1. If determinism is true, then we're never morally responsible for what we do.

Because if all events are caused and human actions are species of eventes, they are caused. Before we were even born. Prior conditions causing our actions. 2. If indeterminisme is true. Actions non causalement dtermines. Random, happend by chance, unpredictable. If human actions are not caused, we can't predict nor explain what someone has done. Not subject to laws of nature. -> Being random or uncaused doesn't necessary mean that the action is free ! Ex: movement of the arm(?), il est juste parti (movement of the harm), not the result of deliberation,... It wasn't free dans le sens d'tre responsable de. Failed to be an action at all (?). ! Notice that distinction between things that we do as an act and thing happening to us (ex: battement du coeur, la respiration) -> The truth of indeterminism ne donne pas non plus un sens acceptable de la libert. -Free or uncaused (unintelligible). Dilemme : (randomness, unpredictability, unintelligibility) alors never morally responsible for what we do ! ! Contradiction au sein du dterminisme : some events are not caused. -> 3. Determinism is true or indeterminism is true. 4. => Un dilemme logique sort de ces 3 propositions : les humains ne sont jamais responsables for what they do. Ce dilemme est le problme classique de freedom and indeterminism. Ca nous rpugne. Why so ? -> For two reasons : 1) Moral outrage, ludicrous if people were not responsible for what they do. Generally we don't think plants are responsible. On ne sent pas de moral repugnance quand tel animal mange telle chose (beyond its control) ! We think that humans are different from plants. We think there is a crucial difference between us and other forms of life. -Ce qui nous dtermine serait plus compliqu mais nous sommes quand mme sujets de la nature (dterminisme) 2) Most of us have a sense of freedom in our everyday life. Real options in life (positive way). We believe alternatives are open to us for ce que nous faisons dans la vie, etc. We're deeply commited to what we have to decide (ex: quelle carrire, quoi manger au matin,...). -Exprience de la libert au sens ngatif aussi : we agonize over chances and decisions. A sense that no one can chose for us. The burden (?) of freedom.

-> Why do we torture ourselves if we're not responsibles ? Il faudrait juste voir ce qui se passe. Mais on est prdisposs profondment l'ide qu'on est libre, profondment connect la libert. -Tout a ne rend pas la conclusion fausse. -2 common sens assumptions : le dterminisme (human actions as species of events) (cours pass), but on the other hadns, we think that human beings have free will. So we have : 1) The determinism thesis : all events, including human actions, are caused. 2) The free will thesis : some human acts are freely performed. And on the face of it, these two claims seem to be incompatibles. -> We need to link two notions : being caused is contradictory to being free. (lier caused et freely) -Lier aussi events et actions. -So : if an action is cause then it isn't free. ... -Contradiction avec le fait que tout a une explication dans le sens des lois de la nature. -Ex: from a legal point of view, voir quand on est non responsables : quand on est un enfant et qu'on commet un crime. Must be mentally competent, .... Si a manque, on peut excuser un comportement. -It seems fare to say that les gens sont blmer seulement pour les actes intentionnels. -Exceptions d'un point lgal : ... If someone is reckless (?), we think that they should have realized (que des consquences nfastes allaient dcouler). -Negligence is someone different. -Intentional actions seem to be the focus of judgement and responsability. -D'autres excuses pour lesquelles on ne prend pas pour responsable mme en contexte lgal : la ncessit, mme si intentionnel. Performed the act of necessity. That may be excused. Ex: self-defense (kill someone else). Ex: compulsion : par ex. vous allez me doner intentionnellement votre sac si je vous menace. Mais on ne dira pas que ce sera librement. Ex: ignorance : we really didn't know that it was wrong ... -> Important because they seem to be connected to determinism. If true, every act is performed by necessity. Every time I do something I'm compelled to do it. The antecedents conditions seem to compell me to act as I act, to decide as I decide.

-These things we generally as excuses may be generalized and excuse all actions (ex: the addiction compells you; the notion of "being able to do otherwise"; potentially certain causes can be introduced and will be stronger, and you're caused to quit smoking (causely determined to do)). -Consider the example of a claptomane : il a vol une montre. Typically we would excuse the act of theft. Because he couldn't do otherwise. -Autre ex, our roomate, qui n'a pas de trouble de ce type, qui nous vole. If determinism is true, just the conditions are different. -> Conclusion regarding responsibility : depend on wheter or not ... -> Leads us to wonder : what kind of freedom is required for moral responsability ? Freedom in this context doesn't mean absolute freedom (faire ce qu'on veut quand on veut, etc.). Tout est limit par les lois de la physique, de la chimie, etc. What agents would do if the opportunity was available to them. Ex: un mal moral, mais contrait de le faire. We tend to attribute some level of responsibilty. -What we do in fact do but in addition what we would do if we could. -> This seems to suggest that in a deeper level, moral ... A key feature seems to be that morally action : he could have acted otherwise (question intressante). -Soit faire A soit non A : par ex on commet un accident et quelqu'un est bless. On a l'opportunit de l'aider. But that won't suffice (?) : il faut savoir ce qu'on appellerait assistance dans ce cas (stopper le sang, comment,...). Ou pas prevented by external forces. Ex: on court ne supportant pas la vue du sang. (La responsabilit associe l'thique, la philosohpie morale. On peut considrer que c'est mal mme si on commet l'acte en plein dsert. ; une position permettant de faire un jugement, soit provenant de soi soit d'un point de vue absolu.) -Revenons au dilemme : incompatibilit entre le dterminisme et la thse de la libert. 1) One option : puisqu'on est sujet aux lois de la nature, on n'est pas libres (donc, le dterminisme). The classical position known as hard determinism (or necessitarianism) does just that : reject freedom. Position that determinisme is true and if it is, on n'a pas la libert prsuppose par la responsabilit morale. Deny that we have freedom. 2) Because we are free, d'une faon ou d'une autre, nos actions ne sont pas causes, mais intelligibles et non pas totalement random. -> Libertarianism : committed to the freedom of some human action. Reject determinism. 1 et 2 sont incompatibles, donc le 1 doit tre faux et le 2 vrai. Si le dterminsime tait vrai, on ne serait pas responsable, donc a ne peut s vrai.

-Soft determinism or compatibilism : embraces determinism and refuses to reject the sort of freedom that is presupposed for moral responsability. If we understand the determinisme correctly and the concept of freedom. -> Determinisme is true but ... -> Couple of things to notice : elles sont en lien, ces positions : a) Si on est libertariens, on doit argumenter contre hard et soft determinism. Et argumenter sur la comprhension de la libert par rapport au sotf determinism. Types diffrents : fatalism, predistanarianisme, moderne scientific determinism. b) Hard et soft sont tous deux dterministes but disagree about the implications of the truth of determinism. c) Libertariens et hard determinism are both commited to the incompatibilism, and disagree about which of the two to give up. -Various forms : tous les tenants du hard determinism ne pensent pas pareil. Ex: modern determinism, trouvant sa source dans la science moderne. Fatalisme (enracin dans du divin). Le philosophe Epictte (?), esclave, dont le matre l'tait aussi. Epictte protestait quand le matre le battait : il tait prdit depuis le dbut du monde que j'aurais fait tomber ce vase, je ne suis pas blmer. Le matre rpondit que de la mme philosophie, il tait prdestin que je te batte. -> Hard determinism can be very tricky to get around. If it's true : things are set in stone. Difficile de le confronter. It has a long history. Physique, psychologie, social science, chimie, etc., isn't (?) the base of old-fashioned necessitarianism. -> There are types of hard determinisme. Mais tous ne sont pas fatalistes (prdestination). -> Ca suppose un destin, depuis la naissance, prdisant ce qui se passera pour chacun. Ex: dans la tentative d'chapper au destin, on le rejoint (versino de fatalisme, qui lui-mme est un type de necessitarianisme). -Autre ex: Oedipe (idipus). -Suppose : supernatural forces, agents involved. Le destin sera quoi qu'on fasse remplit. -Predetinarianism (mme concept que la fatalisme mais li la chrtient) : Dieu avait un plan, remplir, et en crant le monde (sur base de ce plan), il a prdit tout ce qui se passera. God is also all knowing dont personne ne peut contredire ce plan. If god know everything, can you surprised god ? Everything is fixed. God knows what must happen, and therefore could not happen otherwise. -Il nous a donn la libert. Can do nothing to change that future. Our acts and apparently free decisions are predetermined. Freedom is merely an illusion. No hope of changing the outcome. -> Tous deux attribuent le contrle de la destine humaine des agents supernaturels.

-Fatalism : all events are necessitated (what would be will be). It has to be quite specific. -Predestinarianism : caus par le dessein divin. ...?? La plupart rejettent le fatalisme. Peu croient dans la prdestination. La diffrence avec the modern scientific determnism : -No mention of supernatural agency. No mechanism. Les lois de la nature sont ici dtermines. -Prdestination sans le ct divin. Determinsm is grounded in scientific theory. Pas de fixed map in advance. -> Est-ce que le dterminisme moderne scientifique conoit que le future est fix, une question de ce cours. -Lots of evidence(?) for the truth of determinism. Mais peu pour le fatalisme, from a philosophical point of view. -Newton (?), Kepler, ... : laws of mechanic... : toutes les particules dans leurs mouvements peuvent tre expliques. Lois de l'univers. -Darwin expliquant les espces d'un point de vue de mcanisme sans but de slection naturelle. The theory of evolution contre l'ide de sparation entre humains et animaux (rejet d'une conception aristotlicienne que l'homme a une me intelligente). Mais laisse la possibilit de lois psychologiques non dtermines (rem: Skinner, the cognitivst, the behaviorist : mcanismes inconscientes d'o rsultent les lois de la psychologie. ex: on a des rves, etc.) -For the most part, on this course we will focused on this course on hard determinism as it is (soutenu?) by moderne science. Physics supported the vision that events are caused. Even social phenomena were explained causally. Ex: genes (replicated) having properties fully determined by their structure (and determine he or she will become). Learning and behavior in causal terms. Even mental phenomenon (chemical changes that occur in the brain). Neurophysics. -Additionnaly, prenatal factors. Social factors (external causes, environmental influences). Economic condition of the family, etc. -> Where if at all does any genuine choice come (..?)? Ex: murder. A genius (is that not just the outcome of a number of causal factors ?). ! Mais, dans tous les cas (ex: s'il y a des phnomnes qu'on ne peut dterminer), pas de responsabilit ! EXEMPLE DE HARD DETERMINISM : TEXTE : ...-1827. The system of the world. The mechanics of the heaven. On l'a appel the Newton of France. Mathmatiquement. "All events are governed by the laws of nature". He rejects aristotelian talk of final causes. He however suggest that there must be such causes (mais la connaissance les dcouvre peu peu). That what science is about (discover). Uncaused : reflection of our ignorance of the true causes.

-Principle of sufficient reason : les choses ne viennent pas l'existence sans une cause qui les produit. 1) There is an explanation for everything that is (everything that is as a causal explanation). 2) A thing can not come into existence without a cause that produces it. -Extend to human actions. What ever I choose must be caused. Ignore the reasons underlying the will's choice. The will has motives (event a simple choice). The will's decision is an event. Remarque : sometimes cause and effects are simultaneous. -There is some way universe is. Et si on avait l'intelligence, on pourrait dire comment il est en ce moment. -It's also true that the instant before now there is some way the universe was (chacun par ex. tait dans une situation gographique particulire). -> It causes the way the universe is now. -Given such a theory of universe, in principle, a sufficiently powerful being would be able to dermine any state... -Such a being would see future events and be able to predict them. -Strange believes about causes (dans son sicle, 18). Ex: a rain fall attributed to anger amongst the gods (or eclipses). -The knowledge of the laws of the world system's. We lack the knowledge of all the causal factors now. -Generalise our understanding of mechanics. -A les ambitious and perhaps more realistic : d'HOLBACH (hard determinism also). a) First part : a deterministic theory of action. 2) The illusion of free will. His main thesis : the actions of human beings are never free. Mme conclusion que le prcdent mais d'autres arguments (mainstrem events and human actions, et ne parle pas des lois de l'univers). -He bases his argument on a theory of human action : each of my actions ar necessarily consequence of my desire (whatever your desire, it explains your act), lui-mme de mon temprament, en conjonction avec ma conception du bonheur. => Donc, selon d'Holbach : Temprament, li notre conception du bonheur -> Dsires (les plus forts) -> Actions (ex: donc notre prsence ce cours, par ex., est li en fin de compte notre conception du bonheur). -The believes we have about the world,... all determined by our education, our daily experiences, our religious affiliations, ... (p.13 du texte : ...)

-Each actions that you perform in living your life is determined, not necesseraliy by your previous actions but your desires (un seul chemin de la naissance la mort). -Notice that you were born without your consent. The way you're organized does not depend on you. Your ideas come involuntarily. You've various habits (as a consequence of the power of those around you). On est constamment changs par des forces extrieures. Determine the way you act. Nevertheless in spite of it, you pretend you are free agent. -> His general conclusion (p.15) : you are not free in any instance of your life. (Remarque : c'est parce que la tradition philosophique s'est penche sur quelque chose comme la volont, et qu'on la prise pour possibilit de pouvoir, que les dterministes s'attaquent la volont). => Donc, Education, family, background, religion,... (beyond my control) -> my Ideas -> Objets et leurs qualits -> Modification du cerveau (we like to call that the will, the seat of "choice"; desirable object or not) -> Impulsion (impulse) -> Action. -Objects in the world, the quality of which are determined (ex: un chocolat, on aime comme a sent, on a l'impulsion de le manger (that's just how it is with me and chocolate); ex: amis, impulsion : hang out). -There must be other impulses. Ex: sometimes I don't eat the chocolate cake. Only because there's some stronger impulse. (regret, shame, guilt goes out the window). (remarque : pistmologie : comment peut-on connaitre ? Mtaphysique : comment les choses sont ? Ici, position mtaphysique : en principe, a pourrait tre la faon dont les choses sont. Comment prouver qu'elles ne le sont pas telles ? (ex: croyance que la terre tait plate))

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