NATIONAL STUDY

INFLUENCE OF THE GERMAN ARMY (1918-1939)

The Rechswehr - enemy of the republic: During the history of the Weimar Republic the army tried to maintain, a separate and superior place in German society, and frequency in the political decisions. Establishing relations with the Weimar government: After the defeat of 1918, the army made a determined attempt to pass responsibility for the loss to a civilian government. Ludendorff wrote I have asked His Majesty to bring those people into the government who are largely responsible for things having turned out as they have. Ludendorff meant the social democratic politicians had failed to support in the war effort. By having a civilian government to have signed the armistice it allowed the army to preserve the myth that it had been undefeated and it later gave substance to the November Criminals slur when scapegoats were needed at the time of the signing of the Treaty of Versailles. Recapturing the ground lost at Versailles: General von Seekts reaction to the Versailles treaty was to work in secret to circumvent its terms. The development of armoured warfare was disguised as transportation, and the regiments of cavalry were used to conceal motor and house transport battalions as well as number of technical units. The army was limited to 100,000, of whom 4000 were constitute the officer corps, Seekt picked his men with care, choosing recruits of high quality and officers who were promonarchist, strongly anti-republican, and who disliked parliamentary control. Intrigues in the political life of the state: The elevation of army or ex-army officers to civilian office increased the armys influence in the political life of Germany. The major source of the armys influence and intrigue was General von Schleicher, who manipulated much of the political scene from 1930 to 1932, he served briefly as chancellor, and was responsible for the creation of the conditions that enabled Hitler to come to power. During the 1950s, the historians such as W. Saucer and F.L. Carsten emphasised the state witching state concept, arguing that the autonomous position of the Rechswehr weakened the democratic order and contributed to the downfall of the Republic. An alternative view, from historians such as H.T. Gordon and H.Meier-Welcher, claimed that Seekt was loyal to the state and did much to consolidate the republican order. From the mid-1970s, thought the writing of historians such as M.Geyer and A.Hilgruber, a new perspective shifted interest from the Seeckt era to a period from 1926 onwards, when the army wanted to extend military influence, with the objective of creating a totalitarian military state. On 2 February 1933,he met with the leading generals and admirals and stressed two points: 1. A promise to restore German military strength by rearmament. 2. An assurance that the army would not be called upon to intervene in civil war.

A symbol of the growing link between the Nazis and the army came in February 1934 when Bloomberg ordered there Nazi Party emblem of the swastika carried by an eagle was to be worn on the uniforms of all members of the armed forces. Between 1933 and 1936, Hitler was careful to respect the opinions of the army. Therefore, it could not be argued that Hitler had established total political control until his foreign policy successes and domestic programs had cemented his position firmly enough to make him safe from the Reichswehr.
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The Reichswehr sought to blame the politicians for the3 defeat of 1918.The stab in the back legend

Ebert-Groener Pact against Bolshevism November 1918

The Kapp Putsch: Reichswehr does not fire on Reichswehr

Influence of the army officers in government, for example: Groener as Ministry of Defence 1928-32 von Schleicher 1930-32

General von Seeckt: military head 1920-26.Organised the circumvention of Versailles conditions, for example by training the army secretly in the Soviet Union

Hindenburg as President from 1925: growing influence of the army

Had its own separate agenda to reclaim the land lost at Versailles

The first association of the new Republic with the Reichswehr occurred on November 1919 when Elbert accepted General Groners officer to use the army to maintain law and order a suppress revolutionary activity. The Rechswehr was made up of men who had survived the rigorous cuts imposed on the army at Versailles and was officered by those who had formerly served the imperial army Germany militarism and its political influence under General Seeckt: The impacts of militarism on German democracy became highlighted within the rule of General Seeckt. Seeckt initially stood by the government, as he wanted order and discipline. The duty of the soldiers was to fight any revolt ruthlessly, from whichever direction it might come (Carsten) Seeckt was an aristocrat, was seen to never having respect or support for Weimar, and never attained a positive relationship to the republic and its institutions (Carsten) He

The role of the army 1918-33: the Reichswehr a state within a state. Its aims included To maintain its position as part of the ruling class To rebuild the military power of Germany

retained the armys independence and power, and even attended Cabinet meetings attended by the President. This gave him direct access to power, a damaging situation for Weimar as Seeckt was never truly for the republic. The Army Budget increased 75% in the period between 192326 due to Seeckts political influence. Seeckt did not however support Weimar. When President Ebert asked him in September 1923 where the army stood, he replied, The Army, Mr President, stands behind me. The ability of the army to retain their power was devastating for democracy Seeckt put the interest of the army before his duty to the government A.J. Nicholls Weimar foolishly recognised the Armys position as a state within a state and subject only to itself (Shirer) Rechswehr under Seeckt had an imperative role in Germany and the Democracy. Final Impacts of Army on Democratic Collapse in 1929-1933 under Schleicher The final and most imperative influence of the German army on the Democracy came through the impact of General von Schleicher. Gordon Craig The military politicians lacked the will to take responsibility boldly and openly into their hands. Schliecher replaced Papen as chancellor in December 1932. Lack of parliamentary support forces Schleicher to resign pushing army support behind Hitler and so destroying democracy in January 1933. Craig finally comments that in the end military politicians lost heart and their last agent, Hitler, became their master. German Reichswehr : Germa ! ds army as opposed to the arms race, the other egg ne interesting te counterpart ttings of us admitted to the Versailles treaty s weapons against the armor of the Entente L Santander powerless sind.Ein 7.5 gun, Germa ds heaviest artillery weapon, according to the Treaty of Versailles. The Night of the long Knives: It had long been Hindenburgs hope upon his death the monarchy would be restored in Germany. This however, was not Hitlers wish. As long as there was a presidential position, Hitlers leadership as chancellor was not absolute. Upon Hindenburgs death, which could not be far away, Hitler intended to combine the two positions and (chancellor and president) thus achieves absolute power. To do this however ,he needed the army , and to get the support of the army ,he needed to address the problem of the SA. Rohm, as leader of the SA, had power base from which he could, in theory, be a threat to Hitlers position within the Nazi party, Not only that Rohm and SA were part of a more radical element within the Nazi movement. Rohm also called for the reconstitution of the German army with the SA as its core- a prospect that appalled the upper-class generals of the Reichswehr. Hitler was not yet in position where he could ignore the wishes of the army high command, who made it clear that they wanted the threat from the SA removed. In April 1934 Hitler met with the army commanders on board the cruiser Deutschland during military manoeuvres and arranged a deal. The army would support Hitlers succession to the presidency in return for the suppression of Rohms plans and the acceptance of the armys position as the sole armed forces in the state. Until 1933 Rohm and the SA had been useful allies for Hitler, but they had become a liability. As well as alienating the army. On 30 June 1934 Hitler used Heinrich Himmlers SS to murder Rohm and other Leaders of the SA.

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