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The Masks of Proteus: Russia, Geopolitical Shift and the New Eurasianism

Author(s): Graham Smith


Source: Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, New Series, Vol. 24, No. 4 (1999),
pp. 481-494
Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of The Royal Geographical Society (with the
Institute of British Geographers)
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/623236
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The masks of Proteus: Russia, geopolitical
shift and the new Eurasianism

Graham Smith

Despite the growing interest within international relations theory and political
geography in critical geopolitics, there has been little engagement - other than from
Western perspectives - with the relationship between geopolitics and national
identities in Russia. This article examines this relationship by focusing on the
emergence of Eurasianism within geopolitical discourse, and the manner in which
such representations of Russia as a distinctive Eurasian civilization and power
inform geopolitical thinking, particularly in relation to the shift in Russia's foreign
policy since around early 1993. The article first explores the emergence of competing
geopolitical discourses amongst political opinion-makers before turning to consider
how particular sites - 'the Near Abroad', 'Europe' and 'Asia' - have been officially
reinscripted as part of Russia's understanding of itself as a Eurasian power. The
article draws upon the geopolitical writings of prominent Russian theorists and
statesmen and Russian government policy statements and documents from 1993 to
early 1999.

key words Russia geopolitics Eurasia diaspora Zhirinovsky Zyuganov

manuscript received 25 June 1999

Introduction Party following their successes in the 1993 and


1995 parliamentary elections (and a strong losing
Russia has undergone a significant shift in foreign performance in the 1996 presidential election), to
policy since around 1993. Interpreted as a more end the formation within the parliamentary lower
assertive and nationalistic stance within global house (Duma) of a 'Coalition of Patriotic Forces'
affairs, most commentators attribute this sea made up of both blocks (Malcolm and Pravda
change to Russia's disenchantment with its short- 1996). While this is not always made explicit, there
lived Western orientation in the early 1990s and to is also a general consensus amongst Western
a growing perceived need within foreign-policy- analysts that the reformulation of Russia's foreign
making circles to be more assertive with regard to policy reflects a more systemic crisis of national
national security interests (Tsygankov 1997; identity, of what it means to be Russian following
Mezhuev 1997). This shift in security discourse has the demise of the Soviet homeland (Sovetskaya
also been linked to the Yeltsin administration's rodina)and of the difficulty that many Russians face
attempt politically to outbid both the national- in readjusting to the loss of global superpower
istically bellicose Far Right and the Communist status (Smith 1999a).

Editor's note: Graham Smith finished this paper for Transactionsjust before his tragic death earlier this year. Given
the circumstances,the paper could not be refereed in the normal way, but I am indebted to Mike Bradshaw
(Birmingham),MarkBassin (UniversityCollege London),GerryKearns(Cambridge)and Andrew Wilson (School
of Slavonic and East EuropeanStudies, London) for looking through it, and for their advice and comment. The
paper was written before the recent events in Kosovo. It is published here as a tribute to Graham Smith's
outstandingcontributionto the field of politicalgeographyin general,and to'Sovietstudies in particular.The paper
is followed by an appreciationof Graham'swork by GerryKearns.
TransInst Br GeogrNS 24 481-500 1999
ISSN0020-2754? RoyalGeographicalSociety (with The Instituteof BritishGeographers)1999
482 GrahamSmith
Within Moscow foreign-policy circles, the place global security discourse that welcomed a new
ascribed to Russia within global affairs has become beginning for Russia within world affairs. Based on
increasingly scripted as part of an explicitly geo- abandoning 'the imperial past', it sought to safe-
political discourse based on competing representa- guard Russia's interests through cooperation with
tions of Russia as inextricably bound up, both the West and with its post-Soviet neighbours by
geopolitically and culturally, with the idea of prioritizing its full and active participation in inter-
Eurasia. While the 'Eurasian idea' can be traced national political and economic organizations. The
back to nineteenth-century Slavophilism, since the idea of Russia becoming an equal partner of the
early 1990s it has emerged to occupy a prominent West, working with Atlanticism and sharing its
place within the geographical imagination of security concerns, was rapidly inscribed in official
Russia's intellectuals, politicians and foreign- government discourse. Russia, it was claimed, was
policy-makers - especially in those governmental not only rejoining the West but 'returning to civiliz-
institutions concerned with international affairs, ation', again becoming 'an apprentice of Europe',
notably the Russian Foreign Ministry and Ministry and so connecting up with a Westernizing tradition
of Defence, and the Duma's Geopolitics Com- begun in Russia in the late seventeenth century
mittee. Based on the notion that Russia should under Peter the Great (but which throughout most
follow its distinctive societal and geopolitical path of the twentieth century had been interrupted by
separately from Europe and the West, the 'new state socialism: see Kozyrev 1994; 1998). This new
geopolitics' also accords to Russia, as the self- foreign-policy orientation was considered integral
proclaimed leading Eurasian state, a special role to the country's transition to the market and to
within post-Soviet space. However, while stressing securing vital Western assistance for Moscow's
its distinctiveness as part of Eurasian civilization, domestic reconstruction. As Andrei Kozyrev,
Eurasianists differ in the extent to which they Yeltsin's first minister of foreign affairs, put it, this
emphasize Russia's place within Eurasian civiliz- 'return to civilization ... is about a pragmatic
ation as constituting either a potential cultural and politics, of helping meet the internal needs of
geopolitical bridge between Europe and Asia or Russia' (Izvestiya 2 January 1992). In returning to
simply an alternative to both. In the process, the West, the new geopolitics also heralded a
Eurasianist thinkers have appropriated and distancing from the past. Imperializing practices,
reframed the writings of the self-styled inter-war interpreted as both Tsarist and Soviet, were, for
Eurasianists, a school made up of young Russian Russia's liberals, to become closed chapters in the
diasporic intellectuals based largely in Prague who country's geopolitical history. In abandoning
drew heavily upon both late nineteenth-century empire rebuilding ambitions, what was to be
Slavophile thought and the ideas of Western geo- created was a Russian (Rossiiskii)national state in
politicians. Yet, despite their attempt to redefine which even the idea of the reintegration of the
Russia, as Laqueur notes, surrounding CIS countries was not considered
to be in Russia's national interests (Yakovenko
they [the original Eurasianists]never made it clear 1997).
whetherthey had a real,existingEastor an abstraction Above all, the New Eurasianism has framed
in mind; whether they wanted a synthesisof Europe itself in relation to both Western liberalism and
andAsia or rejectedboth,whethertheirdevotionto the
Atlanticism. But the revival of Eurasianist thinking
Orthodoxchurchwas deeperthantheiradmirationfor
Islamand Buddhism.(Laqueur1993,175) has gone hand in hand with the emergence of
differing normative geopolitical visions of Russia's
While the New Eurasianism embodies a similar relationship with not only 'Europe' and 'the West',
ambiguity, its advocates across the political spec- but also 'the Near Abroad' and 'Asia'.1 Thus
trum share an unease with Russia emulating the understanding Eurasia as a mask for legitimating
West, and with the form of foreign policy that particular stances on foreign policy also entails
Moscow pursued during its so-called 'Western- grasping its importance as a geopolitically
liberal' period of 1991-93. While the sudden and constructed and contested exercise in moral
unplanned end of the Soviet Union might have justification. As O'Tuathail writes more generally,
been expected to have thrown Moscow's practi- To evoke a 'civilization' is to call up a foundational
tioners of statecraft into confusion, in fact what identity, a mystical and mythical transcendental
swiftly emerged during this period was a clear presence that is vague yet absolutely fundamental. To
The masks of Proteus 483
designatea conflicta civilizationalone is to determine Far Right nationalist movements and thinkers,
its characterin a definitiveand totalizingmanner.It especially writers such as Alan de Benoist and the
is to impose a closure upon events, situations,and French Nouvelle Droite.
peoples. (1996,244) In emphasizing Russia's special position as part
This article seeks to unpack how such a civiliz- of a distinctive Eurasian civilization, the New
ational credo is imbued with geopolitical meaning. Right has produced a specific geopolitical theory
It is divided into two parts. The first examines the that informs its vision of Russia's place within the
emergence of the Eurasianist idea as propounded New World Order. Dugin argues that the era of the
by the three most prominent and politically influ- Cold War should not be interpreted simply as an
ential schools of geopolitical thought - those of the ideological struggle between the capitalist West
New Right, Eurasian Communists and Democratic and the socialist East, with the end of communism
Statists - each of which is scripted not only in and the adoption of Western liberalism in Russia
relation to Western liberalism but also in relation to signalling a resolution of these differences. Rather,
each other. The second part examines in more he suggests, what distinguishes Russia from the
detail the dominant role that democratic statism West goes much deeper, and is bound up with
plays in official post-1993 foreign-policy thinking what he calls 'the geopolitical struggle between
and how this specific version of Eurasianism two civilizations'. Consequently, he argues, the
interprets Russia's place in relation to 'the West', neo-liberal regime in Russia has, since 1991, made
'the Near Abroad' and 'Asia', thus helping us to 'a fatal mistake' in not recognizing this enduring
understand how these sites have been produced difference:
geopolitically as part of official discourse. this nationalleadership[since1991]seriouslybelieved
that the abandonmentof Marxistphilosophy would
automaticallylead to the creationof a balancedsystem
in Russiaitself with the active and friendlyparticipa-
Geopolitical discourse and the New tion of the West... [Instead]when geopoliticscame to
Eurasianism the forefront,it was clearto everyonethatthe ColdWar
was not a manifestationof a philosophicalduel of
The Eurasianist New Right ideology but the expressionof a historicalconstant
Since the early 1990s, the so-called New Right has independent of socio-political specifics. This was
as the most and simply one stage of the 'greatwar of the continents'.
emerged intellectually important 26 May 1998, 7)
(Zavtra
politically significant force in geopolitical thinking
within Russian nationalism as a whole. It is In drawing upon the ideas of Mackinder,
particularly associated with two self-styled and Dugin interprets history as a struggle for
influential geopoliticians: Aleksandr Prokhanov global supremacy between continentalism and
(who describes himself as a 'geopolitical novelist') maritimism. Throughout history, he argues, two
and the political geographer Aleksandr Dugin. types of states or empires have existed, each the
Combining popular and pseudo-scholarly writ- antithesis of the other: the continental (tellurokatiya)
ings, most notably giving a respectability to its and the maritime (talassokratiya) (Dugin 1997,
ideas by publishing under the disciplinary 15-19). The former is associated with such great
umbrella of Political Geography,the New Right has powers as the Roman empire and the nineteenth-
expounded its views in such journals as Zavtra century Russian and German empires. Based on a
(Tomorrow) and Elementy: Evraziiskoe Obozrenie spiritual ideology of continentalism, their geo-
(Elements: Eurasian Review). Like inter-war political formation, it is contended, is encapsulated
Eurasianists such as the geographer Peter Savitsky in the idea of a people rooted to the land.
and Nikolai Trubetskoi, who provide much of its Continental empires have tended to act as a posi-
inspiration, the New Right also draws heavily tive and benevolent force throughout geopolitical
upon the geopolitical writings of Halford history, uniting contiguous lands and peoples on a
Mackinder and Karl Haushofer, as well as the largely non-exploitative basis, so providing the
1940s Belgian geopolitician Jean Thiriart.Addition- means for promoting the positive virtues of social
ally, the New Right Eurasianists acknowledge harmony, order and autonomy. As Prokhanov
both their shared political stance and intellectual stresses, Russia's nineteenth-century Eurasian
indebtedness to contemporary Western European Empire was above all a tolerant and benevolent
484 GrahamSmith
polity, which recognized that the Russian Imperial country to be central to the Soviet Union's geopo-
Mission was first and foremost concerned with litical security, a position which earned him the
creating a multi-ethnic rather than mono-ethnic title of the 'nightingale of the general staff' (Hauner
empire. It was, he claimed, an empire that 1990, 222). While both Prokhanov and Dugin con-
respected difference, and in which the spread and tinue to argue the importance of the post-Soviet
promotion of the Orthodox faith did not under- South to Russia's geopolitical security interests, not
mine cultural co-existence as claimed by Western least because of the importance of its oil wealth
historians and geopoliticians. Russia as Eurasian in Transcaucasia and Central Asia, it is through
empire is thus represented as the geographical the more idiosyncratic geopolitical writings of
space in which Russians have for centuries lived in Vladimir Zhirinovsky, leader of the most elector-
harmony not only with the land but also with other ally successful Far Right political party, the Liberal
cultures, promoting neither creolization nor Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR),that the impor-
assimilation. This contrasts with the maritime tance of Russia's southward focus has received
empires, which stretch through time from Carthage most public attention. Indeed, much of the inspira-
to the British empire, and are presently represented tion for his ideas has come from the New Right
by Atlanticism. Throughout history, such spatially geopoliticians. In his book Last thrust to the south,
non-congruent empires have been overly repres- Zhirinovsky envisages Russia's geopolitical influ-
sive, dominated by exploitative and self-interested ence stretching southwards to warm water outlets
metropoles whose inherent commercialism has on the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf, a goal he
been driven by rootless and materialistic cultures describes as a strategic priority in early imperial
(Dugin 1997, 15-22). The United States, as the history. For him, this represents,
embodiment of Atlanticism and 'Russia's eternal
the last thrustto the south.I dreamof Russiansoldiers
enemy', is held to represent the present-day washing theirboots in the warm watersof the Indian
epitome of such an anti-organic, diasporic civiliz- Ocean,and changingpermanentlyinto their summer
ation, lacking any sacred tradition or ethnic roots, uniforms.(Zhirinovsky1993,66)
but with the aim of ensuring the universalization
of its hybrid model. Russia should therefore re-establish its hegemonic
Thus for Dugin, Russia's geopolitical interests geopolitical role towards the South. Like the New
reflect its location at 'the geographical pivot of Right, Zhirinovsky also borrows from Haushofer's
vision of a world divided into four north-south
history' (Dugin 1997, 43-50). As a continental
power, Russia has been continuously engaged in a regions, based on what he claims are the 'natural
struggle for grossraum in Eurasia. As its natural spheres of influence' of the superpowers as a basis
to legitimize 'the natural outcome of the geopoliti-
sphere of influence, it is therefore Russia's manifest cal interests of continentalism and maritimism':
destiny to resecure control over Eurasia again - for a Russian sphere of influence, including
it is only by doing so that it will fulfil its manifest
destiny of becoming a global superpower. More- Afghanistan, Iraq and Turkey; Western Europe
over, by drawing upon Ratzel's organic theory of (with its former African colonies); the United States
the state, Dugin stresses the importance of spatial (including the Americas); and Japan (dominating
Eastern Asia and Australia). He writes:
expansion for the renewal of Russian national
identity, which he suggests will only be achieved Regionalco-operationis better,divisioninto spheresof
by it reclaiming its rightful place at the pivot of influenceis better,and by the principleof north-south
Eurasian space. Spatial expansion is, therefore, ... We must come to an agreementthat we divide the
deemed to be a legitimate strategy, not only whole planet,with spheresof economicinfluence,and
because it is inseparable from Russia's national operateon a north-southaxis. (quotedin Solovyovand
renewal and dignity, but also because it serves as Klepikova1995,157)
an essential defensive stratagem and bulwark The road to restoring Russian dignity and geo-
against Atlanticism. political security as in the past, therefore, leads
As part of this project, the post-Soviet South south. In the process, Russia can provide stability
occupies a special place for the New Right. During and order amongst 'southerners', whose clan-
the 1980s, Prokhanov, an outspoken advocate of based social structures are interpreted as the
Moscow's continuing intervention in Afghanistan, enduring cultural markers that distinguish
considered the presence of Soviet troops in that Russians from the Eurasian South, and whose very
The masks of Proteus 485
social condition has a tendency to encourage the global power of Atlanticism. It is therefore only
organized crime, social disorder and ethnic conflict through striking an alliance with Western Europe's
(Andreev 1996). major powers against the maritime powers of the
While the New Right's principle adversary is US and Britain that Russia will be able to weaken
Atlanticism, the major geopolitical and cultural the geopolitical and economic hold that the United
threat to Eurasianism is interpreted as far broader States currently possesses over global affairs
and more all-encompassing, an idea captured in (Tsymburski 1997, 74).
the concept of 'mondialism' (Edinyimir). Employed The New Right argues that Russia can only
by New Right Eurasianists as shorthand for gradually realize its putative place as a Eurasian
globalization, cosmopolitanism and both liberal power within the 'new millennium world order'. A
and socialist internationalism, mondialism is political revolution of 'patriotic forces', made up of
held to emanate from Western-based practices of a so-called 'brown-red alliance' (the Far Right and
'chauvinistic cosmopolitanism' (as was first argued Communist parties), Dugin argues, would have
by the 1920s Eurasianists: Neumann 1996, 112). As disastrous consequences for Russia. Not only
part of a carefully orchestrated and ongoing sub- would it result in an Atlanticist backlash in which
versive strategy to undermine Eurasianism and financial support for Russia's economic recovery
further weaken Russia, it is claimed that mondial- and access to international trade would be severely
ism also has its 'fifth columnists' within Russia affected, but also the rise to power of such patriotic
itself. Both Gorbachev and Yeltsin, as purported forces by revolutionary means would lead to the
agents of mondialism, are considered to have country's imminent geopolitical fragmentation, as
ensured the fragmentation of Russia as a Eurasian the non-Russian ethnorepublics, such as Chechnya,
power and undermined its cultural distinctiveness, Tatarstan,Bashkortostan and Sakha, would choose
at last enabling the West to fulfil its twentieth- to abandon membership of the Russian Federation.
century mission of colonizing the material and Consequently, 'Russia's geopolitical position
cultural life of Russia. The long-term aim of would not only not improve but would most likely
Western-led cosmopolitanism is, therefore, envis- deteriorate' (Zavtra26 May 1998, 7). The preferred
aged as the creation of a homogenous one-world course is Russia's gradual movement towards 'a
civilization that will be the mirror image of the Eurasianist position', based on a dual strategy, one
West, and which threatens to lead to the wholly domestic, the other foreign:
undesirable end-stage of a global federal
government (Dugin 1997, 585). It would not be accompaniedby radicalslogansor the
Russia's geopolitical mission should, therefore, declarationof a new course. Rather,the authorities
be to unite anti-mondialist forces against would activelyand extensivelypracticea doublestand-
ard,outwardlycontinuingto declaretheircommitment
Atlanticism, including mobilizing the support of to democraticvalues, but inwardly - economically,
the 25 million Russians living in the Near Abroad,
culturallyand socially - to revive by degree the pre-
as well as other forces both inside and outside the
requisitesof global autarky,so followingthe post-war
Soviet Union's former territories, notably the exampleof Germanyand Japan.(Zavtra26 May 1998,
countries of the Islamic Near and Middle East. 7)
Prokhanov in particular echoes the views of many
New Rightists in arguing that Atlanticism has long Thus the post-liberal era in Russia will ultimately
attempted unsuccessfully to use the promotion of lead to,
Islam as a buttress against Russia fulfilling its
Eurasianist mission, especially its expansion to the the processof a gradualEurasianrevival,a normaliz-
South. It is therefore only by recognizing their ation of the historicalcourse,and a recognitionof the
common adversary that Russia and Islam will be need of a unique cultural, geopolitical, and socio-
able to check Atlanticism. However, the New Right economicpath for Russia.
also draws a firm geopolitical distinction between
the United States and continental Europe. A What would be established would be:
revolution of the New Right in Western Europe, a kind of Eurasiancapitalism... [thatcombines]mod-
especially in Germany, is considered central to erate and limited socialism [with] clearly expressed
securing the necessary harmony and coexistence patriotic underpinnings ... based on an appeal to
between the continental powers in order to usurp traditionalvalues, to eternalEurasianconstants.
486 GrahamSmith
Eurasian communism sharing the same political space with its Slavic
In contrast to the New Right, those who subscribe brethren in Ukraine and Belarus, Russians in the
to a neo-Soviet or communist vision of Russia Near Abroad and those other peoples and cultures
take as their reference point and golden age a who value communism. In short, neo-Sovietism
Russia embodied within the Soviet homeland envisages Russia returning to a socialist Eurasian
(Sovetskaya rodina). Juxtaposed in particular to homeland. Its pale present shadow, the Russian
Russia's experiences since the fall of communism, republic, is considered to be neither 'historical' nor
the Soviet era is represented with nostalgia as a 'ethnic Russia'. Its boundaries are 'unnatural'. The
positive period in history that provided Russians 'weak' and 'subservient' Russia of today is des-
with international respect and pride in their tined to 'disappear' (Zyuganov 1995b). In wanting
country's achievements. Besides blaming its 'to provide conditions for the gradual restoration
economic, moral and global decline on Western of a Union-state on a voluntary basis', Zyuganov's
capitalism (and the United States in particular), the stance is consistent with the actions in 1996 of the
neo-Soviet version directs its animosity towards Communists in the Duma who voted to renounce
liberal intellectuals and the Russian nouveau riche. the Belavezha accords of 7-8 December 1991
It is only by returning to communism and fulfilling (which recognized the formal dissolution of the
its geopolitical destiny as a Eurasian power that Soviet homeland).
Russia will be strong enough to stand up to the Three aspects are crucial to defining and legiti-
West (see in particular Zyuganov 1994; 1995a; mizing Eurasian communism. Firstly, there is its
1995b). The main organizational force behind neo- relationship to homeland-patriotism. Throughout
Sovietism is the Communist Party of the Russian the Soviet era, it is argued, there was a constant
Federation (CPRF), which emerged out of the struggle within the Communist Party to decide
Russian Communist Party, a hard-line group who legitimately represented the Russian home-
founded by opponents of Gorbachev in 1990, land. For Zyuganov, this is framed in terms of a
banned after the August 1991 putsch and legalized binary struggle between patriotic forces supportive
again by a constitutional court ruling in late 1992. of nasha strana (our country) and those of ta strana
Combining unreconstructed class politics with (that country), whose homeland-patriotic creden-
nationalist rhetoric, 'the real success of the CPRF's tials deviated from the path of reflecting the true
rejuvenation has undoubtedly been grounded in its interests and cultural values of the Russian nation.
encapsulation and embodiment of the nationalist The former is symbolized by particular events and
cause in Russia' (Lester 1997, 36). people: the 1917 October Revolution, the Great
The Communist Party's most important geo- Patriotic War, the Space Race, and its patriots,
politician is its leader, Gennadii Zyuganov, who Joseph Stalin, Marshal Zhukov (hero of the Second
has headed the CPRF since 1993, and has written World War) and Yurii Gagarin. It is these symbolic
extensively on what he labels 'the new geopolitics'. representations of communism who, Zyuganov
Zyuganov has drawn on the ideas of Mackinder argues, stand for the true qualities and social
and others to envisage Russian history since its values of the Russian people and who in their
early medieval origins in Kievan Rus as a constant deeds and actions put the homeland first. This is
struggle to secure its natural hegemonic position as also a vision that is associated with Russia fighting
a Eurasian continental power. Russia's key present- against the odds, overcoming economic backward-
day geopolitical battle is therefore to resist capital- ness through the rapid industrialization of the
ist globalization, which can only be achieved 1930s, urbanizing and taming the Siberian wilder-
through returning to the communist path and so ness and defeating fascism. This patriotic heroism
securing the economic and military strength to contrasts with ta strana,defined through its connec-
resist the West. So, while state-directed moderniz- tions with cosmopolitanism, dogmatic Marxism
ation through the renationalization of the economy and national minorities, particularly the Jews, who
and a return to socialist welfarism are important undermined the greatness of the homeland: those
goals, any such programme of economic recovery communists who put their individual careers
should not come at the expense of Russia's geo- before the Russian national interest, Soviet leaders
political security. Above all, its geopolitical mission after the death of Stalin who initiated nationality
is to connect up historically with the idea of Russia policies designed to curtail the celebration and
as a Great Power (Derzhava),a synonym for it again greatness of the Russian people, and above all
Themasksof Proteus 487
those individuals who in the last few years of since time immemorial been based on collectivism
Soviet rule turned their back on Russia by embrac- and sobornost'.
ing the policies of Western cosmopolitanism. Finally, for Zyuganov, the new geopolitics is
Indeed, as with the New Right, it is the forces of about re-establishing a communist Eurasia through
liberal-cosmopolitanism within present-day Russia voluntary reincorporation. Yet this contains its
that form a vital ingredient of Zyuganov's con- own internal contradictions: although it extols the
spiracy theory, in which much of the rage gener- virtues of incorporation, embracing universalistic
ated by the collapse of 'the socialist fatherland' is aspirations of an 'international brotherhood' based
directed against what is interpreted as the grand on the idea of equality between nations within a
American plan, supported by Russian liberals and common Eurasian homeland, it also regards social-
'pseudo-communists', to break up the Soviet ism as a singularly Russian idea and aim. As the
Union and weaken Russia. 'Our fatherland', claims motherland of socialism, Russia is deemed to be
Zyuganov, 'is being torn away from us ... every- the socialist archetype and its nation 'the agent for
thing is being stolen and sent abroad by insatiable remaking history'. The 1917 revolution is inter-
predators' (SovetskayaRossiya 9 March 1996). The preted as specifically Russian, reflecting the innate
West's aim, in conjunction with 'compradors ... superior socialist values of the Russian people
native agents of foreign enterprise', is to create (Pravda 25 June 1994). Among the post-Soviet
conditions whereby Russia becomes merely a raw nations, Russia, it is argued, is destined to lead the
material colony of the West. Russia's present-day way in re-establishing socialism - thus coexisting
liberal reformers, it is further contended, have been uneasily with the theme of international brother-
duped into believing that capitalism is in the best hood is that of Russia's national greatness.
interests of the Russian homeland when in fact it Although the core aim is to rebuild a socialist
will reduce it to the rank of a third-world state. Eurasia, this project is dependent upon strengthen-
This is also a world view that singles out elements ing Russian statehood, for 'the Russian people
within the Jewish diaspora as playing an instru- should bind together all nations and people by
mental role in influencing Western affairs, and, as their common historical destiny'. The appeal of this
an integral part of a Western capitalist Judeo- largely unreconstructed form of Communism
Christian civilization, as antithetical to Russian therefore relies on re-establishing Russian
cultural values and interests. hegemony. Just as with the formation of the Soviet
Secondly, for Zyuganov, the Russian nation Union, the restorationist political order would be a
is constructed as primordially communist, an specifically Russian achievement, with the recon-
association that predates the 1917 Bolshevik stituted socialist Eurasian homeland constructed
Revolution. Indeed, it is claimed that, as a primor- on the basis of the Russian nation as 'first among
dial quality of the Russian nation, communist equals'.
values stretch back 2000 years and 'are in tune with
the age-old Russian traditions of community and
Democratic statism: official Eurasianism
collectivism, and in keeping with the fundamental
interests of the Fatherland' (SovetskayaRossiya 19 Democratic statists (gosudarstvenniki), so called
March 1996). The distinctiveness of the Russian because of their advocacy of combining the idea of
nation therefore rests on it being quintessentially a strong state with a commitment to Western-style
communist in orientation, on the innate belief in democracy, hold a vision of Russia that has come to
the importance of collectivism and 'the communal reflect a hybrid or compromise drawing upon a
spirit' (sobornost')as inextricably bound up with combination of Western liberalism and neo-
Russianness. For Zyuganov, Russia differs from nationalism to produce a syncretic geopolitical
European civilization in that capitalism remains discourse. Democratic statists see Russia as a dis-
alien to its culture. Bourgeois values and market tinctive civilization, different from the West in its
individualism, it is contended, are both foreign and cultural values and geopolitical security concerns
unsuited to the Russian mentalite,not least because and interests. It is envisaged as a Eurasian power
until the 1990s Russians were innocent of 'the sin whose role is to organize and stabilize the Eurasian
of ownership'. Thus the homeland is held to be a heartland, so operating as a bridge between
space of and for communism because it is occupied Europe and Asia. Thus the goal of Russia should be
by a people whose inherent cultural values have to ensure:
488 GrahamSmith
and furtherdevelopment
the culturalself-preservation erroneous conclusion that Russia should return
of nationaltraditionsand co-operationamong Slavic, inward ... thereby openly and publicly renouncing any
Turkic,Caucasian,Finno-Ugric,Mongolianand other special rights and interests in the post-Soviet space
peoples of Russia within the frameworkof Eurasian outside the Russian Federation ... However, the events
national-culturalspace. (Rossiiskayagazeta 10 July that occurred in Russia and in the republics during
1996,5) 1992 made some serious adjustments in the under-
The new world order does not, therefore, automati- standing of Russia's role and place in the post-Soviet
space ... A significant proportion of the political estab-
cally imply that Russian interests would converge lishment ... began to realize more and more clearly
with those of the West, but nor should it simply that a special role in the post-Soviet space belonged to
adopt an anti-Western stance. Instead, it must play Russia. (Nezavisimayagazeta 12 January 1994, 4)
a more active, even interventionist, role within
Moscow decision-makers began to represent the
post-Soviet Eurasian space, in order to protect its
own geopolitical interests, especially those of Near Abroad as crucial to Russian geopolitical
interests. The Near Abroad, as a politically con-
regional stability. Statists accept Russia's new geo-
structed spatial boundary-marker distinguishing it
political borders, remain steadfast in their commit-
ment to market reform and wish to see Russia from 'the Far Abroad', has been rescripted in four
distinctive ways. This space is bound up with
playing a full and active part within the world
Russia's past greatness, its geopolitical security,
economy. Although statism is uneasy about
Atlanticism as a geopolitical project, it is pragmatic its economic interests and the well-being of its

enough to recognize that Russia must work with diaspora.


the West, and that it is in its interests to cooperate
with Western-dominated international organiz- Derzhava (Great Power status) Eurasian statists
ations. Thus statists have recast a role for Russia signal the way in which the Near Abroad is bound
within global affairs (Neumann 1997). Rather than up with Russia retrieving its great powerness or
national of Russia's
retreating into geopolitical isolation or confronta- greatness. Any abrogation
tion with the West head-on whenever differences responsibilities towards the Near Abroad is judged
are at stake, Russia has shown a willingness to as antithetical to Russia regaining its place as a
recast itself as 'political broker' between the United global superpower. Russia can therefore emerge as
States and its so called 'rogue states', as in the case a superpower only by abandoning the rudderless
of Iraq in December 1998 and Kosovo in April 1999 policy that it had pursued during the early 1990s,
(Rossiiskayagazeta 1 April 1999). by reforging closer ties with its erstwhile Soviet
The manner in which statists perceive Russia's neighbours. The fact that Russia had abandoned its
redefined role as a Eurasian power - in particular moral and political responsibilities as Eurasia's
how specific spaces and cultures ('the Near regional policeman was also deemed to be contrary
Abroad', 'the West' and 'Asia') have been geo- to its long-standing benevolent relationship with
the borderlands. With the retrieving of great power
politically produced - and why such a discourse
has come to occupy a central place within foreign- status inextricably bound up with reinstating
Russia's 'natural sphere of influence', what is
policy-making circles can now be examined.
deemed to be important is what the post-Soviet
The Near Abroad states share in common, rather than what divides
Until late 1992, Russia had what it them - a relationship which can only be based on
largely ignored
dubbed the countries of the 'Near Abroad' (blizhnee cooperation and trust. While the Yeltsin adminis-
zarubezhe). The subsequent shift in thinking in tration has not fully explained how the Near
Russian foreign-policy circles reflected a growing Abroad is to play a role in ensuring Russia's place
unease over events in some of the borderland as a Eurasian power, the gosudarstvennikiare clear
states. As Andrannik Migranyan, one of Yeltsin's that fulfilling Russia's role as 'a great power' is
advisors on foreign policy, put it, different from behaving as 'an imperial power':

As a resultof miscalculationsin assessingthe role and the former constituting the legitimate pursuit of state
place of Russiaand the deep-seatednatureof relations interests towards its neighbours within the norms and
betweenRussiaand the countriesof the Near Abroad, expectations of the state system, the latter constituting
officialsof the Russian Foreign Ministry and other a policy of domination standing outside these norms.
political leaders in the country drew the strategically (Beissinger 1995, 167)
The masks of Proteus 489

Geopolitical security The Near Abroad has Common economic space While in the early 1990s
become viewed as bound up with the permeabil- Moscow emphasized the pragmatic need for con-
ity of borders, both in terms of Russia's 'internal' tinuing economic ties between Russia and the Near
and 'external' security, in which certain political Abroad under the auspices of the Commonwealth
flashpoints within the borderlands may pose of Independent States (CIS), the idea of the re-
a potential threat to Russia's internal security. integration of the surrounding CIS countries was
Russia should therefore intervene to ensure the not considered to be in Russia's national interests
de-escalation of conflicts that could imperil its (Yakovenko 1997). To have done so would have
geopolitical interests or spill over into Russia been tantamount to a 'return to the burden of
proper. In the mid-1990s, in particular, at the empire' (Yakovenko 1997). From 1993 onwards,
height of the war in Chechnya, a geopolitically however, Moscow began to emphasize the impor-
unstable Near Abroad - especially in Transcau- tance of the CIS not only as a means of facilitating
casia - fuelled fears of the Russian Federation closer economic and political integration within
itself succumbing to Balkanization. This included post-Soviet space but also as a way of giving
concern over the escalation of disputes in civil- Russia a higher profile within global economic
war-torn Georgia, notably secessionist struggles affairs. In taking the lead in 1995 in setting up a
in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. In keeping with fast-track customs union with Kazakhstan and
this line, Moscow began to talk about the need to Belarus (extended to include Kyrgyzstan in 1997
deploy troops in the Near Abroad for the pur- and Tajikistan in 1999), Yeltsin was adamant
poses of peacekeeping. In rescripting security that:
concerns, statists also began to borrow the
language and metaphors of geopolitics of the Russia'smain foreignpolicy priorityis the consistent
neo-nationalists (Baev 1997). Moscow now talked promotionof integrationprocessesin the CIS frame-
about 'a geopolitical vacuum' and fears of 'geo- work. This is a vital economic, humanitarianand
vesti1 June1996)
politicalinterestof ours. (Rossiiskie
political isolation' within 'Eurasian political
space', and about the need to reassert Russia's While liberal-Westernizers in Russia continue to
'natural sphere of influence' over the Near balk at the economic costs of continuing to subsi-
Abroad. In redefining the Near Abroad as pivotal dize many CIS member states, and neo-nationalists
to Russia's geopolitical security, Moscow was sig- see such an organization as an opportunity for
nalling the emergence of a new Russian Monroe Russia's return as a Eurasian geopolitical power,
Doctrine, or what has been dubbed the 'Yeltsin democratic statists view the idea of 'deeper inte-
Doctrine'. But defining the Near Abroad as a
gration' and the eventual creation of 'an economic
security concern is also bound up with delimiting confederation' as having mutual economic and
those who do not belong, namely anxiety about
geopolitical benefits for Russia and the other
the growing influence of some Far Abroad coun- member states. As Yevgenii Primakov, while
tries within the Near Abroad. Besides the security
Foreign Minister, put it:
of its Western borders in relation to NATO expan-
sion, Russia fears the growing influence of Islamic Moscow must do everything it can to bring the
fundamentalism on its southern rim. Moscow has 'states on the territoryof the former Soviet Union'
therefore been prepared to intervene in the affairs closer togetherthrougheconomicintegrationand the
'creationof a single economicarea'.(Goble1998)
of the Near Abroad (as in the civil war in
Tajikistan) when militant Islam is judged to be a
potential threat to Eurasian security, especially in Diasporic space The Near Abroad is also repre-
relation to stability in the Muslim ethnorepublics sented as the space in which the Russian diaspora
of Chechnya, Dagestan and Tatarstan. Such fears reside. Since 1992, the fate of Russians living in the
prompted Russia, in May 1998, to sign an agree- borderland states has emerged as a major focus of
ment with the Central Asian states of Uzbekistan concern. Having recognized the sovereignty of the
and Tajikistan. As presidential spokesman Sergei borderland republics, Russia had initially 'con-
Yastrzhembsky, put it, the 'troika' is dedicated ceded defacto to rendering Russians living in these
'above all to political co-operation ... in the areas as foreigners' (Dunlop 1997, 37). But Moscow
struggle with [Islamic] fundamentalism' (Rossi- subsequently began to express concern that 'in the
iskayagazeta 7 May 1998). territory of the former USSR we are, in effect,
490 GrahamSmith
seeing a restoration of the principle of ethnocracy against what Moscow views as that country's
and the formation of ethnocratic states', a tendency increasingly inflexible attitude towards its large
which 'is asserting itself throughout post-Soviet Russian minority. Support for Near Abroad
space ... from the Europeanized Baltic regions to Russians is also reflected in Moscow's policy of
the clan societies of Central Asia' (Andreev 1996, earmarking public funds for what it prefers to
105). Within some of the borderland states, notably call 'humanitarian aid' (Rossiiskayagazeta 10 July
Moldova, Estonia, Latvia and Ukraine, statists 1996, 5).
were calling for Moscow to play a more active and The idea of Russia as the homeland of the
interventionist role in supporting those 'who have Russians has therefore been reinvented (Smith
essentially been abandoned to the vagaries of fate' 1999b). By offering citizenship to all those who
(Andreev 1996, 112). While in the initial years of have a connection - ethnic or historical - with the
Russian statehood, the plight of Russians in the homeland, Russia has sought to redefine the
Near Abroad had been championed by neo- boundaries of the nation, while at the same time
nationalists, Moscow foreign-policy-makers now acknowledging the inviolability of the borderland
also began to think about their ethnic brethren states' sovereign spaces. This differs from the
outside Russia and the way in which they were stance adopted by the neo-nationalists, who do not
being castigated as 'colonizers' and 'occupiers'. accept that Russians in the borderlands should be
Indeed, concern for ethnic Russians in the Near politically separated from Russia, arguing instead
Abroad is now at the forefront of Russia's foreign that they should be reunited with their brethren
policy. The introduction of exclusionary citizenship within a common political homeland. Moscow's
legislation in Estonia (1992) and Latvia (1994) renewed willingness to protect Russians in the
prompted Moscow to level highly charged accusa- Near Abroad does not, however, mean that it
tions of 'social apartheid' and 'ethnic cleansing' wishes to encourage 'return migration'. In the
against these countries. Russia also threatened to current economic climate, it is recognized that a
impose trade embargoes and other economic sanc- large-scale migration to Russia could have disas-
tions, and signalled its unwillingness to withdraw trous economic and social consequences for the
troops from the Baltic states until their govern- country (Zevelev 1996). Rather, statists have
ments respected what Russia termed 'the end of attempted to protect members of the nation with-
human rights abuses' (Smith 1996). The Yeltsin out either encouraging the grand gathering-in of
administration was now in no doubt that 'the Russians or calling for the establishment of a
twenty-five million of our compatriots in these homeland-empire.
countries must not be forgotten' (Nezavisimaya
gazeta 1 January 1994).
In referring to Russians outside Russia as 'com- The retreatfrom Atlanticism
patriots abroad', Russian statists signal an impor- From the mid-1990s onwards, important changes
tant change in Moscow's thinking on citizenship. in attitudes towards the West began to emerge.
Although the state is still prepared to offer citizen- This sea change was largely a reaction to 'the
ship to any former Soviet citizen residing in the construction of a new wall in Europe along the
Near Abroad, what now clearly concerns Russia wall between the CIS and those states bent
most is ethnic Russians. Such a policy shift high- on applying for EU and NATO membership'
lights Russia's envisaged role as the historic home- (Neumann 1996). What concerned Moscow in
land of the Russians. For the vykhodtsy('those who particular were Western proposals to expand
have left'), Russia is deemed to be their 'natural' NATO's frontiers eastwards, initially to include
homeland (otechestvo).The upshot is that Russians three new members - Poland, Hungary and the
in the Near Abroad have become a central concept Czech Republic - but with the further prospect of
in defining Russian national identity, with Russia membership for the Baltic states as well. This
being the 'historic homeland' of all Russians and meant not only that what once constituted Russia's
Moscow making it clear that it has responsibilities vital sphere of influence was now being usurped
and obligations to protect their well-being. by its traditional military adversary, the United
Moscow has therefore made periodic calls for States, but that such a military alliance was
action against recalcitrant borderland regimes, expanding to the very borders of Russia, threaten-
most recently in 1998 against Latvia, to protest ing its security. NATO's proposals shattered what
The masks of Proteus 491
Russia had envisaged as the prospects of building a power house, uniting the Europeansin a major
a common political and security system stretching militarybloc and othertrans-Atlanticstructuresunder
from 'Vancouver to Vladivostok'. In a 1994 speech America'saegis,a centre,whichbringsorderand peace
in Budapest, Yeltsin indicated his disquiet over into this chaoticworld.Withperceptionslike this, why
should Europeansopen theirarmsto Russiaand stand
NATO's proposed expansion by asserting that
up to the United States?For us, too, it would be an
'Europe has not yet freed itself from the heritage of unforgivable mistake to seek rapprochementwith
the Cold War and is now in danger of lunging into
Europe with a view to harming the United States.
a Cold War peace' (Rossiiskayagazeta 7 December (Nezavisimayagazeta 31 December 1997)
1994). This growing mistrust of the West's geo-
Rather, as Primakov put it,
political intentions not only showed Moscow that
its geopolitical interests were no longer necessarily Initially,Russia'spolicy was one of 'strategicpartner-
the same as those of the Atlantic Alliance, but ship'with the UnitedStates... a structurein whichone
that Russia now needed to play a more assertive country(the US) led the otherswas graduallycreated
role in its relations with the United States in ... This is not what Russiawants. We want equitable
co-operationeven though we realizethat we are now
particular. weakerthanthe UnitedStates.I thinkwe have secured
Although statists recognize that Russia's geo- such an objective... The world is becoming accus-
political interests differ from the West's, Moscow tomed to the fact that we haveour distinct identity.This is
continues to operate pragmatically. It acknowl- very important.(Izvestiya23 December1997,emphasis
edges that Russia no longer possesses the super- added)
power status of the Soviet Union. Nor has it the While no longer viewing the West as an adversary,
capacity to recreate the bipolar world of yesteryear: statists have lost neither Russia's anti-Western
it must adjust to being part of a multipolar world
instincts nor its desire to find a new identity for
made up of competing but coexisting global power
itself distinct from the West.
blocs. Statists also see the need to take into account
the stark reality of the country's economic fortunes
being dependent on the goodwill of the West. In Asia: guarded rapprochement
return for accepting US plans for NATO expansion, There is a general perception within Moscow
Moscow secured the establishment in 1997 of the foreign-policy circles that Russia's centre of balance
NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council under the has moved eastwards, towards Asia, in part as a
NATO-Russia Founding Act, which was intended result of the establishment of the six European
to provide a new security framework for the whole post-Soviet borderland states (Kerr 1995). While
of Europe, thus going at least some way towards Moscow has long seen its presence in Asia as
reconciling Moscow's fears of the West as a threat synonymous with its status as a world power, a
to its national security. But cooperation does not growing rapprochement with its immediate Pacific
preclude a firm, aggressive policy of defending neighbours is now regarded as crucial to the
Russia's own national interests (Matveyev 1995, country's material prosperity, especially to opening
32). Indeed, one consequence of US-led NATO up Asiatic Russia (or Siberia). Probably more than
expansionism has been to raise once again the in the late Tsarist period, Russia's vision of itself in
spectre of Russia adopting different stances Asia is more material than cultural or spiritual
towards the United States and Europe. Many (Clover 1999). In short, Moscow recognizes that
statists have increasingly embraced the rhetoric of this region has the potential to give Russia the
the neo-nationalists by representing the United status of an economic superpower. Above all, Asia
States as 'the reborn Cold War Other'. Europe, in was a geopolitical project for imperial Russia
contrast, is redefined as 'the good West' because of rather than the basis of an imagined community
its perceived sensitivity towards Russia's regional grounded in Russians' identifying themselves as
security concerns. Yet, for many statists, this is both European and Asian.
tantamount to a policy of divide and perish. As the Statists have not been slow to realize that Russia
deputy chairman of the lower house of the Russian must provide the necessary conditions for its
parliament put it, Pacific neighbours to participate in opening up the
region's economic opportunities. This has meant
Objectively, most European countries share the recognizing that Russia must strike a balance
Americanconceptwherebythe world is a singlecentre, between its broader geopolitical concerns in
492 GrahamSmith
eastern Asia and the need to attract outside capital. Conclusions
In this regard, Japan is recognized as offering
the greater potential. Since 1997 in particular, 'Eurasia' may now be the key term in Russian
Russo-Japanese relations have shown signs of geopolitical discourse, but, as Laqueur has argued,
there are many possible Eurasias. One version
improvement. The major obstacle to closer ties has
been the territorial dispute over the Kurile Islands, imagines Russia as a cultural and geopolitical
which the Soviet Union annexed from Japan after bridge between the continents of Europe and Asia
the Second World War. Yet while neo-nationalists (Neumann 1996). Like Slavophilism, Eurasianism
in Russia view the islands as an inviolable part of was originally a product of the nineteenth century,
of 'a redirected Russian nationalism that had been
Russia, the Yeltsin administration has adopted a
more flexible stance, offering the prospect that rebuffed by Europe, and a growing consciousness
some arrangement might be forthcoming over the of Russia's presence and opportunity in Asia'
ownership and administration of the islands. A (Kristof 1968, 369). This was a vision of Russia
similar rapprochement has occurred with China. forged by the country's colonization of Asia, by its
Because of Russia's initial orientation towards the southern and eastward expansion during the
nineteenth century into the Caucasus and Central
capitalist West, Beijing treated the new Russia with
Asia and the consolidation of its hold over Siberia.
suspicion, viewing it as 'the gravedigger of com-
munism'. Since the mid-1990s, however, Sino- However, as Greenfeld notes, the Eurasian
Russian relations have improved considerably and vision, the process of looking inward towards the
are now better than at any time since the 1950s. In unique local synthesis of cultural values, was also
part, this is linked to a new confidence amongst inextricably bound up with a view of the West as
China's political elites. For the first time in the the anti-model:
twentieth century, China has surpassed Russia in It was ressentiment
[of Europe],not socialconcerns,that
economic development. More importantly, its fuelled Russian national consciousness,and it was
northern neighbour no longer represents the geo- not sympathyfor the peasantry,thatmade
ressentiment,
political threat that it did during Soviet times. Both the peasanta symbolof the Russiannation.(Greenfeld
countries have also come to recognize the mutual 1992,258)
benefits that flow from cross-border trade and
labour exchange. In an attempt to facilitate move- Moreover, while many nineteenth-century Russian
ment across the Sino-Russian border, major imperialists embraced a vision of Russia's frontiers
defence agreements were signed in 1997 in which extending to Constantinople and even India,
the two countries agreed not only to respect their Russia's actual historical relationship with Asia
common border but also to ensure its demilitariz- has been an ambivalent one, with imperial hauteur
ation. Southern Siberia, in particular, has been a just as important in shaping relations as cultural
cross-fertilization. For example, Hauner notes 'the
major economic beneficiary, as Chinese traders
have seized upon the economic opportunities that almost unlimited capacity among Russians to
this region offers. Such developments, however, identify themselves with Asia while showing their
have not been without their critics, as they have contempt for the Asian peoples and civilizations as
rekindled Russian fears of Siberia's vast under- utterly barbaric' (Hauner 1990, 2).
More typical of today's Eurasianism, therefore,
populated expanses providing lebensraum for
Chinese economic and geopolitical ambitions are those thinkers who, by rejecting both European
and Asian experiments with state-building, see
(Tsepkalo 1998). Yet the influx of Chinese settlers
into Siberia's southern rim has not been enough of Russia in exceptionalist terms and argue that a
an issue to hamper progress towards a new Sino- prosperous future can only be secured by promot-
Russian detente. As much as anything else, it is ing a 'third way'. As Borodaj, a leading spokes-
increasing mistrust of the United States and resent- person for neo-Slavophile ideology, proclaims,
ment at what is seen as its high-handed behaviour
we have to seek our directionbetweenthe Eastand the
in Asia that has helped to facilitate what many in West as it corresponds to our spiritual and geopolitical
Moscow and Beijing hope will become 'a new
position in the world. Not Western individualism
strategic partnership' forming an 'alternative pole' with its imposed sociality ... [n]or on the other hand,
to Atlanticism in global geopolitics (Ferdinand the Asiatic cults with monolithic sociality, where the
1997). individual is nothing ... We have to create the
The masks of Proteus 493
Orthodox confession and the corresponding life and Hauner M 1990 Whatis Asia to us? Russia'sAsian heartland,
economy. This is our third path. (Borodajand Nikiforov yesterdayand today Unwin Hyman, London
1995, 110) Kerr D 1995 The new Eurasianism: the rise of geopolitics
in Russia's foreign policy Europe-AsiaStudies47 977-88
Finally, and more ominously, this cultural and Kozyrev A 1994 Preobrazhenie[Transformation] Mezhd-
geopolitical uniqueness is also held to be charac- unarodnie otnosheniya, Moscow
teristic of the post-Soviet space as a whole. Modern - 1998 Russia and the world's new security agenda
Eurasianism assumes that the global resurgence of InternationalRelations14 41-9
the region as an imagined whole is in essence the Kristof L 1968 The Russian image of Russia: an
same thing as the resurgence of its Russian/East applied study in geopolitical methodology in Fisher A
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abroads still positions Russia itself in the central 345-87
pivotal space. Laqueur W 1993 Blackhundred:the rise of the extremeRight
in Russia Harper Collins, New York
Lester J 1997 Overdosing on nationalism: Gennadi
Zyuganov and the Communist Party of the Russian
Note Federation New Left Review 221 34-53
Malcolm N and Pravda A 1996 Democratization and
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Russian foreign policy InternationalAffairs72 537-52
describe the other 14 republics of the former Soviet
Union. The rest of the world, including Central Matveyev V 1995 Russian foreign policy: historical and
international repercussions International Relations 12
Europe, is the 'Far Abroad'. The 'Near Abroad' 27-40
includes the Baltic States, which the CIS does not.
Mezhuev B 1997 Ponyatie 'natsional'nyi interes' [The
concept of 'national interest'] Rossiiskoiobshchestvenno-
politicheskoimysli [Russian Sociopolitical Thought] 1
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