Professional Documents
Culture Documents
D A V I D A L T M A N and D A N I E L C H A S Q U E T T I
David Altman is Assistant Professor in the Instituto de Ciencia Polı́tica at Pontificia Universidad
Catolica de Chile, Chile, while Daniel Chasquetti is Assistant Professor in the Instituto de Ciencia
Polı́tica at the Universidad de la República, Uruguay.
We are grateful to Daniel Buquet, Rossana Castiglioni, Brian Crisp, Mark Jones, Paul Mueller,
Rafael Piñeyro, Peter Siavelis, and the anonymous referees of the Journal of Legislative
Studies for their helpful comments. We are extremely indebted to Santiago Lopez and Ximena
Machado for their fine research assistance in building the database for this article. This research
was funded by the KONCECYT Project No. 1040920.
to have an impact on this phenomenon. Lastly, closed and blocked lists in con-
junction with the size of electoral districts are additional institutional features
that help to explain the turnover and incumbents’ re-election in the legislature.
From a comparative perspective, Uruguayan rates of legislative turnover
fall somewhere in the middle (middle – low) of those of its neighbours.
Latin American legislatures show a great variety in terms of incumbent re-
election, and in Table 1 Uruguay is compared with other American countries.
While Mexican and Costa Rican legislators cannot run for immediate
re-election,1 their Chilean counterparts show a very high rate of incumbent
re-election.2 Of course, even Chilean legislators fall far below the high regis-
tries of the US legislators. Panamanian legislators are an interesting case given
that they seek re-election almost at the same rate as US legislators but they
barely succeed in this endeavour.3 Argentina shows exceptionally low re-
election rates for incumbents.4 Although re-election is allowed in Argentina,
its legislative patterns of re-election are more similar to those of Mexico and
Costa Rica than to those of Chile. ‘Since 1983, the overall stability of member-
ship in the Argentine Chamber of Deputies has been fairly low. The average
legislator has served only one four-year term in office. The percentage of
“newcomers” has always exceeded 40 per cent, while only 20 per cent of
incumbents obtained immediate re-election.’5
In Colombia re-election rates have been reported as moderate. Archer
and Shugart show that around 48 per cent of legislators in both chambers
are re-elected,6 a very similar percentage to that of Uruguayan legislators
TABLE 1
RE-ELECTION RATES IN SOME COUNTRIES OF THE AMERICAS
Notes: Represents the average of both chambers (40.28 per cent Deputies, 24.20 per cent Senate).
Sources: For Uruguay and Bolivia authors’ calculations, United States, Chile, Brazil and Argen-
tina, Colombia, Venezuela, Panama.
POLITICAL CAREER PATHS IN THE URUGUAYAN CONGRESS 237
in the elections of 1999. In Venezuela during the 1988 – 93 legislature only 38
per cent of legislators were freshmen.7 Legislative turnover in Brazil is also
moderate or moderate –low. Samuels and Mainwaring note that political
decisions account for about half of the turnover because a significant
share of incumbents decide to run for executive offices, such as governor or
vice-governor. Nonetheless, as in Uruguay, ‘the proportion of successful re-
election-seeking legislators in Brazil has been increasing since 1986’.8
If these data are correct and one considers the percentage of those legis-
lators returning to office, Uruguay falls exactly in the middle of these eight
countries in the sample. More specifically, it falls between Colombia and
Brazil. But of course, if we do not consider those countries where legislative
re-election is not permitted, Uruguayan scores look quite different.
Why is it so important to study the patterns of legislative turnover and
re-election? It is well known that re-election rates have important conse-
quences for the quality of the democracy. Very low re-election rates not
only generate deficiencies in legislative expertise, but they can also increase
the dedication costs of policy making and promote unwanted behaviour in
the internal life of political parties.
First, high legislative turnover may impede legislators from gaining
expertise and seniority and therefore can reduce the quality of parliamentary
work. During the last years, Latin American legislatures have dealt with
complex reforms, such as the reform of the state, the opening of the economies
and the processes of regional integration. The importance of those decisions
requires individuals with high qualifications. Second, high legislative turnover
rates can cause great instability in the trajectories of political leaders. Individ-
uals who decide to enter the ‘legislative career’ must have, as the Constitution
demands, a full-time dedication to that job. The risk of not being re-elected
generates personal costs difficult to quantify. In addition, this phenomenon
can lead to some sort of elitisation of political cadres where only those who
have a guaranteed economic sustenance will predominate in the legislative
arena. Third, high legislative turnover rates can generate detrimental
behaviour for the parties’ internal life. As we will explain later, during the
last 15 years some legislators from the very same sector, with the objective
of guaranteeing their re-election, unleashed true fratricide-wars with the
simple objective of improving their position on their ballots.9 Of course,
this behaviour is contingent upon the type of relationship the legislator
maintains with his or her leader, who is the person that holds the power to
make the list, and is also dependent on the voting perspectives of his or her
political sector.
For the aforementioned reasons, it seems that a moderate rate of legislator
turnover is the suitable dose for the health of Congress and political parties. In
this way, it is possible to avoid the ‘petrifaction’ of political leaders. It also
238 THE JOURNAL OF LEGISLATIVE STUDIES
allows the entrance of new representatives without sweeping out the main core
of legislators.
One of the simplest yet strongest assumptions within the literature that
deals with legislatures and legislator behaviour is Mayhew’s assumption
that, when permitted, Congressmen are interested in nothing but being
re-elected, and it is this main and indisputable motivation which generates
predictable behaviour patterns. As Navia argues, ‘seeking re-election does
not automatically result in being re-elected, but being an incumbent helps a
great deal to secure a seat in the Chamber of Deputies’.10 Nonetheless, in a
brand new volume on Latin American legislatures, Morgenstern claims that
‘Latin American legislators (a) are not homogeneous re-election seekers,
(b) follow different strategies into office, (c) are restrained by different
constitutional arrangements, and (d) operate within a vastly different party
alignment. As a result, the Latin American legislatures do not look or act
like the U.S. Congress’.11
Uruguay defies, as do its fellow Latin American countries, the assumption
that legislators are only re-election seekers. Given the great variation in the
number of incumbents seeking re-election in Latin American countries,
several scholars question Mayhew’s assumption regarding re-election. For
instance, Mainwaring is reticent to extrapolate Mayhew’s assumption to the
Brazilian Congress, claiming that it is too restrictive. He says ‘this assumption
has the advantage of parsimony, and it is reasonable to assume that winning
elections is a major motivating force for most politicians. Nevertheless, it is
too restrictive for the Brazilian context, and it must be modified’.12 He is
followed by Morgenstern, who says that ‘these data suggest an important
impediment in the creation of a unified theory of legislative behavior. Since
not all (or even almost all) legislators seek re-election, even within any
given country it is incorrect to assume homogenous legislators all driven by
a similar motivation’.13
In Uruguay, the legislative election creates a much smaller expectation
than the presidential election. Given the characteristics of the institutional
design, which establishes the direct election of the government head and the
concurrency of presidential and legislative elections, political leaders, analysts
and citizens in general show more concern for knowing who the President of
the Republic will be than for knowing who the members of the future
Congress will be. Phenomena like the election of minority governments and
the formation of coalition governments have motivated the study of many
aspects of the executive –legislative relationship. Along these lines, miscella-
neous subjects such as cabinet formation, legislator productivity and disci-
pline, and the influence of the electoral system in the configuration of the
parliamentary maps have been analysed and evaluated.14 In all the cases, an
important role in the equation of the presidential government is recognised
POLITICAL CAREER PATHS IN THE URUGUAYAN CONGRESS 239
and attributed to the legislative branch of government. However, the rate of
turnover in the Uruguayan Congress is an under-studied phenomenon. Only
Bottinelli15 has analysed this subject for the post-authoritarian elections,
and he shows that between the elections of 1989 and 1994 the House of
Representatives had a turnover rate of nearly 70 per cent, which is remarkable
compared to the rates of turnover in 1942 – 66, estimated at around 30 per
cent.16 According to Bottinelli, what explains this phenomenon is the increase
of electoral volatility within the parties during period 1971 –94, a double
effect of the tri-party competition in the countryside, and demographic
changes that determine some sort of first-past-the-post competition within
parties.17
We agree that relatively high rates of legislator turnover exist in Uruguay.
Nevertheless, we present new analytical and empirical explanations of
incumbent turnover. This article is divided into four sections. In the first
section the different theoretical elements of legislator turnover are analysed.
In the second section some methodological definitions for the research will
be offered and the empirical results related to the rates of turnover and
legislative re-election. The third section offers possible explanations for the
causes of the high rates of turnover. The fourth starts elucidating the fate of
incumbents who failed in their re-election attempts, taking as a reference
the legislature of 1990– 95. And finally, we try to systematise the main
conclusions of the study.
the order of legislators that the party presents and might thus increase the
likelihood of electing legislators who are not among the party’s favourites.
Obviously, this increases the autonomy of legislators during their parliamen-
tary mandates and therefore it may diminish the degree of cohesion of parties.
Nevertheless, in case a legislator seeks re-election this autonomy imposes
certain restrictions over his or her behaviour given that in order to be included
on the list, he or she has to maintain a stable bond with the party. Open lists
contribute to weak and non-cohesive parties. This system not only allows the
voter to modify the order of legislators in the list, but it also gives the citizen
the chance of adding or deleting names from the list.21 If this is the case, the
luck of the legislator does not depend on the will of the party alone, but on
the relationship that is maintained with his or her constituencies. Open lists
favour undisciplined behaviour from legislators with high levels of decisional
autonomy.22 Finally, first-past-the-post electoral systems rely on uni-nominal
electoral districts and in consequence on highly personalised candidatures.23
As in the case of the open lists, this modality favours legislator autonomy
and might trigger undisciplined parties. Accordingly, legislators remain
more attentive to the particular demands of their constituencies than to the
party lines.
Second, electoral systems can exhibit great differences of district
magnitudes that directly affect the level of proportionality of the system and
therefore the re-election opportunities.24 District magnitudes also influence
the power of control among party leadership. If closed and blocked lists are
in place, the larger the district magnitude the stronger the influence of party
leadership. Other things being equal, the smaller the district magnitude the
weaker the influence of party leaders and the stronger the local leadership.
The Uruguayan electoral system presents closed and blocked lists within
multi-member districts. As we have seen, closed and blocked lists favour
the party leaders’ control, but in Uruguay the effects of this modality are
modified by the presence of the multiple simultaneous vote (MSV). MSV
allows the voter to elect the party but at the same time it allows the election
of those legislators who will represent the party in Congress. Unlike
systems in which each party presents a closed and blocked list, in Uruguay
each party presents an important variety of closed and blocked lists that
compete among themselves within the party. Intra-party competition softens
the rigidity of closed and blocked lists and transforms the Uruguayan
system into a kind of intrapartisan preferential vote. This also has a great
impact on the possibility of legislative re-election and the level of party
discipline. The relationship between the legislator and his or her fraction
leader will not be determining, because this system allows the undisciplined
legislator to open and run a new list.25 The Uruguayan electoral system
contains an important variety of electoral districts in terms of magnitude.
POLITICAL CAREER PATHS IN THE URUGUAYAN CONGRESS 241
Senators are elected in a 30 member-unique national district and deputies are
elected in 19 multi-member districts of diverse magnitude.26 Taking into
account all legislative positions to be filled in the election, Uruguay presents
two big districts (the Senate and Montevideo), a medium-size district
(Canelones), and 17 small districts that vary between two and four seats each.
Third, the level of electoral volatility directly affects the possibility of
legislator re-election. The positive or negative variation in the total share of
the votes of a party increases or diminishes the chance of incumbent re-elec-
tion. Electoral volatility can be calculated with the Pedersen Index, which
measures the net change of votes of all the parties between two continuous
elections.27 Since 1946 in only four of the 11 elections the electoral volatility
surpassed ten per cent (1946, 1958, 1989 and 1994). In 1946, 13.1 per cent was
caused by the strong electoral decline of the National Party and the significant
growth of the Colorado Party. In 1958, 17.9 per cent volatility was caused by a
similar phenomenon, the abrupt decline of the Colorado Party and spectacular
growth of the National Party. In 1989 the high levels of volatility, 13.3 per
cent, were caused by the appearance of the New Space Party. Finally, in
1994, volatility of 11.6 per cent was related to the virtual tie among the
three largest parties and the permanence of a fourth relevant party.
TABLE 2
RATE OF PARLIAMENTARY RENOVATION AND INCUMBENT RE-ELECTION
SEEKERS
New
Legislators Success of
(rate of Re-Election Seekers
Total parliamentary Non-Seekers Seekers (Rate of Failure
Election Legislators renovation %) (%) (%) Re-Election %) (%)
Notes:
(a) FA-NE: Frente Amplio and Nuevo Espacio
(b) TP: Tradicional Parties
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on Albornoz and Corte Electoral.
POLITICAL CAREER PATHS IN THE URUGUAYAN CONGRESS 243
turnover conceals the phenomenon of legislative desertion. During the elec-
tions of 1989, 1994 and 1999, approximately 30 per cent of legislators did
not pursue re-election. The next question is what happens to those legislators
who do seek re-election.
In 1989 the rate of re-election reaches 48.9 per cent, in 1994 it ascends to
54 per cent, and in 1999 to 64.9 per cent. In absolute numbers this indicates
that in 1989, 44 of 90 legislators obtained their objective; in 1994, 47 of 87;
and in 1999, 61 of 94. As the rate of parliamentary turnover tends to decrease,
the rate of re-election tends to increase. In 1989, the rate of parliamentary turn-
over was 66.1 and TR 48.9; in 1994, the rate of parliamentary turnover was
63.8 and rate of re-election 54.0; finally, in 1999, the tendencies crossed
each other when the rate of parliamentary turnover fell to 53.0 and the rate
of re-election rose to 64.9 per cent.
The high rate of parliamentary renovation and its tendency to decrease can
fundamentally be explained by the variation in electoral volatility. The evi-
dence suggests that the tendency of decreasing volatility might be associated
with the fall in the rate of parliamentary turnover and the increase in the rate of
re-election. The association of electoral volatility, rate of parliamentary turn-
over, and rate of re-election also suggests that the political party to which
legislators belong is a key element for their chances of re-election. The data
show that legislators from the so-called ‘traditional parties’ (Colorado and
National) face greater obstacles in achieving re-election than legislators
from the relatively new parties (Frente Amplio and Nuevo Espacio). In
other words, legislators of parties that decline in electoral terms have less
probability of being re-elected than those from parties that show a sustainable
growth. The re-election rates for the legislators from left-wing parties oscillate
between 61.5 and 73.3 per cent, while for the traditional parties it fluctuates
between 42.8 and 57.1 per cent (see Table 2).
Bottinelli argues that a second explanation for the rates of incumbent
success while seeking re-election could be internal volatility (at the fraction
level).32 Applying Pedersen’s Index of Volatility at the fractional level
within political parties we found that the Colorado Party is the one that dis-
plays the lower volatility. The National Party and the Frente Amplio show
quite similar levels of internal volatility for the elections of 1989 and 1994,
but they diverge in 1999. In the elections of 1999 the National Party shows
a drastic increase of internal volatility and the Frente Amplio a strong
reduction. A contrast between the evolution of intra-party volatility and the
rate of re-election of the legislators from each party shows the non-existence
of an important bond between both phenomena.
244 THE JOURNAL OF LEGISLATIVE STUDIES
Table 3 illustrates the levels of intra-party volatility and the rate of re-
election for the three larger parties. In it, the re-election rate does not seem
to be sensitive to the changes in intra-party volatility. Indeed, within the
Colorado Party a phenomenon contrary to the expected appears, as both the
internal volatility and the rate of re-election increase. Nonetheless, re-election
rates increase to a much more pronounced degree. In the National Party the
behaviour of both variables is still more irregular, because only in 1999
does it behave as expected. In this case, intra-party volatility increases and
the rate of re-election minimally diminishes. It is only in the Frente Amplio
where the expected behaviour is observed with a clear decrease in internal
volatility and an increase of successful rates of re-election. Unlike the
relationship between electoral volatility of the assembly taken as a whole
and the rates of re-election, dissimilar records in all parties demonstrate the
non-existence of an association between intra-party volatility and legislative
re-election.33
At the beginning, this article claimed that the success or failure of those re-
election seekers was related to certain elements of the electoral system such as
closed and blocked lists and district magnitudes. The closed and blocked lists
used by fractions in Uruguay grant a great deal of power to fraction leaders.
Although some fractions use Conventions, Congresses or other executive
bodies to approve their list preparation, in most cases this is nothing more
than a mere formality.34
On the one hand, big electoral districts, like the Senate or the Department
of Montevideo, make possible the election of legislators without their own
electoral capital (votes). Usually, the lists of legislators are headed by
figures of national prestige who obtain such an important volume of votes
that they guarantee the entrance to the parliamentary arena of legislators
barely known by the citizens. This phenomenon is even stronger in
Montevideo than in the Senate of the Republic. In the latter, the citizenry
knows most legislators. On the other hand, something very different may
TABLE 3
INTRA-PARTY ELECTORAL VOLATILITY AND RE-ELECTION RATES
TABLE 4
FAILURE AND SUCCESS OF RE-ELECTION SEEKERS BASED ON THE SIZE OF
ELECTORAL DISTRICTS
Re-election
re-election rates: time itself. It is possible that, as time goes by, legislators
become more acquainted with legislative life and therefore the seniority of
the whole legislature increases. However, there is a problem here. The
constitutional reform of 1996 implied a new set of electoral laws.36 We
considered including a dummy indicating that the elections of 1999 were
held under a different electoral system, but we would then have the problem
of auto-correlation (the Pearson’s correlation between both variables is
0.866 significant at the 0.001 level). Therefore, we simply tested whether
time definitively affects incumbent re-election rates. Of course, in order to
have a more conclusive opinion we should have more data generated
through new elections under the same rules of the game.
Table 5 reports the results of the models explaining incumbent re-election.
The empirical findings fit our theoretical expectations. The overall model has a
high statistical significance (p , 0.001) and performs satisfactorily, predicting
over 60 per cent of the cases correctly. Three of the five independent variables
(Senate, Left and Year) are significant and have the anticipated sign. Since
size of electoral district and intra-party volatility are not statistically
discernible from zero, we cannot reject the null hypotheses that either of
these independent variables has an effect on incumbents’ re-election rates.
In Model 2 we drop the variable Senate, given that part of this information
is included in the variable Size-Electoral District. The model performs
significantly worse than Model 1. In Model 3 we drop variable Size-Electoral
District and the overall performance of the model improves. Model 3’s Chi
TABLE 5
LOGISTIC REGRESSION ANALYSIS
Independent Coef (Std. Err.) Coef. (Std. Err.) Coef. (Std. Err.)
TABLE 6
PROBABILITIES OF INCUMBENT RE-ELECTION BASED ON PARTY AFFILIATION
AND ELECTION YEAR
1995–2000 2000–2002
Total PC PN FA NE Total PC PN FA NE
Total 100% (83) 100% (25) 100% (35) 100% (17) 100% (6) 100% (75) 100% (23) 100% (31) 100% (15) 100% (6)
Remained in the Public 35% (29) 44% (11) 43% (15) 12% (2) 17% (1) 31% (23) 48% (11) 26% (8) 20% (3) 17% (1)
Arena
Elected as: 28% (8) 36% (4) 20% (3) 50% (1) – 52% (12) 45% (5) 50% (4) 67% (2) 100% (1)
† Departmental Mayors 14% (4) 18% (2) 7% (1) 50% (1) – 13% (3) – 25% (2) 33% (1) –
Mayors
† Legislators’ Substitutes 14% (4) 18% (2) 12% (2) – – 17% (4) 18% (2) – 33% (1) 100% (1)
† Legislators – – – – – 22% (5) 27% (3) 25% (2) – –
Appointed as: 72% (21) 64% (7) 80% (12) 50% (1) 100% (1) 48% (11) 55% (6) 50% (4) 33% (1) –
† Executive Directors 31% (9) 36% (4) 33% (5) – – 26% (6) 27% (3) 38% (3) – –
† Ambassadors 14% (4) 18% (2) 13% (2) – – 9% (2) 18% (2) – – –
† Advisors 14% (4) – 27% (4) – 100% (1) 4% (1) – – – –
† Cabinet Minister 3% (1) – 7% (1) – – 4% (1) – 13% (1) – –
† Secretaries at Dept. 7% (2) – – 50% (1) – 4% (1) – – – –
Govts
† Police Director 3% (1) 9% (1) – – – – – – – –
Private Arena 48% (40) 44% (11) 43% (15) 53% (9) 83% (5) 69% (52) 52% (12) 71% (22) 80% (12) 83% (5)
Retired 7% (6) 4% (1) 3% (1) 24% (4) – – – – – –
Passed Away 10% (8) 8% (2) 11% (4) 12% (2) – – – – – –
POLITICAL CAREER PATHS IN THE URUGUAYAN CONGRESS
Note: This category includes Directions at publicly owned companies, decentralised services and other independent offices.
Source: Authors’ elaboration.
249
250 THE JOURNAL OF LEGISLATIVE STUDIES
was from the Frente Amplio or Nuevo Espacio. Three of the 23 were elected
Intendentes, two of these were re-elected for a second period: Mariano Arana
in Montevideo and Eber Da Rosa in Tacuarembó. The other 11 occupied
appointed posts in the national or departmental executive branches: seven at
the publicly owned companies and decentralised services; two were nomi-
nated ambassadors; one, Sergio Abreu, Minister of Industry; and one at the
government of Montevideo (Gonzalo Carámbula), see Table 7. In general
terms, the post-legislature career path in a given time depends on which
party controls the presidency and which parties (or intra-party factions) are
in the coalition with the president. For instance, Nereo Felipe Lateulade
was not re-elected in 1994 and was immediately appointed by the President
of the Republic, leader of the Colorado Party, as the Uruguayan Ambassador
to the Dominican Republic. On the other hand, the non-re-elected legislator,
Carmen Beramendi, from the Frente Amplio, had to seek employment
in the private arena.
CONCLUSIONS
In the last three Uruguayan elections we have observed a medium –high rate of
turnover of legislators. In 1989 it was 66.1 per cent, in 1994 it declined to 63.8
per cent and in 1999 it further descended to 53 per cent. These high rates of
legislative turnover are explained by a significant number of legislators who
do not seek re-election. In 1989 this figure reached 30.8 per cent, in 1994,
33.1 per cent and in 1999, 27.7 per cent. Approximately 70 per cent of the
incumbents seek re-election in Uruguay. Nonetheless, for the last three
elections we saw a significant increase in re-election rates. In 1989 re-election
rates were about 49 per cent, in 1994 they were 54 per cent and in 1999 they
were around 65 per cent. In explaining incumbent rates of re-election we
conclude that if a legislator is a senator or from the left bloc his/her likelihood
of re-election increases. Also, we found that intra-party volatility does not
seem to have an impact upon these phenomena. Electoral volatility of the
party system as a whole serves also to explain incumbent re-election rates.
The traditional parties, which saw a constant decrease in their electoral
support in the last three elections, show re-election rates that do not surpass
60 per cent. The left, whose overall level has increased its electoral support,
presents re-election rates of around 70 per cent.
Legislative turnover in Uruguay does not seem to be extremely different
from other countries in the region. As a matter of fact, data show important
similarities within dissimilar countries such as Colombia and Brazil. The
decreasing tendencies of legislative turnover and increasing incumbent
re-election are good signs for the Uruguayan political system. These ten-
dencies should keep progressing towards an equilibrium point that would
POLITICAL CAREER PATHS IN THE URUGUAYAN CONGRESS 251
allow experienced but not immovable legislators. Nevertheless, this does not
depend exclusively on the will of parties, fractions, or even legislators, but
also on how the citizenship behaves at the time of voting. Therefore, we
welcome this blooming literature on legislative behaviour in Latin American
countries and its efforts towards building mid-range theories that account for
this phenomenon of incumbent turnover.
NOTES