Ramos vs. Dajoyag - A.C. No. 5174 FACTS: This is a complaint filed by Ernesto M. Ramos against Atty.

Mariano A. Dajoyag Jr. for negligence in failing to appeal a ruling of the NLRC, which affirmed the dismissal by the Labor Arbiter of a complaint for legal dismissal.It appears that Ramos was terminated from work for failure of his lawyer, Atty. Dajoyag, to file on timethe petition for certiorari, when the Supreme Court dismissed it with finality.From the records, it can be gleaned that Atty. Dajoyag moved for an extension to file which was granted but the Resolution granting the 1st extension contained a warning that no further extension would begiven. Atty. Dajoyag, on the other hand, explained that he was not aware of this because when he filed hismotion for last extension for only 20 days, he had not yet received the copy of said resolution. He further explained that he relied on good faith that his Motion for 1st Extension of 30 days would be grantedwithout the warning as this was only a first extension; and also that he requested for a second and lastextension of 20 days for which he complied with the filing of the Petition for Certiorari on the last day of the supposed extended period.ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Ramos is guilty of negligence.RULING: Yes. Rule 12.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides: A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse withoutsubmitting the same or offering an explanation for his failure to do so ". Motions for extension are notgranted as a matter of right but in the sound discretion of the court, and lawyers should never presumethat their motions for extension or postponement will be granted or that they will be granted the length of time they pray for. Due diligence requires that they should conduct a timely inquiry with the divisionclerks of court of the action on their motions and, the lack of notice thereof will not make them any lessaccountable for their omission.

IN RE: Paas AM No. 01-12-02-SCISSUE: Whether or not allegations of Judge Paas and Almarvez to each other is meritorious. FACTS: Judge Paas administratively charges Court/Aide Utility Worker Edgar E. Almarvez thathe is discourteous to his co-employees, lawyers and party litigants; has failed to maintain thecleanliness in and around the court premises despite order to do so, habitually absent fromwork or made it appear that he reported for work by signing the log book in the morning, onlyto stay out of office the whole day; asked from detention prisoners P100-P200 before hereleased to them their Release Orders and divulged confidential information to litigants inadvance of its authorized release date for a monetary consideration, thus giving undueadvantage or favour to the paying party. There were attestations of the members of the courtwith regard to this alleged complaint same attestation with the Jail Escort Officer that hewitnessed Almarvez receive from detention prisoners P100-P200 in consideration of the releaseof their Release Orders.Almarvez filed an answer denying Judge Paas charges and alleged that the real reasonwhy the latter filed the case against him was because she suspected him of helping herhusband; Atty. Renerio G. Paas conceal his marital indiscretions; since she failed to elicit anyinformation from him, she resorted to calling him names and other forms of harassment andinsisted him to sign prepared resignation letter, a copy of which he was not able to keep. Hefurther denied ever requesting for money in exchange for the release of court orders andclaimed that Judge Paas ordered him to undergo a drug test per Memorandum even if he hadno history of drug abuse on a periodic or continuous basis as shown by the test results of hisexamination.The administrative cases were consolidated and referred for evaluation to the OCA wherein a separate case for inhibition Judge Paas husband, private practitioner Atty. Paas, was usinghis wife s office as his office address in his law practice wherein they vehemently denied thecharge that the latter was using Room 203 of the Pasay City Hall of Justice as his address, theyclaiming that Atty. Paas actually holds office at 410 Natividad Building, Escolta, Manila. OnJanuary of 2002 Judge Paas admitted that her husband did use her office as his return addressfor notices and orders in a Criminal case but only to ensure and facilitate delivery of thosenotices, but after the cases were terminated, all notices were

sent to his office address inEscolta.OCA laid its findings and recommendations that Almarvez be dismissed of its sharges of exacting money and be duly penalized for inefficiency in the performance of his official duties.On charges against Judge Paas, for lack of supporting evidence recommended the dismissal of the charges of maltreatment, harassment and verbal abuse but instead be found guilty of simple misconduct in office and be penalized with reprimand and warning. HELD: A. On charges against AlmarvezThe Court finds no sufficient evidence to support the charge of violation of confidentiality of official communication against Almarvez while the charges of neglect of duty is too general to support a conviction and are contrary are towhat is reflected in his performance rating that he cooperated willingly. Theirclaims remains hearsay. On the charge of inefficiency concurs with the findingsand recommendations of OCA. The fact that respondent Almarvez neverdisputed the performance ratings given him is tantamount to an impliedacceptance.B. On charges against Judge PaasRegarding the charges of abuse of authority and oppression against Judge Paas, Almarvez failedto substantiate the same. Judge Paas order to undergo drug test is not an unlawful order.However Judge Paas indeed allowed his husband to ride on her prestige for purpose of advancing his private interest, in violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct. On his part, Atty.Paas was guilty of using fraudulent, misleading and deceptive address that had no purporseother than to try to impress either the court in which his cases are lodged, or his client, that hehas close ties to a member of the judiciary. Therefore, violating Canons 3, Rule 3.01, Canon 10,Rule 10.01, Canon 13, Canon 15, Rule 15.06 which states that A lawyer shall not state or implythat he is able to influence any public official, tribunal or legislative body.Wherefore, Almarvez is pronounced GUILTY of inefficiency and is hereby suspende for 1month and Judge Paas GUILTY of conduct of unbecoming of a member of the judiciary andhereby REPRIMANDED, with warning that repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealtwith severely, she is further ordered to pay a FINe and that his husband Atty. Renerio PaasGUILTY of SIMPLE MISCONDUCT and hereby SUSPENDED from practice of law for a period of three months with warning.

De Bumanglag vs. Bumanglag [A.M. No. 188 November 29, 1976] Post under case digests, Legal Ethics at Saturday, February 25, 2012 Posted by Schizophrenic Mind Facts: Esteban T. Bumanglad, the respondent, was found by the Court in its decision of September 24, 1973 guilty of gross immoral conduct and ordered his suspension from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years;

Respondent filed several motions for reconsideration but the same were denied;

As a result of such denial, the respondent wrote a petition to the President of the Philippines that he promulgate(s) a decree that the order of suspension by the Supreme Court be set aside and that your humble self be allowed to become an active member of the New Society.

The respondent alleged in the same petition that he was deprived of due process of law;

The Clerk of Court, by way of an indorsement from the Assistant Executive Secretary, received a copy of the petition and was requested to comment and/or appropriate action on the subject matter;

However, in a subsequent letter to the President the respondent retracted and acknowledged his non observance of protocol of separation of powers;

In the end, the respondent asked for an apology from the members of the Honorable Court.

Issues: (1) Whether or not respondent may be disciplined for gross ignorance of the law and of the Constitution in not observing the protocol of separation of power by asking the President to set aside by decree the decision of the Court imposing suspension upon the respondent

(2) Whether or not a decision duly promulgated by the Supreme Court may be set aside by a Presidential Decree

Held: (1) Respondent is hereby administered a reprimand for gross ignorance of the law and of the Constitution in having asked the President to set aside by decree the Court's decision which suspended him for two years from the practice of law, with warning that the commission of any transgression in the future of his oath and duties as a member of the bar will be severely dealt with.

(2) Since respondent has apologized for his "big mistake" and now appreciates that under the fundamental principle of separation of powers enshrined in both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, a decision of this Court may not be set aside by the President, the Court is disposed to view his misconduct and/or ignorance with liberality and will administer a reprimand with warning of severe action on any future transgressions, considering respondent's unenviable record.