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The Intentional Nature of Hyle in Husserls Genetic Phenomenology Abstract This paper provides an argument that explains how

Husserls developed account of hyle is both inherently organized and intentional. In Husserls works, hyle is first presented as the formless, nonintentional sensuous stuff of perception. This characterization of hyle is the result of proceeding from the static phenomenological method. The static phenomenological method allows the phenomenologist to describe the essential structure of conscious experience (Erlebnis). However, the static phenomenological method is limited in that it cannot describe how conscious experience itself is constituted. In Husserls later works, he employs the genetic phenomenological method that allows the phenomenologist to proceed deeper into the structure of consciousness and ultimately describe the constitution of conscious experience itself. When this method is employed, hyle take on a different characterization than simply the formless, non-intentional sensuous stuff of perception. To discover the organized and intentional nature of hyle, I explain the role that original time constitution and double intentionality play in the genesis of hyle. Original time constitution and double intentionality provide the formal structure, that of retention-primordial impression-protention, in which the passive syntheses of consciousness accomplishes the syntheses of hyletic data and intentional objects. I use this formal structure, double intentionality, and the passive synthesis of similarity to show that when hyle manifest in a primordial impression, they always manifest within an intentional, organized structure that is structured by the retentions and protentions that flag the primordial impression on either side.

John Dombrowski Dombro52@msu.edu Philosophy 820 April 2011

Dombrowski Husserls account of perception is remarkable in some respects and faces complications in others. Part of the complications consists in the fact that he developed his account of perception over the course of four decades. For example, the nature of perception in the Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy (Ideas I) differs greatly from Husserls account in the Analysis Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis (Analysis). One key difference in these two works is Husserl's move from a static method to a genetic method of phenomenology. The static phenomenological method reveals how an object is given to consciousness and the essential or formal structures of consciousness as intentional, but it is limited in that it does not directly investigate the way in which the formal structures themselves are constituted. In contrast, the genetic phenomenological method reveals the fundamental characteristics of the flow of consciousness, not merely the essential structure of the way in which one is conscious-of an object. The results of Husserls shift from the static to the genetic method are numerous, to be sure. In this paper I will focus on one particular development in Husserls account of perception, the nature of hyle. In Husserls published works, the term hyle first appears in the Ideas I. In short, hyle are the sensuous stuff that is inherent in the perception of objects. Even though on a basic level hyle are identified as sensuous stuff, one must not confuse Husserls meaning with the classical meaning of sense data. According to the classical model, sense data represent the information given to one through sensation and are thought of as independent of the object. Sensations, and sense data, become the building blocks that are used to construct perceptual objects and are the means by which we are in contact with the world. For Husserl, on the other hand, hyle are never given in-themselves and then used as building blocks for perceptual objects. Hyle are at all times constituents of an intentional consciousness. One discloses the nature of hyle by means of directing ones focus on that aspect of consciousness through transcendental abstraction (Biceaga, 20). Husserls account of hyle has been criticized by numerous philosophers throughout the years.1 For instance, Aron Gurwitsch, one of Husserls students, complained that the Husserls account of hyle as non-intentional, formless sense-data falls prey to the some of the same errors as the classic model. Part of the problem is that Husserl did identify hyle as non-intentional, formless stuff. However, he did this in some of his earlier works that employed the static phenomenological method. The Logical Investigations and Ideas I are two examples. If one looks to Husserls later works, those that employ the genetic phenomenological method, one finds that the hyle are no longer seen as merely non-intentional,
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For example, Merleau-Ponty, Jean-Paul Sartre, Aron Gurwitsch, and Walter Hopp; to name a few.

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Dombrowski formless stuff in perception. For example, in the Analysis, which employs the genetic phenomenological method, the notion of hyle takes on a broader meaning and is no longer characterized as the nonintentional, formless stuff in perception. To Gurwitschs credit, the Analysis was not published until after Gurwitsch criticized Husserls characterization of hyle in his book Field of Consciousness. However, the perception that Husserl ultimately characterized hyle as non-intentional stuff is still out there. For instance, in 2008, Walter Hopp provided a critique of Husserls theory of interpretation in which he characterized hyle as nonintentional sensuous stuff.2 The aim of this paper is to show that Husserls developed account of hyle moves beyond his original characterization of hyle as the non-intentional stuff of perception that is the result of employing the static phenomenological method and that he ultimately, as a result of employing the genetic phenomenological method, characterized hyle as inherently intentional in the sense that hyle are organized and grouped together by the passive syntheses of consciousness. I will show this by using Husserls description of retention, protention, and primal impression in the Analysis along with recent secondary material that deals with Husserls account of passive synthesis. In short, my argument is that on the primal level, hyle always manifest within a pre-defined structure that is intentional. The structure is that of retention-primal impression-protention and it is intentional in the sense that the contents of retention-primal impression-protention are organized and grouped together according to other content within the structure. The structure of this paper is as follows. In section one I explain the nature of hyle as it is found in Ideas I. This section also contains some preliminary remarks regarding intentionality and how investigations proceed from the phenomenological reduction. Section two contains a short primer on the difference between the static phenomenological method and the genetic phenomenological method. In section three I provide an analysis of the nature of hyle as it relates to the passive synthesis of similarity described in the Analysis. I supplement this with some of Husserls ideas on time that are found in his Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness.

See Hopp, 2008

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Dombrowski 1. Hyle in the Ideas I In its most basic form, the mark of intentionality is being of or about an object. Thus, to say that conscious experiences3 are intentional is to say that they are conscious experiences of something. Another way of putting this is that conscious experiences are directed at an object. For example, when I perceive the blue book in front of me, it is the blue book that I am conscious-of. When I use my imagination to think about the blue book, it is the book that I imagine, i.e. that I am conscious-of. In this intentional structure there are two mutually dependent, correlative moments, the act and its object. The object is that which one is conscious-of and the act is the means by which one is conscious-of an object. Husserls formal terms for the act side and object side of intentionality is noesis and noema, respectively. The noesis/noema relationship as the essential characteristic of intentionality is revealed only after enacting the phenomenological reduction. Before the phenomenological reduction, one is in, what Husserl calls, the natural attitude. This attitude is characterized by the general positing that the world and the objects in the world exist in-themselves. Objects that one is intentionally directed at are real existent things that are constituted in the world itself. Opposed to this is the phenomenological attitude. One takes on this attitude by enacting the phenomenological reduction, which sets aside, or puts in abeyance, the general positing of the natural attitude. After the reduction, objects are no longer taken as objects of the world that exist independently of consciousness, but are now taken as objects of consciousness. The phenomenological attitude allows one to examine the way in which objects are presented to consciousness. This reduction reveals that an intentional consciousness consists of something that is constituted, the intentional object, and something that does the constituting, consciousness. This is what Husserl terms the noema and the noesis, respectively. While the noema is an essential part of intentionality, the focus of this paper is on the noetic side of intentionality. It should be noted, though, that the noesis and the noema have correlative aspects. Thus, for every constituent moment of the noesis there is a correlative constituent moment of the noema. Additionally, it should be stressed again that even though I will focus on the noetic side of intentionality, both the noema and the noesis are moments of the same intentional act and do not exist as independent parts of an intentional act.

I render the German Erlebnis as conscious experience.

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Dombrowski What follows is an explanation of hyle as it is found in Ideas I. In short, the hyle are nonintentional, formless stuff that is found in perception. However, one is never conscious-of the hyle themselves in normal perception. The hyle can only be uncovered through a process of ideation. Husserl calls this an eidetic seizing upon. In normal perception we are directed at the object of perception, for example perceiving a blue book. However, it is also possible to turn ones regard to the perceiving of the blue book itself and examine the constituent moments that are essential to the perception of the blue book. It is through this eidetic turning of ones regard that we can uncover the constituent moments of the noetic moment of intentionality. In fact, it is through this same process of ideation that we discover the essential moments of intentionality as noesis and noema. Through this process of ideation, Husserl discovers that in perception there are two moments of the noetic act. One moment is intentional and the other is non-intentional. Husserl labels these noetic and hyletic, respectively (Ideas I, 205). The hyletic moment is introduced as sensation-contents such as color-Data, touch-Data, and tone-Data, and the like which we should no longer confuse with appearing moments of physical things (Ideas I, 203). Even though the hyle are characterized as sensation-contents, they cannot present objects to consciousness in-themselves. Recall that conscious experience is essentially intentional, i.e. of or about objects. Since the hyletic-Data themselves do not present physical things, the hyletic-Data are not intentional. However, the noetic process as a whole, of which the hyletic-Data is one moment, is intentional. The intentionality of the whole noetic act comes from the noetic moment. The noetic moment serves a sense-bestowal function and animates, or forms, the heletic-Data. This sense-bestowing makes the whole noetic act of or about an object. In Husserls own words, Sensuous Data *hyle] present themselves as stuff for intentive formings, or sensebestowings, belonging to different levels, for simple formings (Ideas I, 204). Husserl goes on to label the hyletic moment and the noetic moment as formless stuff and stufflless forms (Ideas I, 204). Before I explain Husserl's developed account of hyle, I want to provide two short critiques to demonstrate what is potentially wrong with viewing hyle as inherently formless and non-intentional. I will begin Aron Gurwitsch's critique. Following the description of hyle in Husserl's earlier works, Gurwitsch concludes that Husserl's account falls under the umbrella of the 'constancy hypothesis' (McKenna, 223). Gurwitsch comes to this conclusion in three steps. (1) If hyle are non-intentional and formless, then they only play an objectifying role in intentional experience when they are formed and organized by the sense-bestowing

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Dombrowski function of noetic interpretation (McKenna, 223). If this is the case, then (2) "interpreted and apperceived, sense-data [i.e. hyle-Data] enter as components or constituents into the perceptual sense or noema, that is, the perceived object as it presents itself through the given act of perception" (McKenna, 223; quoting Gurwitsch). Thus, Gurwitsch concludes that (3) different objects that are presented by way of interpreted hyletic-Data can be presented through the same hyletic-Data (McKenna, 223). The conclusion reached in (3) is a rendering of the constancy hypothesis. It is fair to call into question whether or not Gurwitsch properly interpreted Husserl as saying that hyle enter into the perceptual noema, but that is not within the scope of this paper. In any case, one can see that since Gurwitsch's interpretation of Husserl rests on an understanding of hyle as non-intentional and formless. If hyle do play a role in intentional experience apart from being interpreted by noetic functions, then Gurwitschs argument becomes suspect on more than one level. Second, Walter Hopp concludes that if one considers Husserl position on hyle in his Ideas I and Logical Investigations, problem arise regarding the way in which non-intentional hyle can function in Husserl account of perceptual fulfillment.4 These two critiques show that when hyle are taken as non-intentional and formless, Husserl account of perception as a whole becomes problematic. To counter these critiques, I will show that hyle are neither non-intentional nor formless. By showing that hyle are not formless, I will argue against Gurwitsch's critique. Likewise, by showing that hyle are intentional, in a special sense, I will show that Hopp's critique is erroneous on the grounds that he misinterpreted Husserl's account of hyle. In this section I detailed the nature of hyle as it is found in the Ideas I. The noetic side of consciousness is made up of a hyletic moment and a noetic moment. The hyletic moment is composed of the non-intentional, formless-stuff, i.e. the hyletic-Data, that is formed and made intentive by noetic moments, or more generally, noeses. I must stress one more time, though, that this is not a process that occurs in a stepwise fashion. The distinction between hyle and noesis is only revealed through an analysis of the intentional experience. Husserl stresses that noeses are not psychical functions. Conscious experience is always intentional in the pregnant sense. It is only through ideation that the different strata and constituent moments are revealed. Additionally, I presented two arguments that demonstrate problems with interpreting Husserls account of hyle as non-intentional, formless stuff.

For details, please see Hopp 2008

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Dombrowski 2. Static and Genetic Phenomenological Methods The aim of the static phenomenological method is to describe the essential structure of intentionality. This method is employed when one enacts the phenomenological reduction as it is explained in the Ideas I. Through this method, the phenomenologist can examine the formal structure of intentionality and bring to consciousness its constituent parts and the role that each plays when consciousness is conscious-of something. As useful as this method is, it has its shortcomings. For example, in the static method one finds that consciousness is essentially a conscious-of something. When one asks how it is that consciousness is essentially consciousness-of, there is no answer to be found. Static phenomenology cannot tell us because it does not look to how the essential structure itself is constituted. This is where the genetic phenomenological method comes in. The genetic phenomenological method looks to the primal laws of the constitution of conscious. This method proceeds by tracing the history of constitution back to the root sources of constitution, to what Husserl sometimes calls the living flow or the living-present. In static phenomenology, one brackets, or sets aside, the constitution of certain aspects of consciousness to describe conscious experience in a state of stasis. By doing so, the phenomenologist can disclose the structure of conscious experience itself, but this also limits the phenomenologists inquiry into what constitutes the constituted conscious experience. The genetic method, on the other hand, does not set aside these fundamental aspects of consciousness and this allows the phenomenologist to recede deeper into those aspects of consciousness that allow conscious experience to be constituted. 3. Time Constitution, Passive Syntheses and Intentional Hyle This section will focus on the inherent intentionality of hyle. I will begin by explaining the way in which time is constituted in the living-present. Original time constitution provides the fundamental structure within which all consciousness is ultimately structured. This fundamental structure takes the form of retention-primordial impression-protention. After explaining original time constitution, I will show how content is related in this fundamental structure through the synthesis of similarity. Last, I will show that the synthesis of similarity relates to the longitudinal intentionality that is constituted in original time constitution. This last move will demonstrate that hyle always manifest through a primordial impression within the living-present in an intentional structure defined by its related retentions and protensions.

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Dombrowski Time consciousness operates on three levels. The first level is that of the clock time of transcendent temporal objects. This time is measured by hours, minutes, days, etc. In general, these are the time scales that operate within the natural attitude. Once the phenomenological reduction is enacted and transcendent objects become immanent objects as correlates of intentional acts, there is a different level of time consciousness. This is the level of subjective or internal time. This time is measured by the duration of the act. As Victor Biceaga explains: To temporal objects, such as lunar eclipses and songs, encountered in the natural attitude, there correspond, in the phenomenological attitude, immanent temporal objects, such as the act of perceiving a lunar eclipse or the act of listening to (or singing) a song (Biceaga, 5). The third level is original time constitution. This level is the most perplexing, as it is not measured in time and is not constituted in time at all. Whereas transcendent objects in the natural attitude have duration in time that is measured by clock time and immanent objects in the phenomenological attitude have duration in time that is measured by the duration of the intentional act, if original time constituting consciousness was constituted in time and had duration in time, there would be an infinite regress. Thus, Husserl explains that original time consciousness timeless and self-constitutive (Biceaga, 5). The significances and challenges that come along with original time consciousness are numerous. For the current investigation, there are two significant aspects that I will focus on, the retention-primordial impression-protention formal structure and double intentionality. Husserl establishes the formal structure of original time consciousness as retention-primordial impression-protention in his work Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness. This formal structure provides the framework in which other passive syntheses in the flow of consciousness must participate (Analysis, 171). This means that the following two expositions regarding the formal structure and double intentionality do not define placeholders for content, but merely the way in which syntheses at the primordial level are framed. On the most basic level, primordial impression names the Now aspect of the flow of consciousness, retention names the just-been aspect of the flow and protention names the about-to-be aspect. When the flow of consciousness moves from one moment to the next, each primordialimpression is retained in retention and a new primordial-impression manifests. In addition to this movement from primordial-impression to retention, there is anticipation of what is to come in protention. For example, understood abstractly, the primordial-impression can stand for the hyle in the perception of a melody. The present tone impression that manifests in the primordial-impression is coupled with the just-been tone impression in retention and the about-to-be tone impression in

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Dombrowski protention (Biceaga, 7). This coupling is a modification of the retended and protended tones as belonging to the melody. Without retention and protention, one cannot be intentionally conscious-of a melody since a melody is composed of multiple tones over the course of time. If one was merely conscious of the current tone impression, they would simply be conscious of a single tone. Implicit in this structure is a new type of intentionality called longitudinal intentionality. Longitudinal intentionality is the way in which the various impressions in retention, protention, and the primordial-impression are related together in a unity (IEP).5 Longitudinal intentionality is opposed to transversal intentionality. Transversal intentionality is the other type of intentionality that I have referenced previously in the paper when I have simply used the term intentionality. In addition to being the structure of conscious experience, transversal intentionality goes from the flow of consciousness to the objects that are constituted in conscious experience (IEP). Using the example of the melody again, when I consciously experience the melody, the melody is the object that I am directed at. This is transverse intentionality at work. However, my ability to be directed at the melody is made possible because longitudinal intentionality is spanning the retention-primordial impression-protention chain and relating the tones together as one contiguous object. Next I will use the formal structure to explain one passive synthesis that occurs according to the framework of the formal structure. I will then tie it all together and show how hyle are manifest within the structure and are thereby manifested intentionally. Before I move on, I want to emphasize that the retention-primordial impression-protention structure is a mere formal structure. In Husserls words, its a limit-concept (Analysis, 479). Husserl notes in the Analysis that if one wants to understand how the content of objects is passively synthesized, one will not find the answer in the analysis of the intentionality of time consciousness (Analysis, 173-4). To understand the way in which the content of objects in the flow of conscious find unity, one has to look to the passive associative syntheses. Thus, to understand how hyle are organized and intentional, I will present one of the associative syntheses that highlights the inherent organization and intentionality of hyle. The associative synthesis that I will focus on is similarity. Similarity names accomplishment of grouping hyletic data, e.g. color-data or sound-data, together in the streaming flow of consciousness (Analysis, 175). Husserl notes that mere similarity in real objects is not enough to group them
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Please note that longitudinal intentionality also serves to make consciousness self-aware and is part of the selfconstitution of the flow itself. However, for my purposes I want to highlight the unifying aspect that it provides with regards to retentions, protentions, and primordial impressions.

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Dombrowski together in any kind of unifying connection. The example Husserl uses is of two people with similar noses and states that the similarity is not enough to form a bond between them (Analysis, 175). However, with hyletic data the case is different. Within the visual field, several seemingly discrete colordata in the flow of consciousness are grouped together from one moment to the next. As Husserl says, there is a kinship among the hyletic data. The kinship is one of degrees, sometimes weaker and sometimes stronger (Analysis, 175). Stronger kinships yield more distinct groupings while weaker kinships yield less distinct groupings. This grouping also holds for succession.6 One perceives the grouping as identical from moment to moment. To find out what accounts for this grouping and similarity, I maintain that we can look to the formal structure of retention-primordial impression-protention and double intentionality. When one perceives the same grouping from moment to moment, the perception is carried out within a retentionprimordial impression-protention chain. From moment to moment, the primordial impression, the hyletic grouping in this case, is retained in retention and a new primordial impression ensues. When a new primordial impression manifests, it manifests with fresh hyletic data. However, this fresh hyletic data is organized by the retentions and protentions that flag it on either side. The retentions and protentions structure the grouping of the hyletic data by their relation in longitudinal intentionality. Therefore, the hyletic data that manifests in the primordial impression is organized according to the structure that its related retentions and protentions define by means of the longitudinal intentional unity of the retention-primordial impression-protention chain. It follows from the above argument that hyle are both organized and intentional. However, they are not intentional in the sense that one is directed at the hyle itself as an intentional object. Hyle are intentional in a broader sense. Specifically, they are intentional in the sense that they always manifest within an intentionally structured grouping. 4. Concluding Remarks The first remark I want to make is that the above case is also a limit-case. Consciousness is exponentially more complex than what I presented. Husserl goes on to name additional passive syntheses that occur and explains the way in which passive syntheses relate to active syntheses. In addition, if we look at just the synthesis of similarity, conscious is never just synthesizing one retentional-primordial impression-protentional chain. In the appendices to the Analysis, specifically the
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It should be noted that succession is a distinct type of synthesis from that of similarity.

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Dombrowski appendices that relate to sections 27 and 28 of the Analysis proper, Husserl describes how there are many simultaneous chains that occur in the flow of consciousness. To conclude, I have demonstrated that when Husserls works that followed from the genetic phenomenological method are considered, hyle are no longer merely non-intentional, formless stuff of perception. The view that hyle are characterized as such comes from Husserls earlier works that employed the static phenomenological method. I used Husserl work on original time consciousness and passive syntheses to show that when hyle manifest through a primordial impression, they always manifest within an intentional structure that is organized by the retentions and protentions that flag it on either side. This shows that hyle are inherently organized and intentional when intentionality is understood in a broad sense that includes longitudinal intentionality.

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Dombrowski

Works Cited Biceaga, Victor. (2010). The Concept of Passivity. Springer: New York Hopp, Walter. (2008). Husserl on Sensation, Perception and Interpretation. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 38, 219-246. McKenna, William. (1983). The Problem of Sense Data in Husserls Theory of Perception. In Gurwitsch, A., & Embree, L. E. (1984). Essays in memory of Aron Gurwitsch, 1983. pp 223 229. Pittsburgh, Pa.: Center for Advanced Research in Phenomenology. Husserl, Edmund. (1982). Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and a Phenomenological Philosophy, First Book. (Fred Kersten, Trans.). Kluwer: Boston. Husserl, Edmund. (2001). Analysis Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis: Lectures on Transcendental Logic. (Anthony J. Steinbock, Trans.). Kluwer: Boston. Kelly, Michael. (2008). Phenomenology and Time Consciousness. Retrieved From: http://www.iep.utm.edu/phe-time/

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