1

US INTEREST IN AFGHANISTAN AND ITS IMPACT ON THE REGION

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Identification of the Problem
On the morning of 11 September 2001, al-Qaeda carried out four coordinated
attacks on U.S. soil. Following the attack, the U.S. President George W. Bush
demanded that the Taliban hand over bin Laden and al-Qaeda leadership, but the
Taliban, then in charge in Afghanistan refused. Consequently, the United States
launched Operation Enduring Freedom on October 7, 2001 with the United
Kingdom, later joined by Canada, Australia, France and other mainly western allies. The
objective of the operation was to dismantle Al-Qaeda, the Islamic terrorist organization
led by Osama bin Laden and to remove from power the Taliban, an Islamic
fundamentalist regime led by Mullah Mohammed Omar, which at the time controlled 90
per cent of Afghanistan and hosted the Al-Qaeda leadership in Afghanistan.
The U.S. and its allies quickly drove the Taliban from power and captured all
major cities and towns in the country. In December 2001, the U.N. Security Council
established the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), to oversee security in
the country and train the Afghan National Army. In 2003, NATO assumed leadership of
ISAF, with troops from 43 countries, however, Only a portion of U.S. forces in
Afghanistan operate under NATO command; the rest remained under direct American
command. On 2 May 2011, U.S. forces killed Osama bin Laden in Abbotabad,
Pakistan. On 21 May 2012 the leaders of the NATO-member countries endorsed an
exit strategy for withdrawing NATO-led forces from Afghanistan by 2014.
Historically, issues in Afghanistan have had a way of affecting the interest of
several world and regional powers, which has made it experience several external
interventions and meddling in its internal affairs. So, the US is not the only foreign
country with strategic interest in Afghanistan. The Pakistan and India, both have long
2

standing rivalry and strategic objectives in Afghanistan, which have contributed to the
dynamics of local politics and stability of the nation. Same is the case with Russia, Iran
and other Central Asian countries. The presence of the US in Afghanistan has
affected the way and manner these nations pursued their interests. Similarly, the
withdrawal of US and NATO forces from Afghanistan will also have significant impact
on future developments in Afghanistan in particular, and other regional countries in
general.
1.2 The Statement of the Problem
After twelve years of fighting in Afghanistan the U.S. war in Afghanistan is
considered the longest war in history, surpassing even the Vietnam War, and the Soviet
Unions extended military campaign in Afghanistan. With the expanded operation, it
costs the U.S. taxpayers nearly $100 billion per year, a sum roughly seven times
larger than Afghanistans annual gross national product (GNP) of $14 billion and greater
than the total annual cost of the new U.S. health insurance program. Thousands of
American and allied personnel have been killed or gravely wounded. The American
public has begun to worry and to question whether U.S. interests at stake in
Afghanistan warrant this level of sacrifice. President Obama, earlier tried to justify the
expenses as been necessary to degrade Al Qaedas infrastructure in Afghanistan, but
has also agreed on the need to wind down the operation in Afghanistan and withdraw
US forces in 2014.
The US interests in Afghanistan is now seen to be limited as the initial objectives
set out for the intervention in that country have apparently been achieved. It is now
believed the Al-Qaeda no longer pose significant threat to the US homeland
neither can they use Afghanistan as a base. The conflict in Afghanistan is now
commonly perceived as a struggle between the Karzai government and an insurgent
Taliban movement that is seeking to gain relevance in the power equation of the
country. It has therefore, been argued that the US needs to redefine its interests in
Afghanistan and chart a new course to advance them.
3

This study therefore seeks to determine what US strategic interests in
Afghanistan are, and to provide an analysis of those interests and their impacts
in the region.


1.3 Hypothesis
The research will be based on the following hypotheses:
a. Despite announcement of withdrawal of forces in 2014, US will continue its
sizable military presence in Afghanistan for a longer period in order to gain sufficient
time to secure its national interests.
b. The South Asian and Central Asian countries including Iran will be drawn into
Afghanistan with conflicting interests following US drawdown.

1.4 Research Questions
a What is the geo-strategic significance of Afghanistan to the US, Europe and
Central Asia that have led to interferences in its internal affairs by several world and
regional powers?.
b. What are the strategic objectives of the regional countries like Pakistan, India,
Iran, China and Central Asian countries in Afghanistan?
c. What could be the US post withdrawal situation in Afghanistan and its
probable impact on the regional security?
1.5 Research Objectives
4

The main objective of the research is to examine the strategic interests of the
US in Afghanistan and its impact in the region. The specific objectives of the
research are as follows:
a. To determine the geo-strategic significance of Afghanistan to the US and
other regional South Asian countries like Pakistan and India.
b. To determine specific US interests in Afghanistan and impact of the pursuit of
the interests on the South Asia region.
c. To determine the interests of such other countries as Pakistan, India and Iran in
Afghanistan.


1.6 Literature Review

Ahmed Rashid in his book, Pakistan on the Brink: The Future of America,
Pakistan, and Afghanistan (February 26, 2013), critically analyzed the strategic
events that led to US invasions and chronological development of the situation in
Afghanistan. The author has nicely painted a picture of post US withdrawal
Afghanistan scenario and its multi-dimensional impacts on the region.

Nafeez Mosaddeq Ahmed (2002) in his book titled, The Great Deception
originally published as The War on Freedom How and Why America Was Attacked
provided some insights into the plot behind September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks.
Nafeez undertakes meticulous research of the background events and motivations of
the participants of the terror attacks leading up to and following the infamous September
11 attacks on US territory.

Norman Friedman (2003) in his book titled, Terrorism, Afghanistan, and
Americas - New Ways of War offers an in-depth analysis of the radically new tactics
and strategy used by the US in Afghanistan. He sets the Afghan War in the wider
context of the war against terrorism, and explores the rationale for it and the
consequences of the 11 September attacks. Angelo Rasanayam (2005) in his book
5

titled, Afghanistan A Modern History, traces the tragic history of Afghanistan from the
Nineteenth Century geo-political Great Games to present times. He further traces the
countrys development from the succession of Abdul Rahman Khan, the Iron Amir in
1880, through the period of the demise of the Taliban. Mel Gurtov (2006), in Super
Power on Crusade, documented the account of the foreign and national security
policies of the President George W. Bushs administration. Gurtov opined that the notion
that US foreign policy is said to move in cycles: between isolationism and
internationalism, bilateralism and multilateralism, generosity and stinginess, involvement
in and disengagement from global issues is incorrect.

The blueprint that was formulated and printed by The Commission on Americas
National Interests (2000) has identified the hierarchy of the US national interests as
vital interests, extremely important interests, important interests, and, less
important or secondary interests. Topping the list are vital national interests, which
are conditions that are strictly necessary to safeguard and enhance Americas survival
and well-being as a free and secure nation.
Comments: The above mentioned books cover a wide spectrum of discussion
on conceptual framework of security, and security dimensions, economic aspects,
foreign policy issues and historical perspectives of US-Afghanistan relations and so on.
The books examined security concerns of the regional countries in view of US
and NATO occupation of Afghanistan. More books will be studied and analyzed to
prove or disprove the hypothesis of the research at hand.
Journals/ Newspapers.
Journal of International Affairs, BIISS Journal, Strategic Analysis and other
different Journals, Newspapers and Internet web sites will be consulted for the
research.
1.7 Research Methodology
There are mainly two methods of research, qualitative and quantitative and this
research is based on qualitative method focusing on descriptive mode of analysis. The
6

secondary sources that will be used are books, documents of USA, Afghanistan, India,
Pakistan and other countries, relevant articles published in different journals around the
globe. Primary sources of research would be interviews of professional diplomats,
experts on Political Science and International Relations; interaction and exchange of
views in different seminars, workshops and symposiums. Detailed, systematic and
critical analysis of the events/subjects will be developed sequentially right from the
beginning. In the process, correlations between the variables will be made and deductions
or major conclusions would be drawn in order to develop the subsequent chapter or event
logically while evaluating various subject matters of the Group Research Paper.

1.8 Scope and Limitations
The time-line of the analytical part of this paper will cover the period of pre-
September 11 until the present time. This research aspires to bring into open
discussion some pertinent issues and questions regarding the 2001 US invasion of
Afghanistan, their subsequent decade long military presence and the future of the
situation that have yet to be answered or thoroughly examined. The research intends to
highlight the US national interests in particular the ones that are related to its
intervention in Afghanistan relating to its war on terrorism.
Finally, this research seeks to examine the current geo-strategic and security
situation of Afghanistan and also the impact of the proposed post withdrawal
announcement by USA in 2014. Endeavour will also be made to analyze the socio-
economic interest of Iran, Central and South Asian countries.
1.9 Theoretical and Conceptual Framework
There are a good number of theories and schools of analysis regarding nation
and international security issues; some of which include: Realism, Neo-realism,
liberalism, Copenhagen School (CS) of thoughts, Critical theory, Constructivism. The
two major analytical theories in International Relations study: Liberalism and Realism,
interpret different approaches to control and manage global insecurity. Realist theory
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explains that human nature is greedy and selfish. Individuals only look after their
personal interests. This theory assumes that the international system is primarily
anarchic as there is no central authority, nor an arbitrator. As a result, states must
protect their national security and the needs of citizens by any means necessary. This
theory proposes the military strength of a country as a source of security and also the
prime method of preserving territorial integrity and state security as well as sovereignty.
The Realist approach to tackling insecurity relies acutely on individual state power,
rather than collective efforts of the international community.

Liberal theory believes in the inherent goodness of mankind to conduct peace-
keeping relations in the international system. States rely on mutual cooperation to tackle
global issues. Managing security issues, according to this theory, requires the
involvement of international institutions, along with the cooperation of states. Liberal
theorists strongly believe in the power of collective security. This is a protective
measure used by a group of allied states. When one state is threatened unlawfully,
united opposition is shown by the other supporting states. The goal is to stop the
aggressor while creating security in the international system. Collective security can be
best described by the concept of one for all, all for one
Despite its ambiguity, the concept of national interest remains of central
importance in any attempt to describe, explain, predict, or prescribe international
behavior. Theodore A. Coloumbis and J.H. Wolfe (1978) agreed that in international
relations, the primary justification of state action is national interest.

There is a major
division of opinion in the field of international relations between those who felt that
national interest can be arrived at objectively and scientifically, and those who see the
definition of national interest as a struggle among various subjective views and
preferences, a struggle in which the national interest is the political outcome.



1.10 Conceptual Framework
8



Fig 1.1 Paul R. Votti & Mark V. Kaupi, 2007. International Relations & World Politics
In Realist perspective, explanations of Operational Framework at Figure 1.1 are as
follows:
1. States are actors in global politics with separate national interests in the world
without a central authority to regulate their activities.
2. States are often assumed to be rational or purposive actors, in pursuing various
objectives understood to be consistent with their separate interests.
3. States will exploit opportunities to handle threats, and are required to mobilize
its capabilities in order to exert power as to achieve its objectives & to protect its
interest.
9


Fig 1.2 Dependent (DV) and Independent Variables (IV)
a. The dependent variable is the US military presence in Afghanistan.
b. The independent variables are:
i. Politics - Democracy and Alliances are the utmost important
aspects in US national interests
ii. Economics - Control of natural resources ie. oil and gas, and to
ensure Americas Multinational Company survivability
iii. Power/Military - US ability to sustain its role as global hegemony
power
iv. Threats - Russia and other neighbouring countries of Afghanistan
i.e. Eurasia and Central Asia, and, Al-Qaeda and other non-state
actors
1.11 Chapter Outline
10

Chapter One of the research work gives the background, statement of the problem,
research methodology and theoretical framework. Chapter Two analyzed the
historical background of Afghanistan US relations and its impact in the region.
In Chapter Three, the socio-economic interest of Iran, other Central and South
Asian countries in the region will be discussed, while Chapter Four evaluate the
impact of post-withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan on regional security.
The research will be concluded in Chapter Five with relevant recommendations made.






















11

CHAPTER 2
US PRESENCE IN AFGHANISTAN AND ITS IMPACT IN THE REGION

2.1 Historical Background of Afghanistan
The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan is a landlocked country in south-central Asia.
1
It is
bordered by Pakistan in the south and east, Iran in the west, Turkmenistan,
Uzbekistan and Tajikistan in the north, and China in the far northeast. Afghanistan
has been an ancient focal point of the Silk Road and human migration. The land is at
an important geostrategic location, connecting East, South, West and Central Asia, and
has been home to various cultures through the ages. The region has been a target of
various invaders since antiquity, including Alexander the Great, the Mauryan Empire,
Muslim armies, and Genghis Khan, and has served as a source from which many
kingdoms, such as the Greco-Bactrians, Kushans, Samanids, Ghaznavids, Ghurids,
Timurids, and many others have risen to form empires of their own.
The political history of modern Afghanistan began in the 18th century with
the rise of the Pashtun tribes (known as Afghans in Persian language), when in
1709 the Hotaki dynasty established its rule in Kandahar and, more specifically,
when Ahmad Shah Durrani created the Durrani Empire in 1747 which became the
forerunner of modern Afghanistan. Its capital was shifted in 1776 from Kandahar
to Kabul and most of its territories ceded to neighboring empires by 1893. In the
late 19th century, Afghanistan became a buffer state in "The Great Game"
between the British and Russian empires. On August 19, 1919, following the third
Anglo-Afghan war, the nation regained controlled over its foreign affairs from the
British.
2.2 Geography of Afghanistan. Land-locked Afghanistan comprises 652,230
square km. Its capital city is Kabul. Other major cities are Kandahar, Herat, Mazar-e-

1
National Intelligence Council Report dated 19 Apr 2002 at public website at www.odci.gov/nic
12

Sharif, Jalalabad, and Konduz. Its terrains are mainly rocky, mountainous desert, and
there are many river valleys where an agricultural economy and many villages exist.
There are 34 provinces variously bordering Pakistan, Iran, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and
Uzbekistan with the Vakhan corridor of




the Hindu Kush range in the northeast to China. Its climate is dry, with cold winters and
hot summers. Afghani population as registered in July 2009 counts 28.4 million people.
Afghanistan is a multi-tribal, multicultural country composed of the Pashtun in
the south which constituted 42 per cent, the Tajik 27 per cent in the central and
north, the Hazara 9 per cent, Uzbek 9 per cent and lesser others.
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2.3 Geo-Strategic and Geo-Political Importance of Afghanistan
The foundations of the modern Afghan state are said to have been laid by Ahmad
Shah Durrani in the 18th Century. There was strategic rivalry between Britain and
Russia for supremacy in Central Asia, which began around 1813. The British were
determined to maintain Afghanistan as a buffer state, being worried about the prospect
of a Russian invasion of India. Constant efforts were made by the British and
Russians to influence the politics of Afghanistan, through diplomacy, espionage
and sometimes by applying force. Afghanistan has historically and geographically
been the link between Central Asia, the Middle East and South Asia. From a geopolitical
point of view, controlling Afghanistan is vital for controlling South Asia. Historically,
the conquest of Afghanistan had played a significant role in the invasion of India from
the west through the Khyber Pass.
Since the 8th Century B.C., Afghanistan has incessantly been shaken by external
invasion or internal conflict. Geography had placed it such that it became a natural
theatre for the imperial powers fighting to control trade routes and expand influence, as
well as the object of a political Buzkashi between local feuding leaders.
Great emperors like Darius I, Alexander the Great, Kanishka, Genghis Khan,
Timur, Babur and Nadir Shah all fought for their way through Afghanistan. But it has
never been completely conquered or colonised. This is the paradox of Afghanistan it is
the most invaded place in the world but yet unconquerable.
2
Because of repeated
invasion or attack, regimes were always weak and susceptible. Yet its society has been
resilient and uncompromising towards foreign rule.
2.4 Afghanistan as nightmare for invaders

2

2
Menon,Aditya, Afghanistan: Most invaded, yet unconquerable, Times of India, Feb 6, 2010
14

The British invaded Afghanistan and occupied the capital city of Kabul in
1830s, The British were seeking to turn Afghanistan from a crossroads to a roadblock
for other nations. They put in place a hand-picked monarch named Shah Shoojah.
But Shoojahs collaboration with non-Muslim occupiers earned him the hatred of many
Afghans. Shoojah had no control outside Kabul, the capital. An uprising against Shoojah
led to the first of two devastating Anglo-Afghan wars.
The British occupiers were violently driven out a few years later. They totally
misread the complexities of the nature of the people and land they invaded. A chaotic
uprising turned into outright disaster when the invaders, forced to retreat, were
all wiped out as they fled, and this became the story of the UKs first invasion of
Afghanistan from 1839 until 1842.
Following the communist coup that ended its constitutional monarchy,
Afghanistan was invaded by the Soviet Union in December 1979 but were ousted
in 1989. This was followed by a period of protracted civil war that ended with the
ultra conservative Islamist Taliban taking over. The Taliban was believed to be a
haven for the Al-Qaeda training camps that spawned the 9/11 attacks on the USA.

Then the current war started following the September 11 World Trade Center
bombings. The United States blamed Osama Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda for the
crime. The U.S. government demanded that the Taliban hand over Bin Laden, but they
refused. Within a few weeks the United States began a bombing campaign that
culminated into the invasion of Afghanistan. Though the Taliban regime was toppled
and bin Laden killed the insurgent Taliban militants are still fighting in Afghanistan.
Observers say, All foreign forces invading Afghanistan must learn that it is easy
to enter, but very difficult to leave Afghanistan.
3
Invaders have always found it
difficult to successfully conquer Afghanistan and govern it peacefully; hence it always
appears to be a nightmare for foreign invaders.

3
A Brief History of Afghanistan in the past 1000 years - A speech delivered by Adam Ritscher in Duluth,
Minnesota (2002), www.afghangovernment.com/ Retrieved on May 23, 2013.

15


2.5 US strategic interests in Afghanistan

US presence in Afghanistan was triggered in 2001 by the September 11
attacks on the US. The US has two vital strategic interests in Afghanistan, which
are to reduce the threat of terrorist attacks against the United States and to
prevent Afghanistan from again becoming a safe haven that could significantly
enhance Al Qaedas ability to organize and conduct attacks on the United States.
The other vital objective of U.S. is to keep the conflict in Afghanistan from
propagating instability in any other place in Central Asia, as the huge oil reserve
in that region is of strategic interest to the US.

2.6 Impact of US presence in the region
The invasion of Afghanistan by the US has impacted other countries in the region
in various ways. Now, let us see the country wise impact of US presence in the region.
2.6.1 Bangladesh
Bangladesh has no border line with Afghanistan. But its role is proactive and
together with USA, China, India Pakistan, Afghanistan and other stakeholders work for
the success of the ongoing dialogue with the Talibans to isolate the extremists and
empower the moderates as democratic and tolerant Afghanistan prepares to join other
South Asian nations following the withdrawal of US and NATO forces from Afghanistan.
i

The United States has sought Bangladesh's engagement in restoration of peace
and stability in Afghanistan
4
. According to Bangladesh Government, Bangladesh's
engagement was sought for the restoration of peace and stability in Afghanistan; and to
that effect Bangladesh was requested to provide economic and development
assistance, render training facilities to Afghan security and law enforcement agencies.

4
Lawrence,Quil and Jackie Northam, Alan Greenblatt, For Invaders, A Well-Worn Path Out Of Afghanistan
December 6, 2010, (www.democraticunderground.com) Retrieved on May 24, 2013.

16

Bangladesh has already offered assistance in education and health sectors of
Afghanistan as a member of the SAARC.
Bangladesh wants to expand its role in the UN peacekeeping, but not willing
to send armed forces to Afghanistan in combat role. Prime Minister of Bangladesh
has proposed to form a regional task force against terrorism to which the US has given
an in principle approval.
5
But Bangladesh has been generally critical of the US
presence in Afghanistan, while being keen on fighting terrorism.
Now the US feels the states likes Bangladesh have abilities, potentialities to act; to
work for global peace and prosperity. Bangladesh needs to stay on the track towards
democracy and maintain steady economic growth to maintain present impetus to
contribute in keeping peace throughout the world, but not in war. The Foreign Minister
of Bangladesh recently said that Afghanistan could be benefited from
Bangladesh's home-grown ideas like micro-credit, non-formal education and
empowerment of women and gender mainstreaming.
ii


2.6.2 Pakistan
According to US security experts, islamist extremism in Pakistan is concentrated
within the tribal areas in its northwest frontier, and largely confined to its Pashtun
minority (which comprises about 15 percent of the population). Although Pakistans
reputation was severely damaged by the Bin Laden raid, its co-operation would be
crucial for U.S in order to achieve a settlement with the Taliban.
Among the neighbouring states, Pakistans fate is the most entangled with
Afghanistan, because, the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), Khyber-
Pakhtunkhwa (KP, the former North-West Frontier Province - NWFP) and
Balochistan function as the main shelter and supply-route into Afghanistan for
the insurgents. Approximately 1.7 million officially registered refugees from

5
http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2010/09/09/report-responders-died-ground-zero-illnesses/ Retrieved on May 24,
2013.

17

Afghanistan are currently living in Pakistan
6
. Pakistan is in critical position for the
provision of logistical support to Afghanistan. It remains the principal artery for
transporting supplies and fuel to Afghanistan. Extremists have continued using
the Afghan-Pakistani border areas as a safe area for them. Therefore, Islamabads
co-operation in the efforts of the allied forces against insurgents or in a probable
settlement between the insurgents and the Afghan government are very important.
The United States claims that it favours democratic rule, human rights, and
economic development in Afghanistan. The U.S. also believes that stable and
prosperous democracies are less likely to threaten their neighbors or to challenge core
U.S. interests. Helping the Afghan people rebuild after decades of war is on moral
grounds. Some Pakistani politicians think that such discord is creating threat to the
stability of the Pakistani state and the security of Pakistans nuclear arsenal. If the
Pakistani government were to fail due to influence of radical extremists, or if terrorists
were able to steal or seize a weapon or sufficient nuclear material, then the danger of a
nuclear terrorism incident would increase significantly. So, it is important that U.S.
strategy in Afghanistan avoids making the situation in Pakistan worse.

2.6.3 India
Indias focus in Afghanistan is on preventing the rise of Islamic
fundamentalism in the region. It stands against the possibility of a Taliban return to
power and has invested significantly in boosting the capacities of Afghan government.
India-Pakistan relations are a key factor in New Delhis contribution to the development
of the Afghan security forces. India is interested in strengthening its economic power in
the region.
The increasing partnership between India and Afghanistan has caused some
anxiety for Pakistan who sees Indian presence in Afghanistan as a threat to them.
After the ASP was signed between New Delhi and Kabul, there was an instant reaction

6
Afghanistan 19191928: Sources in the India Office Records". BritishLibrary. January 1921. Accessed on 18
March 2013. Afghan mission visits Europe and USA to establish diplomatic relations

18

from Islamabad that in such an agreement the fundamental principle of ensuring the
stability in the region must be taken into account
7
. This reaction shows the degree of
anxiousness of Pakistan over the growing Indian presence in Afghanistan.
The two countries collaboration has developed over the past decade, especially in
more sensitive areas such as counter-terrorism and defense. With such a favorable
climate, the US thinks that India could work to shape a clear and prudent
Afghanistan strategy. The two countries have a common vision for Afghanistans
future: a stable, developing and self-sustaining country contributing to the
regions progress. At present, India has stronger ties with the Afghan government
and people than perhaps any other country.
The U.S. has a fundamental interest in developing a strategic partnership with
rising democratic power India as it increasingly contributes to a stable order in the Asia
Pacific. The U.S. thinks that the growing strategic challenge presented by a rising China
should contribute to an increase in cooperation between Washington and New Delhi in
defense and other key sectors, such as space, maritime security, and nuclear
nonproliferation
8
.

2.7 Assessment of the Current Situation in Afghanistan
The war in Afghanistan in general and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in
particular can be said to have resulted in the positive achievement of major national
interests of the US and its allies. The US succeeded in routing the Taliban Regime
and further succeeded in capturing, killing, Al Qaeda operatives including Osama
bin Laden. The flip side is the almost total destruction of Afghanistan and the loss of

7
Afghanistan 19191928: Sources in the India Office Records". British Library. January 1921. Accessed on 18
March 2013. "Afghan mission visits Europe and USA to establish diplomatic relations"

8
Evans, Alexander, The United States and South Asia after Afghanistan, December 2012, Asia Society,
(AsiaSociety.org/USandSouthAsia)

19

large numbers of civilian life. Against this backdrop that an assessment of the current
situation in Afghanistan would be examined:
a. Politics. Before the Soviet invasion in December 1979, Afghanistan was
neutral in its foreign policy. Between 1979 and 1989, Afghanistans foreign policy
reflected that of the Soviet Union. Afghanistans foreign relation improved
dramatically after the fall of the Taliban in 2001, and most countries now maintain
diplomatic relations with Afghanistan. In 2002, Afghanistan six bordering
countries signed a Good Neighbour Declaration that pledged to respect
Afghanistans independence and territorial boundaries. Afghanistan is a land
locked country but in the centre of all the states in the region. The relationship
with the six neighbouring countries are:

(1) Pakistan. Afghanistan has had many differences with its
neighbour Pakistan. Many in each country maintain visceral distrust
and prejudice toward the other. Strained relationship between
Afghanistan and Pakistan result from the separation of Pashtun
tribes, the growing Islamist insurgency on both sides of the border.
The presence of Taliban and Al Qaeda forces in Pakistans border
provinces and Afghanistans increasing relations with India further
strained the relationship. Pakistan wants to minimize Indias influence in
Afghanistan to avoid being surrounded by unfriendly states. Afghanistan
and Pakistan are engaged in dialogue through the United States-
sponsored Tripartite Commission to resolve bilateral issues. Economically,
Pakistan is Afghanistans vital corridor to the Arabian Sea, while
Afghanistan is a vital connection for Pakistan to the natural resources of
Central Asia.

(2) Iran. Relationship between Afghanistan and Iran are generally
good. Iran opposed the Soviet occupation and the Taliban. During
the Soviet occupation, Iran supported Afghan resistance and
20

provided financial and military assistance to rebel leaders who
pledged loyalty to the Iranian vision of Islamic revolution.
Afghanistans relations with Iran have improved since the fall of the
Taliban. Iran has been active in Afghan reconstruction. There is a dispute
over water rights on the Helmand River, which irrigates Afghanistans
southern agricultural region before flowing into Iran. Other issues
between Iran and Afghanistan include Afghan expatriates and refugees in
Iran, Iranian support for warlords in Afghanistans border provinces, and
Iranian concerns for the Shia minority in Afghanistan.

(3) Russia. When the Taliban was in power, Russia became
disenchanted with the Taliban for supporting Chenchen insurgents
and for providing a sanctuary for terrorist groups active in Central
Asia. This resulted in Russian support for the Northern Alliance. Afghan
relations with Russia have improved since the fall of the Taliban. In
the early 2000s, Russia pledged to assist Afghanistan in building military
and business establishments, clearing landmines, and developing oil and
gas facilities. There are, however, remnants of mistrust between both
countries and outstanding Afghan debts to Russia that date back to the
soviet era.
(4) Tajikistan. Afghanistans role in Tajikistans long civil war
complicated relations. Tajik insurgents used Afghanistan as a base for
military operations, and about 100,000 Tajiks took refuge in Northern
Afghanistan in the early 1990s. Tajikistan provided assistance to the
Northern Alliance because of the Talibans harsh treatment of
Afghanistans Tajik minority.
(5) Uzbekistan. Relations between Afghanistan have been limited.
Uzbekistan has forced harsh border controls to prevent the entry of
narcotics smugglers and Islamic fundamentalists from Afghanistan.
21

Uzbekistans ongoing support for Uzbek warlords who control parts of
Afghanistan has also been a source of contention.

(6) India. In the early 2000s, India offered a range of assistance
projects worth US$600 million to establish diplomatic missions
throughout Afghanistan. India expanded the package in 2006.

b. Economy. Afghanistan is the poorest country in Asia, and one of the
poorest in the world. Security threats remain the most significant
deterrents to economic development. Afghanistan relies heavily on foreign
troops and international aid. However, in the aftermath of the NATO-led invasion
in 2001, domestic and international initiatives are working to revitalize the
economy by developing government institutions, constructing and repairing
nationwide infrastructure, developing public and private industries, and
developing natural resources. Afghanistan is taking steps to exploit its
resources, especially precious stones and newly discovered oil and natural
gas. Afghanistan is transitioning to a free market economy and creating
incentives for foreign investors. Improvements have been made to the banking
sector, tax policy, and customs regulations. A new currency has been
established, and inflation is under control. These policies have created potential
economic growth in various sectors, but the need for development and reform in
many areas remains.

(1) Resources. In the 1980s, natural gas accounted for 56 percent of
export revenue. However, the Soviet Union capped natural gas fields
before withdrawing troops in 1989. Since then, Afghanistan has not been
able to benefit from these resources until recently. In 2006, the US
Geological Survey completed a 2-year assessment of oil and natural
gas potential in Afghanistan and discovered many more resources
than expected. Reports claim that Afghanistan has 18 times more oil
resources and more than three times the natural gas resources
22

previously known. Northern Afghanistan contains 100 billion to 1 trillion
cubic meters of natural gas, 0.4 billion barrels to 3.6 billion barrels of oil,
and 126 million barrels to 1,325 million barrels of natural gas liquids.
Afghanistan also has deposits of barites, bauxite, beryllium, chromium,
coal, copper, gold, iron ore, lead, manganese, mercury, nickel, salt, silver,
sulfur, talc, tin, uranium, and zinc. Other precious and semi-precious
minerals include alabaster, amethyst, beryl, emerald, jade, lapis lazuli,
quartz, ruby, sapphire, and tourmaline. Agricultural resources include
grazing land and fertile soil land for growing crops in the northern province
of Kondoz and the southern province of Helmand. However, Afghanistan
has a significant water shortage.

(2) Industry. Afghanistans industrial sector once processed large
quantities of sugar, textiles, and chemical fertilizers, and exported
hundreds of millions of dollars worth of gas. By 2004, however, almost all
Afghan industry had been destroyed by years of conflict, and
reconstruction efforts were focused more on the slow rebuilding of national
infrastructure than on industry. Industry faces many challenges in
Afghanistan. Regional warlords often extort or take resources from private
firms, and corruption in the construction sector also deters prospective
investors and hinders many projects.
(3) Agriculture. Afghanistans rough terrain and arid climate leave
little land use for agriculture. Only 12 percent of land is arable, and
not all of that is actually used to cultivate crops. Prolonged and severe
drought adds to the challenges of growing food and raising livestock.
Despite these obstacles, 70 to 85 percent of people in Afghanistan rely on
agriculture for their livelihood. Almost 40 percent of Afghanistan
legitimate GDP is agricultural, but poor conditions have forced
millions of rural Afghans to rely on food aid.
23

(4) Foreign Investment. Many obstacles deter foreign investors in
Afghanistan. The lack of sea access and adequate infrastructure
makes exporting products expensive. Customs regulations and
property laws are underdeveloped. The banking system is also
underdeveloped and raises little revenue. Basic necessities such as
water and electricity are unreliable, even in Kabul. Another major
obstacle is nationalized industry. Some of the most attractive
industries, such as oil, gas, and precious stones, are state-owned
and unavailable to foreign investors. Despite these challenges to
foreign investment, Afghanistans new government is creating liberal
trade laws, tax reforms, and incentives to encourage much needed
foreign investment. Incentives to foreign investors include 100
percent foreign ownership and the ability to transfer all profits
abroad. The Afghan Investment Support Agency assists foreign
investors with required documents and information on starting a
business enterprise.
c. Social. About 40 percent of the Afghan labour force of 15 millions are
unemployed, many of whom have moved to urban areas. Basic services are
non-existence. These factors have contributed to crimes and lawlessness.
Opium poppy cultivation and drug trafficking have become significant
negative factors in Afghanistans fragile political and economic order over
the past 25 years. In 2007, poppy cultivation and opium production reached
record highs. Afghanistan is now the source of 92 percent of the worlds illicit
opium. UN officials estimate that in-country illicit revenue from the 2006 opium
crop was US$3 billion. Afghan president Hamid Karzai has identified the opium
economy as the single greatest challenge to the long-term security,
development, and effective governance of Afghanistan.

d. Security. The security situation in Afghanistan remains critical to
foreigners. In view of US, UK and NATO decision to withdraw their
24

respective troops by 2014 in phases, the UN had endorsed Afghanistan
proposal to expand security forces of the army to more than 170,000 troops
and police 134,000 personnel in order the country to be able to provide its
own security. There are remnants of the former Taliban regime and the
terrorist Al Qaeda network in various parts of Afghanistan as well as narco
traffickers and other groups that oppose the strengthening of a democratic
government. These groups aim to weaken or bring down the government of
Afghanistan, as well as drive Westerners out of the country.


2.7 Summary
Some analysts say that the US has failed not only in achieving its objectives
of Afghanistan misadventure; its complete withdrawal will unleash a series of
terrorist attack outside the South Asian region where al Qaeda has extended its
franchise. According to an analysis by The National Interest, developments elsewhere
in the Middle East and Africa will compound the emergence of this new threat in South
Asia. Although al Qaeda al Jihad is based on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, it
influences threat groups in North Africa, the Levant and the Arabian Peninsula. Groups
from outside the region, notably the Middle East, are likely to return to Afghanistan and
play primary and peripheral training and operational roles.
iii








25





CHAPTER 3
ANALYSIS OF PAKISTANS AND INDIAS POLITICAL ECONOMIC AND
MILITARY INTERESTS IN AFGHANISTAN
Since the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan in 1980and particularly since
the fall of the Taliban regime in 2001both India and Pakistan have increased their
stakes in the affairs of Afghanistan. Each perceives Afghanistan in a zero-sum
dynamics, in which one sides gain is seen as a loss to the other. India and Pakistan
have different strategic goals for Afghanistan, and they adopt different strategies to
achieve the goals. Once the United States ends its combat mission in Afghanistan, in
2014, the India-Pakistan rivalry will significantly contribute towards the political and
socio-economic developments that will unfold in Afghanistan. It is therefore, in this
perspective that an analysis of Pakistans and Indias strategic interests in Afghanistan
would be examined.

3.1 Pakistans Political Interests in Afghanistan

Pakistans goals for Afghanistan are mainly India-centric. Islamabad seeks a weak
Kabul government, dominated by a pliant, supportive Taliban so that it can maintain
strategic depth against undue Delhis influence in Afghanistan and prevent Indias
power projection in the broader South/Central Asian region.

Islamabad seeks to fend off Afghan claims on Pakistani territory, which have been a
consistent thorn in bilateral relations, given that no Afghan regime has ever accepted
26

the legitimacy of the border drawn by the British in 1893, the so-called Durand Line
9
.
Pakistan thus, seeks to foster a friendly regime in Kabul that dampens Pashtun
nationalism and concomitant calls for an independent Pashtun homeland in parts of
Balochistan, the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
(KPK). Calls for a breakaway irredentist Pashtunistan would directly threaten Pakistans
territorial integrity and potentially contribute to its disintegration along ethnic lines
10
.

Islamabad perceives Indias efforts to gain influence in Afghanistan as a deliberate
strategy of encirclement that is aimed at trapping and ultimately destroying Pakistan
between hostile fronts. Islamabads overriding objective in Afghanistan is therefore to
block Delhis own penetration into the country by helping to foster a pro-Pakistani
administration in Kabul. In addition to limiting Indian power projection in Afghanistan,
Pakistan seeks to limit the extent to which other states are able to extend their influence
in Afghanistan. This is particularly true of Iran, Russia, and the United States..

To some degree, Pakistan lumps the United States in with other countries that seek to
exercise influence in Afghanistan to Pakistans detriment, because some Pakistani
politicians view U.S. involvement in Afghanistan more as a threat than as a comfort.
Washingtons diplomatic efforts to broker a peace deal between the Taliban and Kabul
have added to this consternation by engendering fears that Washington will drive a
settlement that does not take into account or, worse still, bypasses Islamabads own
interests.

3.2 Pakistans Economic Interests in Afghanistan

The government of Pakistan has spent around $300 million in development assistance
to Afghanistan. Most of which has been directed toward the construction of roads and
railways that would connect Pakistan to the energy-rich CARs. Islamabad and Kabul

9
The Durand Line was drawn in 1893 and split ethnic Pashtuns between Afghanistan and British colonial India. No
Afghan regime has ever accepted the international boundary as legitimate. See Rashid, 2000, p. 187. See also Fair and
Chalk, 2006, p. 75.
10
Weinbaum and Humayoon, 2009, p. 96. See also Weinbaum and Harder, 2008, p. 26; and Tellis, 2011, p. 1.
27

signed the AfghanistanPakistan Transit Trade Agreement (APTTA), in which
Afghanistan would permit Pakistani goods to transit en route to Central Asia, and
Pakistan would allow Afghan products to transit on the way to Indian markets.

Pakistan intends Afghanistan to act as a conduit for enhancing regional commerce and
transportation links with the CARs, just as India seeks to do. A strong Pakistani grip on
northern trade routes would diminish the value of Irans Chabahar port and the Indian-
built ZaranjDelaram road (which connects to the Kushka-Herat-Kandahar highway),
thereby undermining Indias efforts to expand its own economic ties with Afghanistan
and Central Asia
11
. Furthermore, Pakistan is eager to gain access to Central Asian
natural gas. The proposed TAPI pipeline would provide as much as 15 percent of
Pakistans current energy consumption. Islamabad has emphasized common historical
and religious links to conclude energy deals with such countries as Tajikistan and
Kyrgyzstan and has also offered to build road and rail links throughout Central Asia.

Islamabad seeks to strengthen its trade links with the CARs by controlling both new
infrastructure and the Silk Routes traditional western routes that connect Karachi with
markets
in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan. Pakistan has secured extensive
Chinese assistance to build a port in Gwadar to serve as a gateway for trade with
Afghanistan and countries beyond. In addition, through its past support for the Taliban,
Pakistan has already assumed a degree of influence over the Kushka-Herat-Kandahar
highway, a critical strategic artery that provides the sole non-Iranian trading route
between Central Asia and the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf.

3.3 Indias Political Interests in Afghanistan

Countering Pakistans influence is certainly one of Indias goals, but Delhi pursues a
broader range of interests in Afghanistan than simply obstructing its principal adversary.

11
Mukhopadhaya, 2010, p. 34. See also Rashid, 2000, p. 90; Meena Singh Roy, Pakistans Strategies in Central Asia,
Strategic Analysis, Vol. 30, No. 4, OctoberDecember 2006, p. 802; and Ganguly and Howenstein, 2009, p. 136.
28

Delhis most fundamental goal for Afghanistan is to prevent Afghanistan from being
used as a base for extremists to launch terrorist attacks in India or against Indian
interests in Afghanistan. Delhi seeks a stable, democratic, multi-ethnic Afghan
government that can establish control over the whole country, maintain peace, prevent
the return of the Taliban, and mitigate anti-India extremism
12
. Achieving such an
arrangement, however, requires India to counter Pakistani political influence and
prevent Pakistan from becoming the sole arbitrator of the Afghan political and strategic
discourse.
3.4 Indias Military Interest in Afghanistan

India has no specific military objective in Afghanistan. It has not projected military power
into Afghanistan, though, some 500 personnel were deployed to protect Indian aid
workers and diplomats, but with no offensive or counterinsurgency (COIN) roles.
Furthermore, Delhi has provided limited training to the Afghan National Army, in India.
In the recent past, however, India seems to have taken a more assertive approach
regarding military cooperation with Afghanistan. As part of a strategic partnership
agreement signed by Afghan President Hamid Karzai and Indian Prime Minister
Manmohan Singh in October 2011, Delhi agreed to provide light weapons, as well as
training in COIN and high-altitude warfare, to the Afghan army, police, and air force
13
.
Perhaps, with the impending US withdrawal from Afghanistan, India may assume more
military responsibility, especially in the area of training and support for the Afghan
military.

3.5 Indias Economic Interests in Afghanistan

India provides more foreign aid to Afghanistan than to any other country
14
. It is
Afghanistans fifth-most significant source of development assistance and its largest
South Asian donor. As of early 2011, Delhi had provided $1.3 billion in aid to

12
Gautam Mukhopadhaya, India, in Ashley J. Tellis and Aroop Mukharji, eds., Is a Regional Strategy Viable in Afghanistan?
Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2010, p. 28.
13
See Shashank Joshi, Indias Strategic Calculus in Afghanistan,
Foreign Policy, October 6, 2011. See also Manu Pubby, 50 Afghan Cadets Train at IMA, Indian Express, July 22,
14
Indias Role in Afghanistan, IISS Strategic Comments, Vol. 17, June 2011.
29

Afghanistan, though subsequent pledges have raised the total amount committed since
2001 to $2 billion
15
. In 2003, Delhi and Kabul signed a preferential trade agreement
that reduced duties on Afghan exports, primarily agricultural goods
16
. This was an
extremely important accord given that fully one-quarter of Afghanistans exports are
destined for Indian markets, with bilateral trade expected to reach as much as $1 billion
by 2012. At present, Delhi must send commodities to Afghanistan via Iran because
Pakistan prevents Indian goods from crossing its territory. Should Islamabad remove
this restriction, IndianAfghan trade will expand dramatically.

The proposed 1,000-mile, $7.6 billion Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI)
pipeline would carry 33 billion cubic meters per year (bcm/y) of Turkmen gas,
generating a much-needed $1.4 billion per year in transit fees for Afghanistan. India and
Pakistan would receive 14 bcm/y each, representing 1.5 percent of Indias total annual
energy consumption and 15 percent of Pakistans.8 The transport of Central Asian
energy resources to both India and Pakistan requires stability in Afghanistan, whose
territory the TAPI pipeline must cross, giving both countries strong incentives to promote
security there.

Although Indias reconstruction strategy is designed to highlight Indian munificence,
expand trade, and gain political advantage in Afghanistan, it is also clearly intended to
undercut Pakistani influence there
17
. By constructing a 220-kilometer road between the
Afghan cities of Zaranj and Delaram in 20082009, for example, the Indian Border
Roads Organization (BRO) connected the main Herat-Kandahar highway with existing
routes leading to the Iranian port of Chabahar. (See Figure 2.1.) It is no coincidence,
however, that the road will significantly shorten overland journey times to a commercial

15
The $1.3 billion figure is taken from Robert O. Blake Jr., assistant secretary, Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs,
U.S. Department of State, The Obama Administrations Priorities in South and Central Asia, remarks, Houston, Texas,
January 19, 2011a.
16
Indo-Afghan Commercial Relations, Embassy of India in Kabul, undated
17
Geoffrey Pyatt, principal deputy assistant secretary, Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, U.S. Department of
State, Next Steps on the Silk Road, remarks to members of the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry,
Chennai, November 15, 2011.
30

ocean outlet and will be much faster than the present network that connects
Afghanistan to the Pakistani ports of Karachi and Gwadar
18
.

To facilitate Indian companies access to Afghanistans estimated $1 trillion in minerals
and raw materials, Delhi is planning to build a rail link from Hajigak, a mineral-rich area
in Bamyan province, through Zaranj, and onward to Chabahar
19
. India is working with
Iran to build a 600-km road from Chabahar to the Iranian city of Zahedan, near the
southwestern corner of Afghanistan that would follow a similar route to the rail line.
These transit routes will reduce the amount of time it takes for Afghan goods to reach a
major port.

3.6 Irans Political Interests in Afghanistan

Afghanistan has become more strategically significant to Iran since the US-led invasion,
although it is still limited compared to Iranian strategic interests in the Gulf region and
the Levant. Afghanistan is primarily important to Iran as a means of securing its eastern
flank and preventing cross-border trafficking in weapons, persons, and narcotics.
Fighting in Afghanistan poses a serious threat to Irans national security, and Iran has
an interest in seeing a stable, Tehran-friendly government emerge in Kabul.

Border security is a major concern for Iran in its relations with Afghanistan. Much of
Afghanistans opium production occurs in its rural southwest provinces of Farah and
Nimroz, both of which border Iran. The UN estimates that poppy cultivation in Farah
rose by 20% in 2011, a sign that trafficking along the border is likely to continue despite
heavy border controls enacted by Iran. At present, drug trafficking is a serious point of
friction in Iranian-Afghan relations, and the Afghan central government shows little
promise of becoming capable of reigning in opium production in the near future.

3.7 Irans Economic Interests in Afghanistan

18
Sudha Ramachandran, India Takes a Slow Road, Asia Times, January 27, 2007
19
Jayanth Jacob and Saubhadra Chatterji, Indias Track 3: AfghanIran Rail Link, Hindustan Times, November 1, 2011.
31


Bilateral trade between Iran and Afghanistan is difficult to measure, as neither the
Iranian nor the Afghan governments, can agree on a number in their public reports. A
2010 estimate from the European Commission put the figure at nearly $11 million, while
a 2010 statement from President Karzai claimed bilateral trade totaled more than $1.5
billion. Iran ranks itself as Afghanistans fifth-largest trade partner. Regardless of the
actual figure, what is certain is that bilateral Iran-Afghanistan trade flows are sharply in
Irans favor. Trade flows from Iran to Afghanistan dwarf those from Afghanistan to Iran,
giving Tehran substantial economic leverage over Kabul. Notably, Afghanistan meets
nearly half of its demand for fuel with Iranian imports.3

Iran has substantial trade and investment links in western Afghanistan, particularly in
the regions most populous city, Herat. Tehrans most notable investment in the area is
in railway construction: Iran began construction on its portion of the Herat-Khaf railroad
in July 2006. Iran has also offered financing for new road infrastructure, power grids,
schools, and mosques.5 Moreover, the Iranians have hinted that they may at some
point link the city of Herat to Iran via natural gas pipeline.

3.8 Central Asias Interests in Afghanistan
Turkmenistan has proven oil reserves of nearly two billion barrels and natural gas
reserves of approximately seventy-one trillion cubic feet (tcf); Uzbekistan has almost six
hundred million barrels of proven oil reserves and more than sixty-two tcf of natural gas;
while Kazakhstan has up to forty billion barrels of oil reserves and sixty-five to one
hundred tcf of natural gas. The Caucasus and Caspian Sea, meanwhile, are estimated
to contain more than four hundred billion barrels of oil and potential reserves, and nearly
three hundred and fifty tcf of natural gas.
Beginning in the late 1990s, India signed a number of Memoranda of Understanding
with Kazakhstan focusing on natural gas provision and delivery, pipeline and
liquefaction infrastructure development, a steel mill outside Astana, and even uranium
trade for nuclear energy. These arrangements are part of the larger New Silk Road
32

across Eurasia that includes natural gas and oil pipelines between Chinas western
Xinjiang Province and Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, respectively. China has sought to
develop highways and railways between Xinjiang, Iran, and even Eastern Europe.
Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan have inaugurated a multi-country railway that would bridge
Europe and Central Asia. At the very center of all of these activities is Afghanistan,
which has historically been a geographic hub of east, west, north, and south Asia.

3.9 Summary
Outside the US, India and Pakistan wield the greatest influence on the economic and
political dynamics in Afghanistan. The post US withdrawal Afghanistan would be partly
shaped by the balance of power between these two nations in the pursuit of their
strategic interests in the country. It is therefore necessary for the US to find greater
roles for them in the negotiations leading up to the withdrawal era and in the socio-
economic development and stability of the post war Afghanistan.


CHAPTER 4
POST US WITHDRAWAL SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN AND ITS
IMPACT ON REGIONAL SECURITY
4.1 Domestic Consequence
US President announced withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan but it
doesnt mean that the mission in Afghanistan will end by 2014, only that it will
cease to be a "combat" mission and become a "support" mission. General John
Allen, the NATO commander and top US general in Afghanistan, has
recommended keeping between 6,000 and 15,000 troops in the country after 2014.
But the final number of any US forces in Afghanistan after 2014 would depend on
33

the perceived strength of al-Qaida and its affiliates in the country, the
progression of Afghan security forces, and the legal protection granted to US
forces by the Afghan government.
20

The United States wants to keep troops at nine bases across Afghanistan.
President Hamid Karzai said that a larger number than expected is given
Washington's scaled-back ambitions for shaping the country's future. Keeping
American soldiers on the ground was in Afghans interests, he said, as long as
the soldiers came with support for the Afghan government and economy. The
places in which the U.S. wants to keep troops include the capital, Kabul, the
sprawling Bagram Airbase, which has been the heart of operations in the east,
the restive southern provinces of Kandahar and Helmand, and Shindand in the
west, where Nato is training the Afghan Airforce, Karzai said. The other bases are
in the northern hub of Mazar-i-Sharif, the western city of Herat, near the Iranian border,
and eastern Gardez and Jalalabad, which is a key gateway to Pakistan and a base for
drones.
21

The most immediate concern over the US's withdrawal from Afghanistan is
how it will affect Afghan security. The Taliban and other Afghan militants still
launch regular attacks against Western force; while the Afghan military and
police forces that NATO has been training are not yet prepared to take on the
responsibility for their own security. The Defense Department found out that,
despite years of training, only one of 23 Afghan brigades can operate
independently. So, the United States and NATO have focused on creating a large
and capable Afghan army.
22


20
Adams Richard., US Considers Complete Afghanistan Withdrawal on Eve of Karzai Visit, published by
guardian.co.uk, 9 January 2013, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jan/08/us-afghanistan-
withdrawal-military-karzai, Accessed on 14
th
June, 2013.
21
Lennard Natasha., After withdrawal US Will Keep 9 Afghan bases, available at
http://www.salon.com/2013/05/09/after_withdrawal_u_s_will_keep_9_afghan_bases/, accessed on
16
th
June, 2012.

22
Sherwell Philip., US Military Leaders Fear Afghanistan Withdrawal will Increase Soldier Deaths,
Available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/8598832/US-military-
leaders-fear-Afghanistan-withdrawal-will-increase-soldier-deaths.html, accessed on 15
th
June, 2013
34

Recent history shows that nearly two years after the withdrawal of Soviet
troops in 1989, its Marxist client government was overthrown. However, there are
two factors that may obviate an overthrow. First, the US is attempting to get the
Taliban to participate in a peace accord with the central government, encouraging
the Taliban to participate through the political process in some form of a coalition
government. Secondly, the US is busy equipping the central government's
military force to reach 350,000 soldiers and is providing substantial training.
23

Afghanistan may not face only disorder and anarchy but also some positive
possibility that indicate peaceful and stable state. Recent history demonstrates that the
population during the reign of former King Zahir Shah lived in relative peace for 40
years (1933-1973). First of all, Afghanistan's population is nearly 100 percent Muslim.
Although there is a minority of Shia, the two sects have lived in peace for centuries. The
only major difference among Afghans is language. There are two prominent languages,
Pashto and Farsi. There are some frictions on this issue, but it is not serious, and in the
city of Kabul most of the population is bilingual. Although the ethnic Pashtun population
is in the majority and have dominated the government since the 1700s, the other ethnic
major groups are gaining relative political power. There is no misdistribution of income,
wealth, or land in Afghanistan. Therefore, peace and civility amongst the diverse ethnic
groups could be a possibility as the country attempts to repair itself and prevail.
Afghanistan needs peace to exploit its rich mineral resources, develop
industries including food production, agriculture, tourism, construction, and
infrastructure, and expand its already rapid growth of transportation and
communication networks. Afghanistan's recent annual growth of gross domestic
product (GDP) is very favorable. If these trends continue in the postwar period,
Afghanistan's per capita income could converge with and even surpass that of
some its neighbors. On the other hand, the United States accepts that a
diminished but resilient Taliban is likely to remain a military threat in some parts
of Afghanistan long after U.S. troops complete their combat mission in 2014. The

23
Qudrat Haseena. & Kamrany Michelle., Securing Peace in Afghanistan after US Withdrawal, available at
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/nake-m-kamrany/afghanistan-us-withdrawal_b_3316935.html, accessed on 16
th

June, 2013.
35

US expects that the Afghans Government must reach some sort of political
accommodation with the insurgents, and that a reconciliation process needs to
be led by Afghans, not Americans. Thus the No. 1 priority for the U.S. military in
its final months of combat in Afghanistan is to do all that is possible to boost the
strength and confidence of the Afghan forces.
24

The results of a full US withdrawal could certainly be worse. After last
election of Pakistan, New Prime Minister Newaz Sharif and one of the leading
opponents Party Chief, Imran khan have taken direct stand against drone
attacks. So, it will be difficult to continue drone strike by the US in long time
against Al-Qaeda targets in Pakistans tribal territories or Afghanistan itself and
there would be no U.S. bases within the drones range. Mr. Karzais bravado
aside, the withdrawal of all American forces would embolden the Taliban and
likely lead to the crumbling of the Afghan army and a new civil war. As it has been
in Syria, that would create new room for al-Qaeda.
25

A bleaker prognosis was offered by Dexter Filkins in a widely discussed New
Yorker article last month titled After America: Will civil war hit Afghanistan when the
U.S. leaves? While respectful of what the U.S. military has accomplished, Filkins was
skeptical that it can endure. In his words, Afghans and Americans are under the stress
of battle and without a substantial presence of American combat troops after 2014
the Afghan army could once again fracture along ethnic lines. However, two factors
would reduce the likelihood of civil war. One is a commitment for a stay-behind
force of, say, 15,000 to 30,000 U.S. troops to prevent a return by al-Qaeda and
continue training the Afghan army and police. Second is a political strategy that
moves toward national reconciliation and supports elections in 2014 for a new
political leadership to replace the corrupt President Hamid Karzai. Unfortunately,

24
Taliban Threat will Remain for Years after US Withdrawal from Afghanistan, available at
http://talkingpointsmemo.com/news/taliban-threat-will-remain-for-years-after-us-withdrawal-from-
afghanistan.php, accessed on 16
th
June, 2013.
25
A US Future in Afghanistan?, The Washington Post, 2
nd
December 2012, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/a-us-future-in-afghanistan/2012/12/01/54015ad4-3af3-11e2-8a97-
363b0f9a0ab3_story.html, accessed on 16
th
June, 2013.
36

this needed political transition is getting much less attention from Washington
than the military pullout
26
. If US want to replace a new leader for Afghanistan, who
will be in place of Karzai when his term ends in 2014? The United States must do
everything possible to ensure a reformer wins that election. The stakes are huge. If
a warlord or corrupt politician wins the presidency, aid will be wasted. Insurgents
will have a rallying cry likely to resonate with millions of disaffected Afghans.
Civil war could resume and, with it, control over large parts of the country could
be lost to the Taliban and al-Qaeda. Consequently it might cost more American
blood and treasure, inviting jihadis in the Middle East and Asia to shoot at
Americans and continuous plundering the military bases and adding to the
burden of the US budget deficit.
Afghanistan supplies more than 90 percent of the world's opium, and
draws roughly a third of its GDP from the drug trade. Some worry that the
withdrawal of Western troops will lead to a boom in the heroin market, from
where, the Taliban finds much of its funding. Writing for George Mason University's
Terrorism, Transnational Crime and Corruption Center, Nazia Hussain warns that in the
wake of US troop withdrawal, "illicit trafficking... will skyrocket." And Gen. Khodaidad,
Afghanistan's former anti-narcotics chief, told the Daily Telegraph that "with the
coming exit strategy for 2014, the whole drug trade will be completely out of
control. All the provinces will go more and more back to poppy."

Recent public opinion shows Afghans in and around Kabul reveal anxieties about
the US and NATO drawdown, and many say they have daydreams of leaving before
chaos sets in. A recent Asia Society survey found that one-third of Afghans would
leave the country if they could. Many express fear of the Talibans return to power even
though many Afghan experts assert that the country has evolved and modernized too
much for that to happen. A US withdrawal from Afghanistan also raises concerns

26
Ignatious David., In Afghanistan, Soccer or Civil War?, The Washington Post, 4
th
August, 2012, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/david-ignatius-in-afghanistan-soccer-or-civil-
war/2012/08/03/21ac9dba-dcec-11e1-af1d-753c613ff6d8_story.html, accessed on 16
th
June, 2013.


37

about what will happen to the fragile social reforms that have been made since
the Taliban fell, particularly those that have improved the lives of women. The
Monitor reported that some 2.4 million girls are now enrolled in school, compared
to a mere 5,000 during the Taliban's reign, and that women are now able to enter
politics and get jobs outside home. But many worry that there has been a creeping
return to old biases, the Monitor notes. Karzai recently backed a government-
backed religious council's statement that women are not equal to men and should
not mix with them in public.

A full American withdrawal, or a cutback to a small presence, will
invigorate the main groups battling the United States and the Karzai government.
The Talibans aim is not defeat the American army; with only about 20,000
fighters, it cannot hope to do so. Its aim is to deplete the will of the US and its
allies eroding support for the war by demonstrating and the continuing violence.
Once foreign forces leave, the insurgents expect to face a weak Afghan
government whose legitimacy has already been badly compromised by
incompetence and corruption.
27

Dialogue with Talibans: Realizing the fact that the Taliban and other insurgents
cannot be defeated or forced into a negotiated settlement by 2014, Obama started
dialogue with Taliban and even opened their first political office in Doha, Qatar in
June 2013. Though, Karzai was not pleased and termed it as challenge to Kabuls
legitimacy, US claimed that it would accelerate peace process that might bring
stability. This strategic move indicates that there can be no decisive military
solution, and the Taliban wants to return to government which may force the
stakeholders to compromise in power sharing.
28


27
Kerpon Michael., Haggling over Afghanistan, The Washington Post, 15
th
June, 2012, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/haggling-over-afghanistan/2012/06/14/gJQAU4cUdV_story.html,
accessed on 16
th
June, 2013.
28
Tharor Ishaan., The Talibans Qatar Office: Are Prospects for Peace already Doomed?, the
Times, 19
th
June, 2013, available at http://world.time.com/2013/06/19/the-talibans-qatar-office-
are-prospects-for-peace-already-doomed/, accessed on 19
th
June, 2013
38


4.2 Regional Consequence
" Harsh V Pant of the Defense Studies Department, King's College London,
said: "New Delhi has been contemplating the impact of a US withdrawal from
Afghanistan for a while. If the US left lock, stock and barrel, India would be left to pick
up the pieces."
iv
India is one of the biggest regional aid donor in Afghanistan and its
$1.3 billion (Dh4.77bn) of projects, shows what Indian officials like to call their "soft
power" to win hearts and minds in Afghanistan. India wanted to remove security
threat not only from Afghanistan but also from Pakistan because India had to face
similar or more security threats from Pakistan that may increase or create new
threat after withdrawal of US troops. So, India has little to gain in using bin Laden's
death to press Pakistan harder. India has achieved little with hawkish stances and there
is recognition that it only risks strengthening Pakistan's hardliners.

On the other side, since Sept. 11, 2001, the United States and Pakistan have
maintained a strained, transactional partnership. Gen. Pervez Musharraf, then
Pakistans chief executive, agreed to a limited U.S. presence at air bases,
restricted use of Pakistani airspace and a logistical supply corridor for U.S.
troops. Pakistani agents were instrumental in capturing al-Qaeda leaders,
including Sept. 11 mastermind Khalid Sheik Mohammed in March 2003. Pakistan
was allocated U.S. military and economic assistance, although far less than its
bill for services rendered. But tensions were inflamed by the May 2011 raid that
killed Osama bin Laden and the NATO attack on a Pakistani border post that
killed 24 Pakistani troops in November 2011. However, Pakistans leaders will
continue to seek U.S. assistance even as they tirelessly pursue a government in
Kabul that, after most U.S. troops withdraw in 2014, will be friendlier to them than
to India. If the Pakistanis fail to ensure this negotiated outcome, they will employ
allies to upend an Afghan government that they deem unfriendly.

39

Indian and Pakistan will not be the lone contenders in post-American
Afghanistan. Neighboring Uzbekistan and Tajikistan may also be pulled in if rump
armies based on Afghanistans Tajiks and Uzveks emerge (as happened between
1992 and 2001). If Taliban success deteriorates the security situation, such
armies will likely form to secure their homelands. Uzbekistan and Tajikistan
emerged from sedentary communities with larger urban populations where Islam
therefore has a stronger social foundation. The post-Soviet history of Tajikistan and
Uzbekistan shows that they cant escape the reverberations of Afghanistans religious
extremism and violence.
Russia is determined to keep militant Islamic movements out of Central
Asia. Moscow still has substantial economic and strategic interests that will be
jeopardized if violence exists in Afghanistan. This makes Afghanistans future
more important for Russia than ever.
29

In present time, China is the most important key partner in the region.
China has been able to expand its economic presence in Central Asia and
Afghanistan without having to protect it. Between 1992 and 2009 alone, its trade
with the five Central Asia states increased from $527 million to $25.9 billion. On the
other side, China suffers Uighur problem, in recent time clashes between Uighur
protesters and police has increased. If Taliban succeeds in Afghanistan, Uighur
protesters may be engaged with Al-Quaeda insurgents and may harm Chinese
security. For China, the stability of Afghanistan, the Stans and Xinjiang are
intertwined, the more so because the Wakhan corridor, a 400 kilometer salient within
Afghanistans northeastern province of Badakshan, sandwiched between Tajikistan and
Pakistan, offers access to Xinjiang. Hence its not just defending the sunken costs
of trade and investment that may draw China into Afghanistan, but also
apprehensions about its own internal stability.
30

Iran shares boarders with Afghanistan. In the present world, US are enemy
of Iran but Iran favors US intervention in Afghanistan because there has long

29
Ibid.
30
Ibid.
40

been blood between Tehran and Taliban. Iran supported the Heart-based anti-
Taliban Tajik warlord Ismail khan. Iran also has interests South of Heart because of the
insurgency rooted in the non-Persian province Sistan-Balochistan. That province
contains Chahbahar and shares a 700 mile border with Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Tehran fears that the insurgency offers its adversaries opportunities for
subversion and has claimed that suicide bombings by the Baloch insurgent that
has strong tie with Taliban and Al-Queada. So, withdrawal of US troops also is a
source of security tension for Tehran.
India, Pakistan, China and Iran will be the most deeply engaged while
Uzbekistan and Tajikistan will not be able to compete with them on equal footing, but
they will be disproportionately affected by the consequence of Afghanistans instability
and the struggle over its future- an unenviable position.
31


4.3 Summary
The withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan would definitely pose security
concerns for both Afghanistan and the South Asia region. The major fear is that
of Afghanistan slipping into civil war due to resurgence of violence. There are
fears whether the hurriedly trained Afghans security forces would be able to
contain such tested forces as the Taliban and other militant groups. The other
neighbouring countries are also concerned that in the event of insecurity in
Afghanistan, the country could be used by terrorists to lunch attacks against
them. There is also a concern to have a friendly regime in power to protect their
strategic interests. Hence, the post withdrawal Afghanistan would be
determined by the nature of the regime in power and the level of political stability
established.





31
Ibid.
41


















CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

Afghanistan is a land-locked country with great geo-strategic and political
significance in both Central and South Asia. It significance has made it an object
of foreign invasions in history. Several powers in history have attempted to conquer
Afghanistan but have found it difficult to dominate and rule. The resilience of the people
to stand up to foreign occupation has made the country to be termed a nightmare for
foreign invaders. Its geo-strategic significance has also made it to be a theatre for
various foreign interests and interferences.
The September 11 attack on the US by the Al-Qaeda resulted in the
subsequent invasion of Afghanistan by the US and its allies. The objectives of the
invasion according to US sources were to topple the ruling Taliban Government
42

in Afghanistan, degrade Al-Qaedas infrastructure in Afghanistan and prevent
Afghanistan from being used as a safe haven by terrorists groups to attack
American interests. The invasion of Afghanistan by the US forces did not only
impact the social, political and economic dynamics of the country, but also the
entire South and Central Asia.
After about 12 years in Afghanistan, the US has decided that the strategic
objectives of going to Afghanistan have been achieved and it is time to withdraw. This
has also thrown up new issues and concerns within Afghanistan and the various
countries with strategic interests in Afghanistan. There are anxieties as to the future
of the country, the security, economic and political stability; and the nature of the
government that would emerge after the withdrawal of the US forces. The regional
powers India and Pakistan are jostling to ensure the emerging regime in post-
US withdrawal Afghanistan is in their best interest. Russia, China and Iran are
watching keenly the unfolding scenario and how it will impact on their strategic
interests.
So far, the Talibans are the most dominant militant group that have the
capacity to topple the post- withdrawal Afghan government or engage them in a
protracted civil war which will not be in the interest of anyone. Hence, efforts are
on by the US to negotiate peace with the Talibans and work out a political
arrangement that will guarantee peace and stability in post withdrawal
Afghanistan. There is also no guarantee that other militant groups would not create
trouble in order to seek attention. Therefore the stability of Afghanistan after the US
withdrawal would depend largely on the dynamics of foreign interferences by nations
like India, Pakistan, Russia and Iran; and the capability of the newly trained Afghan
forces to hold their own in the face of the several multi-dimensional threats they would
encounter.

RECOMMENDATIONS

43

In view of the above observations, it is recommended that:

a. The US should involve various interests groups and
stakeholders in Afghanistan and the South Asia region in the search
for permanent solution for post-withdrawal Afghanistan.

b. The US should ensure that India and Pakistan undertake not to
interfere with the internal affairs of Afghanistan.

c. The US should ensure that a sizeable force of between 30,000
and 50,000 is retained in Afghanistan to help the local forces
stabilize the country.

d. The US should galvanize international collaborative effort to
muster aid for socio-economic development of Afghanistan.


GROUP MEMBERS
Brig Gen Ataul Hakim Sarwar Hasan, afwc, psc - Chairman
Jt Secy Md Mahbub-Ul-Alam - Member
Brig Gen Mohd Nasser bin Murad - Member
Capt (NN) Promise Zebulon Dappa - Secretary

Bangladesh Army, NDC 2013
22 May 2013
44


45


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47





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