Geopolitics in the Foreign Office: British Representations of Argentina 1945-1961 Author(s): Klaus-John Dodds Source: Transactions of the Institute

of British Geographers, New Series, Vol. 19, No. 3 (1994), pp. 273-290 Published by: The Royal Geographical Society (with the Institute of British Geographers) Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/622323 . Accessed: 06/09/2013 16:51
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273

Britishrepresentationsof Argentina 1945-1961

Dodds Klaus-John
studiesof Anglo-Argentine relations tendto neglectthe period 1945-61. Existing The paper presents a critical of analysisof British geopolitical representations within Argentina foreign Geopoliticaland geoeconomic policydiscourse. thosebased on science,mappingand surveying, are representations, including understood as crucialto the legitimation of foreign recordsare policies.Government used to explorehow a long-standing was being replacedby trading relationship relations based increasingly on conflict and geopoliticalcompetition in the Antarctic and the South Atlantic. relations archival research cartography science key words Anglo-Argentine critical geopolitics representation
Lecturer in Geography,CEDAR, Departmentof Geography,Royal Holloway College, University of London,Egham,SurreyTW20 OEX revised manuscript received21 December 1993

in the Foreign Office: Geopolitics

Introduction There are many and varied accounts of Anglorelations of commercial Argentine tracing patterns colonization and exploration, and georelationships, In thispaper,it is suggestedthat politicalconflict'. relationsin the 1950s have not Anglo-Argentine receivedtheextensive charstudyand investigation of previous(e.g. the immediate acteristic postwar) and subsequent (e.g. 1968-1982 and the Falklands/ Malvinas War) periods.An important part of the Anglo-Argentine relationshiphas thereby been neglected. The 1950s, for instance,was a time whenAnglo-Argentine tradehad virtually collapsed and a period when geopoliticalcompetition over the FalklandIslands and Antarctica was to change from of violence. pressing legal claimsto outbreaks These conflictswere later neutralized by the emergence of the AntarcticTreaty System in 1959-61. Thispaperattempts to linktheresearch strategies of criticalgeopoliticsto a detailed archival-based of British records. investigation Anglogovernment
TransInstBr GeogrNS 19 273-290 1994 ISSN: 0020-2754

relationsin the 1940s and 1950s were Argentine characterized by a decisive shift away from a to one based (declining) trading-based relationship on geopolitical in the South Atlantic. I competition how existingcritical hope to illustrate geopolitical studiesof foreign and represenpolicyimaginations tations may be utilized to investigateAngloSlater1993). It (see, forexample, history Argentine is suggestedthat, in spiteof the significant changes to the Anglo-Argentine official British connection, of geopolitical and geoeconomic representations Over a Argentinawere surprisingly reactionary. years,the paper chartsin detail period of fifteen how those representations were linkedto changing and geopolitical I circumstances. trading Ultimately, would argue thatthe stereotypical representations of 'Argentina' led British officials on the one hand to exaggerateArgentinaas a site of danger yet paradoxically,on the other hand, to trivialize Argentina's counter-claimsto disputed terriIslands or tory such as the Falklands/Malvinas Antarctica. the failure of British Tragically, governments to address those long standingterritorial
Printedin Great Britain

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274 claimsultimately contributed to the outbreak of the War (Beck 1988, Dodds 1982 Falklands/Mavlinas 1993b).

Dodds K-J

relations.As making sense of Anglo-Argentine claimto completeness; such,thereis no explicit my of a range of ForeignOffice records interpretation does not enableme to claimto be able to (re)present the Foreign Officeview. The complex webs of Historical context and archival sources and interaction between civil servants,ministers individualscan only be inferred. The immediate postwar context for Anglo- other influential reflects the restrictions affairs was shaped by severaldistinctive This relianceon inference Argentine on under that exist access current the of legislation govdevelopments.First, rapid disintegration Most recordsof the Foreign relations (whichhad been erning publicrecords. Anglo-Argentine trading Colonial Officeand the Dominions Office so decisive in shaping previous Anglo-Argentine Office, alteredthe dynamics of that which relate to the FalklandIslands or Antarctic fundamentally history) sometimes 1940 are closed for50 years, 1989, Hennessy claimsafter (see Bulmer-Thomas relationship and King 1992). The nationalizationof the even 75 years.Indeed some of the mostcontroverof British in 1947 by thePeronregime, for sial recordson assessments sovereignty railways Argentine confirmed thattrend. theriseof are closed indefinitely. Secondly, example, the 1940s Colonel Peronin Argentine By using available archivalrecords,the paper politicsfrom to highlight the existenceof remarkably onwardshad a decisiveimpacton Anglo-Argentine attempts of 'Argentina', as a particurelations. Peron's promotion of Argentine durablerepresentations lar of British of within the discourse the the over and type place sovereignty Falklands/Malvinas Antarctic increased the tension betweenBritain and foreign policy.It is arguedthatthose (geopolitical) were crucial (and/orimaginations) representations Argentina. of of the meaningsand relations In a broadercontext, the periodin questionwas to the enframing For our thererelations. The first was the two Anglo-Argentine purposes, by shaped developments. archival research has theadvantageofallowing consolidationof the United States as the major fore, of reasonably detailedinterpretations LatinAmericain the immediate thepossibility greatpower within 1990). of thisperiod,1954-1960. The paper is thus conpostwarperiod (see Morris1990, Parkinson of 'Argentina'and The rise of pan-Americanism during the Second fined to elite representations WorldWar and its consolidation withthe 1947 Rio does notlinktheseto popularsitesofrepresentation Assist- (e.g. themedia,but see Howells 1992 on theBritish Treatyof Reciprocal Treaty(Inter-American that that trend pressand thePerons).However,it is suggested ance) on collectivedefence confirmed is represented the impactof the second Argentina by elites in a numberof (Dieguez 1989). Secondly, has WorldWar on the British ways: as a place with which Britain economyhad a profound different and defence enjoyed a long trading overseas investment historyand whichis now impacton British as a to renegotiatethat relationship; commitments. Britishdefence spending increased attempting in the 1950s largelyas a consequence place inscribedas a source of danger to British significantly in conflicts suchas Korea and in an colonial possessionsin the South Atlantic; of involvements and as and a nuclear by hysterical hyperbolic place populated evolving weapons programme(Dockrill are signifi1988). However, in termsof Britain's global pri- politicalleaders. These representations elites to pursue orities,Latin Americacontinuedto be ascribeda cant because they enabled British and As Calvert policies which were remarkably low strategicor military reactionary importance. little to in contributed turn, which, in of trade the renegotiating the notes, (1990) region promotion in the second halfof the relations the Anglo-Argentine was to be the central notwithstanding priority, century. territorial Guiana, twentieth long-standing disputesin British Belize and the Falklands/Malvinas. intofour The remainder of thepaperis organized of the sections. First,a briefdiscussionof criticalgeoThispaperis based on a readingofrecords aims to and representation Office records) politics,cartography (also Cabinetand Admiralty Foreign attached to the situatethe paper withincontemporary with officials and on interviews debates in narrahistorical in the humangeography;the subsequent of the ForeignOffice American Department such issues.Secondly, were used tive will be used to illustrate 1950s and 1960s.2Secondaryliteratures afterthe Second World data base. The paper the period immediately this primary to supplement because many of the War is (1945-51) were Office officials how certain explored Foreign explores

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in theForeign Office Geopolitics thatcan be detectedin the processesand patterns 1950s have theiroriginsin the 1940s (and earlier). The third sectionexplorestheperiodbetween1950 and 1959. In doing so it is suggested that two competing scripts of Argentina were used to as a place: on the one hand 'Argentina' (re)present as a potential economicpartner (withan associated with of commercial and cultural history relationships on the otherhand as a geopoliticalrival Britain); intent on threatening British claimsin the sovereign The finalsection Antarctic and the South Atlantic. of the Antarctic focuseson the importance Treaty in Antarctica Systemin suspending possibleconflict in the late 1950s and early 1960s at a timewhen relations had virtually trading disappeared. I hope thatthispaperwillbe considered not only in termsof its modestcontribution to the existing literature on Anglo-Argentine As a geohistory. by ongoing graphicalstudy,it has been informed debates withinpoliticalgeographyand it attempts to explore how places such as Argentina or Antarcticaare specifiedwithin the narrativesof British minis(whether foreign policyprofessionals tersor civil servants). The sortsof storiesthatare recountedabout places and peoples are crucialto and legitimation the justification of certain foreign the paper attempts to highpolicies. Furthermore, light geographicalpracticessuch as mappingand in thelegitimation of sovereign claimsto surveying in this contextthe case of the Falkland territory; IslandsDependencySurveyis briefly considered.

275

such as Barnes 1993) is crucial.Followingwriters and Duncan (1992), criticalgeopolitical scholars have suggestedthatthe academicpracticeof geoabout recording the 'realities' politicsis not simply of the earth(or international the represenpolitics): tationof earthly revealsas muchabout descriptions our theories and positionalities as it does about any external realities.In an epistemologicalcontext, critical to acknowltherefore, geopoliticsattempts of those representations. edge the specificities is an important element ofrepresenCartography tation. The map (whetherit be, for instance,a depiction of a region or the world under a Heartland-Rimland scheme) had been considered of faithfully capable representinggeopolitical realitiessave for the impossibility posed by scale of (Natterand Jones1993). Echoingthe sentiments the late Brian Harley,criticalgeopoliticalwriters such as 6 Tuathail(1989, 1994), have argued that and geopoliticsare farfrom'innocent cartography and are heavilyimplicated tools' of representation and power.The map and thesurvey withauthor(ity) have been important componentsin the contributionof geography and geopolitics to the consolidation and legitimation of territorial sovereignty (Harley 1992). Critical geopolitical writershave triedto investigate how and with what effect the representational practicesemployedmore recently to the legitiby geopoliticianshave contributed mationof territorial of reasoning forms and claims to territory and resources. More specifically, the representation of 'foreign and people could be consideredwithinthe places Critical geopolitics, cartographyand wider debates on representation within human representation geography (e.g. Dalby 1990, O Tuathail and The recent literature on 'criticalgeopolitics' has Agnew 1992, Duncan and Sharp 1993). In one have long recognized been a majorsourceof inspiration forthispaper.By respect,geopoliticalwriters of representation, policy have obvious drawingon theories cartography that the practicesof foreign and discourse, writers such as Dalby (1990, 1991), geographical connotations(e.g. Spykman 1944, O Tuathail (1992a, 1993) and 6 Tuathail and Cohen 1973, Gray 1988). However,an important feature between earlierwriters and to reconstitute Agnew (1992) have attempted geo- distinguishing writers is thatthe geographical politicsas an academic practice.Ratherthan con- critical geopolitical as a seemingly self-evident depictionsin the narratives of foreignpolicy are ceptualizing 'geopolitics' withina contextthatis also sensitive academic preoccupation(which produces authori- investigated from which those tive readingsof international critical politics), geo- to the materialcircumstances how geopolitical depictions arose (see, for example, O Tuathail politicshas soughtto investigate discourseis constituted by a series of specialized 1992b). The depictionsof place and the politics formsof territorial and rhetorics. Academicgeo- sustaining reasoningare influlanguages,grammars discourseson the nation-state, interest in (re)presenting enced by historical politicshas had a lengthy otherplaces and peoples within(often)grandgeo- territorial politics and (often popular) represenpolitical schemes but, for criticalgeopolitics,the tations(see O Tuathail1992a, 1992b, 1993; Sharp (see Duncan and Sharp 1993). concept of representation

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276

Dodds K-J

Withinthose analyses of the geographicaland In the heydayof Anglo-Argentine trade relations, of the practices of foreign and commercehad been important and largely geopoliticalcomponents of the conceptsof the mutually beneficial forpoliticaland economicelites policy lie the development and story-telling. The former has been defined (see Thompson1992). Faced withsevereshortages script as a 'set of representations, a collection of descrip- of meat in 1945, however,the British government deemed to definea looked to Argentina tions,scenariosand attributes foradditional supplies.A new of economic relationship with Argentinahad to be place in foreignpolicy' withinthe utterances discourses (see 0 Tuathail1992a, developed withinthe existinghistorical foreign policyprofessionals and resources. 156). Critical geopolitical writers attempt to on trade,commerce Secondly,with investigatecarefullyhow descriptionsof places the emergenceof Colonel Peron fromthe 1940s were faced with an indiofficials and peoples are stitchedtogetherto narrateand onwards,British vidual able to mobilize discourses of events. are effectively Foreign policy professionals 'explain' understood as the 'master' story-tellers; their territorial to justify reasoning supportfornationaland utterancesare crucial to the isticpolitics. Territorial and betweenBritain interpretations politics and justification of the practicesof Argentina enteredits most important legitimation phase in the in termsof policy preforeign policy(see Slater1993 on experts, represen- 1950s and 1960s. Thirdly, tation and developmenttheory).The public (and scription, British officials were attempting to juggle con- the promotion of trade, the protectionof the private)storiesof foreign policyprofessionals tributeto the public expositionsthat effectively colonies such as Belize, BritishGuyana and the constitutethe practicesof foreignpolicy (Dalby FalklandIslands on reduced defencebudgets,and 1990, 0 Tuathail and Agnew 1992).3 In their the changing international politics of Antarctica of US decision-making dur- (exploredlaterin the paper). Discoursesof science detailedinvestigations relations conflict, Sylvanand Majeski(1994), furthercomplicated the contradictory ing theVietnam forexample,have exploredpractical of geo- betweengeoeconomicsand geopoliticsand led to forms of traditional territorial reasoning political reasoning employed in foreign-policy-the privileging of which emphasized British 'sovereign' territory. making.They suggestthata crucialcomponent theproblem-solving culture ofUS foreign agencies such as the FalklandIslands policyare Cartographic the descriptionsof specificplaces. Geographical Dependency Survey played an active role in such claims. depictionsof Indo-China(as a place, for example, legitimating infiltrated by communists or anti-imperialists) In spite of the significant changes to Angloin the 1940s and 1950s, British in the Argentine relations alteredas the US expandedits involvement of Argentina region(Sylvanand Majeski 1994). The descriptions elites perpetuated representations of Latinpersonalities and representations ofplaces can be farmorenested based on 'familiar' stereotypes farmorecomplex(people, and nation-states (Gooch 1990a, 1990b). As the states, sections), (regions, concludedin of the Duchy of Lancaster history,borders) and far more subtle (locations, Chancellor 1960: than descriptions of geo- July features) places, internal investigatedthus far by political circumstances aboutmaking One has been warned generalizations critical geopoliticalanalyses. about Latin America ... On theeastsideoftheAndes As a consequence, thisstudyfocuseson a range you will findall the vigour, speed and brashness of geopolitical and geoeconomic representations traditionally with North America . . . Buton associated (in themain)and made by Foreign Office mandarins more the west side the tempois more subdued, by the subsequentactionsof British governments. European, architecture oftheSpanish andthegracious The primary is how erais notyetsubdued.4 colonial concernof this investigation or the South Atlantic are places such as Argentina the The durablerepresentation as a place (as particular of Argentina, typesofplaces) within represented of foreign and/or by Latinexaggeration policy dominated grandeur, changingand evolvingnarratives based in London.Withinthose narra- was an important professionals componentin the Britishelite In conrelations relations. of Anglo-Argentine lay threemajor visualization tives on Anglo-Argentine faced a difficult sequenceBritish British Officials claims over territorial first, components: intransigence dilemma:how was Britain (an economically fragile in the South Atlantic and Antarcticacould be state in 1945) going to maintainrelationswith justified to the dangersposed by the as a reaction withLatinAmerica? Argentine state. and,moregenerally, Argentina,

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in theForeign Office Geopolitics

277 Britishelite representations of Argentinain the hostileand based largely 1940s were (consistently) on stereotypical of Latin 'personrepresentations and irrational. alities':unpredictable, Such hysterical dehistoricized and a-geographical of representations Argentinawere largely a product of frustration withinthe Britishelite over decliningtrade performance and of fears aboutArgentine involvement in the Antarctic. The sources of that unease were several-fold. were First, foreign policyprofessionals thata rather nostalgic'sense of history' concerned between Argentina and Britain had been replaced and pragmaticpriorities (like by more immediate Peron's interest in strengthening an 'independent' Argentineeconomy). Secondly, and as a consequence, Britishelites were aware that,for some the source of danger to theircountry Argentines, was not Nazi Germany and theunpopubut Britain lar Roca-Runciman trade pact of 1933 which had shattered As Argentina's exportearningpotential. us: Crawley(1984, 58) reminds WithBritain in favour measures imposing protective of the exporttradeof its Dominions, Argentina's hardcurrency was falling revenue ... the rapidly than a list Roca-Runciman more pact... readlikelittle ofunilateral concessions by Argentina. ThusArgentina's eventual policyofneutrality upset sectionsof theBritish elitewho hoped that political would explicitly theAlliedforces Argentina support and the Britishwar effort. At the same time, however, the eventual overthrowof the Costas led by presidencyby a group of Army officers Colonel Peron in June1943 opened a new chapter in Anglo-Argentine relationsthat was further to alterForeignOffice The immediate representations. reactionof the Foreign Officein London to the As one military Argentine coup of 1943 was hostile. official noted: Fromour pointof view the oldergeneration are an advantage at theheadofaffairs, themeat definitely ofBuenos Aires So I see growers province especially. no reason to wishmatters wereotherwise ...7 A groupof mysterious officers who are led by army Colonel Peron we known hastaken (ofwhom nothing) political power.8 TheArgentine is controlled government by a gangof Anti-US nationalistic andtotalitarian colonels ... there is no sign in Argentina of the emergence of any the politicaloppositioncapable of overthrowing present government.9

Anglo-Argentinerelations between
1945-51

relationsduring the period imAnglo-Argentine mediatelyafterthe Second World War compare to the first decades of the twentieth unfavourably (see Hennessyand King 1992). The decades century beforethe Great Depression of the 1930s representedthe finalchapterof a financial and commerof a cial relationship thathad witnessed thecreation railnetwork, a banking and trading relations system based on Argentine of manufactured goods imports and Britishimportsof primary productssuch as the existenceof a large Anglobeef. Furthermore, (with,for example,its own community Argentine a British ensured clubsand newspapers) (elite)'sense of familiarity' fora place not formally incorporated intotheBritish (see Graham-Yooll 1981). As Empire was part us, Argentina HarryFerns(1953) reminds of Britain's'informal empire' (although see the critical reviewofThompson1992 on thisconceptof 'informal empire'). a former Sir Neville Henderson, British ambassain the 1930s, recalleda seriesof dor to Argentina (Senor meetingswith the Ministerof Agriculture Carcano). The latterwas describedby Henderson and (1945) as 'one of the best typesof landowners politicians'.On another occasion, he noted that the Ministerof Marine was 'a useful friend... for especiallywhen it was a questionof contracts the Argentinenavy .. .'. The familiarity with whichBritish officials in described'The Argentine' the 1930s was replaced by uneasiness in the 1940s. By 1945, Anglo-Argentine commerceand tradehad entereda phase of decline (Lewis 1975, Rock 1987, MacDonald 1992). Argentina's declaration of neutralityduring the Second World War disturbed Americanand British politicalelites who, although suspicious of Peron's military safe shippinglanes regime,had enjoyed relatively in the South Atlantic.However, as the former British Ambassadorto Argentina, Sir David Kelly noted, Their is an indication that neutrality policyof liberal thepeopleofArgentina, their forgetting pastglorious havenotfully thetrue nature of history, appreciated theconflict nowbeing oftyranny wagedbytheforces are temperamental in creatures, ... LatinAmericans withthem, effects are often dealing quiteout of all littlehesitation in proportion ... they experience to common contrary acting sense.6

Geoeconomic competition

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278 These years, therefore, confirmed Argentinaas a source of tension for the Britishstate. Familiar British elite stereotypes about 'Latin' personalities permeatedForeign Officerecordsas did a fascinationforthe President's wife,Eva Peron.As one official noted: Ministers trailed the corridors of the Casa through Rosadaafter thepetticoat oftheFirst LadyoftheLand with of the business heron theprinciple transacting Mad Hatter's Tea Party.io The tension between Britain and Argentina at the increased over thefollowing yearsas officials to makesense of thePeron Office Foreign struggled regime.The subsequentelectoralvictoryof Peron in 1946 and the initiation of a Five Year Plan of Argentina (1947-52) for the industrialization reactionary geoprovoked angry and remarkably As the British and geoeconomicresponses. political Ambassador,Sir Rex Leeper,noted in December 1947:

Dodds K-J of Anglo-Argentine relations.The circumstances disputes over meat supplies were not just over financebut were also about how Britishelites defined Britain and Argentina's place in a postwar world. Having defeatedNazism in Europe,British elites were having difficulty coping with the chalto take advantageof lenges (such as any attempt British economicweakness)thatPeron's temporary whichsupposedly Argentina posed to thetraditions connections. characterized Anglo-Argentine The first meetingon meat suppliesin 1946, for instance, proposed that the 1933 Roca-Runciman Treatybe updatedand provideformorefavourable At the same time,however,Sir tradingrelations. Rex Leepersuggestedin September 1946 that: in It is important that these be stopped peopleshould their coursein orderto put themin their present as a proper place in the worldand in our interests of on the purchase country considerably dependent their thenexttwoyears.3 during products

reaction in spite of The Economist's Nevertheless, thatthe that Peron's tacticswere 'obviouslynot learntat Thereis no sign of dawning recognition forArgentine traditional customers primary produce public school' (a popular motif of Britishelite or impoverished by theseselfish resentment may be estranged a bulk buying of Peron's government) or that unsound thecostsofthese designs, enterprises was signed between the two states in agreement to mainthe must ability eventually republic's impede 1946 (Lewis 1975, MacDonald 1992).14 September costsat competitive tainheragricultural levels.I" of British The resentment politicalelites to these conditions was ironic(if predictover the Peron regimein the changingtrading British unhappiness with the the able) arrangements given previous period afterthe Second World War was revealed in Whilst the estancieros Anglo-Argentine 1930s.'5 most clearlyover two major issues: the supplyof in this and the questionof tradingrelationswere being renegotiated meatfrom to Britain, Argentina eliterepresentations appearedunable sovereigntyclaims in the Antarcticand South period,British from different As Lewis(1975, 121) reminds Atlantic. us,meatwas to reactin ways thatwere radically As earlier Sir of John periods. representations Britain between to one ofArgentina's majorexports noted in August 1949: and a Balfour 1945-52 but risingdomesticconsumption reducedexportsto Britain declinein slaughterings 1295 million (from pesos peryearbetween1940-44 to 1000 millionpesos a year between 1945-49: in The ForeignOffice adjustedforinflation). figures that: London was deeply concerned an agreeseemincapable of drafting theArgentines at but theyare finished mentthemselves experts in such a wayas to deprive contractual terms twisting the while ownbenefits, oftheir all,andmore, depriving as faras shareof the advantage side of their other possible."6

haveturned relations SincetheWar, Anglo-Argentine world of meat... and thata hungry upontheprice competition chooseto Geopolitical to paywhatever couldbe forced Argentina and the South Therewere also fearsthatAntarctica demand.i2 and a of as site Atlantic geopolitical mightemerge Between 1946 and 1952 the Britishgovernment territorial (see Beck 1984, Child 1985). competition as a dangerwas increasingly to discussthe Argentina sent six trademissionsto Argentina represented and 'unstable'military these events,however,were ous place led by 'irrational' situation. Underlying whichdisplaya leaderswho were against US and British of Argentina elite representations imperial of in the region(unlikethe estancieros over the changingeconomic involvement remarkable bitterness

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in theForeign Office Geopolitics the 1930s who were empoweredby theircontacts and export earnwith foreigncapital investment by some as a place of ings). Thus, characterized was also repreand hyperbole, Argentina grandeur sented as a dangerousthreatto British sovereign claims in the South Atlantic.As Beck (1986, 32) notes, Britishanxieties over legal, political and War Cabinet interests led to the British strategic approvingthat:

279 and legitimationof territorial claims (see, for example, Harley 1992). As the FIDS base commanderin Antarctica was reminded, His is to strengthen theprimary oftheSurvey object ... The titleto the sectorof Antarctica Majesty's of the Surveyis to continue objective secondary scientific work in theAntarctic.20

In the summer season of 1947-48, the new Attlee from South despatchedHMS Sheffield to strengthen our government be taken all possible stepsshould of theFalkland Africa to the South Atlanticin response to the title overtheAntarctic Dependencies which theArgentines areencroaching.provocative Islands naval 'exercises' against presenceof Argentine in the region(citedin Calvert1992, 49). Ironically, Operation Tabarin (1943-45) aimed to restore therefore, of the thescientific activities (and civilian) in the region:by remov- FIDS were having to be supportedby a British British Antarctic interests (e.g. plaques), by warshipreacting ing rival marksof sovereignty threatagainstthe 'self-evidently' deployingnaval forcesin the region and by the eningpresenceof Argentina. of expeditionsto the Antarctic.'7 It was funding and surveying The importance of cartographic on thebasis of activities on behalf of the British government funded by theChurchill government as a dangerousplace was considerable. of Argentina representations The maintenance of the FIDS's British committed to overturning sovereignclaims activities forthose attachedto the was a priority to the region.In spite of the severefinancial pres- AmericanDepartmentin the Foreign Office.As sures facing the Britishgovernmentduring the Figure I suggests,British claims to the Antarctic in orderthat (formally SecondWorldWar,monieswerefound datingfrom1908) had been legallychalbases lenged by Argentina could establish permanent Operation Tabarin in 1943 (Chile had made an on the continent duringthe 1943-44 season. After Antarcticclaim in 1940). Within Argentina, the was MilitaryGeographicalInstitutereceived financial theend oftheSecondWorldWar thisoperation intoa civilian theFalkland support transformed organization, from thePeronregimein orderto promote Islands Dependency Survey(FIDS), fundedby the the cartographicannexation of the 'Argentine Colonial Officeand dedicated to protectingthe Antarctic'from 1947 onwards (see Peron 1947, sovereignclaimsof the British state.'8 Aramayo 1949).21 In addition, the Argentine Britishresentment over Argentineinterestin Antarctic Institute (formallycreated in 1951) Antarctica and the SouthAtlantic led to a seriesof launched annualexpeditions to theAntarctic as well limited and protests, counter-protests engagements. as publishing of these'scientific' in results activities British at the ForeignOfficeattempted to severaljournals: officials Boletin and Contribuciones Antartida, justifytheir militarized operations in the South Cientificas. As a consequence, at theForeign officials Atlanticby appealingto scientific research and to Officewere concernedthat Argentine pretensions to had to be countered legal pedantry.Such appeals also contributed that activities by geographical of Britain as inher- supportedBritishsovereign claims in the South ForeignOfficerepresentations and orderly entlyrational comparedto the aggres- Atlantic. sive and childishlyambitious Argentine state. In 1948, further fearswere expressedinside the Followingthe launchof the second expeditionof Foreign Officeand in other government departan official at the ments that conflict Operation Tabarin,for instance, mighterupt in the Antarctic. Colonial Office noted that: Indeed in 1948 an agreement was signedin London and Chile Britain, by Argentina preventingthe theBritish view is thatthediscovery of polarterrifollowed and theexercise of use of warshipssouth of 60?S in responseto fears visits tories, by periodic a title of naval clashes.22As Vice AdmiralSir William administrative is a sufficient basisfor functions, to suchterritories.i"9 Tennantnoted in a remarkable letterto the First Sea Lord,SirJohn dated 5 May 1948: Cunningham, The creation of FIDS in 1947 confirmed the importanceof the 'scientific' of cartography and activities I wouldholdontotheFalklands andSouth at Georgia evento theextent ofgoingto war. .. and in the confirmation all costs, as vital components surveying

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280
V MALVINAS ISLAS GEORGIAS DELSUR

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Dodds K-J
ISLANDS BIRD ,ISLAND SOUTH GEORGIA

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Antirtida Argentina (definedas of 60?S) 25?W 74?W

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Beck1988 Figure 1. Rival Antarctic claims. Source:

theAntarctic the research publicationsof Britishand South thequestion discuss ofinternationalizing to anyof American aretoo stupid to listen ... iftheArgentines scientists. This processwas undoubtedly therather aided thisthenI see no alternative to continue that existed by the very close co-operation our betweenthePolar regionsoffice thathas gone on between childish performance theForeign within ships.23 Islands attached to theFalkland and scientists Office in the 1950s DependencySurvey.The partnership This Naval Agreementwas renewed each year betweenDr BrianRobertsof the FO and Dr (later theAntarctic (ATS) Sir) Vivian Fuchsof the FIDS is a case in point. (Beck1990) until Treaty System and of the continent took over the demilitarization The construction by Britishpolitical elites of the Agreement. Argentinaas a 'threat'or a 'danger' to British water,so subsuming surrounding law and science sovereignclaimswas most intenseat a timewhen The interplay betweengeopolitics, within Foreign Office discussions of Anglo- Anglo-Argentine tradinglinks were decliningin of Antarctica The strategic in Antarctica has been remarked significance. relations importance Argentine in the 1950s was largely authorities upon by other scholars (e.g. Beck 1989, 1990; forthe British the citingof science understood with referenceto Argentine (and 1985). However,neither Joyner soverBritish thatcompromised as the raisond'itrefor Chilean)activities by the Britishauthorities (suchas HMS Nigeriain 1948) to eign claimsin the region.However,as the decade sendingwarships in the South Atlantic, unfoldedAntarctica fantasies defendthe imperial graduallybecame encoded as nor theuse ofscience by theBritish polarauthorities a place of potential conflictor tension within and the wider drama of the Cold War. This in turn to castigate(in privateat least) the Argentines of activitiesin the was crucial to the eventual transformation Chileans for their 'unscientific' of the the creation Antarctic continent the A has been by fully appreciated.24 popular region, TreatySystemin the finalyears of the point of comparisonemployed by Britishpolar Antarctic forexample,was to compareand contrast 1950s. experts,

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in theForeign Office Geopolitics

281

Anglo-Argentinerelations between

relations(see Milensky policy and international on the of a number ofincidents 1978). The outbreak 1950-5 9 continent thatAnglo-Argentine served to confirm The first decade afterthe Second World War was characterized relations were increasingly by conflict tensions within Anglo- and tension ratherthan characterized by further cooperation.The most Argentine relations. In July 1951 the British celebratedincident was at Hope Bay in 1952. An at the officials Embassyin Buenos Aires reminded a base in the established Argentine polarexpedition that: ForeignOffice had abandoned an earlier region afterthe British of theBritish Biscoe on 30 shipJohn and culturally Politically Argentina aspiresto the base. The arrival an immediate as the 1952 January protest provoked and stress of Latin America invariably lays leadership foundArgentine andracial with thecivilization on hercultural of British links, personnelat theirformer of base. The followingday, a Britishteam led by Spain and Italy ... the Argentine assumption is universally superiority resented.25 George Marsh and FrankElliotproceededto land storesin orderto re-establish a new base. However, The characterization of Argentinaas a place of according to official records,the Argentinebase enabledfurther commander mainlySouthern told the British that 'I am Europeanheritage reportedly characterizations and representations instructed to prevent stereotypical by my commander you from aboutassumedsuperiority and territorial a base here,usingforce, ifnecessary' aggrandise- building (Beck ment.In addition, at a timeof continued commer- 1989, 36). Shortly fire was afterwards, machine-gun cial and tradingdecline between the two states, directed over theheads of theBritish who personnel these representations intensified Britishfears that were thenforcefully backto theJohn escorted Biscoe. was attempting to takeover theFalkland On hearingthe news, the then Governorof the Argentina Islands (Islas Malvinas) and British Antarctic terri- FalklandIslands,Sir Miles Clifford, sent a telegram tories (AntartidaArgentina).26 Reactionarygeo- to the Colonial Office that'thispresumsuggesting of Anglo-Argentine relations ably constitutes an act of war'.Without politicalassessments waitingfor enabled further British financialand discursive a reply fromthe Colonial Office,the Governor in scientific investment activities and generalintran- orderedthe John Biscoeto wait at Hope Bay and sigence over colonial possessions. However, as await the arrivalof HMS Burghead Bay. Later in we shall see, this did not deterBritish elites from February wereable to rebuild their 1952, theBritish to sell armsto Argentina in the 1950s even base at Hope Bay. trying thatsuch sales might thoughtheywere concerned The reactions at theForeignOffice of officials to British claims! compromise such an incident were predictably filled withanger and concern.As an official noted on 16 February 1952: conflict Geopolitical In 1951, for instance,the British Ambassador to theForeign Office viewis thattheArgentines have thatPeron had despatchedsix Argentina reported in the recentHope Bay overreached themselves ships to the Antarcticregion. In spite of the incident ... Argentina intends to increase thenumber assurance of the Ambassador that no offensive and permanency of bases in Antarctica forprestige action was contemplated, Churchillordered the reasons.29 to the infantry despatchof a 'companyof British Indeed the 1950s was a period of unprecedented Falkland Islands at once' (Hennessy 1984).27 in Argentina over the questionof pursuing activity Churchill Despite the advice of the ForeignOffice, feltthatany challenge(howeverremote)to British ArgentineAntarcticclaims. As PresidentPeron had to be repulsed in order not to arguedin May 1952 sovereignty We entered intoagreements under which we cannot those claims.28 compromise but thesescientific militarily, occupytheseregions During the followingyear,the Argentine govwillstepby steptakepossession ofthem expeditions of Peroninitiated a majorcampaignin the ernment have thousands of our'rights ... thosewho discuss Antarctic region(Beck1989). As Calvert(1992) has but a few We ahead. have behind, years very perhaps and the Antarctic argued, the Falklands/Malvinas a century butmany in front ofus.30 behind, had become central planks in Peron's 'Third Position'approach(i.e. developingpoliciesindepen- As a consequence,Peron had encouragedofficial dentof the interests of the Superpowers) to foreign surveys, commissioned reports on the polar

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282
700 60o 600 50o

Dodds K-J

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PRO(FO)371/90440 Figure 2. Antarcticactivityin the FID, 1951. Source: Service of Argentine research department expressing concern over continent (e.g. International Publications1955) and increasedfundingto the Argentineactivities.It is evident from Foreign the Office maps,forexample,thatthereis concernfor Argentine Antarctic Institute.Furthermore, and Chilean and locationof Argentine and geopoliticalstudies the number expansionof geographical IslandsDependencies(see Fig. in Argentinain the 1950s created academic and bases in the Falkland the to illustrate in theSouthAtlantic Figure2 purports region(see Isola 2). For instance, publicinterest and Berra1950). The increasein Argentine activity location of 'Bases in the FalklandIslands DepenthatArgentina at the Foreign dencies,1951'. Therewerealso fears worried officials in the Antarctic (as opposed to cartographically) to resolve these over- might militarily In spite of attempts Office. Antarctic Court annexe British claimsat the International possessions.In one case, lappingterritorial of Justice (which Argentinarejected),the foreign for instance, an officialat the Colonial Office Officewas concernedthat Argentina'ssurveying reportedthat an appeal had been made to the for a batch of marinesto be left at and cartographicactivities were compromising Admiralty British claims.As BrianRobertsnoted: Deception Islandbecause: their in someforce TheArgentines mayassert 'rights' it he thought that toldmelastweek Thehydrographer hear ofthe next Island... We might to Deception year should thatthe Admiralty was mostunsatisfactory in an Argentine survivors Island of the Falkland charts their have to correct prison.32 and andChilean from surveys Argentine Dependencies to such fearswas based actnow However,the background inprint...We must this havetoacknowledge removauthorities is anyhopeofstepping ifthere forcefully up FIDS activity.31 largelyon the British fromDecepand Chileanpersonnel ing Argentine thereare tion Island earlierin the year. In a telegraph(10 Withinthe recordsof the ForeignOffice, in and his (influential) February 1953) to theBritish High Commissioner manyexamplesof BrianRoberts

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in theForeign Office Geopolitics of State forCommonwealth Table I. Anglo-Argentinetrade 1950-60 Ottawa, the Secretary notes that Relations, aftervery careful consideration decisionhas been reached thatthe onlypossible courseis to remove latest Argentineand Chilean intrudersfrom theirinstalIsland and to dismantle [Deception] and lations... Withobjectof avoiding resistance ouraimis to takeSouth bloodshed American possible parties by surprise.33 thatArgentine and Chileanactivities British concern in the Antarctic were compromising British soverlaterin the telegraph: eign claimssurfaces
Year 1945 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 Imports FromUK Total 30 113 111 70 49 72 76 53 101 102 90 113 301 965 1480 1117 795 979 1173 1128 1310 1233 993 1249

283

Exports To UK Total 189 211 200 97 218 188 201 212 237 237 235 221 720 1177 1169 688 1125 1027 929 944 975 994 1009 1079

we are alreadyoutclassed by Argentina in the Antarctic .. We haveonlyoneobsolescent vessel... We haveno aircraft in theregion... To go on as we in millionsof dollars,adjusted) are wouldmerely theArgentines to con- (Figures encourage Lewis 1975 120 Source: tinuetheirencroachments untiltheyforceus out a thereafter launch theywouldprobably completely: Islands againstthe Falkland heightened campaign tureditems.As MacDonald (1992, 190) notes,the themselves.34 thenHead of the Instituto de Promocion de Argentino (IAPI) Miguel Miranda wanted 'coal The Colonial Office and the Commonwealth Office InterCambio suchas causticsoda and soda ash. thatHMS Snipe and raw materials laterproposedto theForeign Office could not live on whiskyor lipstick'.37 shouldremain aroundDeceptionIslandto deterany Argentina Peron's of meant that policy import-substitution further incursions Navy given that the Argentine local industries were the traditional replacing was responsible forall Antarctic expeditions. Howon British exports. ever,there appearsto have been some disagreement dependencies However, one growth area in Britishexports between government departments over these seemed to be thearmstrade.ForeignOffice records Indeed the Foreign Office later deployments.35 indicatethat therewas a concernthat such sales indicated withgovernment in that 1954 approval terrimighthave a detrimental impacton British but few officials ithasbeensuggested that we might make someshow torialclaimsin the South Atlantic ofnavalforce andwelcome theArgentine as our seemedable to detecttheironyof their party concern for thus ourclaim to sovereignty. possible Argentine'penetration' guests, demonstrating in the Antarctic whilstat the same timetrying to sell weapons and The Attlee governmentlater agreed to send a aircraft to Argentina. As Sir Ian KirkPatrick at the to Deception Island to meet the Argentine ForeignOffice frigate noted:
Antarctic expedition of 1954.36

the arms trade cooperation: Geoeconomic When 'Argentina'was not being encoded as a threat or source of danger to Britishterritorial at the ForeignOfficeattempted to claims,officials trade.The tradefigures encourage Anglo-Argentine for 1952-56 (see Lewis 1975) reveal the poor The fears over helicopterswere replicatedlater of Britishexports to Argentina(see when the subjectof the possibility of the sale of a performance aircraft was raised.As an official at Table I). This was due in partto increasedcompe- few Shackleton titionfromthe USA, Germanyand other South the Foreign Office noted: 'The point for us is American statesbut it was also due to the factthat whetherShackletonswould, like the helicopters, of our Antarctic Argentina'seconomy needed raw materialsand assist the Argentinepenetration In both cases, however,the sales were semi-finished thanexpensivemanufac- sector'.39 goods rather

Sir HenryMack (the thenBritish Ambassador to Argentina) might be instructed to telltheArgentines that we should liketo sellthem thehelicopters ... it would be veryawkward if theywere to be subused in Argentine in the adventures sequently Antarctic.38

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284 refused because therewas no agreement eventually as to whetherthese aircraft amongstdepartments constituted a threatto British sovereigninterests (even thoughthe Treasurywas anxious that such tradedeals shouldbe completed). Two yearslater, in 1956, the possibility of a sale of armsand an aircraft carrier to Argentina dominatedcabinet businessof theChurchill government. On theadvice of his officials, theForeignSecretary, that: SelwynLloyd,recommended

Dodds K-J

towards Argentinaby drawing on such stereotypicalrepresentations. the Secondly and perhaps more importantly, decision to launch a global scientific programme underthe auspicesof the International Geophysical Year (IGY 1957-58) created new possibilities and tensionsfor Britishofficials in London. The of the in a major British participation government Antarctic programmewas considered vital to counter Argentineand Chilean initiativeseven suswas officially thoughthe issue of sovereignty No attempt should be madeto evicttheArgentines pended (as a possible point of contention). The and Chileans from their bases in Antarctic. The new IGY's Antarctic scientific (involving12 programme inArgentina admin- countries, (i.e.ledbya military government the USA and USSR) was based including under a less at over 60 stations istration General were Aramburu) pursuing (Mitchell 1981, Klotz 1990). The in theAntarctic ... it was doubtful aggressive policy and British wererestricted to Argentine expeditions whether and strategic madeit considerations political their sectors. the substanFurthermore, respective for us to forgo thetrade.40 necessary tive involvement in the of the two superpowers research raisedfearsthatthe programme in 1955 by Antarctic The removalof the Peron government claimsof Britain mightbe caughtup in the Argentine had, therefore, military significantlyterritorial the dramas of the Cold War. Furgeopolitical alteredperceptions of British It was now officials. as the last of this paper briefly section thermore, that interim the was less military thought regime the changes in the international politicsof concernedwith pressingsovereign claims in the notes, Antarctica additional fears provoked geopolitical oceans. In spiteof theprotestations of the southern that would either wreck the Antarctic Argentina issues involvedwere that 'the strategic Admiralty or annexe British possessions. for this carrier Treatynegotiations perhaps more open to argument, might increase the power of the Argentinesto threatenour bases in Antarctica', the Churchill relations and the Anglo-Argentine approvedthe sale.41 government Antarctic (1959-1961) Treaty of Argentina The return of a civilian government under the leadershipof ArturoFrondiziin 1958 The finalchapterof Anglo-Argentine relationsin coincided with two major developmentswhich the 1950s was undoubtedlydominated by the affected Anglo-Argentinerelations. First, the Antarctic Treatyof 1959. The decisionby President in tradebetweenthetwo states(in the Eisenhower improvement to invite'interested parties'fora conofficials ference Antarctica was based on periodbetween1957-60) meantthatBritish to 'internationalize' reassessedtheirviews on the new Argentine gov- fearsthat conflict could eruptover that continent of Argentina (Beck1986). As a place within even ifthoserepresentations ernment, thestrategic dramaof as a place remained stablewithin remarkably foreign the Cold War,Antarctica had become encoded as a policy discourse.As Sir JackWard noted in his place of possiblemissilesitings, atomicbomb testin 1958: annualreviewof Argentina As the Americandelegate ing and armedconflict. Paul Daniels recalled: remarks anti-British ... Dr Despite some routine me that he wanted was at painsto reassure Frondizi an international It was generally agreedto convene to haveplayed ... Argentina good relations appears withsuchnoveland controversial conference dealing an adult andconstructive role.42 and possibly wouldbe unwise, dangerous, questions weremade ... It was unlessadequatepreparations talks inWashington: decided toholdpreparatory of Argentina, British (cited thus,remained representations in Beck1985,654) dualismsabout personalities wedded to 'familiar' v. irrational) and maturity (adult v. child). (rational circumstances ofAnglo- As a consequence, the American government of thechanging Regardless at the Foreign inviteda totalof twelvestatesto attenda meeting British officials relations, Argentine DC in May 1958 (see Beck 1985). in articulating Britishpolicies in Washington Officefeltjustified

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in theForeign Office Geopolitics British elite representations of Argentina in this period were increasingly paradoxical.On the one was consistently written hand,Argentina and seen as a place characterized as a source of danger. Officials at the ForeignOffice were convincedthat militarism could derail the Argentine territorial AntarcticTreaty negotiations and threatenthe fora demilitarized Antarctic continent. possibilities the proposed Antarctic However, for the British, Treaty provided a possible mechanismfor declaims (in fusingfearsthat overlappingterritorial could lead to conflict between Britain Antarctica) and Argentina. Furthermore, the British were concernedthat the FalklandIslands could emerge (once again) as a major source of tension.It was fearedthatArgentina mighttake advantage of an Antarctic agreementto pursue such claims rather than encourageentirely On peacefulnegotiations. the other hand, however,Argentinawas increasingly being seen as a possible place which could resistthe 'spread'of communism in LatinAmerica. Whilst the military (and civilian) regimes of (and LatinAmerica)drew contempt and Argentina British uses. elites,theyhad their despairfrom The desireforan agreement to demilitarize the Antarcticcontinentwas widespread (Beck 1990, Klotz 1990).43 Officials from theForeignOffice, for instance, shouldattempt to arguedthatthemeeting secure the non-militarization of Antarctica,the of scientific in theregion...44 activities promotion The mini-conference in Washingtonheld informal talksin June (and secret) 60 sessionsthe 1958. After conference in participants agreed to hold a formal October 1959. By that time a formaltreatyhad been drafted whichwas latersignedby the twelve states in December 1959. However, an important elementof these meetingswas a series of private Britishand Chilean meetingsbetween Argentine, delegates to discuss the pressing issue of overlappingsovereignclaims. The signingof theAntarctic Treatyin 1959 (and eventualratification in 1961 by thosetwelvestates) was an important momentin Antarctic affairs and relations.The territorial Anglo-Argentine rivalry over Antarctica, while not diffused had entirely, been containedby ArticleIV of the Treatywhich preventedany state fromchangingor improving claims. As a former upon its existing territorial official at the American of the Foreign Department Office noted,the ForeignSecretary, SelwynLloyd, was undergreat pressureto 'keep out of trouble' and to seek to improve trade and commercein

285 South Americarather thanworryabout Argentine claimsto Antarctica.45 On the British side, however,therewas a hope thatotherdisputesin LatinAmericacould also be solved with a mixture of diplomacyand goodwill. The recordsof the Foreign Officefor 1959 and 1960 reveal many references that confirm intense Argentineinterestin the AntarcticTreaty. The British Ambassador, SirJack Ward,senta number of in London detailingArgentine reportsto officials on the subject.Indeed,Sir Henry pronouncements Brain Wardin January 1960 that'we warnedSirJack do not wantto leave theArgentines any excusefor our attitude.'46 The British misunderstanding govorderedthe Embassyin Buenos Aires to ernment issue reminders to the Argentine over government erroneous' claimsover theFalkland Islandsand the Antarctic. Furthermore, duringthe middle of the of the Washington negotiations Treaty,the British embassyin Buenos Aires had to reportthatthere were problemsbetweenArgentina and Chile over theformer's insistence on conducting artillery practicein and aroundthedisputed watersof theBeagle Channel.The recordsof the ForeignOffice record concern: Thisis justthesortofincident that is likely to effect over Antarctica any hopes of an agreement even the area in question wouldbe beyondthe though scopeofsuchan agreement.47 The major territorial concern for Foreign Office officials in the early 1960s, however,had shifted from Antarcticato the Falkland Islands. At the when ForeignOffice officials were precisemoment trying to promote an increase in trade with SirJack Wardnotedin January 1960 that Argentina, fears overArgentine interests in theFalklands might derail the AntarcticTreaty proceedings.As he noted: There is someevidence that there aresomepeoplein officialdom whomaybe trying to work Argentine up a little on this issue... The Falklands were campaign a separate matter from Antarctica ... inthelight quite of thisI judge thatwithclaims and counter claims to Antarctic sealed up by the territory effectively the Argentines Washington Treaty, are thinking of raising theissuewith us ... Morerecently a wildand rather in ourdeplorspeculative piecewas published ablelocalEnglish theBuenos Aires newspaper Herald.48 Yet at the time,officials in the ForeignOffice were be an important acutelyawarethatArgentina might

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286

Dodds K-J

'stalwart' earlier historical have against.'[T]he dangersof Soviet subver- 1950s (withtheir precedents) in all continents importantramifications sion . . . We need powerful friends for Britishintransigence issue in laterdecades. and shouldnot forget SouthAmerica'.49 As events over the Falklands in Cuba in theearly1960s (theemergence of Castro The paper has also attempted to illustrate how and the Cuban Missile Crisis)were to demonstrate, some oftheresearch of critical strategies geopolitics thissentiment was genuinely within felt theForeign mighthave a widerrelevanceformore traditional Office.Later events, however, showed that the diplomatichistorical studies and politicalgeograIslandsdid emergeas a majorpolicyissue phy. Critical geopolitics offersnew forms of Falkland in Anglo-Argentine relationsin the 1960s (ulti- researchstrategies whichattempt to highlight the betweengeographical knowlmately leadingto war in 1982: see Dodds 1993b).s50 connections practices, The fearsof the ForeignOfficewere such that edges, identityformation and power. In a wide theyhad been preparedto draw up an agreement range of studies,scholars such as Dalby (1990, between Britain, Argentinaand Chile creatinga 1991), 6 Tuathail(1992a, 1993), Sharp(1993) and that such 'critical special region dedicated to peacefulresearchand Slater(1993) have demonstrated iftheAntarctic Treatycouldnot resolve pathways'(Slater'sphrase)have been exploitedto exploration the problems of territorial claimsand nuclearization illustrate how foreign employ policy professionals (Beck 1986).s1 Commercial and trading links geographicalreasoningin their (textual) (re)conof world politics; had been replaced structionand (re)presentations between Britain and Argentina in the South how those (re)presentations are themselvestied and conflict by territorial competition Atlantic. to formsof 'popular' geopoliticalunderstandings; and postwar develophow Cold War militarism on (often menttheory simple)geographidepended Conclusions of the Third cal depictionsand representations of geographihow thoseforms elite World;and, finally, This paper has chartedthe changingBritish in the cal reasoningare challengedand resisted of Anglo-Argentine relations by social representations If in this paper, I have concentrated from movements. 1940s and 1950s. I have argued that a shift trade and commercialcooperation towards geo- on Anglo-Argentine history during the 1940s momentum within political competitionto the South Atlantic and and 1950s, there is sufficient to believe that a the criticalgeopoliticalliterature characterized theperiod.By employing Antarctica the of Latin there are real possibilitiesfor reconstituting mixture of stereotypical characterizations Americannations and by utilizinghistoricaldis- research strategiesof political geography more officials generally. scienceand rationality, courseson territory, at the Foreign Office were depicting AngloArgentine relations in surprisingly reactionary terms.At a momentof great change, therefore, Acknowledgements British elites seemed unable to representthat I am very gratefulfor the commentsof Paul in a progressiveway which recog- Glennie, Leslie Hepple and Nigel Thriftat the relationship of Bristol. and strategic Departmentof Geography,University nized changing political-economic a postthisresearch The ESRC supported in Argentina and LatinAmerica. circumstances through Thanksare also due to Roger One of the (implicit) purposesof thispaper has graduatestudentship. excellent of thispaperfortheir that foreignpolicy can be Lee and thereferees been to demonstrate was kind Barton and advice. comments Jonathan of the its through representations interpreted 'Other'. I have not claimed to be able betterto enough to provide trade figures for AngloIn addition, a retired senior trade. relations' Argentine or 'Anglo-Argentine Foreign represent 'Argentina' on the text. also offered detailedcomments than British officials.Rather, the analysis has Official of a The usual disclaimers apply. attempted to provide an interpretation of the I owe thanks to the Librarians In addition, difficult periodof Angloneglectedbut particularly and at Institute at Research Scott Polar how the and illustrate to Cambridge Argentine history (foreign policy) the Public Records Officein Kew for helpingme politicsof British representational PeterBeckof Kingston and records. and not dismissed withreferences elitesneeds to be takenseriously was also kindenoughto sharehis notes I would suggestthatthosetypes University as mere'rhetoric'. in the 1940s and on recordsof the Canadian archiveson Antarctic of representations of 'Argentina'

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Geopoliticsin the ForeignOffice

287

affairs. Nicola Exley at the Department of Geogra- 18. The recordsof the Admiralty providesome details of expeditions to the Antarctic.HMS William redrew themaps forthis phy,Edinburgh University forinstance, Scoresby, was despatched in 1944 to the paper.

Notes
1.

2.

3.

4. 5.

6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15.

16. 17.

19. See, for example, Ferns 1973, 1992; Rock 1975; 20. Beck 1983, 1988; Child 1985; Danchev 1992; 21. Hennessy and King 1992; MacDonald 1992; Thompson 1992. The records citedin thispaperare held at thePublic Record Office(PRO), Kew, Surrey.The following 22. seriesof records were examined: (ADM), Admiralty Cabinet (CAB), Colonial Office(CO) and Foreign Office(FO). The interviewmaterialcited in this paper was grantedon the conditionthatit should remainanonymousand untaped. Slater (1993), however,has cautionedcritical geoon a centred politicsover its collectiveassumptions His deploymentof the geopolitical subjectivity. term 'geopolitical imagination'invokes a careful distinction between different levels of geopolitical a distinc- 23. analysisand deployment and, moreover, tion between geopoliticsand the geopolitical. This can be interpreted as a usefulcontribution to the ongoing critiques made by critical geopolitical writersof the often simplistic assumptionsover 24. geopoliticalreasoningwithin politicaldiscourse. PRO (CAB) 129/102July1960. Cited in Henderson 1945, 205-6. The familiarity and uneasinessof such meetingsstand in marked contrastwith a laterposting to Germany(despite Henderson'ssympathies forNazi Germany). PRO (FO) 371 33518 February 1943. PRO (FO) A3015/11/21943 Sir David Kellyto the ForeignOffice. PRO (CAB) 66/21 July1943. See note 7. See note 7. 25. PRO (FO) 371/51778 1947 Sir Rex Leeperletter to 26. the ForeignOffice. PRO (FO) 371/90475 1949. PRO (FO) 371/51775 1947. Cited in Howells 1992, 227-47. One ironythatmightbe borne in mindis thatfor much of the nineteenth centuryBritishimperialists, speculators and travellerscomplained that 27. was under-developed, thatit wasted its Argentina resourcesand was unprepared forthe expansionof 28. the capitalist As a consequence,it world-economy. was argued thatBritish investment and endeavour was needed to overcome such obstacles (see Pratt 1992). PRO (FO) 371/74375 1949. 29. See Friedrich (1980) for details of the 1938-39 30. GermanPolar Expedition. 31.

Antarctic in orderto erectBritish flagsand distribute boards marked 'BritishCrown Lands'. PRO (ADM) 1/19509 1946. PRO (CO) 78/198/2 1945. Cited in Beck 1986, 23. Escude (1987), however,has noted that, even in the 1920s, the conceptof an 'Argentine Antarctic' had been incorporated into Argentine geographytextbooks forprimary and secondaryeducation. The National SecurityCouncil Records of 1958 recall that the United States' governmenthad (as well as four approachedArgentinaand Britain other claimant nations) about the possibilityof creating an international agreement for the Antarctic. This agreement aimed to '... removethe area fromthe fieldof presentand potentialfuture contention,at the same time preservingto the interested nations control over strategicuse ... The draftagreementwas not enacted upon. US (NSC) 5804/1 8 March 1958. government PRO (ADM) 1/21126 1948. Sir William Tennant identified several reasons for defendingthe South Atlanticislands includingthe importance of maritime resourcessuch as whalingand the possibility forstrategic bases in the south-west Atlantic. I have used theprovocative term 'imperial fantasies' to highlight the significant on military expenditure and civilianactivities of the British stateto 'defend' SouthAtlantic and Antarctic claimsagainstpossible annexation. However, the endeavours of polar explorersheld sway over an imperialimagination which understoodevents such as the 1943 TransAntarctic Expeditionor the mappingof Antarctica as the continuation of a glorioustradition of British (white) masculinity, (never nationalism) patriotism and science. PRO (FO) 371/90475 1951. Child (1988) has noted that in 1948, for instance, and Chile began to articulate theconcept Argentina of a sector called the 'South AmericanAntarctic' (between 0 and 90 degrees) which had to be defended from Geopresences external (e.g. Britain). were important politicalwriters of this supporters concept. PRO (ADM) 1/25082 1951. See also Hennessy 1984. An approach later adopted by the Callaghan in 1977 which despatched a nuclear government submarineto the FalklandIslands in response to fears that the Argentineswere interestedin a possible invasion. PRO (FO) 371/97397 1952. PRO (FO) 371/90440 1952. See note 30.

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288 32. 33. PRO (ADM) 1 25082 1952. to the United Telegraphto the High Commissioner theSecretary forStateforCommonKingdomfrom wealth Relations,10 February1953. Copy of this previously secret telegraph was provided by Professor PeterBeck of KingstonUniversity. Op. cit. (note 33). PRO (ADM) 1/250821951. These records the from chartthe difficulties betweenthe Foreign Admiralty the Colonial Office and the Admiralty. The Office, was the most reluctant to commitships Admiralty to the regionbecause of costs and logistics. PRO (CAB) 128/27 1954. The IAPI was created by Peron in 1945. It was statemonopoliesin Argentina designedto establish and was specifically charged with purchasingthe entiregrain harvestand sellingit to Europe. The IAPI paid domesticproducerslow prices so that income generated from overseas sales could be reinvested in capital machinery necessary for Peron's industrialization plans. PRO (FO) 371/108815 1954. (See also The Times 1954). See note 38. PRO (CAB) 128/30June1956. PRO (CAB) 128/30September1956. PRO (FO) 371/147755 1958. As Beck (1985) notes, the Geneva discussionon nuclearweapons testingin 1958 and Krushchev's visit to the USA in 1959 had helped to createda favourable environment forthe first meetingof the in October 1959. Washingtonconference See note 42. Interview with retired Foreign Office official attached to the Polar Regions Department 15 August 1992 Cambridge. PRO (FO) 371/147713 1960. PRO (FO) 371/139142 1959. See note 46. PRO (CAB) 129/102 1960. Treatyhad effecShortlyafterthe 1959 Antarctic claims,the British tivelyfrozenterritorial governcalled ment createda new administrative territory British Antarctic (BAT) under the direcTerritory This was formed out tion of a High Commissioner. of the old Falkland Island Dependencies (FID) claims were territorial region. In so doing, British split into two groupings:BAT and the Falkland Islandsinsteadof being linkedto one another. PRO (FO) 3711147732 1960. Henry Hankey,the Head of the American Department of Foreign of noted 'We cannotexclude the possibility Office, elementsin Argentina opposed to the Treatysucceeding in deliberately trying to wreck the ratification'.

K-JDodds

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