II. Power to Regulate Practice of Law LEGAL PROVISION: 1987 Philippine Constitution, Article VIII, Sec.

5 (5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court. CASES: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. In re Integration of the Philippine Bar, 49 SCRA 22 (1973) Ortiga v. Rivera, 37 SCRA 577 (1971) - WALA In re Cunanan, 94 Phil 534 (1954) In re: Edillon, 84 SCRA 554 (1978) Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava, 105 Phil. 173 (1959) In re Parazo, 82 Phil. 230 (1948) Tejan v. Cusi, Jr., 57 SCRA 154 (1974) Roy v. Oliva, 107 Phil. 313 (1960)

In 1970, convinced from preliminary surveys that there had grown a strong nationwide sentiment in favor of Bar integration, the Court created the Commission on Bar Integration for the purpose of ascertaining the advisability of unifying the Philippine Bar. In September, 1971, Congress passed House Bill No. 3277 entitled "An Act Providing for the Integration of the Philippine Bar, and Appropriating Funds Therefor." The measure was signed by President Ferdinand E. Marcos on September 17, 1971 and took effect on the same day as Rep. Act 6397. This law provides as follows: SECTION 1. Within two years from the approval of this Act, the Supreme Court may adopt rules of court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit in order to raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively. SEC. 2. The sum of five hundred thousand pesos is hereby appropriated, out of any funds in the National Treasury not otherwise appropriated, to carry out the purposes of this Act. Thereafter, such sums as may be necessary for the same purpose shall be included in the annual appropriations for the Supreme Court. SEC. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

1.

IN THE MATTER OF THE INTEGRATION OF THE BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES.

RESOLUTION PER CURIAM: On December 1, 1972, the Commission on Bar Integration 1 submitted its Report dated November 30, 1972, with the "earnest recommendation" on the basis of the said Report and the proceedings had in Administrative Case No. 526 2 of the Court, and "consistently with the views and counsel received from its [the Commission's] Board of Consultants, as well as the overwhelming nationwide sentiment of the Philippine Bench and Bar" that "this Honorable Court ordain the integration of the Philippine Bar as soon as possible through the adoption and promulgation of an appropriate Court Rule." The petition in Adm. Case No. 526 formally prays the Court to order the integration of the Philippine Bar, after due hearing, giving recognition as far as possible and practicable to existing provincial and other local Bar associations. On August 16, 1962, arguments in favor of as well as in opposition to the petition were orally expounded before the Court. Written oppositions were admitted, 3 and all parties were thereafter granted leave to file written memoranda. 4 Since then, the Court has closely observed and followed significant developments relative to the matter of the integration of the Bar in this jurisdiction.

The Report of the Commission abounds with argument on the constitutionality of Bar integration and contains all necessary factual data bearing on the advisability (practicability and necessity) of Bar integration. Also embodied therein are the views, opinions, sentiments, comments and observations of the rank and file of the Philippine lawyer population relative to Bar integration, as well as a proposed integration Court Rule drafted by the Commission and presented to them by that body in a national Bar plebiscite. There is thus sufficient basis as well as ample material upon which the Court may decide whether or not to integrate the Philippine Bar at this time. The following are the pertinent issues: (1) Does the Court have the power to integrate the Philippine Bar? (2) Would the integration of the Bar be constitutional? (3) Should the Court ordain the integration of the Bar at this time? A resolution of these issues requires, at the outset, a statement of the meaning of Bar integration. It will suffice, for this purpose, to adopt the concept given by the Commission on Bar Integration on pages 3 to 5 of its Report, thus: Integration of the Philippine Bar means the official unification of the entire lawyer population of the Philippines. This

requires membership and financial support (in reasonable amount) of every attorney as conditions sine qua non to the practice of law and the retention of his name in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court. The term "Bar" refers to the collectivity of all persons whose names appear in the Roll of Attorneys. An Integrated Bar (or Unified Bar) perforce must include all lawyers. Complete unification is not possible unless it is decreed by an entity with power to do so: the State. Bar integration, therefore, signifies the setting up by Government authority of a national organization of the legal profession based on the recognition of the lawyer as an officer of the court. Designed to improve the position of the Bar as an instrumentality of justice and the Rule of Law, integration fosters cohesion among lawyers, and ensures, through their own organized action and participation, the promotion of the objectives of the legal profession, pursuant to the principle of maximum Bar autonomy with minimum supervision and regulation by the Supreme Court. The purposes of an integrated Bar, in general, are: (1) Assist in the administration of justice; (2) Foster and maintain on the part of its members high ideals of integrity, learning, professional competence, public service and conduct; (3) Safeguard the professional interests of its members; (4) Cultivate among its members a spirit of cordiality and brotherhood; (5) Provide a forum for the discussion of law, jurisprudence, law reform, pleading, practice and procedure, and the relations of the Bar to the Bench and to the public, and publish information relating thereto; (6) Encourage and foster legal education; (7) Promote a continuing program of legal research in substantive and adjective law, and make reports and recommendations thereon; and (8) Enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility effectively.

Integration of the Bar will, among other things, make it possible for the legal profession to: (1) Render more effective assistance in maintaining the Rule of Law; (2) Protect lawyers and litigants against the abuse of tyrannical judges and prosecuting officers; (3) Discharge, fully and properly, its responsibility in the disciplining and/or removal of incompetent and unworthy judges and prosecuting officers; (4) Shield the judiciary, which traditionally cannot defend itself except within its own forum, from the assaults that politics and self-interest may level at it, and assist it to maintain its integrity, impartiality and independence; (5) Have an effective voice in the selection of judges and prosecuting officers; (6) Prevent the unauthorized practice of law, and break up any monopoly of local practice maintained through influence or position; (7) Establish welfare funds for families of disabled and deceased lawyers; (8) Provide placement services, and establish legal aid offices and set up lawyer reference services throughout the country so that the poor may not lack competent legal service; (9) Distribute educational and informational materials that are difficult to obtain in many of our provinces; (10) Devise and maintain a program of continuing legal education for practising attorneys in order to elevate the standards of the profession throughout the country; (11) Enforce rigid ethical standards, and promulgate minimum fees schedules; (12) Create law centers and establish law libraries for legal research; (13) Conduct campaigns to educate the people on their legal rights and obligations, on the importance of preventive legal advice, and on the functions and duties of the Filipino lawyer; and

(14) Generate and maintain pervasive and meaningful country-wide involvement of the lawyer population in the solution of the multifarious problems that afflict the nation. Anent the first issue, the Court is of the view that it may integrate the Philippine Bar in the exercise of its power, under Article VIII, Sec. 13 of the Constitution, "to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law." Indeed, the power to integrate is an inherent part of the Court's constitutional authority over the Bar. In providing that "the Supreme Court may adopt rules of court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar," Republic Act 6397 neither confers a new power nor restricts the Court's inherent power, but is a mere legislative declaration that the integration of the Bar will promote public interest or, more specifically, will "raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively." Resolution of the second issue whether the unification of the Bar would be constitutional hinges on the effects of Bar integration on the lawyer's constitutional rights of freedom of association and freedom of speech, and on the nature of the dues exacted from him. The Court approvingly quotes the following pertinent discussion made by the Commission on Bar Integration pages 44 to 49 of its Report: Constitutionality of Bar Integration Judicial Pronouncements. In all cases where the validity of Bar integration measures has been put in issue, the Courts have upheld their constitutionality. The judicial pronouncements support this reasoning: Courts have inherent power to supervise and regulate the practice of law. The practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege; a privilege, moreover, clothed with public interest, because a lawyer owes duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to the nation; and takes part in one of the most important functions of the State, the administration of justice, as an officer of the court. Because the practice of law is privilege clothed with public interest, it is far and just that the exercise of that privilege be regulated to assure compliance with the lawyer's public responsibilities.

These public responsibilities can best be discharged through collective action; but there can be no collective action without an organized body; no organized body can operate effectively without incurring expenses; therefore, it is fair and just that all attorneys be required to contribute to the support of such organized body; and, given existing Bar conditions, the most efficient means of doing so is by integrating the Bar through a rule of court that requires all lawyers to pay annual dues to the Integrated Bar. 1. Freedom of Association. To compel a lawyer to be a member of an integrated Bar is not violative of his constitutional freedom to associate (or the corollary right not to associate). Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is not already a member. He became a member of the Bar when he passed the Bar examinations. All that integration actually does is to provide an official national organization for the well-defined but unorganized and incohesive group of which every lawyer is already a member. Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The body compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. Otherwise stated, membership in the Unified Bar imposes only the duty to pay dues in reasonable amount. The issue therefore, is a question of compelled financial support of group activities, not involuntary membership in any other aspect. The greater part of Unified Bar activities serves the function of elevating the educational and ethical standards of the Bar to the end of improving the quality of the legal service available to the people. The Supreme Court, in order to further the State's legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional services, may require that the cost of improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program the lawyers. Assuming that Bar integration does compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar, such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State. The legal profession has long been regarded as a proper subject of legislative regulation and control. Moreover, the inherent power of the Supreme Court to regulate the Bar includes the authority to integrate the Bar.

2. Regulatory Fee. For the Court to prescribe dues to be paid by the members does not mean that the Court levies a tax. A membership fee in the Integrated Bar is an exaction for regulation, while the purpose of a tax is revenue. If the Court has inherent power to regulate the Bar, it follows that as an incident to regulation, it may impose a membership fee for that purpose . It would not be possible to push through an Integrated Bar program without means to defray the concomitant expenses. The doctrine of implied powers necessarily includes the power to impose such an exaction. The only limitation upon the State's power to regulate the Bar is that the regulation does not impose an unconstitutional burden. The public interest promoted by the integration of the Bar far outweighs the inconsequential inconvenience to a member that might result from his required payment of annual dues. 3. Freedom of Speech. A lawyer is free, as he has always been, to voice his views on any subject in any manner he wishes, even though such views be opposed to positions taken by the Unified Bar. For the Integrated Bar to use a member's due to promote measures to which said member is opposed, would not nullify or adversely affect his freedom of speech. Since a State may constitutionally condition the right to practice law upon membership in the Integrated Bar, it is difficult to understand why it should become unconstitutional for the Bar to use the member's dues to fulfill the very purposes for which it was established. The objection would make every Governmental exaction the material of a "free speech" issue. Even the income tax would be suspect. The objection would carry us to lengths that have never been dreamed of. The conscientious objector, if his liberties were to be thus extended, might refuse to contribute taxes in furtherance of war or of any other end condemned by his conscience as irreligious or immoral. The right of private judgment has never yet been exalted above the powers and the compulsion of the agencies of Government. 4. Fair to All Lawyers.

Bar integration is not unfair to lawyers already practising because although the requirement to pay annual dues is a new regulation, it will give the members of the Bar a new system which they hitherto have not had and through which, by proper work, they will receive benefits they have not heretofore enjoyed, and discharge their public responsibilities in a more effective manner than they have been able to do in the past. Because the requirement to pay dues is a valid exercise of regulatory power by the Court, because it will apply equally to all lawyers, young and old, at the time Bar integration takes effect, and because it is a new regulation in exchange for new benefits, it is not retroactive, it is not unequal, it is not unfair. To resolve the third and final issue whether the Court should ordain the integration of the Bar at this time requires a careful overview of the practicability and necessity as well as the advantages and disadvantages of Bar integration. In many other jurisdictions, notably in England, Canada and the United States, Bar integration has yielded the following benefits: (1) improved discipline among the members of the Bar; (2) greater influence and ascendancy of the Bar; (3) better and more meaningful participation of the individual lawyer in the activities of the Integrated Bar; (4) greater Bar facilities and services; (5) elimination of unauthorized practice; (6) avoidance of costly membership campaigns; (7) establishment of an official status for the Bar; (8) more cohesive profession; and (9) better and more effective discharge by the Bar of its obligations and responsibilities to its members, to the courts, and to the public. No less than these salutary consequences are envisioned and in fact expected from the unification of the Philippine Bar. Upon the other hand, it has been variously argued that in the event of integration, Government authority will dominate the Bar; local Bar associations will be weakened; cliquism will be the inevitable result; effective lobbying will not be possible; the Bar will become an impersonal Bar; and politics will intrude into its affairs. It is noteworthy, however, that these and other evils prophesied by opponents of Bar integration have failed to materialize in over fifty years of Bar integration experience in England, Canada and the United States. In all the jurisdictions where the Integrated Bar has been tried, none of the abuses or evils feared has arisen; on the other hand, it has restored public confidence in the Bar, enlarged professional consciousness, energized the Bar's responsibilities to the public, and vastly improved the administration of justice. How do the Filipino lawyers themselves regard Bar integration? The official statistics compiled by the Commission on Bar integration show that in the national poll recently conducted by the Commission in the matter of the integration of the Philippine Bar, of a total of 15,090 lawyers from all over the archipelago who have turned in their individual responses, 14,555 (or 96.45 per cent) voted in favor of Bar integration, while only 378 (or 2.51 per cent) voted against it, and 157 (or 1.04 per cent) are non-commital. In addition, a total of eighty (80) local Bar association and lawyers' groups all over the Philippines have submitted resolutions and other expressions of unqualified endorsement and/or support for Bar integration, while not a single local Bar association or lawyers' group has expressed opposed position thereto. Finally, of the 13,802 individual lawyers who cast their plebiscite ballots on the proposed integration Court Rule drafted by the Commission, 12,855 (or 93.14 per cent) voted in favor thereof, 662

(or 4.80 per cent) vote against it, and 285 (or 2.06 per cent) are non-committal. 5 All these clearly indicate an overwhelming nationwide demand for Bar integration at this time. The Court is fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing conscientious study of all the arguments adduced in Adm. Case No. 526 and the authoritative materials and the mass of factual data contained in the exhaustive Report of the Commission on Bar Integration, that the integration of the Philippine Bar is "perfectly constitutional and legally unobjectionable," within the context of contemporary conditions in the Philippines, has become an imperative means to raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility fully and effectively. ACCORDINGLY, the Court, by virtue of the power vested in it by Section 13 of Article VIII of the Constitution, hereby ordains the integration of the Bar of the Philippines in accordance with the attached COURT RULE, effective on January 16, 1973. Concepcion, C.J., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castillo, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra, JJ., concur.

In re Cunanan, 94 Phil 534 - DIGEST In recent years few controversial issues have aroused so much public interest and concern as Republic Act No. 972, popularly known as the "Bar Flunkers' Act of 1953." Under the Rules of Court governing admission to the bar, "in order that a candidate (for admission to the Bar) may be deemed to have passed his examinations successfully, he must have obtained a general average of 75 per cent in all subjects, without falling below 50 per cent in any subject." (Rule 127, sec. 14, Rules of Court). Nevertheless, considering the varying difficulties of the different bar examinations held since 1946 and the varying degree of strictness with which the examination papers were graded, this court passed and admitted to the bar those candidates who had obtained an average of only 72 per cent in 1946, 69 per cent in 1947, 70 per cent in 1948, and 74 per cent in 1949. In 1950 to 1953, the 74 per cent was raised to 75 per cent. Believing themselves as fully qualified to practice law as those reconsidered and passed by this court, and feeling conscious of having been discriminated against (See Explanatory Note to R.A. No. 972), unsuccessful candidates who obtained averages of a few percentage lower than those admitted to the Bar agitated in Congress for, and secured in 1951 the passage of Senate Bill No. 12 which, among others, reduced the passing general average in bar examinations to 70 per cent effective since 1946. The President requested the views of this court on the bill. Complying with that request, seven members of the court subscribed to and submitted written comments adverse thereto, and shortly thereafter the President vetoed it. Congress did not override the veto. Instead, it approved Senate Bill No. 371, embodying substantially the provisions of the vetoed bill. Although the members of this court reiterated their unfavorable views on the matter, the President allowed the bill to become a law on June 21, 1953 without his signature. The law, which incidentally was enacted in an election year, reads in full as follows: REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972 AN ACT TO FIX THE PASSING MARKS FOR BAR EXAMINATIONS FROM NINETEEN HUNDRED AND FORTY-SIX UP TO AND INCLUDING NINETEEN HUNDRED AND FIFTY-FIVE. Facts: Congress passed Republic Act Number 972, commonly known as the Bar Flunkers Act of 1953. In accordance with the said law, the Supreme Court then passed and admitted to the bar those candidates who had obtained an average of 72 per cent by raising it to 75 percent. After its approval, many of the unsuccessful postwar candidates filed petitions for admission to the bar invoking its provisions, while other motions for the revision of their examination papers were still pending also invoked the aforesaid law as an additional ground for admission. There are also others who have sought simply the reconsideration of their grades without, however, invoking the law in question. To avoid injustice to individual petitioners, the court first reviewed the motions for reconsideration, irrespective of whether or not they had invoked Republic Act No. 972. Issue: Whether or Not RA No. 972 is constitutional and valid.

Held: Summarizing, we are of the opinion and hereby declare that Republic Act No. 972 is unconstitutional and therefore, void, and without any force nor effect for the following reasons, to wit: 1. Because its declared purpose is to admit 810 candidates who failed in the bar examinations of 1946-1952, and who, it admits, are certainly inadequately prepared to practice law, as was exactly found by this Court in the aforesaid years. It decrees the admission to the Bar of these candidates, depriving this Tribunal of the opportunity to determine if they are at present already prepared to become members of the Bar. It obliges the Tribunal to perform something contrary to reason and in an arbitrary manner. This is a manifest encroachment on the constitutional responsibility of the Supreme Court. 2. Because it is, in effect, a judgment revoking the resolution of this Court on the petitions of these 810 candidates, without having examined their respective examination papers, and although it is admitted that this Tribunal may reconsider said resolution at any time for justifiable reasons, only this Court and no other may revise and alter them. In attempting to do it directly Republic Act No. 972 violated the Constitution. 3. By the disputed law, Congress has exceeded its legislative power to repeal, alter and supplement the rules on admission to the Bar. Such additional or amendatory rules are, as they ought to be, intended to regulate acts subsequent to its promulgation and should tend to improve and elevate the practice of law, and this Tribunal shall consider these rules as minimum norms towards that end in the admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers to the Bar, inasmuch as a good bar assists immensely in the daily performance of judicial functions and is essential to a worthy administration of justice. It is therefore the primary and inherent prerogative of the Supreme Court to render the ultimate decision on who may be admitted and may continue in the practice of law according to existing rules. 4. The reason advanced for the pretended classification of candidates, which the law makes, is contrary to facts which are of general knowledge and does not justify the admission to the Bar of law students inadequately prepared. The pretended classification is arbitrary. It is undoubtedly a class legislation. 5. Article 2 of Republic Act No. 972 is not embraced in the title of the law, contrary to what the Constitution enjoins, and being inseparable from the provisions of article 1, the entire law is void. 6. Lacking in eight votes to declare the nullity of that part of article 1 referring to the examinations of 1953 to 1955, said part of article 1, insofar as it concerns the examinations in those years, shall continue in force.

In re: Edillon, 84 SCRA 554 (1978) In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. MARCIAL A. EDILLION (IBP Administrative Case No. MDD-1), petitioner, FERNANDO, C.J.: The full and plenary discretion in the exercise of its competence to reinstate a disbarred member of the bar admits of no doubt. All the relevant factors bearing on the specific case, public interest, the integrity of the profession and the welfare of the recreant who had purged himself of his guilt are given their due weight. Respondent Marcial A. Edillon was disbarred on August 3, 1978, 1 the vote being unanimous with the late. Chief Justice Castro ponente. From June 5, 1979, he had repeatedly pleaded that he be reinstated. The minute resolution dated October 23, 1980, granted such prayer. It was there made clear that it "is without prejudice to issuing an extended opinion." 2 Before doing so, a recital of the background facts that led to the disbarment of respondent may not be amiss. As set forth in the resolution penned by the late Chief Justice Castro: "On November 29. 1975, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP for short) Board of Governors, unanimously adopted Resolution No. 75-65 in Administrative case No. MDD-1 (In the Matter of the Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. Marcial A. Edillon) recommending to the Court the removal of the name of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for 'stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues' to the IBP since the latter's constitution notwithstanding due notice. On January 21, 1976, the IBP, through its then President Liliano B. Neri, submitted the said resolution to the Court for consideration and approval,. Pursuant to paragraph 2, Section 24, Article III of the ByLaws of the IBP, which. reads: ... Should the delinquency further continue until the following June 29, the Board shall promptly inquire into the cause or causes of the continued delinquency and take whatever action it shall deem appropriate, including a recommendation to the Supreme Court for the removal of the delinquent member's name from the Roll of Attorneys. Notice of the action taken should be submit by registered mail to the member and to the Secretary of the Chapter concerned.' On January 27, 1976, the Court required the respondent to comment on the resolution and letter adverted to above he submitted his comment on February 23, 1976, reiterating his refusal to pay the membership fees due from him. On March 2, 1976, the Court required the IBP President and the IBP Board of Governors to reply to Edillon's comment: On March 24, 1976, they submitted a joint reply. Thereafter, the case was set for hearing on June 3, 1976. After the hearing, the parties were required to submit memoranda in amplification of their oral arguments. The matter was thenceforth submitted for resolution." 3 Reference was then made to the authority of the IBP Board of Governors to recommend to the Supreme Court the removal of a delinquent member's name from the Roll of Attorneys as found in Rules of Court: 'Effect of non-payment of dues. Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of this Rule, default in the payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys. 4

The submission of respondent Edillion as summarized in the aforesaid resolution "is that the above provisions constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights in the sense that he is being compelled, as a pre-condition to maintaining his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this compelled financial support of the said organization to which he is admittedly personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty and property guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes, the above provisions of the Court Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force and effect. 5 It was pointed out in the resolution that such issues was raised on a previous case before the Court, entitled 'Administrative Case No. 526, In the Matter of the Petition for the Integration of the Bar of the Philippines, Roman Ozaeta, et al., Petitioners.' The Court exhaustively considered all these matters in that case in its Resolution ordaining the integration of the Bar of the Philippines, promulgated on January 9, 1973. 6 The unanimous conclusion reached by the Court was that the integration of the Philippine Bar raises no constitutional question and is therefore legally unobjectionable, "and, within the context of contemporary conditions in the Philippine, has become an imperative means to raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility fully and effectively." 7 As mentioned at the outset, the vote was unanimous. From the time the decision was rendered, there were various pleadings filed by respondent for reinstatement starting with a motion for reconsideration dated August 19, 1978. Characterized as it was by persistence in his adamantine refusal to admit the full competence of the Court on the matter, it was not unexpected that it would be denied. So it turned out. 8 It was the consensus that he continued to be oblivious to certain balic juridical concepts, the appreciation of which does not even require great depth of intellect. Since respondent could not be said to be that deficient in legal knowledge and since his pleadings in other cases coming before this Tribunal were quite literate, even if rather generously sprinkled with invective for which he had been duly taken to task, there was the impression that his recalcitrance arose from and sheer obstinacy. Necessary, the extreme penalty of disbarment visited on him was more than justified. Since then, however, there were other communications to this Court where a different attitude on his part was discernible. 9 The tone of defiance was gone and circumstances of a mitigating character invoked the state of his health and his advanced age. He likewise spoke of the welfare of former clients who still rely on him for counsel, their confidence apparently undiminished. For he had in his career been a valiant, if at times unreasonable, defender of the causes entrusted to him. This Court, in the light of the above, felt that reinstatement could be ordered and so it did in the resolution of October 23, 1980. It made certain that there was full acceptance on his part of the competence of this Tribunal in the exercise of its plenary power to regulate the legal profession and can integrate the bar and that the dues were duly paid. Moreover, the fact that more than two years had elapsed during which he war. barred from exercising his profession was likewise taken into account. It may likewise be said that as in the case of the inherent power to punish for contempt and paraphrasing the dictum of Justice Malcolm in Villavicencio v. Lukban, 10 the power to discipline, especially if amounting to disbarment, should be exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive principle.11

One last word. It has been pertinently observed that there is no irretrievable finality as far as admission to the bar is concerned. So it is likewise as to loss of membership. What must ever be borne in mind is that membership in the bar, to follow Cardozo, is a privilege burdened with conditions. Failure to abide by any of them entails the loss of such privilege if the gravity thereof warrant such drastic move. Thereafter a sufficient time having elapsed and after actuations evidencing that there was due contrition on the part of the transgressor, he may once again be considered for the restoration of such a privilege. Hence, our resolution of October 23, 1980. The Court restores to membership to the bar Marcial A. Edillon. Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Fernandez, Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur. Aquino, J., concurs in the result.

Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava, 105 Phil. 173 (1959) PHILIPPINE LAWYER'S ASSOCIATION, petitioner, vs. CELEDONIO AGRAVA, in his capacity as Director of the Philippines Patent Office, respondent. MONTEMAYOR, J.: This is the petition filed by the Philippine Lawyer's Association for prohibition and injunction against Celedonio Agrava, in his capacity as Director of the Philippines Patent Office. On may 27, 1957, respondent Director issued a circular announcing that he had scheduled for June 27, 1957 an examination for the purpose of determining who are qualified to practice as patent attorneys before the Philippines Patent Office, the said examination to cover patent law and jurisprudence and the rules of practice before said office. According to the circular, members of the Philippine Bar, engineers and other persons with sufficient scientific and technical training are qualified to take the said examination. It would appear that heretofore, respondent Director has been holding similar examinations. It is the contention of the petitioner Philippine Lawyer's Association that one who has passed the bar examinations and is licensed by the Supreme Court to practice law in the Philippines and who is in good standing, is duly qualified to practice before the Philippines Patent Office, and that consequently, the cat of the respondent Director requiring members of the Philippine Bar in good standing to take and pass an examination given by the Patent Office as a condition precedent to their being allowed to practice before said office, such as representing applicants in the preparation and prosecution of applications for patent, is in excess of his jurisdiction and is in violation of the law. In his answer, respondent Director, through the Solicitor General, maintains that the prosecution of patent cases "does not involve entirely or purely the practice of law but includes the application of scientific and technical knowledge and training, so much so that, as a matter of actual practice, the prosecution of patent cases may be handled not only by lawyers, but also engineers and other persons with sufficient scientific and technical training who pass the prescribed examinations as given by the Patent Office; . . . that the Rules of Court do not prohibit the Patent Office, or any other quasi-judicial body from requiring further condition or qualification from those who would wish to handle cases before the Patent Office which, as stated in the preceding paragraph, requires more of an application of scientific and technical knowledge than the mere application of provisions of law; . . . that the action taken by the respondent is in accordance with Republic Act No. 165, otherwise known as the Patent Law of the Philippines, which similar to the United States Patent Law, in accordance with which the United States Patent Office has also prescribed a similar examination as that prescribed by respondent. ...

Respondent further contends that just as the Patent law of the United States of America authorizes the Commissioner of Patents to prescribe examinations to determine as to who practice before the United States Patent Office, the respondent, is similarly authorized to do so by our Patent Law, Republic Act No. 165. Although as already stated, the Director of Patents, in the past, would appear to have been holding tests or examinations the passing of which was imposed as a required qualification to practice before the Patent Office, to our knowledge, this is the first time that the right of the Director of Patents to do so, specially as regards members of the bar, has been questioned formally, or otherwise put in issue. And we have given it careful thought and consideration. The Supreme Court has the exclusive and constitutional power with respect to admission to the practice of law in the Philippines1 and to any member of the Philippine Bar in good standing may practice law anywhere and before any entity, whether judicial or quasijudicial or administrative, in the Philippines. Naturally, the question arises as to whether or not appearance before the patent Office and the preparation and the prosecution of patent applications, etc., constitutes or is included in the practice of law. The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court ; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and social proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, alladvice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law corporation services, assessment and condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions . (5 Am. Jur. p. 262, 263). (Emphasis supplied). Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside of any court and having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects, and the preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust relations and other affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct connection with court proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill , a wide experience with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex situations. These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate relation to the administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in the order, can be drawn between that part which involves advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of importance to the welfare of the public that these manifold customary functions be performed by persons possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character, and acting at all times under the heavy trust obligations

to clients which rests upon all attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 (1953 ed.), p. 665-666, citing In re Opinion of the Justices (Mass.), 194 N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. vs. Automobile Service Assoc. (R. I. ) 179 A. 139, 144). (Emphasis ours). In our opinion, the practice of law includes such appearance before the Patent Office, the representation of applicants, oppositors, and other persons, and the prosecution of their applications for patent, their oppositions thereto, or the enforcement of their rights in patent cases. In the first place, although the transaction of business in the Patent Office involves the use and application of technical and scientific knowledge and training, still, all such business has to be rendered in accordance with the Patent Law, as well as other laws, including the Rules and Regulations promulgated by the Patent Office in accordance with law. Not only this, but practice before the Patent Office involves the interpretation and application of other laws and legal principles, as well as the existence of facts to be established in accordance with the law of evidence and procedure. For instance: Section 8 of our Patent Law provides that an invention shall not be patentable if it is contrary to public order or morals, or to public health or welfare. Section 9 says that an invention shall not be considered new or patentable if it was known or used by others in the Philippines before the invention thereof by the inventor named in any printed publication in the Philippines or any foreign country more than one year before the application for a patent therefor, or if it had been in public use or on sale in the Philippines for more than one year before the application for the patent therefor. Section 10 provides that the right to patent belongs to the true and actual inventor, his heirs, legal representatives or assigns. Section 25 and 26 refer to connection of any mistake in a patent. Section 28 enumerates the grounds for cancellation of a patent; that although any person may apply for such cancellation, under Section 29, the Solicitor General is authorized to petition for the cancellation of a patent. Section 30 mentions the requirements of a petition for cancellation. Section 31 and 32 provide for a notice of hearing of the petition for cancellation of the patent by the Director of Patents in case the said cancellation is warranted. Under Section 34, at any time after the expiration of three years from the day the patent was granted, any person patent on several grounds, such as, if the patented invention is not being worked in the Philippines on a commercial scale, or if the demand for the patented article in the Philippines on a commercial scale, or if the demand for the patented article in the Philippines is not being met to an adequate extent and reasonable terms, or if by reason of the patentee's refusal to grant a license on reasonable terms or by reason of the condition attached by him to the license, purchase or use of the patented article or working of the patented process or machine of production, the establishment of a new trade or industry in the Philippines is prevented; or if the patent or invention relates to food or medicine or is necessary to public health or public safety. All these things involve the applications of laws, legal principles, practice and procedure. They call for legal knowledge, training and experience for which a member of the bar has been prepared. In support of the proposition that much of the business and many of the act, orders and decisions of the Patent Director involve questions of law or a reasonable and correct evaluation of facts, the very Patent Law, Republic Act No. 165, Section 61, provides that: . . . . The applicant for a patent or for the registration of a design, any party to a proceeding to cancel a patent or to obtain a compulsory license, and any party

to any other proceeding in the Office may appeal to the Supreme Court from any final order or decision of the director. In other words, the appeal is taken to this Tribunal. If the transaction of business in the Patent Office and the acts, orders and decisions of the Patent Director involved exclusively or mostly technical and scientific knowledge and training, then logically, the appeal should be taken not to a court or judicial body, but rather to a board of scientists, engineers or technical men, which is not the case. Another aspect of the question involves the consideration of the nature of the functions and acts of the Head of the Patent Office. . . . . The Commissioner, in issuing or withholding patents, in reissues, interferences, and extensions, exercises quasi-judicial functions. Patents are public records, and it is the duty of the Commissioner to give authenticated copies to any person, on payment of the legal fees. (40 Am. Jur. 537). (Emphasis supplied). . . . . The Commissioner has the only original initiatory jurisdiction that exists up to the granting and delivering of a patent, and it is his duty to decide whether the patent is new and whether it is the proper subject of a patent; and his action in awarding or refusing a patent is a judicial function. In passing on an application the commissioner should decide not only questions of law, but also questions of fact, as whether there has been a prior public use or sale of the article invented. . . . (60 C.J.S. 460). (Emphasis supplied). The Director of Patents, exercising as he does judicial or quasi-judicial functions, it is reasonable to hold that a member of the bar, because of his legal knowledge and training, should be allowed to practice before the Patent Office, without further examination or other qualification. Of course, the Director of Patents, if he deems it advisable or necessary, may require that members of the bar practising before him enlist the assistance of technical men and scientist in the preparation of papers and documents, such as, the drawing or technical description of an invention or machine sought to be patented, in the same way that a lawyer filing an application for the registration of a parcel of land on behalf of his clients, is required to submit a plan and technical description of said land, prepared by a licensed surveyor. But respondent Director claims that he is expressly authorized by the law to require persons desiring to practice or to do business before him to submit an examination, even if they are already members of the bar. He contends that our Patent Law, Republic Act No. 165, is patterned after the United States Patent Law; and of the United States Patent Office in Patent Cases prescribes an examination similar to that which he (respondent) has prescribed and scheduled. He invites our attention to the following provisions of said Rules of Practice: Registration of attorneys and agents. A register of an attorneys and a register agents are kept in the Patent Office on which are entered the names of all persons recognized as entitled to represent applicants before the Patent Office

in the preparation and prosecution of applicants for patent. Registration in the Patent Office under the provisions of these rules shall only entitle the person registered to practice before the Patent Office. (a) Attorney at law. Any attorney at law in good standing admitted to practice before any United States Court or the highest court of any State or Territory of the United States who fulfills the requirements and complied with the provisions of these rules may be admitted to practice before the Patent Office and have his name entered on the register of attorneys. xxx xxx xxx

immediate or prospective applicant, or other person having immediate or prospective business before the office, by word, circular, letter, or by advertising. The reasons for any such suspension or exclusion shall be duly recorded. The action of the Commissioner may be reviewed upon the petition of the person so refused recognition or so suspended by the district court of the United States for the District of Columbia under such conditions and upon such proceedings as the said court may by its rules determine. (Emphasis supplied) Respondent Director concludes that Section 78 of Republic Act No. 165 being similar to the provisions of law just reproduced, then he is authorized to prescribe the rules and regulations requiring that persons desiring to practice before him should submit to and pass an examination. We reproduce said Section 78, Republic Act No. 165, for purposes of comparison: SEC. 78. Rules and regulations. The Director subject to the approval of the Secretary of Justice, shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations, not inconsistent with law, for the conduct of all business in the Patent Office. The above provisions of Section 78 certainly and by far, are different from the provisions of the United States Patent Law as regards authority to hold examinations to determine the qualifications of those allowed to practice before the Patent Office. While the U.S. Patent Law authorizes the Commissioner of Patents to require attorneys to show that they possess the necessary qualifications and competence to render valuable service to and advise and assist their clients in patent cases, which showing may take the form of a test or examination to be held by the Commissioner, our Patent Law, Section 78, is silent on this important point. Our attention has not been called to any express provision of our Patent Law, giving such authority to determine the qualifications of persons allowed to practice before the Patent Office. Section 551 of the Revised Administrative Code authorizes every chief of bureau to prescribe forms and make regulations or general orders not inconsistent with law, to secure the harmonious and efficient administration of his branch of the service and to carry into full effect the laws relating to matters within the jurisdiction of his bureau. Section 608 of Republic Act 1937, known as the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines, provides that the Commissioner of Customs shall, subject to the approval of the Department Head, makes all rules and regulations necessary to enforce the provisions of said code. Section 338 of the National Internal Revenue Code, Commonwealth Act No. 466 as amended, states that the Secretary of Finance, upon recommendation of the Collector of Internal Revenue, shall promulgate all needful rules and regulations for the effective enforcement of the provisions of the code. We understand that rules and regulations have been promulgated not only for the Bureau of Customs and Internal Revenue, but also for other bureaus of the Government, to govern the transaction of business in and to enforce the law for said bureaus. Were we to allow the Patent Office, in the absence of an express and clear provision of law giving the necessary sanction, to require lawyers to submit to and pass on examination prescribed by it before they are allowed to practice before said Patent Office, then there would be no reason why other bureaus specially the Bureau of Internal Revenue and Customs, where the business in the same area are more or less

(c) Requirement for registration. No person will be admitted to practice and register unless he shall apply to the Commissioner of Patents in writing on a prescribed form supplied by the Commissioner and furnish all requested information and material; and shall establish to the satisfaction of the Commissioner that he is of good moral character and of good repute and possessed of the legal and scientific and technical qualifications necessary to enable him to render applicants for patent valuable service, and is otherwise competent to advise and assist him in the presentation and prosecution of their application before the Patent Office. In order that the Commissioner may determine whether a person seeking to have his name placed upon either of the registers has the qualifications specified, satisfactory proof of good moral character and repute, and of sufficient basic training in scientific and technical matters must be submitted and an examination which is held from time to time must be taken and passed. The taking of an examination may be waived in the case of any person who has served for three years in the examining corps of the Patent Office. Respondent states that the promulgation of the Rules of Practice of the United States Patent Office in Patent Cases is authorized by the United States Patent Law itself, which reads as follows: The Commissioner of Patents, subject to the approval of the Secretary of Commerce may prescribe rules and regulations governing the recognition of agents, attorneys, or other persons representing applicants or other parties before his office, and may require of such persons, agents, or attorneys, before being recognized as representatives of applicants or other persons, that they shall show they are of good moral character and in good repute, are possessed of the necessary qualifications to enable them to render to applicants or other persons valuable service, and are likewise to competent to advise and assist applicants or other persons in the presentation or prosecution of their applications or other business before the Office. The Commissioner of Patents may, after notice and opportunity for a hearing, suspend or exclude, either generally or in any particular case from further practice before his office any person, agent or attorney shown to be incompetent or disreputable, or guilty of gross misconduct, or who refuses to comply with the said rules and regulations, or who shall, with intent to defraud in any matter, deceive, mislead, or threaten any applicant or prospective applicant, or other person having

complicated, such as the presentation of books of accounts, balance sheets, etc., assessments exemptions, depreciation, these as regards the Bureau of Internal Revenue, and the classification of goods, imposition of customs duties, seizures, confiscation, etc., as regards the Bureau of Customs, may not also require that any lawyer practising before them or otherwise transacting business with them on behalf of clients, shall first pass an examination to qualify. In conclusion, we hold that under the present law, members of the Philippine Bar authorized by this Tribunal to practice law, and in good standing, may practice their profession before the Patent Office, for the reason that much of the business in said office involves the interpretation and determination of the scope and application of the Patent Law and other laws applicable, as well as the presentation of evidence to establish facts involved; that part of the functions of the Patent director are judicial or quasi-judicial, so much so that appeals from his orders and decisions are, under the law, taken to the Supreme Court. For the foregoing reasons, the petition for prohibition is granted and the respondent Director is hereby prohibited from requiring members of the Philippine Bar to submit to an examination or tests and pass the same before being permitted to appear and practice before the Patent Office. No costs. Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L. and Endencia, JJ., concur.

In re Parazo, 82 Phil. 230 (1948) in re Investigation of ANGEL J. PARAZO for alleged leakage of questions in some subjects in the 1948 Bar Examinations. MONTEMAYOR, J.: The present case had its origin in a story or news item prepared and written by the defendant, Angel J. Parazo, a duly accredited reporter of the Star Reporter, a local daily of general circulation, that appeared on the front page of the issue of September 14, 1948. The story was preceded by the headline in large letters "CLAIM 'LEAK' IN LAST BAR TESTS," followed by another in slightly smaller letters "Applicants In Uproar, Want Anomaly Probed; One School Favored," under the name "By Angel J. Parazo of the Star Reporter Staff." For purposes of reference we quote the news item in full: Leakage in some subjects in the recent bar examinations were denounced by some of the law graduates who took part in the tests, to the Star Reporter this morning. These examinees claim to have seen mimeograph copies of the questions in one subject, days before the tests were given, in the Philippine Normal School. Only students of one private university in Sampaloc had those mimeographed questions on said subject fully one week before the tests. The students who made the denunciation to the Star Reporter claim that the tests actually given were similar in every respect to those they had seen students of this private university holding proudly around the city. The students who claim to have seen the tests which leaked are demanding that the Supreme Court institute an immediate probe into the matter, to find out the source of the leakage, and annul the test papers of the students of the particular university possessed of those tests before the examinations. The discovery of the alleged leakage in the tests of the bar examinations came close on the heels of the revelations in the Philippine Collegian, official organ of the student body of the University of the Philippines, on recent government tests wherein the questions had come into the possession of nearly all the graduates of some private technical schools. To the publication, evidently, the attention of the Supreme Court must have been called, and Mr. Justice Padilla, who had previously been designated Chairman of the Committee of Bar Examiners for this year, by authority of the Court, instructed Mr. Jose de la Cruz as Commissioner with the assistance of Mr. E. Soriano, Clerk of Court to cite Mr. Parazo for questioning and investigation. In this connection, and for purposes of showing the interest of the Supreme Court in the news item and its implications, it may here be stated that this Court is and for many years has been, in charge of the Bar Examinations held every year, including that of this year, held in August, 1948. Section 13, Article VIII of the

Constitution of the Philippines authorizes this Court to promulgate rules concerning admission to the practice of law, and pursuant to that authority, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court was promulgated, under which rule, this Court conducts the Bar Examinations yearly, appoints a Committee of Bar Examiners to be presided by one of the Justices, to serve for one year, acts on the report of the committee and finally, admits to the Bar and to the practice of law, the candidates and examinees who have passed the examinations. The investigation of Mr. Parazo was conducted on September 18, 1948, on which occasion he testified under oath and, answering questions directed to him by Messrs. Cruz and Soriano admitted that he was the author of the news item; that he wrote up the story and had it published, in good faith and in a spirit of public service; and that he knew the persons who gave him the information which formed the basis of his publication but that he declined to reveal their names because the information was given to him in confidence and his informants did not wish to have their identities revealed. The investigators informed Parazo that this was a serious matter involving the confidence of the public in the regularity and cleanliness of the Bar Examinations and also in the Supreme Court which conducted said examinations, and repeatedly appealed to his civic spirit and sense of public service, pleading with and urging him to reveal the names of his informants so that the Supreme Court may be in a position to start and conduct the necessary investigation in order to verify their charge and complaint and take action against the party or parties responsible for the alleged irregularity and anomaly, if found true, but Parazo consistently refused to make the revelation. In the meantime, the writer of this opinion who was appointed to the Supreme Court as associate Justice in the latter part of August, 1948, was designated to succeed Mr. Justice Padilla as Chairman of the Committee of Bar Examiners when the said Justice was appointed Secretary of Justice. The writer of this opinion was furnished a copy of the transcript of the investigation conducted on September 18, 1948, and he made a report thereof to the Court in banc, resulting in the issuance of the resolution of this Court dated October 7, 1948, which reads as follows: In relation with the news item that appeared in the front page of the Star Reporter, issue of September 14, 1948, regarding alleged leakage in some bar examination questions, which examinations were held in August 1948, Mr. Jose de la Cruz, as Commissioner, and Mr. E. Soriano, as Clerk of Court, were authorized by Mr. Justice Sabino Padilla then chairman of the committee of bar examiners to conduct an investigation thereof, particularly to receive the testimony of Mr. Angel J. Parazo, the reporter responsible for and author of said news item. An investigation was conducted on September 18, 1948; stenographic notes were taken of the testimony of Mr. Parazo, and Mr. Justice Marcelino R. Montemayor, the new chairman of the committee of bar examiners, has submitted the transcript of said notes for the consideration of this Court. From the record of said investigation, it is clear that Mr. Parazo has deliberately and consistently declined and refused to reveal the identity of the persons supposed to have given him the data and information on which his news item was based, despite the repeated appeals made to his civic spirit, and for his cooperations, in order to enable this Court to conduct a thorough investigation of the alleged bar examination anomaly, Resolved, to authorize Mr. Justice Montemayor to cite Mr. Parazo before him, explain to him that the interests of the State demand and so this Court requires that he

reveal the source or sources of his information and of his news item, and to warn him that his refusal to make the revelation demanded will be regarded as contempt of court and penalized accordingly. Mr. Justice Montemayor will advise the Court of the result. Acting upon this resolution, the writer of this opinion cited Mr. Parazo to appear before him on October 13, 1948. He appeared on the date set and it was clearly explained to him that the interest of the State demands and this court requires that he reveal the source of sources of his information and of his news item; that this was a very serious matter involving the confidence of the people in general and the law practitioners and bar examinees in particular, in the regularity and cleanliness of the bar examinations; that it also involves the good name and reputation of the bar examiners who are appointed by this Court to prepare the bar examinations questions and later pass upon and correct the examinations questions and last but not least, it also involves and is bound to affect the confidence of the whole country in the very Supreme Court which is conducting the bar examinations. It was further explained to him that the Supreme Court is keenly interested in investigating the alleged anomaly and leakage of the examination questions and is determined to punish the party or parties responsible therefor but that without his help, specially the identities of the persons who furnished him the information and who could give the court the necessary data and evidence, the Court could not even begin the investigation because there would be no basis from which to start, not even a clue from which to formulate a theory. Lastly, Parazo was told that under the law he could be punished if he refused to make the revelation, punishment which may even involve imprisonment. Because of the seriousness of the matter, Parazo was advised to think it over and consider the consequences, and if he need time within which to do this and so that he might even consult the editor and publisher of his paper, the Star Reporter, he could be given an extension of time, and at his request, the investigation was postponed to October 15, 1948. On that date he appeared, accompanied by his counsel, Atty. Felixberto M. Serrano. The writer of this opinion in the presence of his counsel, several newspapermen, Clerk of Court Soriano, Deputy Clerk of Court Cruz, and Mr. Chanliongco made a formal demand on Mr. Parazo to reveal the identities of his informants, under oath, but he declined and refused to make the revelation. At the request of his counsel, that before this Court take action upon his refusal to reveal, he be accorded a hearing, with the consent of the Court first obtained, a public hearing was held on the same day, October 15, 1948 in the course of which, Attorney Serrano extensively and ably argued the case of his client, invoking the benefits of Republic Act No. 53, the first section of which reads as follows: SECTION 1. The publisher, editor or duly accredited reporter of any newspaper, magazine or periodical of general circulation cannot be compelled to reveal the source of any news-report or information appearing in said publication which was related in confidence to such publisher, editor or reporter, unless the court or a House or committee of Congress finds that such revelation is demanded by the interest of the state. This Court has given this case prolonged, careful and mature consideration, involving as it does interesting and important points of law as well as questions of national importance. Counsel contends that the phrase "interest of the state" found at the end of

section 1 of Republic Act No. 53 means and refers only to the security of the state, that is to say that only when National Security or public safety is involved, may this Court compel the defendant to reveal the source or sources of his news report or information. We confess that it was not easy to decide this legal question on which the conviction or acquittal of Parazo hinges. As a matter of facts, the vote of the Justice is not unanimous. In an effort to determine the intent of the Legislature that passed Republic Act No. 53, particularly the Senate were it originated, we examined the record of the proceedings in said legislative body when this Act, then Senate Bill No. 6 was being discussed. We gathered from the said record that the original bill prepared by Senator Sotto provided that the immunity to be accorded a publisher, editor, or reporter of any newspaper was absolute and that under no circumstance could he be compelled to reveal the source of his information or news report. The committee, however, under the chairmanship of Senator Cuenco inserted an amendment or change, by adding to the end of section 1 of the clause "unless the court finds that such revelation is demanded by the public interest." When the bill as amended was recommended for approval on second reading, Senator Sotto, the author of the original bill proposed an amendment by eliminating the clause added by the committee "unless the court finds that such revelation is demanded by the public interest," claiming that said clause would kill the purposed of the bill. This amendment of Senator Sotto was discussed. Various Senators objected to the elimination of the clause already referred to on the ground that without such exception and by giving complete immunity to editors, reporters, etc., many abuses may be committed. Senator Cuenco, Committee chairman, in advocating the disapproval of the Sotto amendment, and in defending the exception embodied in the amendment introduced by the Committee, consisting in the clause: "unless the court finds that such revelation is demanded by the public interest," said that the Committee could not accept the Sotto amendment because there may be cases, perhaps few, in which the interest of the public or the interest of the state required that the names of the informants be published or known. He gave as one example a case of a newspaperman publishing information referring to a theft of the plans of forts or fortifications. He argued that if the immunity accorded a newspaperman should be absolute, as sought by the Sotto amendment, the author of the theft might go scott-free. When the Sotto amendment was put to a vote, it was disapproved. Finally, Senator Sotto proposed another amendment by changing the phrase "public interest" at the end of section 1 as amended by the Committee be changed to and substituted by the phrase "interest of the state," claiming that the phrase public interest was too elastic. Without much discussion this last amendment was approved, and this phrase is now found in the Act as finally approved. In view of the contention now advanced, that the phrase "interest of the state" is confined to cases involving the "security of the state" or "public safety," one might wonder or speculate on why the last amendment proposed by Senator Sotto, changing the phrase "public interest" to "interest of the state," was approved without much discussion. But we notice from the records of the deliberations on and discussion of the bill in the Senate that the phrase "public interest" was used interchangeably by some Senators with the phrase "interest of the state." For instance, although the bill, as amended by the Committee presided by Senator Cuenco, used the words "public interest, "when Senator Cuenco sponsored the bill before the Senate he used in his speech or remarks the phrase "interest of the State" (interes del Estado). Again, although the bill, as

sponsored by the Cuenco Committee and discussed by the Senate, used the words "public interest, "Senator Sebastian referred to the exception by using the phrase "interest of the state." This understanding of at least two of the Senators, who took part in the discussion, about the similarity or interchangeability of the two phrases "public interest" and "interest of the estate," may account for the readiness or lack of objection on the part of the Senate, after it had rejected the first Sotto amendment, to accept the second Sotto amendment, changing the phrase "public interest" to "interest of the state." In referring to a case wherein the security of the state or public safety was involved, such as the theft of the plans of fortifications, Senator Cuenco was obviously giving it only as an example of what he meant by "interest of the state;" it was not meant to be the only case or example. We do not propose to define or fix the limits or scope of the phrase "interest of the state;" but we can say that the phrase "interest of the state" can not be confined and limited to the "security of the state" or to "public safety" alone. These synonymous phrases, "security of the state" and "public safety," are not uncommon terms and we can well presume that the legislators were familiar with them. The phrase "public safety," is used in Article III, section 1(5) of the Constitution of the Philippines, where it says that "the privacy of communications and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of the court or when public safety and order require otherwise;" and Article VII, section 10(2) of the same Constitution provided that the President may suspend the privileges of the writ of habeas corpus, in case of invasion, insurrection, etc., when the public safety requires it. The phrase "National Security" is used at the beginning of Book II of the Revised Penal Code, thus: Title I, Crimes against National Security and the law of Nations, Chapter I, Crimes against National Security. Then, more recently, the phrase "National Security" was used in section 2, and the phrase "public security" was equally used in section 19, of Commonwealth Act No. 682 creating the People's Court, promulgated on September 25, 1945. If, as contended, the Philippine Congress, particularly the Philippine Senate, had meant to limit the exception to the immunity of newspapermen only to cases where the "security of the state," i.e., "National Security" is involved, it could easily and readily have used such phrase or any one of similar phrases like "public safety,""National Security," or "public security" of which it must have been familiar. Since it did not do so, there is valid reason to believe that that was not in the mind and intent of the legislators, and that, in using the phrase "interest of the state," it extended the scope and the limits of the exception when a newspaperman or reporter may be compelled to reveal the sources of his information. The phrase "interest of the state" is quite broad and extensive. It is of course more general and broader than "security of the state." Although not as broad and comprehensive as "public interest" which may include most anything though of minor importance, but affecting the public, such as for instance, the establishment and maintenance of barrio roads, electric light and ice plants, parks, markets, etc., the phrase "interest of the estate" even under a conservative interpretation, may and does include cases and matters of national importance in which the whole state and nations, not only a branch or instrumentality thereof such as a province, city or town, or a part of the public, is interested or would be affected, such as the principal functions of Government like administration of justice, public school system, and such matters like social justice, scientific research, practice of law or of medicine, impeachment of high Government

officials, treaties with other nations, integrity of the three coordinate branches of the Government, their relations to each other, and the discharge of their functions, etc. We are satisfied that the present case easily comes under the phrase "interest of the state." Under constitutional provision, article VIII, section 13, Constitution of the Philippines, the Supreme Court takes charge of the admission of members to the Philippine Bar. By its Rules of Court, it has prescribed the qualifications of the candidates to the Bar Examinations, and it has equally prescribed the subject of the said Bar Examinations. Every year, the Supreme Court appoints the Bar examiners who prepare the questions, then correct the examination papers submitted by the examinees, and later make their report to the Supreme Court. Only those Bar Examination candidates who are found to have obtained to passing grade are admitted to the Bar and licensed to practice law. There are now thousands of members of the Philippine Bar, scattered all over the Philippines, practicing law or occupying important Government posts requiring membership in the Bar as a prerequisite, and every year, quite a number, sometimes several hundreds, are added to the legal fold. The Supreme Court and the Philippine Bar have always tried to maintain a high standard for the legal profession, both in academic preparation and legal training, as well as in honesty and fair dealing. The Court and the licensed lawyers themselves are vitally interested in keeping this high standard; and one of the ways of achieving this end is to admit to the practice of this noble profession only those persons who are known to be honest, possess good moral character, and show proficiency in and knowledge of the law by the standard set by this Court by passing the Bar Examinations honestly and in the regular and usual manner. It is of public knowledge that perhaps by general inclination or the conditions obtaining in this country, or the great demand for the services of licensed lawyers, law as compared to other professions, is the most popular in these islands. The predominantly greater number of members of the Bar, schools and colleges of law as compared to those of other learned professions, attest to this fact. And one important thing to bear in mind is that the Judiciary, from the Supreme Court down to the Justice of the Peace Courts, provincial fiscalships and other prosecuting attorneys, and the legal departments of the Government, draw exclusively from the Bar to fill their positions. Consequently, any charge or insinuation of anomaly in the conduct of Bar Examinations, of necessity is imbued with wide and general interest and national importance. If it is true that Bar Examination questions, for some reason or another, find their way out and get into the hands of Bar examinees before the examinations are actually given, and as a result thereof some examinees succeed in illegally and improperly obtaining passing grades and are later admitted to the Bar and to the practice of law, when otherwise they should not be, then the present members of the legal profession would have reason to resent and be alarmed; and if this is continued it would not be long before the legal profession will have fallen into disrepute. The public would naturally lose confidence in the lawyers, specially in the new ones, because a person contemplating to go to court to seek redress or to defend himself before it would not know whether a particular lawyer to whom he is entrusting his case has legally passed the Bar Examinations because of sufficient and adequate preparation and training, and that he is honest, or whether he was one of those who had succeeded in getting hold of Bar Examination questions in advance, passed the Bar Examinations illegally, and then started his legal career with this act of dishonesty. Particularly, the Bar examinees who, by intense study and conscientious preparations, have honestly passed the Bar Examinations and are admitted to practice law, would be affected by this anomaly,

because they would ever be under a cloud of suspicion, since from the point of view of the public, they might be among those who had made use of Bar Examination questions obtained before hand. And, incidentally, the morale of the hundreds of students and graduates of the different law schools, studying law and later preparing for the Bar Examinations, would be affected, even disastrously, for in them may be born the idea that there is no need of much law study and preparation inasmuch as it is possible and not difficult to obtain copies of questions before the examinations and pass them and be admitted to the Bar. The cloud of suspicion would, equally, hang over the Bar examiners themselves, eight eminent lawyers who in a spirit of public service and civic spirit, have consented to serve on the Committee of Examiners at the request and designation of this Court. They would be suspected, one or two or more of them that through negligence, or connivance, or downright corruption, they have made possible the release if they have not themselves actually released, before examination day, the questions they had prepared. The employees of the Supreme Court in charge of the Bar Examinations, specially those who copy or mimeograph the original copies furnished by the Bar examiners, would all be under suspicion. And, lastly, and more important still, the Supreme Court itself which has to overall supervision and control over the examinations, would share the suspicion, as a result of which the confidence of the people in this High Tribunal, which public confidence, the members of this Court like to think and believe, it still enjoys, might be affected and shaken. All these considerations of vital importance, in our opinion, can and will sufficiently cause the present case to fall and be included within the meaning of the phrase "interest of the state," involving as it does, not only the interests of students and graduates of the law schools and colleges, and of the entire legal profession of this country as well as the good name and reputation of the members of the Committee of Bar Examiners, including the employees of the Supreme Court having charge of and connections with said examinations, but also the highest Tribunal of the land itself which represents one of the three coordinate and independent branches or departments of the Philippine Government. In support of if not in addition to the power granted by section 1 of Republic Act. No. 53 to this Court, we have the inherent power of courts in general, specially of the Supreme Court as representative of the Judicial Department, to adopt proper and adequate measures to preserve their integrity, and render possible and facilitate the exercise of their functions, including, as in the present case, the investigation of charges of error, abuse or misconduct of their officials and subordinates, including lawyers, who are officers of the Court. (Province of Tarlac vs. Gale, 26 Phil., 350; 21 C.J.S. 41, 138.) As we have previously stated, the revelation demanded of the respondent, of the identity of his informants, is essential and necessary to the investigation of the charge contained in the publication already mentioned. It will be noticed from Parazo's news item as quoted in the first part of this decision, that, informants, law graduates and bar examinees, were denouncing the supposed anomaly consisting of the alleged leakage of the Bar Examination questions to the Supreme Court for due investigation. If those persons really meant and intended to make a bona fide and effective denunciation, with expectation of results, the right place to air their grievance was the Supreme Court itself, not a newspaper; and if they truly wanted an investigation, they should have come forward and furnished or stood ready to furnish

the facts on which to base and from which to start an investigation, instead of concealing themselves behind the curtain of press immunity. Examining the news item in question, it is therein claimed and assured that Bar Examination questions in at least one subject had been obtained and used by bar examinees coming from a certain university, one week before the examinations were actually held. Parazo in his statements and answers during the investigation said that examination questions in several subjects were involved in the anomaly. But no copy or copies of said examination questions were furnished us. No one is willing to testify that he actually saw said alleged copies of examination questions; that they were actually and carefully compared with the legitimate examination questions given out on the day of the examination and found to be identical; no one is ready and willing to reveal the identity of the persons or bar examinees said to have been seen with the said Bar Examination questions, although they as well as the university where they came from, was known; and even the law subjects to which the questions pertained are not disclosed; and, lastly, we are not allowed to know even the identity of respondent Parazo's informants who claim to have seen all these things. In this connection it may be stated that in the las Bar Examinations held in August, 1948, approximately nine hundred candidates took them, each candidate writing his answers in a book for each subject. There were eight subjects, each belonging to and corresponding to each one of the eight bar examiners. There were therefore eight sets of bar examination questions, and multiplying these eight sets of questions by nine hundred candidates, gives a total of seven thousand two hundred (7,200) examination papers involved, in the hand of eight different examiners. The examination books or papers bear no names or identifications of their writers or owners and said ownership and identification will not be known until the books or papers are all corrected and graded. Without definite assurance based on reliable witnesses under oath that the alleged anomaly had actually been committed, evidence on the identity of the persons in possession of the alleged copies of questions prematurely released or illegally obtained and made use of, the law subjects or subjects involved, the university from which said persons come, this Court does not feel capable of or warranted in taking any step, such as blindly and desperately revising each and every one of the 7,200 examination books with the fond but forlorn hope of finding any similarity or identity in the answers of any group of examinees and basing thereon any definite finding or conclusion. Apart from the enormity of the task and its hopelessness, this Court may not and cannot base its findings and conclusions, especially in any serious and delicate matter as is the present, on that kind of evidence. Under these circumstances, this Court, for lack of basis, data and information, is unable to conduct, nay, even start, an investigation; and, unless and until the respondent herein reveals the identities of his informants, and those informants and or others with facts and reliable evidence, aid and cooperate with the Court in its endeavor to further examine and probe into the charges contained in the news items, said charges are considered and held to be without basis, proof or foundation. When the Supreme Court decided to demand of the respondent herein that he reveal the names of his informants, it was not impelled or motivated by mere idle curiosity. It truly wanted information on which to start an investigation because it is vitally interested in keeping the Bar Examinations clean and above board and specially, not only to protect the members of the Bar and those aspiring for membership therein and the public

dealing with the members thereof and the Bar Examiners who cooperate with and act as agents of this Court in preparing the examination questions and correcting the examination papers, but also, as already stated, to keep the confidence of the people in this High Tribunal as regards the discharge of its function relative to the admission to the practice of law. These, it can only do by investigating any Bar Examination anomaly, fixing responsibility and punishing those found guilty, even annulling examinations already held, or else declaring the charges as not proven, if, as a result of the investigation, it is found that there is insufficiency or lack of evidence. In demanding from the respondent that he reveal the sources of his information, this Court did not intend to punish those informants or hold them liable. It merely wanted their help and cooperation. In this Court's endeavor to probe thoroughly the anomaly, or irregularity allegedly committed, it was its intention not only to adopt the necessary measures to punish the guilty parties, if the charges are found to be true, but also even to annul the examinations themselves, in justice to the innocent parties who had taken but did not pass the examinations. We say this because in every examination, whether conducted by the Government or by a private institution, certain standards are unconsciously adopted on which to base the passing grade. For instance, if, as a result of the correction of many or all of the examination papers, it is found that only very few have passed it, the examiner might reasonably think that the questions he gave were unduly difficult or hard to understand, or too long, as a result of which he may be more liberal and be more lenient and make allowances. On the hand, if too many obtain passing grade, the examiner may think that the examination questions were too easy and constitute an inadequate measure of the legal knowledge and training required to be a lawyer, and so he may raise his standard and become more strict in his correction of the papers and his appreciation of the answers. So, in a case where examinees, especially if many, succeed in getting hold of questions long before examinations day, and study and prepare the answers to those questions, it may result that when the examiner finds that many of the examinees have easily and correctly answered the questions, he may think that said questions were too easy, raise the standard by being strict in his correction of the papers, thereby giving a grade below passing to a number of examinees who otherwise would have validly passed the examinations. In conclusion, we find that the interest of the state in the present case demands that the respondent Angel J. Parazo reveal the source or sources of his information which formed the basis of his news items or story in the September 14, 1948 issue of the Star Reporter, quoted at the beginning of his decision, and that, in refusing to make the revelation which this Court required of him, he committed contempt of Court. The respondent repeatedly stated during the investigation that he knew the names and identities of the persons who furnished him the information. In other words, he omitted and still refuses to do an act commanded by this Court which is yet in his power to perform. (Rule 64, section 7, Rules of Court.)Ordinarily, in such cases, he can and should be imprisoned indefinitely until he complied with the demand. However, considering that case like the present are not common or frequent, in this jurisdiction, and that there is no reason and immediate necessity for imposing a heavy penalty, as may be done in other cases where it is advisable or necessary to mete out severe penalties to meet a situation of an alarming number of cases of a certain offense or a crime wave, and, considering further the youthful age of the respondent, the majority of the members of this Court have decided to order, as it hereby orders, his immediate arrest and confinement in jail for a period of one (1) month, unless, before the expiration of that period he makes to this Court the revelation demanded of him. So ordered.

Tejan v. Cusi, Jr., 57 SCRA 154 (1974) ALFREDO C. TAJAN, petitioner, vs. HON. VICENTE N. CUSI, JR., Judge, Court of First Instance of Davao, respondent. Jose P. Arro for petitioner. Hon. Vicente N. Cusi, Jr. in his own behalf.

Petitioner, in answer thereto, wrote a letter to respondent Judge on December 7, 1967 denying the material averments of respondent Judge's letter and explaining the circumstances under which he prepared the aforementioned petition. Apparently not satisfied with petitioner's answer, respondent Judge had his letter filed and docketed as Adm. Case No. 59 against petitioner, and, together with Adm. Case No. 58 against Atty. Justo Cinco, gave due course thereto and set the same for hearing on January 24 and 25, 1968. At the hearing on January 24, 1968, petitioner questioned, among others, the propriety of the proceedings, contending that since the case was one for disbarment, respondent Judge had no jurisdiction over the person of petitioner as well as the subject matter thereof. Petitioner orally moved that respondent Judge inhibit himself from hearing the administrative case in view of the latter's conflicting positions as prosecutor and judge at the same time. The oral motion was denied. On February 1, 1968, respondent Judge proceeded to hear the evidence against petitioner. At the said hearing Municipal Judge Saludares testified by more or less reiterating the testimony he previously gave at the hearing of the petition for relief from the order in Misc. Case No. 2968 allowing the issuance of an owner's duplicate of title. The continuation of the hearing was set for April 26, 1968. On April 15, 1968, petitioner filed the present petition, and on April 17, 1968, this Court gave due course thereto and ordered the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction upon petitioner's posting of a bond. Petitioner's thesis is that respondent Judge has no authority on his own motion to hear and determine proceedings for disbarment or suspension of attorneys because jurisdiction thereon is vested exclusively and originally in the Supreme Court and not in courts of first instance. Petitioner also contends that assuming arguendo that courts of first instance have such authority, the procedure outlined in Rule 139 of the Revised Rules of Court should govern the filing and investigation of the complaint. We find petitioner's contentions without merit. 1. The power to exclude unfit and unworthy members of the legal profession stems from the inherent power of the Supreme Court to regulate the practice of law and the admission of persons to engage in that practice. It is a necessary incident to the proper administration of justice. An attorney-at-law is an officer of the court in the administration of justice and as such he is continually accountable to the Court for the manner in which he exercises the privilege which has been granted to him. His admission to the practice of law is upon the implied condition that his continued enjoyment of the right conferred, is dependent upon his remaining a fit and safe person to exercise it. When it appears by acts of misconduct, that he has become unfit to continue with the trust reposed upon him, his right to continue in the enjoyment of that trust and for the enjoyment of the professional privilege accorded to him may and ought to be forfeited. The law accords to the Court of Appeals and the Court of First Instance the power to investigate and suspend members of the bar. The following provisions of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court are applicable:

ANTONIO, J.:p In this original action of prohibition petitioner Alfredo C. Tajan challenges the authority of respondent Judge of the Court of First Instance of Davao to hear Administrative Case No. 59 of said court involving a disciplinary action initiated against petitioner as a member of the Philippine Bar. In a letter dated December 5, 1967 addressed to petitioner Alfredo C. Tajan, he was required by respondent Judge to explain within 72 hours why he should not be removed or suspended from the practice of law for preparing, or causing to be prepared, a petition in court containing factual averments which petitioner knew were false, to wit: The records and the transcript of stenographic notes of Misc. Case No. 2968 of this Court show that you prepared and/or caused to be prepared a verified petition for issuance of a new owner's duplicate copy of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-7312 in favor of Vicente Calongo, alleging therein as grounds therefor, "That the aforesaid Transfer Certificate was lost by the herein petitioner in his house in Mati, Davao; That in spite of the diligent search of the aforesaid title, the same could not be found and is therefore now presumed to be lost," and had the petition signed by Atty. Justo Cinco, when you know very well that the owner's duplicate copy has always been in the custody of Municipal Judge Bernardo P. Saludares of the Municipality of Kapalong to whom the same was entrusted by Vicente Calongo, and that as a result of the petition, this Court, through the Hon. Vicente P. Bullecer, Presiding Judge of Branch IV, issued an Order on June 28, 1967, directing the Register of Deeds of the City of Davao to issue a new owner's duplicate of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-7312. In view thereof, you are hereby given seventy-two (72) hours from the receipt hereof to explain why you shall not be removed or suspended from the practice of law.

SEC. 28. Suspension of attorney by the Court of Appeals or a Court of First Instance. The Court of Appeals or a Court of First Instance may suspend an attorney from practice for any of the causes named in the last preceding section, and after such suspension such attorney shall not practice his profession until further action of the Supreme Court in the premises. SEC. 29. Upon suspension by Court of Appeals or Court of First Instance, further proceedings in Supreme Court. Upon such suspension, the Court of Appeals or the Court of First Instance forthwith transmit to the Supreme Court a certified copy of the order of suspension and a full statement of the facts upon which the same was based. Upon the receipt of such certified copy and statement, the Supreme Court shall make full investigation of the facts involved and make such order revoking or extending the suspension, or removing the attorney from his office as such, as the facts warrant. SEC. 30. Attorney to be heard before removal or suspension. No attorney shall be removed or suspended from the practice of his profession, until he has had full opportunity upon reasonable notice to answer the charges against him, to produce witnesses in his own behalf, and to be heard by himself or counsel. But if upon reasonable notice he fails to appear and answer the accusation, the court may proceed to determine the matter ex parte. These provisions were taken from Sections 22, 23 and 25, respectively, of the Code of Civil Procedure, which read: SEC. 22. Suspension of lawyers. Courts of First Instance may suspend a lawyer from the further practice of his profession for any of the causes named in the last preceding section, and after such suspension such lawyer will not be privileged to practice his profession in any of the courts of the Islands until further action of the Supreme Court in the premises. SEC. 23. Proceedings upon suspension. Upon such suspension the judge of the Court of First Instance ordering the suspension shall forthwith transmit to the Supreme Court a certified copy of the order of suspension and a full statement of the facts upon which the same was based. Upon the receipt of such certified copy and statement, the Supreme Court shall make full investigation of the facts involved and make such order revoking or extending the suspension, or removing the lawyer permanently from the roll as it shall find the facts to warrant. SEC. 25. Hearing of charges. No lawyer shall be removed from the roll or be suspended from the performance of his profession until he has had full opportunity to answer the charges against him, and to produce witnesses in his own behalf and to be heard by himself and

counsel, if he so desires, upon reasonable notice. But if upon reasonable notice the accused fails to appear and answer the accusation, the court may proceed to determine the matter ex parte. 2. It should be observed that proceedings for the disbarment of members of the bar are not in any sense a civil action where there is a plaintiff and the respondent is a defendant. Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for private grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare. They are undertaken for the purpose of preserving courts of justice from the official ministration of persons unfit to practice in them. The attorney is called to answer to the court for his conduct as an officer of the court. The complainant or the person who called the attention of the court to the attorney's alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper administration of justice. The court may therefore act upon its own motion and thus be the initiator of the proceedings, because, obviously the court may investigate into the conduct of its own officers. 1 Indeed it is not only the right but the duty of the Court to institute upon its own motion, proper proceedings for the suspension or the disbarment of an attorney, when from information submitted to it or of its own knowledge it appears that any attorney has so conducted himself in a case pending before said court as to show that he is wanting in the proper measure of respect for the court of which he is an officer, or is lacking in the good character essential to his continuance as an attorney. This is for the protection of the general public and to promote the purity of the administration of justice. 3. Procedural due process requires that no attorney may be "removed or suspended from the practice of his profession, until he has had full opportunity upon reasonable notice to answer the charges against him, to produce witnesses in his own behalf, and to be heard by himself or counsel" (Sec. 30, Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court). 2 While the aforecited Sec. 30 of Rule 138 does not state what is a reasonable notice, Sec. 9 of Rule 139, of the Revised Rules, provides that as far as applicable, the procedure outlined by the preceding actions of Rule 139 "shall govern the filing and investigation of complaints against attorneys in the Court of Appeals or in Courts of First Instance." Section 2 of Rule 139, provides that the respondent lawyer in disciplinary proceedings is granted 10 days from service of a copy of the complaint within which to file his answer. It is desirable, therefore, that a similar period should be granted by the Court of First Instance to attorneys charged before it, for the purpose of uniformity in procedure. We find, however, that in the case at bar, petitioner not only failed to question as unreasonable, the period granted to him by the court within which to answer the complaint, but actually was not substantially prejudiced thereby as he filed his answer to the complaint within the period of 72 hours from receipt thereof. Petitioner claims that pursuant to Section 9 of Rule 139, which provides that as far as may be applicable, the procedure for the investigation by the Solicitor General of complaints against lawyers referred to said official by the Supreme Court shall govern the filing and investigation of complaints against lawyers in the Court of Appeals and in Courts of First Instance, the Solicitor General, and not respondent Judge, should be the one to conduct the present investigation. Sections 3 to 6 of Rule 139 are not applicable to the investigation of complaints against attorneys in the Court of Appeals and in Courts of

First Instance. The investigation by the Solicitor General in Section 3 of Rule 139 refers to complaints referred to said office by this Court and not to investigations in suspension proceedings before the Court of Appeals or Courts of First Instance, because Sections 28 to 30 of Rule 138 authorize said courts and confer upon them the power to conduct the investigation themselves, subject to another and final investigation by the Supreme Court in the event of suspension of the lawyer. On the basis of the certified copy of the order of suspension and the statement of the facts upon which the same is based, required by Section 29 of Rule 138, the Supreme Court "shall make full investigation of the facts involved and make such order revoking or extending the suspension or removing the attorney from his office as such, as the facts warrant." In other words, under such circumstances the intervention of the Solicitor General would, therefore, be unnecessary. WHEREFORE, the present person is denied, and the writ of preliminary injunction previously issued by this Court is ordered dissolved, with costs against petitioner. Zaldivar (Chairman), Fernando, Barredo, Fernandez and Aquino, JJ., concur.

Roy v. Oliva, 107 Phil. 313 (1960) PANFILO ROYO, Complainant, v. CELSO T. OLIVA, Respondent. Crispulo B. Dacusin, for complainant. Jorge A. Dolorfino, for Respondent. SYLLABUS ATTORNEYS-AT-LAW; DISBARMENT; WHEN ORDER MAY BE LIFTED; CASE AT BAR. After considering as a whole, in the case at bar, all the reasons and cases given and cited by respondent in his pleadings, and bearing in mind that almost two years have passed since he was ordered disbarred, and taking into account the circumstances involved in the case and in the belief and confidence that respondent has been sufficiently punished and disciplined, the order disbarring him may be lifted. DECISION MONTEMAYOR, J.: The last two paragraphs of our decision in Administrative Case No. 228, entitled Panfilo Royo,Complainant, v. Celso T. Oliva, respondent, for malpractice, promulgated on April 16, 1958, read as follows:red:chanrobles.com.ph "Consistent with our policy to maintain the high traditions and standards of the legal profession, insure the observance of legal ethics, protect the interests of clients and help keep their faith in attorneys at law, we are constrained to deal firmly with cases like the present."cralaw virtua1aw library "We find Atty. Celso T. Oliva guilty of malpractice and violation of his oath as lawyer. He is hereby ordered disbarred and he is directed to surrender his lawyers diploma, his certificate of admission of the Bar, and any other certificate issued to him relative to his admission to the Bar, within thirty (30) days from notice of this decision."cralaw virtua1aw library Respondent Oliva on May 16, 1958, filed a motion for reconsideration, adducing reasons in support thereof, as well as citations of cases of malpractice, particularly, the punishment of disciplinary action imposed and taken against erring members of the Bar. The motion for reconsideration was denied. On November 16, 1959, respondent Oliva filed a "Petition for the Lifting of the Order of Disbarment", again giving reasons to support his petition and citing cases of malpractice decided by this Tribunal and drawing a comparison of the measures of discipline and punishment adopted against members of the Bar for malpractice and the punishment imposed upon him. Again, his petition was denied.

On February 20, 1960, respondent filed a "Petition Ex-Parte for the Lifting of the Order of Disbarment." After carefully considering this last petition, as we have done the previous motion for reconsideration and the petition for the lifting of the order of disbarment, and after considering as a whole all the reasons and cases given and cited by him in his three pleadings, and bearing in mind that almost two years have passed since he was ordered disbarred, and taking into account the circumstances involved in this case, and in the belief and confidence that respondent Oliva has been sufficiently punished and disciplined, his petition is hereby granted and the order contained in our decision disbarring him hereby lifted. Attorney Celso T. Oliva is hereby reinstated in the legal profession and restored to the practice of law, and the Clerk of Court is directed to return to him his lawyers diploma, his certificate of admission to the Bar, and any other certificate issued to him relative to his admission to the Bar. Paras, C.J. Bengzon, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcin, Reyes, J. B. L., Endencia, Barrera, and Gutirrez David, JJ., concur.

Andres v. Cabrera, 127 SCRA 802 (1984) EMILIA E. vs. STANLEY R. CABRERA, respondent. ANDRES, petitioner,

which took over the functions of the defunct WCC considering that it is easier to resort to the list of the inventory of cases before conducting a diligent search unless both are morons with regards to their public office ... (emphasis supplied). 10. That due to the fact that Acting Referee Benjamin R. Perez, Alfredo Antonio, Jr., Atty. Ernesto Cruz and Atty. Emilia Andres has perpetrated a moronic but criminal conspiracy to conceal the falsified fraudulent and unauthorized petition ... (emphasis supplied). ... And to show beyond reasonable doubt that that the letter is a manufactured evidence respondent Atty. Andres in another demonstration of her unparalleled stupidity in the discharge of her public functions moronically failed to affix her signature to further aggravate matters said manufactured evidence was moronically received upon unlawful inducement by respondents Atty. Cruz and Atty. Andres in furtherance of the criminal conspiracy by the Idiotic with regards to the discharge of public functions ... (emphasis supplied) The same words and phrases are used in respondent's other affidavits supporting the criminal cases against the petitioner such as the following: Her moronic but criminal participation as a conspirator another demonstration of her unparalleled stupidity in the discharge of her public functions moronically failed to affix her signature said manufactured evidence was moronically received by unlawful inducement by respondents idiotic receiving clerk of CAR unparalleled stupidity of chief respondent On April 28, 1977, this Court required respondent to file an answer to the petition to disqualify him from admission to the Bar and ordered at the same time that his oathtaking be held in abeyance until further orders. In his answer, respondent admits the filing of criminal cases in the City Fiscal's Office against the petitioner but he claims that his language was not vile uncouth and un civil due to the simple reason that the same is the truth and was made with good intentions and justifiable motives pursuant to respondent's sense of justice as cherished under the New Society, aside from being absolutely privileged. Respondent's answer, however, repeats his former allegations that "Atty. Emilia Andres is not only a moron" and reiterates "the moronic discharge of public functions by complainant Atty. Emilia Andres."

GUERRERO, J.: In a resolution of this Court dated October 11, 1979, respondent Stanley R. Cabrera. a successful bar examine in 1977 and against whom a petition to disqualify him from membership in the Bar is pending in this Court in the above-entitled case, was required to show cause why he should not be cited and punished for contempt of court. The above citation for contempt against the respondent was issued by the Court following the persistence of the respondent in the use of, abusive and vituperative language despite the Court's admonition implicit in Our previous resolution of June 5, 1979 deferring the oath-taking of respondent pending showing that he has amended his ways and conformed to the use of polite, courteous and civil language. The petition to disqualify respondent from admission to the Bar was filed by Atty. Emilia F. Andres, Legal Officer II in the Office of the Minister, Ministry of Labor on the ground of lack of good moral character as shown by his propensity in using vile, uncouth, and in civil language to the extent of being reprehensively malicious and criminally libelous and likewise, for his proclivity in filing baseless, malicious and unfounded criminal cases. It appears that Atty. Emilia E. Andres, designated as Special Investigator to investigate the administrative charge filed by Mrs. Presentacion R. Cabrera, mother of the respondent, against one, Atty. Benjamin Perez, former Hearing Officer of the defunct Workmen's Compensation Unit, Region IV, Manila, for alleged dishonesty, oppression and discourtesy, recommended the dismissal of the charge even as the records of two relevant Workmen's Compensation cases were not produced at the hearing, notwithstanding the request of the respondent. When the Minister of Labor dismissed the charges upon Atty. Andres' recommendation, respondent filed with the City Fiscal of Manila criminal charges of infidelity in the custody of documents. falsification of public documents, and violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act against the investigator. Supporting these criminal charges are affidavits of respondent Stanley R. Cabrera wherein Atty. Andres. now the petitioner, points to the vile, in civil and uncouth language used by respondent, as shown in the following excerpts: 9. That the moronic statements of Atty. Ernesto Cruz and Atty. Emilia Andres are the product ofmoronic conspiracy to conceal the said falsified, fraudulent and unauthorized document in the sense that how can the CARS conduct a diligent search tor the aforesaid document when according to themoronic excuse of the Chief of the said office

The records show repeated motions of respondent dated October 21, 1977 and February 22, 1978 for the early resolution of his case and in his letter dated April 11, 1978 addressed to then Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, respondent sought, in his very words "some semblance of justice from the Honorable Supreme Court of the Philippines" and another letter to the Chief Justice dated August 17, 1978 making reference to the "avalance of the sadistic resolution en banc," "the cruel and inhuman punishment the Court has speedily bestowed upon undersigned respondent," "the Court does not honor its own resolution," and closing his letter thus "A victim of the Court's inhuman and cruel punishment through its supreme inaction." We referred the petition of Atty. Emilia Andres to the Legal Investigator of the Court for investigation, report and recommendation which was submitted on May 24, 1979. Acting on said report, the Court resolved to defer the oath-taking of respondent pending showing that he has amended his ways and has conformed to the use of polite, courteous and civil language. Thereafter, respondent filed on September 3, 1979 an Urgent ExParte Motion to annul Our resolution of June 5, 1979 and to reinvestigate the case, preferably giving opportunity to respondent to argue his case orally before the Court or to allow him to take his oath of office as an attorney. We denied the motion. On September 11, 1979, respondent filed an Urgent Motion for Contempt of Court, praying the Supreme Court to cite complainant Atty. Emilia Andres for contempt of court, alleging that her false and malicious accusations coupled with her improper and obnoxious acts during the investigation impeded, obstructed and degraded the administration of justice. Under paragraph 2 of said motion, he states: 2. That with all due respect to this Court, the aforestated resolution en banc to DEFER my oath-taking as an attorney pending showing that "he has amended his ways and has conformed to the use of polite, courteous, and civil language" is a degradation of the administration of justice due to the fact that the same is bereft of legal foundation due to the fact that the investigation conducted by Atty. Victor J. Sevilla, whose supreme stupidity in the discharge of his official functions is authenticated by his overt partiality to the complainant as authenticated by the transcript of records of this case thus depriving undersigned respondent-movant of the "Cold and neutral impartiality of a judge" tantamount to lack of due process of law; (emphasis supplied). We noted that the above paragraph is a repetition of paragraph 4 in respondent's previous Urgent Ex-Parte Motion dated September 3, 1979 which also states: 4. That with all due respect to this Court, the aforestated resolution en banc to DEFER my oath-taking as an attorney pending showing that "he has amended his ways and has conformed to the use of polite, courteous and civil language" is a degradation of the administration of justice due to the fact that same is bereft of legal foundation due to the fact that the investigation conducted by Atty. Victor J. Sevilla, whose supreme stupidity in the discharge of his official functions is authenticated by his overt partiality to the complainant as

authenticated by the transcript of records of this case thus depriving undersigned respondent-movant of the "cold and neutral impartiality of a judge, " tantamount to lack of due process of law: (emphasis supplied). We also took note in respondent's Urgent Motion for Contempt of Court the language used by him in praying this Court "to impose upon said Emilia E. Andres imprisonment commensurate to the humiliation and vomitting injusticeundersigned respondentmovant suffered and still suffering from this Court due to complainant Atty. Emilia E. Andres' wanton dishonesty." It is obvious and self-evident that respondent has not amended his conduct despite the Court's admonition. Respondent persists and keeps on using abusive and vituperative language before the Court. Accordingly, We resolved in Our resolution of October 11, 1979 to require respondent to show cause why he should not be cited and punished for contempt of court. Respondent filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration dated September 27, 1979 wherein he tried to assure the Court that he has amended his ways and has conformed to the use of polite, courteous and civil language and prayed that he be allowed to take the lawyer's oath. We denied it on October 16, 1979. Thereafter, respondent submitted a pleading entitled "Subrosa" dated October 22, 1979 and answered the citation for contempt against him in the following wise and manner: 3. That without prejudice to my Urgent Motion for Reconsideration dated Sept. 27, 1979, undersigned respondent respectfully states to this Court that the respondent charges that the Court's Resolution of June 5, 1979 is a "degradation of the administration of justice, " was never intended as a defiance of this Court's authority. nor to scandalize the integrity, dignity, and respect which this Court enjoys, but was an statement made with utmost good faith out of frustration out of respondent's inability to take his lawyer's oath since April, 1977 and in justifiable indignation at the illegalities perpetrated by both complainant Emilia E. Andres and Legal Investigator Victor Sevilla, both members of the Bar which are evident with a cursory perusal of the typewritten transcript of the stenographic notes of the hearings conducted by Legal Investigator Sevilla which this Court adopted; (emphasis supplied). We reject totally respondent's supposed humble apology "for all his non-conformity to the use of polite, courteous and civil language in all his pleadings filed with the Court and on his solemn word of honor pledges not to commit the same hereinafter" and his disavowal of intent of "defiance of (the) Court's authority nor to scandalize (its) integrity, dignity and respect which this Court enjoys." Such apology and disavowal appear to be in sincere, sham and artful for respondent in the same breadth contends that his statement calling the Court's resolution of June 5, 1979 as "a degradation of the administration of justice" was made "with utmost, good faith out of frustration of respondent's inability to

take his lawyer's oath since April, 1977 and in justifiable indignation of the illegalities perpetrated by both complainant Emilia E. Andres and Legal Investigation Victor Sevilla." Although respondent is not yet admitted to the legal profession but now stands at the threshold thereof, having already passed the Bar examinations, it is as much his duty as every attorney-at-law already admitted to the practice of law to ..observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers (Sec. 20, (b), Rule 138, Rules of Court) and "to abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the justice of the cause with which he is charged" (Sec. 20, (f), Rule 138). According to the Canons of Professional Ethics, it is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the Judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme importance. Judges, not being wholly free to defend themselves, are particularly entitled to receive the support of the Bar against unjust criticism and clamor. This duty is likewise incumbent upon one aspiring to be a lawyer such as the respondent for the attorney's oath solemnly enjoins him to "conduct myself as a lawyer according to to the best of my knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the Courts as to my client. The power of the Supreme Court to punish for contempt is inherent and extends to suits at law as well as to administrative proceedings as in the case at bar for it is as necessary to maintain respect for the courts, in administrative cases as it is in any other class of judicial proceedings. Under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, a person guilty of any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct or degrade the administration of justice may be punished for contempt, and the reason is that respect for the courts guarantees their stability and permanence Without such guaranty, the institution of the courts would be resting on a very loose and flimsy foundation, such power is essential to the proper execution and effective maintenance of judicial authority. Respondent's use of vile rude and repulsive language is patent and palpable from the very words, phrases and sentences he has written and which are quoted herein. 'They speak for themselves in their vulgarity, insolence and calumny. Specifically, respondent's direct reference to the Court on the ..sadistic resolution en banc, " "the cruel and inhuman punishment the Court has speedily bestowed" upon him, that "the Court does not honor its own resolution," that he is "a victim of the Court's inhuman and cruel punishment through its supreme inaction," and that he is suffering "humiliation and vomitting in justice" from this Court is not only disrespectful but his charges are false, sham and unfounded. 'There is no excuse, much less plea or pretext to brand ultimately the Court's resolution deferring oath-taking of the respondent as a new lawyer issued June 5, 1979 as "a degradation of the administration of justice." By his improper conduct in the use of highly disrespectful insolent language, respondent has tended to degrade the administration of justice; he has disparaged the dignity and brought to disrepute the integrity and authority of the Court. He has committed contempt of this Court. WHEREFORE respondent Stanley Cabrera is found guilty of contempt and he is hereby sentenced to pay this Court within ten days from notice hereof a fine of Five Hundred Pesos (P500.00) or imprisonment of fifty (50) days.

Let a copy of this resolution be attached to respondent's personal record in the Office of the Bar Confidant. SO ORDERED

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; SUPREME COURT; POWER TO ADMIT, SUSPEND, DISBAR AND REINSTATE LAWYERS; NATURE. The authority and responsibility over the admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys-at-law is vested in the Supreme Court by the Constitution. (Art. X, Sec. 5(5). This power is indisputably a judicial function and responsibility. It is judicial in the sense that discretion is used in its exercise. The function requires (1) previously established rules and principles, (2) concrete facts, whether past or present, affecting determinate individuals, and (3) decision as to whether these facts are governed by the rules and principles; in effect, a judicial function of the highest degree. (In re: Cunanan, Et Al., 94 Phil. 534). 2. ID.; ID.; POWER TO ADMIT ATTORNEYS TO THE BAR; REQUIRES EXERCISE OF SOUND JUDICIAL DISCRETION. This power to admit attorneys to the Bar is not, however, an arbitrary and despotic one, to be exercised at the pleasure of the Court, or from passion, prejudice or personal hostility, but it is the duty of the court to exercise and regulate it by a sound and judicial discretion. 3. LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS; POWER TO PUNISH FOR CONTEMPT, INHERENT IN ALL COURTS. The power to punish persons for contempt is inherent in all courts and essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings and to the enforcement of their lawful orders and decisions (Montalban v. Canonoy, 38 SCRA 1). A lawyer who uses intemperate, abusive, abrasive or threatening language betrays disrespect to the court, disgraces the Bar and invites the exercise by the court of its disciplinary power. (Surigao Mineral Reservation Board v. Cloribel, L-27072, Jan. 9, 1970, 31 SCRA 1; In re Almacen, 31 SCRA 562; Montecillo v. Gica, 6Q SCRA 234). Such power, however, should be exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive principle and on the corrective and not on the retaliatory idea of punishment. (Weigal v. Shuster, 11 Phil. 340; Villavicencio v. Lucban, 39 Phil. 778; People v. Marcos, 70 Phil. 468, 480; Victorino v. Espiritu, 5 SCRA 653; Reliance Procoma, Inc. v. Phil-Asia Tobacco Corp., 57 SCRA 370, Fontelera v. Amores, 70 SCRA 37). Furthermore, contempt power should not be utilized for mere satisfaction of natural inclination to strike back at a party who has shown lesser respect to the dignity of the court. (Royeca v. Animas, 71 SCRA 1). 4. ID.; PURPOSE THEREFOR; ACCOMPLISHED IN THE CASE AT BAR. The dignity and authority of the Court has been maintained and preserved when the Court punished respondent for his contumacious conduct and he willingly and promptly paid the penalty therefor. The preservative and corrective purpose of the contempt power of this Court has already been accomplished and achieved that to continue denying his plea for forgiveness and mercy in his behalf and his family is not only to prolong the agony of his misconduct which he has suffered for seven long years since 1977 when he passed the Bar examinations but also would appear to be despotic and arbitrary. We hold that respondent has expiated enough for his misdeed and may now be allowed to take the lawyers oath and thus become a more useful member of society and of the law profession. RESOLUTION GUERRERO, J.:

EMILIA [SBC-571.

E.

ANDRES, Complainant, February

v.

STANLEY

R. 29,

CABRERA, Respondent. 1984.]

LOURDES C. PEREA, Complainant, v. STANLEY R. CABRERA, Respondent. SYLLABUS

In Our Resolution promulgated December 14, 1979 in the first above-entitled case, respondent Stanley R. Cabrera, a successful Bar examinee in 1977 against whom petition had been filed for denial of his admission as member of the Bar for lack of good moral character and for his proclivity to filing baseless, malicious, and unfounded cases, was found guilty of contempt of this Court for" (b)y his improper conduct in the use of highly disrespectful, insolent language, respondent has tended to degrade the administration of justice; he has disparaged the dignity and brought to disrepute the integrity and authority of the Court" and was sentenced to pay within ten days from notice a fine of P600.00 or imprisonment of 50 days. (See 94 SCRA 512.)chanrobles law library Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated January 9, 1980 which We denied on March 6, 1980 and further required respondent to pay within five (5) days from notice the aforesaid fine of P500.00. The fine was thereafter paid on March 14, 1980 under SC Official Receipt No. 5369050X. On July 16, 1980, respondent submitted an Urgent Motion for Admission to the Bar "in view of the foregoing (payment) and for mercy" which We denied on August 12, 1980 since the investigation against the said respondent was still pending before the Legal Investigator of the Court, Atty. Victor J. Sevilla. Another Urgent Motion for Early Resolution dated August 29, 1980 was again filed with the Court by respondent, calling attention to the fact that the case has been pending since April, 1977. We noted said motion on September 16, 1980. Meanwhile, respondent manifested to the Court in still another Urgent Motion for Admission to the Bar dated September 25, 1981 that "respondent has amended his ways and has conformed to the use of polite, courteous, and civil language as can be gleaned from (his) urgent motion for admission to the Bar dated July 16, 1980 and (his) urgent motion for early resolution dated August 29, 1980 filed with this Honorable Court; and that undersigned respondent reiterates his sincere apologies to this Honorable Court and its Legal Investigator for all his actuations since this case was filed in 1977; . . . that undersigned respondent was acquitted by Judge Priscilla Mijares of the City Court of Manila for estafa wherein Lourdes C. Perea was the complaining witness as hereto authenticated by Annexes A, A-1, A-2, A-3, A-4, A-5, A-6 and made an integral part of this motion. Respondent prayed that "for humanitarian considerations, considering that undersigned respondent has seven children, a wife and a widowed mother to support," he be allowed to take his oath of office as a lawyer and be admitted to the Bar.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary Respondent then wrote a letter dated August 25, 1982 to the Chief Justice, reiterating his sincere apologies to the Court for all his actions which culminated in his conviction for contempt and prayed for help to enable him "to uplift the living conditions of (his) seven children considering that up to this date (he is) a squatter beside the railroad tracks living in abject poverty." The aforementioned letter was noted by this Court on September 16, 1982. In the meantime, the second case, "SBC-571 (Lourdes C. Perea v. Stanley R. Cabrera)" was ordered archived in view of the resolutions in the first case "SBC-586 (Emilia E. Andres v. Stanley R. Cabrera)" denying, among others, respondents admission to the Bar, as per Our Resolution dated September 13, 1979 in SBC-571.

On February 21, 1983, respondent wrote a second letter to the Chief Justice, once more reiterating his sincere apologies to the Court and begged for mercy "to the end that he be allowed to take his oath of office as a lawyer and enable him to give his children a bright future." In Our Resolution of June 14, 1983, We resolved to deny the aforesaid letter/petition. On July 5, 1983, there was received in this Court a letter from one Nerida V. Cabrera with address at 732 Int. 4, Bagumbayan, Bacood, Sta. Mesa, M.M., wife of the respondent herein, addressed to the Chief Justice, appealing for kindness and humanitarian consideration to allow her husband to take his oath as a lawyer so that he can provide food and shelter for their eight children because he is unemployed. She also apologized for her husband for his disrespectful language to the Court and prayed that she be allowed to apologize personally to the Chief Justice and to the Supreme Court for her husband.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary We noted the said letter of Nerida V. Cabrera and required said respondent to appear personally before this Court on Tuesday, August 23, 1983 at 11:00 oclock a.m. The records further disclose that a handwritten letter by Nerida Cabrera dated August 1, 1983 attaching a picture of the family of respondent and their eight children and a similar handwritten letter by Presentacion Vda. de Cabrera, mother of the respondent, were sent to the Chief Justice. Notices of the hearing set for August 23, 1983 were given to the parties. At the said hearing, Atty. Rhodora Javier appeared and argued for the complainant Emilia E. Andres in SBC-585 (Emilia E. Andres v. Stanley R. Cabrera). Stanley Cabrera appeared in his own behalf and answered the questions asked by the Court. Atty. Victor Sevilla, Legal Investigator of this Court, who investigated SBC-585, also answered the questions asked by the Court. The Court then resolved to require respondent Cabrera to submit within five (5) days from date (1) letters of apology to the Court, to Atty. Victor Sevilla, to complainant Emilia E. Andres, and to Fiscal Leonardo Arguelles for the contumacious and vile language contained in his pleadings, and (2) certifications of good behavior and exemplary conduct from the Parish Priest and from the Barangay Captain of the place where he resides. Thereafter, the petition to take the lawyers oath shall be considered submitted for resolution. On August 25, 1983, respondent forwarded to the Chief Justice his letter of apology and through him to all the Associate Justices of the Court "for all (his) disrespectful acts and utterances thru (his) pleadings against the Honorable Supreme Court" and promised never to commit the same. He enclosed therewith the Letter of Apology to Atty. Victor Sevilla, Legal Investigator of the Court, Letter of Apology to Atty. Emilia E. Andres, Legal Division, MOLE, complainant in SBC-585, Letter of Apology to Fiscal Leonardo Arguelles, Manila City Hall, Certification of Good Moral Character from Rev. Fr. Eduardo A. Cruz, Parish Priest, Our Lady of Fatima Parish, Fatima Village, Bacood, Lubiran St., Sta. Mesa, Manila, and Certification of Good Moral Character from Barangay Captain Emiliano C. Masilungan of Barangay 604, Zone 60, Sta. Mesa, Manila.chanrobles.com : virtual law library The authority and responsibility over the admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys-at-law is vested in the Supreme Court by the Constitution. (Art. X, Sec. 5(5). This power is indisputably a judicial function and responsibility. It is judicial in the sense that discretion is used in its exercise. The function requires (1)

previously established rules and principles, (2) concrete facts, whether past or present, affecting determinate individuals, and (3) decision as to whether these facts are governed by the rules and principles; in effect, a judicial function of the highest degree. (In re: Cunanan, Et Al., 94 Phil. 534). This power to admit attorneys to the Bar is not, however, an arbitrary and despotic one, to be exercised at the pleasure of the Court, or from passion, prejudice or personal hostility, but it is the duty of the court to exercise and regulate it by a sound and judicial discretion. (In re: Crum, 204 Pac. 948, 103 Ore. 297; 1 Thornton on Attorneys-at-Law, Sec. 2, cited in Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 6, pp. 204, 205). On the other hand, the power to punish persons for contempt is inherent in all courts and essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings and to the enforcement of their lawful orders and decisions (Montalban v. Canonoy, 38 SCRA 1). A lawyer who uses intemperate, abusive, abrasive or threatening language betrays disrespect to the court, disgraces the Bar and invites the exercise by the court of its disciplinary power. (Surigao Mineral Reservation Board v. Cloribel, L-27072, Jan. 9, 1970, 31 SCRA 1; In re Almacen, 31 SCRA 562; Montecillo v. Gica, 6Q SCRA 234). Such power, however, should be exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive principle and on the corrective and not on the retaliatory idea of punishment. (Weigal v. Shuster, 11 Phil. 340; Villavicencio v. Lucban, 39 Phil. 778; People v. Marcos, 70 Phil. 468, 480; Victorino v. Espiritu, 5 SCRA 653; Reliance Procoma, Inc. v. Phil-Asia Tobacco Corp., 57 SCRA 370, Fontelera v. Amores, 70 SCRA 37). Furthermore, contempt power should not be utilized for mere satisfaction of natural inclination to strike back at a party who has shown lesser respect to the dignity of the court. (Royeca v. Animas, 71 SCRA 1).chanrobles.com:cralaw:red In the case at bar, respondent having paid the fine imposed upon him for direct contempt against the integrity and dignity of this Court, having apologized in repeated motions filed before this Court for his disrespectful language and personally reiterated at the hearing conducted herein, and has furthermore complied with the Courts directives contained in Our Resolution dated August 23, 1983 by submitting his letters of apology to the Chief Justice and to the members of this Court, to Atty. Victor Sevilla, Legal Investigator of the Court, to complainant Atty. Emilia E. Andres, to Fiscal Leonardo Arguelles, and Certifications of Good Moral Character from his parish priest, Rev. Fr. Eduardo A. Cruz, and his Barangay Captain, Emiliano C. Masilungan of Barangay 604, Zone 60, Sta. Mesa, Manila where respondent resides, We are convinced by these actions that he has become respectful, sincere and honest, thereby evincing that good moral character required of a person who may be admitted to the practice of law. The pleas of his mother and wife for the sake and the future of respondents family with eight young children, altho self-serving, are strong human factors in considering, judiciously and wisely the motion of respondent which in effect would allow him to start on a professional career as a lawyer that would certainly mean a bright future for himself and his family, for otherwise the discretion with which the Court may admit qualified persons to the practice of law may be clouded with vindictiveness and retaliation which is not the basic purpose of the Courts inherent power to punish for contempt. The dignity and authority of the Court has been maintained and preserved when the Court punished respondent for his contumacious conduct and he willingly and promptly paid the penalty therefor. The preservative and corrective purpose of the contempt

power of this Court has already been accomplished and achieved that to continue denying his plea for forgiveness and mercy in his behalf and his family is not only to prolong the agony of his misconduct which he has suffered for seven long years since 1977 when he passed the Bar examinations but also would appear to be despotic and arbitrary. We hold that respondent has expiated enough for his misdeed and may now be allowed to take the lawyers oath and thus become a more useful member of society and of the law profession.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary In SBC-571, since the charge against respondent for estafa which is the basis of the petition for disqualification filed by complainant Lourdes C. Perea, has been dismissed and respondent acquitted in Criminal Case No. 015429-CV by the City Court of Manila, Branch VII, the same is hereby dismissed. WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING respondent Stanley R. Cabrera is hereby allowed to take the lawyers oath. SO ORDERED.

Fernando, C.J., Teehankee, Makasiar, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Abad Santos, De Castro, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin and Relova, JJ., concur. Gutierrez, Jr., J., I entertain some reservations about the respondents ability or willingness to maintain his changed disposition and conduct but I concur in the decision to give him a chance to be a member of the bar in good standing.