Patrick Neal. Hobbes and Rational Choice Theory

University of Utah Western Political Science Association
Hobbes and Rational Choice Theory Author(s): Patrick Neal Source: The Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 41, No. 4 (Dec., 1988), pp. 635-652 Published by: University of Utah on behalf of the Western Political Science Association Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/448487 . Accessed: 10/03/2014 12:43
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HOBBES AND RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY

PATRICKNEAL University of Vermont HE depiction of the natural condition of mankind by Thomas Hobbes (Hobbes 1968) has long been a source of fascination to students of political theory. In the past two decades, the concepts and categories of rational choice theory have been increasingly employed as one means of interpreting,illuminating,and understanding Hobbes' teaching (Hampton 1986; Brams 1985: 139-46; Kavka 1983; Laver 1981: 17-18, 43-47; McLean 1981: 339-51; Taylor 1976; Gauthier 1969). The issue I propose to explore herein is that of determining the extent to which this approach does indeed succeed in bringing clearly into focus the essence of that teaching. I shall suggest that though not without value, the appropriation of Hobbes' teaching to the terms of rational choice theory reaps a good deal less than Hobbes attempted to sow. There are a number of mundane senses in which this conclusion is at once obvious and trivial, all rooted in the fact that Hobbes, seminal thinker that he was, planted widely. To take the extreme, no one employing the conceptual framework of rational choice or game theory attempts to use this framework to say anything about Parts III ("Of a Christian Commonwealth") or IV ("Of the Kingdome of Darknesse") of Leviathan. If the conclusion that rational choice theory fails to illuminate fullyHobbes' lessons amounted to no more than this, we would be wasting our time. But the conclusion would be significant if it turned out that aspects of Hobbes' theory which rational choice theorists themselves choose to discuss purport to illuminate resisted assimilation. I shall argue that this is just the case, especially in regard to attempts to treat Hobbes' state of nature as an exemplar of a prisoners' dilemma situation. More importantly,the conclusion would take on even greater significance if it turned out that insofar as one specified and reflected upon the differences (underlying the, admitted, similarities)between Hobbes' understanding of the sociopolitical world and that offered by rational choice theory, one were led to question the coherence, cogency, and ultimately the adequacy, of rational choice theory itselfas an attempt to make sense of that world. This essay suggests that this too is the case, and at the very least aims to show that the question of whether it might be is worth serious reflection, and ought not be dismissed out of hand. It is not claimed, however, that Hobbes' theory itself is sufficient to generate a fully negative
Received: April 16, 1987 FirstRevision Received: November 3, 1987 Second Revision Received: February9. 1988 Accepted for Publication: February10, 1988 An excellent recent discussion of these sections is Johnston(1986).
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conclusionregarding theadequacy of rationalchoice theory.Indeed, were thisso, it would be hard to account forthe similaritiesbetween Hobbes' account of the world and thatoffered by rationalchoice theory.Certain of Hobbes' departuresfromrationalchoice theorypoint toward, but do not themselvesfullyconstitute,a negativejudgmentregardingthe adewithinHobbes' There is, in myjudgment, quacy of rationalchoice theory. theorya tensionbetween those elementswhich are and are not amenable to interpretation forifreflecalong the lines of rationalchoice theory, tion upon Hobbes' teachinggives us reason to question the adequacy of rationalchoice theory,it mustalso give us reason to question the similar elements of his own. The question then arises as to how we are to understand these "tensions." Two possibilitieswill be considered: (1) these tensions constitutea in Hobbes' theory contradiction such thatwe mustconclude thatHobbes' is inconsistent and hence flawed, or (2) these tensionsaccurately theory reflect of the realityof the human conpermanent,paradoxical features dition,such thatHobbes' theory,farfrombeing flawed, is indeed all the more plausible insofaras its internaltensionsgive theoreticalexpression to practical tensions inherentin politics. If (1) were correct, and if we accept forthe momentthe hypothesisthatthe rationalchoice elements of Hobbes' theorywere the ones we would jettison in order to (a) render his theoryconsistentand (b) renderit more accurate as a description of the humanpoliticalcondition(i.e., we proceed on the assumptionthat Hobbes' departuresfromrationalchoice theorydo lead us both toward the rejection of rationalchoice theoryas an account of political reality and toward the rejectionof those elementsof his own theoryinconsistentwith his departures),then we would conclude (11) that the tenets of rationalchoice theoryare neithernecessarynor sufficient for giving an account of human reality,i.e., that they ought be abandoned alA corollaryof (1') would be thatHobbes has littlemore to teach together. us about how to understandman and society,than showing us how not to. On the other hand, if (2) were correct, then me might conclude (22) that the tenetsof rational choice theoryare necessary,though not to the givingof an accurate account of human reality.They sufficient, would have to be supplemented by those elementsof Hobbes' theory(the in termsof the tenets of "departures") not amenable to interpretation rational choice theory.A corollaryof (22) would be that Hobbes has a to teach us about how to understandman greatdeal, perhapseverything, and society. Which are closer to the truth, (1) and (11) or (2) and (22)? Answering thatquestion is the ultimate aim of an inquiry upon which thispaper only embarks.Let us begin,then,by consideringthe tenetsof rationalchoice theoryand Hobbes' account of man and society with an eye to explorand differences. ing theirsimilarities
THE TENETS OF RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY
It is exceedinglydifficult to give a denotative definitionof "rational choice theory." The termhas become common withinthe lexicon of po-
Hobbes and Rational Choice Theory 637 litical science, yet no clear and distinctset of criteriafordelimitingthe axiomatic tenets of this theoryare accepted as canonical, not least because not all of those conventionallyreferred to as practitionersof rationalchoice theoryagree about how to properlydescribeor utilize "it." Perhapsit is only those concerned,forwhateverreasons, to criticize"rational choice theory" who insistupon seeing it as a unifiedwhole, and perhaps it would be best to say that there is no rational choice theory, only rational choice theories. But since I too come to bury ratherthan praise, I shall speak of rationalchoice theoryor the rational choice approach to understandingpolitics, and leave it to the reader to judge whetherwhat I create therebyis a straw man. And if it is no more than that,I will plead only thatI have found it a particularly one, interesting and will happily take credit for it. The essence of rationalchoice theoryresides in (1) its instrumentalism, (2) its individualism,and (3) its subjectivism.These three aspects, when combined, resultin the fundamentalaim of rational choice theas ory, which is to understandsociopolitical relations and institutions the instruments created and used by mutuallydisinterestedand rationto maximizethe degree to which agentsin the attempt ally self-interested they can successfullypursue theirparticularends and satisfytheirparticularpreferences, whateverthose mightbe. Rational choice theoryas here defineddoes not necessarily presuppose the thesisthatthe substance of individualpreferencesis unaffected by one's social or historicalcontext.This thesisseems clearlyuntenable,but manywho would agree also oftensuppose thatrationalchoice theoryis flawedbecause it is intimately tied to this thesis. (1) Instrumentalism Instrumentalism means the methodologicaldecision to view sociopoliticalrelationsand institutions as dependent variables, theirnatureand existence to be explained and understood with referenceto (hypothetical or real) actions undertaken definedindividualselves. by antecedently Such a view is to be distinguished fromany approach to understanding to be insociopolitical realitywhich takes eitherrelationsor institutions of individualselves thence dependentvariables,the actionsand identities to thesewholes. Instrumentalism, then, beingseen as partswithreference mustdeny thathumanbeingsare in any inherentor intrinsic sense social beings, for to accept such a thesis would be to presuppose what instrumentalism purportsto explain - the social relations between individual selves. Instrumentalism seeks to understandrelations in terms of selves, not selves in termsof relations. (2) Individualism Because antecedently definedselves are the foundation,the independent variables, in explanation on the instrumentalist approach to relations and institutions, "individualism" is a second aspect of rational choice theory.Further, these separateselves are "antecedentlydefined" insofaras theyare understoodto be rationally self-interested maximizers
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of utility.Hence "individualism" refersto both a specification of individual action as the fundamental termin social explanations and to a motivationaltheoryabout individualssufficient to generatesuch explanations.That motivational is containedin theview thatindividuals theory are to be understood as rationallyself-interested maximizersof utility. Though often referredto as "rational agents," I shall call such selves "Economic-rational(E-rational)agents," in an attemptto avoid begging the question of whether activityproceeding from such motivation is "really" rational (Green 1981). More specifically,"E-rational agency" is defined by: E: 1 - Agents over and completeorderings transitive, havingreflexive, alternative actions available to them,these orderingscalled preferences. E:2 - Agentspreferring more to less and hence seekingthe maximal and efficient satisfactionof their own preferences. E:3 - Agents aware that all other agents are also E-rational. Ethus gives to each agent the following aim: "Seek the maxrationality imal and efficient of yourown preferences, satisfaction given thateveryone else does the same" (Green 1981: 14-15). (3) Subjectivism By subjectivism,I mean that rational choice theorytreatsthe problem of value in a way consistentwith the tenetsof instrumentalism and individualism,that is, the good for an individual is constitutedby the contentof his or her preferences, the object of his or her desires. Value is subjectivein a double sense; it is definedrelativeto the individual subject and there is no objective order or standard to serve as a basis for definitions. On thissubmoralworthof alternative assessingthe intrinsic jective account of the good, therecan be a "common good," insofaras each separateselfhappens,as a contingent of fact,to hold a prefermatter ence in common. The common good would thenbe an aggregateof similar individual goods. What there cannot be, on the subjective account of the good, is a common good understood as an end which it is morally incumbentupon all men and women to pursue, regardlessof theirparticularpreferencesor desires. Were this so, the good would not be defined relative to particularsubjects.
THE PRISONER'S DILEMMA AND PUBLIC GOODS
E-rationalagents often find themselvesbetween a rock and a hard place. These are "prisoner's dilemma" (PD) situations,the formalstructure of which is given below in Figure 1.
Figure 1 Column Player Cooperation Non-cooperation Cooperation R-10, C-10 R-20, C-1 Non-Cooperation R-l, C-20 R-5, C-5
Row Player
Hobbes and Rational Choice Theory 639 the dilemma consists Assumingthe numbersreferto unitsof utility, in the factthatR and C, insofaras theyare E-rational,will each choose the non-cooperativestrategy with the resultof each receiving 5, where theycould have received 10 each had theyboth chosen the cooperative strategy. For purposes of discussion, it will be usefulto present the situation in the followingformat.2 Taking 1 to constitutethe "sucker's payoff" the "rethe "punishment (S), 5 to constitute payoff"(P), 10 to constitute ward payoff"(R), and 20 to constitutethe "temptationpayoff" (T), the situationmay be representedas below in Figure 2.
Figure 2 Column Player Cooperation Row Player Non-cooperation Cooperation R, R, ' T, S 4 Non-Cooperation S, T 2 P, p 3
WheneverS <P < R < T, E-rational agentsfindthemselvesconfronted with a PD situation.The preferenceorderingsforR and C in such situationsare as follows,where the numbersrefer to the quadrantsof the matrix above.
PD PREFERENCES First Second Third Fourth Row 4 1 3 2 Column 2 1 3 4
Each agent, acting either from the desire to maximize (noncooperation in pursuitof T) or fromthe fear that the other will do so to preventS), chooses the non-cooperativestrategy and (non-cooperation both wind up with P thoughboth could have received R had they each cooperated. This game is oftensaid to illustrate the problemE-rationalagentsface when the production of a public good is at stake, that is, a good such that no one can be excluded fromenjoying its benefits.As a citizen, I enjoy the protectionof a systemof national defense, a benefitI would enjoy whetherI paid taxes to supportthatsystemor not. My not paying and mypaymytaxes will not resultin the dissolutionof thatinstitution, to provide forthatinstitution unless miling taxes will not be sufficient
2
draw here upon the classic work of Rapaport and Chammah (1965). Other more recent works which lay out clearlythe fundamental tenetsof rational choice theoryand the logic of the Prisoner's dilemma are Abrams(1980) and Hardin (1982).
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lions of others do so as well. But as long as they do, I need not. As an E-rationalagent, my first preferenceis to not pay taxes, have everyone else do so, and enjoy the benefitsof national defense as a free-rider. Insofaras everyone were E-rational,no one would pay taxes, institutions providingpublic goods would collapse, and all would be leftwithout goods each would findit usefulto have. Hence a rationale for the state to punishthose who do not pay taxes to a degree sufficient to make freeforE-rational alternative can ridingan unattractive agents.The stateitself thusbe understood as thatinstitution which, possessing a monopoly on the legitimateuse of force, undertakesto provide a range of "public citizens,goods which each has an E-rationalreagoods" foritsE-rational son to desire but would not undertaketo support in the absence of the coercive power of the state.Analysts employingthisframework disagree as to which institutions in contemporary political societies can be corsome maintaining thatmanygoods rectlysaid to fallunderthiscriterion, presently generatedundertheauspices of thestateare not inherently public goods and would be betterleftto private productive arrangements amongstconsenting agents.It does seem,however,thatat leastone public good is necessaryfortheproductionof any otherpublic or privategoods, and this is the systemof social order secured by the state itself.(Communitarian anarchistsmightdisagreeabout the necessityof such a state, but theywould also deny the strictly E-rationalcharacterof individual agents,and so we shall leave thisissue aside.) However, the explanation of the state in termsof rationalchoice theoryis no easy matter,and it is here we begin to see clearly the similarities with Hobbes. Assumingthe tenetsof rationalchoice theory,we can imagine a presociopolitical condition composed of mutuallydisinterestedE-rational Anyrelationships or institutions would agents,and call ita stateof nature.3 have to be explained as arisingfromthe actions of such E-rational agents. The catch is that the possible existence of any conceivable relation or institution will be undermined because of the logic of E-rationality. MutuE-rationalagents,by definition, lack what we can call ally disinterested the internalor external"forces" necessaryto create or generate the institutionwhich, if it existed, would resultin raisingthe utilitysatisfaction of each. The simplest terms way to see thisis to thinkin hypothetical of a postulated agreementor contractbetween E-rationalagents to create the institution of the state. The problem is that of explaining why any such agent would live up to the termsof the postulated agreement insteadof pursuingthe ideal E-rational contract,one where everyoneexand X ridesfreely. cept X agreesto cooperate in upholdingtheagreement, But Y, Z and all other E-rationalagents have the same strategy, and so the "agreement" withersaway. By lack of "internalforces," I mean the absence of any relation between the agents sufficient to generate the
3 It is perhaps worth notingthat "state of nature" is a termused in rationalchoice theory to denote a pre-political conditionof E-rational simplyanalytically agents. For the classical contracttheorists,the concept is used because that condition is taken to tell us somethingsubstantiveabout human nature.
Hobbes and Rational Choice Theory 641 cooperation necessaryto insurethe upholding of the postulated agreement. For example, if the agents trustedone another they could establishthe agreement, is a relationbetween individuals,and cannot but trust be presupposed without violating the tenets of rational choice theory, forthereinrelationsare to be explained, not presupposed. And ifwe try to imagineE-rational because it would the relationof trust agentscreating be usefulforeach, we are back in the same dilemma as above. E-rational the possibility of otherrelations agentsneed some relationto underwrite - but thisis theirdilemma. By lack of "external forces," I mean the absence of any body sufficient to make the agents keep theiragreement. If such a body existed, however, the agents would not need to create one. To suppose such an externalforcewould be to dissolve, not resolve, the dilemma facing E-rationalagents in the state of nature. I take it then,thata rationalchoice theoristconcerned to explain the generation of eitherinternalrelationsbetween agents or the generation of an externalinstitution such as the state,musteitherappeal to factors outside the strictlogic of E-rationality, or relax, at least for a moment, the requirements of thatlogic. Otherwise,E-rationalagentswould seem stuck in the PD dilemma of the state of natureand could not get about theirbusiness.
HOBBES AND THE PRISONER'S DILEMMA
It is this "moment" which will be of interestas we turnto Hobbes. It is clearlypossible to read significant aspects of Hobbes' argumentin Leviathan along the lines of rationalchoice theory,and, specifically,to understandHobbes' depiction of the naturalcondition of mankindas an exemplarof a PD situation.The agentsin Hobbes' state of nature,living under condition's of ". . . continualfear,and danger of (hypothetically) violent death . .." (Hobbes 1968: 186), would each be betteroffunder the conditions of securityforlifeand propertyprovided by a sovereign Yet in the stateof nature,any move toward cooperapolitical authority. tion aimed at instituting would also be a move tosovereign authority ward leaving oneself open to exploitation at the hands of one's thatagentsin Hobbes' stateof nature "apparent" cooperators.Assuming can conceptuallydistinguish of cooperation" from(ii) "threats (i) "offers of cooperation," it is neverthelessthe case that as a disguised as offers under the conditions practical matter,(i) and (ii) are indistinguishable of the state of nature, for as Hobbes puts it, under those conditions "... there is no way for any man to secure himself,so reasonable, as anticipation;thatis, by force,or wiles, to masterthe persons of all men he can, so long, till he sees no other power great enough to endanger him . ." (1968: 184). Of course,giventhe fundamental equalityof men, which means that". . . theweakest has strength enough to killthe strongest .. ." (1968: 183), no man can have reasonable hope of successfully subduing others to the point that no power is leftgreat enough to endanger him. But even if the agents realize this, and let us assume they or externalresourcesnecessaryto institute do, theystilllack the internal
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the sovereignwith which each would be betteroff.For while each can see that (R, R) leaves each betteroffthan (P, P), each also knows that cooperating in pursuitof (R, R) leaves one open to receiving(S) should another exploit one's cooperation in pursuitof (T). And such exploitation is simplynature's way. To make the first cooperative move in the leave to institute and the state of nature would attempt sovereignty amount simplyto ". . . expose oneselfto prey,(which no man is bound to) . . ." (1968: 190), and hence Hobbesian agents in the state of nature seem doomed to remain there. The formalstructure of the PD thus seems to give us a nice "visual" the of representation logical formof the dilemma facingmen in Hobbes' stateof nature.Moreover,it seems to bringout clearlytheprecise nature of thatdilemma;justas thereis no way out of a prisoner'sdilemma,there seems to be no way out of Hobbes' state of nature. Yet upon a closer look, it can be seen that Hobbes' state of nature is not actuallya PD situationat all. That "closer look" entailsa consideration of the substantivepayoffsavailable to human beings in the state of nature.The wages of mutualnon-cooperationare not merelya collective outcome which leaves each worse offthan theywould be under a sovereign,but an outcome which leaves each as bad offas he can possibly be - thatis, facingcertaindeath under the uncertainconditions of the state of nature.Moreover, once we thinkin substantiveratherthan formal we see thatthe strategy of pursuingT (temptation) terms, through momenis not actuallyverytempting. Whetherit brings non-cooperation tarysuccess or not, it leaves one in the state of nature,which is to say thatsuccess could only be momentary, and hence no success at all. The only way forhuman beings to secure theirexistence is throughmutual cooperation aimed at instituting (R, R). All other collective sovereignty outcomes reduce to the same - death in the state of nature. Even those able to exploit cooperation fortheirown benefitin the short run must know that, in the long run, we're all dead. Hence a graphicportrayalof Hobbes' state of nature,takingaccount of the substance of his teaching,would appear as in Figure 3.
Figure 3 Column Player Cooperation Non-cooperation Cooperation Life Death Non-Cooperation Death Death
Row Player
It can thus be seen that even as regardsthe formalstructureof the situationfacingindividuals in Hobbes' state of nature,that situation is not a PD, but a "coordination game" in which thereis a stable and optimalcollective outcome, theproblembeing thatof cooperatingto instituteit. In PD situations, on the otherhand, the stable collective outcome
Hobbes and Rational Choice Theory 643 (P, P) is not optimal, and the optimal collective outcome (R, R) is not stable. Of course, even if Figure 3 is accepted as the correct renderingof Hobbes' stateof nature,the problemof getting out of it stillremains,and thatquestion is an old one forstudentsof Hobbes. Let us consider two approaches which have been taken toward this question, approaches which differ answers to the not so much in termsof providingdifferent issue, but ratherin termsof how theyframeand conceptualize the issue. The first approach would be to take the question at face value, and to suppose thatHobbes, ifhis theoryis to be judged consistentand coherhuman beent, mustprovide some explanation of how, hypothetically, must theoretical exit of or at least the the state nature, ingsmight provide materialsfromwhich such an explanation could be constructed,even if Hobbes himselfdid not bother explicitlyto constructit. Plamenatz's treatment of Hobbes in Man and Society is an example of such an apof thisposition, which proach (1963: 132-38). A more recentstatement we shall take up momentarily, has been advanced by Jean Hampton (1986). The second approach takesthequestionitself as misguided, and, pointing out that the Leviathan is addressed to civilized human beings who enjoy the benefitsof social and political order, takes Hobbes' point to be one of explainingto themhow theycan keep themselvesfromwinding up in the stateof nature,not one of explainingto uncivilized beings how to get out of it. On thisapproach, the question of how, or whether, individuals would exit the state of nature is simply otiose; indeed one mightsuppose thatHobbes' teachingwould be more persuasive just to the extentthathis readers concluded thatexits fromthe state of nature are inexplicable. Hence, ratherthan constituting a weakness or flaw in his theory, Hobbes' "failure" to explain how individualscould hypothetically exit the state of naturewould be seen fromthis approach as one further "positive" component of his practical teaching that those fortunateenough to live under sovereignauthority ought obey it: the alternative is the horribledilemma of the state of nature. Again, these are not so much competinganswers to the same questionas theyare different thequesways of approachingand understanding tion itself.At the same time,theyembody different conceptions of how to read and understandHobbes. Withoutclaimingthattheyneed be entirelyincompatiblewith one another,it seems clear thatthe second apand indeed to illuminate to highlight proach will tend more thanthe first the rhetorical,symbolic,and persuasive aspects of Hobbes' theoretical foron thatapproach itis thepracticalaim of Hobbes' teachformulations, threadby means of which one might ing which is treatedas the unifying unraveland understand his teachingas an integrated set of symbolsaimed at influencinghis reader's cognitive processes. The contrasts between the two approaches can be specifiedmore precisely by consideringHampton's criticalanalysis of Hobbes' argument fromthe perspective of the firstapproach.
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Hampton takes up the issue of whether Hobbesian agents in a state of naturecould institute an absolutesovereign,and arguesthattheycould not. The crux of her argument is to point to the tension between (a) the requirementof a sovereignwho is absolute in the sense of deciding all questions in the commonwealth and (b) the fact that Hobbesian agents commands "whenempower such a sovereignby obeyingitspunishment ever they best interests" decide such obedience is conducive to their (206). Hobbes' argument, thus understood, is said to fallprey to a problem of "regress,"since the conditionin (b) which is necessaryto empower sovforsovereignty the requirement ereignty (individualdecision) undermines (makingall decisions) specifiedin (a). Later,Hampton considers a modifiedand "rehabilitated"account of Hobbes' position (the "fallback" position)designed to make it more tenable. Before doing so, however, she in Leviathan might thatHobbes' argument pauses to takeup thepossibility be salvagedon itsown terms it as what she calls a "conby understanding version argument,"and it is her treatment of thispossibilitywe need to consider,forit mayappear similarto the interpretation proposed herein. The "conversion" referred to here is that of convertingE-rational agents into obedient citizens,a conversion seen as necessary given the on the part of individuals (failureto insticonsequences of E-rationality tuteeffective in the absence of such). Hampton sumdeath sovereignty, marizes the idea as follows: to a differto convert and rational foreach subject Supposeitis possible entstandard of rationality: an individual in thestateof nature Whereas woulduse an expected-utility theextent to which calculation to evaluate in the desires, anyactionwouldbe bestforhim, givenhisself-regarding commonwealth he wouldconvert to using thesovereign's expected-utility sionwerepossible, wouldbe accomplished an absolute sovereign creating undera newkindofreasoner. theactionofauthorization, bybecoming stoodfiguratively wouldliterally as a kindofsurrender to thesovereign, meangiving of an actionand of therationality up one's own judgement instead of an action'srationality as thesovereign's adopting judgement one's standard forevaluating whichactionsto perform. (209) and citingscatteredpassages from Having laid out the interpretation, Hobbes' text which seem to suggestit, Hampton neverthelessrejects it as a plausible readingof Hobbes. However, it is my contention that the force of her criticalargumentrestsultimately upon reading Leviathan as a set of theoreticalarguments detached fromany practical attemptto effect the veryconversionbeing argued forat a theoreticallevel. To put it anotherway, she treatsthe conversion argumentas a possible Hobbesian answer to the question of how Hobbesian agentsmightexit the state of naturethroughthe institution of sovereignty, and findsit wantingin thisregard.I suggestthatit should be understood not as a proposed solution to this theoreticalproblem,but as outlininga program of practical educational activityaimed at maintainingand enhancing obedient citizenshipin an existentcommonwealth. What determinesour assessment of the conversion argument,then, is our conception of Hobbes'
calculation to evaluate the rationality of any action. ... If this conver-
Hobbes and Rational Choice Theory 645 audience and our conception of how he is tryingto influence that audience. Hampton findsthe conversion argumentimplausiblebecause it asks agentswho are definedas "hard-wired" withthe desire to preservetheir own lives to put theirpreservationeffectively in jeopardy by converting to a desirewhich makes the sovereign'spreservation, and not theirown, theirultimate the sort goal (211). This, however, seems to misunderstand of conversion Hobbes is attempting which is one of identificato effect, tion of one's ultimategoal with that of the sovereign upon the realization thatfailure as itgenerates insofar one's preservation to do so imperils a regressto the state of nature. A Hobbesian agent torn between mainor accepting the of personal judgmentagainstsovereignty taininga right judgmentsof a sovereignconceived as an externalforceis an agent who has simplyfailedto convert."Conversion," then,would amountnot simaction as authoritaply to acceptingthe sovereign'sjudgmentsregarding tive,but also to doing thisbecause one now identifies oneself,and one's withthesovereign.Successful conversionwould be constituted judgment, by the (previously)externalsovereignbeing internalizedthrougha relationship of identity. thatsuch conversionwould Hamptonlatersees thiswhen she remarks in effect dissolve theproblemof Hobbesian agentsinstituting sovereignty: ifagents in the state of naturewere to convert in thisway, therewould simplybe no problem of how to institute sovereignty.She thus rejects the conversion account on the groundsthatit does not solve, but rather wishes away, the problem of how Hobbesian agents in the state of nature could institute sovereignty.This is, in a sense, true. Conversion is seen in a different light,however, once one remembersthat Hobbes is writingnot to agentsin the stateof nature,but to citizensremoved from it. It is mycontentionthatHobbes is himself to effect (or buttress) trying this sort of conversion throughthe writingof Leviathan; it may be understoodas thepracticalaim of Hobbes' therapeutic than teaching,rather as a proposed solution to the philosopher's problem of how Hobbesian agents mightexit a state of nature. Conceiving it as a proposed response to the latterproblem,Hampton findsthe conversionargument ". .. it seems at best unlikely far-fetched: and at worst ridiculous to thinkthat Hobbesian people could 'will' to make this (sovereign's preservation)theirnew goal" (211). Yet one can thatit is forjust thisreason that imagineHobbes agreeing,and remarking his teaching is necessaryand beneficial - it is a means of "educating" these recalcitrant wills. UntilE-rational with agentsconvertto identifying theirsovereign,and hence conceive theirpreservationand the preservation of sovereigntyas one, theircalculations persist as a threatto the then,is indeed implaupreservationof both. The conversion argument, sible ifone takesit as an explanationof how Hobbesian agentsmightexit the stateof nature.If,however, one conceives Hobbes' purpose and audience along the lines argued forhere, it is seen not as an argumentthat fails,but as an account of the practical aim Hobbes desires to see imto implement. plemented, and is trying
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What are the implicationsforHobbes' teachingin relationto rational choice theoryifone reads and understandsHobbes along the lines of the second approach above, thatis, an approach focusingupon the practical meaningand importof Hobbes' teaching?One immediatevirtueof such an approach has already been sketched; we need not conclude that Hobbes committed a "howler" in failing to explain how individualscould have exited the stateof nature.Further, we could see why Hobbes' practical teachingwould be obscured,perhaps even vitiated,by any attempt to abstract from itssubstanceand presentitin formal terms.For ifHobbes' lessons are to be understood,it is of the essence thatcitizensrealize that in mattersof obligationregarding the ultimateand sovereignauthority, issue life of and death. one Hobbes' is, literally, underlying teachingrethat these in of theirsubbe both understood terms quires "payoffs" (a) stance and (b) understood as the only two ultimate consequences of obedience and disobediencerespectively. Hobbes be sucOnly thenmight cessful in frightening his readers into the realization that obedience to sovereigntyis at once rational and necessary. One mightobject thatHobbes' purpose is not to frighten, but rather to lay beforeus the rationalgroundsof obedience to sovereignauthority. It is true that Hobbes does this in Leviathan, for thereinhe shows the E-rationalagent thatthe successfulpursuitof his or her particularends is dependent upon a system of social order guaranteed by sovereign that this systemof social order is itselfdependent power, and further upon constraintsbeing imposed upon the maximizingbehavior of Erational to comprehendHobbes' agents.Yet ifreasonalone were sufficient of these restraints, one would teaching,and resultin the self-imposition be moved to wonder why thatteachingremainsnecessary. His teaching remainsnecessarybecause humans' passions too often cloud theirreason, and because, as Hobbes says, "The passion to be reckoned upon, is fear" (1968: 200). It is Leviathan,the state,which imposes constraints upon the maximizingbehavior of E-rationalagents in the only sure and effective way; thatis, by appealingnot to theirreason butby makingthem of the punishmentwhich attends free-riding and disobedience. afraid it is the if read and understood, which Leviathan, would, text, Similarly, save such agents the troubleand pain of learningthese lessons the hard way. And if one considers that text not only as a formalargumentbut as a sustainedpiece of persuasiverhetoric,thenone sees thatthereintoo the passion reckoned upon is fear, more precisely the fear of death. Hobbes, throughthe metaphoricalrhetoricof the Leviathan, attempts no less thanto provide his readerswith an imaginativeand vicarious experience of theirown death, with the aim of therebyimpressingupon theirminds in the most vivid way possible the necessityof obedience. That "impressing" proceeds as much, ifnot more so, by the way of the passionate fearof death as by the way of a cool and calculatingreason. Hobbes' readersmustrealize something more thansimplythe lesson that actions based upon E-rationality can, under certaincircumstances,leave everyone worse offthen they could have been. They must be brought
Hobbes and Rational Choice Theory 647 to the realizationthat "worse off" is equivalent to death, ifthey are efto be persuaded of the virtuesof obedience. Hobbes, then, atfectively temptsto scare citizens to death, in order that they mightsecure their lives.
HOBBES AS CRITIC OF RATIONALCHOICE THEORY
But even should thisbe so, does it reallygive us reason to call Hobbes a critic of rationalchoice theory?I want to suggestthat it does, though it is admittedly in a special sense. Insofaras a readingof Hobbes criticism the lines of rational choice theoryabstractsfromthe substance of along his formulations in order to present his theoryin its formalstructure, the symbolicforce of Hobbes' rhetoricis lost, and with it goes a good portion of the persuasive power of his appeal. But does this really matter?Takingthe point of view of Hobbes, it would not mattera greatdeal iftherewere groundsforsupposingthatthe lessons he aims to teach are only obscured by the purelyformalreading. For one mightsuppose that the "formalization" of Hobbes' substantiveaccount of the state of nature which rendersit as a prisoner's dilemma situationwould by itself by enough rationallyto convince E-rationalagents that it is sometimes in theirown long-term interests to constraintheirmaximizingbehavior and cooperate with others.If,however, therewere grounds forsupposof Hobbes' argument not only obscures but acing thatthe formalization undermines the he wishes to lessons teach, then it would matter tually a great deal, and one mightreasonably call Hobbes a critic of rational choice theory. Are there any grounds for thinking that a formalizationof Hobbes' account along the lines of rationalchoice theorygoes so faras to undermine his teaching?A case in supportof the conclusion thatthereare can be sketchedby first statingthe grounds generallyand then by applying them to the specific case of "The Foole," whom Hobbes addresses in Chapter 15 of Leviathan. The general grounds are constitutedsimplyby the fact that Hobbes treatsreason as subservientto the passions, and hence any attemptto affectthe way human beings act mustacknowledge this and aim its appeal at those passions. Hobbes' appeal is aimed at what he takes to be the most fundamental of those passions, the desire forself-preservation and a correspondingfearof death. Since thispresupposes a substantive conception of human nature,and because like all such conceptions it is bound to be controversial and forceus to open up discussionsat the level of fundamental ontology,rationalchoice readingsof Hobbes which abstract from thesesubstantive seem to providea way of avoidsuppositions ing these controversial issues while retaining something of value in Hobbes' theory.They give us E-rational agentswith a desire to maximize the satisfaction of theirinterests, while Hobbes gives us similarE-rational interests. agents,butwitha substantive conceptionof certainfundamental Yet just because Hobbes' teachingproceeds fromand attemptsto work
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of his account turns upon those substantive passions, the formalization out not to "retain" so much as to underminethe force of his argument. Consider the case of "The Foole": as justice;and The Foole hathsaydin his heart, there is no such thing man'sconsometimes also withhistongue; that every seriously alleging, could to hisown care,there andcontentment, comitted servation, being conduced be no reason,whyevery manmight notdo whathe thought thereunto: and therefore also to make,or not make;keep or not keep was not against covenants, reason,whenit conducedto one's benefit. andthat aresomeHe doesnottherein there be covenants; that they deny, be called ofthem times andthat suchbreach sometimes broken, may kept; whether andtheobservance ofthem buthe questioneth, justice: injustice, Foole said in the same hath the feare of God (for injustice, taking away hisheart is no God),maynotsometimes standwithreason,which there whenitcondictateth manhisowngood; andparticularly to every then, duceth to neglect not to sucha benefit, as shallputa manin a condition, men.(Hobbes thedispraise, andrevilings, butalsothepowerofother onely 1968: 203) The Foole is the quintessential E-rationalagent,who would free-ride when he determinedthathe could get away with it. Hobbes mighttell the Foole thatifeveryonereasonedsimilarly, social orderwould collapse, and all, the Foole included, would be thrownback into the state of nature.The Foole, however, is apparentlyaware of this. He maintainsthat injusticemight"sometimesstandwith Reason, which dictatethto every man his own good." And it is clear thatthesetimes(and only these times) are those wherein the Foole will have calculated that he will be able to power of other men." Now it is quite likely that situationsgiving rise to the temptations which attractthe Foole are bound to exist in any society. The only way to prevent them fromarisingwould be the existence of a sovereign so powerful that each and every act of injustice could be found out and punished, and everycitizenwould know this,and hence never consider such activity.Orwell lays down the necessary condition for such a regime in 1984; at the extreme,subjectswould have to be renderedincapable of even conceptualizingthe possibilityof injustice. Whether such a condition is possible, we may safelytake it that Hobbes himselfdoes not entertain it,4fortheveryfactthathe is moved to arguewith the Foole indicatesthathe does not envision thiscondition as being necessaryfor social order. Hobbes presentstwo arguments againstthe Foole. Insofaras each appeals to reason, theyare bound to fall shortof persuading the Foole of the errorof his ways. The arguments would be potentially persuasiveonly
4
get away with it, that is, put himself "in a position ...
to neglect the
Actually,I remainunsureabout this.Insofaras the sovereignis responsiblefor "the right orderingof speech," the logic of Hobbes' argumentdoes seem to point in the direction of Orwell.
Hobbes and Rational Choice Theory 649 insofaras they were to affecthis passions, by playing upon his fear of death. Hobbes' firstargumentis; whichnotwithstanding thatwhena mandotha thing, First, any thing can be foreseen, howandreckoned to hisown destruction, on, tendeth soeversomeaccident whichhe could notexpect,arriving it mayturne or wisely to hisbenefit; done. do notmakeitreasonably yetsuchevents (1968: 204) This does no more than tell the Foole thathe ought not calculate the probabilityof getting away with injusticeunder a given set of empirical circumstances. Hobbes is urging thatsince therewill always be some probhow miniscule)the Foole abilityof beingcaughtand punished(no matter is unreasonable in not pursuinga risk-averse which makes any strategy such probability(no matterhow miniscule)decisive in his calculations. But if the Foole would accept this, there would be no problem in the first place, thatis, he would not be a "Foole" to begin with. The Foole's foolishnessconsists in the factthatforhim, it is an open and empirical to perform question as to whetherone ought,E-rationally, just or unjust acts. The Foole is always willing to entertainthe thoughtof acting unjustly,and where the expected utilityof injustice exceeds by some determinatedegree the expected costs, he is willing to act unjustly. In his first thata reasonaHobbes simplymaintains counter-argument, ble person would see thatexpected costs always and necessarilyexceed expected benefits,and hence would never treatthe question as an empirical one. But if the Foole were persuaded by this, he would not be foolish. What then, would persuade him? If we rule out the possibility of an Orwellian sovereigncapable of doing the job, thenwe are leftwith an appeal to the Foole's fearof death, and hence with the necessity of adding a passionate dimension,based upon Hobbes' substantivebeliefs about human motivation, to the rational dimension of the counterargument.That is to say, the one thingthat mightpersuade the Foole of the errorof his ways would be some grounds formakinghim believe thattheexpectedcosts of disobediencenecessarily outweightheexpected benefits.And this ground would be the realization that expected costs = death, forthen the Foole mightbe frightened into pursuingthe riskaverse strategy of obedience, for no degree of expected benefitscould ever outweighthe disutility of death, and as long as thereis even a miniscule probabilityof death, that will be enough to tip the balance of the equation toward obedience, fornothingcould be worse than death. But Hobbes' readers,foolish or otherwise,cannot be expected to learn this lesson unless the substanceof his teachingis considered. If Hobbes is to have any chance of saving Fooles fromthemselves,they must be made to see that questions of just vs. unjust behavior are all reducible to the single question of life vs. death. Formalization of his account not only obscures thislesson in abstracting fromthe substanceof his teaching,but underminesthatteaching insofaras formalization encourages "Foolish" behavior by turningmen's mindsaway fromthe fearof death and in the opposite directiontoward
650
thepossibilities of gain. Forgetting thatthe issue is lifevs. death,amnesiac Fooles look at social order along the lines of the formalaccount of the N-personprisoner's dilemma,and seek to determinethe values of T, R, P, and S and the probabilityof achievingT, R, P, and S in a given situation. They imagine thatwhere T is great and S is small, and where the probabilityof achieving T is greatand the probabilityof achieving S is of the situsmall,theymight wiselypracticeinjustice.The formalization ation leads them to look at this as an open question, and in that sense underminesHobbes' abilityto teach his lessons. If he is to succeed at awakeningFooles fromtheirdangerousamnesia, he mustappeal to their deepestpassion, and bringthemto theconscious realizationthattheprice of non-cooperationis death, and hence to the realizationthatpursuitof T can neverbe rational.Men who see only the formof Hobbes' teaching cannot receive his therapy. Hobbes' second argumentagainst the Foole is as follows:
Secondly, thatin a conditionof warre,whereineveryman to everyman, forwant of a common power to keep themall in awe, is an enemy,thare is no man can hope by his own strength, or wit, to defend himselffrom withoutthe help of confederates;where every one expects destruction, the same defenceby the confederation, thatany one else does: and thereforehe which declares he thinksit reason to deceive those thathelp him, can in reason expect no othermeans of safety, thanwhat can be had from his own singlepower. He therefore thatbreakethhis covenant, and consequentlydeclareththathe thinkshe may with reason do so, cannot be received into any society, thatunite themselvesforpeace and defence, but by the errourof them thatreceive him; nor when he is received, be retaynedin it, without seeing the danger of theirerrour; which errours a man cannot reasonablyrecken upon as the means of his security:and ifhe be left,or cast out of society,he perisheth;and ifhe live therefore, in society,it is by the erroursof othermen, which he could not foresee, nor recken upon; and consequently against the reason of his preservation; and so, as all men that contributenot to his destruction,forebear him onely out of ignoranceof what is good forthemselves.(1968: 205)
Hobbes Here, more emphaticallythan in the first counter-argument, seeks to "remind" the Foole that the wages of injustice are death, that practicing injustice in the name of self-interestcan lead him to "perisheth." Whetherthese argumentsare successfulin turningmen's eyes toward the possibilityof death is, and must be, an open question. Therapyis not always successful.But at the least, it seems fairto say that any persuasive power theymighthave forfoolish readers is dependent upon those readersrealizingthatthe issue is one of lifeand death - and thisis possible only insofaras one attendsto the substanceas well as the formof Hobbes' account of the state of nature. Hobbes notes that "all men are by natureprovided of notable multiplying glasses, (thatis their Passions and self-love,)throughwhich every littlepaymentappeareth a greatgrievance; but are destituteof those prospective glasses, (Namely Morall and Civill Science) to see a farreoffthe miseriesthat hang over them,and cannot withoutsuch paymentsby avoyded" (1968: 239). To
Hobbes and Rational Choice Theory 651 replace the "multiplying glasses" requires,quite requires,quite literally, a changein theangleofvisionthrough which societyis viewed. The Foole lacks the lenses which would enable him to envision "a farreoffthe miseries thathang over" him. Hobbes could enable him to see these miseries in the distance, and hence change his ways, by making him look inward,and come face to face with thatwhich he has foolishlyrepressed and forgotten: the fearof his own death. Hobbes, then, turnsout to be cum psychoanalyst,concerned to bring somethingof an existentialist men's death beforetheireyes so thattheymightundergo a kind of cognitivetransformation which would, by leading themaway fromthe maxreason of cure the commonwealth of one source imizing E-rationality, of its hithertoperennial discontents.
CONCLUSION
Near theend of hercritical of Hobbes' "conaccount of theplausibility version" argument, Hampton speculates on what would be necessaryto make his argumentwork. The crucial condition would be thatjust outlined; theHobbesian citizenwould have to see only two possibilities open to him,those of (1) obeyingsovereignty conversionor (2) dying, through to the exclusion of the thirdpossibilityentertainedby the Foole (3) of in reality the right while maintaining givingthe appearance of converting of privatejudgmentto be judiciously employed in potentiallyadvantasituations. Hampton argues that in order to exclude geous free-riding and make and (3) (1) (2) the only possible choices, the sovereignwould have to possess some sortof device capable of penetrating and knowing the citizen's consciousness to a degree which made it impossible forthe citizento trick thesovereign while by givingtheappearance of converting not actually doing do. Consideringan episode of Star Trek which imagined such a device, she remarks: Butshouldwe takeLeviathan to be an implicit plea forthedevelopment ofsuchdevices? We havemadeHobbes' Thesuggestion seemsridiculous. validin a way thatamounts of the to a reductio ad absurdum argument argument. (219) One could summarizethe readingthe Hobbes proposed in this essay by sayingthat it endorses this "ridiculous suggestion" as the appropriate way to understandHobbes, and even goes it one better.Not only is Leviathan a plea forsuch a device, it is such a device itself.It is created by an authorwho realizes thatpsychological conversion, not technological coercion, is the most efficaciousmeans of establishing a secure commonwealth. Hobbes' attemptto secure perpetual civil peace does not await the development of devices now only imagined in the realm of science fiction;to the contrary, it makes use of the oldest practicein politics itself,thatof effecting a relationshipof identity between rulerand ruled, which, to the degree it is successful,rendersdirect coercion unin thisvein,the remarks Levianecessary.It is worthrecalling, concerning than with which Hobbes concludes:
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Western Political Quarterly I think and moreprofitably it maybe profitably Therefore, taught printed, in the Universities, in case theyalso thinkso, to whom the judgements of the same belongeth. For seeing the Universitiesare the Fountains of Civill, and Morall Doctrine, fromwhence the Preachers,and the Gentry, drawingsuch water as theyfind,use to sprinklethe same (both fromthe Pulpit,and in theirconversation)upon the People, thereought certainly to be greatcare taken,to have it pure, both fromthe Venime of Heathen Politicians, and fromthe Incantation of Deceiving Spirits.And by that means the most men, knowing theirDuties, will be less subject to serve the Ambitionof a few discontentedpersons, in theirpurposes againstthe state; and be the lesse grievedwith the contributions necessaryfor their Peace, and Defence; and the Governoursthemselveshave the lesse cause, to maintainat the Common charge any greaterArmy,than is necessary to make good the Publique Liberty, againstthe Invasions and Encroachments of forraign Enemies. (728) REFERENCES
Abrams,Robert. 1980. Foundations of Political Analysis. New York: Columbia Press. University Brams, Steven. 1985. Rational Politics. Washington: Congressional Quarterly Press. Gauthier,David. 1969. The Logic of Leviathan. Oxford: Clarendon Press. and Public Goods," paper presented at the AnGreen, Leslie. 1981. "Authority nual Meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association. Hampton,Jean. 1986. Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition. Cambridge: Press. Cambridge University Russell. Action. Baltimore:Johns Hopkins University Collective 1982. Hardin, Press. PenHobbes, Thomas. 1968. Leviathan (ed. C. B. Macpherson).Harmondsworth: guin Books. Johnston,David. 1986. The Rhetoric of Leviathan. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Press. University Kavka, Gregory. 1983. "Hobbes' War of All AgainstAll." Ethics 93: 291-310. Laver, Michael. 1981. ThePolitics of Private Desires. Harmondsworth:Penguin Books. McLean,Ian. 1981. "The Social Contractin Leviathanand the Prisoner'sDilemma Supergame." Political Studies 29: 339-51. Olson, Mancur. 1965. The Logic of CollectiveAction. Cambridge,MA: Harvard Press. University Plamenatz,John. 1963. Man and Society. 2 vols. New York: McGraw Hill. Rapaport,Anatol,and AlbertM. Chammah. 1965. Prisoner's Dilemma: A Study in Conflictand Cooperation. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Michael. London: and 1976. Anarchy Taylor, Cooperation. Wiley.

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Patrick Neal. Hobbes and Rational Choice Theory

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University of Utah Western Political Science Association

HOBBES AND RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY

Western Political Quarterly

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