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HAZOP STUDY REPORT,

REMEDIATION OF THE FORMER


ORICA VILLAWOOD SITE
Prepared by: Dean Shewring
17 April 2013
Pinnacle Risk Management Pty Limited
ABN 83 098 666 703

PO Box 5024 Elanora Heights
NSW Australia 2101
Telephone: (02) 9913 7284
Facsimile: (02) 9913 7930
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Disclaimer
This report was prepared by Pinnacle Risk Management Pty Limited (Pinnacle
Risk Management) as an account of work for Orica. The material in it reflects
Pinnacle Risk Managements best judgement in the light of the information
available to it at the time of preparation. However, as Pinnacle Risk
Management cannot control the conditions under which this report may be
used, Pinnacle Risk Management will not be responsible for damages of any
nature resulting from use of or reliance upon this report. Pinnacle Risk
Managements responsibility for advice given is subject to the terms of
engagement with Orica.
HAZOP Study Report, Remediation of the Former
Orica Villawood Site
Rev Date Description Reviewed By
A 27/6/12 Draft for Comment Orica
B 12/8/12 Orica Comments Included Orica
C 13/8/12 Final Issue -
D 16/4/13 Supplementary and Water Treatment Plant
HAZOPs Added
Orica
E 17/4/13 Final Issue -

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CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ............................................................................................ I
GLOSSARY ............................................................................................................ II
1 INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................. 1
2 PROCESS DESCRIPTION AND HAZOP SCOPE .................................................. 2
3 METHODOLOGY ............................................................................................. 2
3.1 General ............................................................................................. 2
3.2 Meeting Procedures ........................................................................ 3
4 STUDY TEAM ................................................................................................. 4
5 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS ..................................................................... 5
5.1 Analysis of Main Findings .............................................................. 5
5.2 Actions Arising from the HAZOP ................................................... 6
6 REFERENCES ................................................................................................ 7

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1 HAZOP Team .................................................................................... 4

LIST OF APPENDICES

Appendix 1 - Approval of HAZOP Chair.
Appendix 2 - Process Description
Appendix 3 - HAZOP Drawings
Appendix 4 - HAZOP Guide Words.
Appendix 5 - HAZOP Minutes.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Orica is proposing to install and operate a soil processing facility at the former
Orica Villawood site. The Site contains waste byproducts of industrial activities
which ceased in 2000, in particular DDT and its degradation products DDD and
DDE. The contaminants will be separated from the soil and destroyed within
the process.
The Minister for Planning granted development consent for the Project in May,
2012. Project Development Consent Condition 21(b) requires the preparation
of a Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) Study.
Orica requested that Dean Shewring from Pinnacle Risk Management chair the
HAZOP study. This report details the results of the HAZOP study in
accordance with the requirements of the Department of Planning and
Infrastructures HAZOP Guidelines.
The main participants had appropriate experience in the design and operation
of soil processing (or similar) plants. Therefore, the hazards were generally well
known as well as the required control measures to reduce risk to acceptable
levels.
The plant design is an established design with a number of similar plants being
operated throughout the world. Therefore, many of the significant potential
hazardous events and operability problems were already known which reduced
the demand on this study. This included incidents from recently commissioned
plants for Orica and other companies.


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GLOSSARY
DoPI Department of Planning and Infrastructure
DTD Directly-heated Thermal Desorption
ECS Emission Control System
FSB Feed Soil Building
HAZOP Hazard and Operability Study
HIPAP Hazardous Industry Planning Advisory Paper
PHA Preliminary Hazard Analysis
P&ID Piping and Instrumentation Diagram
STA Soil Treatment Area
VOC Volatile Organic Compound


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REPORT
1 INTRODUCTION
Orica is proposing to install and operate a soil processing facility at the former
Orica Villawood site. The Site contains waste byproducts of industrial activities
which ceased in 2000, in particular DDT and its degradation products DDD and
DDE. The contaminants will be separated from the soil and destroyed within
the process.
The Minister for Planning granted development consent for the project in May,
2012.
Development Consent Condition 21(b) specifies the following requirements for
the HAZOP study.
"Prior to Site Establishment, the Proponent shall obtain the
Director-Generals approval of the following study:
b) a Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP) chaired by an
independent, qualified person or team. The independent person
or team shall be approved by the Director-General. The Study
shall be carried out in accordance with the Department's
publication Hazardous Industry Planning Advisory Paper (HIPAP)
No. 8 - HAZOP Guidelines (Ref 1) and shall include consideration
of measures to prevent any accidental spills of liquids and/ or
liquid wastes on all relevant tanks and equipment used for the
storage and handling of liquids or liquid wastes, including
associated pipes and hoses.
Orica requested that Dean Shewring from Pinnacle Risk Management chair the
required HAZOP study. The approval received from the Department of
Planning and Infrastructure (DoPI) for the chair of this projects HAZOP study is
shown in Appendix 1.
This report details the results of the HAZOP study and is written to meet the
requirements of the Department of Planning and Infrastructures HIPAP Number
8 and Development Consent Condition 21(b).
The HAZOP study on the main contaminant destruction process was detailed in
revisions A to C of this report. Following this study, two additional HAZOPs
were performed. The first additional study reviewed the air compressor for the
evaporative cooler and the pugmill water system. The second additional study
reviewed the waste water treatment plant. The results of these two additional
studies have been added to revision D of this report.
The aim of the HAZOP study is to identify potential hazardous events and
significant operability problems associated with the proposed operations. This
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aim is inherent for all HAZOP studies. The scope for this study is detailed in
Section 2 of this report.
2 PROCESS DESCRIPTION AND HAZOP SCOPE
A copy of the detailed process description for the soil treatment plant is supplied
in Appendix 2.
In summary, the feed soil is initially heated in a dryer to remove the volatile
contaminants which are then destroyed in a directly-heated thermal desorption
unit. The resultant product gases are then absorbed within a scrubber. Treated
soil can then be returned to the site.
In the waste water treatment plant, water from various site containments is
processed via settlers, flocculation (including chemical additional and pH
adjustment) and a series of filters to remove the contaminants. The purified
water is discharged to sewer.
Copies of the drawings used in the study which detail the process areas are
supplied in Appendix 3.
As the natural gas supply train to the directly-heated desorption unit will be
compliant to the relevant Australian Standard then the HAZOP just considered
deviations from the design intent associated with natural gas supply (rather than
try to alter an Australian Standard compliant system).
3 METHODOLOGY
3.1 GENERAL
A HAZOP study is a hazard study which concentrates on how the design will
cope with abnormal conditions, rather than on how it will perform under normal
conditions. The study is comprised of a review of each unit operation,
examining each for possible causes of a wide range of process abnormalities
and their consequences.
HAZOP provides the opportunity for people to think creatively and examine
ways in which hazards or operating problems might arise. To reduce the
chance of missing something, a HAZOP is carried out in a systematic manner,
using guide words to consider each pipeline and each type of hazard in turn.
The study is carried out by a team so that input from all areas of functional
expertise can be provided.
The results of a HAZOP depend heavily upon the experience and attitudes of
the team members and on the leadership style adopted. In this study, the
members of the team had good experience, knowledge and skills and had the
authority to approve the actions decided upon.

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3.2 MEETING PROCEDURES
The HAZOP study of each section of plant followed the procedure given below:
The process design engineer outlined the broad purpose of the section of
design under study and displayed on the relevant P&IDs on the wall. This
outline included design features, operating conditions, description of fittings
and details of equipment.
Any general questions about the scope and intent of the design were
answered.
The first section or area of the design was highlighted for study, typically an
area where material flows into the plant.
Any general questions about this area were then answered. Minutes may
be generated during this discussion. If so, they have been recorded with the
guide word General Discussion.
The detailed "line by line" study commenced at this point. The HAZOP
leader led the group through the HAZOP guide words. Each guide word is a
prompt, such as "MORE OF OR HIGH FLOW", which identifies a deviation
from normal operating conditions that may lead to a hazardous event or
significant operability problem. This is used to prompt discussion of the
possible causes and effects of flow at an undesirably high rate. If, in the
opinion of the team, the safeguards for the combination of the consequences
and likelihood of a credible event are inadequate then an action is recorded
in the minutes.
For major risk areas the need for action is assessed quantitatively (by
Hazard or Reliability Analysis). For less significant risks the need for action
can be based on experience and judgement. For this study, all actions could
be appropriately addressed by the nominated HAZOP team members /
company.
The main aim of the meeting was to find problems needing solution, rather
than the actual solution. When the group became tied down by trying to
resolve a problem, the issue was minuted as requiring further review outside
the meeting, and the study proceeded.
All changes agreed at the meeting were minuted with some being marked
on the HAZOP master P&IDs.
Note that all actions were recorded in the minutes as well as significant
discussion points which did not result in any actions. The latter were
recorded as a means to record the basis of safety for a potential hazardous
event or operability problem.
The guide words used during the study are listed in Appendix 4.
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All actions are listed in the HAZOP minutes, contained in Appendix 5. It is
noted that safeguards are only recorded by exception. It is assumed that the
procedures within the Orica safety management system will be used effectively
(as discussed throughout the HAZOP study).
As the purpose of a HAZOP study is to identify, i.e. not necessarily solve,
potential hazardous events and significant operability problems associated with
the process under review, some of the actions require further review post the
study. As a general rule, a HAZOP facilitator allows approximately 5 to 10
minutes to resolve any issues identified during the study. If a solution cannot be
agreed to within this timeframe then the issue is minuted and the study
proceeds.
The reason for this approach is that a positive, open, questioning mindset is
required from the team members. This allows creative brainstorming to identify
possible abnormal plant conditions that may lead to potential hazardous events
and/or significant operability problems. Teams that become tied down trying to
resolve all issues, in particular problems that require further calculations etc,
lose their creativity and hence the basis for the study effectiveness is lost.
4 STUDY TEAM
The HAZOP study for the project was conducted in a number of sessions from
January to November, 2012.
The main HAZOP team participants had the appropriate level of experience in
design and/or operation of soil processing plants (or similar processes). Table
1 shows the team members who participated in the HAZOP study.
The meetings were led by Dean Shewring with the minutes being recorded by
Peter ODea.
Table 1 HAZOP Team
HAZOP Role Name Company
HAZOP Chair Dean Shewring Pinnacle Risk Management
HAZOP Secretary Peter ODea Orica
Project Management Peter ODea
Lindsay Killin
Cameron McLean
Richard Giles
Orica
EnviroPacific
EnviroPacific
EnviroPacific
Site Management
Representative
Gwenda Lister Orica
Process Design and Plant
Operation Representatives
Brett Garton
Bala Kathiravelu
Rudy Maes
Keith Chapman
Tai Truong
Pearce Anderson
EnviroPacific
Orica
Consultant to Chapman Services
Chapman Services
EnviroPacific
EnviroPacific
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5 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
5.1 ANALYSIS OF MAIN FINDINGS
The HAZOP team assembled for the study was well balanced in terms of
disciplines and experience. The team sizes were generally kept to the required
four to eight people. This increases the ability to achieve a creative
brainstorming workshop to help ensure maximum effectiveness and quality.
The main participants had appropriate experience in the design and operation
of soil processing (or similar) plants. Therefore, the hazards were generally well
known as well as the required control measures to reduce risk to acceptable
levels.
The plant design is an established design with a number of similar plants being
operated throughout the world. Therefore, many of the significant potential
hazardous events and operability problems were already known which reduced
the demand on this study. This included incidents from recently commissioned
plants for Orica and other companies.
Potential hazardous events concerning releases of harmful materials via
gaseous, liquid or solid losses of containment were reviewed during the study.
Assuming the proposed safeguards remain effective then the risk of such
events should be low.
Any significant changes to the HAZOP design should be separately assessed
for new potential hazardous events and operability problems. This is commonly
achieved by utilising a management of change programme within the project
and may require further review using the HAZOP technique.
During the study, industry standard operating procedures were discussed and
included as potential causes for hazardous events and significant operability
problems. Any significant issues identified have been recorded in the HAZOP
minutes for inclusion in the final version of the standard operating procedures
for the Orica facility.
HAZOP studies are, by definition, a qualitative risk assessment. The decisions
made by the HAZOP team members are based on their experience and
knowledge of the type of processing plant under review. If the HAZOP team
members determined the existing control measures were adequate then no
further action is required. Significant points of discussion (generally if significant
consequential impacts are possible) were recorded even though the control
measures were deemed acceptable by the HAZOP team. All issues requiring a
response were included in the HAZOP minutes.



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5.2 ACTIONS ARISING FROM THE HAZOP
Completed HAZOP actions need to be tracked within the projects HAZOP
action register or equivalent. Regular project meetings should include a review
of the progress of closing-out all of the actions. It is normally the responsibility
of the project manager to ensure that all of the HAZOP actions are completed.
The HAZOP drawings and a record of the completed actions should be retained
with the plant files.


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Appendix 1









Approval of HAZOP Chair
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Appendix 1 Approval of HAZOP Chair.

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Appendix 2









Process Description
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Appendix 2 Process Description.

1. Pre-Treatment of Materials
The pre-treatment of excavated materials will be undertaken in two stages. Initially, excavated
material and overlying material may be screened within the Remediation Area compound.
Material required to be treated (in the Directly-heated Thermal Desorption (DTD) Plant) will be
transported to the Feed Soil Building (FSB), where further handling and testing of this material
will take place.

The material will be stockpiled in the FSB using a front end loader before undergoing further
screening and testing for contaminant levels and other characteristics which will be required for
the DTD treatment process. The material will then be blended to achieve a relatively
homogenous feed material prior to being loaded into the feed hopper of the DTD Plant.
Activities within the FSB, including screening and testing will take place 24 hours per day, seven
days per week.

2. Feed Soil Building and Emission Control System
The purpose of the FSB is to control emissions during pre-treatment activities and ensure these
emissions are vented to atmosphere through an Emission Control System (ECS).

The FSB will be constructed of a steel frame with metal sheeting. The building will contain an
approximate seven day working inventory of feed soil plus a sufficient buffer for soil drying and
other pre-treatment activities. This inventory volume is designed to provide adequate storage
capacity to feed the thermal treatment plant during periods when unforeseen conditions
interfere with normal excavation activities.

The FSB will be fitted with an air-lock and automated wheel wash, louvres and an ECS for air
quality control.

The FSB will be equipped with personnel entrances and truck entrances. The truck entrances
will include an air-lock consisting of a small structure internal to the enclosure. The air-lock will
be equipped with two doors. When a truck enters the air-lock, the outer door will open while the
inside door is closed. Once the truck enters the air-lock, the outer door will close, the inner door
will open and the truck will enter the enclosure. The procedure will be reversed when a truck
exits the enclosure.

An ECS will be constructed and operated to preserve air quality within the building and minimise
emissions (dust and organic vapours) to the atmosphere. The ECS will be operated to ensure
the flow of air into the FSB (i.e. air pressure within the FSB will be slightly lower than ambient air
pressure). Conceptually, the ECS will comprise an induced draft fan, duct work system,
particulate control device (dust filters) and a stack.

The air exhausted from the FSB will first pass through a particulate control device to remove
fugitive dust. Dust removed will be collected in enclosed drums or hoppers. When the dust
collection container is taken off-line, the dust will be taken to the Soil Treatment Area (STA) for
treatment.

Air will be exhausted to the atmosphere via a stack. Periodic stack testing will be undertaken in
accordance with license requirements. Permanent analysers will also be installed on the stack to
detect any unacceptable contaminant concentration levels.
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3. Directly-heated Thermal Desorption Plant
The DTD Plant will be located within the STA. After pre-treatment in the FSB, the excavated
materials will be fed into the feed hopper located inside the FSB. The materials will be
transported via a conveyor to the DTD Plant for treatment.

The DTD Plant will operate 24 hours a day, seven days a week with the seventh day typically
scheduled as downtime for maintenance. The nominal maximum rate of treatment through the
DTD Plant is 15 tonnes per hour.

The DTD Plant will have a footprint of approximately 50 m by 25 m. It will be established within
a concrete paved and bunded area having its own internal surface water drainage control
measures. Electrical power to the DTD Plant will be provided by mains power, with a diesel
powered generator used as a back-up. Natural gas sourced from the mains supply, will be used
to fire the heating burners of the plant.

Brief descriptions of typical key unit operations in the process are presented below.

Rotary Dryer
The first step in the DTD treatment process involves the volatilisation or separation of
contaminants from the material in the rotary dryer.

The rotary dryer utilises natural gas as fuel to heat the contaminated material to a temperature
of approximately 350C to 450C.

In a co-current system, the contaminated material enters the rotary dryer at the end where the
burner is located and the combustion gas and treated soil move in the same direction to where
they exit at the opposite end of the dryer.

Contaminants desorb and volatilise as they pass through the dryer. Soil is heated in the first
third of the dryer with most desorption and volatilisation occurring in the next third as
contaminants reach their boiling points.

Once it has passed through the rotary dryer, the heated soil material passes to a pugmill where
it is sprayed with water for cooling and rewetting. The treated material is then transferred to
temporary treated soil stockpiles awaiting validation.

Cyclone
The off-gases flow from the rotary dryer through a cyclone, where large dust particles are
removed, to the thermal oxidiser. The dust from the cyclone is directed to the pugmill where it is
mixed with the treated soil for rewetting and validation.

Thermal Oxidiser
The thermal oxidiser is used to treat the gases produced through the heating of the soil material
in the rotary dryer and would be designed to be Stockholm compliant, i.e. with appropriate
residence time, temperature and turbulence.

The thermal oxidiser operates at a temperature of about 1,000C using natural gas. At this
temperature, the contaminants present in the gas (from the feed material) oxidise or decompose
forming carbon dioxide, water vapour and hydrogen chloride with small amounts of other by-
products such as chlorine and sulphur compounds.
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In order to maintain the correct temperature to maximise destruction efficiency and minimise the
formation of by-products, the thermal oxidiser will be fitted with a sophisticated temperature
control system which will be consistently monitored.

Quench
Once gases have passed through the thermal oxidiser they must be rapidly cooled to minimise
the potential for dioxin formation and allow further treatment before release to the atmosphere
(as required by the Stockholm Convention).

To achieve this, the hot gases are drawn into the quench by an induced draught fan. In the
quench, water is injected to rapidly cool the gases to a temperature which is suitable for further
treatment.

Baghouse
The cooled gas from the quench is combined with steam from the pugmill and drawn into the
baghouse by an induced draught fan. The baghouse contains a series of fabric filters which
remove particulates.

Acid Gas Scrubber
The final step in the treatment process involves the removal of acid gases from the exhaust gas.
The acid gas scrubber consists of a packed tower with a re-circulating caustic solution that
reacts with any hydrogen chloride and chlorine in the exhaust gas to form a salt solution.

Following this, the clean treated gas is vented to the atmosphere via the scrubber stack which
is some 30 m in height.

Treated Soil
Treated soil will be stockpiled adjacent to the STA with drains and bunds provided to manage
runoff. Treated materials stored in this area will undergo validation testing and reclassification.
This is to determine whether the process has been effective and whether or not the materials
are ready for reuse at the Site. Stockpiles will be stabilised with spray grass or other such
treatment and will be wetted when necessary to control dust.

The treated, stockpiled soil will be retained until completion of remediation works at the Site
when it will be transported (by truck) to the Remediation Areas for reinstatement works.



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Appendix 3









HAZOP Drawings
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Appendix 3 HAZOP Drawings.






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Appendix 4









HAZOP Guide Words
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Appendix 4 HAZOP Guide Words.
Note that the main headings are shown only. Some main headings included
various sub-prompts as well.
Line-By-Line Guide Words Continuous Fluid Systems

High Level / High Flow
Low Level / Low Flow
Zero Flow / Empty
Reverse Flow
High Pressure
- Venting, relief
Low Pressure
- Venting, relief
High Temperature
Low Temperature
Impurities
- Gaseous, liquid, solid
Change in Concentration or Composition / Two Phase Flow / Reactions
Testing
- Equipment / product
Plant Items
- Operable / maintainable
Electrical
Instruments

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Overview Guide Words

Toxicity
Commissioning
Startup
Shutdown (isolation, purging)
Breakdown (including services failure)
Effluent
Fire and Explosion
Noise / Vibration
Materials of Construction
Quality and Consistency
Output - Reliability and Bottlenecks
Efficiency Losses
Simplicity


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Appendix 5









HAZOP Minutes
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Appendix 5 HAZOP Minutes.
PINNACLE RISK MANAGEMENT - HAZOP RECORD SHEET
PROJECT: Orica, Villawood, DTD Project TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Gwenda Lister, Keith Chapman,
Rudy Maes, Cameron McLean, Lindsay Killin, Brett
Garton

DATE: 23/1/2012
SYSTEM: Feed Supply Bin and Conveyors LEADER: Dean Shewring

DRAWING: C143-PF-96D-DTDU-10001 Rev B MINUTES BY: Peter ODea

No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING
SAFEGUARDS
ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE
1. General
Discussion
Bricks, rubble and
oversized material,
clay etc
Feed interrupted due to
blockages or equipment
damage
No need for hopper
screen or clay breaker
as pre-screening. will be
done in the feed soil
building
No further action required - -
2. General
Discussion
Chemical (i.e. from
the contaminated
soil) attack on
conveyor belts
Belt failure,
maintenance
Will use chemical
resistant belts
No further action required - -
3. General
Discussion
Rain Increased moisture
impacts process
Conveyor covers to be
installed
No further action required - -
4. High Flow /
High Level
Front end loader
(FEL) overfills
hopper
Spill to the bunded
building floor
DTD operator in contact
with FEL operator, any
spilt soil can be swept
up and reprocessed
Review the need for providing a mirror
or screen in the FEL cabin so the FEL
driver can see the level in the feed
hopper
LK
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PINNACLE RISK MANAGEMENT - HAZOP RECORD SHEET
PROJECT: Orica, Villawood, DTD Project TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Gwenda Lister, Keith Chapman,
Rudy Maes, Cameron McLean, Lindsay Killin, Brett
Garton

DATE: 23/1/2012
SYSTEM: Feed Supply Bin and Conveyors LEADER: Dean Shewring

DRAWING: C143-PF-96D-DTDU-10001 Rev B MINUTES BY: Peter ODea

No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING
SAFEGUARDS
ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE
5. Low Flow /
Low Level
Soil clumps in
hopper
Potential to fall onto the
belt below (damage)
and possibly cause
blockages
Steep sided hopper
minimises the risk of
material hold-up on the
hopper walls.
Can adjust the gap
below the hopper during
commissioning
No further action required - -
6. Zero Flow /
Empty
Hopper empty Only financial keep
burning gas etc
Process controls come
into effect to trip
downstream fired
appliances
No further action required - -
7. Zero Flow /
Empty
Feeder fails Hopper full of material.
Confined space entry to
unblock
Routine checks on belt
feeder during
shutdowns, confined
space risk assessment
Preventive maintenance procedures to
emphasise belt feed conveyor checks
BG
8. Zero Flow /
Empty
Feeder fails (as
above)
Hopper full of material.
Confined space entry to
unblock
Routine checks on belt
feeder during
shutdowns, confined
space risk assessment
Review the need for hatches etc in the
feed bin walls for ease of clearing
material provided they also do not hold
up material
LK
Pinnacle Risk Management

Orica Villawood HAZOP Report Rev E.Doc
17 April 2013 A5.3
PINNACLE RISK MANAGEMENT - HAZOP RECORD SHEET
PROJECT: Orica, Villawood, DTD Project TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Gwenda Lister, Keith Chapman,
Rudy Maes, Cameron McLean, Lindsay Killin, Brett
Garton

DATE: 23/1/2012
SYSTEM: Feed Supply Bin and Conveyors LEADER: Dean Shewring

DRAWING: C143-PF-96D-DTDU-10001 Rev B MINUTES BY: Peter ODea

No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING
SAFEGUARDS
ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE
9. Zero Flow /
Empty
Spillage from
conveyors
Clean-up.
Damage to adjacent
equipment
Scrapers prevent return
below belt.
Canopy over conveyors
Provide a cover around the slinger
conveyor to prevent any spilt soil
damaging adjacent gas burner and
other equipment

10. Zero Flow /
Empty
Friction, e.g. from
wood stuck on belt
etc
Conveyor belt fire with
toxic products of
combustion potentially
smoke logging the
building
Fire hose nearby.
Building vented through
carbon filters
Include in the fire safety study
assessment of belts fires and the risk to
emergency responders from toxic
products of combustion
LK
11. Zero Flow /
Empty
Plant outage Potential for conveyor
belt fire on restart if
material dries out /
solidifies
Slinger conveyor can be
run backwards for
material to be collected
in a truck, i.e. to clear
the conveyors
No further action required - -
12. Reverse Flow Belt stops on the
inclined conveyor
and runs back due to
soil load
Spillage at bottom
requiring cleaning up
Back stop provided on
the conveyor
No further action required - -
13. Impurities Asbestos cement
sheeting pieces in
the feed
Exposure to personnel
who contact the treated
soil and maintain the
plant
Will be removed in
accordance will agreed
practices by licensed
contractor
No further action required - -
Pinnacle Risk Management

Orica Villawood HAZOP Report Rev E.Doc
17 April 2013 A5.4
PINNACLE RISK MANAGEMENT - HAZOP RECORD SHEET
PROJECT: Orica, Villawood, DTD Project TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Gwenda Lister, Keith Chapman,
Rudy Maes, Cameron McLean, Lindsay Killin, Brett
Garton

DATE: 23/1/2012
SYSTEM: Feed Supply Bin and Conveyors LEADER: Dean Shewring

DRAWING: C143-PF-96D-DTDU-10001 Rev B MINUTES BY: Peter ODea

No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING
SAFEGUARDS
ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE
14. Impurities PPE disposed of via
the process
Possibility of embers
getting to the baghouse
and causing damage to
the filters
Will be collected and
disposed of as special
waste
No further action required - -
15. Plant Items Lack of access for
maintenance and
operational checks
Reduced online time Include in the project plan an operability
and maintainability access review to all
equipment items

16. Plant Items Feed soil building
emission control
system out of service
Atmosphere unsuitable
for personnel
Likely to be confined
space entry if the feed
soil building emission
control system fails
Risk assessment, including on confined
space entry, required to determine
suitable safeguards for people entering
the feed soil building when the emission
control system fails

17. Plant Items Wayward FEL
operation etc
Damage to feed hopper,
conveyors etc
Will provide Jersey
barriers
No further action required - -
18. Electrical Magnetic field from
tramp metal collector
Impact on people with
pacemakers
Check impact of magnet on implanted
pacemakers and any other critical
electrical devices
BG

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Orica Villawood HAZOP Report Rev E.Doc
17 April 2013 A5.5

PINNACLE RISK MANAGEMENT - HAZOP RECORD SHEET
PROJECT: Orica, Villawood, DTD Project TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Gwenda Lister, Keith Chapman,
Rudy Maes, Cameron McLean, Lindsay Killin, Brett
Garton

DATE: 23/1/2012
SYSTEM: Dryer and Cyclone LEADER: Dean Shewring

DRAWING: C143-PF-96D-DTDU-10002 Rev B MINUTES BY: Peter ODea

No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING
SAFEGUARDS
ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE
19. General
Discussion (note
the cyclones
remove particles
to 30 microns)
LEL exceeded in the
dryer
Explosion With the soil at
Villawood, the LEL
cannot be exceeded.
Therefore do not need
pop-off damper and
other such provisions
No further action required - -
20. High Flow /
High Level
Knockout box
blockage
Dryer full of soil
requiring confined space
for cleaning
Low soil temperature
and position switches on
the sluice gate or rotary
valve will initiate action
prior to significant
consequential impact
No further action required - -
21. High Flow /
High Level
High gas flow Overheating of materials
and hence the potential
for equipment damage
Plant will shut down
from high temperature in
the flue gases (back up
thermocouples
provided).
Steel designed for 650
deg. C
No further action required - -
Pinnacle Risk Management

Orica Villawood HAZOP Report Rev E.Doc
17 April 2013 A5.6
PINNACLE RISK MANAGEMENT - HAZOP RECORD SHEET
PROJECT: Orica, Villawood, DTD Project TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Gwenda Lister, Keith Chapman,
Rudy Maes, Cameron McLean, Lindsay Killin, Brett
Garton

DATE: 23/1/2012
SYSTEM: Dryer and Cyclone LEADER: Dean Shewring

DRAWING: C143-PF-96D-DTDU-10002 Rev B MINUTES BY: Peter ODea

No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING
SAFEGUARDS
ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE
22. Low Flow /
Low Level
Low solid separation
in cyclones from a
plant turndown
Baghouse overloaded Cyclones designed for
minimum turndown of
the burner
No further action required - -
23. Zero Flow /
Empty
Unplanned plant
shutdown
Material sitting hot in the
bottom of the dryer can
deform the dryer drum
Drum must be able to
turn
Make provisions to turn the drum in
case of plant, including power,
shutdown, e.g. manual jogging
KC
24. Reverse Flow Burner continues to
run when the ID fan
stops
High temperature
damage to the dryer or
injury to personnel if
flames are emitted from
the dryer
Run on of the fan when
shutting down and the
draft from the stack will
initially prevent damage
and the burner flame is
contained within the
dryer, i.e. no potential
for impact on personnel
No further action required - -
25. High
Temperature
Hot exterior of dryer
and ductwork
Burns to personnel Personal protection, e.g.
mesh guards or
insulation, will be
provided for surfaces
over 60 deg. C
No further action required - -
Pinnacle Risk Management

Orica Villawood HAZOP Report Rev E.Doc
17 April 2013 A5.7
PINNACLE RISK MANAGEMENT - HAZOP RECORD SHEET
PROJECT: Orica, Villawood, DTD Project TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Gwenda Lister, Keith Chapman,
Rudy Maes, Cameron McLean, Lindsay Killin, Brett
Garton

DATE: 23/1/2012
SYSTEM: Dryer and Cyclone LEADER: Dean Shewring

DRAWING: C143-PF-96D-DTDU-10002 Rev B MINUTES BY: Peter ODea

No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING
SAFEGUARDS
ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE
26. Plant Items Dryer flight breakage Equipment damage Routine maintenance
checks and operator
response to noise from
within the dryer
No further action required - -
27. Electrical Lightning Instrument damage Review the need for lightning (surge)
protection of the instruments
KC
28. Instruments Ensure redundant pressure transmitters
on the dryer, i.e. separate transmitters
for control and trip actions
KC

Pinnacle Risk Management

Orica Villawood HAZOP Report Rev E.Doc
17 April 2013 A5.8

PINNACLE RISK MANAGEMENT - HAZOP RECORD SHEET
PROJECT: Orica, Villawood, DTD Project TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Gwenda Lister, Keith Chapman,
Rudy Maes, Cameron McLean, Lindsay Killin, Brett
Garton

DATE: 23/1/2012
SYSTEM: Thermal Oxidiser LEADER: Dean Shewring

DRAWING: C143-PF-96D-DTDU-10006 Rev A MINUTES BY: Peter ODea

No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING
SAFEGUARDS
ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE
29. General
Discussion
Burner continues to
run when the ID fan
stops
High temperature
damage to the burner or
injury to personnel if
flames are emitted from
the burner
Run on of the fan when
shutting down and the
draft from the stack will
initially prevent damage
and the burner flame is
contained within the
burner, i.e. no potential
for impact on personnel
No further action required - -
30. High Flow /
High Level
High feed rate Thermal oxidiser (TO)
residence time less than
design
TO designed for > 2
seconds at maximum
flow plus there is some
extra time in the ducts to
the baghouse
No further action required - -
31. High Flow /
High Level
Buildup of slag in
bottom of TO
Shutdown for cleanout Special burner / inlet
gas design eliminates
creation of sticky
particles and
agglomeration
No further action required - -
Pinnacle Risk Management

Orica Villawood HAZOP Report Rev E.Doc
17 April 2013 A5.9
PINNACLE RISK MANAGEMENT - HAZOP RECORD SHEET
PROJECT: Orica, Villawood, DTD Project TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Gwenda Lister, Keith Chapman,
Rudy Maes, Cameron McLean, Lindsay Killin, Brett
Garton

DATE: 23/1/2012
SYSTEM: Thermal Oxidiser LEADER: Dean Shewring

DRAWING: C143-PF-96D-DTDU-10006 Rev A MINUTES BY: Peter ODea

No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING
SAFEGUARDS
ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE
32. Low Pressure ID fan draws too
much flow
Worst case could
extinguish burner
Burner management
system takes control,
i.e. flameout detector
shuts of the natural gas
flow
No further action required - -
33. High
Temperature
Too much natural
gas flow due to the
control temperature
transmitter reading
too low
Equipment damage TO temperature trips
plus there are also
downstream
temperature controls
No further action required - -
34. High
Temperature
Refractory failure Shell temperature rises
(would probably see
glow on the outside of
the shell)
Plant operators will
regularly shoot
measurements with an
infrared gun to detect
hot spots
No further action required - -
35. Low Temperature Loss of process
control due to the
control temperature
transmitter reading
too high
Fail to achieve
regulatory destruction
temperature
Thermocouples in series
will pick up temperature
discrepancies.
Calibration instrument
has been purchased
No further action required - -
Pinnacle Risk Management

Orica Villawood HAZOP Report Rev E.Doc
17 April 2013 A5.10
PINNACLE RISK MANAGEMENT - HAZOP RECORD SHEET
PROJECT: Orica, Villawood, DTD Project TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Gwenda Lister, Keith Chapman,
Rudy Maes, Cameron McLean, Lindsay Killin, Brett
Garton

DATE: 23/1/2012
SYSTEM: Thermal Oxidiser LEADER: Dean Shewring

DRAWING: C143-PF-96D-DTDU-10006 Rev A MINUTES BY: Peter ODea

No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING
SAFEGUARDS
ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE
36. Low Temperature Emergency stop Residual material in the
TO cools with potential
to form other
compounds, e.g.
dioxins, furans
Slow cooling allows
plant to be purged of
gases using ID fan
No further action required - -
37. Plant Items Flame impingement
on shell opposite
burner
Damage to vessel shell Burner entry is longer
than burner flame length
so direct flame
impingement not
expected
No further action required - -
38. Plant Items Dust in the TO Flame detector does not
see the flame and
hence nuisance trips
Flame sensor is self-
checking and air
purged. System fails
safe
No further action required - -

Pinnacle Risk Management

Orica Villawood HAZOP Report Rev E.Doc
17 April 2013 A5.11

PINNACLE RISK MANAGEMENT - HAZOP RECORD SHEET
PROJECT: Orica, Villawood, DTD Project TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Gwenda Lister, Keith Chapman,
Rudy Maes, Cameron McLean, Lindsay Killin, Brett
Garton

DATE: 23/1/2012
SYSTEM: Evaporative Cooler including the Air
/ Water Flows
LEADER: Dean Shewring

DRAWING: C143-PF-96D-DTDU-10007 Rev B MINUTES BY: Peter ODea

No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING
SAFEGUARDS
ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE
39. General
Discussion
Power failure Loss of water flow
leading to high
temperature and hence
damage to equipment,
e.g. the downstream
scrubber
Inlet water valve fails
open
Show the inlet water valve on the P&ID
to fail open designate as FO
KC
40. General
Discussion
Rapid quenching
does not occur
Dioxin formation Design is to quench to
below 200 deg. C in
1 second
No further action required - -
41. High Flow /
High Level
False low
temperature reading
at the outlet duct
Too much water flow
resulting in pooling in
the vessel bottom
causing corrosion
Water will evaporate.
Operator is constantly
observing temperature
to the baghouse
Review the need to install a low
temperature alarm on the existing
downstream thermocouple
RM
42. High Flow /
High Level
Dilution air damper
open when it should
not be
Nothing unsafe just a
change in plant
pressure
Will be detected through
plant pressure controls
No further action required - -
Pinnacle Risk Management

Orica Villawood HAZOP Report Rev E.Doc
17 April 2013 A5.12
PINNACLE RISK MANAGEMENT - HAZOP RECORD SHEET
PROJECT: Orica, Villawood, DTD Project TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Gwenda Lister, Keith Chapman,
Rudy Maes, Cameron McLean, Lindsay Killin, Brett
Garton

DATE: 23/1/2012
SYSTEM: Evaporative Cooler including the Air
/ Water Flows
LEADER: Dean Shewring

DRAWING: C143-PF-96D-DTDU-10007 Rev B MINUTES BY: Peter ODea

No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING
SAFEGUARDS
ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE
43. High Flow /
High Level
ECU (emission
control unit) water
pump keeps running
when the
evaporative cooler is
shutdown
Bottom of the
evaporative cooler
floods
Procedures dictate
pumps to be manually
shut down when the
plant stops.
Water will come out the
dilution air damper and
become visible
No further action required - -
44. Low Flow /
Low Level
Loss of water flow High temperature and
hence damage to
equipment, e.g. the
downstream scrubber
Dilution air damper
opens. If control not
regained, plant trips
Dilution air damper to be as close to the
evaporative cooler outlet duct as
possible for effective cooling
KC
45. Low Flow /
Low Level
Low air flow, even if
air pressure is
maintained due to
the air nozzle
clogging
Large water particles
created. Inefficient
cooling. Control system
calls for more water
Operator is constantly
observing temperature
to the baghouse and a
low temperature alarm
No further action required - -
46. Reverse Flow Hot gases out the
open dilution
damper??? - no
record of this
happening
Burns to nearby
personnel
Damper located
sufficiently high to avoid
damage
No further action required - -
Pinnacle Risk Management

Orica Villawood HAZOP Report Rev E.Doc
17 April 2013 A5.13
PINNACLE RISK MANAGEMENT - HAZOP RECORD SHEET
PROJECT: Orica, Villawood, DTD Project TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Gwenda Lister, Keith Chapman,
Rudy Maes, Cameron McLean, Lindsay Killin, Brett
Garton

DATE: 23/1/2012
SYSTEM: Evaporative Cooler including the Air
/ Water Flows
LEADER: Dean Shewring

DRAWING: C143-PF-96D-DTDU-10007 Rev B MINUTES BY: Peter ODea

No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING
SAFEGUARDS
ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE
47. Impurities Oil from the air
compressor
Could send some of the
stack readings high
The compressor will be
oil-free or have a
coalescing filter
Confirm compressor selection and
hence no oil will flow to the evaporative
cooler
LK
48. Change in
Composition or
Concentration /
Two-Phase Flow
/ Reactions
Poor spray nozzle
atomisation
Pooling in the vessel
bottom causing
corrosion
Nozzles can be
withdrawn and tested
No further action required - -
49. Testing Bypass valves on the
air or water supply
left open
No serious outcome Bypasses are useful for
maintenance purposes
and are to be retained
No further action required - -

Pinnacle Risk Management

Orica Villawood HAZOP Report Rev E.Doc
17 April 2013 A5.14

PINNACLE RISK MANAGEMENT - HAZOP RECORD SHEET
PROJECT: Orica, Villawood, DTD Project TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Gwenda Lister, Keith Chapman,
Rudy Maes, Cameron McLean, Lindsay Killin, Brett
Garton

DATE: 23/1/2012
SYSTEM: Baghouse and Dust Screws LEADER: Dean Shewring

DRAWING: C143-PF-96D-DTDU-10004 Rev B MINUTES BY: Peter ODea

No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING
SAFEGUARDS
ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE
50. Low Flow /
Low Level
Inadequate air
pulsing
Bags become blinded High differential
pressure alarm
Review the air pulsing duration and
frequency in the detailed design
RM
51. Zero Flow /
Empty
Dust in the bottom of
the baghouse plus
moisture, e.g. during
a shutdown
Dust goes solid and
hence maintenance
access is required
Procedure is to run and
empty the dust screw for
prolonged shutdowns
No further action required - -
52. Zero Flow /
Empty
Backup of dust if a
screw conveyor fails
Dust is held-up in the
system
The last screw runs
faster than the 2
nd
last
which runs faster than
dust screw at the
baghouse bottom to
prevent dust being held-
up
No further action required - -
53. Impurities Torn bags falling
onto the dust screw
in the bottom of the
baghouse
Dust screw blocked A grate is provided at
the bottom above the
baghouse dust screw
No further action required - -
54. Plant Items Bag failure Dust not collected PM10 analyser and low
differential pressure
alarm
No further action required - -
Pinnacle Risk Management

Orica Villawood HAZOP Report Rev E.Doc
17 April 2013 A5.15
PINNACLE RISK MANAGEMENT - HAZOP RECORD SHEET
PROJECT: Orica, Villawood, DTD Project TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Gwenda Lister, Keith Chapman,
Rudy Maes, Cameron McLean, Lindsay Killin, Brett
Garton

DATE: 23/1/2012
SYSTEM: Baghouse and Dust Screws LEADER: Dean Shewring

DRAWING: C143-PF-96D-DTDU-10004 Rev B MINUTES BY: Peter ODea

No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING
SAFEGUARDS
ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE
55. Plant Items Moisture ingress Corrosion, e.g. of the
baghouse dust screw
conveyor
Appropriate materials of
construction
No further action required - -

Pinnacle Risk Management

Orica Villawood HAZOP Report Rev E.Doc
17 April 2013 A5.16

PINNACLE RISK MANAGEMENT - HAZOP RECORD SHEET
PROJECT: Orica, Villawood, DTD Project TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Gwenda Lister, Keith Chapman,
Rudy Maes, Cameron McLean, Lindsay Killin, Brett
Garton

DATE: 23/1/2012
SYSTEM: Scrubber (gas stream to
atmosphere) including the Induced Draft Fan
LEADER: Dean Shewring

DRAWING: C143-PF-96D-DTDU-10005 Rev B MINUTES BY: Peter ODea

No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING
SAFEGUARDS
ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE
56. General
Discussion
HCl will be present at
elevated
temperatures
Corrosion and hence
equipment damage
Appropriate materials of
construction will be
provided
No further action required - -
57. Low Flow /
Low Level
Low plant feed rate Low stack velocity, poor
dispersion
The stack top diameter
will be such that the
minimum velocity to
ensure good dispersion
will be maintained at the
design plant turndown
No further action required - -
58. Impurities Baghouse failure Solids through to the
scrubber
TDS (total dissolved
solids) analyser
provided
No further action required - -
59. Plant Items Stack top silencer
corrosion
Higher risk maintenance
due to work at heights
Fan is silenced.
Unsure if the stack top
needs to include a
silencer
Check the need from the noise studies
for a stack top silencer not preferred
as it will be difficult to maintain
POD
60. Plant Items Stack top silencer
corrosion (as above)
Higher risk maintenance
due to work at heights
Fan is silenced.
Unsure if the stack top
needs to include a
silencer
If uncertain about the need for a stack-
top silencer, make provision for bolting
one on later (including allowance for the
weight)
KC
Pinnacle Risk Management

Orica Villawood HAZOP Report Rev E.Doc
17 April 2013 A5.17
PINNACLE RISK MANAGEMENT - HAZOP RECORD SHEET
PROJECT: Orica, Villawood, DTD Project TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Gwenda Lister, Keith Chapman,
Rudy Maes, Cameron McLean, Lindsay Killin, Brett
Garton

DATE: 23/1/2012
SYSTEM: Scrubber (gas stream to
atmosphere) including the Induced Draft Fan
LEADER: Dean Shewring

DRAWING: C143-PF-96D-DTDU-10005 Rev B MINUTES BY: Peter ODea

No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING
SAFEGUARDS
ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE
61. Plant Items Caustic leak Splashing and corrosive
burns to personnel
Safety showers Provide safety showers with insulated
pipes (to prevent hot water flowing
during high ambient temperatures),
green fluoro light above the shower, a
flow sensor to alarm when a person is
using a shower and procedures for lone
workers
LK

Pinnacle Risk Management

Orica Villawood HAZOP Report Rev E.Doc
17 April 2013 A5.18

PINNACLE RISK MANAGEMENT - HAZOP RECORD SHEET
PROJECT: Orica, Villawood, DTD Project TEAM MEMBERS: Gwenda Lister, Keith Chapman, Rudy Maes,
Lindsay Killin, Brett Garton

DATE: 27/1/2012
SYSTEM: Scrubber Make-up Water Supply
Feeds
LEADER: Dean Shewring

DRAWING: C143-PF-96D-DTDU-10005 Rev B MINUTES BY: Peter ODea

No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING
SAFEGUARDS
ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE
62. General
Discussion
Dust carryover from
baghouse
Demister blockage and
hence high scrubber
differential pressure
Sprays onto demister,
high differential
pressure alarm across
the scrubber
No further action required - -
63. General
Discussion
Power failure and the
recycle pumps stop
Loss of containment of
acidic gases to
atmosphere
Emergency power
generator feeds the
scrubber pumps,
analysers installed on
the scrubber stack
No further action required - -
64. General
Discussion
Failure of the check
valve to the scrubber
quench
Caustic flows back to
the towns water tank
The makeup water
supply main block valve
to the scrubber quench
is normally closed and
will only be opened
when the scrubber
recycle pumps are not
operating
No further action required - -
Pinnacle Risk Management

Orica Villawood HAZOP Report Rev E.Doc
17 April 2013 A5.19
PINNACLE RISK MANAGEMENT - HAZOP RECORD SHEET
PROJECT: Orica, Villawood, DTD Project TEAM MEMBERS: Gwenda Lister, Keith Chapman, Rudy Maes,
Lindsay Killin, Brett Garton

DATE: 27/1/2012
SYSTEM: Scrubber Make-up Water Supply
Feeds
LEADER: Dean Shewring

DRAWING: C143-PF-96D-DTDU-10005 Rev B MINUTES BY: Peter ODea

No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING
SAFEGUARDS
ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE
65. General
Discussion
Review need for the low flow alarm on
the make-up water supply line to the
quench as this will be a nuisance alarm
during normal operation when there is
no flow in this line (i.e. as above, this
line is left isolated when the scrubber
recycle pumps are running)
RM
66. General
Discussion
Check with BK the reason for installing
the flow meter in the make-up water
supply line to the quench given the
operation is manual
POD
67. General
Discussion
Show on the P&ID the sump pump and
its controls
KC
Pinnacle Risk Management

Orica Villawood HAZOP Report Rev E.Doc
17 April 2013 A5.20
PINNACLE RISK MANAGEMENT - HAZOP RECORD SHEET
PROJECT: Orica, Villawood, DTD Project TEAM MEMBERS: Gwenda Lister, Keith Chapman, Rudy Maes,
Lindsay Killin, Brett Garton

DATE: 27/1/2012
SYSTEM: Scrubber Make-up Water Supply
Feeds
LEADER: Dean Shewring

DRAWING: C143-PF-96D-DTDU-10005 Rev B MINUTES BY: Peter ODea

No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING
SAFEGUARDS
ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE
68. High Flow /
High Level
Solenoid valve to the
scrubber sump fails
open
Scrubber sump fills and
then overflows via the
emergency overflow
Sump high level alarm.
pH meter will detect a
drop in pH.
The emergency
overflow is sized for all
make-up water supply
flows operating together
at maximum rates.
Bunded area if it does
overflow
Show on the P&ID the 2
nd
level detector
in the scrubber sump to separate the
control and trip functions
KC
69. Zero Flow /
Empty
Solenoid valve to the
demister sprays is
stuck closed
Buildup of solids on the
demister resulting in
high scrubber
differential pressure
Scrubber DP high alarm Include in the functional description a
low flow alarm that is only active when
the solenoid valve to demister sprays
should be open (i.e. to avoid a nuisance
alarm when the solenoid is meant to be
closed)
RM
70. Reverse Flow Acidic gases absorb
back into the make-
up water feed lines
Corrosion of the piping
and piping items
Appropriate materials of
construction, e.g.
stainless steel or plastic
No further action required - -
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PINNACLE RISK MANAGEMENT - HAZOP RECORD SHEET
PROJECT: Orica, Villawood, DTD Project TEAM MEMBERS: Gwenda Lister, Keith Chapman, Rudy Maes,
Lindsay Killin, Brett Garton

DATE: 27/1/2012
SYSTEM: Scrubber Make-up Water Supply
Feeds
LEADER: Dean Shewring

DRAWING: C143-PF-96D-DTDU-10005 Rev B MINUTES BY: Peter ODea

No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING
SAFEGUARDS
ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE
71. Plant Items Control valves
wrongly selected,
e.g. solenoids for
larger (100 to 150
mm) lines not
appropriate
Loss of plant control Correct valve selection Amend the P&ID to show actual types of
valves: electric or pneumatic actuation
KC

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PINNACLE RISK MANAGEMENT - HAZOP RECORD SHEET
PROJECT: Orica, Villawood, DTD Project TEAM MEMBERS: Gwenda Lister, Keith Chapman, Rudy Maes,
Lindsay Killin, Brett Garton

DATE: 27/1/2012
SYSTEM: Scrubber Recycle LEADER: Dean Shewring

DRAWING: C143-PF-96D-DTDU-10005 Rev B MINUTES BY: Peter ODea

No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING
SAFEGUARDS
ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE
72. General
Discussion
Scrubber recycle
pump failure
Plant shuts down
(accepted response)
Manual changeover of
pumps
No further action required - -
73. High Flow /
High Level
Pump seals fail Release of 80 C liquid.

Slow leak only expected
from these types of
pumps
Operator regular
inspection and
maintenance as
required
No further action required - -
74. High Flow /
High Level
Overdosing caustic High pH no significant
consequences identified
pH meter will alarm high
pH
No further action required - -
75. Low Flow /
Low Level
Underdosing caustic
(e.g. from pH meter
drifting, failure to top
up the caustic IBC)
Lack of absorption of
acidic gases and hence
atmospheric emission
Routine manual
sampling of the
scrubber recycle liquid.
pH meter including a
low alarm.
CEMS stack analysers,
e.g. NOx and SOx will
also rise and alarm for
operator response
No further action required - -
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17 April 2013 A5.23
PINNACLE RISK MANAGEMENT - HAZOP RECORD SHEET
PROJECT: Orica, Villawood, DTD Project TEAM MEMBERS: Gwenda Lister, Keith Chapman, Rudy Maes,
Lindsay Killin, Brett Garton

DATE: 27/1/2012
SYSTEM: Scrubber Recycle LEADER: Dean Shewring

DRAWING: C143-PF-96D-DTDU-10005 Rev B MINUTES BY: Peter ODea

No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING
SAFEGUARDS
ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE
76. Low Flow /
Low Level
Nozzles fall off the
reflux distributor
(screw type which
can unwind)
Inadequate liquid / gas
contact due to
channelling in the
packing
Nozzles to be screwed
in tight and are
replaceable through the
side of the scrubber
column
No further action required - -
77. Low Flow /
Low Level
Loss of scrubber flow Increase in temperature
in the plastic packing
with possible damage
Correct packing
selection
Ensure the scrubber packing can
withstand higher temperatures due to
deviations in the recycle scrubber flow
rate

78. Zero Flow /
Empty
Valve left shut before
the scrubber liquor
analysers
Analysers do not detect
changes in pH or
conductivity hence the
potential for poor
scrubber performance
Operator observes
signals not fluctuating,
analysers in the stack
will alarm
Include in the functional description flat-
line detection on the signals from the pH
and conductivity analysers
RM
79. Reverse Flow Recycle flow goes
back to the caustic
pumps
Overpressure, loss of
containment at the
caustic IBC
Pressure control valve
in the common delivery
line from the caustic
pumps
Review need for a check valve in the
common caustic pump discharge line
RM
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17 April 2013 A5.24
PINNACLE RISK MANAGEMENT - HAZOP RECORD SHEET
PROJECT: Orica, Villawood, DTD Project TEAM MEMBERS: Gwenda Lister, Keith Chapman, Rudy Maes,
Lindsay Killin, Brett Garton

DATE: 27/1/2012
SYSTEM: Scrubber Recycle LEADER: Dean Shewring

DRAWING: C143-PF-96D-DTDU-10005 Rev B MINUTES BY: Peter ODea

No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING
SAFEGUARDS
ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE
80. High
Temperature
Hot pipelines (i.e.
approximately 80 C)
Burns on contact Pipes above 60 deg. C
potentially in contact
with personnel to be
provided with personnel
protection through
insulation, mesh
guarding, signage, etc
No further action required - -
81. Impurities Iron oxide dust not
collected in
baghouse
Blockage in the
scrubber
Operator checks for
water discolouration
No further action required - -
82. Change in
Composition or
Concentration /
Two-Phase Flow
/ Reactions
Solids buildup in
system
High conductivity but
this is a slow process
and can be controlled
manually
Manual blowdown to control conductivity
is appropriate. Therefore, delete the
actuated blowdown valve and upstream
/ downstream isolation valves

83. Testing High flow when
taking samples
Splashing Valves (e.g. gate type)
that can be slowly
cracked open, PPE
No further action required - -

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17 April 2013 A5.25

PINNACLE RISK MANAGEMENT - HAZOP RECORD SHEET
PROJECT: Orica, Villawood, DTD Project TEAM MEMBERS: Gwenda Lister, Keith Chapman, Rudy Maes,
Lindsay Killin, Brett Garton

DATE: 27/1/2012
SYSTEM: Liquid Feeds to Pugmill LEADER: Dean Shewring

DRAWING: C143-PF-96D-DTDU-10009 &
C143-PF-96D-DTDU-10003 Rev B
MINUTES BY: Peter ODea

No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING
SAFEGUARDS
ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE
84. General
Discussion
Pump requires
maintenance
The pump discharge
(i.e. after the check
valve) needs to be
flushed for maintenance
Review the need for individual drain
valves on the discharge of each pump
(as per the scrubber recycle pumps) for
maintenance purposes when the other
pump is still operational

85. General
Discussion
Power failure Loss of water to the
pugmill dust release in
the area
Show the flow control valve to the
pugmill as fail open on the P&ID

86. General
Discussion
Hazop suspended until the liquid
balance assessment is carried out on
the liquid feeds to the pugmill.
Preference is to use treated water
instead of Towns Water for sustainability
reasons.
Note: the current design requires
makeup water via the scrubber and
hence excessive caustic usage will
result.
It is expected the liquid feed system
design will change and then the HAZOP
should be performed

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PINNACLE RISK MANAGEMENT - HAZOP RECORD SHEET
PROJECT: Orica, Villawood, DTD Project TEAM MEMBERS: Gwenda Lister, Keith Chapman, Rudy Maes,
Lindsay Killin, Brett Garton

DATE: 27/1/2012
SYSTEM: Soil to and from the Pugmill
(including the cyclones underflow)
LEADER: Dean Shewring

DRAWING: C143-PF-96D-DTDU-10002 &
C143-PF-96D-DTDU-10003 Rev B
MINUTES BY: Peter ODea

No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING
SAFEGUARDS
ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE
87. Low Flow /
Low Level
Rock, metal piece,
etc gets into the
pugmill
Baghouse drive
overloads and
equipment damage
High current detected
shutting down the
pugmill
No further action required - -
88. Zero Flow /
Empty
Screw conveyor
below the cyclones
or rotary valve stops
High dust flow to the
baghouse
Pressure measurements
and/or operator will shut
down the plant
No further action required - -
89. Zero Flow /
Empty
Loss of water Soil too hot, potential
damage to conveyor
belts, burns, etc.

Potential for a build-up
of solids in the dryer and
hence heat damage to
the dryer
High temperature
alarms.
Camera shows high
dust.
Constant operator
attendance.
Operator shuts down
pugmill if it cannot be
controlled
Show on the P&IDs a trip of the dryer if
the pugmill is shut down
RM
90. High
Temperature
Loss of water to the
pugmill
Potential for burns from
the hot treated soil
Temperature alarms.
Operator intervention
Ensure barriers, etc so people cannot
come into contact with hot material
LK

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17 April 2013 A5.27

PINNACLE RISK MANAGEMENT - HAZOP RECORD SHEET
PROJECT: Orica, Villawood, DTD Project TEAM MEMBERS: Gwenda Lister, Keith Chapman, Rudy Maes,
Lindsay Killin, Brett Garton

DATE: 27/1/12
SYSTEM: Overview LEADER: Dean Shewring

DRAWING: All Drawings MINUTES BY: Peter ODea

No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING
SAFEGUARDS
ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE
91. Toxicity No further issues
identified with the
overview guide
words
No further action required - -

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17 April 2013 A5.28

PINNACLE RISK MANAGEMENT - HAZOP RECORD SHEET
PROJECT: Orica, Villawood, DTD Project TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Gwenda Lister, Lindsay Killin,
Tai Truong

DATE: 26/6/12
SYSTEM: Caustic IBC and Pumping System LEADER: Dean Shewring

DRAWING: C143-PF-96D-DTDU-10011 Rev B MINUTES BY: Peter ODea

No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING
SAFEGUARDS
ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE
92. General
Discussion
Note only:

The caustic storage
vessel will be an IBC
manual
changeover via
hoses to a second
IBC about once per
week (with a portable
plastic bund
underneath)
No further action required - -
93. General
Discussion
Note only:

The pumps will be
diaphragm pumps
with internal pressure
relief, manual
changeover, located
in a bund and a
safety shower nearby
No further action required - -
Pinnacle Risk Management

Orica Villawood HAZOP Report Rev E.Doc
17 April 2013 A5.29
PINNACLE RISK MANAGEMENT - HAZOP RECORD SHEET
PROJECT: Orica, Villawood, DTD Project TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Gwenda Lister, Lindsay Killin,
Tai Truong

DATE: 26/6/12
SYSTEM: Caustic IBC and Pumping System LEADER: Dean Shewring

DRAWING: C143-PF-96D-DTDU-10011 Rev B MINUTES BY: Peter ODea

No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING
SAFEGUARDS
ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE
94. General
Discussion
PCV 1082C to have a pressure indicator
integral to the valve to allow the
operators to set the pressure on the
regulator and monitor its performance
LK
95. High Flow /
High Level
Overdosing caustic pH exceeds limit In the
scrubber recycle circuit
no significant
consequences identified
pH meter and alarm (it
is expected to be
reliable in this service
with routine
maintenance)
No further action required - -
96. High Flow /
High Level
Loss of containment,
e.g. forklift tynes
puncture the IBC,
hose failure, etc
Potential to cause injury
to personnel
P10 high pressure
plastic piping, no joints
outside the bunded area
No further action required - -
Pinnacle Risk Management

Orica Villawood HAZOP Report Rev E.Doc
17 April 2013 A5.30
PINNACLE RISK MANAGEMENT - HAZOP RECORD SHEET
PROJECT: Orica, Villawood, DTD Project TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Gwenda Lister, Lindsay Killin,
Tai Truong

DATE: 26/6/12
SYSTEM: Caustic IBC and Pumping System LEADER: Dean Shewring

DRAWING: C143-PF-96D-DTDU-10011 Rev B MINUTES BY: Peter ODea

No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING
SAFEGUARDS
ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE
97. High Flow /
High Level
Pumping caustic
when the plant is
shut down
Scrubber sump
overflow.
Temperature rise due to
heat of mixing
High level alarm in the
scrubber sump
Determine the maximum temperature
rise and whether there is a detrimental
effect on the scrubber system materials
of construction.

Calculate the volume in the scrubber
sump between the normal highest level
and overflow to check that a maximum
of 1 m
3
from an IBC will not result in
overflow from the scrubber overflow
pipe.

Review the need for a hard wired trip to
stop the caustic pump if being run in
manual. Also, review the need for PLC
alarms to indicate that the caustic pump
is left running in manual and hence the
control system trips etc will not be
functional
TT
98. High Flow /
High Level
Stormwater falling
into the bunded area
Stormwater
management required
Bunded area, sump,
discharge to water
treatment plant
No further action required - -
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Orica Villawood HAZOP Report Rev E.Doc
17 April 2013 A5.31
PINNACLE RISK MANAGEMENT - HAZOP RECORD SHEET
PROJECT: Orica, Villawood, DTD Project TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Gwenda Lister, Lindsay Killin,
Tai Truong

DATE: 26/6/12
SYSTEM: Caustic IBC and Pumping System LEADER: Dean Shewring

DRAWING: C143-PF-96D-DTDU-10011 Rev B MINUTES BY: Peter ODea

No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING
SAFEGUARDS
ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE
99. High Flow /
High Level
Pipe breakage, e.g.
mechanical impact
Caustic leak with the
potential to harm
personnel
Strong materials of
construction for the
proposed tubing
Ensure that the small bore caustic
piping is adequately protected from
mechanical impact
LK
100. Low Flow /
Low Level
Empty IBC, leaks,
pump not fast
enough
Loss of acidic gas
scrubbing
pH alarm and interlock,
scrubber stack
analysers and alarms
No further action required - -
101. Zero Flow /
Empty
Valves shut, IBC
empty, pump
deadheaded
Potential to exceed the
piping system design
pressure for the
deadhead case and
hence result in a loss of
containment of caustic
which could harm
personnel
Internal pressure relief
to be included with the
pump, pH meter and
alarm in the scrubber
recycle circuit
No further action required - -
102. Reverse Flow No credible causes
identified given the
safeguards
Non return valve, PCV
1082C will close when
the caustic pump stops,
suction and discharge
valves for the pump will
also act to prevent
reverse flow
No further action required - -
Pinnacle Risk Management

Orica Villawood HAZOP Report Rev E.Doc
17 April 2013 A5.32
PINNACLE RISK MANAGEMENT - HAZOP RECORD SHEET
PROJECT: Orica, Villawood, DTD Project TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Gwenda Lister, Lindsay Killin,
Tai Truong

DATE: 26/6/12
SYSTEM: Caustic IBC and Pumping System LEADER: Dean Shewring

DRAWING: C143-PF-96D-DTDU-10011 Rev B MINUTES BY: Peter ODea

No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING
SAFEGUARDS
ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE
103. Low Pressure IBC vent left closed Suck in the IBC Procedures and training
for bung removal or
some IBCs have vents
included
No further action required - -
104. High
Temperature
Heat of dilution with
caustic and water
No significant
consequences identified
Materials adequate for
100 deg. C
No further action required - -
105. Low Temperature Standby pump
freezes on cold night
No caustic flow to the
scrubber when pumps
changed over
pH alarm and interlock,
scrubber stack
analysers and alarms
Delete the standby pump and piping and
provide a spare pump in store
LK
106. Low Temperature Pump pressure relief
inlet and outlet lines
freeze
Loss of deadhead
protection for the caustic
pump and hence the
potential for a loss of
containment of caustic
which could harm
personnel
Review the need for insulation or heat
tracing on the pump pressure relief inlet
and outlet lines
LK
107. Plant Items IBC changeover Potential incidents
associated with forklift
trucks and hose
disconnection and
reconnection
Review the layout for forklift accessibility
as well as the operability of the caustic
hose connections including hose
draining
LK

Pinnacle Risk Management

Orica Villawood HAZOP Report Rev E.Doc
17 April 2013 A5.33

PINNACLE RISK MANAGEMENT - HAZOP RECORD SHEET
PROJECT: Orica, Villawood, DTD Project TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Gwenda Lister, Lindsay Killin,
Tai Truong

DATE: 26/6/12
SYSTEM: Towns Water Tank LEADER: Dean Shewring

DRAWING: C143-PF-96D-DTDU-10009 Rev B MINUTES BY: Peter ODea

No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING
SAFEGUARDS
ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE
108. General
Discussion
Thoroughly flush the Towns Water
supply pipe during commissioning to
ensure all residual solids are removed
(plus check quality of gas supply with
respect to solids in the pipeline as well)
GL
109. General
Discussion
Ensure the Towns Water pipe from the
Sydney Water main is large enough to
avoid the need for a booster pump, i.e.
delete the booster pump and fill the
Towns Water tank directly from the
Sydney Water mains supply
LK
110. General
Discussion
Show other consumers of Towns Water
on the drawing, e.g. safety showers,
ablutions, etc. These off-takes are to be
from the supply pipe upstream of the
Towns Water tank for supply quality
reliability (e.g. no process contaminants
due to reverse flow)
LK
111. High Flow /
High Level
Supply pipe
ruptured, e.g. by
backhoe
Tank fails to fill. No
water flow to the ECU,
pugmill, scrubber, etc
Low pressure and flow
alarms and trips on the
downstream water users
Ensure the Towns Water supply line is
away from the project excavation areas
LK
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Orica Villawood HAZOP Report Rev E.Doc
17 April 2013 A5.34
PINNACLE RISK MANAGEMENT - HAZOP RECORD SHEET
PROJECT: Orica, Villawood, DTD Project TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Gwenda Lister, Lindsay Killin,
Tai Truong

DATE: 26/6/12
SYSTEM: Towns Water Tank LEADER: Dean Shewring

DRAWING: C143-PF-96D-DTDU-10009 Rev B MINUTES BY: Peter ODea

No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING
SAFEGUARDS
ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE
112. Low Flow /
Low Level
Level control valve
insufficiently open
Tank fails to fill. No
water flow to ECU,
pugmill, scrubber, etc
Low pressure and flow
alarms and trips on the
downstream water users
No further action required - -
113. Reverse Flow The tank overflow is to be lower than the
water inlet to ensure there the risk of
reverse flow into the Towns Water
supply line to the tank is as low as
possible

114. Impurities Frogs, vermin, etc in
tank
Blockage of the water
supply pumps inlet
strainers
Pump strainer
maintenance and
downstream pressure
and flow alarms
No further action required - -
115. Plant Items Locate the LCV close to the Towns
Water tank roof manhole for ease of
inspection and maintenance
LK
116. Plant Items Work at heights
when maintaining the
tanks level
transmitter
Potential for falls and
serious injuries
Permit to work system
including controls for fall
prevention
Use a differential pressure transmitter
for tank level measurement (located at
grade) in lieu of an ultrasonic transmitter
on top of tank
LK
Pinnacle Risk Management

Orica Villawood HAZOP Report Rev E.Doc
17 April 2013 A5.35
PINNACLE RISK MANAGEMENT - HAZOP RECORD SHEET
PROJECT: Orica, Villawood, DTD Project TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Gwenda Lister, Lindsay Killin,
Tai Truong

DATE: 26/6/12
SYSTEM: Towns Water Tank LEADER: Dean Shewring

DRAWING: C143-PF-96D-DTDU-10009 Rev B MINUTES BY: Peter ODea

No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING
SAFEGUARDS
ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE
117. Plant Items Work at heights
when maintaining the
tanks LCV
Potential for falls and
serious injuries
Permit to work system
including controls for fall
prevention
Review to option for replacing the roof
mounted level control valve to one at
grade (i.e. eliminate the need for a float
valve at the top of the tank and hence
work at heights injuries)
LK
118. Instruments Failure of the sight
glass
Water leaks Maintenance and
replacement of the sight
glass
Review type of sight glass level
indication and also the need for a sight
glass for LI1074 to minimise the risk of
leaks


Pinnacle Risk Management

Orica Villawood HAZOP Report Rev E.Doc
17 April 2013 A5.36

PINNACLE RISK MANAGEMENT - HAZOP RECORD SHEET
PROJECT: Orica, Villawood, DTD Project TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Gwenda Lister, Lindsay Killin,
Tai Truong

DATE: 26/6/12
SYSTEM: Towns Water Pumping Systems LEADER: Dean Shewring

DRAWING: C143-PF-96D-DTDU-10009 Rev B MINUTES BY: Peter ODea

No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING
SAFEGUARDS
ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE
119. General
Discussion
The scrubber blowdown (max 20-40
l/min) will go directly to the pugmill from
the discharge side of the scrubber
recycle pumps, not via the pugmill water
supply pumps.

As this line has not been HAZOPed,
perform a formal design change
assessment when the final design
details are known.

Therefore, pumps PUI-0907 and 0908
are duty/standby and are the same
design as the other water pumpsets
shown on this P&ID
TT
120. General
Discussion
Review the need to replace the 6 Y-type
strainers with 2 strainers in the common
suction line to all pumpsets (ease of
maintenance)
TT
121. General
Discussion
Add an isolation valve upstream of
PCV1052 (to be consistent with the
other water pumping systems design)
TT
Pinnacle Risk Management

Orica Villawood HAZOP Report Rev E.Doc
17 April 2013 A5.37
PINNACLE RISK MANAGEMENT - HAZOP RECORD SHEET
PROJECT: Orica, Villawood, DTD Project TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Gwenda Lister, Lindsay Killin,
Tai Truong

DATE: 26/6/12
SYSTEM: Towns Water Pumping Systems LEADER: Dean Shewring

DRAWING: C143-PF-96D-DTDU-10009 Rev B MINUTES BY: Peter ODea

No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING
SAFEGUARDS
ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE
122. High Flow /
High Level
Running 2 pumps
simultaneously
No significant
consequences identified
Duty/standby selector
switch.

Flow controls
downstream will ensure
the users only take what
water they need
No further action required - -
123. Low Flow /
Low Level
Blocked strainers,
valves gagged,
pump problems
Loss of the required flow
to the ECU, scrubber
and pugmill (as
previously HAZOPed
above)
Alarms and trips at each
user of the water, e.g.
low pressure or flow.

Critical pumps can be
started manually when
emergency generator
started
No further action required - -
124. Zero Flow /
Empty
Loss of water to the
ECU
Potential for heat
damage to the water
spray nozzles when the
plant is tripped on low
water flow
Confirm that the nozzles are made from
appropriate materials of construction for
high temperature following a plant trip
LK
Pinnacle Risk Management

Orica Villawood HAZOP Report Rev E.Doc
17 April 2013 A5.38
PINNACLE RISK MANAGEMENT - HAZOP RECORD SHEET
PROJECT: Orica, Villawood, DTD Project TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Gwenda Lister, Lindsay Killin,
Tai Truong

DATE: 26/6/12
SYSTEM: Towns Water Pumping Systems LEADER: Dean Shewring

DRAWING: C143-PF-96D-DTDU-10009 Rev B MINUTES BY: Peter ODea

No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING
SAFEGUARDS
ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE
125. Reverse Flow Loss of the quench
water pumps to the
scrubber
Potential for acidic mist
to absorb into the water
in the supply pipe to the
scrubber and cause
corrosion
As per Plant Items, review the materials
of construction for all equipment
throughout the plant
LK
126. Reverse Flow Pumps stops, e.g.
loss of power
Water in the pipes to the
ECU and scrubber flows
back and hence drawing
gases from these
vessels, i.e. corrosion
potential as above
As above, the correct
materials of construction
are to be confirmed
No further action required - -
127. Plant Items Acidic vapours, etc
throughout the plant
Corrosion of equipment
as above
Review the materials of construction for
all equipment throughout the plant
LK
128. Electrical Power failure Loss of critical
equipment
Emergency generator Confirm the required items connected to
the emergency power supply
BK

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Orica Villawood HAZOP Report Rev E.Doc
17 April 2013 A5.39

PINNACLE RISK MANAGEMENT - HAZOP RECORD SHEET
PROJECT: Orica, Villawood, DTD Project TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Gwenda Lister, Lindsay Killin,
Tai Truong

DATE: 26/6/12
SYSTEM: Instrument and Compressed Air LEADER: Dean Shewring

DRAWING: C143-PF-96D-DTDU-10010 Rev B MINUTES BY: Peter ODea

No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING
SAFEGUARDS
ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE
129. General
Discussion
Review the need for the standby air
compressor, including the need for the
isolation valve on the discharge of
compressor AC-1002. Delete if not
required
LK
130. General
Discussion
Historical incidents
involving oil filled
compressors running
too hot and hence
cracking the oil
The cracked oil can
leave dust deposits
within the piping system
and hence is an internal
dust explosion hazard
Running the air
compressor within the
design limits, routine oil
sampling and
replacement
The air compressor is to be oil free LK
131. General
Discussion
Review the final design details from
vendor for the compressor and dryers
(HAZOP assumes desiccant dryer)
including inlet air strainer, check valve to
avoid depressurisation of the air
receiver when the compressors trip, dew
point measurement, weatherproofing to
avoid rain ingress to the compressor
suction, signals to control room,
functional logic, etc
LK
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PINNACLE RISK MANAGEMENT - HAZOP RECORD SHEET
PROJECT: Orica, Villawood, DTD Project TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Gwenda Lister, Lindsay Killin,
Tai Truong

DATE: 26/6/12
SYSTEM: Instrument and Compressed Air LEADER: Dean Shewring

DRAWING: C143-PF-96D-DTDU-10010 Rev B MINUTES BY: Peter ODea

No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING
SAFEGUARDS
ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE
132. General
Discussion
The maximum air pressure is to be
designed for adequate operation of the
ECU nozzles (possibly 10 barg plus)
LK
133. General
Discussion
Update the air compressor P&ID to
show all air users, e.g. the ECU
LK
134. General
Discussion
Rationalise the number, location and set
pressure for the pressure regulators
(e.g. PCV1079A/B/C appear to be
controlling the same pressure and
hence there is the potential for these
regulators to hunt). For the required
pressure regulators, supply pressure
indication for testing and monitoring
purposes
LK
135. General
Discussion
Make the complete system dry air (i.e.
dry air is required to all users) to avoid
wet air blocking the baghouse filter
bags. This will remove the additional air
receiver, associated equipment and
controls
LK
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Orica Villawood HAZOP Report Rev E.Doc
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PINNACLE RISK MANAGEMENT - HAZOP RECORD SHEET
PROJECT: Orica, Villawood, DTD Project TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Gwenda Lister, Lindsay Killin,
Tai Truong

DATE: 26/6/12
SYSTEM: Instrument and Compressed Air LEADER: Dean Shewring

DRAWING: C143-PF-96D-DTDU-10010 Rev B MINUTES BY: Peter ODea

No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING
SAFEGUARDS
ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE
136. High Flow /
High Level
Regulator failure Potential for the
maximum air supply
pressure to be within the
supply pipe to the final
isolation valve at each
air user
Confirm that the design is rated for full
air pressure to the final isolation valves
for each air user
LK
137. Zero Flow /
Empty
Loss of power No air to users Low pressure alarms
and trips
No further action required - -
138. High Pressure Compressor
deadheaded
Potential for equipment
damage and possible
failure leading to
missiles, i.e. harm to
people and damage to
equipment
Make sure the vendor package has
appropriate safeguards for compressor
deadhead and if a blow off valve /
pressure safety valve is provided then it
should not yield unacceptable noise
levels (e.g. provide a silencer)
LK
139. High
Temperature
Heat from 10 bar
pressure requirement
Potential high
temperature damage to
the downstream
equipment
Review the maximum compressor
discharge temperature and ensure that
adequate safeguards are included, e.g.
ensure the compressor package has a
cooler
LK

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PINNACLE RISK MANAGEMENT - HAZOP RECORD SHEET
PROJECT: Orica, Villawood, DTD Project TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Gwenda Lister, Lindsay Killin,
Tai Truong

DATE: 26/6/12
SYSTEM: OVERVIEW LEADER: Dean Shewring

DRAWING: Caustic, Water and Air P&IDs MINUTES BY: Peter ODea

No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING
SAFEGUARDS
ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE
140. Commissioning Provide high point vents and low point
drains for hydrotesting once the piping
layout drawings are known
LK
141. Commissioning Foreign objects in
the pipes during
commissioning
Potential to damage
equipment
Provide temporary cone strainers,
remove sensitive instruments and
valves, etc for line flushing during
commissioning
LK
142. Commissioning Potential for dioxin
formation from the
plant
Impact to people and
the business
Incorporate the learnings from the
ATMR plant commissioning especially
re dioxin prevention and control
TT
143. Commissioning Provide sufficient process sampling
points between the main plant items to
be able to measure gas composition
and diagnose problems, e.g. levels of
unwanted by-products
LK
144. Materials of
Construction
Potential
incompatibility of the
materials of
construction with the
process materials
Corrosion and
equipment failure with a
loss of containment
Review the compatibility of the chosen
materials of construction, including
gaskets, with the process materials via
the Hazard Study 1 chemicals
compatibility of materials chart
BK

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Orica Villawood HAZOP Report Rev E.Doc
17 April 2013 A5.43

PINNACLE RISK MANAGEMENT - HAZOP RECORD SHEET
PROJECT: Orica, Villawood, DTD Project TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Gwenda Lister, Lindsay Killin,
Tai Truong, Peter ODea, Rudy Maes, Keith
Chapman

DATE: 19/10/12
SYSTEM: Air Compressor for the Evaporative
Cooler
LEADER: Dean Shewring

DRAWING: C143-PF-96D-CTCU-10010 (mark-up) MINUTES BY: Bala Kathiravelu

No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING
SAFEGUARDS
ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE
145. General
Discussion
The tag numbers on the two air
compressor, e.g. hand switches, need to
be unique. Mark up the P&ID
accordingly
KC
146. High Pressure Compressor high
pressure protection
for deadheading
The compressor is a
screw compressor and
hence the potential for
overpressuring the
discharge piping with
possible failures leading
to missiles
Check the vendor P&ID that high
pressure protection is provided. Also,
review the vendor supply details to
confirm adequate controls and
safeguarding is being provided, e.g.
suction screen and an aftercooler and a
high outlet temperature alarm
KC
147. High
Temperature
Operating the oil
flooded compressor
(to be confirmed) at
high temperatures
Potential to crack the oil
and lead to a build-up
on the inside of the
pipes which can explode
Minute 130 (above) regarding the need
for an oil free compressor is to be
reconsidered. If the compressor is not
oil free then provide an oil filter and
confirm the operating temperature is
less than 140 deg C exit the aftercooler
KC
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Orica Villawood HAZOP Report Rev E.Doc
17 April 2013 A5.44
PINNACLE RISK MANAGEMENT - HAZOP RECORD SHEET
PROJECT: Orica, Villawood, DTD Project TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Gwenda Lister, Lindsay Killin,
Tai Truong, Peter ODea, Rudy Maes, Keith
Chapman

DATE: 19/10/12
SYSTEM: Air Compressor for the Evaporative
Cooler
LEADER: Dean Shewring

DRAWING: C143-PF-96D-CTCU-10010 (mark-up) MINUTES BY: Bala Kathiravelu

No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING
SAFEGUARDS
ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE
148. Low Temperature Cooling of the air in
the air receiver
Condensate will form
and build-up within the
air receiver
Manual draining Install an automatic condensate drain on
the receiver(s?) with an isolation valve
and bypass valve for maintenance
KC

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Orica Villawood HAZOP Report Rev E.Doc
17 April 2013 A5.45

PINNACLE RISK MANAGEMENT - HAZOP RECORD SHEET
PROJECT: Orica, Villawood, DTD Project TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Gwenda Lister, Lindsay Killin,
Tai Truong, Peter ODea, Rudy Maes, Keith
Chapman

DATE: 19/10/12
SYSTEM: Pugmill Water System (pumps 0907
and 0908)
LEADER: Dean Shewring

DRAWING: C143-PF-96D-CTCU-10009 and 10003
Rev D
MINUTES BY: Bala Kathiravelu

No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING
SAFEGUARDS
ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE
149. General
Discussion
Following discussion, the scrubber
blowdown is to be sent to the effluent
treatment system. The main issues being:

1. The potential for corrosion in the pugmill
system, e.g. high chlorides levels in a hot,
wet environment or from changes in pH
2. Contamination of the treated soil
3. The historical problems with solids in
the scrubber blowdown causing blockages
(e.g. of the spray nozzles) and settling
(e.g. within tanks), and
4. That the treated water can be rerun and
hence is not a potential loss from plant.

Therefore, Towns Water is to be used for
the pugmill water spray systems. Also,
provide appropriate connections for a
possible future scrubber bleed blowdown
tank (if required) and allow adequate
space in the plot planning
KC
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Orica Villawood HAZOP Report Rev E.Doc
17 April 2013 A5.46
PINNACLE RISK MANAGEMENT - HAZOP RECORD SHEET
PROJECT: Orica, Villawood, DTD Project TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Gwenda Lister, Lindsay Killin,
Tai Truong, Peter ODea, Rudy Maes, Keith
Chapman

DATE: 19/10/12
SYSTEM: Pugmill Water System (pumps 0907
and 0908)
LEADER: Dean Shewring

DRAWING: C143-PF-96D-CTCU-10009 and 10003
Rev D
MINUTES BY: Bala Kathiravelu

No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING
SAFEGUARDS
ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE
150. General
Discussion
Need to balance flow
to pugmill sprays
Mark up the P&ID to show individual
isolation supply valves to each pugmill
spray nozzle
KC
151. General
Discussion
P&ID correction Show PCV1052 controlling upstream
pressure as this valve is used for
deadhead protection for the pumps
KC
152. General
Discussion
P&ID correction The Towns Water pumps kickback lines
are to be top entry into the Towns Water
tank (to prevent reverse flow issues
from submerged entries). Therefore
delete the isolation valves at each
kickback line nozzle to the Towns Water
tank and the check valve in the kickback
line for pumps 0907 and 0908
KC
153. General
Discussion
P&ID correction FCV 1019 is to be a modulating valve
and it is to fail last position on loss of air
to the actuator, i.e. show a mushroom
head valve and FLP on the P&ID
KC
154. General
Discussion
P&ID correction Provide an isolation valve on PI 1019B
(consistent with all PIs)
KC
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Orica Villawood HAZOP Report Rev E.Doc
17 April 2013 A5.47
PINNACLE RISK MANAGEMENT - HAZOP RECORD SHEET
PROJECT: Orica, Villawood, DTD Project TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Gwenda Lister, Lindsay Killin,
Tai Truong, Peter ODea, Rudy Maes, Keith
Chapman

DATE: 19/10/12
SYSTEM: Pugmill Water System (pumps 0907
and 0908)
LEADER: Dean Shewring

DRAWING: C143-PF-96D-CTCU-10009 and 10003
Rev D
MINUTES BY: Bala Kathiravelu

No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING
SAFEGUARDS
ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE
155. General
Discussion
P&ID correction Delete the line on P&ID 1003 shown as
Cooling Water from Scrubber to the
pugmill sprays (as this was formally
used for return scrubber liquid no
longer required) and also delete PT
1019C and the associated alarms on
this line
KC
156. High Flow /
High Level
Spray nozzle
unwinding and falling
off
Too much water flow to
the pugmill no
significant
consequences identified
Spot weld the spray nozzles onto the
pipes to prevent them from falling off
KC
157. High Flow /
High Level
The pugmill pump
stops and water
syphons forward
through them to the
pugmill
Too much water flow to
the pugmill no
significant
consequences identified
Include in the functional description the
need to have FVC 1019 & SV 1019
closed when the pugmill pump stops
KC
158. High
Temperature
Note that the
scrubber blowdown
is approximately 80
deg C
Potential for burn
injuries if personnel
contact hot surfaces
Provide appropriate personal protection
to avoid burns for the scrubber
blowdown line
LK

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Orica Villawood HAZOP Report Rev E.Doc
17 April 2013 A5.48

PINNACLE RISK MANAGEMENT - HAZOP RECORD SHEET
PROJECT: Orica, Villawood, DTD Project TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Gwenda Lister, Lindsay Killin,
Tai Truong, Peter ODea, Rudy Maes, Keith
Chapman

DATE: 19/10/12
SYSTEM: Overview - Air Compressor to the
Evaporative Cooler and the Pugmill
Water System
LEADER: Dean Shewring

DRAWING: C143-PF-96D-CTCU-10009 and 10003
Rev D, C143-PF-96D-CTCU-10010
(mark-up)
MINUTES BY: Bala Kathiravelu

No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING
SAFEGUARDS
ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE
159. No further significant hazardous events
or operability problems identified for
these systems using the Overview
guide words
- -

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17 April 2013 A5.49

PINNACLE RISK MANAGEMENT - HAZOP RECORD SHEET
PROJECT: Orica Villawood Water Treatment
Plant
TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Peter ODea, Pearce Anderson,
Richard Giles, Lindsay Killin

DATE: 29/11/12
SYSTEM: High Capacity Settling Tank LEADER: Dean Shewring

DRAWING: SAS10883-301 Rev A MINUTES BY: Lindsay Killin

No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING
SAFEGUARDS
ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE
160. General
Discussion
Delete the butterfly valve on the clarified
liquid line from the settling tank as this
line is free draining and hence does not
need to be isolated
PA
161. General
Discussion
Mark up the P&IDs to show all line
sizes, e.g. the clarified water line from
the settling tank
PA
162. General
Discussion
Delete the additional diaphragm valve
downstream of the settling tank sump
gate valves. The gate valves are at
ground level (i.e. accessible) and can be
used for isolation for pump flushing etc
instead
PA
163. High Flow /
High Level
Losses of
containment from the
coagulant pumping
system
Potential environmental
consequences of
overflow to the ground
System leak checked
prior to operation, the
coagulant IBC is bunded
Ensure the coagulant pumping system
is within the IBC bunded area to contain
any leaks. Apply this action to all
chemical dosing systems
PA
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Orica Villawood HAZOP Report Rev E.Doc
17 April 2013 A5.50
PINNACLE RISK MANAGEMENT - HAZOP RECORD SHEET
PROJECT: Orica Villawood Water Treatment
Plant
TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Peter ODea, Pearce Anderson,
Richard Giles, Lindsay Killin

DATE: 29/11/12
SYSTEM: High Capacity Settling Tank LEADER: Dean Shewring

DRAWING: SAS10883-301 Rev A MINUTES BY: Lindsay Killin

No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING
SAFEGUARDS
ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE
164. Zero Flow /
Empty
Solids fouling of the
static mixer on the
inlet to the settling
tank
Plant downtime for
maintenance
Delete the static mixer and add the
coagulant upstream in the feed line to
allow sufficient line length for mixing
PA
165. Reverse Flow Confirm that design will prevent reverse
flow of coagulant to the upstream
sources (these upstream sources are to
be shown on the P&ID)
PA
166. High Pressure Deadhead of the
sludge pump
Potential to rupture the
downstream piping
system
Operators to keep the
isolation valves open
during normal operation
Replace the high pressure instrumented
protection system (i.e. a potential Safety
Instrumented Function to AS61511) with
a suitable mechanical over-pressure
device, e.g. a PRV or kick back line
(Note: consider the implications of
sludge fouling a PRV). Also, note that if
a PRV is installed, it should be installed
immediately downstream of the pump
for the case where the NRV is stuck in
the closed position
PA
167. Plant Items Confirm all off-takes from the sludge
lines are horizontal to vertical to prevent
settling and compaction of solids in the
branches
PA
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Orica Villawood HAZOP Report Rev E.Doc
17 April 2013 A5.51
PINNACLE RISK MANAGEMENT - HAZOP RECORD SHEET
PROJECT: Orica Villawood Water Treatment
Plant
TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Peter ODea, Pearce Anderson,
Richard Giles, Lindsay Killin

DATE: 29/11/12
SYSTEM: High Capacity Settling Tank LEADER: Dean Shewring

DRAWING: SAS10883-301 Rev A MINUTES BY: Lindsay Killin

No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING
SAFEGUARDS
ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE
168. Plant Items Preference is to not use PVC due to
interaction between solvents and
plasticiser. If used, then the preference
is to use UPVC (i.e. un-plasticised PVC)
PA
169. Plant Items Operator leaves the
sludge pump running
for too long
Overfilling the
sedimentation tanks
Procedures and training Install a timer on the sludge pump to
prevent excessive amounts of water
being flushed to the sedimentation tanks
and also to allow adequate flushing of
sludge pump and lines during pump
operation
PA
170. I Plant Items Isolation of water in
the aboveground
piping
Potential for heating by
the sun and thermal
overpressure, i.e. piping
system failure
Procedures and training Include in the SOPs the need to keep
aboveground pipework open (i.e. not
isolated) to prevent thermal
overpressure from isolated liquid being
heated by the sun
PA
171. P Plant Items Solids settling in the
feed lines to the
settling tank
Fouling of the feed lines Provide means to allow flushing of the
inlet lines to the settling tank. Treated
water to be used (not potable water due
to the risk of reverse flow and hence
contamination)
PA
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Orica Villawood HAZOP Report Rev E.Doc
17 April 2013 A5.52
PINNACLE RISK MANAGEMENT - HAZOP RECORD SHEET
PROJECT: Orica Villawood Water Treatment
Plant
TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Peter ODea, Pearce Anderson,
Richard Giles, Lindsay Killin

DATE: 29/11/12
SYSTEM: High Capacity Settling Tank LEADER: Dean Shewring

DRAWING: SAS10883-301 Rev A MINUTES BY: Lindsay Killin

No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING
SAFEGUARDS
ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE
172. Plant Items Delete the second isolation valve on
discharge side of the coagulant dosing
pump as it is only isolating a reducer
and double isolation is not required.
Apply this action to all chemical dosing
systems
PA
173. Instruments Provide a diaphragm connection to all
instruments on sludge lines in the plant
to prevent blocking of the impulse lines
from the solids
PA

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17 April 2013 A5.53

PINNACLE RISK MANAGEMENT - HAZOP RECORD SHEET
PROJECT: Orica Villawood Water Treatment
Plant
TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Peter ODea, Pearce Anderson,
Richard Giles, Lindsay Killin

DATE: 29/11/12
SYSTEM: Feed Tank System including the
Untreated Water Basin
LEADER: Dean Shewring

DRAWING: SAS10883 301 Rev A, SAS10883
302 Rev 0
MINUTES BY: Lindsay Killin

No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING
SAFEGUARDS
ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE
174. High Flow /
High Level
Rain and the water
treatment plant not
available
Overfilling the untreated
water basin
Procedural control
monitoring water levels
Install a flashing light (to be visible from
the DTDU) and/or use a SMS text
warning service to alert the operators of
any unacceptable process conditions
when the plant is unattended
PA
175. High Flow /
High Level
Draining of both
sedimentation tanks
to the feed tank, e.g.
manual valves
passing or left open
Potential to initially
overflow the feed tank
and then overflow the
pump well bund
Operator to check level
in the feed tank prior to
discharge from the
sedimentation tank.

High level alarms and
trip 2.1 to stop some
feed pumps into the
feed tank
Review the need to overflow the pump
well bund to the adjacent bunded area
given the current containment areas
capacities
LK
176. Zero Flow /
Empty
Operator does not
perform recycle from
the break tank to the
feed tank during start
up
Higher than normal
solids through to the
zeolite filters resulting in
plant recovery impacts
due to the need to
backwash the filters
SOPs and training Review the need for automating the
break tank recycle valves to lower the
risk of this occurring, e.g. two actuated
valves for flow path determination after
the transfer pump
PA
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Orica Villawood HAZOP Report Rev E.Doc
17 April 2013 A5.54
PINNACLE RISK MANAGEMENT - HAZOP RECORD SHEET
PROJECT: Orica Villawood Water Treatment
Plant
TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Peter ODea, Pearce Anderson,
Richard Giles, Lindsay Killin

DATE: 29/11/12
SYSTEM: Feed Tank System including the
Untreated Water Basin
LEADER: Dean Shewring

DRAWING: SAS10883 301 Rev A, SAS10883
302 Rev 0
MINUTES BY: Lindsay Killin

No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING
SAFEGUARDS
ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE
177. Impurities Foreign objects
entering the un-
treated water basin
Blockage and/or
damage to the raw
water feed pump
Install a screen on the inlet to the raw
water feed pump. Apply this action to all
sump pumps in the plant
PA
178. Instruments Plant inlet water
flowrate monitoring
for mass balances
and performance
checks
Provide means to monitor the water flow
into the mixing tank, e.g. replace the
flow switch with flow meter and a low
flow trip
PA
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17 April 2013 A5.55

PINNACLE RISK MANAGEMENT - HAZOP RECORD SHEET
PROJECT: Orica Villawood Water Treatment
Plant
TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Peter ODea, Pearce Anderson,
Richard Giles, Lindsay Killin

DATE: 29/11/12
SYSTEM: Flocculation Tank and Chemical
Dosing Systems (HAZOPed by Difference)
LEADER: Dean Shewring

DRAWING: SAS10883 302 Rev 0 MINUTES BY: Lindsay Killin

No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING
SAFEGUARDS
ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE
179. General
Discussion
Review the possibility of overflowing
from the flocculation tank chamber 1 to
chamber 2 to minimise risk of short
circuiting in the first chamber and hence
inadequate mixing (i.e. use a higher
elevation overflow line)
PA
180. General
Discussion
Markup the P& ID to show the drain
valves on the flocculation tank
chambers
PA
181. General
Discussion
Show both isolation valves on the outlet
of flocculation chamber 2 from the
flocculation tank
PA
182. High Flow /
High Level
Caustic line
breakage through
high pressure /
damage
Potential to splash a
person and cause a
corrosive burn
System to be leak
checked prior to use,
high pressure tubing to
be used
Add a flow switch alarm to the water
supply to the proposed safety shower in
case a lone worker requires assistance
when using the safety shower
PA
183. High Flow /
High Level
Loss of containment
of flocculant
Slip hazard Utility station to be added to allow wash
down of any spills of flocculant
PA
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Orica Villawood HAZOP Report Rev E.Doc
17 April 2013 A5.56
PINNACLE RISK MANAGEMENT - HAZOP RECORD SHEET
PROJECT: Orica Villawood Water Treatment
Plant
TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Peter ODea, Pearce Anderson,
Richard Giles, Lindsay Killin

DATE: 29/11/12
SYSTEM: Flocculation Tank and Chemical
Dosing Systems (HAZOPed by Difference)
LEADER: Dean Shewring

DRAWING: SAS10883 302 Rev 0 MINUTES BY: Lindsay Killin

No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING
SAFEGUARDS
ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE
184. Reverse Flow Failure of the
flocculant discharge
non-return valve and
the pump suction
and discharge
(check) valves
Drain the entire
flocculation tank,
including both
chambers, to the
flocculant IBC
Maintenance on the
piping system and
check valves
As above, preference is to overflow from
the mixing tank (chamber 1) at a high
point which would be ideal for the
flocculant addition point to reduce the
chance of this reverse flow scenario.
Further review required
PA
185. High
Temperature
Water supply line to
the safety shower /
eyewash heated by
the sun
Hot water from the
safety shower eyewash
with the potential to
render the unit
inoperable
Ensure the potable water to safety
shower eyewash is protected from
reaching high temperature due to
heating by the sun
LK
186. Low Temperature Cold winter night Potential to freeze
caustic (46 to 50%), in
particular, in small bore
lines that have
intermittent flows
Review means to ensure the caustic
does not freeze in the dosing lines
SA
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17 April 2013 A5.57
PINNACLE RISK MANAGEMENT - HAZOP RECORD SHEET
PROJECT: Orica Villawood Water Treatment
Plant
TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Peter ODea, Pearce Anderson,
Richard Giles, Lindsay Killin

DATE: 29/11/12
SYSTEM: Flocculation Tank and Chemical
Dosing Systems (HAZOPed by Difference)
LEADER: Dean Shewring

DRAWING: SAS10883 302 Rev 0 MINUTES BY: Lindsay Killin

No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING
SAFEGUARDS
ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE
187. Plant Items Personnel or wildlife
contact with caustic
when splash filling
into the mixing tank
Corrosive burn injuries Caustic not dosed
during maintenance (the
system is shut down).

Plant will be shutdown
during maintenance of
the pH probe
Perform a risk assessment on the
caustic dosing point for this scenario to
check if additional safety controls are
required, e.g. cowling around the caustic
dosing point
SA

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PINNACLE RISK MANAGEMENT - HAZOP RECORD SHEET
PROJECT: Orica Villawood Water Treatment
Plant
TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Peter ODea, Pearce Anderson,
Richard Giles, Lindsay Killin

DATE: 29/11/12
SYSTEM: Lamella Settlers LEADER: Dean Shewring

DRAWING: SAS10883 303 Rev A MINUTES BY: Lindsay Killin

No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING
SAFEGUARDS
ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE
188. General
Discussion
Apply the common actions from the
settling tank sludge pump as
appropriate, i.e. actions 7, 8 and 10.

No further significant issues identified
PA

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PINNACLE RISK MANAGEMENT - HAZOP RECORD SHEET
PROJECT: Orica Villawood Water Treatment
Plant
TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Peter ODea, Pearce Anderson,
Richard Giles, Lindsay Killin

DATE: 29/11/12
SYSTEM: Break Tank / Zeolite Feed Tank
(HAZOPed by Difference) and the Filter Pumping
System, i.e. Filters on-line
LEADER: Dean Shewring

DRAWING: SAS10883 303 Rev A, SAS10883
304 Rev A
MINUTES BY: Lindsay Killin

No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING
SAFEGUARDS
ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE
189. General
Discussion
Review the need for having two tanks in
series, i.e. the break tank and the zeolite
feed tank. Can the plant be operated
adequately with only one tank (e.g.
consider sludge fouling the filters at a
higher frequency if only one tank was
used). Delete one tank from the scope
if two are not required
PA
190. General
Discussion
Operator leaves one
or more filter manual
valves in the
incorrect position
during or after a
backwash operation
Unwanted misdirected
flows, e.g. backwash
water to the GAC feed
tank
SOPs and training
acceptable given the
consequential impacts
No further action required - -
191. High Pressure Zeolite filters outlet
valves shut
Potential to exceed the
design pressure of the
filters from the filter feed
pumps
PSH on filter feed
pumps discharge,
however, its set point is
unknown
Confirm that there are adequate
safeguards to protect against over-
pressure of the filters as they are
designed for maximum pressure of 250
kPag
PA
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Orica Villawood HAZOP Report Rev E.Doc
17 April 2013 A5.60
PINNACLE RISK MANAGEMENT - HAZOP RECORD SHEET
PROJECT: Orica Villawood Water Treatment
Plant
TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Peter ODea, Pearce Anderson,
Richard Giles, Lindsay Killin

DATE: 29/11/12
SYSTEM: Break Tank / Zeolite Feed Tank
(HAZOPed by Difference) and the Filter Pumping
System, i.e. Filters on-line
LEADER: Dean Shewring

DRAWING: SAS10883 303 Rev A, SAS10883
304 Rev A
MINUTES BY: Lindsay Killin

No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING
SAFEGUARDS
ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE
192. Testing Install an analysis point on the common
line to the GAC feed tank to allow the
operators to test the performance of the
zeolite filters
PA

Pinnacle Risk Management

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17 April 2013 A5.61

PINNACLE RISK MANAGEMENT - HAZOP RECORD SHEET
PROJECT: Orica Villawood Water Treatment
Plant
TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Peter ODea, Pearce Anderson,
Richard Giles, Lindsay Killin

DATE: 29/11/12
SYSTEM: Zeolite Filters Backwashing LEADER: Dean Shewring

DRAWING: SAS10883 304 Rev A MINUTES BY: Lindsay Killin

No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING
SAFEGUARDS
ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE
193. General
Discussion
Install an additional valve downstream
of zeolite filters to isolate the filter
system from the GAC feed tank for
backwashing of the zeolite filters
PA
194. Low Flow /
Low Level
All three filters
become blinded
Inability to backwash Provide means to backwash all three
filters when blinded, e.g. install an
additional hose connection on common
backwash inlet to all three filters for
connecting a hose (must consider the
maximum water supply pressure to
ensure this does not exceed the filter
maximum pressure) or install a filter
bypass line to allow backwash with non-
filtered water from the zeolite filter feed
pump
PA
195. Instruments Review the need for the flow switch after
the zeolite feed pumps as the PSH can
be used for filter blockage and
deadhead protection. Delete if not
required
PA

Pinnacle Risk Management

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17 April 2013 A5.62

PINNACLE RISK MANAGEMENT - HAZOP RECORD SHEET
PROJECT: Orica Villawood Water Treatment
Plant
TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Peter ODea, Pearce Anderson,
Richard Giles, Lindsay Killin

DATE: 29/11/12
SYSTEM: GAC Feed Tank System (HAZOPed
by Difference) and GAC Filters
LEADER: Dean Shewring

DRAWING: SAS10883 305 Rev A MINUTES BY: Lindsay Killin

No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING
SAFEGUARDS
ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE
196. General
Discussion
Update the P&ID to show the tank liquid
outlet nozzle isolation valve
PA
197. General
Discussion
Operator leaves one
or more GAC manual
valves in the
incorrect position
Unwanted misdirected
flows, e.g. non-treated
water to the treated
water basins, or
deadhead of the GAC
feed pump
SOPs and training
acceptable given the
consequential impacts
No further action required - -
198. High Flow /
High Level
Two pumps in
operation
Potential to carry over
activated carbon to the
downstream treated
water tank and beyond
The stand-by pump is to be removed
from the field and used as a hot spare
(i.e. two pump operation not possible).
Also, include in SOPs the need to only
run one pump at a time in the future to
avoid fluidisation of the GAC if a second
stand-by pump is installed
PA
199. High Flow /
High Level
Incorrect valve
alignment
Potential contaminants
going into the treated
water feed tank and/or
dead head the GAC
feed pump
Testing of the treated
water prior to discharge
to the sewer and the
ability to rerun off-spec
water through the plant
Include in the SOPs the need for
supervisory checking of valve positions
after a GAC unit valve change / change
over
LK
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17 April 2013 A5.63
PINNACLE RISK MANAGEMENT - HAZOP RECORD SHEET
PROJECT: Orica Villawood Water Treatment
Plant
TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Peter ODea, Pearce Anderson,
Richard Giles, Lindsay Killin

DATE: 29/11/12
SYSTEM: GAC Feed Tank System (HAZOPed
by Difference) and GAC Filters
LEADER: Dean Shewring

DRAWING: SAS10883 305 Rev A MINUTES BY: Lindsay Killin

No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING
SAFEGUARDS
ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE
200. High Flow /
High Level
GAC purifier feed
pump is larger in size
than the current
pump
Increase pumping rate
has potential to fluidise
the carbon bed and
hence the increase risk
of carry-over of GAC
Confirm the new pump will not result in
fluidisation of the GEC purifiers
SA
201. Zero Flow /
Empty
GAC feed pump
stops
Water in the GAC
purifiers will drain down
to the treated water tank
and form a vacuum in
the upper sections of
the GAC Purifiers. Also,
if the pump check valve
fails, the pressure in the
GACs will be close to a
full vacuum when
draining back to the
GAC feed tank
Confirm that the GAC vessels are
adequately rated for the maximum
vacuum that can be generated
PA
Pinnacle Risk Management

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17 April 2013 A5.64
PINNACLE RISK MANAGEMENT - HAZOP RECORD SHEET
PROJECT: Orica Villawood Water Treatment
Plant
TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Peter ODea, Pearce Anderson,
Richard Giles, Lindsay Killin

DATE: 29/11/12
SYSTEM: GAC Feed Tank System (HAZOPed
by Difference) and GAC Filters
LEADER: Dean Shewring

DRAWING: SAS10883 305 Rev A MINUTES BY: Lindsay Killin

No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING
SAFEGUARDS
ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE
202. High Pressure New pump feeding
the GACs
Potential to exceed the
maximum design
pressure for the GAC
vessels as this is a
larger duty pump
Confirm that the maximum design
pressure of the GAC vessels exceeds
the maximum supply pressure from the
new pump. If not, review the need to
replace the existing PRVs with larger
valves
LK
203. Impurities Extended shutdown
(i.e. 4-5 weeks or
more)
Potential for biological
growth on the GAC and
hence deactivation
Install a recirculation line from the outlet
of the GACs to the GAC feed tank to
allow GAC recirculation during
downtime
PA
204. Impurities Fines from the initial
flushing of the zeolite
filters
Blinding of the activated
carbon and hence
deactivation (as above)
Include in the SOPs the need to rinse
the zeolite filters to the sedimentation
tank via the rinse valves
PA
205. Testing Determine availability of methods to get
quick turnaround on GAC bed analyses,
or indicator tests while awaiting lab
results
PA
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17 April 2013 A5.65
PINNACLE RISK MANAGEMENT - HAZOP RECORD SHEET
PROJECT: Orica Villawood Water Treatment
Plant
TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Peter ODea, Pearce Anderson,
Richard Giles, Lindsay Killin

DATE: 29/11/12
SYSTEM: GAC Feed Tank System (HAZOPed
by Difference) and GAC Filters
LEADER: Dean Shewring

DRAWING: SAS10883 305 Rev A MINUTES BY: Lindsay Killin

No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING
SAFEGUARDS
ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE
206. Plant Items Confirm the mechanical integrity of the
equipment available in the existing parts
of the WTP including the structures (e.g.
stairs and platforms) and the vessels
(e.g. routine pressure vessel inspection
and testing required?)
LK

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PINNACLE RISK MANAGEMENT - HAZOP RECORD SHEET
PROJECT: Orica Villawood Water Treatment
Plant
TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Peter ODea, Pearce Anderson,
Lindsay Killin

DATE: 30/11/12
SYSTEM: Treated Water Basin System LEADER: Dean Shewring

DRAWING: SAS10883 306 Rev A MINUTES BY: Lindsay Killin

No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING
SAFEGUARDS
ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE
207. General
Discussion
As the treated water tank and pump are
not required to recover off-spec material
etc then these can be removed from the
design. To prevent draining and hence
forming a vacuum in the GACs when the
GAC feed pump stops install a
motorised solenoid valve on the
common outlet line (close to the GACs)
which is to close the when the GAC feed
pump stops.

Also, include position switches on this
motorised valve to allow interlocking to
pump operation, i.e. prevent pump
operation if the motorised valve is stuck
closed and raise an alarm if this valve is
open when it should be closed. The
valve should fail to the last position
PA
208. General
Discussion
Retain means to recirculate the basins,
e.g. for pH correction. Note: sampling
can be achieved by manually dipping
the basin
PA
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17 April 2013 A5.67
PINNACLE RISK MANAGEMENT - HAZOP RECORD SHEET
PROJECT: Orica Villawood Water Treatment
Plant
TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Peter ODea, Pearce Anderson,
Lindsay Killin

DATE: 30/11/12
SYSTEM: Treated Water Basin System LEADER: Dean Shewring

DRAWING: SAS10883 306 Rev A MINUTES BY: Lindsay Killin

No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING
SAFEGUARDS
ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE
209. High Flow /
High Level
Passing butterfly
valve
Relatively small amount
of off-spec material
could flow to sewer but
probably still on spec in
relation to trade waste
consent
Change the destination selection valves
in pipes from the basin to ball valves.
Establish a protocol in which Orica and
EPS agree on discharge to the sewer to
minimise the risk of off-spec discharge,
e.g. supervisory checks that the valves
are in the correct position prior to
discharging to the sewer
PA
210. High Flow /
High Level
Off-spec treated
water running to two
basins, e.g. basin
inlet valve passing or
inadvertently left
open
Putting an on-spec
basin off-spec and
hence having to rerun a
basin back through the
plant prior to discharge
Visible inlets to basins
to make sure the
operator can check
visually during
inspections
Change the three basins inlet butterfly
valves to ball valves for improved
reliability of shut-off. These are to be
lockable ball valves to allow full isolation
of basins
PA
211. Low Pressure Motorised valve to
treated water basins
closes quickly
Potential to form a
vacuum downstream of
the motorised valve and
suck in the poly pipe
Provide means to mitigate the vacuum
that could be formed, e.g. install a vent
(vent could have a non-return valve to
prevent water discharge but allow air in)
or a vacuum breaker
SA

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PINNACLE RISK MANAGEMENT - HAZOP RECORD SHEET
PROJECT: Orica Villawood Water Treatment
Plant
TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Peter ODea, Pearce Anderson,
Lindsay Killin

DATE: 30/11/12
SYSTEM: Sedimentation Tanks LEADER: Dean Shewring

DRAWING: SAS10883 307 Rev A MINUTES BY: Lindsay Killin

No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING
SAFEGUARDS
ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE
212. General
Discussion
Review the option of using bulkabags
under the sedimentation tank drains
instead of the drying beds to improve
ease of handling of sludge
LK
213. General
Discussion
Mark up the P & ID to show the bund
under the sedimentation tanks
PA
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Orica Villawood HAZOP Report Rev E.Doc
17 April 2013 A5.69
PINNACLE RISK MANAGEMENT - HAZOP RECORD SHEET
PROJECT: Orica Villawood Water Treatment
Plant
TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Peter ODea, Pearce Anderson,
Lindsay Killin

DATE: 30/11/12
SYSTEM: Sedimentation Tanks LEADER: Dean Shewring

DRAWING: SAS10883 307 Rev A MINUTES BY: Lindsay Killin

No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING
SAFEGUARDS
ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE
214. Zero Flow /
Empty
Sludge caking within
the sludge outlet line
Inability to drain the
sedimentation tank
Lines can be rodded.
Sedimentation tank to
be isolated by the first
outlet valve and the
second outlet valve is to
remain open (to prevent
sludge blockages
between these two
valves). For improved
operation, the
preference is to keep
one tank offline and
hence have the option
to use this standby tank
should the first
tank/lines become
blocked
As an option in the SOPs put the sludge
line from the high capacity settler to only
one of the sedimentation tanks, i.e.
minimise the risk of blocking both tanks
with the higher sludge containing stream
PA
215. Zero Flow /
Empty
Fouling of the sand
dryer bed with the
sludge
Inability to drain through
the beds
Operation to be reviewed during
commissioning and bulkabags
considered as alternative option to beds
if the beds are blocked too often
LK
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Orica Villawood HAZOP Report Rev E.Doc
17 April 2013 A5.70
PINNACLE RISK MANAGEMENT - HAZOP RECORD SHEET
PROJECT: Orica Villawood Water Treatment
Plant
TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Peter ODea, Pearce Anderson,
Lindsay Killin

DATE: 30/11/12
SYSTEM: Sedimentation Tanks LEADER: Dean Shewring

DRAWING: SAS10883 307 Rev A MINUTES BY: Lindsay Killin

No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING
SAFEGUARDS
ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE
216. Plant Items Personnel exposed
to DDT etc contained
within the sludge
Health impacts on
personnel
SWMS/JSA to be
performed on sludge
handling, e.g. disposal
via the DTDU
No further action required - -
217. Instruments Position the level switch in each
sedimentation tank for ease of
maintenance access and away from the
sludge inlet to avoid any materials
potentially seizing up the instrument
PA

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17 April 2013 A5.71

PINNACLE RISK MANAGEMENT - HAZOP RECORD SHEET
PROJECT: Orica Villawood Water Treatment
Plant
TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Peter ODea, Pearce Anderson,
Lindsay Killin

DATE: 30/11/12
SYSTEM: Overview LEADER: Dean Shewring

DRAWING: All WTP P&IDs MINUTES BY: Lindsay Killin

No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING
SAFEGUARDS
ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE
218. Commissioning Contamination of the
pressure test / wash
water with existing
contaminants in the
plant
Problems in disposing of
the wash-water
Include in the commissioning plan the
ability to store water used to rinse and
test the plant and equipment for
processing through the plant at a later
date.

Also, avoid using detergents /
dispersants when cleaning. These can
cause future issues with the settling
processes
LK
219. Materials of
Construction
Review the existing and proposed
materials of construction to ensure that
potential contaminants do not react /
interfere with plant components.
Analysis is also required for the potential
for construction materials being
impregnated by contaminants and
therefore being unsuitable for reuse on
future projects or difficult to dispose of
PA

Pinnacle Risk Management

Orica Villawood HAZOP Report Rev E.Doc
17 April 2013 7
6 REFERENCES


1 Department of Planning, Hazardous Industry Planning Advisory Paper
N 8 - HAZOP Guidelines, NSW Government, Sydney

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