Case, one off.

The case debate:

1) Livestock contribute more to GHG emissions than industrial manufacturing – overwhelms

your solvency. Reuters, December 1 2006
“Cattle Cause Most Global Warming”, (http://www.financialexpress. com/old/fe_full_story.php?content_id=147739)
Who is contributing most to global warming? Dumb cattle and not emissions from factories
and power plants, says the United Nations. The increasing world population, a new UN report warns, would lead
to further increase in the number of livestock as demand for meat and milk increases and that would mean
emission of more greenhouse gases. Not only that. Cattle are also a major contributor to land degradation and pollution of
water, the report says. The livestock business, the report says, is among the most damaging sectors
to the earth's increasingly scarce water resources, contributing among other things to water pollution from animal
wastes, antibiotics and hormones, chemicals from tanneries, fertilizers and the pesticides used to spray feed crops. Stressing that cattle-
rearing generates more global warming greenhouse gases as measured in carbon dioxide
equivalent, the UN has called for improved animal diets to reduce enteric fermentation and consequent methane emissions.

2) The affirmative has yet to provide any type of statistics about how much oil or other
energy resources they save, compared to the entirety of US energy consumption. Means the
aff plan is a drop in the ocean and they're not going to be able to win any kind of substantial
impact.

3) The affirmative fails to take into account problems of systemic failure in vertically
integrated bureaucracies which may well end in more corruption than we see in current
state-level programs. The burden of proof is on the 1AC to prove that increased
management actually increases solvency – you have zero evidence on this question.

4) You don't get to claim "state-level programs" as part of your solvency unless you identify
a method for the federal government to fund its own new program and state-level programs
simultaneously, and evidence for what the states would do with more environmental money.
You do none of these in the 1AC.

5) Michigan's bottle bill is stressful on retailers and hasn't created broad-based support for
recycling. South Bend Tribune 2008
[Editorial, "Michigan's bottle bill needs broader look," November 19, 2008 http://www.bottlebill.org/news/articles/2008/MI-11-19-MIsBBNeedsBroader-
ed.htm]
Now that the state's residents are increasingly turning to nonfizzy drinks and tossing away more than 1 billion of those containers each year, effort to
control that trash makes sense. Tweaking the container law, however, may not be the best way.
The current law is
awkward for consumers, and a burden on retailers who already are stressed in the state's
economic downturn.
Further, the issue ought to be examined more broadly given the considerable change in social
consciousness on litter and recycling in the past 30 years.
Michigan, the first state in the nation to pass a container law, still has the lowest overall recycling rate among the
Great Lakes states. Only 37 percent of Michigan residents have access to curbside service, well below the regional 65 percent average
and national 50 percent average.
The money to modify an already costly returnables program might be better spent on
demonstration projects with the potential for wider environmental benefit.

6) The "pilot project" in the 1AC isn't – Michigan doesn't do the plan, it just has a 10-cent tax
on soda bottles.

And, the K.
A. The link debate.

The affirmative’s desire to manage the world is guided by enframing, a mode of

understanding the world that assumes we can reveal and classify everything. McWhorter
explains in ‘92:
[Ladelle, Professor of Philosophy and Women's Studies Department of Philosophy University of Richmond, Heidegger and the Earth, p.4-5]
Every academic discipline, whether it be biology or history, anthropology or mathematics, is interested in discover, in the revelation of new truths.
Knowledge, at least as it is institutionalized in the modern world, is concerned, then, with what Heidegger would call revealing, the bringing to light, or
Revealing
the coming to presence of things. However, in order for any of this revealing to occur, Heidegger says, concealing must also occur.
and concealing belong together.
Now what does this mean? We know that in order to pay attention to one thing, we must stop paying close
attention to something else. In order to read philosophy we must stop reading cereal boxes. In order to attend to the needs of students
we must sacrifice some of our research time. Allowing for one thing to reveal itself means allowing for the concealing of something else. All revealing
comes at the price of concomitant concealment. But this is more than just a kind of Kantian acknowledgement of human limitation. Heidegger is not
simply dressing up the obvious, that is, the fact that no individual can undergo two different experiences simultaneously. His is not a point about
When revealing reveals itself as temporally linear and
human subjectivity at all. Rather, it is a point about revealing itself.
causally ordered, for example, it cannot simultaneously reveal itself as ordered by song and unfolding in
dream. Furthermore, in revealing, revealing itself is concealed in order for what is revealed to come forth. Thus, when revealing occurs
concealing occurs as well. The two events are one and cannot be separated.
Too often we forget. The radiance of revelation blinds us both to its own event and to the shadows that it casts, so that revealing conceals itself
and its self-concealing conceals itself, and we fall prey to that strange power of vision to consign to oblivion whatever cannot be seen. Even our
forgetting is forgotten, and all traces of absence absent themselves from our world.
The noted physicist Stephen Hawking, in his popular book A Brief History of Time, writes, “The eventual goal of science is to provide a
single theory that describes the whole universe.” Such a theory, many people would assert, would be a systematic
arrangement of all knowledge both already acquired and theoretically possible. It would be a theory to end all theories, outside of
which no information, no revelation could, or would need to, occur. And the advent of such a theory would be as the shining of a light into every
corner of being. Nothing would remain concealed.
This dream of Hawking’s is a dream of power; in fact, it is a dream of absolute power, absolute control. It is a
dream of the ultimate managerial utopia. This, Heidegger would contend, is the dream of technological thought in the modern
age. We dream of knowing, grasping everything, for then we can control, then we can manage, everything.

Specifically, advocates of bottle bills reject the interaction of people with the world around
them out of hand, replacing it with faith in successful management of incentives.
Llanos 2005
[Miguel, the 1AC solvency author, March 3, 2005 http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/5279230/ ]
And what about a low-tech approach of just educating the public to assume more responsibility, taking
those plasticbottles home to a recycling bin instead of leaving them in a trash bin at a park?
"It's unrealistic to think people are going to do that," Franklin says. "In this culture it just doesn't
seem to happen."
B. The implications.

To reveal the world as a manageable object, the affirmative must accept the loss of other
modes of revealing; the logic of enframing therefore ultimately devalues everything in the
world into a stockpile of commodities. McWhorter again:
[Ladelle, Professor of Philosophy and Women's Studies Department of Philosophy University of Richmond, Heidegger and the Earth, p.6]
The danger of a managerial approach to the world lies not, then, in what it knows—not its penetration into
the secrets of galactic emergence or nuclear fission—but in what it forgets, what it itself conceals. It forgets that any other
truths are possible, and it forgets that the belonging together of revealing with concealing is forever beyond the power of human
management. We can never have, or know, it all; we can never manage everything.
What is now especially dangerous about this sense of our own managerial power, born of forgetfulness, is that it results in our
viewing the world as mere resources to be stored or consumed. Managerial or technological
thinkers, Heidegger says, view the earth, the world, all things as mere Bestand, standing-reserve.
All is here simply for human use. No plant, no animal, no ecosystem has a life of its own, has any
significance apart from human desire and need. Nothing, we say, other than human beings, has
any intrinsic value. All things are instruments for the working out of human will. Whether we believe that God
gave Man dominion or simply that human might (sometimes called intelligence or rationality) in the face of ecological fragility makes us always right,
we managerial, technological thinkers tend to believe that the earth is only a stockpile or a set of
commodities to be managed, bought, and sold. The forest is timber; the river, a power source. Even
people have become resources, human resources, personnel to be managed, or populations to be
controlled.
This managerial, technological mode of revealing, Heidegger says, is embedded in and constitutive of Western culture and
has been gathering strength for centuries. Now it is well on its way to extinguishing all other modes of revealing, all
other ways of being human and being earth.

As a result, the affirmative begins to act like a “gardener,” removing undesirable aspects of
the world for the protection of the rest. This call to action risks mass genocide regardless of
the affirmative’s own politics. Szabo ‘2
[Matt Szabo, PhD Candidate in Geography at The University of Manchester, “Managerial ecology: Zygmunt Bauman and the gardening culture of
modernity,” Environments, Vol. 30, No. 3, 2002, p. proquest]
the modern
Bauman argues that while Frederick the Great was merely picking up on the philanthropic zeitgeist of the Enlightenment era,
evolution of the managerial capacities of the modern state, coupled with advances in biological science, eventually
transformed the vision of Frederick the Great into the real-world eugenic experiments of the 20th Century. As the
future Nazi minister of Agriculture, R.W. Darre observed in 1930:
He who leaves the plants in a garden to themselves will soon find to his surprise that the garden is
overgrown by weeds and that even the basic character of the plants has changed. If therefore the garden is to remain the breeding
ground for the plants, if in other words, it is to lift itself above the harsh rules of natural forces, then the forming will
of a gardener is necessary, a gardener who . . . carefully tends what needs tending and ruthlessly eliminates the weeds . . . a people
can only reach spiritual and moral equilibrium if a well-conceived breeding plan stands at the very centre of its culture (Darre cited in Bauman 1991:
27).
Bauman goes on to quote various 20th Century scientists who made the connection between gardening and
the potential improvements offered to society by a marriage of eugenics and social engineering (1991: 27-
29). It is the common drive towards instrumental control rather than a shared politics that unifies the
various protagonists cited, and, crucially, it is the ubiquity of such controlling visions within 'well-intentioned'
scientific and political thinking generally -- the application of results-driven scientific methodologies to the social realm -- that
motivates Bauman's broader critique:
Let us emphasize that none of the above statements [from various scientists] was ideologically motivated; in
particular, none of them was aimed specifically at the Jews. . .The quoted scientists were guided solely by
proper and uncontested understanding of the role and mission of science -- and by the feeling of duty towards the vision of good society; a healthy
were guided by the hardly idiosyncratic, typically modern conviction
society, an orderly society. In particular, they
that the road to such a society leads through the ultimate taming of the inherently chaotic natural
forces, and by systematic, and ruthless if need be, execution of a scientifically conceived rational plan
(Bauman 1991: 29).
Worse, continuing our technological commodification of the world around us will destroy our ability to
authentically be in the world, reducing us to a state of ontological damnation worse than nuclear war.
Zimmerman '94
[Michael E., Professor of Philosophy at Tulane University, Contesting Earth’s Future: Radical Ecology and Postmodernity, p.119-120]
Heidegger asserted that human self-assertion, combined with the
eclipse of being, threatens the relation between being
and human Dasein.53 Loss of this relation would be even more dangerous than a nuclear war that
might "bring about the complete annihilation of humanity and the destruction of the earth."54 This
controversial claim is comparable to the Christian teaching that it is better to forfeit the world than to lose one's soul by losing one's relation to God.
it is possible that after a nuclear war, life might once again
Heidegger apparently thought along these lines:
emerge, but it is far less likely that there will ever again occur an ontological clearing through which
such life could manifest itself. Further, since modernity's one-dimensional disclosure of entities virtually denies them any "being" at all,
the loss of humanity's openness for being is already occurring.55 Modernity's background mood is horror in the face of nihilism, which is consistent
The unleashing of vast quantities
with the aim of providing material "happiness" for everyone by reducing nature to pure energy.56
of energy in nuclear war would be equivalent to modernity's slow-motion destruction of nature: unbounded
destruction would equal limitless consumption. If humanity avoided nuclear war only to survive as contented clever
animals, Heidegger believed we would exist in a state of ontological damnation: hell on earth,
masquerading as material paradise. Deep ecologists might agree that a world of material human comfort
purchased at the price of everything wild would not be a world worth living in, for in killing wild nature, people
would be as good as dead. But most of them could not agree that the loss of humanity's relation to being would be worse than nuclear omnicide, for it
is wrong to suppose that the lives of millions of extinct and unknown species are somehow lessened because they were never "disclosed" by
humanity.
C. The alternative.

The text: Refuse the affirmative call to action.

Frantic attempts to solve are inevitable for technological thinkers. The only way out is to
embrace the paradox that seemingly ‘doing nothing’ brings within us in order to cultivate a
new understanding of action. McWhorter concludes:
[Ladelle, Professor of Philosophy and Women's Studies Department of Philosophy University of Richmond, Heidegger and the Earth, p.6]
Our usual response to such prophecies of doom is to ignore them or, when we cannot do that, to scramble to find
some way to manage our problems, some quick solution, some technological fix. But over and over
again new resource management techniques, new solutions, new technologies disrupt delicate systems even
further, doing still more damage to a planet already dangerously out of ecological balance. Our ceaseless interventions seem only to make things
worse, to perpetuate a cycle of human activity followed by, ecological disaster followed by human intervention followed by a new disaster of another
kind. In fact, it
would appear that our trying to do things, change things, fix things cannot be the
solution, because it is part of the problem itself. But, if we cannot act to solve our problems, what should we do?
Heidegger's work is a call to reflect, to think in some way other than calculatively, technologically,
pragmatically. Once we begin to move with and into Heidegger's call, and begin to see our trying to seize control
and solve problems as itself a problematic approach, if we still believe that thinking's only real
purpose is to function as a prelude to action, we who attempt to think will twist within the agonizing
grip of paradox, feeling nothing but frustration, unable to conceive of ourselves as anything but paralyzed. However, as so many peoples
before us have known, paradox is not only a trap; it is also a scattering point and passageway. Paradox invites examination of its
own constitution (hence of the patterns of thinking within which it occurs) and thereby breaks a way of thinking open,
revealing the configurations of power that propel it and hold it on track. And thus it makes possible
the dissipation of that power and the deflection of thinking into new paths and new possibilities.
Heidegger frustrates us. At a time when the stakes are so very high and decisive action is so loudly and urgently
called for, Heidegger apparently calls us to do- nothing. If we get beyond the revulsion and anger that
such a call initially inspires and actually examine the feasibility of response, we begin to undergo the frustration
attendant upon paradox: how is it possible, we ask, to choose, to will, to do nothing? The call itself places in
question the bimodal logic of activity and passivity; it points up the paradoxical nature of our passion for action, of our passion for maintaining control.
The call itself suggests that our drive for acting decisively and forcefully is part of what must be
thought through, that the narrow option of will versus surrender is one of the power configurations
of current thinking that must be allowed to dissipate.
But of course, those drives and those conceptual dichotomies are part of the very structure of our self-understanding both as individuals and as a
tradition and a civilization. Hence, Heidegger’s call is a threatening one, requiring great courage, “the courage to make the truth of our own
presuppositions and the realm of our own goals into the things that most deserve to be called in question.” Heidegger’s
work pushes
thinking to think through the assumptions that underlie both our ecological vandalism and our love
of scientific solutions, assumptions that also ground the most basic patterns of our current ways of
being human.

And the choice to refrain from political action allows us to access a new form of
responsibility that allows us to act without embracing the logic of Enframing. Meyer ‘98
[Linda Ross Meyer (Professor of Law, Quinnipiac Law School; J.D., Ph.D., University of California, Berkeley), “Is Practical Reason Mindless,”
Georgetown Law Journal, January, 1998]
Above all, for all law we need a new/old account of responsibility, based on a new/old understanding of the essence of
being human -- an account that does not require an all-powerful will of a self-conscious thinker. Perhaps one is
available to us from the past. n128
Heidegger himself points part of the way -- responsibility is grounded in responding to what
is already there, what is not within our control. Freedom is not infinite possibility, but only those finite possibilities opened
n129

by our past. This does not negate choice; rather, it means that we have a choice that is sufficiently
n130

limited to be choosable.
What is the relation of this new understanding of humanity to law? It is that we are neither victims nor predators. Rather, we
are beings with limited choices, beings who are responsive to the world, attentive to what reveals itself to
us. How we can incorporate these truths into law remains to be "seen." Nothing more "practical" can be done until we
know what possibilities are open to us. We who try to engage in this work must try to be quieter, n131

so that we can listen more carefully and see more clearly.

D. The framework.

Ontological questions precede questions of policy because without understanding who we

are in the world, we cannot make meaningful use of the information available to us. Olivier 7
(Bert, Professor of Philosophy at the Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University, “Nature as ‘abject’, critical psychology, and ‘revolt’: The pertinence of
Kristeva,” South African Journal of Psychology, 37(3), 2007, pp. 443–469)
In the light of this, any
responsible human being who has taken note of the current state of affairs cannot and
should not avoid making use of every possible medium to create and expand an informed
awareness of the situation, as well as a sense of urgency and the need to act, among as many people as possible. In my experience,
mere ‘factual knowledge’ is not sufficient to have the desired effect of galvanising people into action
— in the present ‘information age’, people with access to media (that is, the vast majority of people on the planet) are ‘better
informed’ than in any previous era, but arguably just as apathetic as ‘informed’, judging by the deteriorating condition of natural resources.3 Rather,
therefore, by
placing ‘information’ about the precarious state of the earth in the context of not only a
philosophical-theoretical but also, crucially, a critical-psychological interpretation, people are
afforded the intellectual, psychological, and ethical4 means to appreciate what all this information means for them
and for other creatures on the planet.

And, negatives should be able to choose framework for the round:

1) Key to check back aff prep time – affirmatives have non-limited prep time while negatives
have to research every possible affirmative – neg choice checks back aff side bias.

2) 1NC indictments of the affirmative's assumptions destroy the foundations of the

affirmative's truth claims – our kritikal arguments are responsive to the affirmative and
therefore should receive full weight in the round.

3) Claims that the affirmative provides a “net benefit” over the status quo through political
action are fundamentally managerial in nature because they assume that the affirmative can
produce lasting benefit through their political action. This means that the K functions as an
indictment of the affirmative framework in the 1AC, so they have to beat the K to access
their framework.