33 Stoic Cosmopolitanism (HPT 28) - Libre

STOIC COSMOPOLITANISM AND ZENOS REPUBLIC1 John Sellars2
Abstract: Modern accounts of Stoic politics have attributed to Zeno the ideal of an isolated community of sages and to later Stoics such as Seneca a cosmopolitan utopia transcending all traditional States. By returning to the Cynic background to both Zenos Republic and the Cosmopolitan tradition, this paper argues that the distance between the two is not as great as is often supposed. This account, it is argued, is more plausible than trying to offer a developmental explanation of the supposed transformation in Stoic political thought from isolated community to cosmopolitan utopia.
Modern accounts of Stoic political thought are dominated by two very different if not contradictory ideas. The first of these may be called cosmopolitanism and is perhaps best expressed by Seneca:
Let us take hold of the fact that there are two communities (duas res publicas) the one, which is great and truly common (magnam et vere publicam), embracing gods and men, in which we look neither to this corner nor to that, but measure the boundaries of our citizenship by the sun; the other, the one to which we have been assigned by the accident of our birth.3
According to this account the Stoic ideal of cosmopolitanism is focussed upon the thought that the cosmos is a city, the only true city, and that it is to this cosmic city that the Stoic will have his primary affiliation. Consequently he will reject, or at least be indifferent to, the conventional city in which he was born. This Stoic political ideal has often been presented as the desire for a worldwide political organization in which all humankind will be fellow citizens and in which all cultural and racial divisions will be transcended. Plutarch identified it with the new world order created by Alexander the Great, while Cicero
1 Note the following abbreviations: LS = A.A. Long and D.N. Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers (Cambridge, 1987); PG = Patriologia Graeca, ed. J.-P. Migne (Paris, 185766); SSR = Socratis et Socraticorum Reliquiae, ed. G. Giannantoni (Naples, 1990); SVF = Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta, ed. H. von Arnim (Leipzig, 190324); W.-H. = C. Wachsmuth and O. Hense, Ioannis Stobaei Anthologium (Berlin, 18841912). References to ancient works follow the abbreviations laid out in The Oxford Classical Dictionary (3rd edn., Oxford, 1996). 2 Dept. of Philosophy, Kings College London, Strand, London, WC2R 2LS. Email: john.sellars@kcl.ac.uk 3 Seneca De otio 4.1 (= LS 67K); see also Helv. 9.7, Ep. 28.4. For other late Stoic expressions of cosmopolitanism see e.g. Epictetus Diss. 1.9.1, 2.10.3, Marcus Aurelius 2.16, 3.11, 4.3.2, 4.4, 10.15, with G.R. Stanton, The Cosmopolitan Ideas of Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius, Phronesis, 13 (1968), pp. 18395.
HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT. Vol. XXVIII. No. 1. Spring 2007
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equated it with benevolent Roman expansionism that brings civilization and order to its provinces.4 More recently, Stoic cosmopolitanism has been presented in slightly different terms as an affirmation of the common humanity shared by all and the desire to promote actions directed towards the good of the whole species.5 It has also been presented as a natural moral community of rational beings who by nature have moral obligations to one another.6 This humanist conception of a world-wide moral community finds its clearest expression in Cicero. Ciceros account of cosmopolitanism an account that is often taken as a source for Stoic political thought is comprised of two elements.7 The first of these is the idea that all humans and gods are, by virtue of their shared rationality, fellow citizens of the cosmos conceived as a city ruled by divine reason.8 The second supplements this theoretical argument with the more practical thought that a benevolent Empire governed in the best interests of its citizens might actually bring about a political State covering the entire world that could embody this humanist ideal.9 Thus Ciceros conception of cosmopolitanism envisages a world-wide State, governed by one set of political laws, themselves based upon divine law, uniting all humanity. In radical contrast to this cosmopolitan ideal of a world-wide State embracing all humankind, the second idea common in modern accounts of Stoic political thought derives from the handful of fragments relating to the infamous Republic of Zeno, the founder of Stoicism. The most common interpretation of these fragments suggests that in the Republic Zeno proposed an ideal community of sages, an isolated commune of intellectuals, modelled upon an idealized image of Sparta, and something akin to Platos ideal State outlined in his Republic.10 In this ideal Stoic community there would be no law-courts, no temples, no currency, open sexual relationships, and possessions would be
4 See Plutarch De Alex. fort. 329ad and Cicero Rep. 3.3337 respectively. For the use of this idea to justify the Roman Empire see A. Erskine, The Hellenistic Stoa (London, 1990), pp. 181204. 5 M.C. Nussbaum, Kant and Cosmopolitanism, in Perpetual Peace, ed. J. Bohman and M. Lutz-Bachmann (Cambridge, MA, 1997), pp. 2557, at p. 30; see also M.C. Nussbaum, The Therapy of Desire (Princeton, 1994), p. 343. 6 M.L. Colish, The Stoic Tradition from Antiquity to the Early Middle Ages (2 vols., Leiden, 1990), Vol. 1, p. 38. 7 See e.g. Nussbaum, Kant and Cosmopolitanism, p. 27, who acknowledges that her account is heavily dependent on Cicero. 8 Cicero Leg. 1.23 (= SVF 3.339); see also Cicero, Nat. D. 2.154. 9 See e.g. Cicero Rep. 3.3337. This text derives from the famous Vatican palimsest (Vat. Lat. 5757). Unfortunately at this point the text is unrecoverable and we have only a fragmentary reconstruction based upon quotations in Lactantius and Augustine. 10 For this Platonic-Spartan interpretation see W.W. Tarn, Alexander the Great (2 vols., Cambridge, 1948), Vol. 2, p. 418; H.C. Baldry, The Unity of Mankind in Greek Thought (Cambridge, 1965), pp. 156, 158; A.-H. Chroust, The Ideal Polity of the Early Stoics, Review of Politics, 27 (1965), pp. 17383, at p. 173; and more recently
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held in common. At first glance, then, this early Stoic utopia appears to be dramatically at odds with the cosmopolitan ideals expressed by Seneca and Cicero. Some commentators have attempted to overcome this apparent distance between early and late Stoic political thought by outlining an evolution from Zenos Spartan utopia to Senecas and Ciceros universal cosmopolitan ideal.11 In what follows I shall argue that this is an unnecessary move. Instead I shall suggest that the political ideas held by Zeno and Seneca were more or less the same. In order to bring these two apparently distant positions closer together I shall begin by turning to what I take to be their common philosophical ancestor: Cynicism. As I have already suggested, Senecas ideal of a common community embracing gods and men may reasonably be called a cosmopolitan ideal, that is, a dream of a common polis embracing the entire cosmos. The origins of the term cosmopolitan or citizen of the cosmos (kosmopolits) may be traced back to Diogenes the Cynic who appears to have coined the term.12 It is well known that Diogenes remained an important figure for later Stoics,13 and that in antiquity Cynicism and Stoicism were often thought to be closely related.14 Indeed, it is reported that the Stoic sage will himself follow the Cynic way of life (kunikos bios), a way of life characterized in Stoicism as a short cut to virtue (suntomon ep aretn hodon).15 Thus there is not only an etymological reason to consider Cynic cosmopolitanism in order to understand Stoic cosmopolitanism, but also a philosophical one, for Cynic cosmopolitanism is one of the key characteristics of the Cynic way of life. If the Stoic sage will follow the Cynic way of life, then he will be a citizen of the cosmos in the Cynic sense. It is important to stress, then, that Cynic cosmopolitanism is thus not merely an antecedent to Stoic cosmopolitanism but also a constitutive component.
M. Schofield, The Stoic Idea of the City (Cambridge, 1991; 2nd edn., Chicago, 1999), pp. 2256. Schofields account has become the current orthodoxy and is followed by J. Annas, The Morality of Happiness (New York, 1993), p. 306; M.R. Wright, Cicero on Self-Love and Love of Humanity in De Finibus 3, in Cicero the Philosopher, ed. J.G.F. Powell (Oxford, 1995), pp. 17195, at pp. 1845; R.W. Sharples, Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics (London, 1996), pp. 1245; A.A. Long, Stoic Philosophers on Persons, Property-Ownership, and Community, in Aristotle and After, ed. R. Sorabji, BICS Supplement 68 (London, 1997), pp. 1331, at p. 21. 11 See esp. Schofield, Stoic Idea, which, as I have already noted, is regularly cited as the current orthodoxy. It goes without saying that although I disagree with some of its conclusions I nevertheless remain heavily indebted to this excellent work. 12 See Diog. Laert. 6.63 (= SSR V B 355). 13 See e.g. the idealized portrait of Diogenes in Epictetus Diss. 3.22. 14 See e.g. Cicero Off. 1.128; Juvenal 13.122. 15 Diog. Laert. 7.121 (= SVF 3 Apollod. 17); see also Stobaeus 2.114.22 W.-H. (= SVF 3.638).
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Cynicism may also be seen to form the philosophical background to Zenos Republic. It is reported that Zeno was a pupil of the Cynic Crates and that he followed the Cynic way of life.16 More importantly, Zeno is said to have written his Republic when he was still under the influence of Crates.17 It appears, then, as if Cynicism might stand behind both the later Stoic idea of cosmopolitanism and the contents of Zenos Republic. Consequently I shall begin by turning to Cynic cosmopolitanism in order to outline this common background. I Cynic Cosmopolitanism According to tradition, cosmopolitanism originates with Diogenes the Cynic.18 Asked where he came from Diogenes is said to have replied, I am a citizen of the cosmos (kosmopolits).19 There are a number of ways in which this declaration has been understood. One suggestion has been that it is a purely negative statement, the denial of allegiance to any particular city.20 Yet if that were the case then it is more likely that Diogenes would have simply used apolis, without a city, a term that he is reported to have used elsewhere.21 It is unlikely that Diogenes would coin a new term simply to make a negative claim when an existing term would do. Instead, it is more likely that Diogenes was trying to indicate something new, something more than the mere negation of existing political affiliations. Whereas apolis suggests being without a city, being homeless or an exile, kosmopolits literally means that one is a citizen
See Diog. Laert. 7.2 (= SVF 1.1), 6.104 (not in SVF). See Diog. Laert. 7.4 (= SVF 1.2). This is a matter of dispute, to which I shall return. 18 Although the origin of cosmopolitanism is usually credited to Diogenes, there are in fact a number of statements attributed to other Socratic philosophers that express similar ideas although they do not use the term kosmopolits. Examples include Aristippus (Xenophon Mem. 2.1.13 = SSR IV A 163), Theodorus (Diog. Laert. 2.99 = SSR IV H 13) and Stilpo (Seneca Ep. 9.1819 = SSR II O 15). There are also a number of fragments attributed to Socrates that express a cosmopolitan attitude: Cicero Tusc. 5.108; Plutarch De exil. 600f; Musonius Rufus 42.12 Hense (all SSR I C 492); Epictetus Diss. 1.9.1 (= SSR I C 515). Although it is common to dismiss these passages as later Stoic embellishments (e.g. R.F. Dobbin, Epictetus, Discourses Book 1 (Oxford, 1998), pp. 1234), the fact that a cosmopolitan attitude is attributed to the clearly non-Cynic Aristippus by a source as early as Xenophon suggests that this idea may have been current before Diogenes. It is tempting to speculate that the foundations of Cynic cosmopolitanism may have been forged in the Socratic circle of philosophers that included Socrates, Aristippus and the proto-Cynic Antisthenes, sometime in the late fifth century BC. 19 Diog. Laert. 6.63 (= SSR V B 355). 20 See e.g. J.M. Rist, Stoic Philosophy (Cambridge, 1969), p. 59; Schofield, Stoic Idea, p. 144. 21 See Diog. Laert. 6.38 (= SSR V B 263); also Julian Or. 6.195b, Ep. 256d (both also SSR V B 263).
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of the cosmos as such, that one is a citizen everywhere. Thus it appears to indicate some form of positive allegiance to the cosmos.22 Yet the precise nature of the positive content of Diogenes cosmopolitanism is far from clear. Cynic attitudes towards conventional politics were on the whole dismissive. Two fragments from Crates illustrate this. In the first, Crates describes himself as Diogenes fellow citizen (Diogenous einai polits) and characterizes their common country (patrida) as ignominy and poverty (adoxian kai penian).23 In the second, a poem entitled Pera, Crates borrows a couple of lines from Homer, giving them a twist.24 Hickss Loeb translation of the opening lines reads:
There is a city Pera in the midst of a wine-dark vapour, Fair, fruitful, passing squalid, owning nought.
Hickss reading of the opening lines is followed by Histad, who suggests that Crates Pera is an imaginary city, a never-never land, which resembles Platos ideal state in that it consists of a narrowly limited society isolated from the external world.25 However the name of this utopian city, Pra, is simply the name of the Cynics leather wallet or knapsack in which he carries all of his worldly possessions. In the light of this, a more appropriate translation of the opening lines of Crates poem might be:
[The] wallet is a city in the midst of wine-dark delusion, noble and rich, surrounded by squalor.
Far from suggesting a utopian ideal, these lines may be read as a reference to the independence of the Cynic in the midst of whatever circumstances in which he might find himself. It is this state, the state of independence, that Crates refers to in the first fragment; the state of disreputable poverty which he shares with his master and fellow citizen Diogenes. Returning to the term kosmopolits in the light of these passages from Crates, one might suggest that Diogenes claim to be a citizen of the cosmos, although positive, was not a reference to a conventional political ideal but rather an affirmation of a certain attitude and way of life that can be put into practice here and now. If there is a positive dimension to Diogenes statement then we might provisionally characterize it as the affirmation of the laws of the cosmos, the laws of nature, in opposition to the customs and conventions of the traditional city (phusis in place of nomos).
See J.L. Moles, Cynic Cosmopolitanism, in The Cynics, ed. R.B. Branham and M.-O. Goulet-Caz (Berkeley, 1996), pp. 10520, at pp. 10911, who offers five proofs for the positive content for Diogenes cosmopolitanism. 23 Diog. Laert. 6.93 (= SSR V H 31). 24 Crates apud Diog. Laert. 6.85 (= SSR V H 70): Pr tis polis esti mesi eni oinopi tuphi, kal kai pieira, perirrupos, ouden echousa. Note also Clem. Alex. Paed. 2.10 (= SSR V H 70). These opening lines play on Homer Od. 19.17273. 25 R. Histad, Cynic Hero and Cynic King (Uppsala, 1948), pp. 12930.
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There are, however, numerous sources that make clear that Diogenes did not reject the city as such. He is reported to have spent much of his time in Athens and Corinth, often explicitly acknowledging the benefits he gained from so doing. According to Dio Chrysostom, Diogenes made the cities his home and used to live in the public buildings and the shrines.26 Diogenes himself is reported to have said that, in the form of the Portico of Zeus and the Hall of Processions, the Athenians had generously provided him with plenty of places to live.27 If Cynic cosmopolitanism rejected the customs of the city then these passages indicate that it did not reject the city as a geographical entity. If Diogenes and Crates rejected conventional citizenship and affirmed the cosmos as their home, then the centre of the city would be as much home as anywhere else.28 This indifference to geographical location, and consequent rejection of the distinction between the public and the private, formed the background for Diogenes apparently exhibitionist behaviour such as his infamous masturbation in the marketplace.29 For a Cynic, if an act is in accordance with nature then there is no reason why it cannot be performed anywhere, especially if the Cynic affirms everywhere as his home.30 For Diogenes, then, cosmopolitanism may be conceived as a positive allegiance to the cosmos combined with a rejection of the customs of the city and a rejection of citizenship of any particular city. Julian reports that Diogenes rejected Athenian citizenship because he did not want to be tied to any particular place and did not want the obligations that came with it.31 Closely related to this rejection is the positive Cynic doctrine of self-sufficiency or independence (autarkeia).32 This doctrine led the Cynics to reduce their external needs to a minimum. When Diogenes saw a child drinking out of its hands, he is reported to have thrown away his cup and to have said A child has beaten me
Dio Chrys. 4.13 (= SSR V B 582). Diog. Laert. 6.22 (= SSR V B 174); see also Diogenes apud Teles 8.35 Hense (= SSR V B 468). 28 See e.g. Crates apud Diog. Laert. 6.98 (= SSR V H 80). 29 See Diog. Laert. 6.69 (= SSR V B 147); note also Dio Chrys. 6.1718 (= SSR V B 583). 30 Such acts also served two other purposes: the satisfaction of sexual appetites without dependency on anyone else and a deliberate attempt to provoke people into questioning the arbitrary nature of social conventions. The former could in theory be achieved in private but for the Cynic there is no private; the agora is his breakfast room and his bedroom. See also Julian Or. 6.202bc (= SSR V B 264) for a defence of such natural practices and a contrast with the lying, robbery and shady deals that usually go on in the marketplace. 31 Julian Or. 7.238d (= SSR V B 332). Consider, for instance, the unhappy consequences of Socrates acceptance of the obligations of Athenian citizenship. 32 See A.N.M. Rich, The Cynic Conception of autarkeia, Mnemosyne (4th series), 9 (1956), pp. 239.
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in economy (paidion me nenikken euteleiai).33 For the Cynic, all externals are strictly a matter of indifference; the only thing of any intrinsic value is his virtue or excellence (aret), which one might characterize as an internal mental state, a frame of mind, or attitude of independence which the Cynic affirms as the only sure path to well-being or happiness (eudaimonia). This Cynic concept is perhaps best captured in an albeit later summary by the Stoic Epictetus:
Look at me, I am without a home, without a city (apolis), without property, without a slave; I sleep on the ground; I have neither wife nor children, no miserable governors mansion, but only earth and sky, and one rough cloak. Yet what do I lack?34
Cynic cosmopolitanism is arguably but one expression of this more fundamental Cynic doctrine of independence (autarkeia), and the Cynics rejection of conventional citizenship is just one instance of the Cynics rejection of dependence upon externals. Thus one might characterize it as primarily a frame of mind, an attitude, or a personal ethic, directed towards the cultivation of happiness (eudaimonia). As such, there is little reason to suspect that it would have much to do with the idea of the unity of all humankind.35 On the contrary, Diogenes Laertius reports that the Cynic sage recognized as friends only his own like (ti homoii), that is, other Cynic sages.36 As Epictetus puts it, in his discourse On Cynicism, where will you find me a Cynics friend? For such a person must be another Cynic, in order to be worthy of being counted his friend.37 Instead of identifying with humankind, the Cynics felt a much greater affinity with animals, as their very name suggests. It is reported that Diogenes turned to philosophy after watching a mouse, learning from its habits how to adapt himself to any circumstance.38 Yet it is also said that Diogenes aspired to the independence of the gods, and that to achieve Cynic self-sufficiency was to become god-like.39 In this sense the Cynics engaged in a paradoxical affirmation of the independence of both animals and gods, bringing to mind Aristotles comment at the beginning of the Politics that anyone who is so self-sufficient that they no longer need a political commuDiogenes apud Diog. Laert. 6.37 (= SSR V B 158). Epictetus Diss. 3.22.4748 (= SSR V B 263). 35 Pace Nussbaum, Kant and Cosmopolitanism, pp. 29 and 53 n. 11, who claims that Cynic cosmopolitanism involved a primary affiliation with humanity. Instead, T.A. Sinclair, A History of Greek Political Thought (London, 1951), p. 245: Cynic cosmopolitanism was individualistic and dissociative and did not look to the unity of mankind. Note also Baldry, Unity of Mankind, pp. 108 and 110. 36 Diog. Laert. 6.105 (= SSR V A 99). 37 Epictetus Diss. 3.22.6263 (= SSR V B 24). 38 See Diog. Laert. 6.22 (= SSR V B 172). 39 See Diog. Laert. 6.104 (= SSR V A 135); Julian Or. 6.192a (= SSR V B 95).
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nity must either be an animal or a god.40 This was exactly what the Cynics hoped to achieve; the independence from political community characteristic of gods and beasts. Cynic cosmopolitanism might thus be characterized as the combination of this negative attitude towards dependence upon existing political communities with a positive attitude of affirming the cosmos as the only true home for those who live in accordance with nature. II Zenos Republic It was this conception of cosmopolitanism that Zeno would have learned and practised during his time as a pupil of Crates and as a follower of the kunikos bios, the Cynic way of life.41 It was during this time that Zeno is reported to have produced his infamous Republic (Politeia).42 It is said that the Republic was written under the influence of Cynicsm, on the dogs tail (epi ts tou kunos ouras).43 Zenos Republic is often claimed to be the political text of the early Stoa. However the precise nature of its content is far from clear. The fact that a number of later Stoics are reported to have been embarrassed by Zenos Republic suggests that it contained much that might be called
Aristotle Pol. 1253a2729. See Ps.-Lucian Cyn. 12 (with Rich, The Cynic Conception of autarkeia, p. 24) where the objection that the Cynics live like beasts is countered with the claim that they also live like the gods insofar as both embody the life of autarkeia. Note also Dio Chrys. 6.3132 (= SSR V B 583). 41 See Diog. Laert. 6.104 (not in SVF). 42 The ancient sources for the Republic are gathered together in H.C. Baldry, Zenos Ideal State, Journal of Hellenic Studies, 79 (1959), pp. 315 (note also the list in SVF 1, p. 72). The key passages are Diog. Laert. 7.4, 7.3234, 7.121, 7.129, 7.131; Plutarch De Alex. fort. 329ab, Vit. Lyc. 31.12, Quaest. conv. 653e; Philodemus De Stoic. 9.14, 11.913, 12.25, 14.1215, 17.410 (in T. Dorandi, Filodemo. Gli Stoici (PHerc 155 e 339), Cronache Ercolanesi, 12 (1982), pp. 91133); Athenaeus 561c; Clem. Alex. Strom. 5.11 (PG 9.113); Origen Con. Cels. 1.5 (PG 11.6645); Jo. Chrys. Hom. in Matt. 1.4 (PG 57.1819); Theodoretus Graec. affect. curat. 3.74 (PG 83.885). Note also Philodemus Stoic. hist. 4 (in T. Dorandi, Filodemo, Storia dei filosofi: La sto da Zenone a Panezio (Leiden, 1994)). 43 Diog. Laert. 7.4 (= SVF 1.2). This claim has been questioned by Erskine, Hellenistic Stoa, pp. 915, who argues that it was probably the product of later Stoics embarrassed by its Cynic content. Instead Erskine wants to affirm the affinity between the Republic and the rest of Zenos philosophy (contra Tarn, Alexander, Vol. 2, pp. 41718). But insofar as Cynic ideas can be found throughout the early Stoa as Erskine himself acknowledges the rejection of an early date of composition is unnecessary. Instead see P.A. Vander Waerdt, Politics and Philosophy in Stoicism, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 9 (1991), pp. 185211, at p. 194: there is no reason to think that the Cynic tenets which do feature prominently in the Republic are in any way incompatible with orthodox Stoicism. There is no reason why one cannot affirm an early date of composition, a strong Cynic influence and harmony with the rest of Zenos philosophy.
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Cynic.44 Philodemus, for example, describes it as impious, full of shameful opinions, offensive words and the greatest of foolish errors.45 Indeed such supposedly shameful and impious ideas are attributed to a number of the early Stoics, ideas such as open sexual relationships, incest, cannibalism and the public use of obscene language.46 According to the Stoic Antipater, Zenos Republic shared something in common with the Republic of Diogenes.47 The remains of Diogenes Republic are sadly even thinner than those of Zenos.48 However, it would be reasonable to assume that it would have included his definition of the only true State as the cosmos itself.49 This appropriation of traditional political language echoes Diogenes description of himself as a king, as well as Cynic descriptions of their country as the Cynic way of life itself.50 It is within this context of an appropriation of traditional political language that Diogenes title Republic (Politeia) should be understood. It is unlikely that Diogenes ideal city (polis) would have been a real city past, present or future.51 Rather it would
44 See e.g. Philodemus De Stoic. 9.14 Dorandi. Clem. Alex. Strom. 5.9 (= SVF 1.43 = LS 67E) says that only advanced students that had proved themselves would be shown certain works by Zeno. 45 Philodemus De Stoic. 11.913, 14.227 Dorandi. 46 See e.g. Sext. Emp. Adv. Math. 11.1904; Diog. Laert. 7.1878; with further references in SVF 3.74356. See also the note below on Chrysippus On the Republic, and now the comprehensive study of this topic in M.-O. Goulet-Caz, Les Kynica du stocisme (Stuttgart, 2003). As with the Cynics, the justification for such behaviour, often using animal examples, was that it was in accordance with nature (see E. Zeller, The Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics , trans. O.J. Reichel (London, 1892), p. 307). 47 Philodemus De Stoic. 17.410 Dorandi (= SVF 3 Ant. 67= SSR V B 126), who also lists testimonies regarding its existence from Cleanthes and Chrysippus. According to Diog. Laert. 6.15 (= SSR V A 22) behind both Zeno and Diogenes stood Antisthenes: Antisthenes gave the impulse to the indifference of Diogenes, the continence of Crates, and the hardiness of Zeno, himself laying the foundations of their state/republic (ti politeiai). This use of the dative singular suggests not a reference to their texts called Republic but rather to a single state shared by them all, the state of being a citizen of the cosmos perhaps. Of Antisthenes it is reported that he held that the sage will reject the laws of the city (polis) and instead live according to virtue, and that to the sage nothing will be foreign (Diog. Laert. 6.1112 = SSR V A 134). 48 Giannantoni lists only two fragments: Athenaeus 159c (= SSR V B 125) and Philodemus De Stoic. 13.120.12 Dorandi (= SSR V B 126). 49 Diog. Laert. 6.72 (= SSR V B 353). 50 See e.g. Crates apud Diog. Laert. 6.85 (= SSR V H 70) and J.L. Moles, The Cynics and Politics, in Justice and Generosity, ed. A. Laks and M. Schofield (Cambridge, 1995), pp. 12958, at p. 137. For the Stoics, the sage is also a king; in fact, he is the only individual worthy of that title (see e.g. Diog. Laert. 7.122, cited below). 51 Pace Tarn, Alexander, Vol. 2, p. 407; J. Ferguson, Utopias of the Classical World (London, 1975), p. 91; instead see Sinclair, Greek Political Thought, pp. 2445. D. Dawson, Cities of the Gods (New York, 1992), pp. 1501, suggests two possible interpretations: (1) a comic parody of Platos Republic; (2) a third-century Stoic forgery. The
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have been the cosmos itself, and in a piece of word-play his ideal political State would have been the state of being a Cynic.52 It is reported that Zeno followed this Cynic practice of appropriating traditional political terminology. In a book by Chrysippus entitled On Zenos Proper Use of Terminology it is said that only the wise are kings, since true kingship is rule answerable to no-one, and only the wise answer to no-one.53 Similarly, the Stoics are said to have defined a city (polis) as a community of virtuous people held together by a common law, and consequently they denied the existence of any real cities, for such a community does not exist anywhere on earth.54 In the words of the Stoic Diogenes of Babylon, among the foolish (aphronn) there exists no city nor any law (polis [ouk es]tin oude nomos).55 In the light of this Cynic and Stoic practice of re-evaluating traditional political terminology, then, it would be unwise to take the title Republic (Politeia) at face value. Taking this appropriation of the terminology of traditional political discourse into account, Moles has offered a convincing analysis of Diogenes politics involving three stages.56 The first stage would involve the individual self-sufficient Cynic sage. This first stage is in itself the Cynic political ideal. However, in a world with more than one Cynic sage, these individuals would acknowledge one another as equals and fellow citizens of the cosmos following a shared way of life. Thus they would constitute a community of sages, regardless of their individual geographical locations. This community of
first of these seems more likely and if so then it may have superficially resembled a utopian project which might have misled later authors who perhaps only had second hand knowledge of the work. 52 See Baldry, Unity of Mankind, p. 110; Moles, The Cynics and Politics, p. 137. The (English) word-play on state is from Moles. Ancient examples of such word-play can be found in Diog. Laert. 6.93 (= SSR V H 31): Cratess country (patrida) is Cynic poverty and he is a citizen (polits) of Diogenes. 53 See Diog. Laert. 7.122 (= SVF 3.617 = LS 67M); note also Stobaeus 2.108.26 W.-H. (= SVF 3.617); Cicero Parad. Stoic. 42. 54 See Clem. Alex. Strom. 4.26 (= SVF 3.327); Philodemus De Stoic. 20.46 Dorandi; Schofield, Stoic Idea, pp. 61 and 73; Annas, Morality of Happiness, p. 307. Thus Erskine, Hellenistic Stoa, p. 28, is mistaken to assume that Zenos mention of cities is on its own proof that he proposed some form of traditional political State. 55 Diogenes of Babylon apud Philodemus De rhet. 2.211 Sudhaus (= SVF 3 Diog. 117), following the new reconstruction of the text in D. Obbink and P.A. Vander Waerdt, Diogenes of Babylon: The Stoic Sage in the City of Fools, Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies, 32 (1991), pp. 35596. As they note (p. 376), given the rarity of the sage this is a strong statement indeed. Note also Cicero Acad. 2.137 (= SVF 3 Diog. 9) where it is reported that, according to Diogenes, Rome was not a real city (nec haec urbs nec in ea civitas) at all. 56 See Moles, The Cynics and Politics, pp. 1412. We should not place too much weight on the word stages here; there is no suggestion of an inevitable historical development from one to the next.
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sages whether dispersed or gathered together in one place would form a second stage in Cynic politics. Finally, the third stage would be a hypothetical future in which everyone has reached the wisdom of the Cynic sage and thus everyone has become a fellow-citizen of the cosmos. In such an ideal situation all existing traditional States and laws would become irrelevant and there would be what might best be described as an anarchist utopia. This seems to be a plausible reconstruction of Cynic politics, and if Zenos Republic was written under the influence of Cynicism, then it may be reasonable at least to suggest that Zenos Republic might also have involved a number of similar stages.57 Yet at first glance this Cynic approach to politics appears to be dramatically at odds with the more common accounts of Zenos Republic. It is often assumed that Zeno followed the model of Platos work of the same name, constructing an image of an ideal State.58 Indeed, a number of the fragments do appear to echo ideas in Platos Republic. These include a rejection of traditional education, the abolition of currency, and the community of women.59 However, there is one important difference: in Zenos Republic only the wise are citizens.60 In the light of this, Zenos ideal State is often presented as an isolated community of intellectuals,61 a reworked version of the Platonic ideal State, but populated only by one class of sages, thus side-stepping Platos primary political problem, namely the elimination of class conflict. Central to this interpretation of Zenos Republic is a passage from Plutarchs life of the Spartan king Lycurgus that places Zeno and Plato together as followers of the Spartan ideal:
It was not, however, the chief design of Lycurgus then to leave his city in command over a great many others, but he thought that the happiness (eudaimonian) of an entire city, like that of a single individual, depended on the prevalence of virtue (arets) and concord (homonoias) within its own
57 Contra Erskine, Hellenistic Stoa, p. 9, who claims that its Cynic character has already been greatly exaggerated. My claim would be that it has not been taken seriously enough. 58 This claim is often based on the shared title alone; the fact that Diogenes used the same title undermines this. C. Rowe, The Politeiai of Zeno and Plato, in Zeno of Citium and His Legacy, ed. T. Scaltsas and A.S. Mason (Larnaca, 2002), pp. 293308, at p. 295, assumes that Zenos title must imply a close relationship with Platos work of the same name. He also assumes (p. 299) that the same must be true for Diogenes choice of this title. But just because the title Republic seems to us to be so closely associated with the name of Plato does not mean it would have been seen to be so in the fourth century BC. 59 See Diog. Laert. 7.3233 (= SVF 1.259, 268, 269). 60 Diog. Laert. 7.33 (= SVF 1.222). 61 Chroust, Ideal Polity, pp. 17980, claims that the fragment that proposes the abolition of currency (Diog. Laert. 7.33 = SVF 1.268) implies that all foreign travel would be banned in Zenos ideal State. Thus this small community of sages would be totally isolated from the outside world.
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borders. The aim, therefore, of all his arrangements and adjustments was to make his people free-minded, self-sufficing (autarkeis), and moderate in all their ways, and to keep them so as long as possible. His design (hupothesin) for a civil polity (politeias) was adopted by Plato, Diogenes, Zeno, and by all those who have won approval for their treatises on this subject, although they left behind them only writings and words.62
However, it is far from clear that this passage implies that Zeno admired the Spartan political constitution. Instead it reports that Zeno along with Plato and Diogenes agreed with Lycurgus that happiness (eudaimonia) is dependent upon concord (homonoia) and self-sufficiency (autarkeia).63 This reading certainly makes sense with regard to Platos desire to overcome conflict, whether it be within the individual or within society. It also accords both with Diogenes identification of happiness (eudaimonia) with independence (autarkeia), and with Zenos definition of the key to happiness (eudaimonia) the telos of Stoic ethics as harmony (homologia).64 To read Plutarchs remark this way makes more sense than to claim that all three of these philosophers followed the Spartan political ideal, for in the case of Diogenes not only is it unlikely that he proposed an ideal State in the conventional sense, but even if he did it would have been strange if he had chosen Sparta for his model,65 a place from which he himself is reported to have been banned.66 Thus I suggest that it is unlikely that Plutarch is explicitly claiming a Spartan model for Zenos Republic. Plutarch is also the source for another key account of Zenos Republic, perhaps the most important of those that survive. Moreover, this text from On the Fortune and Virtue of Alexander appears to conflict with the common image of a Spartan-Platonic community of sages:
The much admired Republic of Zeno, the founder of the Stoic sect, is aimed at this one main point, that our household arrangements should not be based on cities or parishes (m kata poleis mde kata dmous), each one marked out by its own legal system, but we should regard all humans (pantas anthrpous) as our fellow citizens and local residents (dmotas kai politas), and there should be one way of life and order, like that of a herd grazing
Plutarch Vit. Lyc. 31.12 (= SVF 1.261, 263; trans. Perrin). Pace Tarn, Alexander, Vol. 2, p. 418; instead Chroust, Ideal Polity, pp. 1778. The word translated by Perrin as design (hupothesin) has connotations of groundwork, foundation, presupposition or premiss. Thus it was not Lycurgus actual constitution that Zeno et al. are said to have copied, but rather the fundamental premiss that happiness (eudaimonia) is dependent upon the self-sufficiency (autarkeia) that constitutes virtue (aret). 64 See Stobaeus 2.75.11 W.-H. and Diog. Laert. 7.87 (both SVF 1.179 = LS 63BC). 65 Pace Ferguson, Utopias, pp. 912. Instead Baldry, Zenos Ideal State, p. 8. 66 See Ps.-Diogenes Ep. 27 (= SSR V B 557), The Cynic Epistles, ed. and trans. A.J. Malherbe (Missoula, 1977), p. 118.
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together and nurtured by a common pasture (nomi koini).67 Zeno wrote this, picturing as it were a dream or image (onar eidlon) of a philosophers well-regulated society (politeias).68
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A number of suggestions have been made as to how this passage might be brought into line with the assumption that in the Republic Zeno is outlining an ideal conventional State. One has been to expand Zenos ideal community to include not just the wise (sophoi) but also the non-wise (phauloi), reserving the status of full citizenship and powers of legislation to the wise and according the non-wise the lower status of mere membership.69 Thus, Zenos Republic is again presented along lines similar to Platos ideal community, with a ruling class of sages governing in the interests of the whole, but this time expanded to cover the entire world; a cosmic city in the sense of a world-wide State. However, this seems unlikely, for it is reported that the Stoic sage will be master over no-one.70 It is unlikely, then, that Zeno would have proposed a community of all humans with a ruling class of sages. A more promising solution is Baldrys suggestion that a conditional may have come at the beginning of this text, of the form if all humans were wise, then all humans would live as one community.71 There are a number of reasons why a preceding conditional, if there was one, might have been left out in Plutarchs summary, one of which might be Plutarchs own literary objectives in the text in which this summary appears, namely his desire to show that Alexander achieved in reality what the philosophers merely talked about.72 A missing conditional might also apply to a number of the other fragments and
67 Alternatively by a common law. This alternative reading is often preferred as it resonates with the reference to a common law in Cleanthes Hymn to Zeus (Stobaeus 1.25.327.4 W.H. = SVF 1.537 = LS 54I). However, common pasture appears to make more sense in this context. There may have been a deliberate if not inevitable play on words (see e.g. Ps.-Plato Minos 317d18a), but since Plutarch appears to be paraphrasing rather than quoting it would be difficult to credit this to Zeno himself with any certainty. 68 Plutarch De Alex. fort. 329ab (= SVF 1.262 = LS 67A; trans. LS). For two very different assessments of this passage as a source see Schofield, Stoic Idea, pp. 10411, and P.A. Vander Waerdt, Zenos Republic and the Origins of Natural Law, in The Socratic Movement, ed. P.A. Vander Waerdt (Ithaca, 1994), pp. 272308, esp. pp. 2819. 69 See e.g. Ferguson, Utopias, p. 114; G. Boys-Stones, Eros in Government: Zeno and the Virtuous City, Classical Quarterly, 48 (1998), pp. 16874, at p. 172 n.14. 70 See e.g. Stobaeus 2.99.22 W.-H. (= SVF 1.216, 3.567); the sage neither dominates nor is dominated (oute despozei oute despozetai). 71 See Baldry, Zenos Ideal State, p. 8; Baldry, Unity of Mankind, pp. 160 and 162. As Schofield notes (Stoic Idea, p. 105), the meaning of all is notoriously context-dependent. 72 In both De Alex. fort. 329ab and Vit. Lyc. 31 Plutarchs own objective is to contrast the dreams and talk of the philosophers with the deeds of Alexander and Lycurgus respectively.
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this would certainly make more sense of their reported Cynic inspiration.73 Thus, if everyone were a Stoic sage, then there would be no need for law-courts, no need for currency, and the temples would soon become irrelevant except as good places to sleep.74 Moreover, following the example of the Cynic couple Crates and Hipparchia, men and women would share the same form of dress, might marry, but would also affirm open sexual relationships.75 On this account, Zenos Republic would have contained less a positive political programme and more a descriptive account of what the world would be like if and only if it were populated purely by sages.76 This would certainly make sense of Plutarchs characterization of it as a dream or image (onar eidlon) of a philosophers conception of society. In such an ideal situation there would be no State and no prescriptive laws. It is said both that the sage is the only one fit to rule and that the sage will be master over no-one.77 In Zenos imaginary ideal, each sage would rule their own way of life, yet they would all live in harmony with one another insofar as they would all live according to the same standard: Nature. As Aristotle put it in the Politics, men with superior excellence (arets huperboln) gods among men cannot be part of a State or subject to laws, for to judge them as equals with the foolish majority would be to do them a great injustice. Moreover, a group of such individuals with superior excellence would have no need of a State or of legislation; they would be their own law, Aristotle says.78
73 For instance, if the world were populated solely by sages, then there would be no need for temples (SVF 1.264, 265) or law courts (SVF 1.267) or currency (SVF 1.268). 74 Erskine, Hellenistic Stoa, p. 28, takes the comments about abolishing law-courts as his central argument for his claim that Zeno was proposing some form of State rather than an ethic for the sage in present society. Yet this is at odds with his earlier claim (p. 23; also p. 35), that it was less a proposal of a State and more a philosophical inquiry about how the world would be if everyone were a sage. If it were such an inquiry then presumably it would contain the sorts of conditionals proposed here. 75 Compare Diog. Laert. 6.9698 (= SSR V I 1) with Diog. Laert. 7.33 (= SVF 1.257, 269), 121 (= SVF 1.270), 131 (= SVF 1.269). B. Inwood, Why Do Fools Fall in Love?, in Aristotle and After, ed. R. Sorabji, BICS Supplement 68 (London, 1997), pp. 5569, at pp. 689, proposes the marriage between Crates and Hipparchia as perhaps the only model of a relationship that the Stoics could have accepted given their uncompromising rejection of the passions. 76 See Baldry, Zenos Ideal State, p. 8, and Vander Waerdt, Zenos Republic, p. 294. 77 See Diog. Laert. 7.122 (= SVF 3.617) and Stobaeus 2.99.22 W.-H. (= SVF 1.216, 3.567) respectively. 78 Aristotle Pol. 1284a317. This passage concludes by saying that if anyone did attempt to legislate for the wise, they would probably retort what, in the fable of Antisthenes, the lions said to the hares, when in the council of the beasts the latter began haranguing and claiming equality for all. The presence of this reference to Antisthenes (and so SSR V A 68) makes it tempting to suggest that Aristotle might have been describing an Antisthenean idea, one that he admired but perhaps thought too idealistic. Note
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If a society consisted only of individuals of this calibre then there would indeed be no need for legislation, law-courts, or a State at all.79 Beyond speculation concerning the presence of a conditional at the beginning of Plutarchs summary, central to its interpretation is the status of the phrase all humans (pantas anthrpous). Just as Cynics and Stoics re-evaluated traditional political terminology, so they did man. Famously, Diogenes is reported to have carried a lantern in the middle of the day shouting I am looking for a man (anthrpon zt).80 A similar restricted use of man can be found in the later Stoics Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius.81 Only the wise are real anthrpoi; the non-wise are dismissed as sub-human.82 They are, in comparison to the sage, mad, ignorant, slaves, children, foolish, impious and lawless.83 If Zeno used the phrase all humans he may well have used it in this restricted sense that would have really meant all wise men or sages (sophoi).84 This suggestion is supported by the statement that they all humans will live according to the common law of Nature, this being the defining characteristic of the way of life of the sage.85 The text also implies that all humans will
also Eth. Nic. 1155a26 where Aristotle suggests that justice is not needed among friends. For Zeno the wise are friends as well as fellow-citizens. 79 See Vander Waerdt, Politics and Philosophy, p. 186; Vander Waerdt, Zenos Republic, pp. 275 and 287. Such individuals would decide on the appropriate actions according to each set of new circumstances and would have no need for generalized rules of conduct. 80 Diog. Laert. 6.41 (= SSR V B 272); also 6.60 (= SSR V B 273), 6.40 (= SSR V B 274); with Baldry, Unity of Mankind, pp. 11011. The Greek is of course gender neutral but I am looking for a human does not really capture the sense of the phrase. This is unfortunate, given the Cynics belief in gender equality. 81 See e.g. Epictetus Diss. 2.24.1920; Marcus Aurelius 11.18.10; with Long, Stoic Philosophers on Persons, p. 14. 82 The non-wise or foolish (phauloi) are the thoughtless, petty, sorry, worthless, common and vulgar majority. For an account of the contrast between the sage and the fool see Stobaeus 2.98.14100.14 W.-H. (= SVF 3.54, 1.216, 3.567, 3.589). Yet the rarity of the sage (see e.g. Alex. Aphr. Fat. 199.1422 = SVF 3.658) means that almost everyone falls into this somewhat unflattering category. 83 See e.g. Diog. Laert. 7.12122; Stobaeus 2.68.18 W.-H. (= SVF 3.663); Plutarch De Stoic. rep. 1048e (= SVF 3.662, 668); Cicero Parad. Stoic. 33, 42. Cicero also uses man in this restricted sense in Rep. 1.28: while others are called men (homines), only those who are skilled in the specifically human arts are worthy of the name . 84 See Baldry, Zenos Ideal State, pp. 1213; O. Murray, Classical Review, 16 (1966), pp. 36871, at p. 369; Rist, Stoic Philosophy, p. 65. This suggestion is supported a little later in the text at 329c where Plutarch writes that Alexander, putting into practice Zenos ideal, bade them all consider as their fatherland the whole inhabited earth . . . as akin to them all good men (tous agathous), and as foreigners only the wicked (trans. Babbitt). 85 See Obbink and Vander Waerdt, Diogenes of Babylon, pp. 3612, who note that natural law is what the sage and the sage alone follows when he lives in accordance with Nature. Thus natural law does not provide a set of prescriptive moral laws to be
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live as one community. This may mean that the wise will consider one another to be fellow-citizens wherever they may happen to be geographically, or it may refer to an ideal future time in which everyone is a sage and thus everyone will live as a single community free from the regulations of local States.86 Either way, this second passage from Plutarch appears to be at odds with the model of an isolated Platonic-Spartan State. In the light of this, the claim that Zenos Republic contained a positive proposal for a coventional political community appears to be unlikely and, as with the Republic of Diogenes, it would be a mistake to assume that it did so just on the evidence of its title.87 For just as the sage is characterized as a king, so a group of sages might be characterized as a city according to a revised definition of the term. Instead of a plan for an ideal State, I suggest echoing Moles account of Cynic politics that Zenos Republic contained an individual cosmopolitan ethic that would, in theory, form the foundation for a future world-wide community in which everyone would be a sage, along with an intermediate stage in which sages whether geographically dispersed or together in one location would acknowledge each other as fellow-citizens.88 This would certainly accord with Zenos Cynic training and with the claims that his Republic contained much that could be called Cynic. It would also make sense of Philodemus claim that at the very beginning of the Republic Zeno declared that it contained doctrines convenient both for the places in which he found himself and the times in which he lived.89 This suggests a pragmatic ethic following the example of Diogenes rather than a blueprint for an ideal State following the model of Plato.90
obeyed by the non-wise but rather functions as a descriptive account of the mental disposition and conduct of the sage. 86 See F.E. Devine, Stoicism on the Best Regime, Journal of the History of Ideas, 31 (1970), pp. 32336, at p. 324. 87 Given Zenos Cynic background it seems more likely to assume that he followed the Republic of Diogenes rather than that of Plato if he followed a previous model at all (pace Erskine, Hellenistic Stoa, p. 27). The report that Zeno wrote against Platos Republic (Plutarch De Stoic. rep. 1034e = SVF 1.260) only seems to confirm this. 88 Pace Schofield, Stoic Idea, p. 25. In his list of possible interpretations (p. 22), I would place the Republic somewhere between (a) no positive political ideal and (b) a community of the wise wherever they may be, but would reject (c) a Platonic-Spartan utopia affirmed by Schofield himself. Instead see Vander Waerdt, Zenos Republic, p. 296: Zenos purpose in the Republic is not to provide a model for a world-state, but to describe how an individual may attain his natural end and perfection in the true polity governed by natural law, even while living out his life in inferior regimes. My conjecture of an intermediate stage, echoing the intermediate stage in Moless three-stage account of Cynic politics, is of course speculative. I would not want to claim that Zeno explicitly discussed any such intermediate stage (there is no evidence that he did). 89 Philodemus De Stoic. 12.25 Dorandi. 90 Thus M. Schofield, Saving the City (London, 1999), pp. 5168, characterizes the Republic as anti-utopian. He writes, all that is necessary for the realization of Zenos
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A second passage from Philodemus appears to confirm this when he says that it is consequent with the goal (telos) to accept the things set forth in the Republic.91 In other words, the doctrines in the Republic follow on from the Stoic ideal of living in accordance with Nature.92 In this ideal, the sage only values his own mental disposition of excellence (aret) that assures his selfsufficiency (autarkeia) and happiness (eudaimonia). As with the Cynic sage, all external objects and circumstances are not withstanding the theory of preferred and non-preferred indifferents strictly speaking a matter of indifference.93 Thus, the Stoic sage will be indifferent to the external political circumstances in which he finds himself, indifferent to the laws of the State, and presumably indifferent to all positive political programmes as well.94 The sage will also be indifferent to his geographical location, a minor detail irrelevant to his primary philosophical project of cultivating his well-being or happiness (eudaimonia). Consequently the Stoic sage will follow a way of life not that different from the life of the Cynic citizen of the cosmos (kosmopolits) and, as has already been noted, the Stoics did indeed affirm that the sage would follow the Cynic way of life.95 If, as Philodemus reports, the contents of the Republic follow on from this goal, then it would be very odd if they included a plan for an ideal State with its own set of laws restricted to a specific geographical location. Instead, it would be more reasonable to assume an attitude of indifference towards conventional citizenship following the example of Diogenes.
vision is that people begin to exercise their capacity for virtue (pp. 578) and the good society is . . . something people can achieve by practising virtue in whatever place they live turning it into a good place (p. 205 n.29). This is something of a shift from his earlier position in Stoic Idea. Indeed, in Impossible Hypotheses: Was Zenos Republic Utopian?, in Zeno of Citium and His Legacy, ed. Scaltsas and Mason, pp. 31123 (also printed as the Epilogue to the second edition of Stoic Idea), he suggests that, instead of an ideal State, the sort of ideal community that Zeno would have proposed might have been the collection of philosophers gathered in the Painted Stoa all following a life according to virtue, a group forming a city of the virtuous, existing within and indifferent to the conventional city. Note also M. Schofield, Zeno of Citiums AntiUtopianism, Polis, 15 (1998), pp. 13848, at p. 147. This is very close if not identical to the central thrust of my own position. 91 Philodemus De Stoic. 14.1215 Dorandi. 92 For Zenos telos formulation see Stobaeus 2.75.11 W.-H. and Diog. Laert. 7.87 (both SVF 1.179 = LS 63BC). 93 Of course, unlike the Cynics, the early Stoics (with the exception of Aristo) admitted a distinction between preferred and non-preferred indifferents. Thus although the sage was independent of wealth and physical health he would always prefer to have them than not if they were readily available. See I.G. Kidd, Stoic Intermediates and the End for Man, in Problems in Stoicism, ed. A.A. Long (London, 1971), pp. 15072. 94 See Annas, Morality of Happiness, p. 307, although she still holds the PlatonicSpartan conception of Zenos Republic. 95 See n. 15 above.
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One might object here by stressing that Stoicism differs from Cynicism in that it admits that some indifferent externals might nevertheless be preferred. Thus the Stoic sage might well prefer to live under one type of political constitution rather than another. Moreover, he might even choose to engage in running a city organized according to such a preferred constitution, or even spend time drawing up blueprints for such a preferred constitution. In other words, Stoic ethics has room for the sage to have some concern with the political arrangements of conventional cities in the way that Cynic ethics does not, even if the Stoic will ultimately have to admit that such matters will not contribute to his well being. In response to this objection it should be noted firstly that Philodemus says that it is consequent with the telos to accept the contents of the Republic and not consequent with all of Stoic ethical theory. While the idea of preferred indifferents is indeed an important element in Stoic ethics, it is not part of the telos, which is living in harmony.96 Secondly, we have already seen that the Stoic sage will follow the Cynic way of life, and it seems difficult to imagine the Cynic way of life routinely involving civic duties or constitution design. A final source worth considering is Chrysippus On the Republic (Peri Politeias), a work that may have been a commentary on Zenos text, although we cannot be sure.97 All of the fragments that survive affirm doctrines that are clearly Cynic in inspiration.98 These include open sexual relationships, incest, cannibalism, and the rejection of pleasure. In this work Chrysippus is also reported to have praised Diogenes for his acts of public masturbation.99 In discussing such material I suggest that Chrysippus would have been examining what is and is not in accordance with Nature. For example, he may have argued that according to Nature there is no reason why people should not eat their dead parents rather than bury them; only arbitrary local custom prohibits such an act. Thus the surviving fragments of Chrysippus text if not a commentary on Zenos Republic then surely influenced by it suggest that it dealt with questions relating to what follows from the Stoic telos rather than with an ideal political State. In contrast to the Platonic-Spartan reading of Zenos Republic, I suggest that it is more plausible to offer an account that stresses its resonances with Cynic doctrines. Two features that can be discerned are, on the one hand, a personal ethic of cosmopolitanism la Diogenes that follows on from and is the political expression of the ideal of living according to Nature and, on
See n. 64 above. SVF (3, 202) lists 7 fragments for Peri Politeias: Plutarch De Stoic. rep. 1035b (= SVF 2.30); ibid. 1044b (= SVF 3.706); ibid. 1044d (= SVF 3.714); Diog. Laert. 7.131 (= SVF 3.728); ibid. 7.188 (= SVF 3.744); Sext. Emp. Adv. Math. 11.192 (= SVF 3.745); plus Diog. Laert. 7.34. Baldry, Unity of Mankind, p. 165, suggests that it followed the same lines as Zenos Republic. 98 See Schofield, Stoic Idea, p. 26. 99 Plutarch De Stoic. rep. 1044b (= SVF 3.706).
97 96
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the other hand, a speculative or hypothetical account of what would happen if everyone were a sage living according to this personal ethic.100 In such a hypothetical future there would no longer be any need for temples, currency or laws. It would be something akin to an anarchist utopia populated solely by individuals guided by their own mental dispositions that would all be in agreement with one another insofar as they all accord with Nature.101 In between these two stages one could imagine an intermediate stage: a community of sages geographically dispersed yet acknowledging one another as fellow-citizens of the cosmos.102 These three stages map on to Moless threestage account of Cynic politics that I have already outlined. In both cases there appears to have been an attempt to offer both a pragmatic ethic that can be put into practice here and now alongside a speculative vision of a possible future grounded upon that ethic.103 In between these two poles, there is the notion of a community of a handful of sages, perhaps scattered throughout the world,104 or perhaps together in one location. The foundation, though, is of course the individual cosmopolitan ethic.105 While fellow-citizens might be thought preferable, their presence or absence should make no difference to the sages happiness.106 The same goes for the utopian ideal. Thus, although the image of a world populated solely by rational and virtuous sages indifferent to the laws
100 D. Obbink, The Stoic Sage in the Cosmic City, in Topics in Stoic Philosophy, ed. K. Ierodiakonou (Oxford, 1999), pp. 17895, at p. 195, captures this dual nature when he describes the Stoic cosmic city as an ideal polis of the wise and an attitude of the individual wise man to present society. I suggest that this double aspect was also present in Zenos Republic. 101 In his 1910 article for the Encyclopaedia Britannica Peter Kropotkin described Zeno as the best exponent of Anarchist philosophy in ancient Greece (P. Kropotkin, Anarchism and Anarchist Communism (London, 1987), p. 10). For a cursory account of Cynicism and Stoicism within the anarchist tradition see P. Marshall, Demanding the Impossible: A History of Anarchism (London, 1992), pp. 6871. 102 This intermediate stage is similar to Schofields revised position in Saving the City and Impossible Hypotheses. 103 See Murray, Classical Review, 16 (1966), p. 369: Zenos description is a description both of an ideal polis of the wise and of the attitude of the individual wise man to present society. Zeller, The Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics, trans. Reichel, p. 311, notes that Stoicism has two tendencies at once, one individualistic the other social, the former dominating. Rist, Stoic Philosophy, p. 68, suggests the difference between Zeno and the Cynics to be a matter of degree rather than of kind. 104 Pace Erskine, Hellenistic Stoa, p. 35. For the relationship between geographically scattered sages see Plutarch De comm. not. 1068f69a (= SVF 3.627). 105 Baldry, Unity of Mankind, pp. 112 and 160, acknowledges this for both Cynic cosmopolitanism and for later Stoic cosmopolitanism such as that found in Seneca, describing both in terms of a certain mental outlook rather than a political programme. Yet he does not ascribe it to Zeno, the bridge between the two. 106 As Erskine notes (Hellenistic Stoa, p. 29), the happiness of the sage would not be changed by the presence or lack of a community. Note also M.E. Reesor, The Political Theory of the Old and Middle Stoa (New York, 1951), p. 11.
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of traditional political States might be a pleasant utopian ideal, it must remain secondary. First there must be self-sufficient individuals who are citizens of the cosmos before there can be a community of such individuals. III Cicero and the Middle Stoa This individual ethic of cosmopolitanism shared by Diogenes and Zeno is somewhat at odds with those accounts of Stoic cosmopolitanism that present it as a doctrine affirming the universal brotherhood of all humankind.107 This latter conception of cosmopolitanism appears to derive primarily from Cicero but it is often taken as an accurate account of orthodox Stoicism.108 Ciceros cosmopolitanism is based upon a conception of the cosmos as the common home of gods and humans who are united by their shared rationality,109 a notion that does not appear in the fragments of Zenos Republic. It is possible to outline a number of factors behind this distance between Zeno and Cicero. The first of these is Ciceros open rejection of the Cynic dimension within Stoicism. In De Officiis Cicero explicitly acknowledges that the early Stoics were close to the Cynics, citing as an example their shared rejection of the hypocrisy that says that while it is acceptable to discuss indecent acts such as theft and deception, it is indecent to mention the perfectly natural act of procreation.110 However, Cicero himself suggests that the use of sexually explicit language, no matter what philosophical point it might be used to make, is an offence against decorum. Elsewhere, in one of his letters, Cicero takes up this point again, writing that Zeno and the Stoics affirmed that there is no such thing as obscene or indecent language and that everything should be called by its own name: The sage will call a spade a spade (ho sophos euthurrmonsei).111 In other words, the early Stoics remained faithful to the spirit of Cynicism. However, Cicero finds this distasteful, saying that he
107 Pace Nussbaum, Kant and Cosmopolitanism, p. 29; instead see Baldry, Zenos Ideal State, p. 14. 108 Thus von Arnim includes a number of passages from Cicero in SVF that make no direct reference to the Stoa, in particular Rep. 1.19 (= SVF 3.338) and Leg. 1.2223 (= SVF 3.339). These two works by Cicero, far from expressing Stoic doctrine, were in fact modelled upon the similarly named works by Plato. For Ciceros affiliations to both the New and Old Academies see J. Glucker, Ciceros Philosophical Affiliations, in The Question of Eclecticism, ed. J. Dillon and A.A. Long (Berkeley, 1988), pp. 3469, but note also W. Grler, Silencing the Troublemaker: De Legibus I. 39 and the Continuity of Ciceros Scepticism, in Cicero the Philosopher, ed. J.G.F. Powell (Oxford, 1995), pp. 85113. 109 See Cicero Rep. 1.19 (= SVF 3.338); Leg. 1.23 (= SVF 3.339), 1.61; Fin. 3.64. 110 See Cicero Off. 1.128 (= SVF 1.77), also 1.148; Fin. 3.68 (= SVF 3.645). For a Cynic account of such hypocrisy see Julian Or. 6.202bc. 111 Cicero Fam. 9.22.15 (= SVF 1.77). That this phrase appears in Greek in Ciceros letter suggests that it is a direct quotation from Zeno himself.
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prefers the modesty of Plato. For the Stoics, according to Cicero, also say that we ought to break wind and belch with equal unconstraint.112 It is understandable that the refined Cicero might find such practices unpleasant but this is more than merely a matter of taste or good manners. Ciceros rejection of the Cynic dimension within Stoicism denies something that is essential to the early Stoa, namely the rejection of the arbitrary customs of the foolish majority. One might think it possible to locate Ciceros anti-Cynic remarks in relation to similar comments found in slightly later writers. For example, Epictetus describes the so-called Cynics of his day as followers of Diogenes in the practice of public farting but sadly in not much else.113 Similarly, Julian attacks his contemporaries who adopt the outward appearance of a Cynic but fail to cultivate the corresponding rational way of life.114 It appears, then, that many Cynics in later antiquity were only Cynics by name and did not follow the ethical examples set by Diogenes and Crates. This may also have been true of the Cynics contemporary with Cicero and, if so, may have prompted his desire to distance the Stoa from such unphilosophical individuals. However, in the cases of Epictetus and Julian, these remarks were made in order to distinguish between these so-called Cynics and those who genuinely follow the Cynic way of life. Thus, their intention was to re-affirm the Cynic ideal despite its poor reputation. It is doubtful that Ciceros remarks would have had that aim in mind. Instead Ciceros anti-Cynicism might best be understood when placed within the context of the attitudes of the so-called Middle Stoa.115 Ciceros primary source for Stoicism was Panaetius whose own philosophy differed from the early Stoicism of Zeno in a number of important respects.116 Cicero reports that Panaetius distanced himself from what he calls the harshness and
112 Ibid. For the Cynic practice of public farting as a philosophical act see D. Krueger, The Bawdy and Society, in The Cynics, ed. R.B. Branham and M.-O. Goulet-Caz (Berkeley, 1996), pp. 22239, at pp. 2267. Diogenes is said to have deliberately disrupted public lectures with his farting (Diog. Laert. 6.48 = SSR V B 393) while Crates is said to have provoked Metrocles to the philosophical life with his (ibid. 6.94 = SSR V L 1). For a later example see Demetrius apud Seneca Ep. 91.1920. Although it might appear juvenile to discuss such acts, for the Cynics this seems to have been a benchmark test for deciding whether someone was guided by the laws of nature or those of convention. 113 Epictetus Diss. 3.22.80 (= SSR V B 290). 114 Julian Or. 6.200d201a (= SSR V B 264). 115 For some recent doubts about this label see D. Sedley, The School, from Zeno to Arius Didymus, in The Cambridge Companion to The Stoics, ed. B. Inwood (Cambridge, 2003), pp. 732, at pp. 234. 116 For Ciceros debt to Panaetius see Off. 1.610; Rep. 1.15, 1.34. For Panaetius philosophy and the question of his orthodoxy see E. Zeller, A History of Eclecticism, trans. S.F. Alleyne (London, 1883), pp. 3956, and A.A. Long, Hellenistic Philosophy (London, 2nd edn., 1986), pp. 21116. The fragments of Panaetius are cited according to the edition by M. van Straaten, Panaetii Rhodii Fragmenta (Leiden, 1952).
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sourness of the early Stoa, instead preferring a more mellow approach that owed much to Plato and Aristotle.117 His Stoicism was thus moderate and eclectic. One consequence of this was a move away from the early Stoic ethical ideal of the perfect sage. Seneca reports the following:
I think Panaetius gave a charming answer to the youth who asked whether the wise man would fall in love: As to the wise man, we shall see; what concerns you and me, who are still a great distance from the wise man, is to ensure that we do not fall into a state of affairs which is disturbed, powerless, subservient to another, and worthless to oneself.118
Similarly Cicero, following this shift by Panaetius, says at the beginning of his De Officiis that its subject matter is not perfect virtue but rather the likeness or semblance of virtue (simulacra virtutis) since, as a rule, life is not spent in the company of sages.119 Consequently it seems unlikely that either Panaetius or Cicero would have had much interest in Zenos hypothetical ideal of a community of sages.120 Cicero also reports that Panaetius rejected the early Stoic re-evaluation of terms such as man, preferring to stick to the common and popular use of language.121 The important point to note here is that this rejection of the distinction between the wise and the foolish, and the affirmation of the ordinary individual, leads to a humanism in which all humans can be equals and fellow-citizens. 122 Suddenly the conception of a cosmic city embracing all humankind becomes a realistic possibility, whereas for Zeno it was merely a hypothetical ideal, especially when we remember that the sage is famously said to be a creature rarer than the Ethiopian phoenix.123 In this Panaetian and Ciceronian ethic, all of humankind are held to share a common rationality and this forms the basis for their brotherhood with one another.124 This is clearly at odds with the early Stoic insults directed towards
See Cicero Fin. 4.79 (= Panaetius fr. 55); Tusc. 1.79 (= Panaetius fr. 56). This new recognition of Plato and Aristotle by the middle Stoa may have begun with Diogenes of Babylon, the first Stoic to lecture in Rome (see Obbink and Vander Waerdt, Diogenes of Babylon, p. 357). In Leg. 3.1314, Cicero claims that both Diogenes of Babylon and Panaetius followed in the tradition of Plato and Aristotle in offering a practical politics in contrast to the tradition of the early Stoics who, Cicero says, engaged only in theoretical discussions of the State and did not offer a practical politics. 118 Seneca Ep. 116.5 (= Panaetius fr. 114 = LS 66C; trans. LS). 119 See Cicero Off. 1.46 (= LS 66D); also 3.13. 120 This shift from the ideal to the actual can be seen in Book 2 of Ciceros Rep. (esp. 2.3) where he prefers to focus upon the actual events that have shaped the development of Rome rather than dream up an ideal community in the manner of Plato. 121 See Cicero Off. 2.35 (= Panaetius fr. 62). 122 See Baldry, Unity of Mankind, pp. 178 and 182. 123 See Alex. Aphr. Fat. 199.1422 (= SVF 3.658 = LS 61N); Seneca Ep. 42.1. 124 See Cicero Leg. 1.2223, 1.2930; Nat. D. 2.154.
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the foolish and stupid majority.125 However, despite this democratization of reason, Cicero acknowledges that his rational majority are far from being sages and thus far from being capable of living in accordance with Nature if left to their own devices. Thus, unlike Zenos sages, Ciceros masses will require legislation. Cicero takes up the notion of a common law of Nature from Zeno and Cleanthes,126 transforming it from a descriptive account of the conduct of the wise into a prescriptive moral code for the non-wise.127 For the early Stoics the term law is reserved for the reason within Nature and the reason in the mind of the sage that is in harmony with Nature.128 Cicero acknowledges this early Stoic definition of law when he says that law can be identified with reason that is fully developed in the human mind. Thus law only exists in the mind of the sage where reason is fully developed.129 In this, Cicero is in agreement with Zeno, for whom the notion of a law of Nature simply describes the mental disposition of the sage who always chooses what is in accordance with Nature. However, in the light of his shift of focus from the sage to the common majority, Cicero finds this somewhat abstract conception of law too distant from the ordinary conception:
As our whole discourse has to do with ordinary ways of thinking, we shall sometimes have to use ordinary language, applying the word law to that which lays down in writing what it wishes to enjoin or forbid. For thats what the man in the street (vulgus) calls law.130
Despite his agreement with Zeno elsewhere, Ciceros proposed use of the term law (lex) here is quite different. The early Stoic concept is transformed from a description of the mental disposition of the sage into a prescriptive code for the masses, a shift that seems an inevitable consequence of the move away from the sage as an ethical ideal. In the hands of Cicero (or perhaps Panaetius), the early Stoic individual ethic that one might choose to follow in order to cultivate ones own happiness (eudaimonia) now becomes a law to be obeyed by everyone everywhere. Moreover, virtue or excellence (aret) becomes something that can be achieved by anyone who is prepared to submit
125 Wright, Cicero on Self-Love, p. 188, notes that in Fin. 5 Cicero cites Academic and Peripatetic ancestry for this shift of focus to all of humankind. 126 See Plutarch De Alex. fort. 329ab (= SVF 1.262 = LS 67A) and Cleanthes Hymn to Zeus in Stobaeus 1.25.327.4 W.H. (= SVF 1.537 = LS 54I). 127 See Obbink and Vander Waerdt, Diogenes of Babylon, pp. 3623. As they note, in Leg. 1.19 Cicero holds on to the early Stoic conception of natural law as the rational disposition of the intelligent man and distinguishes it from the popular conception of prescriptive law, only to drop the distinction soon after. This seems to be due to his desire following the example of Panaetius to address the non-wise majority rather than the ideal sage. For further discussion see G. Watson, The Natural Law and Stoicism, in Problems in Stoicism, ed. A.A. Long (London, 1971), pp. 21638. 128 See Ciceros accounts in Rep. 3.33 (= LS 67S); Leg. 1.18. 129 See Cicero Leg. 2.11; Off. 3.23. 130 Cicero Leg. 1.19 (trans. Rudd); see also 1.42.
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themselves to this new conception of a moral law. This is a significant shift from Zenos claim that there are some who are so foolish that whatever they do they will never attain wisdom and would probably be better off dead.131 It is clear, then, that the cosmopolitan ideal as presented by Cicero is something quite different from that of either Diogenes or Zeno. Cicero, following the Middle Stoa, offers what has been called a more liberal Stoicism in contrast to what has been called the left-wing Stoicism inspired by the Cynics.132 Yet this Cynic-inspired left-wing is in fact Stoic orthodoxy. It is clearly to this wing that Zeno and Chrysippus belong and it is also to this wing that a later Stoic such as Epictetus belongs. As with his predecessors, Epictetus affirms the Cynic way of life and the individualistic ethic of cosmopolitanism, even if he has no taste for public farting and attempts to clean up the image of Diogenes into what has been called pin-striped Cynicism.133 Ciceros rejection of this Cynic dimension within the early Stoa suggests that he should not be taken as its unbiased reporter and that his notion of a universal community of humankind should not be used in any attempt to reconstruct early Stoic politics.134 IV In Conclusion Despite the apparent distance between the two political ideas often attributed to the Stoa a utopian plan for an isolated community of sages on the one hand and a humanist brotherhood of all humankind on the other one can see that it is in fact possible to bring together the early Stoic politics expressed in Zenos Republic and the later Stoic politics expressed by authors such as Seneca. This can be done by emphasizing Zenos well attested debt to Cynicism rather than any superficial similarities with Plato, and by treating with scepticism those modern commentators who use Ciceros humanist political ideal to flesh out later Stoic cosmopolitanism. The traditional account of Stoic politics tends to suggest that with the Cynics, Zeno, and later Stoics such as Seneca, we have three distinct political models: the Cynics propose an individualist ethic; Zeno studies with the
See Cicero Leg. 1.2830 (= SVF 3.343) and Fin. 4.56 (= SVF 1.232) respectively. See Wright, Cicero on Self-Love, p. 188, and D.R. Dudley, A History of Cynicism (London, 1937), p. 99, respectively. Dudleys comment is based on the phrase andrdestats Stiks, the manly Stoics (Diog. Laert. 6.14 = SSR V A 22). 133 J. Barnes, Logic and the Imperial Stoa (Leiden, 1997), p. 25, based on Epictetus Diss. 4.11.2229. 134 The claim that Cicero is not a trustworthy source for the early Stoa is by no means a criticism of Cicero qua Cicero. On the contrary, recent work affirming Cicero as an important thinker in his own right (see e.g. Cicero the Philosopher, ed. J.G.F. Powell (Oxford, 1995)), is to be welcomed. The more seriously Cicero is taken as a philosopher in his own right the less he will be used uncritically as a source for the ideas of others.
132 131
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Cynics but completely ignores their political stance and instead copies Plato in designing a Spartan utopia; later Stoics then ignore the most famous text of their schools founder and instead propose a world-wide State. It thus has to offer explanations for the dramatic shifts between these stages. In contrast, the account offered here suggests an underlying unity behind these three positions, namely an individualist ethic that favours the regulations of phusis over those of nomos, an ethic that a number of sources trace back ultimately to Socrates. Epictetus reports that when asked to what country he belonged, Socrates never said I am an Athenian or I am a Corinthian but rather I am a citizen of the cosmos.135 This Socratic pedigree whatever we might think about its reliability would surely have been enough to commend the doctrine to both early and late Stoics. John Sellars KINGS COLLEGE LONDON
Appendix: The Fragments of Zenos Republic136 I. Authorship

1. Diogenes Laertius 7.34 That the Republic is his [Zenos] Chrysippus also affirms in his On the Republic. John Chrysostom Homiliae in Matthaeum 1.4 (PG 57.18-19 = SVF 1.262) Not like Plato, who composed that ridiculous Republic, and Zeno, and if any others wrote a Republic, or composed laws.
2.
II. Cynic Influence

3. Diogenes Laertius 7.4 (= SVF 1.2) So for a while he [Zeno] listened to Crates, and when at this time he had written his Republic, some people said in jest that he had written it on the tail of the dog.
Epictetus Diss. 1.9.1; see n. 18 above. A few of the following translations derive from either Loeb editions (e.g. Plutarch) or LS (e.g. Diogenes Laertius) and these have often been silently amended. The bulk, however, are my own. I have made no attempt to investigate the status of the Greek texts and I include this collection not as an attempt at an edition but merely for convenient reference. I use the word fragment loosely; candidates for fragments proper include fr. 11, 13a, 13b and 17. Note also a passing reference to the Republic in Philodemus Stoic. hist. 4, which adds nothing new.
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135
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Philodemus De Stoicis 17.410 Dorandi (7.410 Crnert = SVF 3 Ant. 67)137 And Antipater in his Against the Philosophical Schools alludes to the Republic of Zeno and to the opinion of Diogenes which he set out in his Republic, being amazed at the insensibility of them. Philodemus De Stoicis 9.14 Dorandi (15.14 Crnert) Zenos Republic: some errors it has, it having been written by him when he was still young and foolish. Philodemus De Stoicis 11.913 Dorandi (17.913 Crnert) But I say that in his [Epicurus] former things nothing shameful nor impious can be found, but this [Zenos Republic] is full of them. Plutarch Quaestiones convivales 653e (= SVF 1.252) For my part, by the dog, I could wish that Zeno had put his remarks on thigh-spreading in the playful context of some dinner-party piece and not in his Republic, a work which aims at such great seriousness.
5.
6.
7.
III. General Characteristics

8. Philodemus De Stoicis 12.25 Dorandi (18.25 Crnert) From the beginning of the text he [Zeno] shows that it [the Republic] sets out what is useful for the places and the times such as he was in. Philodemus De Stoicis 14.1215 Dorandi (12.1215 Crnert) And it is consequent with the goal [of Stoicism] to accept the things set forth in the Republic.
9.
IV. Critical Doctrines

10. Diogenes Laertius 7.32 (= SVF 1.259) Some people, including the circle of Cassius the Sceptic, criticize Zeno extensively, first for declaring at the beginning of his Republic that the educational curriculum is useless.138 Diogenes Laertius 7.33 (= SVF 1.268) They also take exception to his statement on currency, The provision of currency should not be thought necessary either for exchange or for travel.139
11.
137 For the De Stoicis I also supply references to the earlier edition in W. Crnert, Kolotes und Menedemos (Leipzig, 1906). 138 As Schofield notes (Impossible Hypotheses, p. 314), useless should perhaps be read as useless for the acquisition of virtue. 139 Chroust, Ideal Polity, p. 179, takes this to imply that the sage will never leave the confines of his isolated State. Ferguson, Utopias, p. 113, thinks it suggests a world-wide network of communities who share property with their visitors. However the reference to travel appears to be merely illustrative for the claim that money is unnecessary, even in a situation when it might be thought to be essential. The rejection of money is of course in harmony with the Stoic attitude of indifference towards externals.

12. Diogenes Laertius 7.33 (= SVF 1.267) . . . and his prohibition at line 200 against the building of temples, law-courts, and gymnasia in cities.
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13a. Clement of Alexandria Stromata 5.11 (PG 9.113 = SVF 1.264) But Zeno, the founder of the Stoic school, says in his book the Republic that one ought to make neither temples nor statues; for such contrivances are not worthy of the gods. And he did not fear to write these words here: There is no need to build temples; for they ought not to be thought holy or of great worth or sacred; for nothing that is of great worth or sacred is the work of builders and artisans. 13b. Origen Contra Celsum 1.5 (PG 11.66465 = SVF 1.265) But we add that Zeno of Citium in the Republic affirms: There is no need to build temples; for nothing ought to be thought holy, nor of great worth or sacred, that is the work of builders and artisans.140 13c. Theodoretus Graecarum affectionum curatio 3.74 (PG 83.885 = SVF 1.264) Zeno of Citium in his book the Republic forbids both building temples and making statues for he affirms neither of these contrivances to be worthy of the gods.141
V. Positive Doctrines
14. Plutarch De Alexandri magni fortuna aut virtute 329ab (= SVF 1.262) The much admired Republic of Zeno, the founder of the Stoic sect, is aimed at this one main point, that our household arrangements should not be based on cities or parishes, each one marked out by its own legal system, but we should regard all humans as our fellow-citizens and local residents, and there should be one way of life and order, like that of a herd grazing together and nurtured by a common pasture.142 Zeno wrote this, picturing as it were a dream or image of a philosophers well-regulated society. Diogenes Laertius 7.33 (= SVF 1.222) They criticize him again for presenting only virtuous people in the Republic as citizens, friends, relations, and free. Diogenes Laertius 7.129 (= SVF 1.248) And that the wise man will fall in love with young men who reveal
15.
16.
140 The latter part is an almost word for word repeat of Clements testimony, written around fifty years earlier (the texts here have been dated to c.AD 249 and 200 respectively). It is probable that Origen is quoting from Clement, perhaps from memory, hence the slight variation. 141 Theodoretus worked considerably later than both Clement and Origen (c.AD 393466) and this probably derives from one of their accounts. 142 Alternatively common law, depending upon an accent emendation. However, in the period before accents the text would have been inevitably ambiguous.
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through their appearance a natural aptitude for virtue, as Zeno says in the Republic.143
17.
Athenaeus 561c (= SVF 1.263) Pontianus said that Zeno of Citium regarded Eros as god of friendship and freedom, and the provider in addition of concord, but of nothing else. Hence in the Republic Zeno said Eros is a god which contributes to the citys security.144 Plutarch Vita Lycurgi 31.12 (= SVF 1.261, 263) It was not, however, the chief design of Lycurgus then to leave his city in command over a great many others, but he thought that the happiness of an entire city, like that of a single individual, depended on the prevalence of virtue and concord within its own borders. The aim, therefore, of all his arrangements and adjustments was to make his people free-minded, self-sufficing, and moderate in all their ways, and to keep them so as long as possible. His design for a civil polity was adopted by Plato, Diogenes, Zeno, and by all those who have won approval for their treatises on this subject, although they left behind them only writings and words.
18.
19a. Diogenes Laertius 7.33 (= SVF 1.269) Likewise in the Republic the doctrine of the community of women.145 19b. Diogenes Laertius 7.131 (= SVF 1.269) And it is also the opinion of them that there ought to be the community of women among the wise, so that any man may have intercourse with
143 Baldry, Zenos Ideal State, p. 10, and Unity of Mankind, p. 155, takes this to refer to the acceptability of homosexual relationships in Zenos ideal community. However the text continues with a report of the Stoic definition of Eros as not physical love but rather friendship (Diog. Laert. 7.130). Thus the sage will form friendships with youths who show an aptitude for virtue. However, such relationships will remain secondary to proper friendships between sages (see fr. 15). 144 This is often read alongside fr. 16 as a reference to homosexual relationships (e.g. Schofield, Stoic Idea, pp. 3556). Indeed, this is the line taken by the character Myrtilus a little later in this text at 563e: oglers of boys you [Stoics] are, and in that alone emulating the founder of your philosophy, Zeno the Phoenician, who never resorted to a woman, but always to boy-favourites, as Antigonus of Carystus records in his Biography of him. An alternative interpretation has been offered by Boys-Stones, Eros in Government, who notes the fact that Eros also had an earlier cosmological meaning related to the order of the cosmos as well as its more common sexual connotations. The suggestion would be that Eros brings order to the city just as it brings order to the cosmos. Yet a much simpler explanation, avoiding recourse to either cosmology or sexual relationships, is the Stoic definition of Eros in this passage itself and elsewhere as friendship (see previous note). This is underscored in the remarks immediately following this passage which make clear that Zeno distanced his conception of Eros from sexual intercourse and erotic love. Thus the key to harmony in a community is simply friendship between its citizens. 145 As Baldry notes (Zenos Ideal State, p. 9, and Unity of Mankind, p. 155), community of women should probably be understood as freedom of intercourse between the sexes. For this doctrines Cynic ancestry see Diog. Laert. 6.72 (= SSR V B 353).

any woman, as Zeno affirms in the Republic and Chrysippus in his On the Republic. 20. Diogenes Laertius 7.121 (= SVF 1.270) And [the sage] will wish to marry, as Zeno affirms in the Republic, and have children.146 Diogenes Laertius 7.33 (= SVF 1.257) . . . and for his instruction that men and women should wear the same clothes and keep no part of the body completely covered.147
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21.
At first glance this may appear to conflict with fr. 19. One could presumably imagine an open marriage modelled on that of Crates and Hipparchia. However, Erskine, Hellenistic Stoa, pp. 256, notes that although wish to marry (gamsein) usually does indeed mean just this, it can also be used in a wider sense to refer to sexual intercourse in general (see e.g. Plato Rep. 459a where it is used with reference to animals). Thus the sage will have intercourse and reproduce, but not necessarily marry in the conventional sense. 147 The idea of unisex clothing goes back to the Cynics; see Diog. Laert. 6.93 (= SSR V H 26), 6.97 (= SSR V I 1).
146

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STOIC COSMOPOLITANISM AND ZENOS REPUBLIC1 John Sellars2

HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT. Vol. XXVIII. No. 1. Spring 2007

STOIC COSMOPOLITANISM AND ZENOS REPUBLIC

STOIC COSMOPOLITANISM AND ZENOS REPUBLIC

STOIC COSMOPOLITANISM AND ZENOS REPUBLIC

STOIC COSMOPOLITANISM AND ZENOS REPUBLIC

STOIC COSMOPOLITANISM AND ZENOS REPUBLIC

STOIC COSMOPOLITANISM AND ZENOS REPUBLIC

STOIC COSMOPOLITANISM AND ZENOS REPUBLIC

STOIC COSMOPOLITANISM AND ZENOS REPUBLIC

STOIC COSMOPOLITANISM AND ZENOS REPUBLIC

STOIC COSMOPOLITANISM AND ZENOS REPUBLIC

STOIC COSMOPOLITANISM AND ZENOS REPUBLIC

STOIC COSMOPOLITANISM AND ZENOS REPUBLIC

Appendix: The Fragments of Zenos Republic136 I. Authorship

II. Cynic Influence

III. General Characteristics

IV. Critical Doctrines

STOIC COSMOPOLITANISM AND ZENOS REPUBLIC

STOIC COSMOPOLITANISM AND ZENOS REPUBLIC

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