REVIEWS

Religion in Evolution
BY LINDA HEUMAN
Robert N. Bella h RELIGION IN HUMAN EVOLUTION Harvard University Press 201 1, 784 pp., $39.95 cloth

In an imervicw wirh Tricyck almosr a decade ago, che sociologisr of religion Roberr N. Bellah addressed a central problem-pcrhaps rhe central problemfacing religious people roday. O ur modern incellccrual inherirance demands a critica! ap proach ro received wisdom, yer fa irh wou ld seem ro req ui re che opposice: crusr in che reliabiliry and aurhoricariveness of cradicion. How can we approach che stud y of rel igion in a way char is borh affirmacive and cri t ica!? Tr-icycle asked . .Bellah, who is widely regarded as the preeminent figure in h is field, agrecd that putting our ha nds over our ears isn't an option fo r modern religious people; we musr critique cradirion rhoroughly. Bur rhere is a rhi rd possibiliry, Bellah suggesred. Taking a page from rhe French philosopher Paul Ricoeur, Bellah suggesred rhar we can move from an unquesrioning acceprance of tradirion rhrough a crirical invesrigarion and come out che orher side ro anorher srage of belief, a "second naiver." Second naiver, he said, "accepts rhe crirical process, yer 'in and rhrough criricism' ir lers rhe symbols and narrarives embedded in cradirion speak again; ir liscens ro whac chcy are saying." Bu e how do you do that? T here is a scene in thc fi lm HowLabout rhe obscenity trial of Allen G ins88

berg's poem-in which che prosecuror rurns ro lirerary cric Mark Schorer and asks him to translace whar Ginsberg meanr when he wrote "angelheaded hipsters burning for che anciem heavenly connecon ro che starry dynamo in the machinery of nighr." Schorer replies, "Sir, you can't rranslare poerry inro prose. T hac's why ir's poerry." Ju.sc like poeuy, symbols and narratives speak rheir own lang uage. And in an era of rationalism, rhese rypes of cruthaccounts, especially in rhe realm of religion, are no longer our narive rongue. Symbols and narrarives may srill be speaking, bur for the mosr part we are meaning-monolinguiscs. Maybe you rhink rhe prosecuror was simply square. Then consider rhis. When you learn rhar che craditional accounts of che Buddha's Life don'r line up well with the hisrorical facrs- or for rhar marrer, when you learn rhar che scriprures' claims ro hisrorical accuracy are false or, ar best, resr on shaky ground-do you fccl you have lose something? When you cake rhose accounrs out of your caregory marked "faces" and put rhcm imo one

marked "stories," did you move them up or dow n-promote or demore rhem? Now, what happens if you rh ink of them as "myr hs"? H ow do you value them now? This is just a su rface symprom of a profou nd and very hard-ro-see problem wirh enormous implicarions for our own self-undersranding and for our poremial ro understand others. For severa) cenruries, rhere has been a rakeover afoor in rhe realm of human meaning. In modern Western culture-and increasingly globally-a cerrain type of racional, cheorerical knowledge has come ro dominare rerritOry that throughour earlier human hisrory was shared with orher modes of knowing, orher forms of rrurh. Cultu ral forms like poerry, music, theater, and an-which are primarily expressions of meaning-have become second-class citizens, pushed ro che m argins and req ui red- like G insberg's poem-to speak

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in che dominam language of facc. Guided by che assumpcions of che modern mindser, ritual, symbol, and myrh can seem nor only inscrutable bur superfluous, even worrhy of conrempc. Wirh chis as our condirion, ir is hard ro imagine how a religious person could slam imo sciemific knowledge and hisrorical facr and come out nor jusr unscathed, bur richer for che experience. Ricoeur's second naivet sounds-frankly-well, naive. Roben Bellah is on ro rhar problem. At rhe rime of che Tricycle imerview, he was already years inro wriring a book rhar would cake up Ricoeur's challenge. Re-

search for meaning, Religion in Human Evolution, was released in 2011. lnsighrful and magisterial, ir is che crowning achievemem of a brilliant scholar who is symparheric ro religion and deeply aeruned ro che problcms of moderniry. Ir is noe ar all self-evidenr ehat a book wirh ehe ride Religion in Human Evolution would be an invicing read for che religiously sensitive. Nor is ir, necessarily. Bellah has written a scholarly, cricical book. He draws on scienrific explanacions amd hisrorical faces ro presem and supporr a new mulrisrranded rheory of religion, one rhar places che human pursuir of

(simple ro complex), cultures (primicive co advanced), or humans (immarure ro marure). The aurhor is aware of rhese connorarions, of course, and he makes some pretty fine disrinccions ro disrance himself from rhem. The bese rhing, 1 rhink, is ro bracket one's objecrions unril che end, and ler Bellah present his case. le will be worrh ir. Bellah sers out ambiriously ro answer che question of where religion came from. He focuses on che evolurion of capacicies in general and more parricularly on our mulrifarious capaciries ro understand che world and find meaning in ir. Bur beca use

flecring on his morivarion for wriring ir,

he said, "My scholarly interese in religion srems from my belief rhar [ir] is rhe primary way we humans have rried ro undersrand che cosmos and ourselves. Seeing how rhar undersranding has changed over rime helps us comprehend where we are now." He called his book in progress a "Bildungsroman of che human race." This "coming-of-age srory" of humanity's

meaning squarely in rhe comexr of our

social hisrory, which in rurn reses in rhe conrexr of our biological and cosmological evolurion. The book rops out ar more rhan 750 pages, and ar rimes ir can be slow going. Many of Bellah's proposirions are comroversial. For example, evolutionary rheory comes loaded wieh progress-myrh baggage, wherher whar is evolving are species

religion is embedded in orher dimensions

of human experience, rhe scope of his rask quickly escalares from ambirious to dizzying. Bellah at firs t faces a kind of un-nesting, akin to a Russian matryoshka doll: ro undersrand religion, we have to open the quescion of society; but to undersrand society, we first have ro open che question of biology; buc ro open biology, we first have ro open the quesrion of cos-

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REVIEWS
mology. Each single leve! in turn can be mulcidimensional: for example, sociecy includes economics, policics, and demogcaphics. Then consider that eaeh dimension changes over time, sending ripples through che others. Bellah tracks these whirling clouds of change against a timeline starting at che Big Bang; he stops just short of the last two millennia- one would imagine, breachless. Bellah focuses in on breakchrough momencs in cultural history- stageshifcs- when new capacities emerged, as when we grew from a primitive stage without language in which we communicated primarily by bodily gestures or basic sounds inco a more complex one wich language and che capacity ro speak, tell stories, and underscand our world wich a new kind of coherence. (Working from che scheme laid out by che evolutionary psychologist Merlin Donald, Bellah calls these stages "mimetic" and "mythic.") Bellah's key interese is che most recenc shift, wh ich, he argues, happened nearly simultaneously in various cultures worldwide about two anda half millennia ago. At that time, what Donald calls "theoretic" culture emerged out of mythic culture. Humans gained che ability co step back and reAect on their myths and cheir experience in a new way; they began ro reflect on thoughc irself, ro critique their social order, and ro imagine alternatives- like spiritual transcendence or social utopas. Bellah uses Karl Jasper's term for chis era, che axial age, and he paints che axial worlds oflsrael, India, Greece, and China in elaborare detail. For each, he illuscraces how che convergence of conditions on multiple levels led co an axial breakthrough, unique ro that culture and time but eerily akin ro axial breakchroughs happening elsewhere. In Bellah 's view, che na cure of evolution as ir applies ro capaciries for human meaning is never "out with che old, in with che new" criumphalism. New modes of understanding always arise in dependence on existing conditions. T heoretic culture arose in dependence on mythic culture, wh ich in turn arose in dependence on mimetic culture. And new capacities don't supersede che old ones. "Norhing is ever lose" is a Bellah signature refrain. Rarher, he insists, when a new capacity arises, ir takes irs place alongside existing capacities; chey work out a new way ro incerrelace and, ro che degree thac chis succeeds, a new inregracion. Theoretic culture didn't get rid of mythic or mimetic cultures; racher, ic caused them to be reorganized and repurposed. Worldviews shift in a similar manner. W hen Buddhjsm arose out oflndia's Vedic religion, che Buddha didn't oust che Vedic view emirely. Racher, he kepc ics key elemems, caking convenrions such as "dharma," "samsara" (and liberation from it), and "karma" out of che service of social status and putting them imo che service of ethics; that is, he told a new story. The Buddha even maincained che ideal of"beinga Brahmn," buche redefined thatstatus from one of caste to one of moral imegrity. The Buddha repurposed ritual to ethical ends in a similar way when, for example, he founded che monastic community.

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Bellah can at rimes seem to be giving a long-winded answer wirhout a quesrion. Throughout che book, you have che sense thar rhere is a !ion of a moral imperarive lurking in che shadows. Occasional rustlings sound, as when he writes, "Technological advance at high speed combined wirh moral blindness abour whar we are doing ro che world's socieries and ro rhe biosphere is a recipe for rapid exrincrion. The burden of proof lies on anyone who would say it is not so." From rime ro rime, a paw extends visibly from rhe bushes, chen rerrears. Bellah srares, "Moderniry is on tria!," bur conrinues, "I cannor in rhis book give an accounr of rhar tria!. All I can

do is call up some very imporram witnesses." Once, che !ion roars. "Sorne have suggesred rhar we are in che midsr of a second axial age, bur if we are, rhere should be a new cultural form emerging. Maybe I am blind, bur I don'r see ir. What I think we have is a crisis ofincoherence anda need ro integrare in new ways che dimensions we have had since che axial age." The "need ro integrare" is clearly che answer (hence deep and wide hisrory); rhe "crisis of incoherence" muse be che question. But rhen, in whar way have we sropped making sense? Ir takes a litde readi ng between che lines, but a sense of che problem begins to emerge. T heory has spun loose fro m our orher modes ofknowing. (Iris wonh noting rhac theory itself is not che problem for Bellah- nor is science. Bellah isn't anti-reason. T he problem is in che spinning loose.) "Once disengaged cheory becomes possible, chen rheory can cake anorher turn: ir can abandon any moral scance ac all and look simply ac what will be useful, whac can make che powerful and exploitarive even more so." T his abandoning of a moral scance in turn sers a srage: "Theory in rhe sense of disengaged knowing, inquiry for rhe sake of understanding, wirh or wirhout moral evaluarion ... has given humans rhe power ro desrroy rheir environmenr and themselves." When rheory gone rogue also becomes rhe only k ind of meaning-making rhar counrs, then we are radically, deeply, and dangerously dislocared. Since theory is rhe source of rrouble here, rhe crisis of incoherence is not going ro be solved by coming up wirh a new

cheory, any more rhan alcoholism could be cured by invenring a new kind of drink. But more than rhat, chis is acrually not a problem on che order of theory, not a problem of rhe ty pe rhat could be corrected wirh more knowledge: new facts, or a convincing argumem. Ir is a problem in self-.undersranding. The correcrion needed is on the order of self-transformarion . And rhat requires a therapeutic processwhich is rhe domain of narrative, of story. "Narrarive is at the heart of our identiry," as Bellah understands ir. "The self is a telling." Personal and social idemiry reside not in our rheories about che world but in our srories. Bellah knows well che difference berween rheory and narrative, and rhe rypes of power each hold. He is well aware rhar myrh ic sensibily is still operating within us (remember, "nothing is ever losr"). Bur Bellah isworkingwithin the convemions ofhis profession. T heory is rhe only authoricative discourse available ro him as a social scienrist. So he does someching tricky, and herein lies brilliance. Using cheory, Bellah tells a new story about theory and, by doing so, shows a way co Ricoeur's second naiver. Employing che rools of hisrory and science, Bellah simultaneously undermines our unexamined con fidence in the absolure aurhoriry of reason and increases our confidence in orher kinds of rrurh. By putting the rise of cheoreric culture in rhe conrext of earlier periods of cultural history, he exposes borh rhe hisrorical contingency of racional knowing and its indebtedness ro, and grounding in, irs genealogical predecessors. Then he demonstrates rhar even in an individual, rhe abiliry ro chink abstracdy comes only aftter enacrive and symbolic knowledge give us somerhing ro rhink absrracdy abour; in chis view of human developmenr, we are firsr embodied knowers, rhen storytellers, and only rhen analyric thinkers. Reason comes not first but lasr-ir is rhe newesr member of an esrablished team, nor rhe caprain but a co-player. Having reorganized our differenr ways of knowing meaning under che metanarrarive of evolution and history, the pasr, our rradirions, "speak again." And we start to be able to hear them. With chis, one recognizes thar che book doesn't just saya lor of rhings; ir does somerhing.

Ir doesn't just tell us how we carne ro be; ir shows us who we are. We srart to be able to emer inro rhese axial worlds, and we resonare wirh rhe character of each as though seeing ir from che inside. Indeed, Bellah admits, "In rhe course of writing rhis book, wh ich is a history of histories, and a srory of srories, I have beco me involved wirh many of rhe stories I recount to che poinc of at least parcial conversion." Upon leaving rhe axial worlds, we return home and see our own world anew-we undersrand in a diffe renr way what ir means to have religion, a belief system, or a worldview. Having a religion is nor like carrying

around a map of true or false proposirions

rhar we hold up againsr realiry. Rarher, meaning systems are embodied and contingem: whac we can think or believe is utterly bounded by whar we can say and do-and what we can think, say, and do al! shape each orher. And furrher, all these possibiliries are shaped by our biology, sociery, and culture. This shift in self-undersranding has implicarions beyond a newfound respecr for rhe myrhs, symbols, and riruals of our own rradirion. As long as we misunderstand rhe narure of our own religion, we will also fail ro undersrand che nature of rhe religions of orhers. If we imagine our religion ro be a ser of stand-alone theories, we will imagine theirs ro be just rheories roo. And, of course, our rheories will be rhe righr ones; theirs, rhe wrong ones. Bur if we can pull off rhis shifr of perspecrive-accomplished nor jusr by learning a new idea bur having a new insighr-"rhat we are all in rhis, with our rheories, yes, bur wirh our practices and scories, rogerher," a new kind of capaciry unfolds ro undersrand rhe world and find meaning in ir. Not a breakrhrough on rhe order of che axial, perhaps, bur ar rhe very leasr, new hope for finding commonaliries, and accommodating and perhaps even appreciating differences. Maybe we will even discover a new understanding of what sameness and difference could mean. Bellah would seem ro be right: religion is, indeed, in evolution. T
Linda Heuman, a Tricycle contributing editor, is a freelance journa list based in Providence, Rhode lsland.

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