The Brazilian Military in Post Democratic Transition PDF

Revista Fuerzas Armadas y Sociedad Ao 18 N 3-4 pp.
115-146
The Brazilian Military in Post-Democratic Transition*

Maria Helena de Castro Santos
Instituto de Relaciones Internacionales, Universidad de Brasilia, Brasil
Resumen
Este artculo se centra en las relaciones cvico-militares en Brasil. El control civil sobre los militares es considerado una condicin necesaria para la consolidacin democrtica. De acuerdo a los modelos de control civil, Brasil era considerado el pas de Latinoamrica con menores oportunidades de alcanzar una democratizacin exitosa. Sin embargo, despus de 15 aos, el control civil es mayor que lo que estos modelos anticipaban.
Abstract
This article focus on the civil-military relations in Brazil. Civilian control over the military is considered a necessary and crucial condition for the consolidation of democracy. According to this civilian-control model, Brazil was considered the least promising Latin-American case of successful civilianization. However, after 15 years of civilian rule, military power has eroded more than this model anticipated.
Palabras Clave: democratizacin, Brasil, relaciones cvico-militares, desmilitarizacin.
INTRODUCTION
The literature on third wave democracies deals with various independent variables. Among these variables is civil-military relations, which this article focuses on and which is especially meaningful for new democracies in LatinAmerican.
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Dossier
This paper contains excerpts from Diamint, Rut and Maria Helena de Castro Santos, Authoritarian Legacies and the Military in Brazil and Argentina, presented to the conference Confronting Non-Democratic Legacies during Democratic Deepening: Latin America and southern Europe in Comparative Perspective, Universidad Torcuato di Tella, Buenos Aires, 27-29 August, 1998.
In fact, among the authoritarian legacies that most affect the quality of democracy are military prerogatives. Civilian control over the military is considered a necessary and crucial condition for the consolidation of democracy.1 The basic reference is still Huntington,2 and with regard to Latin America, the works of Stepan3 . According to this civilian control model, Brazil was considered the least promising Latin American case of successful civilianization. In fact, the first civilian government, that of President Jos Sarney, did little to challenge the prerogatives of the Brazilian military. Those remained high even after the enactment of the democratic constitution of 1988.4 After 15 years of civilian rule, however, military power has eroded more than the scholars of the Huntington-Stepan model of civil-military relations anticipated.5 Notwithstanding periods of military unrest, Brazil, in a series of
1 2 It was Terry Karl (Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America, Comparative Politics, N 27, October 1990) who first suggested the inclusion of the civilian control over the military in Dahls procedural minimum definition of democrary. Huntington, Samuel. 1957. The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations. Cambridge: Harvard Un. Press. For Huntington, the new democracies face the challenge to approach the objective civilian control, which characterizes the civil-military relations in industrial democracies. This pattern involves: (1) a high level of military professionalism ; (2) the effective subordination of the military to the civilian political leaders who make the basis decisions on foreign and military policy; (3) the recognition and acceptance of that civilian ledaderchip of an area of competence and autonomy for the military; and (4) as a consequence, one should expect the minimization of military intervention in politics and of political intervention in the military. Those characteristics are reproduced in another work of the author, Reforming the Civil-Military Relations in Diamond Larry and Marc F. Plattner. 1996. Civil-Military Relations and Democracy. Baltimore and London: The Jonhs Hopkins University Press. See Stepan, Alfred. 1971. The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil. Princeton: the Princeton University Press, Rethinking Military in Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988 and Os Militares: da Abertura Nova Repblica. Rio de Janeiro: Ed. Paz e Terra, 1986. Cf., for instance, Agero, Felipe. 1992. The Military and the Limits to Democratization in Mainwaring, Scott, Guillermo ODonnell and J. Samuel Valenzuela (Eds.), Issues in Democratic Consolidation: The New South Americann Democracies in Comparative Perspective. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press. See, for example, the first works of Felipe Agero, op. cit, and Toward Civilian Supremacy in South America in Diamond, Larry, Marc Plattner, Yun-han Chu and Hung-mao Tien, 1997. Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies: Themes and Perspectives. Baltimore; The Jonhs Hopkins Un. Press, 1997. But cf. Hunter, Wendy, Eroding Military Influence in Brazil: Politicians Against Soldiers. Chapel Hill and London: The Un. of North Caroline Press. Agero, for instance, resorts to legal-institutional factors (characteristics of the authoritarian constitution with which the military entered the transition) to explain the unexpected erosion of military prerogatives in Brazil. See his, Legacies of Transitions: Institutionalization, the Military, and New Democracies in South America. Paper delivered at the conference Confronting Non-Democratic Legacies during Democratic Deepening: Latin America and Southern Europe in Comparative Perspective. Buenos Aires, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella, 27-29 August, 1998.
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The Brazilian Military in Post-Democratic Transition
back and forth movements, has taken important steps toward the civilinization of the polity. Demilitarization is in progress, although through a long, slow and peaceful process. It did not came to a halt as expected, and scholars of the Huntington-Stepan tradition now seek answers to this puzzle.6 I will argue here that to grasp the whole picture and solve the puzzle, it is important to analyze possible changes in the civil-military relations of new democracies from the perspective of both the civilians and the military. That is to say, in addition to the important question about the civilian control over the military in the Huntington-Stepan vein, researchers must also inquiry about the military process of adaptation to the democratic polity as well as their new role in the post-cold war world.7 Looking through the eyes of the military, they face multiple challenges of adapting their behavior to the domestic democratizing milieu, of enduring their loss of power and prestige, of accepting and operating under severe budgetary cuts on account of market oriented reforms adopted by the civilian governments, and, with the end of the cold war, of redefining their institutional role. Therefore, from the military perspective, important research questions must be added. Do the military abide by democratic procedures? To what extent? Do they accept a police role, combating drug trafficking, guarding the coast, and eventually controlling urban riots? Do they accept the abolishment of conscription, downsizing of the Armed Forces and joining of UN-sponsored peacekeeping missions when so requested? What I suggest here is, then, that with a broader picture of the civilmilitary relations in the post-authoritarian period in mind the analyst will be better equipped to assess the patterns of civil-military relations in the countries of interest and their relation to the prospects for democratic consolidation. Is there still a coup dtat threat in Latin America? These important questions will be addressed in this article, having Brazil as the empirical reference. The analysis provided here covers the period 1985-2004, corresponding to the five post-transition civilian governments in Brazil: the Jos Sarney (19851989), the Fernando Collor de Melo (1990 - Sept. 1991), the Itamar Franco (Sept. 1992- 1993), the Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995-1998 and 19992002) and the Luiz Incio Lula da Silva (2003-2004) administrations.
This issue was dealt in more detail in mine A Nova Misso das Foras Armadas LatinoAmericanas no Mundo Ps-Guerra Fria: o Caso do Brasil in Revista Brasileira de Cincias Sociais,Vol.19, N 54, February 2004.
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The work is divided into two parts. The first one, following the Huntington-Stepan civilian control model, deals with the demilitarization process in the five civilian governments. The second part analyzes the perspective of the military, focusing on their effort to adapt to the domestic democratizing environment.
THE DEMILITARIZATION PROCESS

The implicit assumption of the civilian-control model is that the military will try to maintain their authoritarian prerogatives for as long as possible. They are expected, therefore, to resist civilian efforts to exert control over their actions and curtail their influence in the governmental agenda. Whith these premises in mind, a brief account of the Sarney, Collor, Franco, both Cardoso and Lula administrations follows below. High military prerogatives: the Sarney administration The administration of Sarney, the first civilian President after the demise of the military regime, has been thoroughly revised by the literature.8 Sarney came to power in a rather weak position, indirectly elected Vice-President of the country by an Electoral College (Colgio Electoral).9 Tancredo Neves, the indirectly elected President, died before his inauguration. The transition agenda was controlled by the military and negotiated by Tancredo Neves, with no participation whatsoever of the future Vice-President. Sarney had previously been an important leader of the party (PDS), created by the military to support the authoritarian regime. During his administration, he did not do much to strength his position vis--vis the military elite. In fact, his cabinet, continued to have six active-duty generals, as in the athoritarian period: the chief of the Military Cabinet (also the Secretary-General of the National Security Council), the Minister of the Army, the Minister of the Navy, the Minister of the Air Force, the chief of
8 Cf. Stepan, Alfred, op. cit, 1986 and 1988; Hunter, Wendy, 1997; Agero, Felipe, op. cit,1992.; Oliveira, Eliezer Rizzo de, De Geisel a Collor: Foras Armadas, Transio e Democracia. So Paulo, Paipirus Ed., 1994; Miguel, Luiz Felipe, A Sombra dos Generais, master thesis, Dep. of Political Science, Un. de Brasilia. The Electoral College was constituted of all members of Congress plus six representatives from each State Legislative. Note also that one third of the senators was appointed by the military President.
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the Armed Forces General Staff (EMFA), and the chief of the National Intelligence Service (SNI) . The SNI, the institutional symbol of repression and torture, was left untouched. Many high-ranking positions were filled by the military, including ministries and heads of state enterprises. As the transition pact included the amnesty law of 1979, human rights offenders were not held accountable for their crimes, and many of them continued to hold positions in the state apparatus. The Minister of the Army, General Lenidas Pires Gonalves and the other five military ministers dutifully advocated their positions on major issues of the government agenda. Congress had little influence in military affairs and so had the Judiciary, which included a especial branch for dealing with military crimes10 (Justicia Militar). The National Constituent Assembly (ACN), called by Sarney to craft a new democratic constitution, did not do much to revise the defense structure or to enhance civilian control over the military. Most decisions concerning military affairs came favorable to the interests of the corporation, although in some important issues the military were not completely happy.11 The major issue at stake was the constitutional definition of the role of the Armed Forces. Their internal task of defending law and order was maintained, but with an important qualification. The military could now take action only upon the initiative of any of the constitutional powers.12 Another important point was that in previous constitutions the military was placed under the supreme authority of the President, but only within the limits of law and order. This meant that the military was entitled to judge the legality of the presidential acts and they pressed to maintain this privilege. Article 142 of the 1988 democratic constitution, as indicated, eliminated this clause. Thus, a middle-of-road solution was achieved: the tutelage role was maintained with, however, important restrictions imposed upon the Armed Forces by the politicians members of the National Constituent Assembly.
10 11
12
See footnote 12. For an account of the outcomes of the ANC concerning the military interests, see Costa, Artur. T.M., 1998. O Lobby Militar: Um Estudo das Relaes Civis-Militares, 19851990 (Master thesis, Dep. of Political Science, Un. Brasilia), Miguel, Luis Felipe, op.cit, 1992), Oliveira, Eliezer,, op.cit., 1994 and Hunter, Wendy, op.cit. 1997. In 1991, 3 years after the enactment of the constitution, a bill was approved to regulate the organization, training and the use of the Armed Forces in internal affairs (PLA 181A/1989). The law determined that was the President prerogative to decide upon the use of the Armed Forces even if the initiative was taken by one of the others constitutional powers. This correction, proposed by the leftist representative Jos Genoino (PT-SP) - a former member of the guerilla movement in the 70s -, was welcomed by the military to avoid incidents like the one in Volta Redonda, a Steel Company in Rio de Janeiro. Called
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The Constituent Assembly abolished the National Security Council (CSN), but President Sarney created the Advisory Secretariat for National Defense (SADEN), with attributions nearly identical to that of the CSN. The creation of the Council of the Republic (an exclusively civilian advisory body) and the National Defense Council (composed of six high-level civilian bureaucrats and the armed forces ministers), however, opened up space for civilian participation in matters of security and defense. The SNI survived, but allowance was made for habeas data, which permits citizens to have access to their personal files held by the secret service during the military regime. The NGO Torture, Never More complained, however, that access to this data was still restricted. All in all, the intelligence system was kept almost unaltered. Other requirements of the civilian-control model were not fulfilled: a Ministry of Defense was not created, conscription was not abolished, and the Military Justice, a court whose members are military judges, continued to hear and try either the military or the civilians by military crimes.13 Altogether, however, although the military prerogatives remained high, analysts of the participation of the military in the ACN assess their accomplishments as a mixed success.14 By the civilian-control model Sarneys administration rates rather poorly. However, the Armed Forces were not fully pleased with the outcomes of the issues of their interest in the final text of the 1988 Constitution. This indicates that the military had to bargain and negotiate over the issues that affected them, facing the need to get organized. As Oliveira15 points out, they did it very efficiently, establishing two combined fronts: while the military ministers were in charge of making strong public statements in defense of their tutelary role, they managed to organize what was known as the military lobby to defend their institutional interests in the National Constituent Assembly.
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14 15
by a local Judge to put an end to the occupation of the plant by workers on strike, the Army performed their constitutional role at the expense of three dead workers. Those military crimes included, during the authoritarian regime, the crimes against national security, a broad label that encompassed major dimensions of social, political and economic life. Thousands of civilians that opposed the military regime were tried and prosecuted by the Military Justice under the accusation of crimes against the national security. CL. Oliveira. op. cit., Hunter. op. cit. Cf. Oliveira, op. cit.
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The military participation in the National Constituent Assembly was the beginning of the Armed Forces institutional activities in the arena of the Legislative. There, they efficiently pursued their interests following the same civilian procedures, a theme analyzed in more detail below.
Drastic civilianization: the Collor administration

President Collor, the first president directly elected in the recent democratic period, took a very different stand on the military issue. Based on popular mandate, and without the support of any major political party,16 Collor adopted a bonapartist style in politics. The sweeping economic measures taken at the very first hour of his administration did not leave any doubts about his intentions of establishing his autonomy and strong authority over society. The military was no exception. In fact, he combined frequent statements stressing his role of supreme chief of the Armed Forces with radical measures to reduce the military influence in politics. On the day of his inauguration, among the impact measures announced, was the extinction by decree of SNI and SADEN (Medida Provisria no. 150), which was immediately ratified by Congress. To replace these agencies Collor created the Secretariat of Strategic Affairs (SAE), in charge of carrying out intelligence as well as strategic planning and analysis. SAE, incontrast to SNI, was not granted a ministerial status. Moreover, a civilian was appointed as the head of the new organ. Many military officers, retired or on active duty, previously employed in the SNI and SADEN lost their jobs or were forced back to the barracks. Notwithstanding, some military enclaves persisted within the new agency. The attack on the so-called security community also included the dismantling of Divisions of Information and Security (DSIs), which existed in all civilian ministries for information-gathering functions. However, Collors attempt to give the SAE monopoly over intelligence functions, thus terminating the information services within the military ministries, as well as his intention to enhance congressional control over defense subjects did not materialize.17 In addition to SAE, the Armed Forces General Staff (EMFA) and the Military Cabinet were striped of ministerial status, thus reducing to three the number of military positions in his cabinet.
16 17
Collor was affiliated to a small party, the PRN, created by himself to run for presidential elections. Cf. Hunter, op. cit., pp.64-65, on this respect.
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The selection of the military ministers was an important part of Collors plan to demilitarize the government. The ministers are the Supreme Chiefs of their Forces, and it is up to them to control military unrest. Collor picked officers that had not been connected in the past with intelligence nor with repression and that unrestrictedly abided by constitutional rules. Despite the growing and pervasive dissatisfaction with the government policies and actions within the Armed Forces, the military ministers under Collor were able to prevent the fracturing of the Armed Forces and avoid coup attempts. The main sources of military unrest were the governments attack on the security apparatus and the severe budgetary cuts that hurt wage levels and the operational capacity of the Armed Forces. The security community immediately reacted strongly to the dismantling of the SNI. The chief of the important Military Command of the Southeast Region and two retired generals led the reaction. The retired officers criticized the new government, invoking the historical participation of the Armed Forces in governmental decisions to justify the legitimacy of their statements. They reminded society at this point that was better to speak out than resort to guns. Collor, calling upon his position of Supreme Chief of the Armed Forces, managed to have the Minister of the Army punish the two retired officers, although the Minister resisted doing the same with the commander of the southeast region.18 Shortly after this episode, Collor, adopting a carrot and stick approach, paid visits to important units of the Army, Navy and Air Force, wearing military attire.19 The drastic cuts in the military budget, which hindered the military power and social prestige, was a consequence of market-oriented reforms. In this sense, the military and the civilian personnel, as well as the military and the civilian ministries were treated equally. The equality of treatment dispensed to the military and civilians constitutes the novelty of the situation. The severe overall budgetary restrictions on items rather than personnel were certainly, a policy choice of the government, which decided not to privilege the military. The application of the same wage policy to both civilians and the military was a constitutional requirement (art. no. 31), which, however, was been
18
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Cf. General defende militares que atuam no setor de informaes, Folha de So Paulo, 5/ 05/90, Protesto de general irrita presidente, Jornal do Brasil, 8/05/90, Collor manda prender Newton Cruz e advertir Eucliydes, Jornal do Brasil, 12/05/90, -General diz para Collor dar tiro na cabea-, Estado de So Paulo, 12/05/90. Cf. Militares apoiam, com crticas isoladas, Correio Braziliense, 17/06/90.
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bypassed in the Sarney administration. As part of Collors economic policy wages decreased in real terms,20 equally impacting the military and civilians. The negative impact of the stabilization policies on the operational capacity of the Armed Forces was an issue carried out by high ranking officers, especially those occupying the highest positions in the military hierarchy or in the high echelons of the government. Important projects of the three Forces had to be abandoned.21 The high-ranking officers of the three Forces complained at this time that their equipment consisted of secondhand items dating from the Second World War. They argued that the Brazilian defense budget was already among the lowest in the world, less than 1% of GDP,22 and that additional cuts would not let them perform their constitutional role of defending the territory, the frontiers, and the constitutional powers. In fact, during the Collor and Itamar Franco years, the discontinuity of major projects was the least of the militarys concerns. The Army had no bullets to train conscripts. The Air Force was in shortage of fuel, and as a consequence, senior officers could not fly airplanes to train younger officers. The only carrier, dating from the World War II, had no planes to carry. Senior officers frequently reported situations like these to the press. Most of the time they resorted to non-political, technical, and legal arguments. Military ministers and retired officers together took on the issue of wage increases. The Military Disciplinary Code establishes that retired officers, differently from active-duty officers, may express their opinion about political matters as well as their philosophical and ideological thoughts. They cannot, however, criticize acts from a hierarchical superior officer, especially the President, who is the Supreme Chief of the Armed Forces. It was then up to the retired officers, with the occasional
20 21 22 There were nominal wage increases along the Collor administration, with inflation rates reaching,7% per month at the best and between 20% and 30% per month in its worst phases. Among them are the Armys Project FT-2000 (Fora Terrestre 2000), for the full modernization of the Force equipment, the Navys construction of a nuclear submarine and the Air Force space program. There is a great number of statistical sources for military expenditure. They varied greatly in terms of their definition of military expenditure and they use different formulas for inflation adjustment. Stepan, at Rethinking Military in Politics, examined 5 different sources of data, concluding that contrary to what has occurred in other military regimes, the Brazilian military expenditures decreased in absolute terms during the 70s. Comparing the Brazilian military expenditures as a percentage of GDP with those of other countries (SIPRI data, 1976-1984), he concludes that Brazil is the democracy with the lowest level of military expenditures as a percentage of GDP in the world, and the nation with the second-lowest level of all major nations in the world. The Military Balance (the International Institute for Strategic Studies), cited in Oliveira, op. cit., indicates that the Brazilian defense expenditures was 0.41% of the GDP in 1989. This was the most common rate cited by the military during the Franco administration. The ACDA data, however, indicates for this same year, 1.5% of GDP.
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help of the wives of the active-duty officers, to take the banner of wage increase. Voicing the demands of the military as a whole, they pressured the government firmly. A traditional channel of their expression was the Clube Militar, a retired army officers association that has participated intensively in the debate over important national issues before the 1964 military coup. The retired officers also organized in innumerous informal associations spread all over country. These associations, which approached ten in number during the Itamar Franco administration, differed substantially in the way their demands were carried out. Some of them acted in a clandestine way and even advocated a coup detat. Most or them, however, abided by the Military Disciplinary Code. The major task of the military ministers was to control unrest within the Forces. They did so by voicing themselves the demand for better wages as well as applying punishments to those officers who, breaking the Military Discipline Code, expressed political opinions or criticized the government. The military ministers pressed for years for wages equal to those of the Legislative and the Judiciary, much higher than the wages paid by the Executive to its personnel. This is a constitutional provision that, nevertheless, has never been fulfilled. The impeachment of President Collor was a crucial test for the process of demilitarization. The military passed the test with honor? Not only did they not interfere in the congressional process, but they also repeatedly assured their obedience to the Constitution. Vice-President Itamar Franco took office with no difficulties whatsoever. In summary, during the Collor administration, despite the hard economic situation and the militarys loss of social prestige and power, the Armed Forces ministers managed to control unrest among the military. They proclaimed strict compliance with the Constitution and acted accordingly, a fact in itself extraordinarily relevant for the new democracy.
Caretaking Government: the Franco administration

During his administration Franco did not deepen the demilitarization process, backsliding on some of the measures taken by Collor to reduce military prerogatives. In fact, the number of retired officers occupying high-level positions in the bureaucracy substantially increased,23 which was justified by the President as an effective way to prevent corruption. The fight against corruption was also
23 CF Itamar e os militares, Jornal do Brasil, 14/01/94.
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the excuse used by the President to recreate the DSIs, the branches of the intelligence service within the civilian ministries. Contrary to Collor, he chose a member of the military to head the SAE, the ex-Minister of the Navy in the Collor administration, Admiral Mario Flores, who displayed a modern and more democratic conception of intelligence. Franco also created, as a branch of SAE, the Sub Secretariats of Intelligence (DSTs). These facts indicate that Franco did not want to remove intelligence activities nor military personnel from the SAE, as Collor intended. Even more importantly, Franco gave back by decree the status of minister to the head of EMFA, the Military Cabinet, and the SAE, which resulted in government again having six active-duty generals in the cabinet. Despite those pro-military measures, military unrest greatly intensified during the Franco administration. The increasing number of public statements by high-ranking officers and the informal groups of retired military officers agreed in two basic demands: wage increases and the modernization of the military equipment. The economic crisis reached its peak. General, a former President during the military dictatorship and still a leader among the military, reported that low-ranking officers were living in slums. The Armed Forces was facing increasing difficulty in recruiting youngsters from the middle class.24 The series of corruption scandals that took place in Congress combined with critical economic circumstances created a growing feeling among the military that the civilians were not able to run the country. Some of the independent military groups advocated the fujimorization of Brazil, a reference to the recent authoritarian movement of President Fujimori. Those groups started to meet frequently and they attended as well a national meeting in the Clube Militar, in Rio de Janeiro. Reportedly, some groups of entrepreneurs, as they have done so many times before in the Brazilian history, started contacting the military, calling for their interference in the countrys political life. The military signaled, although quietly, that they were watching the civilian mess. A highranking officer warned against the fury of the legions (fria das legies).25 The climate was typical of the pre-coup periods.
24 25
Less than 1% of the young people that joined the Forces came from households with average income higher than 30 minimum wages per month (aproximately 1,200 dollars per year). Manifesto conquista apoio de oficiais, O Estado de So Paulo,5/113/93; Tenso nas Foras Armadas,O Estado de So Paulo,5/15/93;Militares pedem Itamar medidas contra crise, Jornal de Brasilia,5/18/93; Relatrios mantm Itamar avisado sobre rebeldia nas Foras Armadas, Jornal de Brasilia,5/25/93; Cerqueira: crticas de militares so patriticas,O Globo,6/11/93; Rudo de Sabres, Folha de So Paulo, 21/11/93; Os militares inquietos, Jornal do Brasil,12/8/93;Poder militar (da reserva) paralelo,O Estado de So Paulo, 12/14/93;Guararapes, o golpe que no houve, Jornal do Brasil, 3/27/94; Militares reagem reduo de aposentadoria, Correio Braziliense, 2/13/94.
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However, the military ministers, led by the Minister of the Army, were capable of controlling the pervasive unrest. The retired officers and their associations were not able to put up a concerted military action and the activeduty officers that publicly complained against the government were punished. Again, the commitment of the military ministers to the constitutional rules was essential to guarantee this favorable outcome of the events.
Rescuing the military: the Cardoso administrations

Fernando Henrique Cardoso served two terms in office. Both terms, he took office enjoying a stronger political position than his predecessors. In fact, supported by an alliance of center-rightist parties, he won elections in the first round with 54% and 53% of the votes for the first and second terms, respectively. Both his victories were, for the most part, due to his capacity to lead a successful stabilization program, the Plano Real, during the time he served as the Minister of Finance of the Franco administration, and to his ability to sustain it along his two administrations. This was true despite several international financial crises that severely hit the country during his first term26 and a major currency devaluation at the very beginning of his second term, in January of 1999. As a consequence of these facts, wage erosion decreased significantl, although the sense of economic crisis persisted during the Cardoso years. As for the military, since the beginning of his first administration, President Cardoso showed a clear intention of improving civil-military relations. He did not follow the carrot-stick approach of Collor, whose administration ranked well from the perspective of the civilian-control model. Instead, Cardoso viewed the military as a strategic actor whose interests and needs should be taken into serious consideration. To show his appreciation for the military, in the beginning of his first term in office, the President paid visits to important units of the Armed Forces. This approach to the military, however, did not prevent the President from engaging in a demilitarization process. A brief account of this process follows below. The military was able to revise budgetary cuts proposed by the economic staff for the fiscal year of 1995 (first year of the Cardoso administration)
26
The crises faced by Cardoso were the so-called Mexican, Asian and Russian crises, respectively in the beginning of his first term, in January of 1995, in September and October of 1997, and in October of 1998.
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and were pleased with their share in the budgetary proposal for the four years to come (Plano Plurianual). However, the expected steady improvement in the military budget did not materialize, as severe cuts in the government expenditure followed the sequence of the international financial crises. The critical budgetary situation of the Forces, therefore, remained unchanged as it had in previous civilian governments. Today, their share of the federal budget barely covers the costs of personnel and operational activities. Resources for investment, especially in technology and modern equipment, come almost exclusively from external credit operations.27 Those external resources made possible the reactivation or acceleration of some military pet projects as well as the purchase of much needed equipment. Budget is then considered the crucial issue. Notwithstanding the scarcity of resources, the military received a reasonable wage increase during the first Cardoso term. What is more important, Congress approved an amendment to the Constitution that separates their status as public servants from those of civil servants, thus allowing the government to treat them separately from the civilians as far as wage increases and welfare are concerned. This indicates that military pressure and their argument about the special characteristics of their profession have been successful both in the Executive and in the Legislative.28 On the other hand, Cardoso was able to put forward some civilianization projects that were resisted or rejected altogether by the military. Thus, in the name of increasing integration between the military and society, by the end of his first term, the President was rather active in reinforcing mutual amnesty (perdo mtuo), as part of the transition pact. The Missing People Commission (Comisso dos Desaparecidos) was created within the Ministry of Justice jurisdiction. Despite expressed military uneasiness with this issue, the State recognized its responsibility for the missing or killed people during the years of repression. Finally, nineteen years after
27 In the Army, for example, the total investment resources coming from external loans mounted to aproximately 1 billion dollars from 1993 to 2000, or an average value of 286 million dollars per year. To give an idea of the importance of these external loans, it is sufficient to say that operational costs and investment covered by the federal budget was around 333 million dollars per year in 1999 and in 2000. Investmment alone coming from federal budget in 1999 reached less than 34 million dollars. The Army could purchase with those external resources modern combat cars, artillery equipment in general and helicopters (interview with officer of the Congress Liaison for the Army). Interesting enough, the leader of the most radical communist party (PC do B) emphatically recognizes the especial characteristics of the military profession (see O Globo, 5/11/99).
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the amnesty law was enacted in 1979 the families of the desaparecidos started receiving financial compensations.29 More importantly, Cardoso reorganized and civilianized the defense structure, a process that started at the very beginning of his first term and culminated with the creation of the Ministry of Defense (Law N 97,6/10/99 and Constitutional Amendment N 626/99) and the creation of the Brazilian System of Intelligence, and its central organ, the Brazilian Intelligence Agency (ABIN) (law N 9.883, 12/07/99).
Steps made the building of the institutional framework for defense activities
First, in his first administration, Cardoso transferred the remaining intelligence activities, SNI-like, from the SAE to the Military Cabinet. SAEs Center for Personnel Training (CEFAR) started training strategic analysts with a different intelligence perspective. Cardoso appointed a senior diplomat to head SAE. The Secretariat was significantly civilianized, not only as far as personnel is concerned but also regarding its administrative procedures, profoundly militarized in the past. In Cardosos first administration, it served as an advisory organ with regard to strategic issues and took part in the formulation process of the defense policy.30 When Cardosos second term was inaugurated a further step was taken. SAE was abolished, and all its intelligence functions were absorbed by the Military Cabinet, renamed at this point, Institutional Defense Cabinet (GSI) and, in 1999, they were transferred to the new intelligence organ, the ABIN. A step of major importance was the change in the way the recruitment of the personnel was made. In fact, public contestations have been taking place since 1995 to select the new strategic analysts. They have been trained in ABINs School of Intelligence, which substituted for SAEs Center for Personnel Training (CEFAR). To be sure, the training of the two first classes of analysts displayed a traditional, military way of performing the job,31 which clashed with the emergent, more civilian perspective. By the time of the training of the third class, however, the civilian procedures have already made its way. This changing of ways and
29 30 31
For a detailed account of the military position on this issue see the interview to Veja, May 27, 1998, of the chief of EMFA, general Benedito Onofre Bezerra Leonel, Machucou, sim (Yes, it hurts). Interview with Minister Edmundo Fujita, diplomat, Under Secretary for Analysis and Evaluation, SAE, Brasilia, 8/07/98. This included a military at the head of the School, a rigid discipline and a military way of communication.
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procedures was also taking place in ABIN as a whole. Thus, it opened up more to TCU, the Legislative organ in charge of controlling the Executive and to various ministries. However, the big change was to occur in the President Lula administration when a civilian was chosen to head ABIN As an advisory agency which directly reports to the President, the ABIN is to gather and analyze information strategically needed in the governmental decision-making process in defense of the democratic State, the rule of law, the society in general and the national sovereignty. As articulated by the Chief of the Institutional Defense Cabinet (former Military Cabinet), General Alberto Cardoso, intelligence activities are to be performed rigorously within the limits of law and strictly respecting individual rights. Emphasis is put on strategic analysis of sensitive issues, like agrarian reform and social movements in general, or the occupation of the Amazon region. The Intelligence Agency is in charge of the implementation of the National Plan of Intelligence, defined by the President and supervised by the External Affairs and National Defense Committees of the two Congressional Houses. The government, as a landmark of democracy, commemorated the approval of the bill that created ABIN. General Cardoso said to the President: We followed your orientation. You wanted a State and not a government intelligence organ; you wanted a non-partisan, non-ideological organ committed to democracy; you wanted information to be an activity accountable to the Legislative.32 In fact, the article N 6 of the law 9983/ 99 that created ABIN determined that the Agency should be accountable to the Legislative by means of a Mixed Commission. The Commission of Intelligence Activities ControlCCAI, composed of the majority and minority leaders in the House and the Presidents of the External Affairs and National Defense Committees of both the Chambers of Deputy and the Senate, was created three years later, in April 2002. Up to now, CCAI has had three Presidents, invited three times the Minister-Chief of the Interinstitutional Cabinet and held four meetings to give information and make clear some of ABINs irregular activities. In general, however, the Committees performance is not well evaluated. The opposition leaders, moreover, fearing that the new agency could turn into a parallel power, as it did in the past with the authoritarian
32
Cf. Jornal do Brasil, Marcos da Democracia, Rosngela Bittar, 12/08/99.
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Intelligence Service Organ (SNI) wanted more effective participation of the Legislative in all the activities of the Agency. They complained, as well, that the project of the intelligence agency, initiated by Executive Decree (MP 813,1/011/95), was processed too quickly being submitted as a bill to Congress (PL 3651,9/22/97) and approved as the law N 9.883 (12/7/99). In fact, they said, little more than four years is a short period of time to discuss such an important issue. They feared also that the SNI methods could prevail in the new organ.33 In May 5, 2000, as a further step to constitute the institutional framework of the defense activities, the Subsystem of Intelligence and Public Defense, as part of the Brazilian System of Intelligence was created (decree N 3.448). Its objective is to integrate and coordinate all the intelligence and public defense activities of the country, including the intelligence organs of the Armed Forces and of the Federal Police, through the Special Council for the Subsystem of Intelligence and Public Defense, directly linked to the Institutional Security Cabinet. It remains to be seen how well this intelligence system is going to work. Will it in fact be able to coordinate and control the Forces intelligence services ? Will its degree of civilianization really improve? As for the National Defense Policy its process of formulation developed in 1996, the second year of President Cardosos first term. In September of this year, a journalist wrote that (...) they [the military] are shocked with the attempt of President Fernando Henrique Cardoso to create a national defense policy for the three Forces, to be formulated according to the interests of society and the constitutional definition that war is justified only to respond to external aggressions.34 Shortly there after, however, the Brazilian National Defense Policy (PDN), a major accomplishment in terms of the civil-military relations, was presented to the nation. For the first time in the history of the country the defense policy was formulated at the Presidential level, more precisely, at the newly created Camera of External Relations and National Defense (CREDEN),35 with the participation of military and civilian ministers
33 Cf. Correio Braziliense, Servio Secreto s Claras, 11/20/99; Correio Braziliense, Comisso aprova Projeto de Criao da ABIN, 11/21/99; Jornal do Brasil, Marcos da Democracia, Rosngela Bittar, 12/08/99; Jornal do Brasil, ABIN Ser Alvo de controle Externo, 12/08/99. Militares em confronto, Vanda Celia, Correio Braziliense, 9/09/96. CREDEN was created by President Cardoso to be an arena of discussion of issues related to the State interests, not the Government interests, which seen as political. It was a product of intense discussions between the President and General Cardoso, then Chief of the Military Cabinet. It had as its triggering event the killing at Carajs of rural workers, members of
34 35
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as well as invited persons, both civilians and members of the military, linked to the issue at stake.36 Prior to that, the military ministries separately defined their own policy. The process of formulation of the defense policy drawn by the Cardoso administration started with the issue of the navy airplanes, which requires for its solution an overall National Defense Policy (PDN). This policy has two main goals: to abolish the national security approach on the grounds that the internal enemy does not exist anymore and to improve civil-military relations.37 The National Defense Policy is, therefore, aimed at threats coming from abroad and based in the principle of peaceful resolution of disputes. The defensive nature of the National Defense Policy rests both on the high value given to diplomatic actions as the first tool to resolve disputes and also on the existence of a sound military structure that is capable of being effectively deterrent.38 Diplomats and the military should then go hand in hand in the implementation of the policy. Societys involvement on the matter was also expected. However, no progress in this direction could be detected. Congress, moreover, despite the fact that it has two permanent commissions related to military affairs the Commissions for External Relations and National Defense at the House of Representatives (CREDN) and at the Senate (CRE)-, has not participated in the formulation of The National Defense Policy (PDN), nor has it a role assigned to the monitoring of the defense policy implementation. The National Defense Policy is now solely the business of the Executive. The critics of the PDN say that the policy is nothing but a set of general principles and that the use of Armed Forces and their preparedness should be
36
37 38
the Landless Workers Movement (MTS), by the military police of the state of Par. General Cardoso referred to CREDEN as a State island embeded in a Governmental environment. Cf. interview with Gal Cardoso, Rio de Janeiro, 26 de maio de 2003. The members of the Camera are: the President, the Ministers of Justice and Foreign Affairs, the Chief of the Military Cabinet (renamed Cabinet for Interinstitutional Security in the second Cardososs administration), the Chief of the Civilian Cabinet and the Chief of the Secretariat for Strategic Affairs (abolished in the second Cardosos government), the Ministers of the Army, Navy and Air Force. In the second Cardosos term the newly created Ministry of Defense substituted for the three military ministries, renamed Commands. The three commanders, however,, continued to participate in CREDEN meetings on the quality of advisers of the Minister of Defense. Interview with Minister Edmundo Fujita, diplomat, Under Secretary for Analysis and Evaluation, SAE, Brasilia, 8/07/98. See also Rizzo, op. cit, for a thorough account of the defense policy and their changing principles under the Cardoso administration. Brazilian Defense Policy, Presidncia da Repblica, Brasilia, 1998, p. 10.
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discussed as well.39 General Cardoso, however, who participated in the debates that took place in the CREDEN, thinks that the defense policy as it was formulated was the outcome of a bargaining process or, in other words, the possible agreement that could be reached considering the different interests at stake. The PDN, he says, was to be refined in the due course.40 In fact, the National Defense Policy was discussed in more detail in the Ministry of Defense during the administration of the second Minister, Geraldo Quinto. The Minister formed a so-called Group of Notables, composed of around 30 experts on the matter of defense and security. The suggestions of these notables were consolidated in a document which, however, never came out. As defined by the constitution, the Armed Forces have the duty of defending the nation, its territorial integrity and sovereignty. To accomplish this task it is essential to persevere in continuously improving the integration of the Armed Forces, in both their preparedness and employment, as well as in the rationalization of the related activities.41 This strategic guidance of the National Defense Policy clearly calls for the creation of the Ministry of Defense. The creation of the Ministry of Defense was a clear Cardosos objective. In the same week of his inauguration, in the first week of January 1995, the President asked his military ministers to present a joint proposal for a new Ministry of Defense under the coordination of the chief of EMFA, General Benedito Leonel. The mission that Gal Leonel received from the President included the ending of the military resistance to the Ministry. Although the government has agreed to discussion within each Force and among them, Generals Leonels task was not easy. The creation of the Ministry of Defense took place in two phases. In the first one, the processes of creation of Ministries of Defense of other countries were identified and the models compared. They were divided in two models, which differ with regard to the degree of subordination of the Armed Forces to the Ministry. One showed a direct link between the Ministry and the Forces while in the other the Forces were subordinated to the General Staff of Defense. Brazil adopted the first model. This phase ended in September of 1997, when General
39 40 41
See, for instance Proena Jr., Domcio and Eugenio Diniz, 1998. Poltica de Defesa no Brasil: uma Anlise Crtica. Brasilia, Ed. Universidade de Brasilia. Interview with General Cardoso, Ro de Janeiro, May 26, 2003. Brazilian Defense Policy, p. 10.
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Leonel presented to President Cardoso the conclusions of those initial studies and a draft of the Ministry of Defense proposal. 42 The second phase of the MDs process of formulation started in October 1997, when the President included in the Group of the four military ministries the Secretariat of Strategic Affairs (SAE), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Civil House and the Military House. Ten working groups were created. These Groups performed a functional analysis (e.g. strategy, logistic, mobilization). The functions of defense were gathered in categories and for each set of categories an organizational structure was devised in such a way as to compound the structure as a whole of the Ministry of Defense. This phase was completed in October 1998, when the definite Executive proposal for the Ministry of Defense was completed, exactly one year after its start. It was coordinated at this time by the Extraordinary Minister of Defense, Senator lcio Alvarez. President Cardoso ended his first term with a proposal in hand. In May 1999, beginning his second term in office, the Ministry of Defense was created. The government basically faced two different proposals. The EMFA wanted to prevent political appointments to the positions for the Ministry and, therefore, saved many of the highest positions to the military. It also gave a prominent role to the Superior War College (Escola Superior de Guerra), which was to be in charge of training civil personnel in the military affairs. The other proposal came from the leftist opposition to the government, which wanted to limit the role of the Armed forces in internal defense and to increase the powers of the Ministry of Defense vis--vis the Forces. None of these proposals were incorporated in the Executive project.43 While the whole process of formulation of the Ministry of Defense at the Executive level has taken more than 4 years to be completed, it took only 5 months to be processed in the Legislative. The opposition criticized, as it did in the case of ABIN, this fast track in Congress, given the crucial importance of the issue. In Congress, the Executive project was confronted with the Constitutional Amendment Proposal N 498/97, submitted by the House Representative Jos Genoino, a member of the opposition workers party, who wanted to limit the power of the Armed Forces. His proposal, however, had a short life given that as it was approved the preference for the Executive Constitutional Amendment Proposal (N 626/98).
42 43
Interview with Gal Synesio, Brasilia,2003. F. Interviews with General Cardoso, Rio de Janeiro, May 26, 2003 and with General Synesio, Brasilia, 2003.
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As mentioned before, a significant part of the military resented the downgrading of the Commanders of the Forces as well as having a civilian as their hierarchal superior. But what they resented most was the fact that the first Minister of Defense appointed, Senator lcio Alvarez, not only was a civilian, but also a politician who could not be reelected. The post of the Minister of Defense was a compensation won by a looser in the electoral competition, being part of the political game that ruled the building and maintenance of the support coalition of the government. Military resentment surfaced in an episode where the Commander of the Air Force voiced strong criticism of a female senior adviser of Alvarez, who used to coordinate meetings with the General Commanders in the new Ministry of Defense. This fact upset the military because according to the military hierarchy, generals should sit only with their equals, i.e., the Minister himself. The Air Force, moreover, was to be the Force that would loose more power and prestige with the creation of the Ministry of Defense because of the announced privatization of the civil airports and the creation of a regulatory agency to control commercial airlines. All the airports of the country and the operation of commercial airlines were historically controlled and regulated by the Air Force, through its branches INFRAERO and DAC, respectively. The Air Force Commander strongly opposed as well the selloff of 20% of the shares of EMBRAER44 to a French company. This episode ended up with the dismissal of both the Ministry of Defense and the Commander of the Air force. The dismissal of the Commander provoked significant military unrest, with a series of protests of retired as well as active-duty officers of the Air Force, which went beyond the narrow limits of the episode. It didnt last long, however, as the new Air Force Commander was able to control his subordinates. The military in general was also more pleased with the choice of a non-politician as the new Minister of Defense, Geraldo Quinto, the former Attorney General. All in all, this episode may be interpreted as part of the process of adaptation of both civilians and the military to the new pattern of civilmilitary relations. It seems that Cardoso was on the right track. By recognizing the military as an strategic actor of undeniable importance and the special nature of their profession, by dealing with the formulation of the defense policy on
44 EMBRAER was the Air Force enterprise that built middle-range aircrafts. The Air Force grievance was less related to the privatization of the enterprise in itself than to what the Force interpreted as its denationalization.
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an incremental basis and by carefully building the institutional framework for intelligence activities he has been able to introduce important changes in the civil-military relations.
On the right track: The Lula administration

It is fair to say that Lulas administration continued on the right track as far as demilitarization and civil-military relations are concerned. In these last two years,45 there have been neither major backsliding movements nor major improvement in this matter. To be sure, a military crisis erupted, but Lula could deal with the situation well and managed to control it. Aside from that, usual issues have come to the fore: budget cuts, wages and welfare, replacement and modernization of the military equipment, the defense of the Amazon region (border trespassing, transference of troops to the region, agreement with Colombia), the new role (policing role, combat of drug trafficking, control of urban riots), and the role of the intelligence agencyABIN in a democratic milieu. In all those issues a bargaining process took place at the Executive level, between the Commanders of the Forces and the highest echelons of the bureaucracy, as well as with Lula himself, who directly and frequently interfered in the dispute. The outcomes showed that both the military and the government have to compromise, as it was the case in the welfare reform. To be sure, in one issue, that of wages, the process of bargaining extended outside the Executive domain, with public manifestations coming from the wives of the active-duty officers and the retired-military associations.46 These reactions, however, are the usual as far as wage issues are concerned. Many issues have to go through the legislative process (like wages and welfare) to be approved. As mentioned above, the Executive presents the bills (or other legislative propositions) to Congress after a hard process of bargaining with the military chiefs. In Congress the bills are closely followed by four Congressional Liaisons (three for the Forces and the fourth for EMFA, later the Ministry of Defense), staffed by active-duty or retired officers that interact strongly with the Ministry of Defense.47
45 46 47
Lulas administration was inaugurated in January 2003. Recall that the active-duty military officers are not allowed participating in politics. For a more detailed analysis of the behavior of the military in Congress see below in the section The military in politics.
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The Lula administration differentiates itself from preceding administrations in that it brought to the fore the role the military should play. In fact, the very moment the new administration was inaugurated Lula and his Ministers made clear that budget priorities were to go to combat hunger (Program Hunger Zero), a distinctive mark of his electoral campaign. This was the reason to abort the bidding for the purchase of 12 FX jets to replace the old Air Force ones and that had been taking place since Cardosos government. This was announced in the first moments of the Lula administration, on January 1st 2003, when it became clear which role the new government wanted the Armed Forces to perform. In fact, in January 5th, the new Minister of Defense, Jos Viegas, stated that aside from the first and traditional role of defending the country, the Armed forces should participate in the social programs of the new government.48 On January 7th, the Ministries of Transports and Defense settled an agreement by which eleven engineering battalions are to construct and reconstruct federal roads.49 Later, Lula expressed his wish that conscription should be a mechanism of social rising for the poor. The Armed Forces, the new administration thought, were to reinforce the performance of their historical role in the social-economic development of the country. This objective, however, met with the resistance of the military, who thought that their social role, no matter how proud they were of it, still was a complementary role. It faded away with the poor results of Lulas social programs. Finally, it is important to mention the military crisis that emerged recently, in October 2004, and how Lula managed it. The Correio Braziliense, an important Brasilia newspaper, published on the front page pictures of a naked man seated, with his the hands covering his face probably in despair. These pictures were part of the documents that in 1997 a lower-ranking member of the military, who served as a secret agent in the Army, handed to the Committee of Human Rights of Congress. At the moment, what interested more the congressmen was the fact that illegal hearings has been performed during a democratic regime, the first Cardosos administration. The individual pictures was first identified as an important journalist who was tortured and killed in prison. In the end, the man in the pictures was not the journalist, but someone else. The importance of the episode lies in the fact that the publishing of the pictures provoked a response from the Army that shocked many people. The
48 49 Cf. Correio Braziliense,, Viegas defende funo social das Foras Armadas, 01/05/2003. See Correio Braziliense,, Batalhes de engenharia do Exrcito vo construir e recupera estradas, 01/07/2003.
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Army in response, justified the imprisonment and torture of members of a subversive movement in that it was a legitimated response to the violence of those who refused dialogue () and took the initiative to arm themselves.50 Besides justifying imprisonment and torture, the written response used old terms, proper of the time of the military regime and its national security doctrine. If there was any doubt about the resilience of this group among the military, it ended with this event. Lula directly intervened and required a note with the signature of the commander of the Army retracting his undemocratic statements.51 The Minister of Defense, Jos Viegas, theoretically the hierarchal superior of the Commander of the Army, Gal Albuquerque, did not know about the Armys response. This insubordination was one in many others that have been occurring for quite some time. Viegas, even weaker after this episode asked for his dismissal, and he was attended by the President. The same solution was to be given to the Commander of the Army were it not for the interference of Lulas party leader in the Senate, Alosio Mercadante, son and brother of military officers. Gal Albuquerque is expected to be dismissed together with other Ministers at the end of this year, in a planned governmental reform. This was considered a milder attitude than the immediate dismissal. After all, no one in the government wanted to provoke a clime of revenge. This episode, however, served as a window of opportunity for latent issues. In fact, NGOs like the Group Torture Never More, the Catholic Church represented by the Bishop of So Paulo, D. Evaristo Arns, and Amnesty International started pressing hard to open the military-regime archives 52 and to reopen cases of tortured and killed persons that had been closed, including the case of the journalist whose false pictures triggered the military crisis. Lulas administration decided to deal with those issues carefully and slowly, as did the Legislative. *** Altogether, despite some backsliding, one can say that an undeniable process of demilitarization has ocurred in Brazil, beginning with the first directly elected President, Fernando Collor de Mello.
50 51 52
See Correio Braziliense, Questo Militar, 11/05/2004. Reportedly, this final note was preceded by two others refused by Lula. The opening of the archives has to deal with the decree n4553 signed by President Cardoso two days before he left the government, in December , 27th 2003. This decree modified an older one and established that ultra-secret State subjects have a 50 years period to be unclassified that can be renewed indefinitely.
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Up to the point, the analysis was performed from the civilian-control perspective. In the next sections the perspective shifts, the inquiry proceeding from the military perspective. How did they adapt to democracy?
T HE M ILITARY P ERSPECTIVE DEMOCRATIC POLITICS
AND THEIR
A DAPTATION
TO
In search for a new mission the militarys most difficult step is to relinquish their tutelage role. In fact, the Brazilian military seem to think they are entitled to this role by historical and political traditions. From the civilian-control point of view, this is a crucial obstacle to democratization. But arent the military progressing toward democracy on other fronts? This section analyzes how the military adapted their procedures and behavior to the new democratic environment.
The military in politics53

The military are a strategic privileged political actor. Their privileged position comes, in addition to the nature of their power resource - the use of force-, from the position they hold in the Executive branch of the government. There they were represented before the creation of the Ministry of Defense through the heads of the three military Ministries as well as the heads of the Military Cabinet (later Institutional Security Cabinet) and the Armed General Staff (EMFA), the latter stripped from the ministerial status since the Collor administration. Collor also abolished the SNI, the organ in charge of intelligence and security in the military regime, the symbol of repression. After the creation of the Ministry of Defense, Commands substituted for the three military Ministries and started reporting to it. However, the Commanders still have direct contact with the highest echelons of the Executive, as the Minister of Defense usually bring the three Commanders as his advisers to the meetings to which he is invited. So, from the six high-echelon positions the military held in the first civilian government of Jos Sarney they went down to only one position in the second Cardoso administration, that of the head of the Institutional, Security Cabinet. This is a very important indicator of democratization according to the civil- control model.54
53 54 The sources of information of this section are, unless explicitly indicated, the interviews with high-ranking officers from the staff of the Congressional Liaisons for EMFA and the Ministry of the Army, Brasilia, July 1998 and June 2000. The number of active-duty military participation in the Cabinet is the prerogative n4 in Stepan, op.cit., p. 95.
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Thus, one can say that incomparison to other strategic actors (e.g. entrepreneurs, workers), the military enjoy, even if declining, direct institutional channels of communication with the Presidency and the Ministries. Like other strategic actors, however, they build up informal relations with civilian ministries that are in charge of policies that affect them. Even if informally, the military always interact as an institutional actor. Eventually those relations become formalized. 55 They participate in politics, therefore, as an institutional interest group. This means, among other things, that the military never press for individual interests, something that they are very proud of.56 If it is true that the military holds privileged access to policy formulation at the Executive level, within Congress they participate in decision-making very much like the civilians. There they learn about democratic politics. From the point of view of the civilian-control model, it matters how Congress monitors and controls the military and the defense policies57. In Brazil, Congress does not participate in important decisions like the choice of general officers, the formulation of the defense policy and, consequentially, does not influence the definition of the use and preparedness of the Forces or monitor weapons initiatives. However, there exist some congressional controls like hearings and information requests as well as two Committees on External Relations and National Defense, one in the Senate (CRE) and the other in the House of Representatives (CRDEN). Also the share of the military in the Executive budget bill is submitted to the same bargaining game as the other sectors are, taking place annually at the Mixed Commission for the Budget (CMO). The effort of the military is to have the minimum possible cut in the amount proposed in the Executive budget. The Committees on External Relations and National Defense sponsor seminars on defense and security, with the participation of both the military and civilians, among which there are politicians, academics and representatives of government bureaucracies whose subject matters are related to defense and security. They also invite or make convocations to the heads of the military bureaucracies and institutions to hearings on legislative matters that are under discussion in the House or in the Senate. For instance, when the bill N 250/98 and the constitutional
55
56 57
When the issues are complex, like those of the administrative reform or reform of the welfare system, the military typically make preliminary contacts with the Ministry in charge of the policy . Eventually they form a working group, thus opening up a channel of communication and an arena of negotiation. We never ask for a job for our relatives. We are strictly forbidden to do that (cited interviews). This corresponds to Stepans fifth prerogative, about the role of the legislature.
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amendment proposals N 498/97 and N 626/98, which were meant to create the Ministry of Defense, were under discussion in the House, the Committee of External Relations and National Defense heard, in the period between May 1998 and August 2000, the Chief-Minister of EMFA, the Ministers of the Army, Navy and Air Force, the Extraordinary Minister of Defense and the first Minister after the official creation of the Ministry, besides academics with an expertise in security and defense. When ABIN was under discussion, the Chief Minister of the Military Cabinet was heard, and after ABIN was created, the head of the Institutional Security Cabinet was called upon three times. Also, a Joint Commission for the Control of the Intelligence Activities (CCAI), composed of senators and House representatives, was created in April 2002 following explicit directives of President Cardoso. This Commission has convoked up to now four meetings with the heads of ABIN to monitor irregular activities of the institution.58 Reportedly, however, until today the Commission has not performed well. The Committee for External Relations and National Defense of the House of Representatives has also served as a channel through which the military on their own initiative makes their actions accountable to society.59 The guiding question of the civilian control model is the extent to which the Legislative controls the military and their affairs. From the analysis provided above one can conclude that while it is true that the Executive is the predominant power, the Legislative matters and exerts some control upon the military. Even so, by this model, Brazil ranks rather poorly in the item role of legislature. 60 The civilian control model, however, misses important aspects of the civil-military relations when it neglects other questions, like: how does the military represent its interests in Congress? How does the military influence Congress and press for its interests? How do its modes of interest representation compare with those of the civilians? Even before the coup dtat in 1964, the military created Congressional Liaisons (Assessorias Parlamentares) for the Forces. It was, however, during the National Constituent Assembly that those Liaisons received a great boost, being completely restructured. Very active and efficient, by all accounts, the
58 59
60
Note that one of the meetings was with the Chief-Minister of the Institutional Security Cabinet, to which ABIN is subordinated. Following an explosion in the marines headquarters in Rio de Janeiro, the Minister of the Navy on his own initiative came to both the committees on environmental issues and on defense matters to explain what has happened and why there was no longer danger of further incidents. See table of military prerogatives in Stepan, 1988, op. cit.
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Assessorias Parlamentares pursued the Armed Forces interests. Donning civilian attire, they were seen in the corridors, in the Commissions and in the floor of Congress dutifully persuading legislators to support their interests on constitutional issues deemed to affect the Forces. They organized four Congressional Liaisons, one for each Force and one for EMFA. Like the civilian ministries they have offices in the Congress building. Retired and/or active-duty officers, depending on the service branch at stake, staff those Congressional Liaisons. The Liaison for the Army seems to be better structured and organized. There, all the members are active-duty officers. They work with four coordinated groups: one that follows the bills for constitutional amendments (PEC), two others that monitor the legislative process in the House and in the Senate and the fourth, located at the Army headquarters, that gives support to the other groups.61 The Army has also regional offices to follow military issues in state legislatures. The military career does not prepare for this kind of job. The members of the Assessorias Parlamentares attended courses offered by the University of Brasilia for legislative assistants. They eventually attend as well graduate courses in the social sciences. But, as they say, it is here, in Congress, that we really learn. So, they basically get trained to the new job in practice, with the civilian politicians and other legislative assistants, in the day to day activities of the legislative process. Since the days of the National Constituent Assembly they have been perfecting their working procedures. Until the recent creation of the Ministry of Defense, the four Congressional Liaisons, including EMFAs, followed basically the same modus operandi. The military members of the Congressional Liaisons identify among the bills submitted to Congress those that interfere with the Armed Forces interests. They send them to the evaluation of the corresponding Ministry (or EMFA). After a short while they receive a technical and juridical assessment and an indication to work for getting the bills approved, rejected, amended, or simply monitored along the legislative process. With this clear indication from the superior ranks the members of the Assessorias Parlamentares set up a strategy of action, somewhat different for each case, but following the same basic procedures. They follow all the steps of the legislative process, from Committee to Committee until the bill reaches the floor of Congress. They get to know the greatest possible number of congressmen, no matter their party affiliation or ideology, and build the most cordial relations with them. They try to persuade the
61
For a detailed account of the Congressional Liaison for the Army see Costa, op. cit.
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legislators to support their interests out of technical (never political) arguments.62 We have nothing to exchange, they say, we can only offer the credibility of our institution. Many times they hand the legislator a written report, which is a very efficient way to influence the process. They argue that their profession entails some especial features,63 and therefore they should be treated differently in some issues, like welfare and public servant status. They distribute booklets explaining those special characteristics or their preferences on other issues at stake, like conscription. They bring the representatives to visit their Minister or to a technical department of the Ministry so that all the information on the issue is provided. These procedures are followed for each bill submitted to Congress that affects the Armed Forces interests. Sometimes only a small part of the bills affect the military. But all of them are monitored.64 The big issue for sure is the budget. Here, as indicated above, the work of the Assessorias Parlamentares is to avoid by all means cuts in the budgetary items already negotiated at the Executive level. Aside from that they follow bills on sensitive issues - like indemnification for the family of opponents of the military regime who disappeared, nuclear and chemical weapons, conscription, use of the Armed Forces in the combat against drug trafficking - as well as on minor issues, like the free entrance of religious sects in hospitals or the interference of the Regional Councils of Medicine in the military hospitals. Thus, discipline, high esprit de corps, prompt technical and juridical back up, coordinated actions that follow one clear directive, planned follow-up of the legislative process, the promotion of institutional (never individual) interests are typical characteristics of the military lobby. Altogether those characteristics make it more efficient than its civilian counterparts. Aside from that, the Assessorias Parlamentares of the Armed Forces enjoy greater flexibility of action vis--vis those of the civilian ministries. Because the military ministers do not belong to any political party, the members of the their lobby can freely negotiate with congressmen across the ideological spectrum.65 In this way, the staff of the Assessorias Parlamentares can manage to build bridges between the political and the military world, otherwise two
62 63
64 65
This is the so-called corpo a corpo procedure, very much used by civilian lobbies For instance, the military work full time, with no payment for extra hours or the chance to take a complementary job. Because they move several times along their carrier from one region to the other, their wives cannot pursue a carrier of their own. Those facts are used to justify separate rules for welfare and for wage increases. The Congress Liaison for EMFA was, at the time of the interview, July 1998, monitoring 160 bills, while the Liaison for the Army was following up about 300 bills. When interviewed, the military legislative assistants stress this point, emphasizing how well they relate with the parties of the radical left: it doesnt matter if we think differently from them, we try to make our point with purely technical arguments. They like to
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completely separated domains. Working inside Congress, the military learn about democratic politics and try hard to teach the civilians about the barracks.66 All this points to an important change in the civil-military relations. What did change with the creation of the Ministry of Defense? EMFA disappeared, and the Congressional Liaison of the Ministry of Defense now provides coordination. The procedures didnt change much. The modus operandi is the following. The Assessorias Parlamentares of each Force and of the Ministry of Defense identify the bills, constitutional amendments proposals, decrees of their interest and hearings, ranking them according to their priority. Every Monday they get together in the Ministry of Defense where they discuss, negotiate and rank the legislative proposals, deciding who should be in charge of each item and which should be the strategy to be followed and acted upon. The legislative proposals are selected and ranked according to the degree of conflict they raise in Congress, within the Forces or at the national level. The most important bills to be followed are still, not surprisingly, those referring to the annual budget and the external credit operations. Other legislative proposals are related to the role of the Armed Forces in the Amazon, amnesty and indemnification to the victims of repression, conscription, welfare and health policies.67 In broad terms it seems that the creation of the Ministry of Defense did not affect much the basic operational procedures of the so-called military lobby in Congress, althought the Congressional Liaisons seem now to work less independently. In fact, the coordination of the Assessorias Parlamentares of the three Forces performed by the Ministry of Defense seems now, in Lulas administration, more effective than in Cardosos. An important reason is that in the new government a high rank officer substituted for a civilian as head of the Congressional Liaison of the Ministry of Defense. Almost all the military members of the Assessorias Parlamentares hold the post of colonel. The colonels were not comfortable to report to a civilian who was considered to be in a lower rank than them. In this respect, recall that the military crisis that was responsible
particularly stress their good relations with the communist party (PC do B) and with Dep. Jos Genono (PDT), ex-member of the guerilla movement against the military regime. Genono is one of the few representatives that show great interest in discussing the Armed forces role and the national defense policy. Interviewed military members of the Assessorias Parlamentares call the attention to that important part of their job. The military dont know anything about the way the congressmen think and behave. So, we come here, learn about it and translate it to our colleagues. Conversely, they think that bringing legislators to visit military units and talk to the military officers helps them to understand the military life and professional characteristics. Interview with Colonel Gonalves, coordinator of the Congressional Liaison for the Ministry of Defense, Brasilia, May 12 and 16, 2003.
66
67
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for the dismissal of the first Minister of Defense, lcio Alvarez, was in part triggered by the fact that the Commanders of the Forces thought that was inadequate that they meet with an Alvarez adviser rather than with the Minister himself. Another example is that the colonel head of the Assessoria Parlamentar of the Ministry of Defense left the coordination of the Mondays meetings to a brigadier who is member of the Air Force Congressional Liaison. It is worth stressing a final point. The civilian-control model sees the lobby of the military in Congress as a negative point. The military would be unduly exerting pressure upon the Legislative. However, they are playing exactly the same game as the civilian lobbies are. They abide to predictable procedures. Their tanks are not surrounding Congress or parading in the streets every time a bill of their interest is under consideration. This signals an impressive adaptation to the democratic polity by the military, with no parallel that I know of in any other Latin American country.68
C ONCLUSIONS
It is fair to say that the military in Brazil predominantly has thought of themelves as a tutelary power. Their intervention in politics is justified on the basis of political, historical and cultural tradition. However, the process of democratization in the domestic political milieu, the economic crises that plagued the country in the last decade and the changing international order put great pressures on the military. In fact, they have had to endure budgetary cuts and the loss of power and prestige, to adapt to democratic politics and to find a new mission.69 On the one hand, a clear process of demilitarization has been in progress since the Collor administration, the second civilian government. A major indicator is the decrease of the number of activeduty general officers in the Cabinet from six in the first civilian government to one in President Cardosos second term and beyond. Other indicators are the creation of the Ministry of Defense and ABIN,
68
69
This point deserves more attention in future communications. In old democracies, and this is certainly the case of the United States, the military press for their interests in Congress through non-formalized, indirect means, like pushing former military congressmen or members of the Defense Committee that have a significant number of military in their district. The question to be put to the democratization literature is then: how can civilians best control the pressure of the military on Congress? Which type of military lobby pressures more? See footnote n7.
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the intelligence service meant to be a non-partisan, non-ideological, non-military organ committed to democracy and accountable to Congress. Moreover, the military commanders and ministries of the post-authoritarian administrations have strictly abided to the constitutional rules, fact that proved crucial to control unrest during the first and second civilian governments. They have as well passed the test posed by the impeachment of President Collor. On the other hand, their insertion in congressional politics is surprising. There they learned about democracy and how to press for their interests in the same way civilians do. They play the game that is played by civilians and abide to procedures. This is completely new in the Brazilian history and signals an important change in the civil-military relations. Rather than a negative indicator as interpreted by the civilian-control model, I argue here that, on the contrary, the military behavior in Congress is a positive sign toward democratization and an impressive adaptation to the democratic politics. Paradoxically, a further improvement of the civil-military relations is hindered by the lack of civilian interest in defense and military affairs. This is particularly true in the congressional realm. Notwithstanding, the military is still a privileged actor with privileged access to decisionmaking. But all in all, it is fair to say that if there is no homogeneous commitment to the democratic values among the Brazilian military, they indeed abide to democratic procedures, a fact extraordinarily important in itself .70 There is no threat of coup dtat. And there are important signs of change in the civilmilitary relations.
REFERENCES
Agero, Felipe. 1998. Legacies of Transitions: Institutionalization, the Military, and New Democracies in South America. Paper delivered at the conference Confronting Non-Democratic Legacies during Democratic Deepening: Latin America and Southern Europe in Comparative Perspective. Buenos Aires, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella, 27-29 August.
70
Agero makes a similar argument. () transitions have succeeded without the military becoming committed to democratic values overnight (Agero, Felipe, Toward Civilian Supremacy in Latin America in Diamond, Larry et alli (Eds.),Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies, Themes and Perspectives, Baltimore and London: the Jonhs Hopkins Un. Press, 1997,p.201, ft N .6).
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Maria Helena de Castro Santos __________. 1997. Toward Civilian Supremacy in South America in Diamond, Larry, Marc Plattner, Yun-han Chu and Hung-mao Tien, Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies: Themes and Perspectives. Baltimore; The Jonhs Hopkins Un. Press. __________. 1992. The Military and the Limits to Democratization in Mainwaring, Scott, Guillermo ODonnell and J. Samuel Valenzuela (eds.), Issues in Democratic Consolidation: The New South Americann Democracies in Comparative Perspective. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press. Castros Santos, Mara Helena de. 2004. A Nova Misso das Foras Armadas LatinoAmericanas no Mundo Ps-Guerra Fria: o Caso do Brasil. En: Revista Brasileira de Cincias Sociais,Vol.19, N 54, February. Costa, Artur. T.M. 1998. O Lobby Militar: Um Estudo das Relaes Civis-Militares, 1985-1990, Master thesis, Dep. of Political Science, Un. Brasilia, 1998. Hunter, Wendy. 1997. Eroding Military Influence in Brazil: Politicians Against Soldiers. Chapel Hill and London: The Un. of North Caroline Press. Huntington, Samuel. 1996. Reforming the Civil-Military Relations. En: Diamond Larry and Marc F. Plattner. Civil-Military Relations and Democracy. Baltimore and London: The Jonhs Hopkins University Press. _______________. 1957. The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Karl, Terry. 1990. Dilemmas of Demcoratization in Latin America, Comparative Politics, N 27, October. Oliveira, Eliezer Rizzo de. 1992. De Geisel a Collor: Foras Armadas, Transio e Democracia. So Paulo, Paipirus Ed., 1994; Miguel, Luiz Felipe, A Sombra dos Generais, master thesis, Dep. of Political Science, Un. de Brasilia. Stepan, Alfred. 1971. The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil. Princenton: the Princeton University Press. ___________. 1988. Rethinking Military in Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone. Princenton: Princeton Un. Press, 1988 ___________. 1986. Os Militares: da Abertura Nova Repblica. Ro de Janeiro: Ed. Paz e Terra.

mhelena@unb.br
PhD in Political Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology - MIT, 1985. She is an associate professor at the Institute of International Relations, University of Brasilia and author of Poltica e Polticas de uma Energia Alternativa: o Caso do Prolcool (Rio de janeiro, Ed. Notrya/ANPOCS, 1993). Her themes of interest are democratization, civil-military relations, Executive-Legislative relations, defense and security, the new role of the Armed Forces in Latin America.
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Revista Fuerzas Armadas y Sociedad Ao 18 N 3-4 pp.

The Brazilian Military in Post-Democratic Transition*

Palabras Clave: democratizacin, Brasil, relaciones cvico-militares, desmilitarizacin.

Maria Helena de Castro Santos

The Brazilian Military in Post-Democratic Transition

Maria Helena de Castro Santos

THE DEMILITARIZATION PROCESS

The Brazilian Military in Post-Democratic Transition

Maria Helena de Castro Santos

The Brazilian Military in Post-Democratic Transition

Drastic civilianization: the Collor administration

Maria Helena de Castro Santos

The Brazilian Military in Post-Democratic Transition

Maria Helena de Castro Santos

Caretaking Government: the Franco administration

The Brazilian Military in Post-Democratic Transition

Maria Helena de Castro Santos

Rescuing the military: the Cardoso administrations

The Brazilian Military in Post-Democratic Transition

Maria Helena de Castro Santos

The Brazilian Military in Post-Democratic Transition

Cf. Jornal do Brasil, Marcos da Democracia, Rosngela Bittar, 12/08/99.

Maria Helena de Castro Santos

The Brazilian Military in Post-Democratic Transition

Maria Helena de Castro Santos

The Brazilian Military in Post-Democratic Transition

Maria Helena de Castro Santos

The Brazilian Military in Post-Democratic Transition

On the right track: The Lula administration

Maria Helena de Castro Santos

The Brazilian Military in Post-Democratic Transition

Maria Helena de Castro Santos

T HE M ILITARY P ERSPECTIVE DEMOCRATIC POLITICS

The military in politics53

The Brazilian Military in Post-Democratic Transition

Maria Helena de Castro Santos

The Brazilian Military in Post-Democratic Transition

Maria Helena de Castro Santos

The Brazilian Military in Post-Democratic Transition

Maria Helena de Castro Santos

The Brazilian Military in Post-Democratic Transition

Maria Helena de Castro Santos

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