SUPREME COURT RULINGS ON AGRARIAN LAW

2008 to 2010

DELA CRUZ v. QUIAZON, G.R. No. 171961, November 28, 2008

Estela Dizon-Garcia, mother of Amelia G. Quiazon, was the registered owner of a
parcel of land brought under the coverage of PD 27. In 1981, Feliciano dela Cruz, a
tenant-farmer, was issued a CLT over a 3.7200-hectare portion of the said property. In
1992, the heirs of Estela Dizon-Garcia executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Admission and
Partition with Waiver adjudicating among themselves all the properties left by both of
their parents, except for the subject property, which was adjudicated solely in favor of
respondent.
In 1993, A, Quiazon filed a Complaint with the PARAD against petitioner Ferdinand dela
Cruz, alleging that in 1991, he entered into a leasehold contract with A. Quiazon, by
virtue of which he bound himself to deliver 28 cavans of palay as rental. Since 1991,
petitioner F. dela Cruz allegedly failed to deliver the stipulated rental because he had
already abandoned the landholding. For this reason, respondent prayed for his ejectment
from the property and the termination of their tenancy relationship
1. RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT
Citing Tuason v. Court of Appeals, 326 Phil. 169, 178-179 [1996]:
A petition for relief from judgment is an equitable remedy
that is allowed only in exceptional cases when there is no
other available or adequate remedy. When a party has
another remedy available to him, which may be either a
motion for new trial or appeal from an adverse decision of
the trial court, and he was not prevented by fraud, accident,
mistake or excusable negligence from filing such motion or
taking such appeal, he cannot avail himself of this remedy.
Indeed, relief will not be granted to a party who seeks
avoidance from the effects of the judgment when the loss of
the remedy at law was due to his own negligence; otherwise,
the petition for relief can be used to revive the right to
appeal which had been lost thru inexcusable negligence.
2. CERTIFICATE OF LAND TRANSFER EFFECT
Citing Planters Development Bank v. Garcia, G.R. No. 147081, December 9, 2005,
477 SCRA 185, 199; Vinzons-Magana v. Estrella, G.R. No. 60269, September 13,
1991, 201 SCRA 536, 540:
The issuance of a CLT does not vest full ownership in the
holder.
Citing Martillano v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 148277, June 29, 2004, 433 SCRA
195, 203-204:
The issuance of the CLT does not sever the tenancy relationship
between the landowner and the tenant-farmer. A certificate of
land transfer merely evinces that the grantee thereof is qualified
to avail himself of the statutory mechanism for the acquisition of
ownership of the land tilled by him as provided under P.D. No.
27. It is not a muniment of title that vests in the farmer/grantee
absolute ownership of his tillage.
Citing Pagtalunan v. Tamayo, G.R. No. 54281, March 19, 1990, 183 SCRA 252,
259:
It is only after compliance with the conditions which entitle a
farmer/grantee to an emancipation patent that he acquires the
vested right of absolute ownership in the landholding a right
which then would have become fixed and established, and no
longer open to doubt or controversy. HTcDEa
3. PERSONALITY OF LANDOWNER TO RAISE ABANDONMENT
Citing Estolas v. Mabalot, 431 Phil. 462, 469 [2002]:
For this reason, the landowner retains an interest over the
property that gives him the right to file the necessary action
to evict the tenant from the landholding should there be an
abandonment despite the fact that land acquired under P.D.
No. 27 will not revert to the landowner.
4. ABANDONMENT
Citing Corpuz v. Grospe, 388 Phil. 1100, 1111 (2000):
Abandonment requires (a) a clear and absolute intention to
renounce a right or claim or to desert a right or property; and
(b) an external act by which that intention is expressed or
carried into effect. The intention to abandon implies a
departure, with the avowed intent of never returning,
resuming or claiming the right and the interest that have
been abandoned.
Citing Verde v. Macapagal, G.R. No. 151342, June 23, 2005, 461 SCRA 97, 106-
107; Romero v. Tan, 468 Phil. 224, 238 (2004); Palele v. Court of Appeals, 414
Phil. 417, 429 (2001):
The immigration of the original farmer-beneficiary to the
U.S.A. did not necessarily result in the abandonment of the
landholding, considering that one of his sons, petitioner
Renato dela Cruz, continued cultivating the land. Personal
cultivation, as required by law, includes cultivation of the
land by the tenant (lessee) himself or with the aid of the
immediate farm household, which refers to the members of
the family of the tenant and other persons who are
dependent upon him for support and who usually help him
in the [agricultural] activities.
5. CERTIFICATE OF LAND TRANSFER
RETENTION/CANCELLATION
Citing Daez v. Court of Appeals, 382 Phil. 742, 754 (2000):
Without doubt, the landowner's right of retention may be
exercised over tenanted land despite the issuance of a CLT
to farmer-beneficiaries. However, the cancellation of a CLT
over the subject landholding as a necessary consequence of
the landowner's exercise of his right of retention is within
the jurisdiction of the DAR Secretary, not the DARAB, as it
does not involve an agrarian dispute.
In Tenants of the Estate of Dr. Jose Sison v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 93045,
June 29, 1992, 210 SCRA 545), the Court sustained the authority or jurisdiction of
the DAR Secretary to cancel the CLT issued to tenant-beneficiaries after the
landowners' right to retain the subject landholding was upheld. The Court ruled that
the issuance, recall or cancellation of certificates of land transfer falls within the
Secretary's administrative jurisdiction as implementor of P.D. No. 27.
6. COLLATERAL ATTACK ON JUDGMENT
Citing Arcelona v. Court of Appeals, 345 Phil. 250, 264 (1997):
To conclude, respondent's remedy is to raise before the
DAR Secretary the matter of cancellation of petitioner's
CLT as an incident of the order granting the landowners'
application for retention over the said landholding. In the
same forum, petitioners can raise the issue of the validity of
the DAR order granting the application for retention based
on their claim of denial of due process, or in a separate
action specifically filed to assail the validity of the
judgment. A collateral attack against a judgment is generally
not allowed, unless the judgment is void upon its face or its
nullity is apparent by virtue of its own recitals.
xxx xxx xxx
2009

LAND BANK v. PACITA AGRICULTURAL MULTI-PURPOSE
COOPERATIVE, G.R. No. 177607, January 19, 2009

Eight parcels of land with an aggregate area of 34.96 hectare was placed under the
coverage of OLT. Between the years 1978 to 1983 CLTs were issued to farmer
beneficiaries. Between 1986 to 1990, EPs were issued. In 1986 and, LBP paid AAC
P35, 778, the amount of only two of the eight parcels of land. Thereafter, AAC sold the
landholding to Pacita. Pacita then inquired from LBP regarding the price of the
remaining six parcels. LBP valued the same at P148,172, which was refused by Pacita.
Upon the passage of DAR AO, Series of 1994, a 6% per year increment on the value of
land from the date it was taken up to October 1994 shall be imposed. Hence, the value
was increased to P537,538. However, the said value was still refused by Pacita, which
then filed a complaint for determination of just compensation before the SAC. It asked
that the value of the remaining parcels be pegged at 2.7M.
1. JUST COMPENSATION WHEN COMPUTED
The instant case involves a closely similar factual milieu as that
in Natividadand Meneses. The DAR acquired the subject property in 1972 through
its Operation Land Transfer Program, pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27. Since
then, the subject property has already been distributed to the farmer-beneficiaries
who, since then, have exclusively possessed the same and harvested its produce.
Eventually, the Emancipation Patents were issued in the beneficiaries' favor. Even
after the lapse of 23 years from 1972, when the DAR took the subject land
property, until 1995, when respondent filed its Petition before the SAC the full
payment of just compensation due respondent has yet to be made by petitioner.
These circumstances, the same as in Natividad and Meneses, make it more
equitable for the SAC to determine the just compensation due the respondent for the
remainder of the subject property using values at the time of its payment.
xxx xxx xxx

LANDICHO v. SIA, G.R. No. 169472, January 20, 2009
The Aragons were the owners of a parcel of land tenanted by Arcadio Landicho. Upon
the latter's death, his son Francisco Landicho succeeded him in his tenancy. Francisco
Landicho cultivated the landholding with the help of his son Buenaventura Landicho and
his brother Federico Landicho. Subsequently, he surrendered his tenancy rights over the
landholding in favor of E. Zolota, wife of one of the Aragons as per aKasulatan. Despite
the execution of the Kasulatan, F. Landicho, et al. continued in the possession and
cultivation of the landholding. Years after, another Kasulatanevidencing the surrender of
rights was executed. On the day of the execution of the second Kasulatan, the Aragons
sold the subject landholding to Sia who managed to convert the use of the land for
residential purpose without a DAR clearance. Thus, the Landichos filed a complaint for
disturbance compensation. TcCSIa
1. TENANCY ESTABLISHMENT
Citing RA 1199:
A tenancy relationship arises between a landholder and a
tenant once they agree, expressly or impliedly, to undertake
jointly the cultivation of a land belonging to the landholder,
as a result of which relationship the tenant acquires the right
to continue working on and cultivating the land.
2. TENANCY QUANTUM OF PROOF
Citing Heirs of Jugalbot v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 170346, March 12, 2007,
518 SCRA 202, 214-215, citing Berenguer, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-
60287, August 17, 1988, 164 SCRA 431, 438-439:
The petitioners cannot rely on their self-serving statements
to prove the existence of a tenancy relationship because
independent and concrete evidence, aside from self-serving
statements, is needed to prove personal cultivation, sharing
of harvests, or consent of the landowner.
3. CULTIVATION INSUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH TENANCY
Citing Danan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 132759, October 25, 2005, 474 SCRA
113, 126:
A tiller or a farmworker does not automatically become an
agricultural tenant recognized under agrarian laws by mere
occupation or cultivation of an agricultural land.
4. ELEMENT OF TENANCY SHARING OF HARVESTS
Citing Cornelio de Jesus, et al. v. Moldex Realty, Inc., G.R. No. 153595, November
23, 2007, 538 SCRA 316:
Independent evidence, such as receipts, must be presented to
show that there was a sharing of the harvest between the
landowner and the tenant. And, assuming the landowners
received a share of the harvest, that the fact of receipt,
without an agreed system of sharing, does not ipso
factocreate a tenancy.
5. IMPLIED TENANCY
Acquiescence by the landowner of their cultivation of the land does not create an
implied tenancy if the landowners have never considered petitioners Federico and
Buenaventura as tenants of the land and if the essential requisites of a tenancy
relationship are lacking. There was no intention to institute the petitioners as
agricultural tenants.
Citing Epitacio Sialana v. Mary Y. Avila, et al., G.R. No. 143598, July 20, 2006,
495 SCRA 501:
For an implied tenancy to come about, the actuations of the
parties taken in their entirety must be demonstrative of an
intent to continue a prior lease established by the landholder.
6. CAPACITY TO GIVE CONSENT
Citing Mario J. Mendezona v. Julio H. Ozamiz, et al., 426 Phil. 888, 906 (2002):
A person is not incapacitated to contract merely because of
advanced years or by reason of physical infirmities. It is
only when such age or infirmities impair the mental
faculties to such extent as to prevent one from properly,
intelligently, and fairly protecting her property rights, is she
considered incapacitated.
7. PRESUMPTION OF VALIDITY OF PUBLIC INSTRUMENT
It is also important to note that both the 1976 and 1987 Kasulatan are duly
notarized and are considered as public documents evidencing the surrender of
Francisco's tenancy rights over the subject landholdings. They were executed with
all the legal formalities of a public document and thus the legal presumption of the
regularity and validity of the Kasulatan are retained in the absence of full, clear and
convincing evidence to overcome such presumption. Strong evidence is required to
prove a defect of a public instrument, and since such strong and convincing
evidence was not presented in the instant case, the 1976 and the 1987 Kasulatan are
presumed valid.
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CASTILLO v. TOLENTINO, G.R. No. 181525, March 4, 2009
Tolentino was the owner of two parcels of land and a caretaker of another. The said
parcels were tenanted by Castillo who promised to remit lease rentals to Tolentino.
Castillo wrote the PARO informing the latter of his intention to construct a water
reservoir. Tolentino also received a copy of the letter and opposed the same. Despite this,
Castillo proceeded with the construction of the water dike. Tolentino filed a case for
ejectment. PARAD ruled for the ejectment of Castillo. DARAB initially affirmed the
Decision but reversed itself in a Motion for Reconsideration. CA reinstated the Decision
of the PARAD since it held that the appeal was filed out of time.
1. OBLIGATIONS OF A TENANT WITH RESPECT TO CONSTRUCTION
OF IMPROVEMENTS ON THE LANDHOLDING
Section 32 of R.A. No. 3844 specifically requires notice to and consent of the
agricultural lessor before the agricultural lessee may embark upon the construction
of a permanent irrigation system. It is only when the former refuses to bear the
expenses of construction that the latter may choose to shoulder the same. More
importantly, any change in the use of tillable land in the leasehold, e.g. through the
construction of a sizeable water reservoir, impacts upon the agricultural lessor's
share in the harvest, which is the only consideration he receives under the agrarian
law. This being the case, before the agricultural lessee may use the leasehold for a
purpose other than what had been agreed upon, the consent of the agricultural lessor
must be obtained, lest he be dispossessed of his leasehold.
The law (Sec. 32 of R.A. No. 3844) does not give blanket authority to the
agricultural lessee to construct an irrigation system at anytime and for any reason;
instead, it presupposes primarily that the same is necessary.
2. IMPLIED OBLIGATION OF A TENANT
The fact that CASTILLO was convicted by final judgment of an offense against
TOLENTINO's son, George, demonstrates how relations between the two have
deteriorated. While R.A. No. 3844 authorizes termination by the agricultural lessee
of the lease for a crime committed by the agricultural lessor against the former or
any member of his immediate farm household, the same privilege is not granted to
the agricultural lessor. Yet, this does not mean that the courts should not take into
account the circumstance that the agricultural lessee committed a crime against the
agricultural lessor or any member of his immediate family. By committing a crime
against TOLENTINO's son, CASTILLO violated his obligation to his lessor to act
with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith, an
obligation that is deemed included in his leasehold agreement. Provisions of
existing laws form part of and are read into every contract without need for the
parties expressly making reference to them.
3. VIOLATION OF OBLIGATION OF A TENANT GROUND FOR
DISPOSSESSION
In sum, we hold that the construction of the reservoir constitutes a violation of
Section 36 of R.A. No. 3844, an unauthorized use of the landholding for a purpose
other than what had been agreed upon, and a violation of the leasehold contract
between CASTILLO and TOLENTINO, for which the former is hereby penalized
with permanent dispossession of his leasehold. SEAHcT
4. SOCIAL JUSTICE POLICY
Citing Bautista v. Mag-isa, G.R. No. 152564, September 13, 2004, 438 SCRA
259; Gonzales v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 110335, June 18, 2001, 358 SCRA
598:
Agrarian laws were enacted to help small farmers uplift
their economic status by providing them with a modest
standard of living sufficient to meet their needs for food,
clothing, shelter and other basic necessities. It provides the
answer to the urgent need to alleviate the lives of the vast
number of poor farmers in our country. Yet, despite such
laws, the majority of these farmers still live on a hand-to-
mouth existence. This can be attributed to the fact that these
agrarian laws have never really been effectively
implemented. Certain individuals have continued to prey on
the disadvantaged, and as a result, the farmers who are
intended to be protected and uplifted by the said laws find
themselves back in their previous plight or even in a more
distressing situation.
Citing De Jesus v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 72282, July 24, 1989,
175 SCRA 559:
R.A. No. 3844, or the Agricultural Land Reform Code, was
enacted by Congress to institute land reforms in the
Philippines. It was passed to establish owner-cultivatorship
and the family size farm as the basis of Philippine
agriculture; to achieve a dignified existence for the small
farmers free from pernicious industrial restraints and
practices; as well as to make the small farmers more
independent, self-reliant and responsible citizens and a
source of genuine strength in our democratic society.
R.A. 3844 and R.A. 6389, being social legislations, are designed to promote
economic and social stability and must be interpreted liberally to give full force and
effect to their clear intent, not only in favor of the tenant-farmers but also of
landowners.
5. SOCIAL JUSTICE POLICY NOT INTENDED TO COUNTENANCE
WRONGDOING
We cannot allow a situation where despite the one-sided nature of the law
governing agricultural leasehold tenancy (R.A. No. 3844), which exceedingly
favors the agricultural lessee/tenant and farmworker the agricultural lessee has
shown lack of courtesy to the landowner and, instead, abused his rights under said
law, at the same time neglecting or willfully refusing to take advantage of his rights
under the comprehensive agrarian reform law which would have otherwise fulfilled
its mandate to provide land for the landless. The primary purpose, precisely, of
agrarian reform is the redistribution of lands to farmers and regular farmworkers
who are landless, irrespective of tenurial arrangement.
The law recognizes and condones that a leasehold tenant may have his own land
while he tills that of another, but certainly we cannot see any justification why a
tenant should give away for free and sell his own agricultural land until nothing is
left, and then insist himself on someone else's without giving the landowner the
proper respect and regard that is due him, acting presumptuously and beyond his
stature as mere agricultural lessee.
Citing Cecilleville Realty and Service Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 120363,
September 5, 1997, 278 SCRA 819:
The policy of social justice is not intended to countenance
wrongdoing simply because it is committed by the
underprivileged. Compassion for the poor is an imperative
of every humane society but only when the recipient is not a
rascal claiming an undeserved privilege.
xxx xxx xxx
MERCADO v. MERCADO, G.R. No. 178672, March, 19 2009
The grandfather of Edmundo Mercado was the owner of a parcel of land tenanted by
Julio Mercado. J. Mercado was issued a CLT, and subsequently, an EP covering the
landholding. Having been designated in his grandfather's Huling Habilin, E. Mercado
was able to obtain a Certificate of Retention. Thus, he filed a complaint for the
cancellation of the EP, alleging that the same had been irregularly issued, and ejectment
on the ground of deliberate non-payment of lease rentals. The PARAD declared the
validity of the EP. The said Decision was reversed by the DARAB, ordering the ejecment
of J. Mercado. No appeal having been taken within the reglementary period, the DARAB
Decision became final and executory.
1. IMMUTABILITY OF JUDGMENT
Citing Biglang-awa v. Philippine Trust Company, G.R. No. 158998, March 28,
2008, 550 SCRA 160, 177:
The DARAB decision in DARAB Case No. 4389 had long
become final and executory, hence, immutable and
unalterable. It may thus no longer be modified in any
respect, even if the modification is meant to correct
erroneous conclusions of fact or law. Excepted from this
rule is when the modification involves correction of 1)
clerical errors, 2)nunc pro tunc entries which cause no
prejudice to any party, and 3) void judgments. None of these
exceptions is present in the case at bar, however.
2. JURISDICTION DARAB
Citing Hermoso v. C.L. Realty Corporation, G.R. No. 140319, May 5, 2006, 489
SCRA 556, 563:
Jurisdiction over a case does not thus disappear the moment
a certificate of title is issued, for the issuance of such
certificate is not a mode of transfer of property but merely
an evidence of such transfer.
3. JURISDICTION BY ESTOPPEL
Citing Hermoso v. C.L. Realty Corporation, G.R. No. 140319, May 5, 2006, 489
SCRA 556, 563:
IN ANY EVENT, petitioner may not question the
jurisdiction of the DARAB and its adjudicative arm at this
late juncture of the proceedings, he having actively
participated in the proceedings below. acADIT
4. RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT
Respecting the affirmance by the appellate court of the denial by the DARAB of
petitioner's Petition for Relief from Judgment, Rule XVI of the 2003 DARAB
Rules of Procedure provides the following conditions for availing of such relief:
Section 1. Petition for Relief from
Decision/Resolution/Final Order. When a
decision/resolution/final order is rendered by the adjudicator
against any party, through fraud, accident, mistake, and
excusable negligence and such party has no other adequate
remedy available to him in the ordinary course of law, he
may file a petition for relief with said adjudicator, praying
that the decision/resolution/final order be set aside.
(Underscoring supplied)
Section 2. Form and Time of Filing of Petition. A
petition for relief must be verified and a copy thereof
together with its annexes and supporting affidavits, if any,
must be furnished to the adverse party or parties and filed
within sixty (60) days from the time the fraud, mistake or
excusable negligence was discovered and within six (6)
months after the decision/resolution/final order was
rendered. (Underscoring supplied)
Relief from judgment is thus available only against the decision of an adjudicator,
to be filed before the adjudicator, when the party seeking it has no other adequate
remedy available to him in the ordinary course of law.
xxx xxx xxx
REYNALDO v. YATCO, G.R. No. 165494, March 20, 2009
DCN 3361
Belizario was the owner of a 4.3 hectare parcel of land which she donated to Tomas
Yatco as evidence by a Deed of Donation inter vivos. Said land was tenanted by Aguido
Levardo who subsequently executed a Pinanumpaang Salaysay signed by him and his
children, waiving his rights as tenant. A. Levardo received 2M as disturbance
compensation. T. Yatco sold the landholding to Gonzalo Puyat and Sons. The Levardos
filed a complaint for the declaration of nullity of the Deed of Donation, Deed of Sale and
the waiver of rights.
DCN 3362
Leoncio Yatco was the owner of a 4.2 hectare parcel of land which was tenanted by
Francisco and his son Hernando Levardo. F. Levardo likewise executed a
similarPinanumpaang Salaysay waiving his rights as tenant. F. Levardo received 2.4M as
disturbance compensation. L. Yatco thereafter sold the landholding to Gonzalo Puyat and
Sons. The Levardos filed a complaint for the declaration of nullity of the Deed of
Donation, Deed of Sale and the waiver of rights.
In both cases, the plaintiffs grounded their causes of action on the claim that the land in
dispute was covered by Operation Land Transfer (OLT) pursuant to Presidential Decree
No. 27 (P.D. No. 27). They contend that they were already deemed the owners of the land
on the basis of an alleged Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT) in the name of their father
Aguido, which was never issued by the DAR, but on the basis of an alleged certified
xerox copy of a Masterlist of tenants wherein his name appeared.
1. PD 27 COVERAGE
P.D. No. 27 should be read in conjunction with Letter of Instruction No. 474 (LOI
No. 474) and the DAR Memorandum on the "Interim Guidelines on Retention by
Small Landowners" dated July 10, 1975 (DAR Memorandum). The pertinent
portion of LOI No. 474 is as follows:
1. You shall undertake to place the Land Transfer
Program of the government pursuant to Presidential Decree
No. 27, all tenanted rice/corn lands with areas of seven
hectares or less belonging to landowners who own other
agricultural lands of more than seven hectares in aggregate
areas or lands used for residential, commercial, industrial or
other urban purposes from which they derive adequate
income to support themselves and their families. (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
The pertinent portion of the DAR Memorandum is as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
5. Tenanted rice and/or corn lands seven (7) hectares or
less shall not be covered by Operation Land Transfer. The
relation of the land owner and tenant-farmers in these areas
shall be leasehold . . . (Emphasis supplied)
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the lands in dispute do not fall under the
coverage of P.D. No. 27. The DAR Memorandum is categorical that lands with
seven hectares or less shall not be covered by OLT.
2. TERMINATION OF LEASEHOLD BY PAYMENT OF DISTURBANCE
COMPENSATION
Based on the evidence on record, respondents paid Aguido P2,000,000.00 and
Hernando P2,417,142.00 as disturbance compensation. A reading of
thePinanumpaang Salaysay executed by petitioners show that they gave up their
leasehold rights "dahil sa aming kagustuhang umiba ng hanap buhay ng higit ang
pagkikitaan kaysa panakahan." The money given by respondents as disturbance
compensation was indeed advantageous to the families of petitioners, as it would
have allowed them to pursue other sources of livelihood.
3. CERTIFICATE OF LAND TRANSFER EFFECT
Citing Pagtalunan v. Tamayo, G.R. No. 54281, March 19, 1990, 183 SCRA 252:
Moreover, assuming arguendo that CLTs were actually
issued to petitioners, a CLT does not vest in the
farmer/grantee ownership of the land described therein.
At most, the CLT merely evidences the government's
recognition of the grantee as partly qualified to await
the statutory mechanism for the acquisition of
ownership of the land titled by him as provided in P.D.
No. 27. Neither is this recognition permanent or
irrevocable.
xxx xxx xxx
LAKEVIEW GOLF AND COUNTRY CLUB, INC. v. LUZVIMIN SAMAHANG
NAYON, G.R. No. 171253, April 16, 2009
Lakeview was the owner of a 60-hectare parcel of land. The DAR issued a Notice of
Coverage and served a Notice of Acquisition upon Lakeview. The latter opposed the
coverage alleging that: (1) the subject property is not agricultural having been projected
as a golf course prior to 1988; (2) that the development for its conversion and utilization
has already been commenced; (3) that it is generally mountainous with major portions
having a slope of over 18% and minimal topsoil; and (4) that it has no tenant or
farmworker since the alleged farmer-beneficiaries are mere intruders who entered the
subject property. OSEC denied the protest and directed the acquisition of the landholding.
CLOAs were then issued and registered.
1. JURISDICTION OVER DETERMINATION OF CARP COVERAGE
DAR SECRETARY
Citing Aninao v. Asturias Chemical Industries, Inc., G.R. No. 160420, July 28,
2005, 464 SCRA 526, 540:
Noteworthy, the afore-cited Section 2 of DAR
Administrative Order No. 06-00 also provides that the DAR
Secretary has exclusive jurisdiction to classify and identify
landholdings for coverage under the CARP, including
protests or oppositions thereto and petitions for lifting of
coverage. The matter of CARP coverage is strictly an
administrative implementation of the CARP whose
competence belongs to the DAR Secretary. Significantly,
the DAR Secretary had already denied petitioner's protest
and determined that the subject property was covered by the
CARP. Such ruling was even affirmed by the Court of
Appeals and this Court. Absent palpable error by these
bodies, of which this Court finds none, their determination
as to the coverage of the subject property under the CARP is
controlling. HAaDcS
xxx xxx xxx
HERMOSO v. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 166748, April 24, 2009
Two lots which form part of a bigger parcel of land were tenanted. The tenants filed an
application for the coverage of the landholding under PD 27. The said application was
granted but the issuance of EP in favor of the applicants was suspended because a
separate case for the declaration of tenancy relationship was filed by the said applicants
with the DARAB. In the latter case, the DARAB ruled that tenancy relationship existed.
Subsequently, the applicants moved for the issuance of EPs in their favor. The OSEC
approved the same. However, upon review by the OP where the owners raised the issue
that the landholding was not within the ambit of PD 27, it having been previously
reclassified by the OSEC as suited for residential, commercial, industrial and urban
purposes.
1. CLASSIFICATION OF LANDS
The classification of lands of the public domain is of two types, i.e., primary
classification and secondary classification. The primary classification comprises
agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and national parks. These are lands
specifically mentioned in Section 3, Article XII of the Constitution. The same
provision of the Constitution, however, also states that agricultural lands of the
public domain may further be classified by law according to the uses to which they
may be devoted. This further classification of agricultural lands is referred to as
secondary classification. Under existing laws, Congress has granted authority to a
number of government agencies to effect the secondary classification of agricultural
lands to residential, commercial or industrial or other urban uses.
2. COVERAGE UNDER PD 27
For the parcels of land subject of this petition to come within the coverage of P.D.
No. 27, it is necessary to determine whether the land is agricultural. Section 3 (c) of
R.A. No. 6657 defines agricultural land, as follows:
(c) Agricultural Land refers to the land devoted to
agricultural activity as defined in this Act and not
classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or
industrial land.
and Section 3 (b) specifies agricultural activity as:
(b) Agriculture, Agriculture Enterprise or
Agricultural Activity means cultivation of the soil,
planting of crops, growing of fruit trees, including the
harvesting of such farm products, and other farm
activities and practices performed by a farmer in
conjunction with such farming operations done by
persons whether natural or juridical.
On the basis of these definitions, the subject parcels of land cannot be considered as
within the ambit of P.D. No. 27. This considering that the subject lots were
reclassified by the DAR Secretary as suited for residential, commercial, industrial
or other urban purposes way before petitioner filed a petition for emancipation
under P.D. No. 27.
3. CONVERSION UNDER RA 3844 AS AMENDED BY RA 6389
Citing De Guzman v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 156965, October 12, 2006, 504
SCRA 238, 249:
Under R.A. No. 6389, the condition imposed on the
landowner to implement the conversion of the agricultural
land to non-agricultural purposes within a certain period was
deleted. With the enactment of the amendatory law, the
condition imposed on the landowner to implement the
conversion of the agricultural land to a non-agricultural
purpose within a certain period was deleted. The remedy left
available to the tenant is to claim disturbance compensation.
xxx xxx xxx
SOLIMAN v. PASUDECO, G.R. No. 169589, June 16, 2009
Dalmacio Sicat was the owner of a 10 hectare parcel of land. He offered to sell the
subject property to PASUDECO to be used as a housing complex for PASUDECO's
laborers and employees. The land was initially offered for sale at the price of P8.00 per
square meter. This was later reduced to P5.00 per square meter. The Board of Directors
of PASUDECO issued Board Resolution authorizing the purchase of the subject property
at P4.00 per square meter. Thereafter, Dalmacio and his tenants jointly filed a Petition
seeking approval of the voluntary surrender of the subject property with payment of
disturbance compensation. The voluntary surrender was approved and the tenancy
relation was extinguished on the date they entered into the agreement. A Deed of Sale
with Mortgage was executed between Dalmacio and PASUDECO. Thereafter, the
documents needed for the conversion of the land to residential purposes were prepared.
TCT in favor PASUDECO was then issued and registered. However, due to financial
distress, PASUDECO did not complete the construction. For the meantime, though, it did
not authorize any person to occupy the landholding.
Petitioners alleged that in 1970, the manager of PASUDECO made one Ciriaco Almario
his overseer/caretaker, tasked to collect lease rentals from petitioners. In turn, C. Almario
remitted the rentals to the manager. In May 1990, C. Almario certified that petitioners
were the actual tenant-tillers of the subject property. Moreover, petitioners deposited their
alleged rentals with the LBP.
The real controversy arose when PASUDECO decided to pursue the development of the
property into a housing project for its employees in the latter part of April 1990. In May
1990, petitioners filed a Complaint for Maintenance of Peaceful Possession before the
PARAD to restrain him from harassing and molesting petitioners in their respective
landholdings. Petitioners together with armed men, entered the property and destroyed
some of their crops. Traversing the complaint, the manager raised as one of his defenses
the fact that PASUDECO was the owner of the subject property.
1. TENANCY ESTABLISHMENT
Citing Reyes v. Reyes, G.R. No. 140164, September 6, 2002, 388 SCRA 471, 481-
482:
Under R.A. 3844, two modes are provided for in the
establishment of an agricultural leasehold relation: (1) by
operation of law in accordance with Section 4 of the said
act; or (2) by oral or written agreement, either express or
implied.
By operation of law simply means the abolition of the
agricultural share tenancy system and the conversion of
share tenancy relations into leasehold relations. The other
method is the agricultural leasehold contract, which may
either be oral or in writing.
2. IMPLIED TENANCY
Petitioners' assertion that they were allowed to cultivate the subject property
without opposition, does not mean that PASUDECO impliedly recognized the
existence of a leasehold relation. Occupancy and continued possession of the land
will not ipso facto make one a de jure tenant, because the principal factor in
determining whether a tenancy relationship exists is intent.
3. ELEMENT OF TENANCY CONSENT
Citing Masaquel v. Orial, G.R. No. 148044, October 19, 2007, 537 SCRA 51,
63 and Bautista v. Araneta, G.R. No. 135829, February 22, 2000, 326 SCRA
234, citing Lastimoza v. Blanco, 110 Phil. 835, 838 [1961]).
Tenancy relationship can only be created with the consent of
the true and lawful landholder who is either the owner,
lessee, usufructuary or legal possessor of the property, and
not through the acts of the supposed landholder who has no
right to the property subject of the tenancy. To rule
otherwise would allow collusion among the unscrupulous to
the prejudice of the true and lawful landholder. cCaSHA
4. ACTUAL AND CONTINUED POSSESSION NOT DETERMINATIVE
OF TENANCY
Citing Nicorp Management and Development Corporation v. Leonida de Leon,
G.R. No. 176942 and G.R. No. 177125, August 28, 2008:
Occupancy and continued possession of the land will
not ipso facto make one a de jure tenant, because the
principal factor in determining whether a tenancy
relationship exists is intent.
5. QUANTUM OF PROOF TO PROVE SHARING SUBSTANTIAL
EVIDENCE
Citing Valencia v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 122363, April 29, 2003, 401 SCRA
666, 690-691:
Substantial evidence necessary to establish the fact of
sharing cannot be satisfied by a mere scintilla of evidence;
there must be concrete evidence on record adequate to prove
the element of sharing. Thus, to prove sharing of harvests, a
receipt or any other credible evidence must be presented,
because self-serving statements are inadequate.
6. CERTIFICATION ATTESTING TO TENANT STATUS NOT BINDING
UPON JUDICIARY
Citing Salmorin v. Zaldivar, G.R. No. 169691, July 23, 2008, 559 SCRA 564, 571-
572:
The certifications attesting to petitioners' alleged status as de
jure tenants are insufficient. In a given locality, the
certification issued by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform or
an authorized representative, like the MARO or the BARC,
concerning the presence or the absence of a tenancy
relationship between the contending parties, is considered
merely preliminary or provisional, hence, such certification
does not bind the judiciary.
xxx xxx xxx
TARONA v. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 170182, June 18, 2009
Respondents Leanos were the owners of the landholding which was registered in the
name of their now deceased mother. They filed a complaint for recovery of the
landholding against the Taronas who claimed to be successor-tenants (their uncle
allegedly having been recognized by the respondents' father as such tenant as per a
leasehold agreement between the two). The Leanos denied such claim arguing that the
Taronas could not have been tenants because they were not even residents of the place
where the landholding was located.
1. ELEMENT OF TENANCY PERSONAL CULTIVATION
Clearly, private respondents' evidence, which significantly the petitioners failed to
refute, more than substantially proved the impossibility of personal cultivation.
Petitioners (intervenors) have already left the place where the subject land lies in
Morong, Bataan, and now live in another locality which is in Caloocan City. Since
Bataan is of a considerable distance from Caloocan City, it would undeniably be
physically impossible for the petitioners to personally cultivate the landholding.
Citing Deloso v. Marapao, G.R. No. 144244, November 11, 2005, 474 SCRA 585:
While a tenant is not required to be physically present in
the land at all hours of the day and night, such doctrine
cannot be stretched to apply to a case wherein the
supposed tenant has chosen to reside in another place so
far from the land to be cultivated that it would be
physically impossible to be present therein with some
degree of constancy as to allow the tenant to cultivate
the same.
Citing Verde v. Macapagal, G.R. No. 151342, June 23, 2005, 461 SCRA 97, 106-
107:
It has been held that personal cultivation is an important
factor in determining the existence of an agricultural
lease relationship such that in its absence, an occupant
of a tract of land, or a cultivator thereof, or planter
thereon, cannot qualify as a de jure lessee.
2. JURISDICTION OVER DETERMINATION OF CARP COVERAGE
The power to determine whether a property is subject to CARP coverage lies with
the DAR Secretary pursuant to Section 50 of R.A. No. 6657. Verily, it is explicitly
provided under Section 1, Rule II of the DARAB Revised Rules that matters
involving strictly the administrative implementation of the CARP and other
agrarian laws and regulations, shall be the exclusive prerogative of and cognizable
by the Secretary of the DAR. Moreover, under the Rules of Procedure for Agrarian
Law Implementation (ALI) Cases, set forth in Administrative Order No. 06-00, it is
provided that the DAR Secretary has exclusive jurisdiction over classification and
identification of landholdings for coverage under the CARP, including protests or
oppositions thereto and petitions for lifting of coverage. This being so, the CA's
declaration regarding CARP coverage of the subject land was premature
considering that the Order of the DAR Regional Director in A.R. Case No. LSD
015703, entitled In Re Protest from CARP Coverage . . . upon which the CA based
its questioned declaration, was still pending review with the Office of the DAR
Assistant Secretary, as per Certification dated February 18, 2005 by the Legal
Affairs Office of the DAR.
3. IRRELEVANCE OF THE ISSUE OF CARP COVERAGE TO TENANCY
ISSUES
In any event, the resolution of the issue of whether the entire property or only part
of it is subject to CARP coverage has no bearing on the issue in this
case,i.e. whether petitioners can be considered bona fide tenants of herein private
respondents.
xxx xxx xxx
OCTAVIO v. PEROVANO, G.R. No. 172400, June 23, 2009
Perovano was the owner of a landholding which was entered into and planted on by
Octavio, et al. Perovano filed a complaint for ejectment with the RTC. Octavio alleged
that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the case since the land was subjected to CARP
coverage. HTCDcS
1. JURISDICTION IN GENERAL
Citing Rimasug v. Martin, G.R. No. 160118, November 22, 2005, 475 SCRA 703,
712:
At the outset, let us be clear that jurisdiction over the
subject matter of an action is determined by the material
allegations of the complaint and the law at the time the
action is commenced, irrespective of whether the
plaintiff is entitled to recover all or some of the claims
or reliefs sought therein. It cannot be made to depend
upon the defenses