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Potency: Aristotle defines or describes potency as follows: Potentiality means in general the source of change or movement in some other

thing, or in the same thing to the extent that it is different, and also the source of a thing being moved by another thing or by itself (to he extent that it is different). Metaphysics V 12, 1019 a 15ff. c. Act and Potentiality The concepts of act and potentiality are in the first instance correlative. t is tr!e that bein", o!r first concept, is conceived as act, b!t this is at a level prior to the distinction between act and potentiality. #otentiality can be defined as the possibility or capability of an act (posse ad actum), i.e. of a reali$ation and co%pletion. #otentiality has in fact an essential relationship to act, to a co%pletion on a partic!lar level of bein". There is not one &ind of potentiality, b!t potentiality is an analo"o!s concept and is fo!nd on the vario!s levels of created bein". 2. The Principles Expressing the elation of Act and Potency to !eing a' (irst: e"erything that exists is either pure act or else consists in act and potency. This %eans that act and potency are o!r &ey to !nderstandin" reality. This principle is based on the fact that what is real is act, and on the fact of the chan"e and %!ltiplicity that we find in thin"s. f chan"e is the transition fro% one bein" to another, the possibility of chan"e %!st needs to be present, whereby this thin" can chan"e and beco%e different. )t. Tho%as says, *act is %ore e+cellent than potency in re"ard to that "en!s, c' -oncernin" the real distinction bet#een act and potency the followin" principles can be for%!lated: in a chan"eable bein", act and potency are really distinct fro% one another: potency is that which is not yet act, b!t which can beco%e deter%ination and reality, whereas act is already deter%ination of a thin" and is real. Accidents, s!bstantial for% and the act of bein" are all acts, altho!"h each in their own way. .e can %a&e a basic division of act and potency that will help !s to clarify thin"s a little better. /n the one hand, there is passive potency 0the real capacity to receive' and the correspondin" first act 0also called the entitative act'. /ne the other hand, there is active potency 0the real capacity to act' and the correspondin" second act, which is action or operation. There are three basic $inds of passi"e potency and their corresponding acts. 01' Prime matter and Substantial Form. n all %aterial s!bstances there is an !lti%ate s!bstrat!%, pri%e %atter, in which s!bstantial for% is received. This for% deter%ines the %atter, and thereby for%s one or another type of corporeal s!bstance, s!ch as iron, water or o+y"en. #ri%e %atter is the !lti%ate potential s!bstrat!%, since it is itself p!re potency, a %erely receptive s!b1ect which lac&s any act!ality of its own. The s!bstantial for% is the first act which pri%e %atter receives. ( ) Substance and !ccidents. All s!bstances, whether %aterial 0co%posed of %atter and for%' or p!rely spirit!al, are s!b1ects of accidental perfections, s!ch as 2!alities or relations. 3nli&e pri%e %atter, the s!bstance is a s!b1ect which is already in act thro!"h the for%, b!t which itself is in potency with respect to the accidents. )o, pri%e %atter is p!re potency with no act!ality. )!bstance is a potency, b!t it is also act. t is act beca!se it contains in itself the s!bstantial for% that %a&es it be a s!bstance. (") #ssence (potentia essendi) and the !ct$of$%eing. The for%, in t!rn, whether it is received in %atter or not, is no %ore than a deter%inate %eas!re of participation in the act of bein". The essences *%an,, *do",, *pine tree,, and *!rani!%,, for instance, are different ways of participatin" in bein". That is, different ways of havin" the act of bein". .ith respect to the act of bein", everythin" is a li%itin" receptive potency 4fro% the separated for%s 0an"els' separated so!ls, to the co%posite %atter and for%, down to the accidents 0which participate in the act of bein" thro!"h their !nion with the s!bstance'.

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