar e&en in countries #here the courts refuse to recogni"e the !uremberg principles as legally binding' or exactly that reason, some po#erful nations today &ie# international la# and the !uremberg precedents #ith greater suspicion than pre&iously' The most po#erful forces #orking against an e&enhanded application of international la# today are those that ha&e up to no# usually gained the most from its terms' -a*or po#ers continue to cynically exploit international la# to support propaganda claims against their ri&als' They call for strict enforcement of international sanctions #hen it suits their purpose, but they ignore rulings by international courts #hen it is opportune to do so' 0n recent years 3'S' administrations 2and the media, %opinion leaders,% and so on4 ha&e consistently in&oked international la# to *ustify actions against Aibya, 0ran, 0ra<, ,renada, Panama, and other enemies du *our' 3'S' leaders usually present themsel&es as the only real defenders of international order in a #orld that #ould other#ise be cast into anarchy' Fet, they maintain an icy silence #hen the la# is less to their liking, as #hen the 0nternational Court of (rbitration at The 8ague ruled that the 3'S' mining of !icaraguan harbors, shooting do#n of an 0ranian ci&ilian airliner, and a list of similar acts constituted serious international crimes' The fact that such ob&ious deceits pass by largely #ithout comment in most parliaments, ne#spapers, and *ournals &i&idly illustrates the extent to #hich double+think on genocide and human rights remains ingrained in the present #orld order'

)ho then, or #hat, is the splendid blond beastN 0t is the destruction inherent in any system of order, the institutionali"ed brutality #hose existence is denied by cheerleaders of the status <uo at the &ery moment they feed its appetite for blood' The present #orld order supplies stability and rationality of a sort for human society, #hile its day+to+day operations che# up the #eak, the scapegoats, and almost anyone else in its #ay' This is not necessarily an e&il conspiracy of insiders. it is a structural dilemma that generates itself more or less consistently from place to place and from generation to generation' -uch of modern society has been built upon genocide' This crime #as integral to the emergence of the 3nited States, of c"arist 1ussia and later the 3SS1, of /uropean empires, and of many other states' Today, modern go&ernments continue extermination of indigenous peoples throughout (sia, (frica, and Aatin (merica, mainly as a means of stealing land and natural resources' /<ually pernicious, though often less ob&ious, the present #orld order has institutionali"ed persecution and depri&ation of hundreds of millions of children, particularly in the Third )orld, and in this #ay kills countless innocents each year' These systemic atrocities are for the most part not e&en regarded as crimes, but instead are #rit+ E ten off by most of the #orld$s media and intellectual leadership as acts of ,od or of nature #hose origin remains a mystery' 0t is indi&idual human beings #ho make the day+to+day decisions that create genocide, re#ard mass murder, and ease the escape of the guilty' But social systems usually protect these indi&iduals from responsibility for %authori"ed% acts, in part by pro&iding rationali"ations that present systemic brutality as a necessary e&il' Some obser&ers may claim that men such as (llen ;ulles, 1obert -urphy, et al' #ere gripped by an ideal of a higher good #hen they preser&ed the po#er of the ,erman business elite as a hedge against re&olution in /urope' But in the long run, their intentions ha&e little to do #ith the real issue, #hich is the character of social systems that permit decisions institutionali"ing murder to take on the appearance of #isdom, reason, or e&en *ustice among the men and #omen #ho lead society' Progress in the control of genocide depends in part on confronting those #ho #ould legitimi"e and legali"e the act' The cycle of genocide can be broken through relati&ely simple+but politically difficult+reforms in the international legal system' 0t is essential to identify and condemn the deeds that contribute to genocide, particularly #hen such deeds ha&e assumed a mantle of respectability, and to ensure *ust and e&enhanded punishment for those responsible' But the temptation #ill be to accept the inducements and rationali"ations society offers in exchange for keeping one$s mouth shut' The choice is in our hands'

Puotations
pD> '''The concept of a crime against humanity #as not #ell defined at this point, e&en by its ad&ocates' But the definition had at least t#o important elements that set it apart from earlier understandings of #ar crimes, #hich #ere limited to acts that a go&ernment might take against the population or troops of a foreign po#er' irst, crimes against humanity included atrocities that #ere criminal not only under ci&il la# but also under the most elementary morality, yet #ere not technically #ar crimes' The ne# definition included domestic campaigns to exterminate a particular ethnic or religious group as #ell as institutionali"ed sla&ery, e&en though neither of these #as considered a #ar crime under the 8ague of ,ene&a co&enants' Second, many atrocities committed by a go&ernment against its o#n people #ere defined as crimes against humanity' p9D rench Premier ,eorges Clemenceau %?il is as necessary as blood'$$

p99 3'S' 8igh Commissioner to Turkey #as (dmiral -ark A' Bristol %The (rmenians, are a race like the 7e#s+they ha&e little or no national spirit and poor moral character'% p9: (llen ;ulles, chief of the State ;epartment$s !ear /ast desk %HTIhe Secretary of State #ants to a&oid gi&ing the impression that #hile the 3nited States is #illing to inter&ene acti&ely to protect its commercial interests, it is not #illing to mo&e on behalf of the Christian minorities'% ;ulles #ent on to complain about the agitation in the 3'S' on behalf of (rmenians, ,reeks, and

Palestinian 7e#s' %0$&e been kept busy trying to #ard off congressional resolutions of sympathy for these groups'$$ p95 -ar*orie 8ousepian ;obkin$s study about the shift in #estern media content and go&ernment beha&ior to#ard the (rmenians during the 8arding (dministration %Those #ho underestimate the po#er of commerce in the history of the -iddle /ast cannot ha&e studied the post#ar situation in Turkey bet#een 191@ and 19D9,% ;obkin #rites' %There #ere, of course, other political factors that pro&ed disastrous for the (rmenians ' ' ' but the systematic effort 2chiefly by the 8arding administration4 to turn 3'S' public opinion to#ards Turkey #as purely and simply moti&ated by the desire to beat the Hri&al (ssociatedI Po#ers to #hat #ere thought of as the &ast, untapped resources of that country, and chiefly the oil'% p51 ;illon, 1ead Chairman Clarance ;illon %Throughout history, societies ha&e been dominated by one element of society or another+by priests, by royalty, by the military, by politicians either from the common folk or from the aristocracy, and from time to time by #ealthy financiers' This last element had found its #ay to the top of the hierarchy for a #hile in ancient ,reece, in 1ome in the days of Aucullus, in the city+states of 0taly during the days of the -edici, for a #hile in rance, and ' ' ' in the 3nited States'% pG@ -ost members of the ,erman economic elite #ere not !a"i ideologues or fanatical anti+Semites, at least not as indi&iduals' They #ere, ho#e&er, #illing to sacrifice the li&es of innocent people in order to achie&e or maintain a pri&ileged position in ,erman society' p>G (dolph 8itler, prior to his in&asion of Poland in 1999 %?ur strength is in our <uickness and our brutality' ,enghis Chan had millions of #omen and children killed by his o#n #ill and #ith a gay heart' 8istory sees only in him a great state builder'''' Thus for the time being 0 ha&e sent to the /ast ' ' ' my ;eath$s 8ead 3nits #ith the order to kill #ithout pity or mercy all men, #omen, and children of the Polish race or language' ?nly in such a #ay

#ill #e #in the &ital space that #e need' )ho still talks no#adays of the extermination of the (rmeniansN% p>> ( 2secret419:D report on the fate of 7e#s in eastern Poland %''' The follo#ing system #as applied e&ery#here5 men, fourteen to sixty years old, #ere dri&en to a single place+ a s<uare or a cemetery, #here they #ere slaughtered, or shot by machine+guns, or killed by hand grenades' They had to dig their o#n gra&es' Children in orphanages, inmates in old+age homes, sick in hospitals #ere shot, #omen #ere killed on the streets''' p>@ SS security chief 1einhard 8eydrich at 19:D Aake )annsee meeting %/urope #ill be cleaned up from the )est to the /ast,% 8eydrich commented' %(ble+bodied 7e#s #ill be taken in large labor columns to these districts Hi'e'5 !a"i+occupied territories on the /astern rontI for #ork on roads ' ' ' in the course of #hich action a great part #ill undoubtedly be eliminated by natural causes' The possible final remnant #ill, as it must undoubtedly consist of the toughest, ha&e to be treated accordingly, as it #ould, if liberated, act as a bud cell of a 7e#ish reconstruction'% (ll ,erman go&ernment agencies #ere to cooperate #ith the SS in this plan. it #as to be the %final solution of the 7e#ish problem in /urope'% p@1 The e&idence sho#s that, despite later denials, much of the corporate elite of ,ermany #as #ell a#are of the !a"is$ extermination programs' Thousands of ,erman corporate directors and senior managers kno#ingly contributed to murders carried out by their institutions, in many cases e&en after they had become disenchanted #ith 8itler and kne# that the #ar #as lost' The SS and the !a"i party could at least point to their ideology as an explanation of sorts for their participation in crime' But the business elite could not make e&en that claim' or them, cooperation in years of genocide became simply a matter of doing business' p@: 0, arben appears to ha&e been the first company to fully integrate concentration camp labor into modern industrial production, and it e&entually became kno#n in ,ermany as a model enterprise for this ne# techni<ue' arben executi&es e&en pro&ided ad&ice and training on the large+scale use of forced

labor for executi&es from 6olks#agen, -esserschmitt, 8einkel, and other ma*or companies' p@> ''' ,erman industry$s unprecedented exploitation of sla&e labor became a crucial element of the 8olocaust' But it is often o&erlooked in the popular imagination and in media portrayals of !a"i crimes, #hich tend to stress the role of the political police or the grotes<ue and horrifying extermination camps p@@ ''' The foreign #orkers became #hat amounted to chattel sla&es' -ost #ere Poles, 3krainians, rench, and 1ussians, though &irtually e&ery /uropean nationality #as represented' The !a"i go&ernment effecti&ely o#ned these #orkers and leased them out to pri&ate industry for #ar production or agricultural labor' ''' 0n contrast, 7e#ish concentration camp inmates and many So&iet P?)s #ere set to #ork in order to extract some labor from them during the process of destroying them' ''' The prisoners #orked to death #ere primarily 7e#s, though they #ere in time *oined by groups of Polish and 1ussian P?)s homosexuals, %guest #orkers% #ho had attempted to escape from corporate #ork gangs, and others' p19: 8erbert Pell, 19DBs about the (merican business community after )) 0 % The destinies of the #orld #ere handed them on a plate in 19DB' Their piglike rush for immediate profits knocked o&er the #hole feast in nine years' These are the people, #ith an ignorance e<ualed only by their impudence, #ho set themsel&es up as leaders of the country' pD>1 The legal precedent that resulted from the 3'S' trials of ,erman industrialists after )) 00 ''' a nineteen+year+old draftee accused of #ar crimes cannot successfully plead that he #as acting under orders, but the o#ners and directors of multi+billion+ dollar companies can'

pD>1 ''' the 3'S' high commissioner for ,ermany 7ohn -cCloy H#ho follo#ed ,eneral Telford TaylorI granted clemency to e&ery single industrialist #ho had been con&icted at !uremberg' pD>D 3'S' policy ''' entailed an amnesty for much of #hat ,erman business had done during the 8olocaust' pD@> 0t is indi&idual human beings #ho make the day+to+day decisions that create genocide, re#ard mass murder, and ease the escape of the guilty' But social systems usually protect these indi&iduals from responsibility for %authori"ed% acts, in part by pro&iding rationali"ations that present systemic brutality as a necessary e&il' pD@> ''' the real issue ''' is the character of social systems that permit decisions institutionali"ing murder to take on the appearance of #isdom, reason, or e&en *ustice among the men and #omen #ho lead society'