1

1. PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS, INC., petitioner,

vs. HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON as Secretary of Labor and
Employment, and TOMAS D. ACHACOSO, as Administrator of the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, respondents.
G.R. No. 81958 June 30, 1988 (FULL CASE)

The petitioner, Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI,
for short), a firm "engaged principally in the recruitment of Filipino
workers, male and female, for overseas placement,"
1
challenges the
Constitutional validity of Department Order No. 1, Series of 1988, of
the Department of Labor and Employment, in the character of
"GUIDELINES GOVERNING THE TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF
DEPLOYMENT OF FILIPINO DOMESTIC AND HOUSEHOLD WORKERS," in
this petition for certiorari and prohibition. Specifically, the measure is
assailed for "discrimination against males or females;"
2
that it "does
not apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and
females with similar skills;"
3
and that it is violative of the right to
travel. It is held likewise to be an invalid exercise of the lawmaking
power, police power being legislative, and not executive, in character.
In its supplement to the petition, PASEI invokes Section 3, of Article
XIII, of the Constitution, providing for worker participation "in policy
and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as
may be provided by law."
4
Department Order No. 1, it is contended,
was passed in the absence of prior consultations. It is claimed, finally,
to be in violation of the Charter's non-impairment clause, in addition to
the "great and irreparable injury" that PASEI members face should the
Order be further enforced.
On May 25, 1988, the Solicitor General, on behalf of the respondents
Secretary of Labor and Administrator of the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration, filed a Comment informing the Court that
on March 8, 1988, the respondent Labor Secretary lifted the
deployment ban in the states of Iraq, Jordan, Qatar, Canada,
Hongkong, United States, Italy, Norway, Austria, and Switzerland. * In
submitting the validity of the challenged "guidelines," the Solicitor
General invokes the police power of the Philippine State.
It is admitted that Department Order No. 1 is in the nature of a police
power measure. The only question is whether or not it is valid under
the Constitution.
The concept of police power is well-established in this jurisdiction. It
has been defined as the "state authority to enact legislation that may
interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the
general welfare."
5
As defined, it consists of (1) an imposition of
restraint upon liberty or property, (2) in order to foster the common
good. It is not capable of an exact definition but has been, purposely,
veiled in general terms to underscore its all-comprehensive embrace.
"Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to
anticipate the future where it could be done, provides enough room
for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances
thus assuring the greatest benefits."
6

It finds no specific Constitutional grant for the plain reason that it does
not owe its origin to the Charter. Along with the taxing power and
eminent domain, it is inborn in the very fact of statehood and
sovereignty. It is a fundamental attribute of government that has
enabled it to perform the most vital functions of governance. Marshall,
to whom the expression has been credited,
7
refers to it succinctly as
the plenary power of the State "to govern its citizens."
8

"The police power of the State ... is a power coextensive with self-
protection, and it is not inaptly termed the "law of overwhelming
necessity." It may be said to be that inherent and plenary power in the
State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort,
safety, and welfare of society."
9

It constitutes an implied limitation on the Bill of Rights. According to
Fernando, it is "rooted in the conception that men in organizing the
state and imposing upon its government limitations to safeguard
constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable an individual
citizen or a group of citizens to obstruct unreasonably the enactment
of such salutary measures calculated to ensure communal peace,
safety, good order, and welfare."
10
Significantly, the Bill of Rights itself
does not purport to be an absolute guaranty of individual rights and
liberties "Even liberty itself, the greatest of all rights, is not unrestricted
license to act according to one's will."
11
It is subject to the far more
overriding demands and requirements of the greater number.
Notwithstanding its extensive sweep, police power is not without its
own limitations. For all its awesome consequences, it may not be
exercised arbitrarily or unreasonably. Otherwise, and in that event, it
defeats the purpose for which it is exercised, that is, to advance the
public good. Thus, when the power is used to further private interests
at the expense of the citizenry, there is a clear misuse of the power.
12

In the light of the foregoing, the petition must be dismissed.
As a general rule, official acts enjoy a presumed valdity.
13
In the
absence of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, the
presumption logically stands.
The petitioner has shown no satisfactory reason why the contested
measure should be nullified. There is no question that Department
Order No. 1 applies only to "female contract workers,"
14
but it does
not thereby make an undue discrimination between the sexes. It is
well-settled that "equality before the law" under the
Constitution
15
does not import a perfect Identity of rights among all
men and women. It admits of classifications, provided that (1) such
classifications rest on substantial distinctions; (2) they are germane to
the purposes of the law; (3) they are not confined to existing
conditions; and (4) they apply equally to all members of the same
class.
16

The Court is satisfied that the classification made-the preference for
female workers rests on substantial distinctions.
As a matter of judicial notice, the Court is well aware of the unhappy
plight that has befallen our female labor force abroad, especially
domestic servants, amid exploitative working conditions marked by, in
not a few cases, physical and personal abuse. The sordid tales of
maltreatment suffered by migrant Filipina workers, even rape and
various forms of torture, confirmed by testimonies of returning
workers, are compelling motives for urgent Government action. As
precisely the caretaker of Constitutional rights, the Court is called upon
to protect victims of exploitation. In fulfilling that duty, the Court
sustains the Government's efforts.
The same, however, cannot be said of our male workers. In the first
place, there is no evidence that, except perhaps for isolated instances,
our men abroad have been afflicted with an Identical predicament. The
petitioner has proffered no argument that the Government should act
similarly with respect to male workers. The Court, of course, is not
impressing some male chauvinistic notion that men are superior to
women. What the Court is saying is that it was largely a matter of
evidence (that women domestic workers are being ill-treated abroad in
massive instances) and not upon some fanciful or arbitrary yardstick
that the Government acted in this case. It is evidence capable indeed of
unquestionable demonstration and evidence this Court accepts. The
Court cannot, however, say the same thing as far as men are
concerned. There is simply no evidence to justify such an inference.
Suffice it to state, then, that insofar as classifications are concerned,
this Court is content that distinctions are borne by the evidence.
Discrimination in this case is justified.
As we have furthermore indicated, executive determinations are
generally final on the Court. Under a republican regime, it is the
executive branch that enforces policy. For their part, the courts decide,
in the proper cases, whether that policy, or the manner by which it is
implemented, agrees with the Constitution or the laws, but it is not for
them to question its wisdom. As a co-equal body, the judiciary has
great respect for determinations of the Chief Executive or his
subalterns, especially when the legislature itself has specifically given
them enough room on how the law should be effectively enforced. In
the case at bar, there is no gainsaying the fact, and the Court will deal
with this at greater length shortly, that Department Order No. 1
implements the rule-making powers granted by the Labor Code. But
what should be noted is the fact that in spite of such a fiction of
finality, the Court is on its own persuaded that prevailing conditions
indeed call for a deployment ban.
There is likewise no doubt that such a classification is germane to the
purpose behind the measure. Unquestionably, it is the avowed
2

objective of Department Order No. 1 to "enhance the protection for
Filipino female overseas workers"
17
this Court has no quarrel that in
the midst of the terrible mistreatment Filipina workers have suffered
abroad, a ban on deployment will be for their own good and welfare.
The Order does not narrowly apply to existing conditions. Rather, it is
intended to apply indefinitely so long as those conditions exist. This is
clear from the Order itself ("Pending review of the administrative and
legal measures, in the Philippines and in the host countries . . ."
18
),
meaning to say that should the authorities arrive at a means impressed
with a greater degree of permanency, the ban shall be lifted. As a stop-
gap measure, it is possessed of a necessary malleability, depending on
the circumstances of each case. Accordingly, it provides:
9. LIFTING OF SUSPENSION. The Secretary of
Labor and Employment (DOLE) may, upon
recommendation of the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA), lift the
suspension in countries where there are:
1. Bilateral agreements or understanding with the
Philippines, and/or,
2. Existing mechanisms providing for sufficient
safeguards to ensure the welfare and protection of
Filipino workers.
19

The Court finds, finally, the impugned guidelines to be applicable to all
female domestic overseas workers. That it does not apply to "all
Filipina workers"
20
is not an argument for unconstitutionality. Had the
ban been given universal applicability, then it would have been
unreasonable and arbitrary. For obvious reasons, not all of them are
similarly circumstanced. What the Constitution prohibits is the singling
out of a select person or group of persons within an existing class, to
the prejudice of such a person or group or resulting in an unfair
advantage to another person or group of persons. To apply the ban,
say exclusively to workers deployed by A, but not to those recruited by
B, would obviously clash with the equal protection clause of the
Charter. It would be a classic case of what Chase refers to as a law that
"takes property from A and gives it to B."
21
It would be an unlawful
invasion of property rights and freedom of contract and needless to
state, an invalid act.
22
(Fernando says: "Where the classification is
based on such distinctions that make a real difference as infancy, sex,
and stage of civilization of minority groups, the better rule, it would
seem, is to recognize its validity only if the young, the women, and the
cultural minorities are singled out for favorable treatment. There
would be an element of unreasonableness if on the contrary their
status that calls for the law ministering to their needs is made the basis
of discriminatory legislation against them. If such be the case, it would
be difficult to refute the assertion of denial of equal protection."
23
In
the case at bar, the assailed Order clearly accords protection to certain
women workers, and not the contrary.)
It is incorrect to say that Department Order No. 1 prescribes a total ban
on overseas deployment. From scattered provisions of the Order, it is
evident that such a total ban has hot been contemplated. We quote:
5. AUTHORIZED DEPLOYMENT-The deployment of
domestic helpers and workers of similar skills
defined herein to the following [sic] are authorized
under these guidelines and are exempted from the
suspension.
5.1 Hirings by immediate
members of the family of Heads
of State and Government;
5.2 Hirings by Minister, Deputy
Minister and the other senior
government officials; and
5.3 Hirings by senior officials of
the diplomatic corps and duly
accredited international
organizations.
5.4 Hirings by employers in
countries with whom the
Philippines have [sic] bilateral
labor agreements or
understanding.
xxx xxx xxx
7. VACATIONING DOMESTIC HELPERS AND
WORKERS OF SIMILAR SKILLS--Vacationing
domestic helpers and/or workers of similar skills
shall be allowed to process with the POEA and
leave for worksite only if they are returning to the
same employer to finish an existing or partially
served employment contract. Those workers
returning to worksite to serve a new employer shall
be covered by the suspension and the provision of
these guidelines.
xxx xxx xxx
9. LIFTING OF SUSPENSION-The Secretary of Labor
and Employment (DOLE) may, upon
recommendation of the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA), lift the
suspension in countries where there are:
1. Bilateral agreements or
understanding with the
Philippines, and/or,
2. Existing mechanisms
providing for sufficient
safeguards to ensure the
welfare and protection of
Filipino workers.
24

xxx xxx xxx
The consequence the deployment ban has on the right to travel does
not impair the right. The right to travel is subject, among other things,
to the requirements of "public safety," "as may be provided by
law."
25
Department Order No. 1 is a valid implementation of the Labor
Code, in particular, its basic policy to "afford protection to
labor,"
26
pursuant to the respondent Department of Labor's rule-
making authority vested in it by the Labor Code.
27
The petitioner
assumes that it is unreasonable simply because of its impact on the
right to travel, but as we have stated, the right itself is not absolute.
The disputed Order is a valid qualification thereto.
Neither is there merit in the contention that Department Order No. 1
constitutes an invalid exercise of legislative power. It is true that police
power is the domain of the legislature, but it does not mean that such
an authority may not be lawfully delegated. As we have mentioned, the
Labor Code itself vests the Department of Labor and Employment with
rulemaking powers in the enforcement whereof.
28

The petitioners's reliance on the Constitutional guaranty of worker
participation "in policy and decision-making processes affecting their
rights and benefits"
29
is not well-taken. The right granted by this
provision, again, must submit to the demands and necessities of the
State's power of regulation.
The Constitution declares that:
Sec. 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and
overseas, organized and unorganized, and promote full employment
and equality of employment opportunities for all.
30

"Protection to labor" does not signify the promotion of employment
alone. What concerns the Constitution more paramountly is that such
an employment be above all, decent, just, and humane. It is bad
enough that the country has to send its sons and daughters to strange
lands because it cannot satisfy their employment needs at home.
Under these circumstances, the Government is duty-bound to insure
that our toiling expatriates have adequate protection, personally and
economically, while away from home. In this case, the Government has
evidence, an evidence the petitioner cannot seriously dispute, of the
lack or inadequacy of such protection, and as part of its duty, it has
precisely ordered an indefinite ban on deployment.
The Court finds furthermore that the Government has not
indiscriminately made use of its authority. It is not contested that it has
in fact removed the prohibition with respect to certain countries as
manifested by the Solicitor General.
3

The non-impairment clause of the Constitution, invoked by the
petitioner, must yield to the loftier purposes targetted by the
Government.
31
Freedom of contract and enterprise, like all other
freedoms, is not free from restrictions, more so in this jurisdiction,
where laissez faire has never been fully accepted as a controlling
economic way of life.
This Court understands the grave implications the questioned Order
has on the business of recruitment. The concern of the Government,
however, is not necessarily to maintain profits of business firms. In the
ordinary sequence of events, it is profits that suffer as a result of
Government regulation. The interest of the State is to provide a decent
living to its citizens. The Government has convinced the Court in this
case that this is its intent. We do not find the impugned Order to be
tainted with a grave abuse of discretion to warrant the extraordinary
relief prayed for.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. No costs. SO ORDERED.

2. CHAVEZ VS BONTO-PEREZ
Labor Standards Standard Employment Contract for Entertainers
Laches
Chavez is a dancer who was contracted by Centrum Placement &
Promotions Corporation to perform in Japan for 6 months. The
contract was for $1.5k a month, which was approved by POEA. After
the approval of said contract, Chavez entered into a side contract
reducing her salary with her Japanese employer through her local
manager-agency (Jaz Talents Promotion). The salary was reduced to
$500 and $750 was to go to Jaz Talents. In February 1991 (two years
after the expiration of her contract), Chavez sued Centrum Placement
and Jaz Talents for underpayment of wages before the POEA.
The POEA ruled against her. POEA stated that the side agreement
entered into by Chavez with her Japanese employer superseded the
Standard Employment Contract; that POEA had no knowledge of such
side agreement being entered into; that Chavez is barred by laches for
sleeping on her right for two years.
ISSUE: Whether or not Chavez is entitled to relief.
HELD: Yes. The SC ruled that the managerial commission agreement
executed by Chavez to authorize her Japanese Employer to deduct her
salary is void because it is against our existing laws, morals and public
policy. It cannot supersede the standard employment contract
approved by the POEA with the following stipulation appended
thereto:
It is understood that the terms and conditions stated in this
Employment Contract are in conformance with the Standard
Employment Contract for Entertainers prescribed by the POEA under
Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of 1986. Any alterations or changes
made in any part of this contract without prior approval by the POEA
shall be null and void;
The side agreement which reduced Chavezs basic wage is null and void
for violating the POEAs minimum employment standards, and for not
having been approved by the POEA. Here, both Centrum Placement
and Jaz Talents are solidarily liable.
Laches does not apply in the case at bar. In this case, Chavez filed her
claim well within the three-year prescriptive period for the filing of
money claims set forth in Article 291 of the Labor Code. For this
reason, laches is not applicable.

3. People of the Philippines vs. Domingo Panis
GR No. L5867477, July 11, 1990

FACTS:

On January 9, 1981, four information were filed in the in the Court of
First Instance (CFI) of Zambales and Olongapo City alleging that herein
private respondent Serapio Abug, "without first securing a license from
the Ministry of Labor as a holder of authority to operate a fee-charging
employment agency, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
criminally operate a private fee charging employment agency by
charging fees and expenses (from) and promising employment in Saudi
Arabia" to four separate individuals. Abug filed a motion to quash
contending that he cannot be charged for illegal recruitment because
according to him, Article 13(b) of the Labor Code says there would be
illegal recruitment only "whenever two or more persons are in any
manner promised or offered any employment for a fee.

Denied at first, the motion to quash was reconsidered and granted by
the Trial Court in its Orders dated June 24, 1981, and September 17,
1981. In the instant case, the view of the private respondents is that to
constitute recruitment and placement, all the acts mentioned in this
article should involve dealings with two or more persons as an
indispensable requirement. On the other hand, the petitioner argues
that the requirement of two or more persons is imposed only where
the recruitment and placement consists of an offer or promise of
employment to such persons and always in consideration of a fee.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Article 13(b) of the Labor Code provides for the
innocence or guilt of the private respondent of the crime of illegal
recruitment

COURT RULING:

The Supreme Court reversed the CFIs Orders and reinstated all four
information filed against private respondent.

The Article 13(b) of the Labor Code was merely intended to create a
presumption, and not to impose a condition on the basic rule nor to
provide an exception thereto.

Where a fee is collected in consideration of a promise or offer of
employment to two or more prospective workers, the individual or
entity dealing with them shall be deemed to be engaged in the act of
recruitment and placement. The words "shall be deemed" create the
said presumption.

4. PEOPLE VS CAPT. GASACAO (2005) G.R. 168449
Facts:
Appellant was the Crewing Manager of Great Eastern Shipping Agency
Inc., a licensed local manning agency, while his nephew and co-
accused, Jose Gasacao, was the President. As the crewing manager,
appellant's duties included receiving job applications, interviewing the
applicants and informing them of the agency's requirement of payment
of performance or cash bond prior to deployment.
On August 4, 2000, appellant and Jose Gasacao were charged with
Large Scale Illegal Recruitment defined under Section 6, paragraphs (a),
(l) and (m) of Republic Act (RA) No. 8042 or the Migrant Workers and
Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, and penalized under Section 7 (b) of the
same law, before the RTC of Quezon City.
Only the appellant was arrested while Jose Gasacao remained at large.
When arraigned, appellant pleaded not guilty to the offense charged.
Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued. On March 5, 2001, the RTC of
Quezon City, Branch 218, rendered its Joint Decision convicting
appellant of Large Scale Illegal Recruitment in Crim. Case No. Q-00-
94240 and acquitting him of the charge in Crim. Case No. Q-00-94241.
Conformably with our pronouncement in People v. Mateo, 6 which
modified pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court insofar as they
provide for direct appeals from the RTC to the Supreme Court in cases
where the penalty imposed is death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, as in this case, as well as this Court's Resolution dated
September 19, 1995, we resolved on February 2, 2005 to transfer the
case to the Court of Appeals for appropriate action and disposition.
Issue: WON an error attended the trial court's findings, as affirmed by
the Court of Appeals, that appellant was guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of large scale illegal recruitment.
Held:
ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT
Sec. 6. DEFINITIONS. For purposes of this Act, illegal recruitment
shall mean any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting,
4

utilizing, hiring, procuring workers and includes referring, contract
services, promising or advertising for employment abroad, whether for
profit or not, when undertaken by a non-licensee or non-holder of
authority contemplated under Article 13(f) of Presidential Decree No.
442, as amended, otherwise known as the Labor Code of the
Philippines: Provided, that such non-licensee or non-holder who, in any
manner, offers or promises for a fee employment abroad to two or
more persons shall be deemed so engaged. It shall likewise include the
following acts, whether committed by any persons, whether a non-
licensee, non-holder, licensee or holder of authority.
(a) To charge or accept directly or indirectly any amount greater
than the specified in the schedule of allowable fees prescribed by the
Secretary of Labor and Employment, or to make a worker pay any
amount greater than that actually received by him as a loan or
advance;
(l) Failure to actually deploy without valid reason as determined
by the Department of Labor and Employment; and
(m) Failure to reimburse expenses incurred by the workers in
connection with his documentation and processing for purposes of
deployment, in cases where the deployment does not actually take
place without the worker's fault. Illegal recruitment when committed
by a syndicate or in large scale shall be considered as offense involving
economic sabotage.
Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate carried out by
a group of three (3) or more persons conspiring or confederating with
one another. It is deemed committed in large scale if committed
against three (3) or more persons individually or as a group.
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8042 (THE MIGRANT WORKERS AND OVERSEAS
FILIPINO ACT OF 1995); LICENSE DIFFERENTIATED FROM AUTHORITY -
A license is a document issued by the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE) authorizing a person or entity to operate a private
employment agency, while an authority is a document issued by the
DOLE authorizing a person or association to engage in recruitment and
placement activities as a private recruitment entity. However, it
appears that even licensees or holders of authority can be held liable
for illegal recruitment should they commit any of the above-
enumerated acts.
Thus, it is inconsequential that appellant committed large scale illegal
recruitment while Great Eastern Shipping Agency, Inc. was holding a
valid authority. We thus find that the court below committed no
reversible error in not appreciating that the manning agency was a
holder of a valid authority when appellant recruited the private
complainants.
There is no merit in appellant's contention that he could not be held
liable for illegal recruitment since he was a mere employee of the
manning agency, pursuant to Section 6 of RA No. 8042 which provides:
The persons criminally liable for the above offenses are the principals,
accomplices and accessories. In case of juridical persons, the officers
having control, management or direction of their business shall be
liable.
ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT IN LARGE SCALE, CREWING MANAGER OF A
SHIPPING AGENCY PROMISED THE COMPLAINANTS THAT THEY WILL BE
DEPLOYED ABROAD AFTER THEY HAVE PAID THE CASH BOND
Contrary to appellant's claim, he is not a mere employee of the
manning agency but the crewing manager. As such, he receives job
applications, interviews applicants and informs them of the agency's
requirement of payment of performance or cash bond prior to the
applicant's deployment. As the crewing manager, he was at the
forefront of the company's recruitment activities.
The testimonies of the private complainants clearly established that
appellant is not a mere employee of Great Eastern Shipping Agency Inc.
As the crewing manager, it was appellant who made representations
with the private complainants that he can secure overseas
employment for them upon payment of the cash bond.
It is well settled that to prove illegal recruitment, it must be shown that
appellant gave complainants the distinct impression that he had the
power or ability to send complainants abroad for work such that the
latter were convinced to part with their money in order to be
employed. 10 Appellant's act of promising the private complainants
that they will be deployed abroad within three months after they have
paid the cash bond clearly shows that he is engaged in illegal
recruitment.
AN EMPLOYEE OF A COMPANY OR CORPORATION ENGAGED THEREIN
MAY BE HELD LIABLE AS PRINCIPAL TOGETHER WITH HIS EMPLOYER.
The trial court's appreciation of the complainants' testimonies
deserves the highest respect since it was in a better position to assess
their credibility.
Even assuming that appellant was a mere employee, such fact is not a
shield against his conviction for large scale illegal recruitment. In the
case of People vs. Cabais, we have held that an employee of a company
or corporation engaged in illegal recruitment may be held liable as
principal, together with the employer, if it is shown that he actively and
consciously participated in the recruitment process.
Clearly, the acts of appellant vis--vis the private complainants, either
as the crewing manager of Great Eastern Shipping Agency Inc. or as a
mere employee of the same, constitute acts of large scale illegal
recruitment which should not be countenanced.

We find no reason to deviate from the findings of the trial court that
appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of large scale illegal
recruitment. It was established that he promised overseas employment
to five applicants, herein private complainants. He interviewed and
required them to complete and submit documents purportedly needed
for their employment. Although he informed them that it is optional,
he collected cash bonds and promised their deployment
notwithstanding the proscription against its collection under Section 60
of the Omnibus Rules and Regulations Implementing R.A. No. 8042 13
which state that:
SEC. 60. Prohibition on Bonds and Deposits. In no case shall an
employment agency require any bond or cash deposit from the worker
to guarantee performance under the contract or his/her repatriation.


5. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. DOLORES DE
LEON Y MISAJON, accused-appellant.
D E C I S I O N
ROMERO, J.:
Appellant Dolores de Leon was charged with violation of Article
38 (a) of Presidential Decree 1412 in relation to Article 15 (b) and (c) of
the Labor Code in an information which reads:
"That in or about and during the period comprised between July 6,
1992 and September 30, 1992, inclusive, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused, representing herself to have the capacity
to contract, enlist and transport Filipino workers for employment in
Jeddah/Saudi Arabia, did then and there wilfully and unlawfully for a
fee, recruit and promise employment/job placement in said country to
Roberto Porio y Silva, Ambrosio Miler y dela Cruz, Rafael Laurente y
Enriquez, Olimpia Guillena y Daliopac, Cipriano Perez y Bongoy,
Charlene Tatlonghari y Sota, Elvira Banta y Puno, Purita Joaquin y
Flores, Loreta Tatlonghari y Toboro, Joseph Chavez y Cater, Analiza
Tatlonghari y Toboro, Jaime Indaya y Lambozon, Manuel Cabusao y
Parungao, Edgardo Alagao y dela Cruz, Raymunda Miguelles y Balaba,
Desiree dela Cruz y Laconsay, Felicidad Galvez y Ducusin, Exequiel
Miguelles y Cirunay, Rosenda Jose y Perez, Guillermo Lampa y
Tansueco, Edmar Alagao y dela Cruz, Rommel Lozano y Cortez, Rodante
Sunico y Galvez and Romeo Porio y Silva, without first having secured
the required license or authority from the Department of Labor and
Employment."
The prosecution's evidence shows that:
Appellant is a former overseas contract worker placed by All Seasons
Manpower for employment as a midwife in Kuwait from 1989 to
September 1991 and as a nursing aide in Jeddah from February 1992 to
June 1992.
On August 14, 1992, appellant went to the house of Mr. Tatlonghari
and offered him and his daughter-in-law, Charlene Tatlonghari,
placement in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. Although Charlene already had a
pending application in another agency, she still submitted her bio-data
to appellant.
5

On August 15, 1992, appellant told Charlene that she would be hired as
a clerk with a monthly salary of US$450.00. On August 16, 1992,
Charlene withdrew her passport from the other agency and gave it to
appellant together with P1,000.00, which was P400.00 short of the
amount required by appellant allegedly for travel tax. No receipt was
issued but appellant promised Charlene's departure on August 28,
1992.
[1]

The scheduled departure was postponed as were the succeeding
schedules, prompting Charlene and the other applicants to go to All
Seasons Manpower in Makati. They saw appellant there and she
advised them to attend a seminar at the Philippine Overseas
Employment Agency (POEA). However, they were warned not to talk
with anyone in the said government agency. Subsequently, she learned
that appellant was arrested in one of the lodging houses in Sta. Cruz,
Manila where all the applications and other documents were found
beneath the bed. When she saw appellant at the police station,
appellant told Charlene not to join the other accusers who caused her
arrest.
[2]

Rodante Sunico, a food server at Jollibee along Rizal Avenue, Manila
met appellant on August 15, 1992. Appellant was introduced as a
recruiter who had already sent five workers to the Middle East. Sunico
gave appellant his bio-data and other documents after she promised
him that he would be included as a nurse in the second batch of
workers for Saudi Arabia.
On August 21, 1992, Sunico went to the house of Mr. Tatlonghari
where he gave appellant the amount of P5,400.00 allegedly for
processing his passport and payment of travel tax.
[3]
Sunico was not
issued a receipt but appellant required him to come back on the eve of
his scheduled departure on August 28, 1992. This "departure" was,
however, postponed several times. Later, Sunico learned from
Charlene Tatlonghari that appellant was arrested and detained by the
police. Sunico confronted appellant who promised to settle the
obligation but failed;
[4]
whereupon he went to All Seasons Manpower
in Makati where he was told that the said agency did not know
appellant.
Guillermo Lampa, a tricycle driver, was recruited by appellant on
August 4, 1992. He was offered a janitorial job in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia
with a monthly salary of US$300.00. Lampa and his wife gave
appellant P1,000.00 for medical expenses and another P1,000.00 for a
joint account with his wife. No receipt was issued by appellant but she
promised him that he would leave in two weeks' time and that All
Seasons Manpower would pay for his plane ticket.
[5]
Lampa never left
as promised and on September 27, 1992, he learned that appellant had
been arrested. At police headquarters, appellant promised to refund
Lampa's money but failed to do so.
Manuel Cabusao, a carpenter, met appellant through one Desiree de la
Cruz. Also present then were his brother Leonardo Cabusao, Guillermo
Lampa, Rommel Losano, Joseph Chavez and Analiza Tatlonghari.
Appellant offered him a janitorial job in a hospital in Saudi Arabia with
a monthly salary of US$300.00. He gave appellant P2,700.00 for the
processing of the travel documents. No receipt was issued by appellant
allegedly because the amount involved was small and because the
amount he should have paid was P5,000.00. Appellant scheduled his
departure on September 11, 1992 but postponed the same. He then
started looking for appellant until he learned that she was staying in a
hotel in Bambang, Jose Abad Santos, Tondo, Manila. He relayed the
information to his co-applicants who sought the help of the Barangay
Chairman in arresting appellant.
[6]
During the preliminary investigation,
appellant promised to refund the amount he paid, but failed to do so.
Joseph Chavez, a bakery caretaker in Bambang Market, met appellant
on September 6, 1992 through the wife of his co-applicant Guillermo
Lampa. Appellant represented herself as a recruiter of All Seasons
Manpower in Makati and offered him a janitorial job in Bahrain
because two applicants were rejected. He gave appellant P6,500.00
supposedly for medical, processing and placement fees. Appellant did
not issue a receipt because she was in a hurry. His departure was
scheduled on September 22, 1992 and when nothing happened, he
waited for appellant. Later, he learned that she had been arrested by
barangay officials. Like the other applicants, he executed a sworn
statement.
[7]

Roberto Porio, an electrician, went to the house of appellant on July 9,
1992 in the belief that appellant, as alleged owner of All Seasons
Manpower in Makati, was recruiting workers for abroad. He applied as
nursing aide and gave appellant his NBI clearance, passport, pictures
and P2,300.00.
[8]
Since he trusted appellant, he did not ask her for a
receipt. Thereafter, appellant disappeared.
On September 27, 1992, he saw appellant at police headquarters
where she promised to refund his money. He executed an affidavit
stating the circumstances of the illegal recruitment.
The prosecution also presented POEA records, duly identified by
Visitacion Carreon, POEA Senior Officer, showing that All Seasons
Manpower International Services is a licensed placement
agency.
[9]
However, appellant's name was not among the list of
personnel submitted by said agency to the POEA.
On April 28, 1993, the trial court rendered a decision, the
dispositive portion of which states:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused
Dolores de Leon guilty of the crime of Illegal Recruitment in large scale
and hereby sentences her to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment
and to pay a fine of P100,000.00, and further, for the said accused to
indemnify the complainants as follows -
1. To Rodante Sunico the sum of P5,400.00 with interest at the
legal rate from October 22, 1992 until the same is fully paid;
2. To Charlene Tatlonghari the sum of P1,000.00 with interest at
the legal rate from October 22, 1992 until the same is fully paid;
3. To Guillermo Lampa the sum of P2,000.00 with interest at the
legal rate from October 22, 1992 until the same is fully paid;
4. To Manuel Cabusao the sum of P2,700.00 with interest at the
legal rate from October 22, 1992 until the same is fully paid;
5. To Joseph Chavez the sum of P6,500.00 with interest at the legal
rate from October 22, 1992 until the same is fully paid; and
6. To Roberto Porio the sum of P2,300.00 with interest at the legal
rate from October 22, 1992 until the same is fully paid.
Costs against the accused.
SO ORDERED."
[10]

Appellant now questions the said decision of the trial court
saying that it erred in not acquitting her of the offense charged on the
ground that her guilt was not proved beyond reasonable doubt.
Appellant asserts that it was not she but her suitor, Rolando Clemente,
who received the payments from the complaining witnesses. She
explained further that all she did was to accompany them to All
Seasons Manpower in an effort to help them find jobs abroad.
We find appellant's contentions unworthy of belief.
In People v. Benemerito,
[11]
we said "Illegal recruitment is defined
in Article 38 of the Labor Code, as amended, as follows:
ART. 38. Illegal Recruitment. - - (a) Any recruitment activities,
including the prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34 of this
Code, to be undertaken by non-licensees or non-holders of authority
shall be deemed illegal and punishable under Article 39 of this Code.
The Ministry of Labor and Employment or any law enforcement officer
may initiate complaints under this Article.
(b) Illegal recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in large
scale shall be considered an offense involving economic sabotage and
shall be penalized in accordance with Article 39 hereof.
Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out
by a group of three (3) or more persons conspiring and/or
confederating with one another in carrying out any unlawful or illegal
transaction, enterprise or scheme defined under the first paragraph
hereof. Illegal recruitment is deemed committed in large scale if
committed against three (3) or more persons individually or as a group.
Article 13(b) of the same Code defines "recruitment and placement"
as: "any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing,
hiring or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services,
promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether
for profit or not: Provided, that any person or entity which, in any
manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more
persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement."
6

To prove illegal recruitment, only two elements need be shown:
(1) the person charged with the crime must have undertaken
recruitment activities; and (2) the said person does not have a license
or authority to do so.
A license is a document issued by the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE) authorizing a person or entity to operate a private
employment agency, while an authority is a document issued by the
DOLE authorizing a person or association to engage in recruitment and
placement activities as a private recruitment agency.
[12]

Large scale illegal recruitment is punishable by life imprisonment
and a fine of P100,000.00 under Article 39(a) of the Labor Code.
[13]

In the instant case, appellant clearly committed large scale illegal
recruitment as she recruited at least three persons, giving them the
impression that she had the capability of sending them abroad for
assured jobs in Saudi Arabia, and collecting various amounts allegedly
for processing and placement fees without license or authority to do
so.
Against the prosecution's overwhelming evidence, appellant
could only offer a bare denial and an obviously concocted story that it
was her suitor who actually recruited the various complainants and not
she. This suitor was never presented to corroborate her statements,
nor were other evidence presented to cast even an iota of doubt on
the testimony of the prosecution's witnesses.
After a thorough and painstaking review, the Court is satisfied
that there is nothing in the records to signify that the trial court
ignored or misappreciated substantial facts as would warrant a reversal
of its findings and conclusions.
[14]

As we declared in People v. Naparan, Jr.:
[15]

"Nitong mga nakaraang buwan, ang pansin ng sambayanan ay natuon
sa mga krimen na karumaldumal na katulad ng pagpatay at
pagsasamantala sa ating mga kababaihan. Wari ay nakaligtaan natin
ang mga salarin na di nahuhuli sa mga mamamatay tao. Sila rin ay
nagsasamantala sa mga inosente at walang malay. Ang kaibhan nga
lamang ay ang kanilang biktima ay yaong ating mga kababayan na
nangangarap na mangibang bayan upang sila ay mahango sa karalitaan
sampu ng kanilang pamilya.
Sa masidhi nilang hangarin, halos hindi nagdadalawang-isip kapag may
balanang nangangako na ipadadala sila sa mga bayang nakaririwasa
kung sila ay magbabayad ng sapat na salapi. Upang mapaniwala sila,
ang mga may masasamang tangka ay nagpapanggap na sila ay malakas
at may koneksyon sa mga Embahada ng mga bayang ito. Hindi lamang
madudulas ang kanilang dila. Umaasta silang maykaya. Naroong
sabihin na nakatira sila sa otel o pook ng mayayaman. Kapag
nakikipagkita sa kanilang kliyente ay magara ang suot at nakakotse.
Anupat ang mga pobreng nangangarap ay gagawin ang lahat ng
makakaya upang makapagbayad ng hinihinging pamasahe sa eroplano.
Kadalasan ay nangungutang sila o ang mga magulang nila sa 'sinco-
seis;' o dili kaya'y nagsasangla ng lupain o nagbibili ng mga ari-ariang
gaya ng kalabaw. Kanila namang nahihimok ang kamaganakan nila na
tumulong sapagkat nangangakong magpapadala ng higit na maraming
kuwarta na pambayad sa kanilang utang o dili kaya ay pampaaral sa
mga nakababatang kapatid.
Sa oras na nakapagbitiw ng salapi ang biktima, ang manlilinlang ay
dagling nawawala na parang bula. Sapagkat karamihan sa kanila ay
'illegal recruiter' at walang lisensya sa Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA), hindi na matutunton ang kanilang bakas.
Totoong napakarami na ang ating kaawa-awang kababayan na
napagsamantalahan na ng gayon. Nakalulungkot na kahit na
magbabala ang pamahalaan at ang mga opisinang kinauukulan, hindi
rin dinidinggin ng mga nais na mapabuti ang kalagayan nila sa buhay sa
pamamagitan ng pangingibang bayan.
Napapanahon nang iparating sa mga salarin na iyan na hindi
pahihintulutan ng pamahalaan ang gayong malawakang pangloloko sa
mga maralita na masasabing ang kasalanan lamang ay 'naghangad ng
kagitna, isang salop ang nawala." Kami ay maaasahang magpataw ng
akma at nauukol na parusa na bilanggo habang buhay at multa sa
halagang Isang Daang Libong Piso (P100,000.00) sa katulad ng
nasasakdal sa kasong itong nakasalang sa Kataastaasang Hukuman
ngayon. Umaasa kaming ito ay magsisilbing halimbawa sa mga walang
awa nating kababayan na patuloy ang gawang panlilinlang sa kanilang
kapwa Pilipino."
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the trial court finding Dolores de
Leon GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of illegal
recruitment in large scale is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
6. SEAGULL MARITIME CORP. AND PHILIMARE SHIPPING &
EQUIPMENT SUPPLY vs NERRY D. BALATONGAN, NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION AND PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT
ADMINISTRATION
On November 2, 1982, a "crew Agreement" was entered into by
private respondent Nerry D. Balatongan and Philimare Shipping and
Equipment Supply (hereinafter called Philimare) whereby the latter
employed the former as able seaman on board its vessel "Santa Cruz"
(renamed "Turtle Bay") with a monthly salary of US $ 300.00. Said
agreement was processed and approved by the National Seaman's
Board (NSB) on November 3, 1982.
1

While on board said vessel the said parties entered into a
supplementary contract of employment on December 6, 1982
2
which
provides among others:
1. The employer shall be obliged to insure the
employee during his engagement against death or
permanent invalidity caused by accident on board
up to:
US $ 40,000 - for death caused
by accident
US $ 50,000 - for permanent
total disability caused by
accident.
3

On October 6, 1983 Balatongan met an accident in the Suez Canal,
Egypt as a result of which he was hospitalized at the Suez Canal
Authority Hospital. Later, he was repatriated to the Philippines and was
hospitalized at the Makati Medical Center from October 23, 1983 to
March 27, 1984. On August 19, 1985 the medical certificate was issued
describing his disability as "permanent in nature."
Balatongan demanded payment for his claim for total disability
insurance in the amount of US $ 50,000.00 as provided for in the
contract of employment but his claim was denied for having been
submitted to the insurers beyond the designated period for doing so.
Thus, Balatongan filed on June 21, 1985 a complaint against Philimare
and Seagull Maritime Corporation (hereinafter called Seagull) in the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) for non-
payment of his claim for permanent total disability with damages and
attorney's fees.
After the parties submitted their respective position papers with the
corresponding documentary evidence, the officer-in-charge of the
Workers Assistance and Adjudication Office of the POEA rendered a
decision on May 2, 1986, the dispositive part of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondents
are hereby ordered to pay complainant the amount
of US $ 50,000.00 representing permanent total
disability insurance and attorney's fees at 10% of
the award. Payment should be made in this Office
within ten (10) days from receipt hereof at the
prevailing rate of exchange. This Office cannot
however rule on damages, having no jurisdiction on
the matter.
SO ORDERED.
4

Seagull and Philimare appealed said decision to the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) on June 4, 1986. Pending resolution of
their appeal because of the alleged transfer of the agency of Seagull to
Southeast Asia Shipping Corporation, Seagull filed on April 28, 1987 a
Motion For Substitution/Inclusion of Party Respondent which was
opposed by Balatongan.
5
This was followed by an ex-parte motion for
leave to file third party complaint on June 4, 1987 by Seagull. A
decision was promulgated on December 7, 1987 denying both motions
and dismissing the appeal for lack of merit.
6
A motion for
reconsideration of said decision was denied for lack of merit in a
resolution dated February 26, 1988.
7

7

Hence, Seagull and Philimare filed this petition for certiorari with a
prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order based on the
following grounds:
1. Respondent POEA erred in applying the
Supplemental Contract;
2. Respondents POEA and NLRC acted with grave
abuse of discretion in holding that the
Supplemental Contract was signed on board MV
Santa Cruz by and between private respondent and
your petitioner; and
3. Respondent NLRC acted with grave abuse of
discretion in not giving due course to your
petitioners' Motion for Leave to File Third Party
Complaint as well as their Motion for
Inclusion/Substitution of respondents.
8

On March 21, 1988, the Court issued a temporary restraining order
enjoining respondents from enforcing the questioned decision and
resolution of public respondents.
Petitioners argue that prior to private respondent's departure he
executed a crew agreement on November 2, 1982 which was duly
approved by the POEA; that the supplementary contract of
employment that was entered into on board the vessel "Turtle Bay"
which provides for a US $ 50,000.00 insurance benefit in case of
permanent disability was neither approved nor verified by respondent
POEA; and that the same violates Article 34(i) of the Labor Code, as
amended, which provides as follows:
Art. 34. Prohibited Practices. - It shall be unlawful
for any individual, entity, licensee, or holder of
authority:
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
(i) to substitute or alter employment contracts
approved and verified by the Department of Labor
from the time of actual signing thereof by the
parties up to and including the period of expiration
of the same without the approval of the
Department of Labor.
Petitioners also call attention to Article VIII, paragraph 2 of the
Supplementary Contract which provides as follows:
2. Notwithstanding his claim against the insurers
the employee hereby expressly waives all claims of
his own or his heirs for compensation of damages
due to death or permanent invalidity which he
suffered during his engagement against the
employers ... unless his death or permanent
invalidity has been caused by willful act of any of
the above-named persons.
9

Petitioners stress that while public respondents upheld the
applicability of said supplementary contract insofar as it increased the
benefits to private respondent, public respondents considered the
provision on the waiver against all claims by private respondent to be
contrary to public policy.
In its questioned decision dated December 7, 1987, the respondent
NLRC made the following disquisition:
The focal issue for determination is the validity and
enforceability of the second contract of
employment entered into by and between
complainant and respondents on board the vessel
where the former had served as a member of its
complement despite the absence of NSB
verification or approval. With respect to the
findings of facts in the appealed decision, We
consider the same as duly supported by substantial
evidence and the admissions of the parties in their
pleadings.
Much stress and emphasis are made by the
respondents in their appeal that this claim has no
legal basis or footing inasmuch as the second
contract of employment containing a total disability
insurance benefit of US $ 50,000.00, much more
than that embodied in the first contract of
employment which was approved by the defunct
NSB, was not verified or approved by the latter.
Accordingly, the respondents posit the argument
that subject claim may not prosper pursuant to the
provisions of Art. 34(i) of the Labor Code, as
amended, which provides that it shall be unlawful
for any individual, entity, licensee, or holder of
authority '(T)o substitute or alter employment
contracts approved and verified by the Department
of Labor from the time of actual signing thereof by
the parties up to and including the period of
expiration of the same without the approval of the
Department of Labor.
Did the POEA commit a reversible error when it
considered the second contract of employment as
valid sans any verification or approval thereof by
the NSB? Our answer to this query is in the
negative. Apparently, the intention of the law when
Art. 34 of the Labor Code was enacted is to provide
for the prohibited and unlawful practices relative to
recruitment and placement. As shown in the
'Explanatory Note' of Parliamentary Bill No. 4531,
pertaining to Art. 34 (supra), thus:
Many of the provisions are already existing and
were simply restated. Some however were restated
with modifications and new ones were introduced
to reflect what in the past have been noted to be
pernicious practices which tend to place workers at
a disadvantage.'
it is indubitably clear that the purpose of having
overseas contracts of employment approved by the
NSB(POEA) is whether or not such contracts
conform to the minimum terms and conditions
prescribed by the NSB (POEA). In other words, the
law did not at all prohibit any alteration which
provided for increases in wages or other benefits
voluntarily granted by the employer. Precisely,
under Section 2, Rule 1, Book V of the Rules and
Regulations of the POEA, '(t)he standard format of
employment contracts shall set the minimum
standards of the terms and conditions of
employment. All employers and principals shall
adopt the model contract in connection with the
hiring of workers without prejudice to their
adopting other terms and conditions of
employment over and above the minimum
standards of the Administration.' Where, as here, it
is admitted that the second contract although not
verified or approved by the NSB (POEA) granted
more benefits by way of total disability insurance
to the complainant, the respondents may not be
allowed to disvow their own voluntary acts by
insisting that such beneficial contract in favor of the
seaman is null and void. (Emphasis supplied.)
10

We agree.
The supplementary contract of employment was entered into between
petitioner and private respondent to modify the original contract of
employment The reason why the law requires that the POEA should
approve and verify a contract under Article 34(i) of the Labor Code is to
insure that the employee shall not thereby be placed in a
disadvantageous position and that the same are within the minimum
standards of the terms and conditions of such employment contract
set by the POEA. This is why a standard format for employment
contracts has been adopted by the Department of Labor. However,
there is no prohibition against stipulating in a contract more benefits to
the employee than those required by law. Thus, in this case wherein a
"supplementary contract" was entered into affording greater benefits
8

to the employee than the previous one, and although the same was
not submitted for the approval of the POEA, the public respondents
properly considered said contract to be valid and enforceable. Indeed,
said pronouncements of public respondents have the effect of an
approval of said contract. Moreover, as said contract was voluntarily
entered into by the parties the same is binding between them.
11
Not
being contrary to law, morals, good customs, public policy or public
order, its validity must be sustained.
12
By the same token, the court
sustains the ruling of public respondents that the provision in the
supplementary contract whereby private respondent waives any claim
against petitioners for damages arising from death or permanent
disability is against public policy, oppressive and inimical to the rights
of private respondent. The said provision defeats and is inconsistent
with the duty of petitioners to insure private respondent against said
contingencies as clearly stipulated in the said contract.
Petitioners however argue that they could not have entered into said
supplementary contract of employment as Philimare was a mere
manning agent in the Philippines of the shipping company managed by
Navales Shipping Management and Marine Consultant (Pte) Ltd., its
principal. Petitioners assert that the said supplementary contract was
entered into by private respondent with their principal, Navales
Shipping Management and Marine Consultant (Pte) Ltd. on board the
vessel Turtle Bay so petitioners cannot be held responsible thereunder.
This Court is not a trier of facts and the findings of the public
respondents are conclusive in this proceeding. Public respondents
found that petitioner Philimare and private respondent entered into
said supplementary contract of employment on December 6, 1982.
Assuming for the sake of argument that it was petitioners' principal
which entered into said contract with private respondent, nevertheless
petitioner, as its manning agent in the Philippines, is jointly responsible
with its principal thereunder.
13

There is no question that under the said supplementary contract of
employment, it is the duty of the employer, petitioners herein, to
insure the employee, during his engagement, against death and
permanent invalidity caused by accident on board up to $ 50,000.00.
Consequently, it is also its concomitant obligation to see to it that the
claim against the insurance company is duly filed by private respondent
or in his behalf, and within the time provided for by the terms of the
insurance contract.
In this case, the private respondent met the accident on October 6,
1983. Since then, he was hospitalized at the Suez Canal Authority
Hospital and thereafter be was repatriated to the Philippines wherein
he was also hospitalized from October 22, 1983 to March 27, 1984. It
was only on August 19, 1985 that he was issued a medical certificate
describing his disability to be permanent in nature. It was not possible
for private respondent to file a claim for permanent disability with the
insurance company within the one-year period from the time of the
injury, as his disability was ascertained to be permanent only
thereafter. Petitioners did not exert any effort to assist private
respondent to recover payment of his claim from the insurance
company. They did not even care to dispute the finding of the insurer
that the claim was not flied on time.
14
Petitioners must, therefore, be
held responsible for its omission, if not negligence, by requiring them
to pay the claim of private respondent.
The Court finds that the respondent NLRC did not commit a grave
abuse of discretion in denying petitioners, motion for leave to file
third-party complaint and substitution inclusion of party respondent.
Such motion is largely addressed to the discretion of the said
Commission. Inasmuch as the alleged transfer of interest took place
only after the POEA had rendered its decision, the denial of the motion
so as to avoid further delay in the settlement of the claim of private
respondent was well-taken. At any rate, petitioners may pursue their
claim against their alleged successor-in-interest in a separate suit.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit and
the temporary restraining order issued by this Court on March 21, 1988
is hereby LIFTED. No costs. This decision is immediately executory. SO
ORDERED.
7. STRONGHOLD INSURANCE COMPANY, INC. vs CA: G.R. No. 88050
January 30, 1992 (full case)
The petitioner invokes due process to escape liability on a surety bond
executed for the protection of a Filipino seaman. It is a familiar
argument that will be denied, in light of the following findings.
Acting on behalf of its foreign principal, Qatar National Fishing Co., Pan
Asian Logistics and Trading, a domestic recruiting and placement
agency, hired Adriano Urtesuela as captain of the vessel M/V Oryx for
the stipulated period of twelve months. The required surety bond, in
the amount of P50,000.00, was submitted by Pan Asian and Stronghold
Insurance Co., Inc., the herein petitioner, to answer for the liabilities of
the employer. Urtesuela assumed his duties on April 18, 1982, but
three months later his services were terminated and he was
repatriated to Manila. He thereupon filed a complaint against Pan
Asian and his former employer with the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration for breach of contract and damages.
In due time, the POEA rendered a decision in his favor for the amount
of P6,374.94, representing his salaries for the unexpired portion of his
contract and the cash value of his unused vacation leave, plus
attorney's fees and costs, which the respondents were required to
pay. The judgment eventually became final and executory, not having
been appealed on time. Pursuant thereto, a writ of execution was
issued against Pan Asian but could be enforced only against its cash
bond of P10,000.00, the company having ceased to operate. Urtesuela
then filed a complaint with the Insurance Commission against
Stronghold on the basis of the aforementioned surety bond and prayed
for the value thereof plus attorney's fees and litigation costs.
Under the bond, the petitioner and Pan Asian undertook
To answer for all liabilities which the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration may
adjudge/impose against the Principal in connection
with the recruitment of Filipino seamen.
It is understood that notice to the Principal is notice
to the surety. (Exh. "I-2").
WHEREAS, the liability of the surety under this
Bond shall in no case exceed the sum of PESOS:
FIFTY THOUSAND ONLY (P50,000.00) Philippine
Currency.
After hearing, the Insurance Commission held that the complaint
should be reformed because the provisions in the surety bond were
not stipulations pour autrui to entitle Urtesuela to bring the suit
himself. It held that the proper party was the POEA.
1
This ruling was
reversed on appeal by the respondent court in its decision dated April
20, 1989.
2
It was there declared that, as the actual beneficiary of the
surety bond, Urtesuela was competent to sue Stronghold, which as
surety was solidarily liable with Pan Asian for the judgment rendered
against the latter by the POEA.
The petitioner asks for reversal of the Court of Appeals. It submits that
the decision of the POEA is not binding upon it because it was not
impleaded in the complaint; it was not notified thereof nor did it
participate in the hearing; and it was not specifically directed to pay
the damages awarded to the complainant.
In support of its posture, the petitioner cites abundant jurisprudence,
particularly Aguasin v. Velasquez,
3
where the Court held:
If the surety is to be bound by his undertaking, it is
essential according to Section 10 of Rule 62 in
connection with Section 20 of Rule 59 of the Rules
of Court that the damages be awarded upon
application and after proper hearing and included
in the judgment. As a corollary to these
requirements, due notice to the plaintiff and his
surety setting forth the facts showing his right to
damages and the amount thereof under the bond is
indispensable. This has to be so if the surety is not
to be condemned or made to pay without due
process of law. It is to be kept in mind that the
surety in this case was not a party to the action and
had no notice of or intervention in the trial. It
seems elementary that before being condemned to
pay, it was the elementary right of the surety to be
heard and to be informed that the party seeking
9

indemnity would hold it liable and was going to
prove the grounds and extent of its liability. This
case is different from those in which the surety, by
law and/or by the terms of his contract, has
promised to abide by the judgment against the
principal and renounced the right to be sued or
cited.
The Court has gone over the decision and finds that the petitioner is
"hoist by its own petard." For as the quoted excerpt itself says, the
case is "different from those in which the surety, by law and/or by the
terms of his contract, has promised to abide by the judgment against
the principal and renounced the right to be sued or cited."
In the surety bond, the petitioner unequivocally bound itself:
To answer for all liabilities which the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration may
adjudge/impose against the Principal in connection
with the recruitment of Filipino seamen.
Strictly interpreted, this would mean that the petitioner agreed to
answer for whatever decision might be rendered against the principal,
whether or not the surety was impleaded in the complaint and had the
opportunity to defend itself. There is nothing in the stipulation calling
for a direct judgment against the surety as a co-defendant in an action
against the principal. On the contrary, the petitioner agreed "to answer
for all liabilities" that "might be adjudged or imposed by the
POEA against the Principal."
But even if this interpretation were rejected, considering the well-
known maxim that "the surety is a favorite of the law," the petitioner
would still have to explain its other agreement that "notice to the
Principal is notice to the surety." This was in fact another special
stipulation typewritten on the printed form of the surety bond
prepared by the petitioner. Under this commitment, the petitioner is
deemed, by the implied notice, to have been given an opportunity to
participate in the litigation and to present its side, if it so chose, to
avoid liability. If it did not decide to intervene as a co-defendant (and
perhaps also as cross-claimant against Pan Asian), it cannot be heard
now to complain that it was denied due process.
The petitioner contends, however, that the said stipulation is
unconstitutional and contrary to public policy, because it is "a virtual
waiver" of the right to be heard and "opens wide the door for fraud
and collusion between the principal and the bond obligee" to the
prejudice of the surety. Hence, disregarding the stipulation, the
petitioner should be deemed as having received no notice at all of the
complaint and therefore deprived of the opportunity to defend itself.
The Court cannot agree. The argument assumes that the right to a
hearing is absolute and may not be waived in any case under the due
process clause. This is not correct. As a matter of fact, the right to be
heard is as often waived as it is invoked, and validly as long as the party
is given an opportunity to be heard on his behalf.
4

The circumstance that the chance to be heard is not availed of does
not disparage that opportunity and deprive the person of the right to
due process. This Court has consistently held in cases too numerous to
mention that due process is not violated where a person is not heard
because he has chosen, for whatever reason, not to be heard. It should
be obvious that if he opts to be silent where he has a right to speak, he
cannot later be heard to complain that he was unduly silenced.
Neither is public policy offended on the wicked ground of fraud and
collusion imagined by the petitioner. For one thing, the speculation
contravenes without proof the presumption of good faith and
unreasonably imputes dishonest motives to the principal and the
obligee. For another, it disregards the fiduciary relationship between
the principal and the surety, which is the legal and also practical reason
why the latter is willing to answer for the liabilities of the former.
In a familiar parallel, notice to the lawyer is considered notice to the
client he represents even if the latter is not actually notified. It has not
been suspected that this arrangement might result in a confabulation
between the counsel and the other party to the client's prejudice.
At any rate, it is too late now for the petitioner to challenge the
stipulation. If it believed then that it was onerous and illegal, what it
should have done was object when its inclusion as a condition in the
surety bond was required by the POEA. Even if the POEA had insisted
on the condition, as now claimed, there was still nothing to prevent the
petitioner from refusing altogether to issue the surety bond. The
petitioner did neither of these. The fact is that, whether or not the
petitioner objected, it in the end filed the surety bond with the
suggested condition. The consequence of its submission is that it
cannot now argue that it is not bound by that condition because it was
coerced into accepting it.
This Court has always been receptive to complaints against the denial
of the right to be heard, which is the very foundation of a free society.
This right is especially necessary in the court of justice, where cases are
decided after the parties shall have been given an opportunity to
present their respective positions, for evaluation by the impartial
judge. Nevertheless, a party is not compelled to speak if it chooses to
be silent. If it avails itself of the right to be heard, well and good; but if
not, that is also its right. In the latter situation, however, it cannot later
complain that, because it was not heard, it was deprived of due
process.
Worthy of consideration also is the private respondent's contention
that he sought to enforce the petitioner's liability not in NSB Case No.
3810-82 as decided by the POEA, but in another forum. What he did
was file an independent action for that purpose with the Insurance
Commission on the basis of the surety bond which bound the
petitioner to answer for whatever liabilities might be adjudged against
Qatar National Fishing Co. by the POEA. In the proceedings before the
Commission, the petitioner was given full opportunity (which it took)
to present its side, in its answer with counterclaim to the complaint, in
its testimony at the hearings, in its motion to dismiss the complaint,
and in its 10-page memorandum. There is absolutely no question that
in that proceeding, the petitioner was actually and even
extensively heard.
The surety bond required of recruitment agencies
5
is intended for the
protection of our citizens who are engaged for overseas employment
by foreign companies. The purpose is to insure that if the rights of
these overseas workers are violated by their employers, recourse
would still be available to them against the local companies that
recruited them for the foreign principal. The foreign principal is outside
the jurisdiction of our courts and would probably have no properties in
this country against which an adverse judgment can be enforced. This
difficulty is corrected by the bond, which can be proceeded against to
satisfy that judgment.
Given this purpose, and guided by the benign policy of social justice,
we reject the technicalities raised by the petitioner against its
established legal and even moral liability to the private respondent.
These technicalities do not impair the rudiments of due process or the
requirements of the law and must be rejected in deference to the
constitutional imperative of justice for the worker.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the challenged decision of the
Court of Appeals AFFIRMED in toto. The respondent court is directed to
ENFORCE payment to the private respondent in full, and with all
possible dispatch of the amount awarded to him by the POEA in its
decision dated May 13, 1983. It is so ordered.
8. EASTERN ASSURANCE & SURETY CORPORATION vs.SECRETARY OF
LABOR| G.R. No. L-79436-50 January 17, 1990
In connection with the application with the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA) of J & B Manpower Specialist, Inc.
for a license to engage in business as a recruitment agency, a surety
bond was filed on January 2, 1985 by the applicant and the Eastern
Assurance and Surety Corporation, herein petitioner, in virtue of which
they both held themselves
. . . firmly bound unto (said) Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration, Ministry of Labor in
the penal sum of PESOS ONE HUNDRED FIFTY
THOUSAND ONLY . . . (Pl50,000.00) for the payment
of which will and truly to be made, . . . (they bound
themselves, their) heirs, executors, administrators,
successors and assigns, jointly and severally . .
The bond stipulated that:
10

a) it was "conditioned upon the true and faithful performance and
observance of the . . . principal (J & B Manpower Specialist, Inc.) of its
duties and obligations in accordance with all the rules and regulations
promulgated by the Ministry of Labor Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration and with the terms and conditions stipulated in the
License;
b) the liability of the . . . Surety (petitioner) shall in no case exceed the
sum of PESOS ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND (P150,000.00) ONLY,
PHILIPPINE CURRENCY;
1

c) notice to the Principal is also a notice to the Surety; and
d) LIABILITY of the surety . . . shall expire on JANUARY 02, 1986 and this
bond shall be automatically cancelled ten (10) days after its expiration
and the surety shall not be liable for any claim not discovered and
presented to it in writing within said period of . . . from expiration and
the obligee hereby expressly waives the rights to file any court action
against the Surety after termination of said period of . . . . above
cited.
2

As narrated by respondent Secretary of Labor, the facts are as
follows:
3

From June 1983 to December 1985 . . . thirty three
(33) . . . (persons) applied for overseas employment
with . . . (J & B). In consideration of promised
deployment, complainants paid respondent various
amounts for various fees. Most of' the receipts
issued were sighed by Mrs. Baby Bundalian,
Executive Vice-President of . . . (J & B).
Because of non-deployment . . . (the applicants)
filed separate complaints with the Licensing and
Regulation Office of POEA against . . . (J & B) for
violation of Articles 32 and 34 (a) of the Labor Code
between the months of April to October 1985.
Despite summons/notices of hearing,, . . . (J & B)
failed to file Answer nor appear in the hearings
conducted.
In its separate Answer, . . . EASCO essentially
disclaimed liability on the ground that the claims
were not expressly covered by the bond, that POEA
had no jurisdiction to order forfeiture of the bond,
that some of the claims were paid beyond or prior
to the period of effectivity of the bond.
On September 8, 1986, the POEA Administrator
issued the Order in favor of complainants ruling
thus:
After careful evaluation, we
find that the receipts and
testimonies of complainants, in
the absence of controverting
evidence substantially establish
that respondent charged and
collected fees from them in
amounts exceeding what is
prescribed by this
Administration. Complainants'
non-deployment strongly
indicates that there was no
employment obtained for
them. Hence, violation of
Articles 32 and 34 (a) of the
Labor Code, as amended, is
established against respondent.
The claims of complainants
having arose (arisen) out of acts
of the principal covered under
the surety (bond), the
respondent surety is equally
liable therefor.
Except for complainants Ramos, Samson, de Leon
and Rizada, whose claims were transacted prior to
the effectivity of the bond, . . . EASCO was declared
jointly and severally liable with . . . (J & B) to
twenty-nine (29) complainants.
(The dispositive portion of the POEA
Administrator's Order also contained the following
statement and direction, viz.:
Respondent was suspended on
May 23, 1985, June 26, 1985
and January 17, 1986 all for
illegal exaction. Considering its
track record of illegal exaction
activities and considering
further the gross violation of
recruitment rules and
regulations established against
it in the instant cases, and the
expiration of its license on
February 15, 1985, it is hereby
forever banned from
participation in the overseas
employment program. It is
ordered to cease and desist
from further engaging in
recruitment activities otherwise
it shall be prosecuted for illegal
recruitment.')
(J & B filed a motion for reconsideration). On
December 19, 1986, the then deputy Minister of
Labor and Employment denied the . . . Motion for
Reconsideration for lack of merit and affirmed the
findings in the Order of the POEA Administrator
finding no reversible error therein.
On appeal by EASCO J & B having as aforestated taken no part in the
proceeding despite due service of summons the judgment was
modified by the Secretary of Labor, by Order dated July 1, 1987,
disposing as follows:
4

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the
Resolution of the then Deputy Minister of Labor
dated December 19, 1986 affirming the Order of
the POEA Administrator dated September 8, 1986
is hereby MODIFIED. Respondent J & B Manpower
Specialist is directed to refund all thirty-three (33)
complainants as listed in the Order of September 8,
1986 in the amounts listed thereto with the
modification that complainants Lucena Cabasal and
Felix Rivero are both entitled only to P15,980 and
not P15,980 each. Respondent Eastern Assurance
and Surety Corporation is hereby found jointly and
severally liable with respondent J & B Manpower
Specialist to refund nineteen (19) complainants in
the modified amounts . . . (particularly specified).
The other findings in the Order of the POEA
Administrator dated September 8, 1986 affirmed in
the Resolution of the then Deputy Minister . . . are
also hereby AFFIRMED. This Order is FINAL. No
further Motion for Reconsideration hereof shall be
entertained.
It is noteworthy that EASCO's liability for the refund, jointly and
severally with its principal, was limited to 19 named complainants (in
contrast to verdicts of the POEA and the Deputy Minister which both
ordered payment to no less than 33 complainants) and was
correspondingly reduced from P308,751.75 and US $ 400.00
5
to the
aggregate amount of P 140,817.75.
6

The special civil action of certiorari at bar was thereafter instituted by
EASCO
7
praying for the nullification of the POEA Administrator's Order
of September 8, 1986, the Resolution of the Deputy Minister of Labor
of' December 19, 1986, and the Order of the Secretary of Labor of July
1, 1987, It theorizes that:
1) the POEA had no jurisdiction over the claims for
refund filed by non-employees;
11

2) neither did the Secretary of Labor have
jurisdiction of the claims;
3) assuming they had jurisdiction, both the POEA
and Secretary of Labor also committed legal errors
and acted with grave abuse of discretion when they
ruled that petitioner is liable on the claims.
EASCO contends that the POEA had no "adjudicatory jurisdiction" over
the monetary claims in question because the same "did not arise from
employer-employee relations." Invoked in support of the argument is
Section 4 (a) of EO 797 providing in part
8
that the POEA has
. . . original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases,
including money claims, involving employer-
employee relations arising out of or by virtue of any
law or contract involving Filipino workers for
overseas employment including seamen . . .
The complaints are however for violation of Articles 32 and
34 a) of the Labor Code. Article 32 and paragraph (a) of
Article 34 read as follows:
Art. 32. Fees to be paid by workers.Any person
applying with a private fee-charging employment
agency for employment assistance shall not be
charged any fee until he has obtained employment
through its efforts or has actually commenced
employment. Such fee shall be always covered with
the approved receipt clearly showing the amount
paid. The Secretary of Labor shall promulgate a
schedule of allowable fees.
Art. 34. Prohibited practices.It shall be unlawful
for any individual, entity, licensee, or holder of
authority:
a) To charge or accept, directly or indirectly, any
amount greater than that specified in the schedule
of allowable fees prescribed by the Secretary of
Labor, or to make a worker pay any amount greater
than actually received by him as a loan or advance;
. . .
The penalties of suspension and cancellation of license or authority are
prescribed for violations of the above quoted provisions, among
others. And the Secretary of Labor has the power under Section 35 of
the law to apply these sanctions, as well as the authority, conferred by
Section 36, not only, to "restrict and regulate the recruitment and
placement activities of all agencies," but also to "promulgate rules and
regulations to carry out the objectives and implement the provisions"
governing said activities. Pursuant to this rule-making power thus
granted, the Secretary of Labor gave the POEA
9
"on its own initiative
or upon filing of a complaint or report or upon request for investigation
by any aggrieved person, . . . (authority to) conduct the necessary
proceedings for the suspension or cancellation of the license or
authority of any agency or entity" for certain enumerated offenses
including
1) the imposition or acceptance, directly or indirectly, of any amount of
money, goods or services, or any fee or bond in excess of what is
prescribed by the Administration, and
2) any other violation of pertinent provisions of the Labor Code and
other relevant laws, rules and regulations.
10

The Administrator was also given the power to "order the
dismissal of the case or the suspension of the license or
authority of the respondent agency or contractor or
recommend to the Minister the cancellation thereof."
11

Implicit in these powers is the award of appropriate relief to the
victims of the offenses committed by the respondent agency or
contractor, specially the refund or reimbursement of such fees as may
have been fraudulently or otherwise illegally collected, or such money,
goods or services imposed and accepted in excess of what is licitly
prescribed. It would be illogical and absurd to limit the sanction on an
offending recruitment agency or contractor to suspension or
cancellation of its license, without the concomitant obligation to repair
the injury caused to its victims. It would result either in rewarding
unlawful acts, as it would leave the victims without recourse, or in
compelling the latter to litigate in another forum, giving rise to that
multiplicity of actions or proceedings which the law abhors.
Even more untenable is EASCO's next argument that the recruiter and
its victims are in pari delicto the former for having required
payment, and the latter for having voluntarily paid, "prohibited
recruitment fees" and therefore, said victims are barred from
obtaining relief. The sophistical, if not callous, character of the
argument is evident upon the most cursory reading thereof; it merits
no consideration whatever.
The Court is intrigued by EASCO's reiteration of its argument that it
should not be held liable for claims which accrued prior to or after the
effectivity of its bond, considering that the respondent Secretary had
conceded the validity of part of said argument, at least. The Secretary
ruled that EASCO's "contention that it should not be held liable for
claims/payments made to respondent agency before the effectivity of
the surety bond on January 2, 1985 is well taken." According to the
Secretary:
12

. . . A close examination of the records reveal(s)
that respondent EASCO is not jointly and severally
liable with respondent agency to refund
complainants Lucena Cabasal, Felix Rivero, Romulo
del Rosario, Rogelio Banzuela, Josefina Ogatis,
Francisco Sorato, Sonny Quiazon, Josefina Dictado,
Mario del Guzman and Rogelio Mercado (10 in
all). These complainants paid respondent agency in
1984, or before the effectivity of the bond on
January 2, 1985 as evidence by the reciept and their
testimonies.
The related argument, that it is also not liable for claims filed after the
expiry (on January 2, 1986) of the period stipulated in the surety bond
for the filing of claims against the bond, must however be rejected, as
the Secretary did. The Court discerns no grave abuse of discretion in
the Secretary's statement of his reasons for doing so, to wit:
. . . While it may be true that respondent EASCO
received notice of their claims after the ten (10)
day expiration period from cancellation or after
January 12, 1986 as provided in the surety bond,
records show that . . . EASCO's principal,
respondent agency, was notified/ summoned prior
to the expiration period or before January 12, 1986.
Respondent agency received summons on July 24,
1985 with respect to claims of complainants
Penarroyo, dela Cruz and Canti. It also received
summons on November 26, 1985 with respect to
Giovanni Garbillons' claim. Respondent agency was
likewise considered constructively notified of the
claims of complainants Calayag, Danuco Domingo
and Campena on October 6, 1985. In this
connection, it may be stressed that the surety bond
provides that notice to the principal is notice to the
surety. Besides, it has been held that the contract
of a compensated surety like respondent EASCO is
to be interpreted liberally in the interest of the
promises and beneficiaries rather than strictly in
favor of the surety (Acoustics Inc. v. American
Surety, 74 Nev-6, 320 P2d. 626, 74 Am. Jur. 2d).
So, too, EASCO's claim that it had not been properly served with
summons as regards a few of the complaints must be rejected, the
issue being factual, and the Court having been cited to no grave error
invalidating the respondent Secretary's conclusion that summons had
indeed been duly served.
Finally, EASCO's half-hearted argument that its liability should be
limited to the maximum amount set in its surety bond, i.e.,
P150,000.00, is palpably without merit, since the aggregate liability
imposed on it, P140,817.75, supra, does not in fact exceed that limit.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit, and this
decision is declared to be immediately executory. Costs against
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
12

9. AURORA T. AQUINO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES| G.R. No. 91896 November 21, 1991
This is a petition for review seeking the reversal of the November 15,
1989 decision of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed a trial court
decision finding the accused-petitioner, Aurora Aquino, guilty of illegal
recruitment.
The information filed against the accused-petitioner reads:
That on or about and during the period comprised
between May 23, 1974 to May, 1975, both dates
inclusive, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
knowingly, being then a private individual, recruit
workers for employment abroad without first
obtaining the required license or authority from the
Ministry of Labor, in violation of the said Article 25,
Presidential Decree 442. (Rollo, pp. 17-18)
Upon arraignment, the accused pleaded not guilty. Thereupon the trial
ensued.
The facts according to the prosecution are as follows:
1. Sometime in January of 1973, Rodrigo Nicolas, a
laborer from Sta. Cruz, Manila, met appellant
Aurora Aquino when he applied at her Manila Hotel
Office in response to a published notice of alleged
recruitment of workers for Guam. At such meeting,
he applied for the position of carpenter. One week
later, he gave appellant Pl,000.00 as part payment
of the P1,500.00 required of him (pp. 9-11, TSN,
June 20, 1979). A second payment of the P500.00
was made by Nicolas to appellant on September
24, 1974 (pp. 35-36, TSN, ibid.). Of the total
Pl,500.00 Nicolas paid, Pl,000.00 was later
refunded directly to him by appellant (pp. 12-14,
TSN, ibid.) and the balance of P500.00 was included
in an alleged "group refund check" for P5,270
which could not be cashed for lack of funds (pp. 34-
35, TSN,ibid).
2. On or about March 12, 1973, Braulio Sapitula, a
farmer from Agoo, La Union, having learned that
Mrs. Aurora T. Aquino, (known hereafter as
Appellant) was recruiting applicants for
employment in Guam, likewise applied for the
position of carpenter at appellant's Manila Hotel
Office and plunked down FIVE HUNDRED (P500.00)
PESOS as his initial payment of the recruitment
fees. A second payment of ONE THOUSAND
(Pl,000.00) PESOS was delivered to the appellant by
Sapitula on February 5, 1975 (p. 1, Decision).
3. Sometime in May of 1973, Aurelio Costales, a
resident of Sampaloc, Manila, met appellant at the
Greenwich Travel Agency, where Costales likewise
applied for a job in Guam and made a partial
payment of P800.00 for the usual Pl,500.00
recruitment fees appellant charged job applicants
(pp. 5-6, TSN, Jan. 4, 1980). A second payment of
P550.00 was given by Costales to appellant on
September 24, 1974 (pp. 35-36, Ibid). Later on,
Costales, disappointed at not being able to go to
Guam, asked for a refund of his money. He was
paid P700.00 by appellant, and the balance of
P650.00 was allegedly part of the alleged "group
refund check" for P5,270.00 issued by appellant
which was dishonored for lack of funds (pp. 15-
17, Ibid.)
4. Sometime in June, 1974, Benito Vertudez, a
resident of Gen. Trias, Cavite, applied for a Guam
job at appellant's agency. At such time he filled out
an application form and paid P70.00 for "mailing
expenses" (pp. 39-44, TSN, June 14, 1979).
Thereafter, in the course of following up his
application to work in Guam, Vertudez paid
appellant P500.00 in September, 1974, and another
P500.00 in September, 1974 (pp. 51-52, Ibid). Due
to appellant's inability to get him a job in Guam,
Vertudez asked for the return of his money. He was
issued a check for the amount of Pl,070.00 by
appellant, but said check like the alleged "group
refund check" was dishonored for lack of funds (p.
54, Ibid.)
5. On November 2, 1978, a complaint was filed
against appellant for violation of the Provisions of
Article 24, of P.D. No. 442, otherwise known as the
Labor Code of the Philippines, before the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, Branch VIII. (Rollo, pp. 44-48)
The accused-appellant's version, on the other hand, shows that:
Aurora T. Aquino, 51 years old businesswoman,
disclosed that in 1973, she was a licensed
contractor authorized to hire laborers as evidenced
by a Labor Contractor's License (New) dated 22
May, 1973, Exh. 5, page 257, record; 21-22 tsn, July
24, 1984; said license was issued after payment of
P6,000.00 for the year 1973-1974 (Exh. 5-A, page
256, record); in the recruitment of workers, she
was appointed by several employers of Guam and
London as their representative in the Philippines,
like the Special Power of Attorney executed by
George J. Viegas, dated November 29, 1973, in the
territory of Agana, Guam (Exh. 6, page 258, record)
authorizing her to recruit Filipinos for Guam and
likewise, for London (Exh. 7, 7-A, page 260, record);
she knows Benito Vertudez of General Trias, Cavite
being one of the applicants for Guam and also
Braulio Sapitula of Sta. Fe, Agoo, La Union include
(sic) Alfredo Empredo of Pasay City, Rodrigo Nicolas
of Sta. Cruz, Manila (30-31, tsn, ibid.) all of them
having applied in 1973 for employment for abroad,
hence, she processed their application and
submitted thereafter, their application to her
employer abroad, George J. Viegas (32 tsn, ibid);
they were not able to leave for Guam because her
employer had some trouble with his contract with
the government of Guam (33 tsn, ibid); she
refunded P500.00 to Sapitula (Exh. 1; 34 tsn. ibid);
she refunded Alfredo Empredo on Jan. 28, 1974
P300.00 Exh. 8, page 261, record), refunded
P500.00 to Benito Vertudes (Exh. 9, page 262,
record), of the amount of P2,200.00 in the form of
check (Exh. 10, page 265, record), handwritten
receipt of P5,270.00 (Exh. 11, page 264, ibid) which
was received by Aurelio Costales (41-42, TSN, Ibid);
she refunded them when she said applicants
cannot leave for Guam by issuing Exh. 11 for
amounts indicated in the receipts (Exhs. 8, 9, 10 (44
TSN, ibid); she does not violated (sic) Art. 25, P.D.
442 for illegal recruitment because she is a duly
licensed labor contractor because when she acted
on the applications of the complaining witnesses,
she acted as representative in the Philippines of her
employer George Viegas (45 TSN, Ibid) and the
money covered by the personal check (Exh. 11)
belongs to the complainants; the receipts which
she issued dated October 24, 1973, August 15,
1973, December 15, 1973, August 14, 1974 and
June 19, 1974 show that on said dates she was a
duly licensed contractor (47-48 TSN, Ibid); on its
expiration on 18 May, 1974, she applied for a
renewal of her license by writing a letter to the
Bureau of Labor addressed to Minister Blas Ople
(Exh. 12, dated Feb. 4, 1975; page 265, record; 5
13

TSN, August 14, 1984); which was a follow up of her
renewal letter dated July 4, 1974 and was just
waiting for the renewal of her license, so that
meanwhile, she was able to talk with Under-
Secretary Amado Inciong concerning said renewal's
delay at the time, Sec. Ople was in Italy, hence, she
was told by said Under-Secretary Inciong to
proceed with her operation "until such time as the
Secretary will go home." (6-7 TSN, Ibid); when she
did not receive any reply to her Feb. 12, 1975
renewal communication she next made another
follow-up letter dated March 3, 1975 addressed
Minister to Ople (Exh. 13, NOTE: 3 TSN, October 29,
1985 not submitted and offered) and another letter
dated April 29, 1975 [Exh. 14; Note: not submitted
and offered, 3 TSN, October 29, 1985); she next
waited for the renewal, but was not submitted and
offered, 3 TSN, October 29, 1985); she next waited
for the renewal, but was not able to receive any
reply from the Department of Labor, hence, she
stopped operations (13-14 TSN,Ibid) in 1976 (p.15
TSN, Ibid); applicants Benito Vertudes, Sapitula,
Empredo, Nicolas, were not able to leave for Guam
(15-16 TSN, Ibid); (Decision, pp. 4-5, Record, pp.
294-295). (Rollo, pp. 19-22)
After trial, the lower court found the accused guilty, the positive
portion of its decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court
finds accused Aurora T. Aquino, GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of Illegal Recruitment in violation
of Art. 25, PD 442 and penalized under Art. 39 par.
(b), Labor Code, sans mitigating circumstance, and
applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, hereby
sentences her to an indeterminate imprisonment of
FOUR (4) YEARS up to SEVEN (7) YEARS and fine of
P20,000.00, with the accessory penalties of the
law; to indemnify the complainants in the total
amount of P5,270.00 with the legal rate of interest
reckoned from the filing of instant information on
Dec. 1, 1978 until fully paid, but without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency; and finally, to
pay the cost of the proceeding.
Due to the gravity of the sentence, it is further
ordered that accused serves her imprisonment at
the National Penitentiary at Muntinlupa, Rizal.
(Rollo, p. 22)
The accused-petitioner appealed the decision of the lower court to the
Court of Appeals. After submission of memorandums, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower court.
The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the guilt of appellant of the crime
charged having been established beyond
reasonable doubt, the appealed decision is hereby
AFFIRMED in all aspects. No costs. (Rollo, p. 25)
The petition for review was initially denied by this Court on March 21,
1990. A motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioner on April
5, 1990. On May 9, 1990, we gave due course to the motion for
reconsideration.
The petitioner relies on the following reasons for the allowance of her
petition:
I
The Court of Appeals erred in not dismissing the
case for want of jurisdiction by the Regional Trial
Court of Manila.
II
The Court of Appeals erred in holding that the
accused illegally recruited the complaints after her
license expired on May 18, 1974.
III
Even if the Regional Trial Court of Manila had
jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals erred in
sustaining the indemnification by the accused
petitioner of the sum of P5,270.00 in favor of the
complainants.
The jurisdiction of a Court is determined by the allegations of the
information as to the situs of the crime. If the information alleges that
the crime was committed in the place where the court is seated, then
the court has jurisdiction, in the first instance, to hear the case.
(Colmenares v. Villar, 33 SCRA 186 [1970]; People v. Galano, 75 SCRA
193 [1977])
In this case, the then accused never raised the ground of lack of
jurisdiction in the proceedings before the lower court and before the
Court of Appeals. Only after she received the decision of the Court of
Appeals affirming the decision of the lower court, did the appellant
question the jurisdiction of the court a quo.
In the interest of sound administration of justice, such practice cannot
be tolerated. If we are to sanction this argument, then all the
proceedings had before the lower court and the Court of Appeals while
valid in all other respects would simply become useless.
In the landmark case of Tijam v. Sibonghanoy (23 SCRA 29 [1968]), we
held that a party who has affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a
court to secure an affirmative relief, may not afterwards deny that
same jurisdiction to escape a penalty. A party's active participation in
the proceedings before the court without jurisdiction will estop the
party from assailing such lack of jurisdiction. (Echaus v. Blanco, 179
SCRA 704 [1989]; Crisostomo v. Court of Appeals, 32 SCRA 54 [1970];
Libudan v. Gil, 45 SCRA 17 [1972]; and People v. Casuga y Munar, 53
SCRA 278 [1973])
Anent the second issue, the Court on the basis of the evidence on
record finds the accused-petitioner not guilty of illegal recruitment.
Although as a general rule, the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals
are conclusive upon the Supreme Court, this is, however, not without
exceptions.
In certain instances, the Supreme Court may review the findings of fact
of the Court of Appeals as when the inference made is manifestly
mistaken or when the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts
or when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant
facts not disputed by the parties and which if properly considered,
would justify a different conclusion. (Moran v. Court of Appeals, 133
SCRA 88 [1984]; Sacay v. Sandiganbayan, 142 SCRA 593 [1986];
Manlapaz v. Court of Appeals, 147 SCRA 236 [1987])
There are relevant factual circumstances which the Court of Appeals
manifestly misconstrued, thus, necessitating the Court to re-examine
the facts.
The information charges the accused-petitioner with violating Article
25 of the Labor Code which provides:
Travel agencies prohibited to recruit. Travel
agencies are prohibited from engaging in the
business of recruitment and placement of workers
for overseas employment whether for profit or not.
The Secretary of Labor shall issue rules and
regulations establishing the requirements and the
procedures for the issuance of a license or
authority.
Every existing authority or license to hire or recruit
workers on the date of effectivity of this Code shall
remain valid for the duration indicated therein
unless sooner cancelled, revoked, or suspended for
cause by the Secretary of Labor. However, said
authority or license to hire or recruit may be
renewed provided that the holders thereof shall
comply with all applicable provisions of this Code
and its implementing rules and regulations.
While the charge is for a violation of Article 25, the Solicitor General
states that it was really Article 24 which was violated (Rollo, pp. 43, 53-
54). Article 24 reads:
Authority or license to recruit. No individual or
entity may engage in the business of a private fee-
14

charging employment agency without first
obtaining a license from the Department of Labor.
No individual or entity may operate a private non-
fee charging employment agency without first
obtaining an authority from the Department of
Labor.
There is no dispute that the accused-petitioner had a valid license
before May 18, 1974. She contends that her license was not renewed,
not because of any violations, but because of a Ministry of Labor policy
phasing out allprivate recruitment agencies. She never received any
letter from the Labor Ministry about any illegal activities and never was
her office raided. She claims that her activities were above-board and
states that the Ministry was merely implementing a policy that no new
application for a license to operate shall be entertained upon the
effectivity of the Code and that all private employment agencies would
be phased out within four years from that date. She argued that the
phrase "no new application" should not include renewal of old
applications.
The information was filed against Ms. Aquino because she "wilfully,
unlawfully, and knowingly . . . recruit(ed) workers for employment
abroad without first obtaining the required license or authority . . ."
The Solicitor General contends that when Ms. Aquino continued to
charge and collect fees from her applicants/recruits after May 18,
1974, she engaged in illegal recruitment violative of Article 24 of the
Labor Code.
We must emphasize that this case involves a criminal prosecution for a
violation of a penal provision. We are not concerned with whether or
not the accused-petitioner's license should be renewed nor with the
administrative actions taken by the Labor Department against
recruitment agencies. By no stretch of the imagination should an
acquittal in this case mean that the Court does not support the
legitimate activities of the Government against illegal recruiters
preying on the gullibility of poor laborers, seamen, domestics, and
other workers who see employment abroad as the only way out of
their grinding poverty. We simply apply the principles of Criminal Law
that an accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty and that the
burden of establishing guilt must be satisfactorily met by the
prosecution beyond reasonable doubt.
Does the receipt of payments, after the expiration of the license, for
services rendered before said expiration constitute illegal recruitment?
We believe that it does not, at least not for purposes of criminal
prosecutions.
Recruitment refers to the offering of inducements to qualified
personnel to enter a particular job or employment. The advertising, the
promise of future employment and other come-ons took place while
Ms. Aquino was still licensed. True, the payments for services rendered
are necessary consequences of the applications for overseas
employment. However, it is asking too much to expect a licensed
agency to absolutely at the stroke of midnight stop all transactions on
the day its license expires and refuse to accept carry-over payments
after the agency is closed. In any business, there has to be a winding-
up after it ceases operations. The collection of unpaid accounts should
not be the basis of a criminal prosecution.
Thus, in the case of the complainant Braulio Sapitula, the recruitment
took place at the very latest on February 12, 1973, when Sapitula went
to the office of the petitioner at the annex of Manila Hotel, and
correspondingly, filed his application papers for overseas employment
(Rollo, p. 28); as for Rodrigo Nicolas when he met the petitioner in
January, 1973 (Rollo, p. 30); and Aurelio Costales, when sometime in
May, 1973, he submitted his application papers for overseas
employment at the office of the accused at the Manila Hotel annex.
(Rollo, pp. 30-31) Other than receipt of carry-over payments, there is
no evidence of recruiting activities after May 18, 1974.
It has been suggested that once a license expires, the recruiter should
turn over all continuing activities such as collections of unpaid accounts
to another licensed agency in order to give teeth to the campaign
against illegal recruiters. There is nothing to prevent the law from
being amended to avoid the problem exemplified by this case but
certainly no speculations on what could have been done should enter
into the resolution of a criminal case.
The Government did not question the legality of the payment as such.
The prosecution is based on the date of the prohibited activity, not on
the payments being illegal exactions even if effected during the correct
period. The payments are necessary in order to defray the expenses
entailed in any overseas contract of employment. They are intended
for administrative and business expenses and for the travelling
expenses of the applicants once cleared for overseas travel.
In the case of one complainant, Benito Vertudes, the prosecution
alleges that he filed his application paper sometime in June of 1974, a
month after the expiration of Aquino's license to operate (Rollo, p. 47).
On the other hand, the petitioner in her testimony before the lower
court stated that Vertudes applied in 1973, within the period when her
license to operate the employment agency had not yet expired. (Rollo,
p. 20)
This accusation against the petitioner constitutes a negative allegation
where the negative fact of recruiting without a license forms an
essential element of the crime charged. Hence, it was incumbent upon
the prosecution to satisfactorily establish the date when Vertudes was
recruited.
It has not been clearly established that the petitioner is guilty of
recruiting Benito Vertudes after May 18, 1974.
The prosecution relied on the sole testimony of Benito Vertudes, that
he applied sometime in June of 1974. His testimony was flatly denied
by the petitioner who gave an earlier date. No other evidence was
proferred by the prosecution particularly in relation to the recruitment
of Benito Vertudes. (Rollo, pp. 29-30)
In the absence of any corroborating evidence to support such
particular fact, and considering that the prosecution's main theory is
that collection of carry-over payments constitutes recruitment, the
Court is constrained to resolve the issue in favor of the accused
consistent with the rule on the construction of penal laws, that they
are strictly construed against the government and liberally in favor of
the accused. (See People v. Yu Hai, 99 Phil. 725 [1956])
Article 25 (it should be Article 24) of the Labor Code, the violation of
which was imputed to Aurora Aquino, states only that no person may
operate a private fee charging employment agency without the
necessary license.
Inferentially, it is the operation of this kind of employment agency
without the proper license which constitutes the act of illegal
recruitment.
If the factual circumstances are otherwise, as when the accused does
not operate any employment agency, then all activities including the
acceptance of the application papers and the collection of payment
would constitute acts of recruitment within the meaning of the law. Or
if the accused continued to operate as before, even after the license is
denied renewal, this would be punishable under the law.
The facts of this case, however, conspicuously show that the
recruitment activities, namely the continued operation of the
Greenwich Travel Agency, the advertisements that the agency was
recruiting workers for overseas employment and the active solicitation
of workers ceased upon the non-renewal of Aurora Aquino's license to
operate the said agency.
After May 18, 1974, Aquino closed her office at the Manila Hotel Annex
and settled in her residential home in Quezon City from where she
conducted the winding-up of her business.
Two of the complainants, namely, Aurelio Costales and Rodrigo Nicolas
filed affidavits of desistance although these affidavits were not filed in
the case at bar but in another criminal case of estafa filed against the
petitioner.
This notwithstanding, the causes of action of the two criminal cases
arose from the same factual circumstances. The importance of these
affidavits cannot just be ignored.
As a rule, affidavits of desistance should not be given too much credit.
Under the circumstances of this case, however, they serve to create
serious doubts as to the criminal liability of the petitioner. At the very
least, they call for a second look at the records of the case and the
15

basis for the judgment of conviction. (People v. Lim, 190 SCRA 706
[1990])
Anent the final argument questioning the order of the trial court,
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, which required Aquino to pay the
complainants the sum of P5,270.00 as reimbursements of the
payments made by the latter, the court after considering the records of
the case resolved to affirm the order of the Court of Appeals with
modification.
The petitioner professes that she has reimbursed the complainants by
issuing them a group-check in the amount of P5,270.00. She states that
if indeed the check bounced as alleged by the complainants, then why
did not the complainants present the dishonored check or the bank's
return slip to show that the checks were not encashed. (Rollo, p.12)
If that be the case, then the resultant query would be: why did the
petitioner not produce the check issued by her to the complainants to
show that it had been honored by the drawee bank and
correspondingly deducted from her account, evidencing therefore, the
fact of payment?
The petitioner issued a check to reimburse the complainants for the
sums of money paid the latter by virtue of the "failed" overseas
contract.
The controversy arose when the check was dishonored by the drawee
bank due to lack of funds. The petitioner, on the other hand, claims full
satisfaction of the sum owed by her since she already issued a check in
favor of the complainants.
The argument of the petitioner is unconvincing.
It has been the consistent ruling of this Court that the issuance of a
check has been encashed. Although a check, as a negotiable
instrument, is regarded as a substitute for money, it is not money.
Hence, its mere delivery does not, by itself, operate as payment. (PAL
v. Court of Appeals, 181 SCRA 557 [1990])
To this end, it was de rigueur for the petitioner to have presented the
check she issued to the complainants which had been honored by the
drawee bank in order to show that the amount covered by the check
has been received evidencing, therefore, full satisfaction of the sums of
money owed to the complainants.
The records reveal nothing of this sort. Nowhere during the
proceedings before the lower court did the accused present any
evidence showing that the checks was actually encashed. In the
absence of any evidence regarding this matter, the conclusion of the
Court of Appeals must be sustained.
In view, however, of the affidavits of desistance executed by Aurelio
Costales and Rodrigo Nicolas where both admitted that the petitioner
had satisfied her monetary obligations to them (Rollo, pp. 107-108), in
the amount of P650.00 and P500.00 respectively, these sums should be
deducted from the total amount of P5,270.00. (Rollo, p. 18)
WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction is hereby REVERSED and
accused-petitioner Aurora Aquino is ACQUITTED of the crime of illegal
recruitment. The accused-petitioner is, however, ordered to pay to the
remaining complainants the sum of FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED
SEVENTY PESOS (P4,170.00), with legal rate of interest reckoned from
the filing of the information on December 1, 1978 until fully paid. SO
ORDERED.
10. PEOPLE vs CABACANG
An Illegal Recruitment case was filed against appellant FELICIA
MAZAMBIQUE CABACANG for allegedly committing the following act:
That in or about and during the period comprised
from March 22, 1990 to April 27, 1990, both dates
inclusive, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused, representing herself to have the capacity
to contract, enlist and transport Filipino workers for
employment abroad, did then and there willfully
and unlawfully, for a fee, recruit and promise
employment/job placement abroad to the
following persons: Romeo Eguia, Ronnie Reyes,
Armando Castro and Dante Eguia, without first
having secured the required license or authority
from the Department of Labor and Employment.
1

The case was raffled off to Branch 5 of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila,
2
and docketed as Criminal Case No. 91-93606. A not guilty plea
was entered upon her arraignment on July 17, 1991.
The records reveal that the four private complainants are related.
DANTE
3
and ROMEO EGUIA are brothers, and RONNIE REYES
4
and
ARMANDO CASTRO are their brothers-in-law. RAMON EGUIA and
prosecution witness WILMA GREGORIO
5
are Dante's and Romeo's
siblings.
The prosecution evidence show that appellant who is not a recruiter
licensed by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
(POEA),
6
handled the processing of the papers of cousins Ramon Eguia
and Edgardo Santos. In June, 1988, the two were deployed to Abu
Dhabi for employment as janitors.
7
Private complainants were
encouraged by their employment, and decided to apply for overseas
janitorial work as well.
8

According to private complainant Ronnie Reyes, he was approached in
Lipa by appellant who represented herself as the Assistant Manager of
the Lakas Agency Management Corporation located near Robinson's
Department Store in Ermita, Manila. Appellant informed him that there
would be a second batch of overseas workers to be deployed to Abu
Dhabi. Ronnie relayed the information to Wilma, who made further
inquiries and verifications from appellant about the job
opportunity.
9
Wilma then directly worked out with appellant, the
overseas job applications of private complainants.
Private complainants filed their applications and appellant assured
them that they would be able to leave for Abu Dhabi after the
processing of their paper.
10
She instructed them to pay their
processing fees
11
directly to her. During the period from March 3, 1990
to April 27, 1990, inclusive, private complainants through Wilma paid
appellant a total of THIRTY-TWO THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED PESOS
(P32,500.00).
12

Appellant assured private complainants they could leave for Abu Dhabi
on May 10, 1990, at 8:00 p.m.
13
The date of departure came without
private complainants leaving Philippine soil. Thereafter, appellant told
them to stay put and wait for the arrival in the Philippines of their
prospective Middle Eastern employer. However, no employer arrived,
and the four complainants failed to be deployed by appellant
overseas.
14

Private complainants and Wilma returned to the Lakas Agency to look
for appellant. They did not find her. It was then that they found out
from the agency's Manager, MR. NARCISO DELA FUENTE, that
appellant was merely renting a table in the office and was not,
employed with Lakas.
15
The revelation moved private complainants to
file a complaint against appellant with the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI).
16

The NBI was able to work out a settlement between the parties.
Appellant agreed in writing to pay back the processing fees of private
complainants.
17
Nonetheless, appellant did not fully fulfill her
obligation under the agreement. She only refunded a total of SIX
THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED PESOS (P6,700.00) to private
complainants.
18

For her part, appellant admits that she received from private
complainants, through Wilma Gregorio, the sum of THIRTY-TWO
THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (P32,500.00).
19
She, however,
denied that she was merely renting a table at the office of the Lakas
Agency Management Corporation. She insisted that she was an
employee of that recruitment office owned and managed by Mr.
Narciso dela Fuente,
20
and that she acted as its liaison officer and
messenger. As liaison officer, she assisted applicants in the processing
of their documents in the POEA. She also signed documents and
receipts in behalf of the recruitment agency.
21

According to appellant, it is the Lakas Agency's policy that each
applicant be charged FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00) as processing
fee, and that the airline fare of FIFTEEN THOUSAND PESOS
(P15,000.00) in cases of deployment to Abu Dhabi be shouldered by
the applicant.
22
The agency adopted the policy as a result of its alleged
unfortunate experience with Ramon Eguia and Edgardo Santos. The
two, she claimed, refused to pay back the cost of their tickets (THIRTY
THOUSAND PESOS [P30,000.00]) which was advanced by the agency.
23

16

Appellant blamed private complainants for their failure to leave for
Abu Dhabi as they were unable to produce the money for their air
fare.
24
Allegedly, Wilma insisted that the SIXTY THOUSAND PESOS
(60,000.00) for private complainants' tickets be advanced by Lakas
Agency and be repaid by the four once they start working in Abu Dhabi.
Her proposal did not sit well with the recruitment agency, resulting in
the shelving of private complainants' deployment abroad.
25

Appellant further testified that private complainant Ronnie Reyes later
withdrew his application and demanded the refund of his processing
fees, plus SEVEN HUNDRED PESOS (P700.00) to cover miscellaneous
expenses.
26
Since private complainants' papers had already been
processed in the POEA, Ronnie was informed that the agency was not
obliged to make the refund to him. He was, however, insistent, so
appellant took it upon herself to pay him back.
27
As guarantee for her
promise to make the refund, Ronnie allegedly took her Sony stereo
worth FOUR THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED PESOS (P4,700.00), which he
never returned to her even after she had given him SIX THOUSAND
SEVEN HUNDRED PESOS (P6,700.00).
28

Appellant also alleged that no similar refunds were made to the three
other private complainants. Their processing fees were merely off-set
against the existing obligation of Romeo Eguia and Edgardo Santos with
the Lakas Agency.
29

At trial's end, appellant was found guilty of illegal recruitment and
sentenced as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is
hereby rendered finding the accused Felicia
Cabacang y Mosambique (sic) guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of illegal recruitment and hereby
sentences her to suffer the penalty of LIFE
IMPRISONMENT and a fine of One Hundred
Thousand (P100,000.00) Pesos.
30

Appellant now assails the trial court's Decision with the following
arguments:
1. The
court a
quo erred
by failing to
appreciate
the facts (1)
that
(appellant)
never
represented
herself as
licensed by
the
Department
of Labor
and
Employmen
t
Philippine
Overseas
Employmen
t
Administrati
on as labor
recruiter,
(2) that
what she
represented
to the
applicants is
that her
employer
LAKAS
MANAGEM
ENT
AGENCY is a
duly
licensed
recruitment
agency with
principals-
employers
abroad, and
(3) that the
accused
told
applicants
that she can
help them
get
employed
with the
same
employer of
their
relatives
who are
now
working
there
through her
help.
2. The
court a
quo erred in
finding
(appellant)
at fault and
liable for
the failure
or
negligence
of her
employer
LAKAS
MANAGEM
ENT
AGENCY to
register her
name as its
employee at
the
Philippine
Overseas
Employmen
t
Administrati
on.
3. The
court a
quo erred in
finding
(appellant)
at fault or
liable for
the
decision/pol
icy of her
employer,
LAKAS
MANAGEM
ENT
AGENCY, or
requiring
the four (4)
17

complaining
witnesses to
pay the cost
of their
plane
tickets from
Manila to
the jobsite
(Abu Dhabi,
UAE);
4. The
court a
quo erred in
finding
(appellant)
guilty of
illegal
recruitment
based on
(appellant's)
receipt of
the
P32,000.00
from Wilma
Eguia
Gregorio
intended as
placement
fees of the
four (4)
complaining
witnesses.
We affirm appellant's conviction with modifications.
The centerpiece of appellant's defense is two-fold: (1) that she cannot
be held liable for illegal recruitment since she never represented
herself to private complainants as a POEA-licensed recruiter; and (2)
that she was not the one responsible for the recruitment of private
complainants nor for their
non-deployment for work abroad, since she was merely an employee
of the POEA-licensed Lakas Agency Management Corporation. We
reject these contentions.
Firstly, it is incorrect to maintain that to be liable for illegal
recruitment, one must represent himself/herself to the victims as a
duly-licensed recruiter. Illegal recruitment is defined in Article 38 (a) of
the Labor Code, as amended, as "(a)ny recruitment activities, including
the prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34 of this Code, to
be undertaken by non-licensees or non-holders of authority." Article 13
(b) of the same Code defines "recruitment and placement" as referring
to:
(A)ny act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting,
transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers,
and includes referrals, contract services, promising
or advertising for employment, locally or abroad,
whether for profit or not: Provided, That any
person or entity which in any manner, offers or
promises for a fee employment to two or more
persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment
and placement.
Clearly, to prove illegal recruitment, only two elements need to be
shown, viz.: (1) the person charged with the crime must have
undertaken recruitment activities (or any of the activities enumerated
in Article 34 of the Labor Code, as amended); and (2) said person does
not have a license
31
or authority
32
to do so. It is not required that it be
shown that such person wrongfully represented himself as a licensed
recruiter.
Secondly, appellant cannot successfully contend she merely performed
her duties as an employee of a licensed recruitment agency. Apart
from her uncorroborated testimony on the matter, she failed to
present credible evidence to buttress her claim of employment. Thus,
she failed to follow the immutable rule on burden of proof that "each
party must prove his own affirmative allegations by the amount of
evidence required by law.
33

On the other hand, the documentary evidence of the prosecution show
that appellant received private complainants' processing fees from
Wilma Gregorio in her own behalf. The wordings of Exhibits "C" to "G",
inclusive, are strongly persuasive on this factual issue.
They read, as follows:
Exh. "C": "Received from Wilma
Gregorio the amount of 5,000
only";
Exh. "D": "Received from
Romeo Eguia amount 5,000";
Exh. "E": "Received from Wilma
the amount of 5,000 Wilma
only"
Exh. "F": "Received from Wilma
Gregorio amount 7,500 pesos
only"; and
Exh. "G": "Received the amount
of 10,000 pesos from Wilma
Gregorio as Deposit, 4
applicants."
These receipts which are not written on Lakas agency stationary
show no indication that the payments were accepted by appellant in
behalf of the
Lakas Agency Management Corporation. Exh. "J", which is the
Commitment/Agreement executed and signed by appellant before the
NBI further proves that she was acting in her own behalf in receiving
Wilma's payment. For, why else would she personally "promise to
return to Wilma Gregorio . . . the amount of P32,500.00" if said sum
was for the benefit of the Lakas Agency?
More importantly, the prosecution demonstrated reasonable doubt
that appellant performed recruitment activities without any license to
do so. She informed private complainant Ronnie Reyes that there
would be a second batch of janitors to be deployed to Abu Dhabi. After
she accepted private complainants' job applications, she assured them
that they would be able to fly to that Middle Eastern nation after their
papers are processed by the POEA. She told them, through Wilma, to
pay their processing fees directly to her, and later personally received
the same, in the total amount of THIRTY-TWO THOUSAND PESOS
(P32,000.00). She issued and signed the receipts evidencing payment
to her of such fees. She processed private complainants' papers at the
POEA, and she assured them that they were to fly to Abu Dhabi on May
10, 1990, at 8:00 p.m. Throughout the entire transaction, private
complainants and Wilma Gregorio dealt with appellant, and with
appellant alone. The only time they talked to the manager of the Lakas
Agency was after their aborted flight to Abu Dhabi, when they were
trying to locate the whereabouts of appellant.
Clearly, it was appellant who directly recruited private complainants
within the meaning of Article 38 (a) and (b) the Labor Code. Since it is
undisputed that appellant is not a holder of a license or authority to
recruit from the Department of Labor, through the POEA, her acts
constitute illegal recruitment.
Illegal recruitment carries with it the penalty of life imprisonment, and
a fine which varies by degrees in accordance with the enumeration
made in
Article 39 of the Labor Code, as amended. In the case at bench, since
appellant was charged with and convicted of illegally recruiting four (4)
people, her crime is classified as having been committed in large
scale.
34
As such, it is considered as involving economic sabotage, and
carries with it a fine of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
(P100,000.00).
35
In addition to these penalties, appellant must also be
ordered to indemnify private complainants the unrefunded portion of
their processing fees.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Decision, dated January 25, 1994, of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 5, in Criminal Case No. 91-93606
is AFFIRMED, subject to the modification that, in addition to being
sentenced to suffer LIFE IMPRISONMENT and pay a fine of ONE
18

HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P100,000.00), appellant Felicia
Mazambique Cabacang is likewise ordered to indemnify private
complainants in the amount of TWENTY-FIVE THOUSAND EIGHT
HUNDRED PESOS (P25,800.00). Costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED.


11. People vs. Chowdury [G.R. No. 129577-80 February 15, 2000]

Facts: Bulu Chowdury was charged with the crime of
illegalrecruitment in large scale by recruiting Estrella B. Calleja, Melvin
C. Miranda and Aser S. Sasis for employment in Korea. Evidence shows
that accused appellant interviewed private complainant in 1994 at
Craftrades office. At that time, he was an interviewer of Craftrade
which was operating under temporary authority given by POEA
pending the renewal of license. He was charged based on the fact that
he was not registered with the POEA as employee of Craftrade and he
is not in his personal capacity, licensed to recruit overseas workers. The
complainants also averred that during their applications
for employment for abroad, the license of Craftrade was already
expired.

For his defense Chowdury testified that he worked as interviewer at
Craftrade from 1990 until 1994. His primary duty was to interview
jobapplicants for abroad. As a mere employee, he only followed the
instructions given by his superiors, Mr. Emmanuel Geslani, the agency's
President and General Manager, and Mr. UtkalChowdury, the agency's
Managing Director.

Issue: Whether or not accused-appellant knowingly and intentionally
participated in the commission of the crime charged.

Held: No, an employee of a company or corporation engaged in
illegal recruitment may be held liable as principal, together with his
employer, if it is shown that he actively and consciously participated in
illegal recruitment. In this case, Chowdury merely performed his tasks
under the supervision of its president and managing director. The
prosecution failed to show that the accused-appellant is conscious and
has an active participation in the commission of the crime of
illegal recruitment. Moreover, accused-appellant was not aware of
Craftrade's failure to register his name with the POEA and the
prosecution failed to prove that he actively engaged
inrecruitment despite this knowledge. The obligation to register its
personnel with the POEA belongs to the officers of the agency. A mere
employee of the agency cannot be expected to know the
legalrequirements for its operation. The accused-appellant carried out
his duties as interviewer of Craftrade believing that the agency was
duly licensed by the POEA and he, in turn, was duly authorized by his
agency to deal with the applicants in its behalf. Accused-appellant in
fact confined his actions to his job description. He merely interviewed
the applicants and informed them of the requirements for deployment
but he never received money from them. Chowdury did not knowingly
and intentionally participated in the commission of
illegal recruitment being merely performing his task and unaware of
illegality of recruitment.

12. People of the Philippines v Jamilosa:

FACTS: In May 1996, Lourdes Valenciano, claiming to be an employee
of Middle East International Manpower Resources, Inc., went with one
Susie Caraeg to the house of Agapito De Luna, and told him he could
apply for a job in Taiwan. A week later, De Luna went to Valencianos
house, there to be told to undergo a medical examination, with the
assurance that if there were a job order abroad, he would be able to
leave. He was also told that the placement fee for his employment as a
factory worker in Taiwan was PhP 70,000.

After passing the medical examination, De Luna paid Valenciano
at the latters residence the following amounts: PhP 20,000 on June 21,
1996; PhP 20,000 on July 12, 1996; and PhP 30,000 on August 21, 1996.
The first and last payments were turned over by Valenciano to Teresita
Imperial, who issued the corresponding receipts, and the second
payment was turned over by Valenciano to Rodante Imperial, who also
issued a receipt.

Also in May 1996, Valenciano visited the house of Allan De Villa,
accompanied by Euziel N. Dela Cuesta, Eusebio T. Candelaria, and De
Luna, to recruit De Villa as a factory worker in Taiwan. De Villa was
also asked for PhP 70,000 as placement fee. He paid Valenciano the
following amounts: PhP 20,000 on May 16, 1996 at Valencianos
residence; PhP 20,000 onMay 30, 1996 at the Rural Bank of Calaca,
Batangas; PhP 20,000 on July 8, 1996 at Valencianos residence; and
PhP 10,000 on August 14, 1996, also at her residence. Valenciano
turned over the amounts to either Teresita or Rodante. Teresita issued
receipts for the May 16, July 8, and August 14, 1996 payments, while
Rodante issued a receipt for the payment made onMay 30, 1996.

On May 20, 1996, Valenciano, accompanied by Rodante and
Puring Caraeg, went to the house of Dela Cuesta to recruit her for
employment as a factory worker in Taiwan. Dela Cuesta paid
Valenciano PhP 20,000 as initial payment on May 20, 1996. On May
30, 1996, she paid Valenciano another PhP 20,000. On August 12, 1996,
she paid PhP 15,000, and onAugust 21, 1996, she paid PhP 7,000.
Valenciano turned the May 20 and 30, 1996 payments over to
Rodante, who issued receipts for these payments. The payments made
on August 12 and 21, 1996 were turned over to Teresita, who also
issued receipts for them. These payments were to cover the
placement fee and other expenses for the processing of the
requirements for the employment of Dela Cuesta in Taiwan.

On May 1, 1996, Valenciano, with Rodante, Teresita, and Rommel
Imperial, went to Lian, Batangas to recruit workers for employment
abroad. Candelaria applied for a job as a factory worker
in Taiwan when Valenciano went to his residence in Lian. Valenciano
asked him for an initial payment of PhP 20,000. On May 30, 1996,
Candelaria paid Valenciano PhP 20,000 when she returned to Lian. He
then paid PhP 20,000 on June 24, 1996 and PhP 29,000 on July 17,
1996 at Valencianos residence in Manila. These payments were to
cover the placement fee and the expenses for the processing of his
passport and other papers connected with his application for
employment as a factory worker in Taiwan. The payments made on
May 30 and July 17, 1996 were turned over to Rodante, who issued a
receipt for the said payments. The payment made on June 24,
1996 was turned over by Valenciano to Teresita.

After the payments were made, Valenciano brought the
prospective workers to the office of Middle East International
Manpower Resources, Inc. in Pasay City, where they were made to fill
out application forms for their employment as factory workers
in Taiwan. The complainants were introduced to Romeo Marquez,
alias Rodante Imperial, Teresita Marquez, alias Teresita Imperial,
and Rommel Marquez, alias Rommel Imperial, whom Valenciano
made to appear as the owners of the employment agency. She
assured the prospective workers that they could leave
for Taiwan within one month from the filing of their
applications. During the period material, they have not yet found
employment as factory workers in Taiwan.

Valenciano, Rodante, Teresita, and Rommel were charged with
the offense of illegal recruitment in large scale, as defined under Article
13(b) of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 442, otherwise known as the
Labor Code of the Philippines, as amended, in relation to Art. 38(a),
and penalized under Art. 39(c) of the Code, as amended by PD 1920
and PD 2018.

The RTC found accused-appellant guilty, is also ordered to indemnify
complainants Agapito R. de Luna, Allan Ilagan de Villa, Euziel N. dela
Cuesta and Eusebio T. Candelaria the amounts of P70,000.00,
19

P70,000.00, P62,000.00 and P69,000.00, respectively, as reparation of
the damage caused.
Accused-appellant appealed to this Court, but the case was transferred
to the CA through a Resolution dated September 6, 2004.
ISSUE: 1) the lower court gravely erred in not acquitting accused-
appellant on reasonable doubt; and (2) the lower court gravely erred in
holding that a conspiracy exists between accused-appellant and her co-
accused.

HELD: The appeal is without merit. In her defense, accused-appellant
claims that she was an ordinary employee of Middle East International
Manpower Resources, Inc., where her other co-accused were the
owners and managers. She also denies receiving payment from the
complainants; that had she promised employment in Taiwan, this
promise was made in the performance of her duties as a clerk in the
company. She denies too having knowledge of the criminal intent of
her co-accused, adding that she might even be regarded as a victim in
the present case, as she was in good faith when she made the promise.
The claim of accused-appellant that she was a mere
employee of her other co-accused does not relieve her of liability. An
employee of a company or corporation engaged in illegal recruitment
may be held liable as principal, together with his employer, if it is
shown that the employee actively and consciously participated in
illegal recruitment
.
As testified to by the complainants, accused-
appellant was among those who met and transacted with them
regarding the job placement offers. In some instances, she made the
effort to go to their houses to recruit them. She even gave assurances
that they would be able to find employment abroad and leave
for Taiwan after the filing of their applications. Accused-appellant was
clearly engaged in recruitment activities, notwithstanding her
gratuitous protestation that her actions were merely done in the
course of her employment as a clerk.

Accused-appellant cannot claim to be merely following the
dictates of her employers and use good faith as a shield against
criminal liability. As held in People v. Gutierrez:
Appellant cannot escape liability by
claiming that she was not aware that before
working for her employer in the recruitment
agency, she should first be registered with the
POEA. Illegal recruitment in large scale is malum
prohibitum, not malum in se. Good faith is not a
defense
.


The claim of accused-appellant that she received no payment
and that the payments were handed directly over to her co-accused
fails in the face of the testimony of the complainants that accused-
appellant was the one who received the money. In spite of the
receipts having been issued by her co-accused, the trial court found
that payments were directly made to accused-appellant, and this
finding was upheld by the CA. Nothing is more entrenched than the
rule that where, as here, the findings of fact of the trial court are
affirmed by the CA, these are final and conclusive upon this Court.

And
even if it were true that no money changed hands, money is not
material to a prosecution for illegal recruitment, as the definition of
recruitment and placement in the Labor Code includes the phrase,
whether for profit or not. We held in People v. Jamilosa that it was
sufficient that the accused promises or offers for a fee employment to
warrant conviction for illegal recruitment. Accused-appellant made
representations that complainants would receive employment abroad,
and this suffices for her conviction, even if her name does not appear
on the receipts issued to complainants as evidence that payment was
made.

The RTC found accused-appellant to have undertaken recruitment
activities, and this was affirmed by the CA. A POEA certification was
submitted stating that accused-appellant was not authorized to recruit
applicants for overseas employment, and she did not contest this
certification. In the present case, there are four complainants: De
Luna, De Villa, Dela Cuesta, and Candelaria. The three essential
elements for illegal recruitment in large scale are present. Thus, there
can be no other conclusion in this case but to uphold the conviction of
accused-appellant and apply the penalty as imposed by law.

13. Executive Secretary vs. The Court of Appeals

Facts: Republic Act 8042, otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and
Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, took effect on 15 July 1995. The
Omnibus Rules and Regulations Implementing the Migrant Workers
and Overseas Filipino Act of 1995 was, thereafter, published in the 7
April 1996 issue of the Manila Bulletin. However, even before the law
took effect, the Asian Recruitment Council Philippine Chapter, Inc.
(ARCO-Phil.) filed, on 17 July 1995, a petition for declaratory relief
under Rule 63 of the Rules of Court with the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City to declare as unconstitutional Section 2, paragraph (g),
Section 6, paragraphs (a) to (j), (l) and (m), Section 7, paragraphs (a)
and (b), and Sections 9 and 10 of the law, with a plea for the issuance
of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction
enjoining The Executive Secretary, the Secretary of Justice, the
Secretary of Labor and Employment, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
OWWA Administrator, and POEA Administrator from enforcing the
assailed provisions of the law. In a supplement to its petition, the
ARCO-Phil. alleged that RA 8042 was self-executory and that no
implementing rules were needed. It prayed that the court issue a
temporary restraining order to enjoin the enforcement of Section 6,
paragraphs (a) to (m) on illegal recruitment, Section 7 on penalties for
illegal recruitment, and Section 9 on venue of criminal actions for
illegal recruitments. On 1 August 1995, the trial court issued a
temporary restraining order effective for a period of only 20 days
therefrom. After the Executive Secretary, et al. filed their comment on
the petition, the ARCO-Phil. filed an amended petition, the
amendments consisting in the inclusion in the caption thereof 11 other
corporations which it alleged were its members and which it
represented in the suit, and a plea for a temporary restraining order
enjoining the Executive Secretary, et al. from enforcing Section 6
subsection (i), Section 6 subsection (k) and paragraphs 15 and 16
thereof, Section 8, Section 10, paragraphs 1 and 2, and Sections 11 and
40 of RA 8042. Arco-Phil averred that the provisions of RA 8042 violate
Section 1, Article III of the Constitution (i.e. discrimination against
unskilled workers, discrimination against licensed and registered
recruiters, among others) In their answer to the petition, the Executive
Secretary, et al. alleged, inter alia, that (a) Acro-Phil has no cause of
action for a declaratory relief; (b) the petition was premature as the
rules implementing RA 8042 not having been released as yet; (c) the
assailed provisions do not violate any provisions of the Constitution;
and, (d) the law was approved by Congress in the exercise of the police
power of the State. After the respective counsels of the parties were
heard on oral arguments, the trial court issued on 21 August 1995, an
order granting Acro-Phils plea for a writ of preliminary injunction upon
a bond of P50,000. Acro-Phil posted the requisite bond and on 24
August 1995, the trial court issued a writ of preliminary injunction
enjoining the enforcement of Section 2, subsections (g) and (i, 2nd
par.); Section 6, subsections (a) to (m), and pars. 15 & 16; Section 7,
subsections (a) & (b); Section 8; Section 9; Section 10; pars. 1 & 2;
Section 11; and Section 40 of RA 8042, pending the termination of the
proceedings. The Executive Secretary, et al. filed a petition for
certiorari with the Court of Appeals assailing the order and the writ of
preliminary injunction issued by the trial court. They asserted that
Acro-Phil is not the real party-in-interest as petitioner in the trial court,
as it was inconceivable how a non-stock and non-profit corporation,
could sustain direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the law.
They argued that if, at all, any damage would result in the
implementation of the law, it is the licensed and registered recruitment
agencies and/or the unskilled Filipino migrant workers discriminated
against who would sustain the said injury or damage, not Acro-Phil. On
5 December 1997, the appellate court came out with a four-page
decision dismissing the petition and affirming the assailed order and
writ of preliminary injunction issued by the trial court. The appellate
20

court, likewise, denied the Executive Secretary, et al.s motion for
reconsideration of the said decision. They thus filed a petition for
review on certiorari.

Issue: Whether ACRO-Phil has locus standi.

Held: PARTLY YES. ACRO-Phil has locus standi to file the petition in the
RTC in representation of the 11 licensed and registered recruitment
agencies impleaded in the
amended petition. The modern view is that an association has standing
to complain of injuries to its members. This view fuses the legal
identity of an association with that of its members. An association has
standing to file suit for its workers despite its lack of direct interest if its
members are affected by the action. An organization has standing to
assert the concerns of its constituents. In Telecommunications and
Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines v. Commission on Elections, the
Court held that standing jus tertii would be recognized only if it can be
shown that the party suing has some substantial relation to the third
party, or that the right of the third party would be diluted unless the
party in court is allowed to espouse the third partys constitutional
claims. Herein, ACRO-Phil filed the petition for declaratory relief under
Rule 64 of the Rules of Court for and in behalf of its 11 licensed and
registered recruitment agencies which are its members, and which
approved separate resolutions expressly authorizing ACRO-Phil to file
the said suit for and in their.behalf. The Court note that, under its
Articles of Incorporation, ACRO-Phil was organized for the purposes
inter alia of promoting and supporting the growth and development of
the manpower recruitment industry, both in the local and international
levels; providing, creating and exploring employment opportunities for
the exclusive benefit of its general membership; enhancing and
promoting the general welfare and protection of Filipino workers; and,
to act as the representative of any individual, company, entity or
association on matters related to the manpower recruitment industry,
and to perform other acts and activities necessary to accomplish the
purposes embodied therein. ACRO-Phil is, thus, the appropriate party
to assert the rights of its members, because it and its members are in
every practical sense identical. ACRO-Phil asserts that the assailed
provisions violate the constitutional rights of its members and the
officers and employees thereof. ACRO-Phil is but the medium through
which its individual members seek to make more effective the
expression of their voices and the redress of their grievances. However,
ACROPHIL has no locus standi to file the petition for and in behalf of
unskilled workers. The Court notes that it even failed to implead any
unskilled workers in its petition. Furthermore, in failing to implead, as
parties-petitioners, the 11 licensed and registered recruitment
agencies it claimed to represent, ACRO-Phil failed to comply with
Section 2 of Rule 63 of the Rules of Court. Nevertheless, since the
eleven licensed and registered recruitment agencies for which ACRO-
Phil filed the suit are specifically named in the petition, the amended
petition is deemed amended to avoid multiplicity of suits.

14. Romero vs People

FACTS: PRIVATE respondent Romulo Padlan went to petitioner Delia D.
Romero to inquire about securing a job in Israel. Convinced by
petitioners words of encouragement and inspired by the potential
salary of US$700 to US$1,200 a month, respondent raised the amount
of US$3,600, which he gave to petitioner so that his papers could be
processed.
Respondent left for Israel and secured a job with a monthly salary of
US$650. Unfortunately, after two and a half months, he was caught by
Israels immigration police and deported for lack of a working visa.
On his return, respondent demanded from petitioner the return of his
money but the later refused.

ISSUE: Will the accused be held liable for Illegal recruitment?

Ruling: Yes.
Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code defines recruitment and placement
as: any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing,
hiring or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services,
promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether
for profit or not: Provided, that any person or entity which, in any
manner, offers or promises for a fee, employment to two or more
persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement.
The crime of illegal recruitment is committed when two elements
concur, namely: (1) the offender has no valid license or authority
required by law to enable one to lawfully engage in recruitment and
placement of workers; and (2) he undertakes either any activity within
the meaning of recruitment and placement defined under Article 13
(b), or any prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34 of the
Labor Code.
x x x
Thus, the trial court did not err in considering the certification from the
Department of Labor and Employment-Dagupan District Office stating
that petitioner has not been issued any license by the POEA nor is a
holder of an authority to engage in recruitment and placement
activities.
x x x
From the above testimonies, it is apparent that petitioner was able to
convince the private respondents to apply for work in Israel after
parting with their money in exchange for the services she would
render. The said act of the petitioner, without a doubt, falls within the
meaning of recruitment and placement as defined in Article 13 (b) of
the Labor Code


19. RESURRECCION SUZARA Vs BENIPAYO
EN BANC
[G.R. Nos. 57999, 58143-53. August 15, 1989.]


FACTS OF THE CASE
ThIS involveS a group of Filipino seamen who were declared by the
defunct National Seamen Board (NSB) guilty of breaching their
employment contracts with the private respondent because they
demanded, upon the intervention and assistance of a third party, the
International Transport Worker's Federation (ITF), the payment of
wages over and above their contracted rates without the approval of
the NSB. The means they used were violent and illegal. The petitioners
were ordered to reimburse the total amount of US$91,348.44 or its
equivalent in Philippine Currency representing the said over-payments
and to be suspended from the NSB registry for a period of three years
.The National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) affirmed the decision
of the NSB.
In a corollary development, the private respondent, for failure of the
petitioners to return the overpayments made to them upon demand
by the former, filed estafa charges against some of the petitioners. The
criminal cases were eventually consolidated in the sala of then
respondent Judge Alfredo Benipayo. Hence, these consolidated
petitions, G.R. No. 64781-99 and G.R. Nos. 57999 and 58143-53, which
respectively pray for the nullification of the decisions of the NLRC and
the NSB, and the dismissal of the criminal cases against the petitioners.
ISSUES
The principal issue in these consolidated petitions is whether or not the
petitioners are entitled to the amounts they received from the private
respondent representing additional wages as determined in the special
agreement. If they are, then the decision of the NLRC and NSB must be
reversed. Similarly, the criminal cases of estafa must be dismissed
because it follows as a consequence that the amounts received by the
petitioners belong to them and not to the private respondent.

RULING
The decisions of the National Seamen Board and National Labor
Relations Commission in G. R. Nos. 64781-99 are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE and a new one is entered holding the petitioners not guilty of
the offenses for which they were charged. The petitioners' suspension
21

from the National Seamen Board's Registry for three (3) years is
LIFTED. The private respondent is ordered to pay the petitioners their
earned but unpaid wages and overtime pay/allowance from November
1, 1978 to December 14, 1978 according to the rates in the Special
Agreement that the parties entered into in Vancouver, Canada.
The criminal cases for estafa, subject matter of G. R. Nos. 57999 and
58143-53, are ordered DISMISSED.
As stated in Vir-Jen Shipping (supra):
"The seamen had done no act which under Philippine law or any other
civilized law would be termed illegal, oppressive, or malicious.
Whatever pressure existed, it was mild compared to accepted and valid
modes of labor activity."The court cannot affirm the NSB and NLRC's
finding that there was violence, physical or otherwise employed by the
petitioners in demanding for additional wages. The fact that the
petitioners placed placards on the gangway of their ship to show
support for ITF's demands for wage differentials for their own benefit
and the resulting ITF's threatened interdiction do not constitute
violence. The petitioners were exercising their freedom of speech and
expressing sentiments in their hearts when they placed the placard
"We Want ITF Rates." Under the facts and circumstances of these
petitions, we see no reason to deprive the seamen of their right to
freedom of expression guaranteed by the Philippine Constitution and
the fundamental law of Canada where they happened to exercise it.

We likewise, find the public respondents' conclusions that the acts of
the petitioners in demanding and receiving wages over and above the
rates appearing in their NSB-approved contracts is in effect an
alteration of their valid and subsisting contracts because the same
were not obtained through mutual consent and without the prior
approval of the NSB to be without basis, not only because the private
respondent's consent to pay additional wages was not vitiated by any
violence or intimidation on the part of the petitioners but because the
said NSB-approved form contracts are not unalterable contracts that
can have no room for improvement during their effectivity or which
ban any amendments during their term.
For one thing, the employer can always improve the working
conditions without violating any law or stipulation.


20. Seagull maritime Vs nerry balatongan

FACTS OF THE CASE
Nerry balatongan was employed as a seaman on board the vessel santa
cruz. While on bOardd he entered a supplementary contract Of
insurance for Accidental disability Or death. Almost a year unto his
contract he met an accident which required prolonged hospitalization
for almost 6 months which led to a permanent disability.
Balatongan then demanded payment from his insurance coverage of
$50,000 but his claim was denied because he failed to file his claim
within the designated period.
THis led him to file a complaint .against philmare and seagull maritime
in the POEA for non payment of his i surance claim. The POEA decided
in favor of Balatongan And ordered the payment Of his insurance
claim. philmare filed a motion for reconsideration which was dismissed
by the NLRC. Hence this petition for certiorari And restraining order.
Petitioner claims that the supplementary contract vIolated article 34 of
the labor code And with the supplementary contract is also a waiver
for claims for compensation for damages due to death or permanent
disability

ISSUES
WON the supplementary contract is valid and enforceable in as much
as the POEA Did not approve it Therefore violating art 34 of the labor
code

RULING
The petition was dismissed for lack of merit
SUPPLEMENTARY CONTRACT" PROVIDING FOR MORE BENEFITS TO THE
WORKERS, DECLARED VALID AND ENFORCEABLE EVEN WITHOUT
APPROVAL OF THE POEA. The supplementary contract of
employment was entered into between petitioner and private
respondent to modify the original contract of employment. The reason
why the law requires that the POEA should approve and verify a
contract under Article 34(i) of the Labor Code is to insure that the
employee shall not thereby be placed in a disadvantageous position
and that the same are within the minimum standards of the terms and
conditions of such employment contract set by the POEA. This is why a
standard format for employment contracts has been adopted by the
Department of Labor. However, there is no prohibition against
stipulating in a contract more benefits to the employee than those
required by law. Thus, in this case wherein a "supplementary contract"
was entered into affording greater benefits to the employee than the
previous one, and although the same was not submitted for the
approval of the POEA, the public respondents properly considered said
contract to be valid and enforceable. Indeed, said pronouncements of
public respondents have the effect of an approval of said contract.
Moreover, as said contract was voluntarily entered into by the parties
the same is binding between them. Not being contrary to law, morals,
good customs, public policy or public order, its validity must be
sustained
PROVISION ON WAIVER AGAINST ALL CLAIMS AGAINST THE
EMPLOYER, HELD CONTRARY TO PUBLIC POLICY. The court sustains
the ruling of public respondents that the provision in the
supplementary contract whereby private respondent waives any claim
against petitioners for damages arising from death or permanent
disability is against public policy, oppressive and inimical to the rights
of private respondent. The said provision defeats and is inconsistent
with the duty of petitioners to insure private respondent against said
contingencies as clearly stipulated in the said contract.
** Seagull vs balatongan
Respondent nerrybalatongan and petitioner seagull had a crew
agreement approved by NSB(defunct, now POEA approves such)
While on board the ship petitioner and respondent entered into
another contract (supplementary contract) insurance for respondent
if any case he dies or becomes permanently disabled
Some time respondent met an accident in Suez canal, he was
repatriated to Philippines. There he was categorized as permanently
disabled.
Respondent tried to claim insurance but was denied for it being filed
beyond the designated period
Respondent filed complaint, adjudicator compelled petitioner to pay
the insurance benefit $50000 with 10% atty fee
Pet. Petitioned to nlrc dismissed
Issues: 1. Is Petitioner liable even if said supplementary contract was
not authorized by POEA?
Yes POEA only prohibits contracts which are not up to standard of
POEA rules and regulations(sec 2 rule 1 book 5 rules and regulations of
POEA), and those that are against public policy law etc. Since the
supplementary contract is more beneficial to the respondent more so
than the minimum standard set by POEA there is no valid reason for SC
to disallow such contract.


21. Ocean agency Corp vs. NLRC
FACTS: On September 28, 1991, respondent Capt. Pepito M. Gucor was
hired by petitioner Ocean East Agency Corp. (Ocean East), the manning
agent of herein co-petitioner European Navigation, Inc. (ENI), as master
of M/V "Alpine" for a period of one (1) year with a monthly salary of
US$840.00. Sometime in February 1992, while the M/V "Alpine" was
anchored at the Port of Havana, Cuba, respondent was informed of his
repatriation for his subsequent transfer to another vessel.
Perceiving the transfer as an insult to his professional competence,
Capt. Gucor signified that, unless his full benefits are accorded him, he
shall refuse to leave the vessel knowing the cause for his repatriation
to be unreasonable. In an effort to assuage his fears, petitioners Ocean
East and ENI advised him that his services were not terminated at all,
the repatriation being solely for documentation purposes. On February
22

29, 1992, after his demands were fully settled, respondent agreed to
be repatriated. Petitioner alleged that in view of respondent's earlier
refusal to be repatriated and to man the newly-acquired MV "Havre de
Grace," it was compelled to assign another master to the said vessel.
Thereafter, the company decided to assign him to MV "Eleptheria-K,"
whose master was going on leave on February 27, which, however,
respondent likewise missed for failure to disembark when ordered to
do so.
On the ground of serious misconduct or willful disobedience, petitioner
terminated the services of respondent. In a complaint for illegal
dismissal, on December 1, 1993, Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA), through Administrator Felicisimo O. Joson,
dismissed the said complaint for lack of merit finding respondent's
apprehension as premature and that petitioners were merely acting in
the exercise of their management prerogative.
On appeal, this decision was reversed by the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) in its decision dated November 29, 1994.
ISSUE: WON the intended transfer of Capt. Gucor to another vessel
was in effect an alteration of his original contract which could not be
done without the approval of the Secretary of Labor.
HELD: Standard Employment Contract:
The CREWMEMBER agrees to be transferred at any port to
any vessel owned or operated, manned or managed by the
same employer provided it is accredited to the same
manning agent and provided further that the rating of the
crewmember and the rate of his wages and terms of service
are in no way inferior and the total period of employment
shall not exceed that originally agreed upon.
Article 34(i) of the Labor Code, on the other hand, reads:
(i) It shall be unlawful for "any individual,
entity, licensee or holder of authority to
substitute or alter employment contract
approved and verified by the Department
of labor from the time of actual signing
thereof by the parties up to and including
the periods of expiration of the
same without the approval of the
Secretary of Labor.
Apparently, there is no inconsistency between Article 34(i) of the Labor
Code and the transfer clause under the SEC. On the contrary, the latter
even complements the other by way of resolving the complex demands
of seafarers whose services may entail occasional transfer from one
vessel to another. Obviously, the transfer clause is not without
limitations. Thus, a transfer is sanctioned only if it is to any vessel
owned or operated, manned or managed by the same employer
provided it is accredited to the same mantling agent and that the rating
of the crewmember, his wages and terms of service are in no way
inferior and the total period of employment shall not exceed that
originally agreed upon. In the instant case, respondent's assignment to
another vessel owned by European Navigation and accredited to the
same manning agent, therefore, under no circumstance, violated
Article 34(i) of the Labor Code. The transfer clause is deemed
incorporated into the original contract; hence, the approval of the
Secretary of Labor is no longer necessary.
Accordingly, we conclude that petitioners merely availed of what the
employment contract allows. Indeed, it was nothing more than an
application of the subject provision.

22. Serrano Vs. Gallant maritime services
Facts:
Petitioner was hired by Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and Marlow
Navigation Co., Ltd. (respondents) under aPOEA-approved Contract of
Employment. On March 19, 1998, the date of his departure, petitioner
was constrained toaccept a downgraded employment contract for the
position of Second Officer with a monthly salary of US$1,000.00,
uponthe assurance and representation of respondents that he would
be made Chief Officer by the end of April. However,respondents did
not deliver on their promise to make petitioner Chief Officer. Hence,
petitioner refused to stay on as SecondOfficer and was repatriated to
the Philippines on May.
Petitioner's employment contract was for a period of 12 months or
from March 19, 1998 up to March 19, 1999, butat the time of his
repatriation on May 26, 1998, he had served only two (2) months and
seven (7) days of his contract,leaving an unexpired portion of nine (9)
months and twenty-three (23) days. Petitioner filed with the Labor
Arbiter (LA) a Complaint against respondents for constructive dismissal
and for payment of his money claims. LA rendered the dismissal of
petitioner illegal and awarding him monetary benefits.Respondents
appealed to the NLRC to question the finding of the LA. Likewise,
petitioner also appealed to the NLRC onthe sole issue that the LA erred
in not applying the ruling of the Court in...?

23. Pert/CPM Manpower Exponent Co., Inc. Vs. Amando A. Vinuya, et
al.
Facts:
The respondents alleged that the agency deployed them was to work
as aluminum fabricator/installer. However, they were shocked to find
out what their working and living conditions were in Dubai. They were
required to work from 6:30 a.m. to 6:30 p.m., with a break of only one
hour to one and a half hours. When they rendered overtime work, they
were most of the time either underpaid or not paid at all.
Burdened by all the expenses and financial obligations, they signed
new employment contracts. Due to agencys inaction, the respondents
expressed to Modern Metal their desire to resign.Out of fear, as they
put it, that Modern Metal would not give them their salaries and
release papers, the respondents, except Era, cited personal/family
problems for their resignation. It took the agency several weeks to
repatriate the respondents to the Philippines.
The agency countered that the respondents were not illegally
dismissed; they voluntarily resigned from their employment to seek a
better paying job.The agency further alleged that the respondents even
voluntarily signed affidavits of quitclaim and release after they
resigned
Issue:
W/N petitioners were illegally dismissed
Held:
The agency and its principal, Modern Metal, committed a prohibited
practice and engaged in illegal recruitment when they altered or
substituted the contracts approved by the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA). Article 34 (i) of the Labor Code
provides: It shall be unlawful for any individual, entity, licensee, or
holder of authority to substitute or alter employment contracts
approved and verified by the Department of Labor from the time of
actual signing thereof by the parties up to and including the period of
expiration of the same without the approval of the Secretary of Labor.
Meanwhile, Article 38 (i) of the Labor Code, as amended by R.A. 8042,
defined illegal recruitment to include the substitution or alteration,
to the prejudice of the worker, of employment contracts approved and
verified by the Department of Labor and Employment from the time of
actual signing thereof by the parties up to and including the period of
the expiration of the same without the approval of the Department of
Labor and Employment.
Furthermore, the agency and Modern Metal committed breach of
contract by providing substandard working and living arrangements,
when the contract provided free and suitable housing.
We thus cannot accept the agencys insistence that the respondents
voluntarily resigned since they personally prepared their resignation
letters in their own handwriting.


24. SALAZAR VS. ACHACOSO
Facts:
Rosalie Tesoro charged petitioner with illegal recruitment. Public
respondent Atty. Ferdinand Marquez sent petitioner a telegram
directing him to appear to the POEA regarding the complaint against
him. On the same day, after knowing that petitioner had no license to
23

operate a recruitment agency, public respondent Administrator Tomas
Achacoso issued a Closure and Seizure . It stated that there will a
seizure of the documents and paraphernalia being used or intended to
be used as the means of committing illegal recruitment, it having
verified that petitioner has (1) No valid license or authority from the
Department of Labor and Employment to recruit and deploy workers
for overseas employment; (2) Committed/are committing acts
prohibited under Article 34 of the New Labor Code in relation to Article
38 of the same code
A team was then tasked to implement the said Order. The group,
accompanied by mediamen and Mandaluyong policemen, went to
petitioners residence. They served the order to a certain Mrs. For a
Salazar, who let them in. The team confiscated assorted costumes.
Petitioner filed with POEA a letter requesting for the return of the
seized properties, because she was not given prior notice and hearing.
The said Order violated due process.
Issue:
Whether or Not the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
(or the Secretary of Labor) can validly issue warrants of search and
seizure (or arrest) under Article 38 of the Labor Code
Held:
Under the new Constitution, . . . no search warrant or warrant of
arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of
the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized. Mayors and prosecuting officers cannot issue
warrants of seizure or arrest. The Closure and Seizure Order was based
on Article 38 of the Labor Code. The Supreme Court held, We
reiterate that the Secretary of Labor, not being a judge, may no longer
issue search or arrest warrants. Hence, the authorities must go through
the judicial process. To that extent, we declare Article 38, paragraph
(c), of the Labor Code, unconstitutional and of no force and effect
The power of the President to order the arrest of aliens for deportation
is, obviously, exceptional. It (the power to order arrests) cannot be
made to extend to other cases, like the one at bar. Under the
Constitution, it is the sole domain of the courts. Furthermore, the
search and seizure order was in the nature of a general warrant. The
court held that the warrant is null and void, because it must identify
specifically the things to be seized.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Article 38, paragraph (c) of the
Labor Code is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL and null and void. The
respondents are ORDERED to return all materials seized as a result of
the implementation of Search and Seizure Order

25. TOLOSA vs NLRC
FACTS
Evelyn Tolosa, was the widow of Captain Virgilio Tolosa who was hired
by Qwana-Kaiun, through its manning agent, Asia Bulk, to be the
master of the Vessel named M/V Lady Dona. . The vessel departed for
Long Beach California, passing by Hawaii in the middle of the voyage.
At the time of embarkation, CAPT. TOLOSA was allegedly shown to be
in good health.
During channeling activities upon the vessels departure CAPT.
TOLOSA was drenched with rainwater. The following day, he had a
slight fever and in the succeeding twelve (12) days, his health rapidly
deteriorated resulting in his death . It was alleged that the request for
emergency evacuation of Capt Tolosa was too late.
Because of the death of CAPT. TOLOSA, his wife, EVELYN, as petitioner,
filed a Complaint/Position Paper before the POEA against Qwana-
Kaiun, thru its resident-agent. The case was however transferred to the
NLRC, when the amendatory legislation expanding its jurisdiction, and
removing overseas employment related claims from the ambit of POEA
jurisdiction.
Petitioner argues that her cause of action is not predicated on a quasi
delict or tort, but on the failure of private respondents -- as employers
of her husband (Captain Tolosa) -- to provide him with timely,
adequate and competent medical services under Article 161 of the
Labor Code.
Respondents aver that the Labor Arbiter has no jurisdiction over the
subject matter, since her cause did not arise from an employer-
employee relation, but from a quasi delict or tort. Further, there is no
reasonable causal connection between her suit for damages and her
claim under Article 217 (a)(4) of the Labor Code, which allows an award
of damages incident to an employer-employee relation.
ISSUE
Whether or not the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction over the subject
matter.
HELD
The SC held that the NLRC and the labor arbiter had no jurisdiction
over petitioners claim for damages, because that ruling was based on
a quasi delict or tort per Article 2176 of the Civil Code.
After carefully examining the complaint/position paper of petitioner,
we are convinced that the allegations therein are in the nature of an
action based on a quasidelict or tort. It is evident that she sued Pedro
Garate and Mario Asis for gross negligence. Petitioners
complaint/position paper refers to and extensively discusses the
negligent acts of shipmates Garate and Asis, who had no employer-
employee relation with Captain Tolosa. The SC stressed that the case
does not involve the adjudication of a labor dispute, but the recovery
of damages based on a quasi delict. The jurisdiction of labor tribunals
is limited to disputes arising from employer-employee relations.
Not every dispute between an employer and employee involves
matters that only labor arbiters and the NLRC can resolve in the
exercise of their adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers. The jurisdiction
of labor arbiters and the NLRC under Article 217 of the Labor Code is
limited to disputes arising from an employer-employee relationship
which can only be resolved by reference to the Labor Code, other labor
statutes, or their collective bargaining agreement.
23. Pert/CPM Manpower Exponent Co., Inc. Vs. Amando A. Vinuya, et
al.
Facts:
The respondents alleged that the agency deployed them was to work
as aluminum fabricator/installer. However, they were shocked to find
out what their working and living conditions were in Dubai. They were
required to work from 6:30 a.m. to 6:30 p.m., with a break of only one
hour to one and a half hours. When they rendered overtime work, they
were most of the time either underpaid or not paid at all.
Burdened by all the expenses and financial obligations, they signed
new employment contracts. Due to agencys inaction, the respondents
expressed to Modern Metal their desire to resign.Out of fear, as they
put it, that Modern Metal would not give them their salaries and
release papers, the respondents, except Era, cited personal/family
problems for their resignation. It took the agency several weeks to
repatriate the respondents to the Philippines.
The agency countered that the respondents were not illegally
dismissed; they voluntarily resigned from their employment to seek a
better paying job.The agency further alleged that the respondents even
voluntarily signed affidavits of quitclaim and release after they
resigned
Issue:
W/N petitioners were illegally dismissed
Held:
The agency and its principal, Modern Metal, committed a prohibited
practice and engaged in illegal recruitment when they altered or
substituted the contracts approved by the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA). Article 34 (i) of the Labor Code
provides: It shall be unlawful for any individual, entity, licensee, or
holder of authority to substitute or alter employment contracts
approved and verified by the Department of Labor from the time of
actual signing thereof by the parties up to and including the period of
expiration of the same without the approval of the Secretary of Labor.
Meanwhile, Article 38 (i) of the Labor Code, as amended by R.A. 8042,
defined illegal recruitment to include the substitution or alteration,
to the prejudice of the worker, of employment contracts approved and
verified by the Department of Labor and Employment from the time of
actual signing thereof by the parties up to and including the period of
the expiration of the same without the approval of the Department of
24

Labor and Employment.
Furthermore, the agency and Modern Metal committed breach of
contract by providing substandard working and living arrangements,
when the contract provided free and suitable housing.
We thus cannot accept the agencys insistence that the respondents
voluntarily resigned since they personally prepared their resignation
letters in their own handwriting.


24. SALAZAR VS. ACHACOSO
Facts:
Rosalie Tesoro charged petitioner with illegal recruitment. Public
respondent Atty. Ferdinand Marquez sent petitioner a telegram
directing him to appear to the POEA regarding the complaint against
him. On the same day, after knowing that petitioner had no license to
operate a recruitment agency, public respondent Administrator Tomas
Achacoso issued a Closure and Seizure . It stated that there will a
seizure of the documents and paraphernalia being used or intended to
be used as the means of committing illegal recruitment, it having
verified that petitioner has (1) No valid license or authority from the
Department of Labor and Employment to recruit and deploy workers
for overseas employment; (2) Committed/are committing acts
prohibited under Article 34 of the New Labor Code in relation to Article
38 of the same code
A team was then tasked to implement the said Order. The group,
accompanied by mediamen and Mandaluyong policemen, went to
petitioners residence. They served the order to a certain Mrs. For a
Salazar, who let them in. The team confiscated assorted costumes.
Petitioner filed with POEA a letter requesting for the return of the
seized properties, because she was not given prior notice and hearing.
The said Order violated due process.
Issue:
Whether or Not the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
(or the Secretary of Labor) can validly issue warrants of search and
seizure (or arrest) under Article 38 of the Labor Code
Held:
Under the new Constitution, . . . no search warrant or warrant of
arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of
the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized. Mayors and prosecuting officers cannot issue
warrants of seizure or arrest. The Closure and Seizure Order was based
on Article 38 of the Labor Code. The Supreme Court held, We
reiterate that the Secretary of Labor, not being a judge, may no longer
issue search or arrest warrants. Hence, the authorities must go through
the judicial process. To that extent, we declare Article 38, paragraph
(c), of the Labor Code, unconstitutional and of no force and effect
The power of the President to order the arrest of aliens for deportation
is, obviously, exceptional. It (the power to order arrests) cannot be
made to extend to other cases, like the one at bar. Under the
Constitution, it is the sole domain of the courts. Furthermore, the
search and seizure order was in the nature of a general warrant. The
court held that the warrant is null and void, because it must identify
specifically the things to be seized.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Article 38, paragraph (c) of the
Labor Code is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL and null and void. The
respondents are ORDERED to return all materials seized as a result of
the implementation of Search and Seizure Order

25. TOLOSA vs NLRC
FACTS
Evelyn Tolosa, was the widow of Captain Virgilio Tolosa who was hired
by Qwana-Kaiun, through its manning agent, Asia Bulk, to be the
master of the Vessel named M/V Lady Dona. . The vessel departed for
Long Beach California, passing by Hawaii in the middle of the voyage.
At the time of embarkation, CAPT. TOLOSA was allegedly shown to be
in good health.
During channeling activities upon the vessels departure CAPT.
TOLOSA was drenched with rainwater. The following day, he had a
slight fever and in the succeeding twelve (12) days, his health rapidly
deteriorated resulting in his death . It was alleged that the request for
emergency evacuation of Capt Tolosa was too late.
Because of the death of CAPT. TOLOSA, his wife, EVELYN, as petitioner,
filed a Complaint/Position Paper before the POEA against Qwana-
Kaiun, thru its resident-agent. The case was however transferred to the
NLRC, when the amendatory legislation expanding its jurisdiction, and
removing overseas employment related claims from the ambit of POEA
jurisdiction.
Petitioner argues that her cause of action is not predicated on a quasi
delict or tort, but on the failure of private respondents -- as employers
of her husband (Captain Tolosa) -- to provide him with timely,
adequate and competent medical services under Article 161 of the
Labor Code.
Respondents aver that the Labor Arbiter has no jurisdiction over the
subject matter, since her cause did not arise from an employer-
employee relation, but from a quasi delict or tort. Further, there is no
reasonable causal connection between her suit for damages and her
claim under Article 217 (a)(4) of the Labor Code, which allows an award
of damages incident to an employer-employee relation.
ISSUE
Whether or not the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction over the subject
matter.
HELD
The SC held that the NLRC and the labor arbiter had no jurisdiction
over petitioners claim for damages, because that ruling was based on
a quasi delict or tort per Article 2176 of the Civil Code.
After carefully examining the complaint/position paper of petitioner,
we are convinced that the allegations therein are in the nature of an
action based on a quasidelict or tort. It is evident that she sued Pedro
Garate and Mario Asis for gross negligence. Petitioners
complaint/position paper refers to and extensively discusses the
negligent acts of shipmates Garate and Asis, who had no employer-
employee relation with Captain Tolosa. The SC stressed that the case
does not involve the adjudication of a labor dispute, but the recovery
of damages based on a quasi delict. The jurisdiction of labor tribunals
is limited to disputes arising from employer-employee relations.
Not every dispute between an employer and employee involves
matters that only labor arbiters and the NLRC can resolve in the
exercise of their adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers. The jurisdiction
of labor arbiters and the NLRC under Article 217 of the Labor Code is
limited to disputes arising from an employer-employee relationship
which can only be resolved by reference to the Labor Code, other labor
statutes, or their collective bargaining agreement.




29. HOLIDAY INN MANILA V. NLRC
G.R. No. 109114 September 14, 1993
TRAINING & EMPLOYMENT OF SPECIAL WORKERS: Apprentice


FACTS: Honasan was accepted for on-the-job training as telephone
operator at Holiday Inn for three weeks. Subsequently, she was
employed on probationary basis for six months. On her employment
contract, it was stipulated that the hotel can terminate her
employment any time before the end of the probationary period.
Alleging that her performance did not come up to the standards of the
hotel, Holiday Inn dismissed her four days before the end of her
probationary period. She questioned the dismissal on the ground that
she was already a regular employee; hence, she cannot be dismissed as
a probationer.

ISSUE: WON Honasan is still a probationer.

25

RULING: No. We find that Honasan was placed by the petitioner on
probation twice, first during her on-the-job training for three weeks,
and next during another period of six months, ostensibly in accordance
with Article 281. Her probation clearly exceeded the period of six
months prescribed by this article.

Probation is the period during which the employer may determine if
the employee is qualified for possible inclusion in the regular force. In
the case at bar, the period was for three weeks, during Honasan's on-
the-job training. When her services were continued after this training,
the petitioners in effect recognized that she had passed probation and
was qualified to be a regular employee.
Honasan was certainly under observation during her three-week on-
the-job training. If her services proved unsatisfactory then, she could
have been dropped as early as during that period. But she was not. On
the contrary, her services were continued, presumably because they
were acceptable, although she was formally placed this time on
probation.

The consequence is that she could no longer be summarily separated
on the ground invoked by the petitioners. As a regular employee, she
had acquired the protection of Article 279 of the Labor Code stating as
follows:
Art. 279. Security of Tenure In cases of regular employment, the
employer shall not terminate the services of an employee except for a
just cause or when authorized by this Title. An employee who is
unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement
without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full
backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or their
monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation was
withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement.

The policy of the Constitution is to give the utmost protection to the
working class when subjected to such maneuvers as the one attempted
by the petitioners. This Court is fully committed to that policy and has
always been quick to rise in defense of the rights of labor, as in this
case.

30-31. NITTO ENTERPRISES V. NLRC
G.R. No. 114337 September 29, 1995
TRAINING & EMPLOYMENT OF SPECIAL WORKERS: Apprentice & Dual
Training Systems Act

FACTS: Private respondent was hired as apprentice at Nitto
Enterprises for six months. At one instance, he accidentally hit and
injured the leg of the office secretary who was then sent to the
hospital. Later that day, he entered a workshop which was not his work
station and operated one of the machines without authority. On the
process, his thumb got injured. Nitto Enterprises covered for his
medication. The next day, respondent was asked to resign. When
respondent filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, NLRC held that
respondent is not an apprentice since no apprenticeship program had
yet been filed and approved at the time their agreement was executed.
On the other hand, Nitto Enterprises contended that the mere signing
of the apprenticeship agreement already established an employer-
apprentice relationship.

ISSUE: WON respondent is considered an apprentice.

RULING: No. The law is clear on this matter. Article 61 of the Labor
Code provides:
Contents of apprenticeship agreement. Apprenticeship agreements,
including the main rates of apprentices, shall conform to the rules
issued by the Minister of Labor and Employment. The period of
apprenticeship shall not exceed six months. Apprenticeship
agreements providing for wage rates below the legal minimum wage,
which in no case shall start below 75% per cent of the applicable
minimum wage, may be entered into only in accordance with
apprenticeship program duly approved by the Minister of Labor and
Employment. The Ministry shall develop standard model programs of
apprenticeship.

Petitioner did not comply with the requirements of the law. It is
mandated that apprenticeship agreements entered into by the
employer and apprentice shall be entered only in accordance with the
apprenticeship program duly approved by the Minister of Labor and
Employment.
Prior approval by the Department of Labor and Employment of the
proposed apprenticeship program is, therefore, a condition sine quo
non before an apprenticeship agreement can be validly entered into.
The act of filing the proposed apprenticeship program with the
Department of Labor and Employment is a preliminary step towards its
final approval and does not instantaneously give rise to an employer-
apprentice relationship.
Article 57 of the Labor Code provides that the State aims to "establish a
national apprenticeship program through the participation of
employers, workers and government and non-government agencies"
and "to establish apprenticeship standards for the protection of
apprentices." To translate such objectives into existence, prior
approval of the DOLE to any apprenticeship program has to be secured
as a condition sine qua non before any such apprenticeship agreement
can be fully enforced. The role of the DOLE in apprenticeship programs
and agreements cannot be debased.
Hence, since the apprenticeship agreement between petitioner and
private respondent has no force and effect in the absence of a valid
apprenticeship program duly approved by the DOLE, private
respondent's assertion that he was hired not as an apprentice but as a
delivery boy ("kargador" or "pahinante") deserves credence. He should
rightly be considered as a regular employee of petitioner.





32. BERNARDO V. NLRC
G.R. No. 122917 July 12, 1999
RIGHTS OF PERSONS WITH DISABILITY, PRIVILEGES, AND PROTECTIONS


FACTS: Several handicapped persons were hired temporarily as money
sorters and counters by the Far East Bank and were dismissed after six
months by virtue of their employment contract. They filed a complaint
for their dismissal. The bank argued that the complainants were not
regular employees because their employment was under a special
employment program and was for humanitarian reasons only.
Although their contracts were renewed several times, the positions of
money sorters and counters no longer exist. The NLRC agreed and
ruled that complainants were hired as an accommodation to the
recommendation of civic oriented personalities and that the Magna
Carta for Disabled Persons was not applicable.

ISSUE: WON the proscription against discrimination against disabled
persons applies in the case at bar.

RULING: Yes. Respondent bank entered into the aforesaid contract
with a total of 56 handicapped workers and renewed the contracts of
37 of them. In fact, two of them worked from 1988 to 1993. Verily, the
renewal of the contracts of the handicapped workers and the hiring of
others lead to the conclusion that their tasks were beneficial and
necessary to the bank. More important, these facts show that they
were qualified to perform the responsibilities of their positions. In
other words, their disability did not render them unqualified or unfit
for the tasks assigned to them.

In this light, the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons mandates that a
qualified disabled employee should be given the same terms and
26

conditions of employment as a qualified able-bodied person. Section 5
of the Magna Carta provides:
Sec. 5. Equal Opportunity for Employment. No disabled person shall
be denied access to opportunities for suitable employment. A qualified
disabled employee shall be subject to the same terms and conditions
of employment and the same compensation, privileges, benefits, fringe
benefits, incentives or allowances as a qualified able bodied person.

The primary standard, therefore, of determining regular employment is
the reasonable connection between the particular activity performed
by the employee in relation to the usual trade or business of the
employer. The test is whether the former is usually necessary or
desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer. The
connection can be determined by considering the nature of the work
performed and its relation to the scheme of the particular business or
trade in its entirety. Also if the employee has been performing the job
for at least one year, even if the performance is not continuous and
merely intermittent, the law deems repeated and continuing need for
its performance as sufficient evidence of the necessity if not
indispensibility of that activity to the business. Hence, the employment
is considered regular, but only with respect to such activity, and while
such activity exist.

Without a doubt, the task of counting and sorting bills is necessary and
desirable to the business of respondent bank.
As regular employees, the twenty-seven petitioners are entitled to
security of tenure; that is, their services may be terminated only for a
just or authorized cause. Because respondent failed to show such
cause,
17
these twenty-seven petitioners are deemed illegally dismissed
and therefore entitled to back wages and reinstatement without loss of
seniority rights and other privileges.
18
Considering the allegation of
respondent that the job of money sorting is no longer available
because it has been assigned back to the tellers to whom it originally
belonged,
18
petitioners are hereby awarded separation pay in lieu of
reinstatement.