Introduction

The autopilot had its humble beginnings as a trimmer. The first known autopilot came
before the advent of integrated electronic circuits. It was invented by the Sperry Corporation
and it connected a gyroscopic heading indicator and an attitude indicator to hydraulically
operated elevators and rudders. The main reason for the introduction of autopilots thereafter
was to reduce the workload of the pilots. The pilot, theoretically, could focus more on the
surroundings and manage the crew efficiently, while the autopilot flew the aircraft.
As technology advanced, the size of computers shrank, and when semiconductor based
microchips came in vogue, autopilots became more and more sophisticated to the point that
they are now capable of flying an aircraft without the pilots intervention. The pilots role
changed from someone who effectively controls an aircraft, to a cockpit manager, under
normal flight circumstances. In fact, Airbus Industrie officially refers to pilots as cockpit
manages, since they are so confident on the capability of Airbus aircrafts to fly themselves.
So why pilots are hired by airline companies and paid a hefty sum as their salary? It is
simply because no amount of simulation or testing can take into account all the variables that
affect the flight of an aircraft in an event of failure of any component of the aircraft. Flying a
damaged aircraft is something which only humans can do, at the moment. To this end, it is of
utmost importance that a pilots flying skills are in pristine condition. In the aviation industry,
one must plan for all known contingencies, and make sure that safeguards are in place in an
unlikely event of failure. And with regard to piloting skills, the autopilot is a liability and there is
no doubt regarding this statement.
It is human nature to become complacent. Take, for instance, a person who travels from
home to the office by driving, every morning and evening. In the beginning, that person will
concentrate on the road, and even small details will be stored and kept in the memory. As the
days go by, the person knows where each turn is, by recollecting only the bare minimum
amount of details, which is only used to cross reference with his/ her senses to check if the turn
is the right one or not. As it can be seen, the person changed from being a concentrated driver,
to someone who just mindlessly drives.
This example can be extended to include pilots too. But, the driver was always in
complete control of the vehicle. On the other hand, the pilot is not in direct control of the
aircraft. In the pilots mind, the aircraft is being flown by someone else. He just has to supervise
everything to make sure that everything goes right. The days go by, and the pilot logs hours in
the logbook. Even after thousands of hours, the autopilot does not fail. The pilot is then lulled
into a false sense of security. He/ she will expect the autopilot to function without failing till the
end of the pilots career. Naturally, the pilot becomes lazy and does not bother with flying the
aircraft much. Why should they fly the aircraft, when it can fly itself without any problems,
right? The truth cannot be farther than this.
Another major problem is the loss of situational awareness. When a complacent
pilot gets into a situation where the autopilot suddenly disconnects, the pilot, who was not
monitoring the situation, will be thrust into a role which he has no idea about. The loss of
situational awareness is in fact, one of the most important problems which is caused due to the
over reliance on the autopilot. This stems from complacency. And yes, the final problem, but
not one o be ignored is the tendency for pilots to forget what they learned. The root cause of
this, too, is complacency.
Over the course of the debate, we will be focusing on the numerous kinds of problems
the excessive usage of the autopilot has brought to the aviation industry, and we will try to
drive home the point that autopilots, are in fact, a liability to the sustenance of piloting skills.
We believe we have identified the key problems that stem from the overuse of the autopilots
and we also have numerous accidents and an industry wide study, which was conducted by the
FAA to back up our claims.












Forgetting how to fly
What is the job of a pilot? It is to fly an aircraft in such way that it involves high level of multi-
tasking skills. Monitoring instruments, handling, keeping a visual watch, etc. which increases
the work-load of a pilot which is very exhausting. Hence the autopilot came into existence. To
reduce the work-load of the pilot and not to take over his job completely. The autopilot is
simply supposed to assist a pilot. But human nature is such that we tend to default to being
lazy. And the autopilot assists a pilot in this too, to such an extent that the piloting skill of a pilot
becomes rusty. This is a multi faceted problem. On one hand, we have pilots who become
complacent and forget how to fly. On the other hand you have terrible pilots who mask their
bad piloting skills using the autopilot. The good pilots who became lazy may then do what the
bad pilots always did, and they will rely more on the autopilot. This cycle then keeps going till
the pilot retires, or, unfortunately, he/ she causes a crash.
Manual handling skills, stick and rudder skill, basic airmanship, basic piloting skills all of these
are phrases used to describe pilot knowledge and skill sets that are a basic foundation of safe
and successful flight. Manual flying skills are typically pure core flying skills, where maneuvers
are flown solely by reference to raw data obtained from the
heading, airspeed, attitude, altitude and vertical speed instruments, and without the use of
technology such as auto-throttles, auto-pilot, flight director or any other flight management
system. This might extend as far as requiring manual trim inputs and navigation using basic
systems. Therefore, pilots developing and maintaining the knowledge and skills for excellent
manual flight operations is very important to the safety and effectiveness of aviation operations
but unfortunately today pilots are just forgetting how to fly.

This is reinforced by a study conducted by the FAA that is Federal Aviation Administration, on
the wake of the Air Asiana accident. They asserted that pilots simply forgot how to fly. In fact, a
study conducted in 1995, Villiette et al, found significant differences in the manual flying
abilities of a pilot who was accustomed to hand flying an aircraft to a pilot who was
accustomed to using automation to fly.

The study found that some pilots "lack sufficient or in-depth knowledge and skills" to properly
control their plane's trajectory, partly because "current training methods, training devices and
the time allotted for training" may be inadequate to fully master advanced automated systems.
The excessive use of autopilots in commercial airlines has lead to degrading manual-flying skills
to poor decision-making among some aviators when automation abruptly malfunctions or
disconnects during an emergency. Pilots losing control of aircraft, because of poor situational
awareness or inability to grasp what their instruments and automated systems are telling them,
has been identified as the primary cause in two thirds of the crashes globally in recent years.
Pilot lapses and automation were implicated in the high-profile 2009 crash of an Air France
Airbus A330 that stalled and went down in the Atlantic Ocean, killing all 228 aboard, just as
they are suspected of causing last July's crash of an Asiana Airlines Inc. Boeing BA 777 during a
botched landing in San Francisco.

One of the great myths associated with increased automation is that automation will reduce
training requirements, this is not true. Learning manual flying is primary for a pilot and
automation is secondary, infact extra skills are required to oversee and comprehend the
autopilot. The reason for deterioration of piloting skills is simply lack of practice. Today pilots
are getting far less hands on experience of flying the aircraft compared to earlier times. With
the engines and flight controls continuing to improve, airline pilots spend vast majority of their
time programming and monitoring automated system and basically neglecting manual flying to
barely a few minutes during takeoffs and right before touchdowns. For instance, a major
international airline has reported that its long range fleet schedules permit only one and a half
takeoffs and landings per month per pilot. And sometimes they just let the automatics make
the approach and landing simply because it is easier than doing it manually. This shows now
days pilots are more accustomed to watching things happeninstead of being proactive. Pilots
tend to rely too heavily on autopilot and are reluctant to intervene which shows their lack of
self confidence.

Therefore pilots must be provided with opportunities to refine manual flying skills, while
receiving enhanced training in computer complexities and automation modes. Pilots should be
taught about prevention, recognition and recovery from upset conditions, stalls or unusual
attitudes and appropriate manual handling after transition from automated control. In addition
they must be provided with training for rare but potentially catastrophic malfunctions.

In the end I would like to conclude by saying that though autopilot has decreased the workload
of a pilot but when it becomes to developing piloting skill it has caused nothing but hindrance.
Thus autopilot is a liability.








Complacency
The word complacency means contented, smug, self-satisfied. With regard to the
aviation industry, and the topic at hand, it means that the pilot is so satisfied with the present
automated system that they hardly wish to monitor this system. Hence, they tend to rely too
much on its accuracy and that too without the complete knowledge of its functioning. This
attitude has been one of the major reasons which lead to serious cases of incidents and
accidents.
It is rightly said that complacency is the biggest threat to safety. Be it a robbery or the
plight of a hundred passengers, an alert mind can prevent tragedies. If I had been watching
the instruments I could have prevented the accident. a pilot said, after a corporate turboprop
crashed into terrain. Complacency is also one of the biggest threats to piloting skills. Flight
crews tend to rely on automation so much that normal checks that were to be carried out, or
the things that were to be monitored are not monitored. Another example of over reliance on
automation that posed a threat to passenger safety was when a Northwest Airlines flight flew
on for 150 miles past the destination which they were to go to while the pilots were distracted
with their laptop. Hence there have been many such cases in the past that has over and over
again raised the debate whether the automation is an advantage or a disadvantage.
There is an ethical dimension to this problem, which also involves a few human
characteristics of carelessness, over-reliance and a usual tendency to take advantage of things.
Human factor experts have known for years that very highly skilled personnel do not do a good
job of monitoring for events that have a very low probability of occurrence; those who
maximize the use of technologically possible automation often miss this very critical point.
Hence, forget to monitor during crucial manoeuvres.This happens due to the habituated use of
the system and coming across minor or no errors in the automated system. This causes the
pilot to believe that nothing can go wrong and every situation can be handled by the system.
When one tends to over rely on automation, they tend to take the efficiency, speed and
convenience for granted and tend to off load work on computers.
Automated systems are fallible, and pilots are the last line of defense capable of
controlling, or in some cases preventing, a system failure. Pilots, however, tend to overlook the
faults of the system and forget that no machine is completely self-sufficient and that it requires
timely monitoring and checks.In doing so, they neglect to see what they are sacrificing as a
result. This can be reduced if the automated systems are made predictable. An automated
system can only be monitored effectively if it is predictable. Pilots must be trained for normal
operation of each automated units well as its behavior during any failure modes, so they can
make manual corrections or stop the automation failure going further.

Another major reason of complacency in pilots is due to the lack of communication
between the flying pilot and the not-flying pilot. In order to be involved, the human operator
must be informed. The information available has to include all of the data that is necessary to
keep the pilot actively involved in the operation. This must include the information required to
keep the pilot fully informed regarding the state, progress, and intention of the system.
Otherwise the human operator cannot hope to be meaningfully involved. Once the system is
fed with the information regarding the flight and the moment it is activated, it completely takes
over the duty of flying the aircraft to its destination. It gives no knowledge of what it is doing
and most importantly how it is doing it, thus giving no signals to the pilot, about the changing
tracks, altitudes, etc.
For example, the sequence of actions in using the autopilot to climb to a higher altitude
goes like this: The aircraft is at some initial altitude say 23,000 ft. The pilot selects an altitude to
which the autopilot should climb and level-off at 27,000 ft. the pilot then engages a climb mode
such as vertical speed andthe aircraft starts to climb. The current altitude of the aircraft is
depicted in the pointed box in the lower left corner and the selected altitude is depicted in the
upper right box. Somewhere prior to reaching 27,000 ft, the autopilot automatically transitions
to the CAPTURE mode and the starts the capture maneuver. The capture-start altitude is 25,000
ft. above 25,000 ft. the autopilot commands a parabolic trajectory in which the climb rate
varies as the aircraft gradually transitions to level flight. This trajectory depends on the
aircrafts climb rate, altitude and acceleration. The main point is that the altitude at which the
transition to the CAPTURE mode takes place varies. The pilot has no pre-knowledge of this
altitude. This also gives the pilot complete independence of the carrying on with his other
secondary tasks.
There is always a human tendency to take advantages of the facilities that were
provided to us to enhance the safety of the passengers and aircraft. And the safe completion of
the flight, without any error or mishaps lulls a human into a false sense of security. When you
are in the cockpit and you think that everything will be handled by the co pilot, you tend to
detach yourself from your present environment. A very important human factors issue is
determining the form, time, and manner in which information is presented. This will ultimately
lead to a lack of situational awareness, which will be dealt with, as a separate topic, later.
Some researchers believe that further automation would have an adverse effect on the
effectiveness of pilot monitoring, some of this because humans aren't good monitors of rare
events, and monitoring can be a boring job especially for a long haul flight. In some cases pilots
have wanted to remove just part of the automation and utilize the remaining features but are
unable to do so because 'all or nothing is the only options. This is probably a computer
programming problem because computer programmers didn't know all of the intricacies of
aircraft operation in real world, and there are numerous vertical modes, it is difficult at times
for pilots to understand how the modes are functioning.

There are few ways to resolve these issues:
The automated systems must also be able to monitor the human operator and the human
must be able to monitor the automatics. This emphasizes two real problems; first, humans are
fallible and are not the perfect monitors because of human limitations. Secondly, even highly
capable computers available today can fail partially or completely and cannot anticipate all of
the circumstances that might be encountered in a line operation. Therefore, the performance
of the computers and the human operators must be monitored by each other. For example, the
computers should be able to send warning signals when human operator has made an error,
and at the same time, when the automation is making incorrect decisions, humans need to
understand and be aw are of it.
Each element of the system must have knowledge of the others intent. A very basic principle
in cross-monitoring, which must be effective in achieving maximum safety, is that it can only be
effective if the monitor knows what the system is trying to accomplish. This principle requires
good communication between the pilot flying and pilot-not flying for it is virtually impossible to
be sure of intent without effective communication.




















Lack of Situational Awareness
What is situational awareness? Simply put its the knowledge of whats going on around
you. Perception of elements around you within that time and space, comprehension of their
meaning and their status in near future. Accurate perception of factors and conditions that
affect the aircraft and flight crew.
Autopilot is there to relieve you of your responsibilities. It is there to help you perform
them. It can reduce the workload as the pilot can concentrate on the communication, plane
systems and the surrounding environment. It does not give one an excuse to take a nap or turn
around and chat with the flight attendant. Having the autopilot on the pilot still needs to keep a
check if the aircraft is still on its intended course.
Complacency and situational awareness go hand in hand. A pilot tends to relax and lose
focus or gets distracted with what is not important during the flight. As pilots become more and
more complacent with automation they will start blindly trusting their instruments and fail to
perform basic checks and will tend to have less understanding of whats actually going on since
they have no opportunity to exercise their knowledge. So when automation does fail they will
lack the situational awareness of whats going on and incase if they come to know that
something have happened they may have possibly flawed readings of various instruments
and/or wont have a good handle on what happened to put them in that situation .Hugh
Schoelzel, the vice president of safety at Trans World Airlines, a carrier acquired by American
Airlines said,most pilots had at one time or another lost track of where they were in flight.
Anyone who says they havent is either being disingenuous, or hasnt been paying attention.
The computer weakens our awareness and attentiveness points. Automation turns us
from actors into observers, in our case pilots into managers. Instead of manipulating the yolk,
we watch the screen. The shift may make our lives easier, but it can also inhibit the
development of expertise. According to Key Dismukes, chief scientist for aerospace human
factors at NASA, The introduction of automation did good things. But it changed the essential
nature of the pilots role in the cockpit. Now the pilot is a manager, which is good, and a
monitor, which is not so good. Computers make great monitors for people, but people make
poor monitors for computers. Mainly because monitoring is a boing job especially for a long
haul flight. And so pilots tend to get distracted and lose situational awareness. In some cases
pilots wanted to remove just the part of automation and utilize the remaining features but are
unable to because of all or nothing are the only options.
According to Kevin Hiatt, a former airline pilot, theyre (pilots) are becoming very
dependent upon using the autopilot, the auto-throttles, the auto flight system, the computers,
to actually operate the entire flight. What happens is, you dont actually hand-fly or manipulate
the controls, whether its a control yoke or a side stick controller, therefore, your computer
skills get enhanced, but your skills start to get rusty. The best developed and trained skills do
no good unless pilots actually use or practice these skills.
Pilots have been told to actively monitor the aircraft, meaning that they must mentally
fly the aircraft even when the autopilot or other pilot is flying. Monitor the flight instruments
just as you would when hand flying. Autopilot is a brilliant system; it will do what the pilot
inputs it to do and performs it better and more efficiently than the best pilot. But then it does
not have a brain of its own. It will perform exactly as it have been programmed to, if any
variations or a situation arises it does not know what to do but continues as it was till it
disengages putting the pilot, if he/she was actually monitoring the instruments, into a very
awkward and dangerous situation.
An example incident due to lack of situational awareness:
Colgan Air Flight 3407
Feb 12,2009
Fatalities 50 (1 on ground).Injuries 4 (all on ground).
According to information released by NTSB (National Transportation Safety Board) it appeared
that the plane had been on autopilot when it went down. Although its recommended that
pilots fly manually during icing or severe icing conditions still it was on auto pilot. Without flying
manually pilots may be unable to feel changes in the handling characteristics of the airplane,
which is a warning sign of ice buildup. Although the anti-icing was on still some icing formed on
the airframe. The aircraft came close to its stalling speed and the stick pusher was activated.
The crew concerned with the nose down attitude responded by pulling the nose up and
increasing power, but over corrected and causing a stall or even a spin.
Later NTSB reported that icing had not only been the reason for the incident. The Captain had
failed three check rides and also according to the Colgan Air officials the pilots apparently were
not paying close attention to aircrafts instruments.
In 1997, researchers Jentsch, Martin and Bowers completed a study of training needs. They
found that in approximately one-third of the ASRS (Aviation Safety Reporting System) reports
they reviewed, pilots failed to monitor errors, often because they had planned their own
workload poorly and were doing something else at a critical time.Further, a 1998 NASA
research project of cockpit interruptions and distractions reviewed 107 ASRS reports to
determine types of tasks that crews typically neglected at critical moments while attending to
other tasks.Sixty-nine percent of the neglected tasks involved either failure to monitor the
current status or position of the aircraft, or failure to monitor the actions of the pilot flying or
taxiing said the NASA report.
Thus proving the fact that the need for situational awareness, with autopilot engaged or not, is
crucial for safety of a flight. And with advancement and dependence of automation in flight
pilots tend to become more complacent and start to become situationally unaware during
flight.



















The FAA Study

When entering their aviation career, the new generation of personnel is expected to
bring high levels of computer skills but some may not have the robust aviation background and
aeronautical experience that current pilots have from actual flight experience. Future pilots will
require improved computer aptitude suited for many advanced operations and automation
tools, as well as a broad aviation experience and fundamental knowledge and skills, including
manual flying, situation awareness, decision making, and understanding of aircraft
performance.
It was concluded that the role and requirements for pilot knowledge and skills has not
diminished as a result of automated systems or modern flight deck design, but has actually
increased to include being a manager of systems as well as maintaining all their basic
knowledge and skills. Furthermore, pilots will need to continue to perform as a system of-
systems manager, with additional roles and responsibilities, while retaining basic cognitive and
manual handling skills necessary for evolving and reversionary operations.
An additional concern was the level of basic knowledge and skills necessary for
identifying and handling different situations; that is, knowing what to do, especially those
situations that occur very infrequently. One example is the ability to reconfigure knowing
how to get back to normal operations after a change (such as, pilots knowing how to respond to
wind shear alerts but not how to recover to nominal flight path following the wind shear
encounter, which may be the more demanding manoeuvre).
Pilots successfully manage equipment malfunctions as threats that occur in normal
operations. However, insufficient system knowledge, flight crew procedure, or understanding
of aircraft state may decrease pilots ability to respond to failure situations. This is a particular
concern for failure situations which do not have procedures or checklists, or where the
procedures or checklists do not completely apply.
The following aspects of pilot use of, and interaction with, automated systems were
found to have some vulnerability areas:
Pilots sometimes rely too much on automated systems and may be reluctant to
intervene;
Auto flight mode confusion errors continue to occur;
The use of information automation is increasing, including implementations that may
result in errors and confusion; and
FMS programming and usage errors continue to occur.

Case Studies

CASE 1:
Turkish Airlines Accident
INCIDENT
Turkish Airlines Flight TK1951, a Boeing 737-800, departed Istanbul-Atatrk International
Airport (IST) for a flight to Amsterdam-Schiphol International Airport (AMS), The Netherlands.
The flight crew consisted of three pilots: a line training captain who occupied the left seat, a
first officer under line training in the right seat and an additional first officer who occupied the
flight deck jump seat. The first officer under line training was the pilot flying. The en route part
of the flight was uneventful. The flight was descending for Schiphol and passed overhead
Flevoland at about 8500 ft.
At that time the aural landing gear warning sounded. The aircraft continued and was then
directed by Air Traffic Control towards runway 18R for an ILS approach and landing. The
standard procedure for runway 18R prescribes that the aircraft is lined up at least 8 NM from
the runway threshold at an altitude of 2000 feet. The glidepath is then approached and
intercepted from below. Lining up at a distance between 5 and 8 NM is allowed when
permitted by ATC. Flight 1951 was vectored for a line up at approximately 6 NM at an altitude
of 2000 feet. The glide slope was now approached from above.
The crew performed the approach with one of the two autopilot and auto throttle
engaged. The landing gear was selected down and flaps 15 were set. While descending through
1950 feet, the radio altimeter value suddenly changed to -8 feet. And again the aural landing
gear warning sounded. This could be seen on the captains (left-hand) primary flight display.
The first officers (right-hand) primary flight display, by contrast, indicated the correct height, as
provided by the right-hand system. The left hand radio altimeter system, however, categorized
the erroneous altitude reading as a correct one, and did not record any error. In turn, this
meant that it was the erroneous altitude reading that was used by various aircraft systems,
including the autothrottle.
The crew was unaware of this, and could not have known about it. The manuals for use
during the flight did not contain any procedures for errors in the radio altimeter system. In
addition, the training that the pilots had undergone did not include any detailed system
information that would have allowed them to understand the significance of the problem.
When the aircraft started to follow the glidepath because of the incorrect altitude reading, the
autothrottle moved into the retard flare mode. This mode is normally only activated in the
final phase of the landing, below 27 feet.
This was possible because the other preconditions had also been met, including flaps at
(minimum) position 15. The thrust from both engines was accordingly reduced to a minimum
value (approach idle). This mode was shown on the primary flight displays as RETARD.
However, the right-hand autopilot, which was activated, was receiving the correct altitude from
the right-hand radio altimeter system. Thus the autopilot attempted to keep the aircraft flying
on the glide path for as long as possible. This meant that the aircrafts nose continued to rise,
creating an increasing angle of attack of the wings. This was necessary in order to maintain the
same lift as the airspeed reduced.




















CASE 2:
China Airlines Accident
INCIDENT
A China Airlines Flight 140, Airbus A300-600R, en route from Taipei to Nagoya had 256
passengers and 15 crews on board. It passed the outer marker at 20:12 and started landing. The
pilot was performing a normal ILS approach to the runway. The copilot mistakenly triggered the
GO lever 5.5km before the runway and the plane entered the GO-AROUND mode and increased
its thrust.
The captain cautioned the copilot that he had triggered the GO lever, and instructed him
to disengage the GO-AROUND mode. This thrust increase lifted the aircraft off the regular path.
The captain instructed the copilot to lower the course, and the copilot operated the control
lever in the direction to lower the nose. He also activated the auto-pilot in an attempt to
engage the auto-landing mode. He then put the plane in autopilot thinking that the computer
would adjust the descent path while still in GO-AROUND mode. The GO lever, however, kept
the plane in GO-AROUND mode and the tail wing elevator moved against the copilot's
operation to lower the nose and suddenly move in the other direction to lift the nose. The
autopilot computer was simply trying to execute GO-AROUND.
The captain repeatedly instructed the copilot to descend, and the copilot acknowledged
it, however, the horizontal stabilizers were at their other limits to lift the nose. The autopilots
were disengaged 2 minutes after the activation of GO AROUND mode. The aircraft kept
climbing with its pitch angle in the nose-up direction.
After 3 minutes, the stall prevention system, Alpha Floor function activated to prevent a stall.
The function maximized the thrust and the plane further pitched upwards.
The captain took over controls, but the aircraft's pitch angle continued to increase to above 10
degrees.
The captain then found that he could not drop the plane to the landing altitude so he
gave up the landing plan and notified Nagoya tower that he will initiate a go around.
The increase in the thrust, however, with the horizontal stabilizer at its full up position further
caused the aircraft to pitch up. The pitch angle eventually reached 53 degrees and the aircraft
stalled, the tail went down first and burst into flames. The aircraft crashed subsequently, killing
264 (15 crew and 249 passengers) and severely injured 7 people. All the passengers who
survived were seated in rows 7 through 15. This was the second biggest aircraft accident in
Japan.
FACTORS :
The direct cause of this accident was mishandling, inadequate knowledge of the autopilot.
(1) Technical factors
Deficiencies between the automatic and manual operation systems design that
prioritizes the computer commands during automatic landing and GO-AROUND modes.
The automatic flight system worked against the pilot's intent through the control lever;
the pilot first wanted to lower the nose, whereas the computer followed the GO-
AROUND instruction.
The aircraft was not equipped with a warning device which would have alerted the
pilots of the two simultaneous control inputs, GO-AROUND and LAND.
The pilots placed too much confidence in automation and the designers lacked sufficient
assessment of the worst case scenario.
(2) Human factor
There a technical issue about this inadvertent activation of the GO lever. The placement
and design of the GO lever on the thrust lever may have allowed the copilot to
inadvertently trigger the GO lever when he tried to move the thrust lever to control the
thrust.
The flight crew did not sufficiently understand the Automatic Flight System.
The captain lacked situational awareness so he failed to realize that the aircraft was
under autopilot control, or he believed that manual controls input would override (or
disengage) the autopilot.
The copilot failed to immediately report to the captain that he could not disengage the
GO-AROUND mode and he recognized the abnormally strong resistive force of the
control wheel. The captain did not properly check if his instructions were carried out.
Instead of the copilot, the captain should have taken controls of the aircraft earlier.


CASE 3:
Air France 447 Accident
INCIDENT:
The Airbus A330-203 flight AF447, took off from Rio de Janeiro Galeo airport on 31
May 2009 at 22:29, bound for Paris Charles de Gaulle. The aircraft was carrying 216 passengers
from 32 nationalities, as well as 9 flight attendants and 3 pilots, including a Captain and two co-
pilots. The aircraft was to cross the inter-tropical convergence zone off the coast of Brazil. This
area is home to storm phenomena characterized by turbulence and precipitation. The weather
situation on the day of the accident was not exceptional for the month of June in this area.
As the aircraft was passing through this zone the captain had left the fight deck to take a
nap. He gave his left hand seat to one of the copilots and kept him in charge of the controls. As
the aircraft was passing through the clouds in the ITCZ the pilot turned on the anti-icing system
to try to keep the ice off the flight surface. As the aircraft was moving towards a place of
intense activity the pilot banked to the left to divert. Suddenly a strange aroma flooded the
cockpit and the crew realized that the temperature started rising.
The sound of the slipstream suddenly became louder. This was presumably is due to the
accumulation of ice crystals on the exterior of the fuselage. In order to prevent the jet engines
from flaming out in the event of severe icing the speed of the aircraft was reduced. Just then an
alarm sounded for 2.2 seconds which indicated that the autopilot is disconnected. Later, it was
found that the pitot tubes, externally mounted sensors that determine airspeed, have iced
over. However, neither of the pilots had ever received training how to deal with an unreliable
airspeed indicator at cruise altitude or fly the airplane by hand under such conditions. The
failure to understand the situation and the disruption of crew cooperation had a multiplying
effect, inducing total loss of control of the situation. The aircraft went into a sustained stall,
signaled by the stall warning and strong buffet.
Despite these persistent symptoms, the crew never understood that the aircraft had stalled
and therefore never undertook any recovery maneuvers. The pilots ignored the stall warnings
thinking that the Airbus is built in such a way that it always flies in its safety envelope.
Moreover, the Airbus is a fly-by-wire plane; the control inputs are not directly fed to the control
surface but to a computer which, in turn, commands the actuators that move the control
systems.
The vast majority of the time, the computer operates within the normal law, which means
that the computer will not give any command to the controls that would cause the aircraft to
leave its flight envelope. The flight control computer, when operating under normal law would
not have allowed the aircraft to stall. But once the computer lost its airspeed data it
disconnected and the autopilot and switched from normal law to alternate law, a regime
with far fewer restrictions on what a pilot can do. In the alternate law pilots can stall the
aircraft.
By the time the captain entered the cockpit, understood the scenario and regained the
controls it was too late, the aircraft had stalled and crashed into the Atlantic Ocean, killing
everyone on board. The wreckage and flight data recorders were lost beneath 5 miles of the
ocean. Five days after flight 447 crashed, the first bodies were recovered. In 2011 154 bodies
were recovered, ending the search with 74 bodies being left unrecovered. The CVR and the FDR
was recovered in mid 2011 thus helping in the investigation of the accident.
FACTORS:
Temporary inconsistency between the measured speeds, likely as a result of the obstruction of
the pitot probes by ice crystals that caused the autopilot disconnection and the reconfiguration
to alternate law;
The lack of knowledge they did not know the link between airspeed and stall
Insufficient knowledge of the autopilot limitations.
The crew not identifying the approach to stall their lack of immediate response and the exit
from the flight envelope.






















Conclusion
What conclusions can we draw from the above? Its simple. The autopilot is a liability to
pilots, insofar as the development, sustenance and honing of piloting skills is concerned. It is
rightly said that the road to hell is paved with good intentions. The autopilot was never
intended as a replacement to the pilot. In fact, it is meant to be a system whose primary aim is
to augment the skills of a pilot by reducing his workload and thereby making him less tired
during the course of a flight or a sortie. But of course, laziness is an integral part of human
nature, and few have conquered this aspect of their personality.
In April, 2013, much before the famous Air Asiana crash, the FAA released a Safety Alert
for Operators notice, or a SAFO. This SAFO, document number SAFO 1003 noted that A recent
analysis of flight operations data (including normal flight operations, incidents, and accidents)
identified an increase in manual handling errors. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
believes maintaining and improving the knowledge and skills for manual flight operations is
necessary for safe flight operations. This, they said, was caused due to continuous use of
autopilot systems. The SAFO asked the airline companies and organizations to incorporate
more manual training into their ground training regimes.
When a respected authority such as the FAA says that pilots are required to undergo
more hands on training, then we must follow it. In fact, following the Asiana Airlines crash, the
FAA released a study which was conducted by taking data from the aviation industry. The span
of the study was huge. They reinforce what we have already told you that the excessive usage
of autopilots, degrade the performance of pilots when it came to the manual handling of the
aircraft. In fact, they noticed differences between pilots who were habituated to using the
autopilot, as opposed to pilots who did not have autopilot in their aircraft, in the same type of
aircraft.
As we have said, the root cause of this problem is complacency. And complacency arises
due to conditioning of the human mind. When one becomes conditioned to think that
everything is going to be fine, it will be assimilated into the unconscious. This will then reflect in
the attitude of the pilot. The problem is that they do not know, or they are blissfully ignorant
about the problems that complacency brings with it. And by the time they realize it, it would be
too late, and they end up having their license revoked, or worse yet, dead, along with the
passengers, who was his/ her responsibility.
Ultimately, where can we place the blame? After asking around in forums where pilots
gather, on line, we saw that the problems begins with airline companies themselves. They
mandate the use of autopilot as company procedure. In fact, deviating from these procedures
can be a problem for the pilot, since he or she may have to face inquiry and if that happens,
they will have to justify themselves to a panel. But are the airline companies really to blame?
After all, their aim is to maximize profits, and the autopilots help them achieve this to a great
extent, since the autopilots can select the optimal amount of fuel required, amongst other
things. But it is also their responsibility to take the passengers from place A to place B without
any them getting hurt in the process.
Of course, yet another problem is the lack of understanding of autopilot. The current
requirement for procuring a CPL or an ATPL license is clearing the 12
th
grade with passing
marks. This holds good for most countries. But airline companies prefer pilots who also hold a
degree. Some of them are subtle about such hiring processes, and some of them outrightly
state that they will hire only graduates. A good portion of pilots are still 12
th
grade cleared
students. Autopilots are designed by engineers. They include documentation to help a pilot
understand what goes on in a system, but it becomes a daunting task to make someone with
the knowledge of a 12
th
grader understand the finer nuances of high or low pass filters or how
analog signals are converted to digital signals. The pilots have to be formally educated in such
subjects before he/ she is fully able to grasp such concepts. And once the pilot thoroughly
understands the autopilot system, then they can be confident enough to tackle any situation
that comes in their way due to the failure of the autopilot.
And finally, there is another problem. Many pilots tend to use the autopilot to mask
their lack of manual piloting skills. Such free riders are many; in fact, one will be hard pressed to
say that any industry is free from such people. But they ruin it for everyone else. With
ignorance, comes a tendency to act like they can handle everything. Again, they realize it when
it is too late. With this, we sincerely hope that you have been convinced regarding the perils of
the overuse of autopilots. We also hope that all of you will endeavor to be pilots who can rely
on their manual piloting skills if the situation calls for it, instead of being pilots just by name.








Citations
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2013/11
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http://www.theverge.com/2013/11/18/5120270/relian
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http://nation.time.com/2013/11/20/pilots-are-losing-
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http://human-
factors.arc.nasa.gov/flightcognition/Publications/Holbro
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http://aviationknowledge.wikidot.com/aviation:human-
factors-and-automation-pilot-computer-interfa
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l
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http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turkish_Airlines_Flight_19
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http://lesswrong.com/lw/hey/the_autopilot_problem_dri
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