The Fall of the Soul in Plato's Phaedrus Author(s): D. D. McGibbon Source: The Classical Quarterly, New Series, Vol.

14, No. 1 (May, 1964), pp. 56-63 Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of The Classical Association Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/637629 . Accessed: 01/04/2011 08:00
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at . http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=cup. . Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission. JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Cambridge University Press and The Classical Association are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The Classical Quarterly.

http://www.jstor.org

THE FALL OF THE SOUL IN PLATO'S PHAEDRUS

IN the myth of the Phaedrus Plato sets forth a picture of the life of discarnate souls in heaven. He representsthese souls by the symbol of a winged charioteer driving winged horses. In the case of the souls of the gods (theoi),the charioteers
and horses are good (246 a OEv TE Kal rVaOOL vES a o v '77uTOL '7 Plato 'To case of the other souls whom calls yaOol Kal E' cdyalOv). In the tpv T-E

and among whom our own souls are included, the soul is represented daimones, by a charioteer with two horses of which the right one is good but the left one evil (246 b r S %i Kat 7pcii-OV I-v V ~juiv d pXWV E/1IELKTaL. -3v 2AAwv UavvwpISos 0 1E L7T7TWV Kat EK E' 7)LOXEL, , EdrarWv IlEVavw- KaAO6s KaL " dya0o ToLvOWV 8'
Evavl'wv and passion respectively, while the charioteer symbolizes represent thumos reason. Plato goes on to describe a procession which the gods and daimones make up to the outer edge of heaven in order to contemplate the Forms which lie beyond. The gods, we are told, make the ascent easily and when they reach the edge of heaven have no difficulty in staying there and beholding the Forms. The daimones, however, experience difficulty due to the recalcitrance of the evil horse, which all their charioteers possess (247 b -d d Ahha itody&" TE KalfapVvwv EMTL 77V Y7V PE7TWV IETEXWV yapoT7s 1&0 flptLOEL Lt'17T.OS -V TEv KaAw
TE Kal

Evav7Tlo).It is generally agreed that the right and left horses

difficulty; beholding though groups: those whose vision is only partial; those, finally, who fail to see the Formsat all.' Since contemplation of the Forms provides the nourishment by which the who fail to see the Forms at all wings of the soul are nurtured, those daimones lose their wings and fall to earth. They have to go through a series of earthly existencesfor Io,ooo years, before they regain their wings and return to heaven. It has been traditionally assumed that in this picture Plato is describing an original fall of souls, the theory being taken from the Orphic-Pythagorean tradition and adapted by Plato to his own ends. In order to account for this fall, he has conceived of the discarnate soul, in the case of those who are not gods, as containing in the element of passion an intrinsically evil element which may, unless it is perfectly trained, hinder the soul from attaining a full vision of Truth, and render it unfit to continue in its divine existence.2 The view that passion is intrinsically evil is not as such found elsewhere.3 The
I They fail because of the KaKta (248 b) of their charioteers, that is to say because of their lack of skill in controlling the evil horse. The use of avY-vXla(248 c) I take to indicate that Plato does not wish to go into the circumstances which led to the imperfect condition of the soul and its consequent failure in the vision. For the possible use of avvrvxla without any reference to chance see R. S. Bluck, A.J.P. lxxix (1958), I58. It appears from 249 b that all human souls have seen something of Truth, hence Plato does not strictly mean that the third category of daimonesto which our souls belonged in the

KaK77S Plato divides the daimonesinto three main 7-6v VLdw'xwv). paOaLppEL the Forms those who succeed in with

precarnate life failed completely in the vision. See, e.g., R. Hackforth, Plato's Phaedrus (Cambridge, 1952), p. 832 The change to the psychology of the Phaedrusis made, it is believed, not necessarily because Plato did not previously believe in an original fall, but because in the Phaedrus he takes it upon himself for the first time to explain this fall systematically. 3 See p. 6o, n. 4, for Hackforth's tentative suggestion that in the PhaedrusPlato's view may be that the lowest part contains an intrinsic defect rather than that it is to be condemned as a whole.

THE FALL OF THE SOUL

IN PLATO'S

PHAEDRUS

57

idea, however, need not be regarded as inherently implausible. The validity where it is called a 'manyaccorded to the lowest part of the soul in the Republic headed beast' (588 c) and again in the Timaeuswhere it is described as a 'savage creature' (70 e) is clearly precarious. Further, it may fairly be said that in the Phaedothe type of activity with which the lowest part of the soul is attributed to the body, is rejected as is concerned, but which in the Phaedo a constituent of the philosophic life.' The traditional belief, however, that Plato is describing an original fall of souls has been challenged recentlyzby R. S. Bluck, who argues that it is more likely that the souls who fall have been on earth before. With regard to Plato's X tells statement at 247 b, cited above, he makes two points (I) 'If, as Republic us, a soul in its truest nature is not at variance with itself, why should any horse be suffering from bad training if it has never been on earth before, and spoilt its nature here ? Does it not seem that the "fall" which resultsfrom this discord is not, in fact, an original'fall'-that the soul in question has led an impure life on earth, some of the effects of which still remain with it?' The ... ... Republic passage, to which Bluck is referring,is at 61I a-b 7jT~E EZOa ol, KaL Wo E PVX7'v, ELOVL 9EL aKvoLOoc7ros' rTOAAh9TOLKLALaS -'r aO6qErTarT OLOjVTooV which the heaviness, TE Kat aTro. (2) Bluckcompares y v - 7TrpOs &a gopa5E/IlE to is said which heaviness the with horse evil the of to oppress nature,3 belongs souls at Phaedo 81 a-d who leave the body in an impure condition, and suggests the cause of the heavinessis contamination as in the Phaedo, that in the Phaedrus, by the body. Having made these two points, Bluck goes on to argue that if the purification of the soul in the cycle depends upon individual effort, and if all souls leave the cycle at the end of Io,ooo years,4as we are told at Phaedrus 248 e, then it may be assumed that some souls leave the cycle in an unpurified state. The souls who fall in the Phaedrus myth, he believes, are souls in the last catethe question of how souls fell originally, Bluck suggests gory. With regard to that Plato may not have envisaged an original fall, but regarded man's soul as made by God for incarnation though, as a reward for philosophic virtue, it 41 b, 69 c, may earn 'promotion' to a higher existence. He compares Timaeus where the Demiurgos is said to create men's souls, show them the Forms, and then implant them himself in bodies in order that the universe should have mortal as well as immortal life and so be complete.s
The order of these dialogues I take to be PhaedoRepublicPhaedrusTimaeus.It has often been pointed out that Plato's psychology cannot be made to yield a systematic pattern of development. 2 A.J.P. lxxix (1958), I56 f., 405 f. See also Plato's Meno (Cambridge, I961), p. 52. 3 Bluck takes (247 b 3) as denoting gplWOEL 'heaviness', which is probably correct. 4 The departure from the cycle every Io,ooo years, Bluck suggests (art. cit., p. i6o), is simply to give souls the opportunity to refresh their memories with regard to the Forms. s An immediate difficulty in the applicawhich Bluck tion of this idea to the Phaedrus, does not discuss, arises from the apparent existence of souls implied at Phaedrus249 b who have never seen the Forms (literally never, as opposed to those souls at 248 c who in fact have had some vision; see p. 56, n. I above), and have never been in human form. Plato, describing the choosing by souls of lives for the second periodos,says 0 tov Mvaa Kat els r77ptov kuvx' a'vpwclTnv7 OV53OTE vporos 607p'0u 'd0KVEE7aLt, Kal EK
-qv 7rdaALV
1ouc0a

T7V

cOopwrcov. El aA?'eOELaV ElS rdoE

oUyap 21 ye tj/roITE,
77geoL

-ro

anta.

Although Plato does not discuss these souls in the Phaedrus, it seems preferable, in view of the form of the sentence, to believe that he had in mind some souls actually existing, than to take o' yip KTA.as a purely hypothetical statement referring to a case of which there could be no examples. On this question see H. S. Long, A Study of the Doctrine of Metempsychosisin Greece (Princeton, 1948,) P. 79; L. Robin, Phidre

58

D. D. McGIBBON

It is necessary to draw attention to one point, which does not clearly emerge from Bluck's account. On his interpretationnot only those souls who actually must be regarded as souls who have left earth in an fall, but all the daimones unpurified state. This supposition is necessary because (i) all the daimones have an evil horse which is 'heavy';' and (2) more simply, all the daimones have an evil horse. The idea that souls contain an evil element, even where the desires of this element may be suppressed, is at variance with Socrates' words at Republic 611 a-b no less than the idea that they contain an element which may assert itself. In the former case, as in the latter, the soul consists of diverse and unlike elements, while a forcible suppressionof the desires of one element cannot be said to constitute a state of agreement or harmony in the sense in which Plato used this concept of the soul. If the horse is evil its wishes in both cases are equally at variance with those of the charioteer.Consequently, although one could interpret 247 b in such a way that some of the daimones might be regarded as having their evil horse well trained,2 on Bluck's argument we may make no such distinction. But if we adopt the view that all the are unpurified souls from earth, we must accept, as a corollary, that daimones such souls as have been on earth and have attained philosophic virtue-and there must be some-are classified by Plato in the myth as theoi.3 In this paper I do not wish to discuss whether or not souls may leave the cycle in an unpurified state, but only the question of whether the falls in the Phaedrus myth are original. The latter point may be taken quite independently of the former, since we may clearly believe both that the falls are original and that souls may leave the cycle in an unpurified state. To Bluck's view that the falls in the myth are not original a series of objections may be made which, taken together, possess, I believe, decisive force. i. It is clear that in arriving at an interpretationof the myth, we must relate it to context and understand the theory for the sake of which the myth is introduced-a question which Bluck does not consider at all. In the passage myth, Plato establishes by means of an immediately previous to the Phaedrus elaborate proof the position of all soul as an independent principle, that is to say as an entity which is sufficient to its own existence. Since, then, soul is an independent principle, he is faced with the inescapable question-how does some soul come to be incorporated? It is as an explanation of this question that the myth with its account of the fall is introduced, because here, in contrast to the Timaeus,Plato does not attribute incorporation to a creator of the universe. This view, which has always been that generally held of this section of the Phaedrus, seems both satisfactory and necessary, yet it is set aside by Bluck without refutation.
3 In reply to a query of mine Dr. Bluck (Paris, 1954), p. xcii; Hackforth, op. cit., very kindly wrote to say that although he p. 91. flptlO at 247 b 3 explains Ta S lAAaa had not considered the question as such, he believed that this was his assumption. He ,/dyL?, and refers to a characteristic possessed referred me to his view (cf. art. cit., p. I6o) by the left horse of all the daimones. 2 I believe this interpretation to be probthat upon purification souls will be able to see the Forms when they wish-which is able. A distinction may be made at 247 b 3-4 between and AP1rwv,the former re- clearly not the case with any of the daimones. PplpEt I have dwelt upon the point because it seems ferring to a natural tendency to move downwards (which may be checked by training), that, on his argument, this must be our and the latter referring to actual motion assumption. The two points which I make downwards. are my own.

THE FALL OF THE SOUL IN PLATO'S PHAEDRUS

59

is strongly 2. That Plato believed in an original fall of souls in the Phaedrus supported by his use in it of the body/prison idea,' which implies that incarnation is a punishment for some original lapse. Bluck does not mention the occurrence of this idea in the Phaedrus, though he does refer to its appearance in the Phaedo.With regard to Plato's description of it there (62 b) as pIEya
-LS represents the application of the body-prison idea to suicide as "difficult to grasp" perhaps indicates that he was not necessarily prepared to accept the idea literally with all its implications'.2It is more likely, however, that what Plato has in mind here is not the dubiety of the idea but, what is a different matter, its complexity.3The theory of an original fall is clearly a very complex idea incapable in the last analysis of proof. That Plato should draw attention to this fact is not 'curious'when the context is considered.His use of the theory to prove to Cebes the wrongnessof suicide would be a case of proving ignotum per ignotius.Plato acknowledges this and passes to a theory more likely to win general acceptance, namely that the gods are our masters and we are their chattels. This idea is one which Cebes may be representedas holding already, and is clearly therefore much more suitable thai the body/prison idea for Socrates' immediate purpose in the Phaedo.It should be observed that with regard to what is an equally strong, if not stronger,statement by Socrates concerning the difficultyof the soul'simmortalitytogetherwith that of reminiscence and reincarnation at Meno 86 b,4 Bluck himself,s rightly, I believe, observes that the likely meaning of this is simply that Socrates is indicating that he is not able to prove these ideas, not that he does not believe in their truth. Since, therefore, the acknowledgement by Plato of the complexity of ideas in which he believes but cannot prove is a characteristic feature, his vigorous use of the Orphic body/prison idea must remain important evidence that he believed in an original lapse or fall. 3. In the famous passage describing the soul's vision of the Forms, Plato describesall those now on earth as at the time dealt with by the myth oAo'dKApoL OlE KaKWV iKal oAoKAtqpa XpOvcp 7TE4cLEVEV _z atvTno a'raOEvs9 acYq/ aLv a E,... Oaa evo-rpcp, KaOapol VO1E. The central idea ... E7orrc7TvovTEs Ev a3ya of this powerful passage is that the soul KaOapa,, and the Forms come together each in the purity of their own nature. To this idea, and, what is important, to the emotion which lies behind it, the traditional interpretationof the imperfection is alone able to do justice. It is very difficult to believe of the soul in the Phaedrus if in Plato's mind was that the souls in question had idea foremost the that, been on earth and carried with them, as the souls in the Phaedo, the ill-effects of their life there in the body, he should have chosen to dwell upon the view that they were untouched (cdraOEs) by the ills of earthly existence. It is equally difficult to believe that, after applying the concept of purity and perfection to the Forms on the ground that they are free from earthly alloy, he should use
I Phaedrus 250 c. Referring to our state before incarnation, during our vision of
Tovrov

rE

talvETraL

KaL O p~~08tO &L88EL he

comments 'the curious fact that ...

he

3 Hence jidyag. As Hackforth notes 'in the

sequel (8I e, 82 e, 83 d) he seems fully to the Forms, Plato describesus as do pavTot accept the symbol of the prison'. Plato's
8 VVV V77
awl>a

For a good oa-rpeov rpowov o eSTOaev/IvYot. see ad loc. W. H. Thompnote on this point son, The Phaedrus of Plato (London, 1868). Also see Hackforth,op. cit., p. 95. 2 Art. cit., p. 163-

7rept

'povreES dIvojida'oiEiv,

Phaedo (Cambridge, 1955), P 36. 4 Kat dAAa (i.e. immortality, re7& tv incarnation, and recollection) O'K v TYrdvv lr p r70o -dyov StLoXvPLOaallv.

s Plato's Meno, p. 3 18.

60

D. D. McGIBBON

this same concept of the soul if he was thinking of it in the manner of the Phaedo as 'interpenetratedwith the physical" or again as 'carrying the bodily with it'.2 The thought which must be uppermost in this point of view, as it is in the Phaedo, is that the state of such a soul is essentially as if it was still in a in the Phaedothe soul in question is specifically described as so body-and
~Eaau~l out in the Phaedrus. set The inference must be that the idea of the Phaedo was not at all in Plato's mind when he wrote the Phaedrus, and that the manner in which he viewed the imperfection of the soul in the latter dialogue was quite different to the manner in which he viewed the imperfection of the impure souls in the Phaedo.3 4. We have seen that Bluck's interpretation carries in it the view that the nature of the left horse is not intrinsicallyevil but evil only because it has been badly trained. If it has been properly trained then it is entirely good like the horses of the souls of the gods. This view, however, cannot be said to receive itself. That the nature of the horse is intrinsically any support in the Phaedrus evil is indicated by the actual description of its training which we are given in the case of the philosophic lover upon earth (253 cf.). We are told that, when the left horse after repeated disciplining is finally humbled and follows the charioteer, it is henceforward in a state of 'abject terror' (254 e aim The implication here, as R. Hackforth observes,*is that the o6<fl, s&dMUAraL). of training is suppression-that the desires of the left horse remain evil but that, whenever it comes into the presence of beauty, it will be too cowed to try to assert them against the wishes of the charioteer. Presently we learn that the horse will begs for gratification, and we are told simply that if the better elements, reason and thumos, prevail then philosophic victory will be won.
I Phaedo c 4. 2 Ibid. 8Ie i; cf. 8I 8i c 1-2. 3 The degreeof imperfection must be concan hardly be sidered also, since KaOapds divorced from the notion of moral purity perse. On the traditional interpretation, since consummation of the vision of the Forms represents the supreme test for the soul, no significant degree of impurity need be entailed on the part of souls who fail. Plato's point may rather be that the latter are simply not in a state of absolute perfection (thus yi7 at 247 b 4 may be taken to mean 'not KaASco perfectly'). This view is strengthened if we as having trained regard some of the daimones At 248 a we learn that their left horse KaA6~. the best of the daimones succeed in the vision only with difficulty; this indicates that even where absolute perfection is found, failure is not far absent. If, on the other hand, the souls are impure souls from earth whose condition, as Bluck maintains (art. cit., p. 159), depends ultimately upon their own will, it must be presumed that many may be in a state of extreme impurity. Consequently, with regard to the Timaeus, Bluck suggests (art. cit., p. 163) that the state of souls may be such after a cycle that they have to undergo subsequently an endless number of cycles.

709 Kal' cKcOapT0os

UCai-os

(81 b) which is the opposite idea to that

With regard, then, to the degree of imperfection, the latitude involved on the traditional interpretation need be regarded as trifling and explicable because the taint is not that of body with which Plato is preoccupied, while the latitude involved on the interpretation of Bluck seems impossibly great. One difficulty is to understand how souls of a significant degree of impurity could have any vision of the Forms, since for Plato the moral and intellectual aspects are one. f. Hackforth advocates 4 Op. cit., pp. 10o7 caution and suggests tentatively that since Plato is not propounding psychological doctrine for its own sake, it is possible that he does not mean to condemn the whole lowest part of the soul, but rather an ever-present element in it of carnal lust (aKa~OS which is to the forefront of his mind Epwo), in the Phaedrus. This view, if we accept it, would not materially affect the argument. Whatever Plato has in the forefront of his mind in the symbol of the evil horse here and at 247 bbe it the whole lowest part or simply one everpresent element in it-that thing is intrinsically evil. s i.e. as opposed to trying to assert itself by force.

THE FALL OF THE SOUL IN PLATO'S PHAEDRUS

61

There is nothing in this about any transformation,nothing to suggest that the horse is being turned into an active partner for good. The passage ends at 256 b on the same hard note of subjectionor enslavementwhen Plato describes
8ovAwatLEvoC~ the reference being, as the context makes clear, to the left dpEr', rES and reason on the other. horse on the one hand and thumos the left horse is 5. It is only by supposing that in the case of the daimones intrinsically evil that we can give any proper meaning to Plato's description
%C ~S

the lover and loved as

W l U IV KOKaK~a

EVEY VETO, iAEV6EpoCav-

two ways, either literally or as an intensified superlative. If we take it literally, we will have the meaning 'evil by nature (lit. composed of evil elements) and still evil',z which of course is that which Bluck rejects. But can he make much more sense of the second meaning? When Plato uses the intensified superlative, he must be regarded as stressingthat the possessionof evil is complete and enis evil only to the degree that the latter tire. Yet if the left horse of the daimones failed to pursue philosophic goodness upon earth, then it must in fact be in a variety of conditions ranging to one in many cases of near-complete goodness. Is it likely that Plato would have described a horse in this state as wholly evil? It may be observed that, on the traditional interpretation that the horse is intrinsically evil, either meaning of the phrase is satisfactory. are souls who have left earth in an impure condition and 6. If the daimones it is due to their unsatisfactorylife there that the left horse has become corrupted, why in some cases has the right horse not been corrupted also? It may is less liable to corruption than the lowest element, and be allowed that thumos we may agree with one commentator who remarks that at one point in the seems indistinguishable from that of reason.3This, the desire of thumos Phaedrus which stresses,what must be clear however, is to say no more than the Republic is a separate element and may, if in any case, that in the last analysis thumos the traditional from reason.4 differ On interpretation on the other corrupted, hand there is no difficulty. Since the lower element is regarded by Plato as intrinsically evil, the process of corruption starts from it and before it has advanced to any significant degree the soul has fallen to earth. who have at7. The view entailed by Bluck's interpretation, that daimones tained to philosophic goodness have been promoted and are classifiedby Plato in the myth as theoi,is clearly not without considerable difficulty. It is to be expected that whenever at any single point Plato uses a generic term of divine beings, he uses it at that point to denote beings who are of similar orders. Whatever be the precise significance of Zeus and the other Olympians, who are included in Plato's use of theoiin the Phaedrus myth, it is clear that they TEKaCL KaLEK right horse as KaA's dyaO(9S
TOLOVTJWV.

of it in the first place as

E'e ivav-rwv

Kal vavdros., We may take this in one of

In opposition to his description of the

2 We need not translate with Thompson (op. cit., p. 45) 'evil by nature and by conditioning' though this could be the contrast intended. av-rItog, however, may mean 'still evil' in the sense of 'irremediably evil', and not preclude proper training, as in the translation of Thompson. 3 Hackforth, op. cit., p. Io7. This is because Plato is primarily concerned with the

opposition of the better parts of the soul to the lowest part. Their cause for his purpose may be treated as one. At 253 c thumosis distinguished, as in the Republic,by its love of honour or glory. 4 For a quasi-identification of the desires of reason and thumossee Republic 440 a-b. For a statement of the possible corruption of thumossee ibid. 441 a, 553 c f., 585 c f. This point with regard to thumosis made well by Thompson, op. cit., p. 45-

62

D. D. McGIBBON

represent a type of being who not only never will be but never has been subject to incarnation'-the type of being representedelsewhere by the 'created gods' or astral deities. The probability must be that whatever other members are included in the class of theoi,they are of a similar kind. 8. That Plato regards the theoiand daimones as two classesof beings who are permanently of different orders is strongly supported by the manner in which he initially distinguishesthe souls of the latter from those of the formerat 246 b
LTTWV of distinguishingthe daimones must be, as by the fact that they drive a advwp~s Hackforth says,z that 'Plato while definitely affirming triplicity in the souls destined to inhabit human bodies, deliberately leaves vague the number of parts ... of the gods' souls'. If Plato, then, considersat least the possibilitythat the souls of the theoi as a classare structurallydifferentfromthose of the daimones, how can we believe that such of the latter as have purified themselves were included by him among the former?

IjPV Ka rTprov LLV

apXWV Uvwplos0

E L yOXE,

7jVY

KTA. The point

9. If all the daimonesare unpurified souls from earth, why does every daimon

not return to earth immediately after it has refreshedits mind with the vision of the Forms? In other words, why do all the daimones not return to earth in the on from the fact that Bluck's own myth? Apart argument refreshment is the only reason for their being in heaven in the first place,3 it is clearly to the interest of all souls to return to earth as soon as possible, and free themselves from the bodily contamination which they all carry. Further, if we believe, as who attain to philosophic we must on Bluck's argument, that the daimones a curious earth become theoi, difficulty arises. It is clear not goodness upon do not fall in the myth, but also that some daimones only that some daimones may never fall-a possibility which Plato himself underlines at 248 c where,
'4- lv /vixv OE speaking of the daimoneshe says OEac1?ds E A4paacr'ElaS OSE. vpola '7 ETepaS KaTl'7 s77S YEVOILIVI o IOv, XPttp" T'E rrEpooV EL" ' Y t v syr7L Kav ' TOrTO Are we to believe that aEL fAafl4EV1atL. TOLEV, adtlpova, the of whom Plato earlier describesas most like the

superior type daimon, gods a satisfactory vision of (249 a), and who in the mythobtains,if with difficulty, Truth, permanently remains a daimon,if it continues to avoid a fall, while inferior daimones who fall have the opportunity of winning promotion as theoi? It is clear that amplification is needed on these points. Over against these difficulties lie two factors adduced by Bluck, both of which arise not out of a consideration of the Phaedrus itself but out of a comparison with other dialogues. The first comparison with the Phaedoseems of
I use 'incarnation' here as 'incorporation' in my first objection above to denote the union of the soul with an earthly body The question of whether (246 c awotta yrgwov). the theoi are asomatic must clearly be left open. Such bodies as they might possess would not of course limit the powers of their souls in the manner in which earthly bodies limit the powers of our souls. 2 Op. cit., p. 69. The clear implication is that the clause introduced by parallels like the latter that introduced by cdra andrrp6orov expresses a distinction, possible or probable, which is a class distinction. The distinction may be that the souls of the theoi contain more than three parts (Hackforth, op. cit., p. 76, n. 4). or it may be that they have only one part, viz. reason. By drawing our attention to the fact that in the case of the souls of the theoi he has no definite number of horses in mind, Plato may be indicating that in their case the horses have no symbolic value, and are present only to accord with the imagery with which he chooses to express the prenatal vision of our souls. This possibility that in the case of the souls of the theoi the horses have no symbolic value is in fact considered by Hackforth, op. cit., p. 76. 3 See p. 57, n. 4, above.

THE FALL OF THE SOUL IN PLATO'S PHAEDRUS

63

its nature a rather tenuous basis upon which to argue. All that is established is that in both the Phaedo and the Phaedrus Plato uses the very natural metaphor of weight to denote evil in order to emphasize the fact that evil draws the soul from heaven to earth. The value of this as evidence that the cause of evil in both cases is the same is in itself slight, and, as I have argued, is furtherreduced by the fact that in relation to the idea of freedom from the impurity of body the the impure soul souls in the Phaedrus are said to be KaOapol while in the Phaedo But can any greater in question is specifically characterized as &KdcOap0os. The reliance be placed upon Bluck's second comparison with the Republic? must have the of views on is that Plato's this subject necessarypresupposition remained unaltered. This presupposition,however, is clearly dubious when it is consideredthat Plato's psychology is one of the most unstable elements of his thought. This might be illustratedby the Republic passagein question. The most common view of Socrates' statement, that the soul in its truest nature is not at variance with itself, is that it is by way of a preamble to the position that the discarnate soul consistsonly of reason. This whole passage in the Republic, therefore, might conceivably be used as a basis upon which to argue that if Plato did come to assume,as later, that the discarnatehuman soul was tripartite,he might have regarded it as subject to possible disharmony,' or at any rate would have felt himself obliged to reconsider the question. We can, however, come on to more certain ground. If we supposethat Plato never believed that the discarnate soul in its own nature could be subject to disharmony, what are we to make of the PX-7KaKYov theory in the Laws? Does this not necessarilyimply that some soulz in its own nature may contain a disharmonious element? If, however, Plato modified his position in the Laws for a special purpose, then there can be no bar to supposingthat he did so again for a special purposein the Phaedrus. We may believe that he did not adopt the idea lightly, and if we can take the essential details of the Timaeus at face value, as I believe we may do with some he abandoned it. This, however, was a natural step to probability, presently take. The idea of an original fall, with its view of human existence as contingent and in itself evil, was unsuited to the teleological hypothesis which, in the Timaeus,Plato for the first time systematically expounded.3 New Zealand University of Canterbury,
x The lowest part of the soul is given a legitimate function in the Republic.It causes discord, however, by trying on occasion to go beyond this function. 2 It does not matter for the purpose of the argument which kind of soul Plato has in mind, since Socrates' point at Republic 6 11 a-b is that no soul can be subject to discord if it is to be immortal. M. Meldrumn (J.H.S. lxx [1950], 71), however, makes

D. D. McGIBBON
the interesting, though tentative, suggestion that we should consider the possibility that Plato may be referring to human souls. 3 In dealing with this topic I have been compelled to take a negative attitude towards Dr. Bluck's two articles in A.J.P. There are, however, many valuable points in these articles, and I have received great benefit from his scholarly and extremely lucid discussion.