New Dimensions of U.S.

Foreign Policy Toward Russia

By George Friedman Geopolitical Weekly Tuesday, February 11, 2014 - 04:13 http://www strat!or co"/weekly/#ew-di"e#sio#s-us-!orei$#-policy-toward-russia% ut"&source'!reelist!(ut"&"ediu"'e"ail(ut"&ca"pai$#'20140211(ut"&ter"'Gweekly(ut"&co#te#t'read "ore The stru$$le !or so"e o! the "ost strate$ic territory i# the world took a# i#teresti#$ twist this week )ast week we discussed what appeared to be a si$#i!ica#t shi!t i# Ger"a# #atio#al strate$y i# which *erli# see"ed to declare a #ew doctri#e o! i#creased asserti+e#ess i# the world -- a shi!t that !ollowed i#te#se Ger"a# i#terest i# ,krai#e This week, , - .ssista#t -ecretary o! -tate /ictoria 0ula#d, i# a #ow-!a"ous cellpho#e co#+ersatio#, declared her stro#$ co#te"pt !or the 1uropea# ,#io# a#d its weak#ess a#d cou#seled the , - a"bassador to ,krai#e to proceed 2uickly a#d without the 1uropea#s to piece to$ether a speci!ic oppositio# coalitio# be!ore the 3ussia#s saw what was happe#i#$ a#d took actio# This is a #ew twist #ot because it "akes clear that the ,#ited -tates is #ot the o#ly cou#try i#tercepti#$ pho#e calls, but because it puts , - policy i# ,krai#e i# a #ew li$ht a#d !orces us to reco#sider , - strate$y toward 3ussia a#d Ger"a#y 0ula#d4s cellpho#e co#+ersatio# is hardly de!i#iti+e, but it is a# additio#al i#dicator o! ."erica# strate$ic thi#ki#$

Recent U.S. Foreign Policy Shifts

, - !orei$# policy has e+ol+ed duri#$ the past !ew years 5re+iously, the ,#ited -tates was !ocused hea+ily o# the 6sla"ic world a#d, "ore i"porta#t, te#ded to re$ard the use o! !orce as a# early optio# i# the e7ecutio# o! , - policy rather tha# as a last resort This was true #ot o#ly i# .!$ha#ista# a#d 6ra2 but also i# .!rica a#d elsewhere The strate$y was success!ul whe# its $oal was to destroy a# e#e"y "ilitary !orce 6t pro+ed !ar "ore di!!icult to use i# occupyi#$ cou#tries a#d shapi#$ their i#ter#al a#d !orei$# policies 8ilitary !orce has i#tri#sic li"its The alter#ati+e has bee# a shi!t to a bala#ce-o!-power strate$y i# which the ,#ited -tates relies o# the #atural schis"s that e7ist i# e+ery re$io# to block the e"er$e#ce o! re$io#al he$e"o#s a#d co#tai# u#rest a#d $roups that could threate# , - i#terests The best e7a"ple o! the old policy is )ibya, where the ,#ited -tates directly i#ter+e#ed with air power a#d special operatio#s !orces to u#seat 8oa""ar Gadha!i Wester# e!!orts to replace hi" with a re$i"e !a+orable to the ,#ited -tates a#d its allies ha+e #ot succeeded The #ew strate$y ca# be see# i# -yria, where rather tha# directly i#ter+e#i#$ the ,#ited -tates has stood back a#d allowed the warri#$ !actio#s to e7pe#d their e#er$y o# each other, pre+e#ti#$ either side !ro" di+erti#$ resources to acti+ities that "i$ht challe#$e , - i#terests

*ehi#d this is a ri!t i# , - !orei$# policy that has "ore to do with "oti+atio# tha# actual actio# 9# o#e side, there are those who co#sciously support the -yria "odel !or the ,#ited -tates as #ot #ecessarily the best "oral optio# but the o#ly practical optio# 9# the other, there are those who ar$ue o# behal! o! "oral i#ter+e#tio#s, as we saw i# )ibya, a#d who see re"o+i#$ tyra#ts as a# e#d i# itsel! Gi+e# the outco"e i# )ibya, this !actio# is o# the de!e#si+e: it "ust e7plai# how a# i#ter+e#tio# will actually i"pro+e the "oral situatio# -i#ce this !actio# also te#ded to oppose 6ra2, it "ust show how a# i#ter+e#tio# will #ot de$e#erate i#to 6ra2-type war!are That is hard to do, so !or all the rhetoric, the ,#ited -tates is by de!ault !alli#$ i#to a bala#ce-o!-power "odel

The Geopolitical Battle in Ukraine

3ussia e"er$ed as a proble" !or the ,#ited -tates a!ter the 9ra#$e 3e+olutio# i# 2004, whe# the ,#ited -tates, supporti#$ a#ti-3ussia# !actio#s i# ,krai#e, succeeded i# cra!ti#$ a relati+ely pro-Wester#, a#ti-3ussia# $o+er#"e#t The 3ussia#s read this as , - i#telli$e#ce operatio#s desi$#ed to create a# a#ti-3ussia# ,krai#e that, as we ha+e writte#, would directly challe#$e 3ussia# strate$ic a#d eco#o"ic i#terests 8oreo+er, 8oscow saw the 9ra#$e 3e+olutio# ;alo#$ with the 3ose 3e+olutio#< as a dress rehearsal !or so"ethi#$ that could occur i# 3ussia #e7t The 3ussia# respo#se was to use its ow# co+ert capabilities, i# co#=u#ctio# with eco#o"ic pressure !ro" #atural $as cuto!!s, to u#der"i#e ,krai#e4s $o+er#"e#t a#d to use its war with Geor$ia as a striki#$ re"i#der o! the resurrectio# o! 3ussia# "ilitary capabilities These "o+es, plus disappoi#t"e#t with Wester# aid, e#abled a "ore pro-3ussia# $o+er#"e#t to e"er$e i# >ie+, reduci#$ the 3ussia#s4 !ears a#d i#creasi#$ their co#!ide#ce 6# ti"e, 8oscow beca"e "ore e!!ecti+e a#d asserti+e i# playi#$ its cards ri$ht i# the 8iddle 1ast, $i+i#$ rise to the curre#t situatio#s i# -yria, 6ra# a#d elsewhere Washi#$to# had two optio#s 9#e was to allow the bala#ce o! power to assert itsel!, i# this case relyi#$ o# the 1uropea#s to co#tai# the 3ussia#s The other was to co#ti#ue to !ollow the bala#ce-o!-power "odel but at a #otch hi$her tha# pure passi+ity .s 0ula#d4s call shows, , - co#!ide#ce i# 1urope4s will !or a#d i#terest i# blocki#$ the 3ussia#s was low: he#ce a purely passi+e "odel would #ot work The #e7t step was the lowest possible le+el o! i#+ol+e"e#t to co#tai# the 3ussia#s a#d cou#ter their "o+es i# the 8iddle 1ast This "ea#t a li"ited a#d #ot too co+ert support !or a#ti-3ussia#, pro-1uropea# de"o#strators -- the recreatio# o! a pro-Wester#, a#ti-3ussia# $o+er#"e#t i# ,krai#e To a co#siderable de$ree, the , - talks with 6ra# also e#able Washi#$to# to de#y the 3ussia#s a# 6ra#ia# card, althou$h the -yria# theater still pro+ides the >re"li# so"e roo" to "a#eu+er The ,#ited -tates is #ot prepared to i#ter+e#e i# the !or"er -o+iet ,#io# 3ussia is #ot a $lobal power, a#d its "ilitary has "a#y weak#esses, but it is by !ar the stro#$est i# the re$io# a#d is able to pro=ect power i# the !or"er -o+iet periphery, as the war with Geor$ia showed .t the "o"e#t, the , - "ilitary also has "a#y weak#esses ?a+i#$ !ou$ht !or "ore tha# a decade i# the core o! the 6sla"ic world, the , - "ilitary is hi$hly !ocused o# a way o! war #ot rele+a#t to the !or"er -o+iet ,#io#, its allia#ce structure arou#d the !or"er -o+iet ,#io# is !rayed a#d #ot supporti+e o! war, a#d the i#e+itable post-war cutbacks that traditio#ally !ollow a#y war the ,#ited -tates !i$hts are cutti#$ i#to capabilities . direct i#ter+e#tio#, e+e# were it co#te"plated ;which it was #ot<, is #ot a# optio# The o#ly correlatio# o! !orces that "atters is what e7ists at a $i+e# poi#t i# ti"e i# a $i+e# place 6# that se#se, the closer , - !orces $et to the 3ussia# ho"ela#d, the $reater the ad+a#ta$e the 3ussia#s ha+e

6#stead, the ,#ited -tates did the sa"e thi#$ that it did prior to the 9ra#$e 3e+olutio#: back the type o! i#ter+e#tio# that both the hu"a# ri$hts ad+ocates a#d the bala#ce-o!-power ad+ocates could support Gi+i#$ !i#a#cial a#d psycholo$ical support to the de"o#strators protesti#$ ,krai#ia# 5reside#t /iktor @a#uko+ich4s decisio# to re=ect a closer relatio#ship with 1urope, a#d later protesti#$ the $o+er#"e#t4s atte"pt to suppress the de"o#stratio#s, preser+ed the possibility o! re$i"e cha#$e i# ,krai#e, with "i#i"al e7posure a#d risk to the ,#ited -tates

Dissatisfaction with the German Approach

.s we said last week, it appeared that it was the Ger"a#s who were particularly pressi#$ the issue, a#d that they were the o#es +irtually co#trolli#$ o#e o! the leaders o! the protests, /itali >litschko The ,#ited -tates appeared to be taki#$ a back seat to Ger"a#y 6#deed, *erli#4s state"e#ts i#dicati#$ that it is prepared to take a "ore asserti+e role i# the world appeared to be a historic shi!t i# Ger"a# !orei$# policy The state"e#ts were e+e# "ore #otable si#ce, o+er the years, Ger"a#y appeared to ha+e bee# "o+i#$ closer to 3ussia o# eco#o"ic a#d strate$ic issues 0either cou#try was co"!ortable with , - a$$ressi+e#ess i# the 8iddle 1ast a#d -outhwest .sia *oth cou#tries shared the #eed to create #ew eco#o"ic relatio#ships i# the !ace o! the 1uropea# eco#o"ic crisis a#d the #eed to co#tai# the ,#ited -tates ?e#ce, the appare#t Ger"a# shi!t was startli#$ .lthou$h Ger"a#y4s "o+e should #ot be dis"issed, its "ea#i#$ was #ot as clear as it see"ed 6# her cellpho#e call, 0ula#d is clearly dis"issi#$ the Ger"a#s, >litschko a#d all their e!!orts i# ,krai#e This could "ea# that the strate$y was too !eeble !or ."erica# tastes ;*erli# ca##ot, a!ter all, risk too bi$ a co#!ro#tatio# with 8oscow< 9r it could "ea# that whe# the Ger"a#s said they were pla##i#$ to be "ore asserti+e, their #ew bold#ess was "ea#t to head o!! , - e!!orts )ooki#$ at this week4s e+e#ts, it is #ot clear what the Ger"a#s "ea#t What is clear is that the ,#ited -tates was #ot satis!ied with Ger"a#y a#d the 1uropea# ,#io# )o$ically, this "ea#t that the ,#ited -tates i#te#ded to be "ore a$$ressi+e tha# the Ger"a#s i# supporti#$ oppo#e#ts o! the re$i"e This is a touchy issue !or hu"a# ri$hts ad+ocates, or should be @a#uko+ich is the elected preside#t o! ,krai#e, wi##er o! a# electio# that is $e#erally a$reed to ha+e bee# ho#est -- e+e# thou$h his co#stitutio#al a"e#d"e#ts a#d subse2ue#t parlia"e#tary electio#s "ay #ot ha+e bee# ?e was acti#$ withi# his authority i# re=ecti#$ the deal with the 1uropea# ,#io# 6! de"o#strators ca# u#seat a# elected preside#t because they disa$ree with his actio#s, they ha+e set a precede#t that u#der"i#es co#stitutio#alis" 1+e# i! he was rou$h i# suppressi#$ the de"o#strators, it does #ot #ulli!y his electio# Fro" a bala#ce-o!-power strate$y, howe+er, it "akes $reat se#se . pro-Wester#, e+e# a"bi$uous, ,krai#e poses a pro!ou#d strate$ic proble" !or 3ussia 6t would be as i! Te7as beca"e pro-3ussia#, a#d the 8ississippi 3i+er syste", oil productio#, the 8idwest a#d the -outhwest beca"e +ul#erable The 3ussia# ability to e#$a$e i# 6ra# or -yria sudde#ly co#tracts 8oscow4s !ocus "ust be o# ,krai#e ,si#$ the de"o#stratio#s to create a "assi+e proble" !or 3ussia does two thi#$s 6t creates a real strate$ic challe#$e !or the 3ussia#s a#d !orces the" o# the de!e#si+e -eco#d, it re"i#ds 3ussia that Washi#$to# has capabilities a#d optio#s that "ake challe#$i#$ the ,#ited -tates

di!!icult .#d it ca# be !ra"ed i# a way that hu"a# ri$hts ad+ocates will applaud i# spite o! the co#stitutio#al issues, e#e"ies o! the 6ra#ia# talks will appreciate a#d Ae#tral 1uropea#s !ro" 5ola#d to 3o"a#ia will see as a si$# o! , - co""it"e#t to the re$io# The ,#ited -tates will re-e"er$e as a# alter#ati+e to Ger"a#y a#d 3ussia 6t is a brillia#t stroke 6ts o#e weak#ess, i! we ca# call it that, is that it is hard to see how it ca# work 3ussia has si$#i!ica#t eco#o"ic le+era$e i# ,krai#e, it is #ot clear that pro-Wester# de"o#strators are i# the "a=ority, a#d 3ussia# co+ert capabilities i# ,krai#e outstrip ."erica# capabilities The Federal -ecurity -er+ice a#d Forei$# 6#telli$e#ce -er+ice ha+e bee# collecti#$ !iles o# ,krai#ia#s !or a lo#$ ti"e We would e7pect that a!ter the 9ly"pics i# -ochi, the 3ussia#s could play their tru"p cards 9# the other ha#d, e+e# i! the play !ails, the ,#ited -tates will ha+e de"o#strated that it is back i# the $a"e a#d that the 3ussia#s should look arou#d their periphery a#d wo#der where the ,#ited -tates will act #e7t 5utti#$ so"eo#e i# a de!e#si+e crouch does #ot re2uire that the !irst pu#ch work 6t is e#ou$h !or the oppo#e#t to u#dersta#d that the #e7t pu#ch will co"e whe# he is least e7pecti#$ it The "ere willi#$#ess o! the ,#ited -tates to e#$a$e will cha#$e the e7pectatio#s o! Ae#tral 1urope, cause te#sio#s betwee# the Ae#tral 1uropea#s a#d the Ger"a#s a#d create a# ope#i#$ !or the ,#ited -tates

The Pressure on Russia

9! course, the 2uestio# is whether a#d where the 3ussia#s will a#swer the ."erica#s, or e+e# i! they will co#sider the , - actio#s si$#i!ica#t at all 6# a se#se, -yria was 8oscow4s "o+e a#d this is the cou#ter"o+e The 3ussia#s ca# choose to call the $a"e They ha+e "a#y reaso#s to Their eco#o"y is u#der pressure The Ger"a#s "ay #ot rally to the ,#ited -tates, but they will #ot break !ro" it .#d i! the ,#ited -tates ups the a#te i# Ae#tral 1urope, 3ussia# i#roads there will dissol+e 6! the 3ussia#s are #ow a# ."erica# proble", which they are, a#d i! the ,#ited -tates is #ot $oi#$ to re+ert to a direct i#ter+e#tio# "ode, which it ca##ot, the# this strate$y "akes se#se .t the +ery least it $i+es the 3ussia#s a proble" a#d a se#se o! i#security that ca# curb their actio#s elsewhere .t best it could create a re$i"e that "i$ht #ot cou#terbala#ce 3ussia but could "ake pipeli#es a#d ports +ul#erable -- especially with , - help The public i#terceptio# o! 0ula#d4s pho#e call was #ot all that e"barrassi#$ 6t showed the world that the ,#ited -tates, #ot Ger"a#y, is leadi#$ the way i# ,krai#e .#d it showed the 3ussia#s that the ."erica#s care so little, they will e7press it o# a# ope# cellpho#e li#e 0ula#d4s obsce#e dis"issal o! the 1uropea# ,#io# a#d treat"e#t o! 3ussia as a proble" to deal with co#!ir"s a , - policy: The ,#ited -tates is #ot $oi#$ to war, but passi+ity is o+er 3ead "ore: 0ew Bi"e#sio#s o! , - Forei$# 5olicy Toward 3ussia C -trat!or Follow us: Dstrat!or o# Twitter C -trat!or o# Facebook 3ead "ore: 0ew Bi"e#sio#s o! , - Forei$# 5olicy Toward 3ussia C -trat!or Follow us: Dstrat!or o# Twitter C -trat!or o# Facebook