South Korea and Democratic Consolidation

Connor Kincheloe
Political Science 458
Dr. Gretchen Casper, The Pennsylvania State University
April 9, 2013









Introduction
Over the past 30 years, South Korea has experienced tremendous change in its
political climate. Since the transition in 1987, several key events have shaped the current
state of democracy in South Korea: Corruption charges against former presidents Chun
Doo-Hwan and Roh Tae Woo, the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, the 2002 Presidential
Election, the impeachment of President Roo Moo-Hyun, and the 2007 Presidential
election.
Corruption Charges against Chun Doo-Hwan and Roh Tae-Woo
In 1996, Kim Young-Sam and the National Assembly charged former Presidents
Chun and Roh with insurrection, treason, and corruption. The charges arose from their
role in the 1979 coup and the 1980 Kwangju massacre (West, 1997). In 1979, Chun and
the secret military organization, Hanahwoe, led the 12.12 coup which overthrew acting
President Choe Kyu Ha. In the 1980 massacre, Chun began his regime killing
approximately 200 civilians and injuring thousands as he unleashed the military on the
civilian opposition (Casper, South Koreas Transition To Democracy, 3/12/13). On
August 26, 1996, Chun and Roh were convicted of the charges, but were later pardoned
by President-elect Kim Dae Jung (Shin, 1997).
On June 19, 1987, Roh announced sweeping reforms (See Appendix A) that
would bring about democracy to South Korea to answer the cries of the people. Despite
Roh making the announcement, Chun was behind the idea so he could avoid a
humiliating political defeat and maintain power through a handpicked successor (Casper,
South Koreas Transition To Democracy, 3/12/13). In the 1987 Presidential election,
Kim Dae-Jung and Kim Young-Sam broke away from their coalition and split the
opposition, which allowed Roh to win the election. Democratic consolidation requires
the authoritarian legacies to be removed, and Roh was a remaining authoritarian legacy
(Casper, Democratic Consolidation, 3/28/13). The charges against Chun and Roh were a
key step in removing those legacies.
The 1997 Asian Financial Crisis
The 1997 Asian Financial Crisis swept across East Asia effecting countries like
Malaysia, Thailand, and in our case, South Korea. The crisis was triggered by rising
inflation and depreciation of local currencies like the Korean won, Thai baht, Malaysian
ringgit, and Indonesian rupiah (Nanto, 1998). South Korea experienced significant
economic decline (See Appendix B), and Kim Dae-Jung would have to work with
government to get the reforms needed to stabilize the economy.
Historically in South Korea, a struggling economy has been used as a justification
for authoritarianism. General Park overthrew Chang Myon in the 2
nd
Republic under the
premise that government was unable to meet the needs for quick economic reform
(Casper, Historical Background of South Korea, 1/29/13). South Korea experienced
tremendous economic growth under Parks authoritarian regime as its annual growth rate
skyrocketed to approximately 9% (Oh, Jo. 1999, 62). Kim Dae-Jung entered office
facing a divided government, making gridlock a high possibility, which could have
hindered his efforts to deal with the crisis (Haggard, 2000). Kim realized that political
factors had influenced the free flow of the market economy and to combat these
problems, Kim enacted sweeping reforms (See Appendix C) that allowed Kim to push
South Korea through the crisis (ibid). He showed the people of South Korea that a
democracy can push through economic crisis in a timely fashion, just as previous
authoritarian leaders have done.
2002 Presidential Election
The 2002 Presidential Election pitted the liberal Millennium Democratic Party
(MDP) candidate Roh Moo-Hyun against the conservative Grand National Party (GNP)
candidate Lee Hoi-Chang. At this time, the MDP administration under Kim Dae-Jung
was weak, which led to speculation that the MDP could not win the presidential election.
The GNP wanted a much stronger approach with North Korea, which ran opposite to
what the Korean people wanted at the time. The MDP used the personal likability of Roh
Moo-Hyun, whom came from a farming family and modest upbringing, to its advantage.
Roh ended up winning the election with 48.9% of the vote to Lees 46.6%. (Walker and
Kang, 2002)
Personalities, rather than issues, have dominated South Korean elections, which
leads to high levels of regionalism within the elections (Walker and Kang, 2002). The
Three Kims and their personalities had dominated electoral politics, and the 2002
election was the first election where none of them would be running; regionalism should
have declined as a result (ibid). The results of the 2002 election did not show a significant
decline in regionalism as hypothesized (See Appendix D), but Rohs support in his home
region of Honam did fluctuate throughout the election cycle; this indicates that people
were taking other issues under consideration besides regionalism (Walker and Kang,
2002). Additionally, there was an emergence of generational and ideological cleavages.
Under 40 voters came out in support of Roh at a two to one rate, while the over 50
voters favored Lee 61% to 37% (Park and Lee, 2005). This generational effect came hand
in hand with an ideological cleavage as it was also observed that the older generations
were much more conservative (ibid). As democracy grows, regionalism should become
less prevalent. The growing cleavages demonstrate the beginning of a fall in regionalism,
as those differences soon may be enough to counteract the effects of regionalism in South
Korea (ibid).
Impeachment of Roh Moo-Hyun
On March 12, 2004, an outgoing National Assembly, made up of the opposition,
impeached President Roh Moo-Hyun for electoral law violations, corruption, and
incompetence. Many South Koreans did not like the fact that the outgoing members were
impeaching a popularly elected president. On May 14, the Constitutional Court rejected
the impeachment based on Article 65 of the Constitution, which stipulates that in order to
impeach a president, he or she must be guilty of severe violations. The President was not
guilty of corruption or incompetence, but was found guilty of electoral law violations.
(Kihl, 2005).
Traditionally in South Korea, we have seen a history of coups when the
opposition was not happy with the current administration; they reverted to physical
means to overthrow the president. The response to the impeachment represents two signs
of a strengthening democracy in South Korea: a stronger constitution and the growing
understanding of the institutions of democracy. First, the Constitutional Court upheld
Article 65 of the Constitution, making it clear that the Constitution was now a stable
document in South Korea. Secondly, the issue was not resolved by physical means,
resulting in political instability, but institutionally as the people and opposition waited
for a decision from the court (Yoon and Jaehyon 2008, 10). This is a significant
advancement for the Korean democratic culture as it appears that democracy is beginning
to become institutionalized within the country (Yoon and Jaehyon, 2008).
2007 Presidential Election
The 2007 Presidential Election took place on December 19, when Lee Myung-
Bak of the conservative GNP won the election with 48.7% of the vote; he defeated
United New Democratic Party (UNDP) candidate Chung Dong-Young (26.1%) and
independent Lee Hoi-Chang (15.1%). It was a wide margin of victory for Lee as
compared to previous, highly contested presidential elections. Lee was a former Hyundai
executive who helped lead Hyundais emergence in the 70s and 80s, when South Korea
experienced strong economic growth. Lee ran under a banner of getting the economy
back on track, which had been starting to become stagnant (See Appendix B). (Chaibong,
2004)
Past presidential elections have focused on the ideas of nationalism, ideology,
unification, and democratization. The 1987 presidential election, the first election as
a democracy, had debate focused on democracy against dictatorship, national
reunification, and the working class against the capital owners (Chaibong 2004, 138).
More recently, the 2002 election was dominated by debate over the Sunshine Policy,
which dealt with the relationship with North Korea. The 2007 election marked a
significant change as nuts and bolts issues began to dominate the political discourse
(ibid). A survey taken before the 2007 presidential election (See Appendix E) illustrates
the changing preferences of the people. Elections are now more about policies, which
will further allow ideological cleavage to break apart regionalism. As the focus shifts to
policy, democracy has been further strengthened by this maturation of the political
process.
Because of these events, I believe that South Korea has achieved the status of
becoming a consolidated democracy. Three measures provide support to my belief that
South Korea has achieved democratic consolidation: Freedom House, the Democracy
Index published by the Economist Intelligence Unit, and the two-turnover test.
Freedom House
Freedom House is a measure of political rights and civil liberties within a country.
Each country is given a score between one and seven, with one being the best, for
political rights and civil liberties. To determine the political rights score, ten questions
are asked covering three categories: electoral processes, political pluralism and
participation, and the functioning of government. The civil rights score is based on 15
questions that cover four categories: freedom of expression and belief, associational and
organization rights, rule of law, and personal autonomy and individual rights. After
scoring both, the two are combined to give the overall score. (Methodology, 2013)
South Korea is has been given a free designation by receiving an overall score of
three in the 2013 study (See Appendix F for Historical Scores). It is important to see that
South Korea has received a designation of free since democracy began in 1987 as it
received an overall score of five (political rights two, civil liberties three). I do not
agree that South Korea was consolidated right after its transition, as it was a transition by
transaction and there were remaining authoritarian legacies (Casper, South Koreas
Transition To Democracy, 3/12/13). I do agree that South Koreas democracy has
strengthened, as demonstrated by the drop in scores in 1993 and 2003 indicate (See
Appendix F). I used the Democracy Index from the Economist Intelligence Unit to help
illustrate my point that South Korea was not consolidated immediately after the
transition.
Democracy Index
The Democracy Index, started in 2007, grades countries on a zero to ten scale,
with a ten indicating a perfect democracy. The index uses ratings for 60 indicators
grouped into five categories: electoral processes and pluralism, civil liberties, the
functioning of government, political participation, and political culture. A country is a
full democracy if it scores between an eight and ten, while it is a flawed democracy if it is
from 6-7.9 (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2012)
South Korea received a score of 8.13 in 2012 and is then categorized as a full
democracy. In 2007, the Democracy Index categorized South Korea as a flawed
democracy. In 2008, South Korea received a score of 8.01, and thus was a full
democracy. The Democracy Index highlights that South Koreas democracy was not
immediately a consolidated democracy, but it strengthened over time. The increases and
history of scores can be seen in Appendix G.
Two-Turnover Test
The two-turnover test requires that power is transferred twice and peacefully. The
movement of power cannot just be from leader to leader of the same party or a party just
changing names. A transfer of power occurs when a new leader or party takes power that
has differing political ideologies. South Korea passed this test in the 2007 Presidential
Election. The table in Appendix H outlines the exchanges of power. (Suh, Park, and
Kim, 2012)
This test is important as South Korea did not have a strong experience with free
and fair elections that resulted in the rotation of power. Synghman Rhee was forced out
by General Park in a military coup; Park was later assassinated and then acting president
Choe was overthrown by General Chuns military coup (Oh, Jo., 1999). The two-
turnover test indicates that South Korea has become a consolidated democracy, as the
institutions and expectations are becoming further entrenched in Korean society.
As demonstrated by the data above, South Korea has become a consolidated
democracy. There are three factors that have played vital roles in getting South Korea
where it is today: the economy, civil society, and the military being brought back under
civilian control.
Economy
In 1959, Martin Lipset coined his idea of modernization theory, which looks at
the relationship of economic growth and education with the development of democracy.
It has long been though that higher levels of education are a perquisite for democracy;
education encourages the development of the culture of democracy (Acemoglu,
Johnson, Robinson, and Yared, 44, 2004). As Lipset posited, Education presumably
broadens mens outlooks, enables them to understand the need for norms of tolerance,
restrains them from adhering to extremist and monistic doctrines, and increase their
capacity to make rational electoral choices (ibid). Economic growth in South Korea led
to an increase in the demand for education, which manifests itself as a greater demand for
democracy, as examined below.
A key facet in bringing about democratic transition was the emergence of the
middle class in South Korea. After years of having low GNP per capita, Parks growth
first technologies launched the country into a new age economically. GNP per capita
went from $79 in 1960 to $3,098 in 1987. With this growth in GNP came a five-fold
increase in middle and high school enrollment from 602,000 in 1960 to 4,169,000 in
1987. College enrollment soared as well as in 1960 there were 101,000 college students
and by 1980 there were 602,000 (Oh, Jo. 1999, 66).
The middle class favored gradual democratization and said that there reason for
participating in politics was for democratization (Oh, Jo., 1999). Around this time,
national surveys were conducted that highlighted these changing ideals. A key response
to highlight is that 87% said that it would be desirable to increase human rights at the cost
of economic growth. Later, in 1979, surveys indicated that 73% of the people now
favored democratization (ibid). The people no longer had to worry about surviving from
pay-check to pay-check; they did not have to constantly think about making sure their
family was provided for. They could now turn their attention to politics, and specifically,
democratization. As will be discussed in the next section, civil society, the middle class
now began to take part in rallies and demonstrations unlike they ever have before. This
was a big turning point for bringing about the transition to democracy and its
consolidation.
Civil Society
Civil society is an important facet of the transition to democracy as well the
consolidation process thereafter. South Korea has a very strong history of
demonstrations and mass protests; going back to the 1960s, civilian movements have
opposed authoritarian regimes, and in 1987, they helped contribute to the downfall of one
(Fioramanti and Fiori, 2010). In June 1987, the middle classes joined the peoples march
of students and workers as they protested the Chun regime. Demonstrations sprang up
not only in Seoul, but also in more than 37 other urban centers (Oh 1999, 91).
After the transition, Fiormamanti and Fiori (2010) discuss the idea of the
demobilization crisis; after the civilians have reached the goal of getting a democracy,
the civil society movements seem to stop. That was not the case in South Korea as the
civil society groups in South Korea continued to grow. In the 1990s, 56.5% of all South
Korean civil society groups were formed (Fiormamanti and Fiori, 2010). The peoples
movements of the past for democracy became movements that are now concerned with
socio-economic rights, transparency, and accountability (ibid). In 2008, 1,800 civic
groups protested U.S. beef imports. In 2004, there were mass demonstrations in support
of Roh Moo-Hyun when he was impeached. This demonstrates that the citizens are now
engaging in various political activities aimed at reforming existing policies and
practices (Oh, Je. 2012, 529).
It is key for democratic consolidation that civil society continues to grow and
improve. It is demonstrating that democracy is reaching all parts of the system. People
no longer have to be concerned with making the transition to democracy, but rather there
focus is now on exerting influence in the policy making process (He, 2009). The
peoples movements did not stop after they achieved democracy, but rather they
continued to grow within the new system of democracy. Throughout history, South
Korean civilians have shown they are not afraid to protest, demonstrate, and mobilize.
That drive did not end in June 1987, but rather has taken on new forms.


Civilian Control of Military
South Korea has a history of military coups that demonstrate the large role that
the military has played in South Korean politics. In 1961, General Park Chung-Hee led a
military coup that overthrew the 2
nd
Republic, just nine months after its formation
(Casper, Historical Background of South Korea, 1/29/13). Then in 1979, General Chun
Doo Hwan led the 12.12 coup that overthrew acting President Choe Kyu Ha, just after
he had announced that South Korea would make movements toward becoming a
democracy (Casper, South Koreas transition to democracy, 3/12/13). The military is a
politicized institution, and unless military tutelage[is] eliminated, a new democracy
can not consolidate (Huyg 2000, 31).
When Kim Young-Sam took over the presidency in 1992, he recognized that
many democracies have been threatened, explicitly and implicitly, by a military
establishment that regards itself as the privileged definer and guardian of national
interest (ibid). Kim Young-Sam quickly moved to remove the military from power and
reassert civilian control. He set the tone by charging Chun and Roh Tae-Woo as
described earlier in the paper. Additionally, he purged the secret military organization
Hanahwoe, who had dominated strategic military posts and provided a key base of
support for Chun in his coup, from its high ranking military positions (ibid). The
Hanahwoe was one of the authoritarian legacies that had remained in place after the
transition to democracy (Casper, Democratic Consolidation, 3/28/13). The Hanahwoe
had two separate lines of command: one emanating from the military head, and one from
their secret organization (Oh Jo., 1999). If this inner-network would continue, it could
pose a threat to the leadership of South Korea.
Kim Young-Sam replaced the former Hanahwoe generals with military members
who had been excluded from higher-level positions by the Hanahwoe because they were
not a part of the secret organization. Therefore, he made them direct beneficiaries of
civilian rule and their careers tied to the fate of electoral democracy (Kim, 54, 2000).
As a result, Kim Young Sam had effectively tied the interests of the military with the
continuation of democracy. At this point in time, the idea that a coup could overthrow a
government became a thought of the past and the military has become a functioning
institution within the boundaries of democracy (Kim, 2000).
South Korea has become a consolidated democracy, as I have detailed above.
The question then turns to the future of South Korea, and will democracy continue to
deepen into South Korean culture.
Predictions for the Future
There has not been a shortage of news coming from the Korean peninsula as
North Korea and its new leader, Kim Jong-Un, have continued to raise the tensions with
rhetoric and actions. The most recent contentions began when North Korea tested a
nuclear device just days before new South Korean President Park Guen-Hyes
inauguration in February, which drew outrage from the global community (Agence
France-Presse, 2013). More recently, the actions of North Korea continue to keep South
Korea and the world on edge. North Korea announced that it was ending the 60 year
armistice that ended the Korean War as the United States and South Korea were
partaking in their annual joint-military training in South Korea (Watkins, 2013). In the
past week, North Korea has moved two medium range missiles to its eastern coast. South
Korea expects North Korea to launch them in the coming week (Choe, 2013).
As tensions rise, South Korean President Park Geun-Hye will be forced to make
difficult decisions to protect the country. Park was elected in 2012, and she has previous
experience living in South Koreas Blue House; Park is the daughter of former
authoritarian leader Park Chung-Hee. When her mother was killed, Park Geun-Hye
served as the first lady for her father. Park Chung-Hee is a very polarizing figure in
South Korean politics as he is credited with bring South Korea out from financial
collapse, but is still remembered for his repression. This was a constant shadow over
Park Geun-Hye; she addressed the issue by acknowledging the repression of her fathers
regime and apologized to those families affected. Park, however, would not completely
condemn her father as she felt some his actions were necessary. (Agence France-Presse,
2013).
The question now becomes, how will these current events shape the future of
South Koreas democracy and could it be a possible threat? I do believe that South Korea
will still be a consolidated democracy over the next five years, unless there is an external
shock such as war with North Korea. As the Freedom House scores and Democracy
Index scores indicate, South Korean democracy is strengthening (See Appendix F and G).
The people of South Korea have had a democracy for 25 years and the expectations of
democracy are widespread. I do not believe that Park Geun-Hye will revert to
authoritarianism just because of her experience with her father; the South Korean people
have demonstrated throughout history they will protest for their rights (See previous
section: Civil Society). However, if there is war with North Korea, I would not reject the
possibility that Park Geun-Hye would declare martial law in order to get the South
through the crisis. Park has experience with martial law from her time under her father;
she did not completely condemn his actions, as mentioned above, because she felt they
were necessary at the time. If there is war with North Korea, they necessity might exist
again.
Conclusion
South Korea has had a turbulent history, but it appears that its democracy is here
to stay. The expectations have now been set, as the people of South Korea have grown
use to their political environment; free elections, transfer of power, political rights and
civil liberties. As described by Chaibong (2008), South Korea is truly a Miraculous
Democracy.












Appendix A
Democratization and Reform Declaration

1.) Direct Presidential Election System
2.) Revision of Presidential Election Law
3.) Amnesty and Restoration of Civil Rights for Dissidents
4.) Strengthening All Basic Rights in the New Constitution
5.) Promoting Freedom of the Press in New Press Law
6.) Local Autonomy to Go Ahead as Schedules
7.) New Political Climate of Dialogue Essential for Democratic Growth
8.) Bold Social Reforms to Build a Clean Society

Source: Oh, Jo. (1999)
































Appendix B

YEAR GDP GDP Growth Rate (%) GNI/CAPITA
1970 81 255
1971 95 10.40 291
1972 108 6.50 322
1973 138 14.80 404
1974 194 9.40 559
1975 216 7.30 607
1976 298 13.50 825
1977 382 11.80 1,043
1978 535 10.30 1,443
1979 640 8.40 1,693
1980 643 -1.90 1,660
1981 724 7.40 1,826
1982 775 8.30 1,927
1983 859 12.20 2,113
1984 949 9.90 2,300
1985 984 7.50 2,355
1986 1,137 12.20 2,702
1987 1,434 12.30 3,402
1988 1,923 11.70 4,548
1989 2,363 6.80 5,556
1990 2,703 9.30 6,303
1991 3,155 9.70 7,276
1992 3,381 5.80 7,714
1993 3,722 6.30 8,402
1994 4,355 8.80 9,727
1995 5,313 8.90 11,735
1996 5,728 7.20 12,518
1997 5,323 5.80 11,505
1998 3,582 -5.70 7,607
1999 4,616 10.70 9,778
2000 5,335 8.80 11,292
2001 5,046 4.00 10,631
2002 5,759 7.20 12,100
2003 6,436 2.80 13,460
2004 7,224 4.60 15,082
2005 8,447 4.00 17,531
2006 9,511 5.20 19,691
2007 10,493 5.10 21,632
2008 9,309 2.30 19,161
2009 8,344 0.30 17,041
2010 10,147 6.20 20,562
2011 11,147 3.60 22,451
2012 11,292 22,708
Source: Economics Statistics System, Bank of Korea

GDP = Gross Domestic Product (In Hundreds of Millions)
GNI/Capita = Gross National Income per Capita


1998 is highlighted to indicate the effects of the Asian Financial crisis. The economy
went into a recession as GDP growth became negative (-5.7%) and the people watched as
their GNI/capita fell by nearly $4,000.

South Korea rebounded strongly, because of Kim Dae-Jung and the reforms, and the
following year GDP growth was 10.7%. Additionally, you can see that it only took two
years for the economy to get back to its pre-financial crisis levels according to GDP
(1997- 5,323; 2000 5,335).

The years 2003-2007 are highlighted red to show the growing stagnation of the economy.






























Appendix C

Kim Dae-Jung Financial Reforms



Source: Haggard (2000)

As demonstrated by the chart above, Kim Dae-Jung was able to implement many Acts
that reformed the South Korean financial system. These helped to push South Korea
through the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis.




Appendix D

2002 Election Results



Source: Walker and Kang (2004)

The candidates faired similarly in the Seoul, Chungcheong, and other regions. However,
you can distinctly see a split in the Southeast and Southwest regions. Lee Hoi-Chang is
from the Southeast while Roh Moo-Hyun is from the Southwest, which helps to illustrate
that regionalism still does have a hold on South Korean elections.


























Appendix E

2007 Election Survey

Question: The most important task of the next president

Response Percent
Economic development and the creation
of jobs
36.1
Closing the income gap and improving
welfare
27.4
Political and social unity 22.4
Political reform and leadership 11.2
Improving inter-Korean and diplomatic
relationships
2.4

Source: Oh, Jo. (1999)

This survey helps to illustrate that the discourse of politics is now becoming more issue
focused as evident by the top two responses being economic development and the income
gap. Improving inter-Korean and diplomatic relations dominated the 2002 election with
the ideas of the Sunshine Policy, but it appears it is beginning to take a back seat to the
other issues.






















Appendix F

Freedom House

A country is classified as a free state if the overall score ranges from 2.0 5.0, partly free
if scores are 6.0 10.0, and not free if scores are 11.0-14.0. If a state receives the free
designation, it can be categorized as a consolidated democracy, while partly free would
be a democracy that is not yet consolidated. (Methodology, 2012)

NOTE: The highlighted red segments represent the transition to democracy between 1987
and 1988.





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Appendix G

DEMOCRACY INDEX SCORES
Year Overall I II III IV V
2006 7.88 9.58 7.14 7.22 7.50 7.94
2008 8.01 9.58 7.50 7.22 7.50 8.24
2010 8.11 9.17 7.86 7.22 7.50 8.82
2011 8.06 9.17 7.86 7.22 7.50 8.53
2012 8.13 9.17 8.21 7.22 7.50 8.53

Source: Economist Intelligence Unit

I = Electoral Process and Pluralism
II = Functioning of Government
III = Political Participation
IV = Political Culture
V = Civil Liberties

Note: The Overall score is an average of the five indicators; a survey was not conducted
in 2007

The Democracy Index scores indicate that South Korea has made significant gains in the
Functioning of Government and Civil Liberties over the past seven years. According to
these scores, South Koreas democracy is strengthening.






















Appendix H

Election Results

Year Winner Party
1987 Roh Tae-Woo Democratic Justice Party
1992 Kim Young-Sam Democratic Liberal Party
1997 Kim Dae-Jung National Congress for New Politics
2002 Roh Moo-Hyun Millennium Democratic Party
2007 Lee Myung-Bak Grand National Party
2012 Park Geun-Hye Saenuri Party
Source: Wikipedia, South Korean Election Results

The results highlight that South Korea has gone through the two-turnover test, which
indicates that a democracy has consolidated. The coloration on the chart shows how
power has alternated twice under the A ! B ! A pattern. I will outline the history of
the South Korean party structure below.

The Democratic Justice Party merged with the Reunification Democratic Party to form
the Democratic Liberal Party in 1992. Hence, there was not a transfer of power in the
1992 election as the ruling party did not change itself, but rather just the name.

In 1995, Kim Dae-Jung formed the National Congress for New Politics; in 2000 it
changed its name to the Millennium Democratic Party, so there was not a transfer of
power in between the 2002 election.

The Democratic Liberal Party became the New Korean Party, which then merged with
the Democratic Party to form the Grand National Party in 1997. In 2012, the party
renamed itself to the Saenuri Party.

So, because of the party name switches and mergers, transitions of power occurred in the
1997 elections and the 2007 elections, which makes the two-turnover test complete.

Source: Encyclopedia Britannica












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Note: Cited Lectures from Dr. Gretchen Casper, Department of Political Science at The
Pennsylvania State University, give the title of the lecture and the date that it was given at
the University Park campus.