1.

SALIGUMBA VS PALANOG
Facts: Monica Palanog, assisted by her husband AvelinoPalanog filed a complaint for Quieting of Title with
Damages against defendants, spouses Valeria Saligumba and Eliseo Saligumba, Sr. before the RTC.In the complaint,
spouses Palanogs alleged that they have been in actual, open, adverse and continuous possession as owners for
more than 50 years of a parcel of land .The spouses Saligumbas allegedly prevented them from entering and
residing on the subject premises and had destroyed the barbed wires enclosing the land.
On 7 August 1987, RTC- rendered a judgment declaring spouses Palanogs the lawful owners of the subject land and
ordering spouses Saligumbas, to vacate the premises. A motion for the issuance of a writ of execution of the said
decision was filed but the trial court, in its Order dated 8 May 1997, and ruled that since more than five years had
elapsed after the date of its finality, the decision could no longer be executed by mere motion. Thus, on 9 May 1997,
Monica Palanog (respondent), now a widow, filed a Complaint seeking to revive and enforce the Decision dated 7
August 1987 which she claimed has not been barred by the statute of limitations. She impleaded petitioners
GenerosoSaligumba and Ernesto Saligumba, the heirs the spouses Saligumbas, as defendants. It appears that Eliseo
Saligumba, Sr. died on 18 February 1984 while Valeria Saligumba died on 2February 1985. No motion for the
substitution of the spouses was filed nor did an order issue for the substitution of the deceased spouses
Saligumbas. Atty. Miralles and petitioner Eliseo Saligumba, Jr., despite notices sent to them to appear, never
confirmed the death of Eliseo Saligumba, Sr. and Valeria Saligumba. The record is bereft of any evidence proving
the death of the spouses, except the mere notations in the envelopes enclosing the trial courts orders which were
returned unserved.
Issue: W/N the death of a party would affect the validity of the decision
Held: No. Civil Case No. 2570 is an action for quieting of title with damages which is an action involving real
property. It is an action that survives pursuant to Section 1, Rule 87 as the claim is not extinguished by the death
of a party. Section 1, Rule 87 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
SECTION 1.Actions which may and which may not be brought against executor or administrator. - No action
upon a claim for the recovery of money or debt or interest thereon shall be commenced against the
executor or administrator; but actions to recover real or personal property, or an interest therein, from the
estate, or to enforce a lien thereon, and actions to recover damages for an injury to person or property, real
or personal, may be commenced against him.
And when a party dies in an action that survives, Section 17 of Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court provides for the
procedure, thus:
Section 17.Death of Party. - After a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the court shall
order, upon proper notice, the legal representative of the deceased to appear and to be substituted for the
deceased, within a period of thirty (30) days, or within such time as may be granted. If the legal
representative fails to appear within said time, the court may order the opposing party to procure the
appointment of a legal representative of the deceased within a time to be specified by the court, and the
representative shall immediately appear for and on behalf of the interest of the deceased. The court
charges involved in procuring such appointment, if defrayed by the opposing party, may be recovered as
costs. The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without requiring the
appointment of an executor or administrator and the court may appoint guardian ad litem for the minor
heirs. (Emphasis supplied)

Under the express terms of Section 17, in case of death of a party, and upon proper notice, it is the duty of the court
to order the legal representative or heir of the deceased to appear for the deceased. In the instant case, it is true
that the trial court, after receiving an informal notice of death by the mere notation in the envelopes, failed to order
the appearance of the legal representative or heir of the deceased. There was no court order for deceaseds legal
representative or heir to appear, nor did any such legal representative ever appear in court to be substituted for
the deceased. Neither did the respondent ever procure the appointment of such legal representative, nor did the
heirs ever ask to be substituted.

2. SAN JUAN, JR VS JUDGE RAMON CRUZ
Facts: Loreto Samia San Juan executed a Last Will and Testament naming Oscar Casa as one of the devisees therein.
Upon Loreto's death, Atty. Aquino filed a petition for the probate of the will.
While the petition was pending, Oscar Casa died intestate. The firm of Aquino, Galang, Lucas, Espinoza, Miranda&
Associates entered their appearance as counsel of Federico Casa, Jr., who claimed to be one of the heirs of Oscar
Casa and their representative.
the probate court issued an Order denying the entry of appearance of said law firm, considering that Federico Casa,
Jr. was not the executor or administrator of the estate of the devisee, hence, cannot be substituted for the deceased
as his representative as required by Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court.
Aquino filed a pleading entitled "Appointment of Administrator" praying that Federico Casa, Jr., be designated as
administrator of the estate of the deceased and that he be substituted for the deceased.
Epifanio San Juan filed a "Motion to Declare Appointment of Administrator As Inadequate or Insufficient." He
maintained that the heirs should present an administrator of the estate of Oscar Casa as the representative of the
estate in the case.
In his reply, Aquino stated that, under Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, the heirs of Oscar Casa may be
substituted for the deceased without need for appointment of an administrator or executor of the estate.
Issue: W/N a person nominated as administrator by purported heirs of a devisee or legatee in a will under
probate may validly substitute for that devisee or legatee in the probate proceedings despite the fact that such
administrator is not the court appointed administrator of the estate of the deceased devisee or legatee
Held: The second paragraph of the rule 3, section 16 is plain and explicit: the heirs may be allowed to be
substituted for the deceased without requiring the appointment of an administrator or executor. However, if
within the specified period s legal representative fails to appear, the court may order the opposing counsel, within
a specified period, to process the appointment of an administrator or executor who shall immediately appear for
the estate of the deceased. The pronouncement of this Court in Lawas v. Court of Appeals (relied upon by
petitioner), that priority is given to the legal representative of the deceased (the executor or administrator) and
that it is only in case of unreasonable delay in the appointment of an executor or administrator, or in cases where
the heirs resort to an extrajudicial settlement of the estate that the court may adopt the alternative of allowing the
heirs of the deceased to be substituted for the deceased, is no longer true. In Gochan v. Young, a case of fairly recent
vintage, the Court ruled as follows:
The above-quoted rules, while permitting an executor or administrator to represent or to bring suits on
behalf of the deceased, do not prohibit the heirs from representing the deceased. These rules are easily
applicable to cases in which an administrator has already been appointed. But no rule categorically
addresses the situation in which special proceedings for the settlement of an estate have already been
instituted, yet no administrator has been appointed. In such instances, the heirs cannot be expected to wait
for the appointment of an administrator; then wait further to see if the administrator appointed would care
enough to file a suit to protect the rights and the interests of the deceased; and in the meantime do nothing
while the rights and the properties of the decedent are violated or dissipated.
The heirs of the estate of Oscar Casa do not need to first secure the appointment of an administrator of his estate,
because from the very moment of his death, they stepped into his shoes and acquired his rights as devisee/legatee
of the deceased Loreto San Juan. Thus, a prior appointment of an administrator or executor of the estate of Oscar
Casa is not necessary for his heirs to acquire legal capacity to be substituted as representatives of the estate.
42
Said
heirs may designate one or some of them as their representative before the trial court.

3. SARSABA VS VDA DE TE
Facts: This case rooted out from the judgment in the NLRC case (PatricioSereno v. TeodoroGasing/Truck
Operator) rendering a decision in favour of sereno which was satisfied through issuance of writ of execution of the
truck which is in possession of Gasing.
Respondent Fe Vda.deTe, represented by her attorney-in-fact, Faustino Castaeda, filed with the RTC, a Complaint
for recovery of motor vehicle, damages with prayer for the delivery of the truck pendentelite against petitioner,
Sereno, Lavarez and the NLRC of Davao City.
Respondent alleged that: she is the wife of the late Pedro Te, the registered owner of the truck, as evidenced by the
Official Receip and Certificate of Registration; Gasing merely rented the truck from her.
petitioner denied the material allegations in the complaint. Specifically, he cited as affirmative defenses that:
respondent had no legal personality to sue, as she had no interest over the motor vehicle; that there was no
showing that the heirs have filed an intestate estate proceedings of the estate of Pedro Te, or that respondent was
duly authorized by her co-heirs to file the case.
It appeared that the respondent, Fe Vda. deTe, died on April 12, 2005
Issue: W/N respondent's attorney-in-fact, Faustino Castaeda, be discharged as he has no more legal personality
to sue on behalf of FeVda. deTe, who passed away on April 12, 2005, during the pendency of the case before the
RTC.
Held: When a party to a pending action dies and the claim is not extinguished, the Rules of Court require a
substitution of the deceased.[44] Section 1, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court enumerates the actions that survived and
may be filed against the decedent's representatives as follows: (1) actions to recover real or personal property or
an interest thereon, (2) actions to enforce liens thereon, and (3) actions to recover damages for an injury to a
person or a property. In such cases, a counsel is obliged to inform the court of the death of his client and give the
name and address of the latter's legal representative
The rule on substitution of parties is governed by Section 16, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended.
Strictly speaking, the rule on substitution by heirs is not a matter of jurisdiction, but a requirement of due
process. The rule on substitution was crafted to protect every party's right to due process. It was designed to
ensure that the deceased party would continue to be properly represented in the suit through his heirs or the duly
appointed legal representative of his estate. Moreover, non-compliance with the Rules results in the denial of the
right to due process for the heirs who, though not duly notified of the proceedings, would be substantially affected
by the decision rendered therein. Thus, it is only when there is a denial of due process, as when the deceased is
not represented by any legal representative or heir, that the court nullifies the trial proceedings and the resulting
judgment therein.
In the case before Us, it appears that respondent's counsel did not make any manifestation before the RTC as to
her death. In fact, he had actively participated in the proceedings. Neither had he shown any proof that he had
been retained by respondent's legal representative or any one who succeeded her.
However, We do not believe that such ground would cause the dismissal of the complaint. For as We have said,
Civil Case No. 3488, which is an action for the recovery of a personal property, a motor vehicle, is an action that
survives pursuant to Section 1, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court. As such, it is not extinguished by the death of a party.

4. HEIRS OF DORONIO vs. HEIRS OF DORONIO
Facts: Spouses Simeon Doronio and Cornelia Gantedeceased,were the registered owners of a parcel of land located
at Pangasinan.MarcelinoDoronio and Fortunato Doronio, deceased, were the children of the spouses and the
parties in this case aretheir heirs.Petitioners are the heirs of MarcelinoDoronio, while respondents are the heirs of
Fortunato Doronio.
Eager to obtain the entire property, the heirs of MarcelinoDoronio and Veronica Pico filed before the RTC
inUrdaneta, Pangasinana petition "For the Registration of a Private Deed of Donation.
No respondents were named in the said petition although notices of hearing were posted on the bulletin boards of
Barangay Cabalitaan, Municipalities of Asingan and Lingayen. During the hearings, no one interposed an objection
tothe petition. Afterthe RTC ordered a general default, the petition was eventually granted on September 22,
1993.This led to the registration of the deed of donation, cancellation of OCT No. 352 and issuance of anew
TransferCertificate of Title (TCT) No. 44481 in the names of MarcelinoDoronio and Veronica Pico. Thus, the entire
propertywas titled in the names of petitioners predecessors.
On April 28, 1994, the heirs of Fortunato Doronio filed a pleading before the RTC in the form of a petition in the
same Petition Case No. U-920. The petition was for the reconsideration of the decision of the RTC that ordered the
registration of the subject deed of donation. It was prayed in the petition that an order be issued declaring null and
void the registration of the private deed of donation and that TCT No. 44481 be cancelled. However, the petition
was dismissed on May 13, 1994 on the ground that the decision in Petition Case No. U-920 had already become
final as it was not appealed.
Issue: Can respondents be bound by the decision in the petition even if they were not made parties in the saidcase?

Held: Petitioners cannot use the finality of the RTC decision in Petition Case No. U-920 as a shield against the
verification of thevalidity of the deed of donation. According to petitioners, the said final decision is one for
quieting of title. In other words, it is acase for declaratory relief under Rule 64 (now Rule 63) of the Rules of Court.
Suits to quiet title are not technically suits in rem,nor are they, strictly speaking, in personam, but being against the
person in respect of the res, these proceedings arecharacterized as quasi in rem. The judgment in such proceedings
is conclusive only between the parties. Thus, respondents arenot bound by the decision in Petition Case No. U-920
as they were not made parties in the said case.The rules on quieting of title expressly provide that any declaration
in a suit to quiet title shall not prejudice persons who are not parties to the action.That respondent filed a
subsequent pleading in the same Petition Case No. U-920 after the decision there had become final didnot change
the fact that said decision became final without their being impleaded in the case. Said subsequent pleading
wasdismissed onthe ground of finality of the decision

5. Bernardo vs CA
Facts: EusebioCapili and Hermogena Reyes were husband and wife. The first died and a testate proceeding for the
settlement of his estate was instituted in the Court of the Fist Instance of Bulacan. His will was admitted to probate
disposing of his properties in favor of his widow; his cousins Armando, Ursula, and Buenaventura, all surnamed
Capili; and Arturo, Deogracias and Eduardo, all surnamed Bernardo.
Hermogena Reyes herself died later. Upon petition of Deogracias Bernardo, executor of the estate of the deceased
EusebioCapili, she was substituted by her collateral relatives and intestate heirs, namely, Marcos, Vicente,
Francisco and Dominga, all surnamed Reyes; and Jose, Constancia, Raymunda and Elena, all surnamed Isidoro.
Subsequently, the executor filed a project of partition in the testate proceeding in accordance with the terms of the
will, adjudicating the estate of EusebioCapili among the testamentary heirs with the exception of Hermogena
Reyes, whose share was alloted to her collateral relatives aforementioned. These relatives filed an opposition to
the executor's project of partition and submitted a counter-project of partition of their own, claiming 1/2 of the
properties mentioned in the will of the deceased EusebioCapili on the theory that they belonged not to the latter
alone but to the conjugal partnership of the spouses.
The probate court issued an order declaring the donation void without making any specific finding as to its
juridical nature, that is, whether it was inter vivos or mortis causa, for the reason that, considered under the first
category, it falls under Article 133 of the Civil Code, which prohibits donations between spouses during the
marriage; and considered under the second category, it does not comply with the formalities of a will as required
by Article 728 in relation to Article 805 of the same Code, there being no attestation clause. In the same order the
court disapproved both projects of partition and directed the executor to file another," dividing the property
mentioned in the last will and testament of the deceased EusebioCapili and the properties mentioned in the deed of
donationbetween the instituted heirs of the deceased EusebioCapili and the legal heirs of the deceased Hermogena
Reyes, upon the basis that the said properties were conjugal properties of the deceased spouses.
The CA affirmed.


Issue: Whether or not he appellate court erred in not declaring that the probate court, having limited and special
jurisdiction, had generally no power to adjudicate title and erred in applying the exception to the rule

Held: In the case now before us, the matter in controversy is the question of ownership of certain of the properties
involved whether they belong to the conjugal partnership or to the husband exclusively. This is a matter
properly within the jurisdiction of the probate court which necessarily has to liquidate the conjugal partnership in
order to determine the estate of the decedent which is to be distributed among his heirs who are all parties to the
proceedings, including, of course, the widow, now represented because of her death, by her heirs who have been
substituted upon petition of the executor himself and who have appeared voluntarily. There are no third parties
whose rights may be affected. It is true that the heirs of the deceased widow are not heirs of the testator-husband,
but the widow is, in addition to her own right to the conjugal property. And it is this right that is being sought to be
enforced by her substitutes. Therefore, the claim that is being asserted is one belonging to an heir to the testator
and, consequently, it complies with the requirement of the exception that the parties interested (the petitioners
and the widow, represented by dents) are all heirs claiming title under the testator.
Petitioners contend additionally that they have never submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the probate court,
for the purpose of the determination of the question of ownership of the disputed properties. This is not borne by
the admitted facts. On the contrary, it is undisputed that they were the ones who presented the project of partition
claiming the questioned properties as part of the testator's asset. The respondents, as representatives or
substitutes of the deceased widow opposed the project of partition and submitted another.
Petitioners-appellants claim that appellees are estopped to raise the question of ownership of the properties
involved because the widow herself, during her lifetime, not only did not object to the inclusion of these properties
in the inventory of the assets of her deceased husband, but also signed an extra-judicial partition of those
inventoried properties. In the present case, the deceased widow acted as she did because of the deed of donation
she executed in favor of her husband not knowing that such deed was illegal, if inter-vivos, and ineffectual if
mortis-causa, as it has not been executed with the required formalities similar to a will.



6. ANCHETA vs. DALAYGON
Facts: Spouses Audrey ONeill (Audrey) and W. Richard Guersey (Richard) were American citizens who have
resided in the Philippines for 30 years. They have an adopted daughter, Kyle Guersey Hill (Kyle). Audrey died in
1979. She left a will wherein she bequeathed her entire estate to Richard consisting of Audreys conjugal share in
real estate improvements at Forbes Park, current account with cash balance and shares of stock in A/G Interiors.
Two years after her death, Richard married CandelariaGuersey-Dalaygon. Four years thereafter, Richard died and
left a will wherein he bequeathed his entire estate to respondent, except for his shares in A/G, which he left to his
adopted daughter.
Petitioner, as ancillary administrator in the court where Audreys will was admitted to probate, filed a motion to
declare Richard and Kyle as heirs of Audrey and a project of partition of Audreys estate. The motion and project of
partition were granted. Meanwhile, the ancillary administrator with regards to Richards will also filed a project of
partition, leaving 2/5 of Richards undivided interest in the Forbes property was allocated to respondent
Candelaria, while 3/5 thereof was allocated to their three children. Respondent opposed on the ground that under
the law of the State of Maryland, where Richard was a native of, a legacy passes to the legatee the entire interest of
the testator in the property subject to the legacy.

Issue: Whether or not the decree of distribution may still be annulled under the circumstances.

Held: A decree of distribution of the estate of a deceased person vests the title to the land of the estate in the
distributees, which, if erroneous may be corrected by a timely appeal. Once it becomes final, its binding effect is
like any other judgment in rem.
However, in exceptional cases, a final decree of distribution of the estate may be set aside for lack of jurisdiction or
fraud. Further, in Ramon vs. Ortuzar, the Court ruled that a party interested in a probate proceeding may have a
final liquidation set aside when he is left out by reason of circumstances beyond his control or through mistake or
inadvertence not imputable to negligence.
Petitioners failure to proficiently manage the distribution of Audreys estate according to the terms of her will and
as dictated by the applicable law amounted to extrinsic fraud. Hence the CA Decision annulling the RTC Orders
dated February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988, must be upheld.

7. Quasha Ancheta Pea and Nolasco Law Office v. LCN Construction Corp.,

FACTS:Raymond Triviere passed away and proceedings for the settlement of his estate were instituted by his
widow, Amy Consuelo Triviere. Atty. Syquia and Atty. Quasha of the Quasha Law Office, representing the widow
and the children of the deceased, respectively, were appointed administrators of the estate of the deceased. As
administrators, Atty. Syquia and Atty. Quasha incurred expenses for the payment of real estate taxes, security
services, and the preservation and administration of the estate as well as litigation expenses.
Atty. Syquia and Atty. Quasha filed before the RTC a Motion for Payment of their litigation expenses. Citing their
failure to submit an accounting of the assets and liabilities of the estate under administration, the RTC denied the
Motion for Payment and ordered an advance award of the shares to children and widow of Raymond Triviere.
In 1996, Atty. Syquia passed away and Atty. Zapata also of Quasha Law Office, took over as the counsel of the
Triviere children and continued to help Atty. Syquia in the settlement of the estate. On September 2002, Atty.
Syquia and Atty. Zapata filed another Motion for Payment for their own behalf and for their respective clients,
claiming for the payment of attorneys fees and litigation expenses. LCN as the only remaining claimant against the
Intestate Estate of the Late Triviere in Special Proceedings filed its comment on/ opposition of the aforementioned
motion contending that the RTC had already resolved the issue of payment of litigation expenses when it denied
the First Motion for Payment filed by Atty. Syquia and Atty. Quasha

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the advance award of shares by the RTC to petitioner children and the widow of the late
Raymond Triviere pending LCNs claim against the estate of the former is valid.

2. Whether or not the award of attorneys fees in favor of any one of the lawyers of Quasha Law Office is
proper.
HELD:
1. No. Section 2, Rule 109 of the Revised Rules of Court expressly recognizes advance distribution of the
estate, thus:
Section 2. Advance distribution in special proceedings. - Notwithstanding a pending controversy or appeal
in proceedings to settle the estate of a decedent, the court may, in its discretion and upon such terms as it
may deem proper and just, permit that such part of the estate as may not be affected by the controversy or
appeal be distributed among the heirs or legatees, upon compliance with the conditions set forth in Rule 90
of these rules. The second paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 90 of the Revised Rules of Court allows the
distribution of the estate prior to the payment of the obligations mentioned therein, provided that "the
distributees, or any of them, gives a bond, in a sum to be fixed by the court, conditioned for the payment of
said obligations within such time as the court directs."
There is no showing that the RTC, in awarding to the petitioner children and widow their shares in the
estate prior to the settlement of all its obligations, complied with these two requirements or, at the very
least, took the same into consideration. Taking into account that the claim of LCN against the estate of the
late Raymond Triviere allegedly amounted to P6,016,570.65, already in excess of the P4,738,558.63
reported total value of the estate, the RTC should have been more prudent in approving the advance
distribution of the same.

Where, however, the estate has sufficient assets to ensure equitable distribution of the inheritance in
accordance with law and the final judgment in the proceedings and it does not appear there are unpaid
obligations, as contemplated in Rule 90, for which provisions should have been made or a bond required,
such partial distribution may be allowed. No similar determination on sufficiency of assets or absence of
any outstanding obligations of the estate of the late Raymond Triviere was made by the RTC in this case. In
fact, there is a pending claim by LCN against the estate, and the amount thereof exceeds the value of the
entire estate.


2. NO. Nothing in the records, however reveals that any one of the lawyers of Quasha Law Office was indeed a
substitute administrator of Atty. Quasha upon his death.

The court has jurisdiction to appoint an administrator of an estate by granting letters of administration to a
person not otherwise disqualified or incompetent to severe as such, following the procedure laid down in
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court. Corollary thereto, Section 2, Rule 82 of the Rules of Court provides
in clear and unequivocal terms the modes for replacing an administrator of an estate upon the death of an
administrator, to wit:
Section 2. Court may remove or accept resignation of executor or administrator. Proceedings upon
death, resignation, or removal. x x x.
When an executor or administrator dies, resigns, or is removed the remaining executor or
administrator may administer the trust alone, unless the court grants letters to someone to act with him. If
there is no remaining executor or administrator, administration may be granted to any suitable person.
The records of the case are wanting in evidence that Quasha Law Office or any of its lawyers substituted
Atty. Quasha as co-administrator of the estate since it was never even issued letters of administration.
The attorneys fees therefore, cannot be covered by the prohibition in the paragraph 3, Section 7, Rule
85 of the Revised Rules of Court against an attorney, to charge against the estate professional fees for legal
services rendered by them.




8. Ariagavda. De Guerrea, Et al. vs. Suplico

FACTS: Ricardo Gurrea, represented by and through his counsel Atty. Enrique Suplico (the defendant), filed an
Opposition in Special Proc. No. 7185. Inconsideration of said representation, Ricardo Gurrea agreed to pay Atty.
Suplico "a contingent fee of twenty (20%) of whatever is due me, either realor personal property" . During the
pendency of the proceedings and upon the oral instructions of Ricardo Gurrea, Atty. Supliconegotiated with the
other heirs of Adelina Gurrea regarding the transfer of the piso (apartment building) in Spain to Ricardo Gurreas
daughter, JulietGurrea de Melendres. Ricardo Gurrea further instructed Atty. Suplico not to enter into any
settlement with the heirs unless the piso is transferred tohis daughter. Finally, the transfer of the piso worth
P64,000.00 was executed and the heirs arrived at an amicable settlement regarding the estate of AdelinaGurrea.
Hence, Ricardo Gurrea withdrew his Opposition and the heirs then drew up a project of partition which was
eventually approved bythe probate court.
As payment of his attorneys fees, Ricardo Gurrea offered the San Juan lot to Atty. Suplico who was initially hesitant
to accept the same as the property is occupied by squatters. However, in order not to antagonize his client, Atty.
Suplico agreed to Ricardo Gurreas proposal with the further understanding that he will receive an additional
commission of 5% if he sells the Baguio property. Thereafter, the deed of Transfer of Rights andInterest was
drafted. The said deed was presented to Ricardo Gurrea for his signature.
On August 20, 1975, the deed was finally signed by RicardoGurrea at the office of Atty. Pama, in the presence of the
latter, Atty. Suplico, Victor Tupas and another person, the last two acting as witnesses. Later, on October 7, 1980,
Atty. Suplico registered the deed and obtained a title/TCT to the San Juan property under his name. Ricardo Gurrea
died on October 22, 1980. After his death, his heirs instituted Special Pro. No. 2722 for the settlement of Ricardo
Gurreas estate.

In the said proceedings ,Atty. Suplico filed several claims for unpaid attorneys fees (no claim was filed relative to
Special Proc. No. 7185); however, all were dismissed with finality. Also in the same case, the estates administrator,
Carlos Gurrea, filed an Inventory of Properties left by the decedent ,which did not initially include the property
subject of this case. The said lot was included only subsequently in the Amended Inventory.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT, ASSUMING THE TRANSFER OF RIGHTS AND INTERESTS DULY EXECUTED BY
RICARDO GURREAVIOLATES ARTICLE 1491 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE AND, THEREFORE, NULL AND VOID.

HELD: Article 1491(5) of the Civil Code provides:1491. The following persons cannot acquire by purchase, even at
a public or judicial auction, either in person or through the mediation of another:(5) Justices, judges, prosecuting
attorneys, clerks of superior and inferior courts, and other officers and employees connected with the
administration of justice, the property and rights in litigation or levied upon an execution before the court within
whose jurisdiction or territory they exercise their respective functions; this prohibition includes the act of
acquiring by assignment and shall apply to lawyers, with respect to the property and rights which may be the
object of any litigation in which they may take part by virtue of their profession. According to the evidence for the
defendant, a Motion for Termination of Proceeding and Discharge of the Executor and Bond dated June 20,
1975was filed in the case, alleging in paragraphs 3 and 5 thereof, that the executor Angel E. Ordoez has already
turned over to the respective heirs and devisees all their respective shares in accordance with the Project of
Partition duly approved by the Court. Thereafter, more than one month from the filing thereof, the Transfer of
Rights and Interest was executed on August 20, 1975. Hence, at the time of the execution of the questioned
document, it may be concluded that Special Proceedings No. 7185 had been terminated. The property in San Juan is
no longer the subject of a litigation and may be alienated by the client to his lawyer as payment of attorneys fees
rendered. It is clear from the above-quoted ruling of the trial court that its sole basis in concluding that Special
Proceedings No. 7185 had been terminated and that the subject property is no longer the object of litigation at the
time the deed of Transfer of Rights and Interest was executed on August 20, 1975 is the allegation of the executor,
Angel E. Ordoez, in his Motion for Termination of Proceeding and Discharge of the Executor and Bond dated June
20, 1975, that he had already turned over to the respective heirs and devisees all their respective shares in
accordance with the project of partition duly approved by the probate court.

In the present case, there is no proof to show that at the time the deed of Transfer of Rights and Interest was
executed, the probate court had issued an order granting the Motion for Termination of Proceeding and Discharge
of the Executor and Bond. Since the judge has yet to act on the above-mentioned motion, it follows that the subject
property which is the subject matter of the deed of Transfer of Rights and Interest, is still the object of litigation
that is Special Proceedings No. 7185. Furthermore, we agree with the petitioners undisputed contention that when
the deed of Transfer of Rights and Interest was executed, the title over the subject lot was still in the name of
Adelina Gurrea and that it was only on October 7, 1980 that the title was transferred in the name of Ricardo. The
probate court loses jurisdiction of an estate under administration only after the payment of all the debts and the
remaining estate delivered to the heirs entitled to receive the same. In the present case, while the subject lot was
assigned as Ricardos share in the project of partition executed by the heirs of Adelina Gurrea, the title over the
subject lot was still in the name of the latter and was not yet conveyed to Ricardo when the Transfer of Rights and
Interest was executed. It having been established that the subject property was still the object of litigation at the
time the subject deed of Transfer of Rights and Interest was executed, the assignment of rights and interest over
the subject property in favor of respondent is null and void for being violative of the provisions of Article 1491 of
the Civil Code which expressly prohibits lawyers from acquiring property or rights which may be the object of any
litigation in which they may take part by virtue of their profession.

9. TIMBOL V. CANO
Facts: Mercedes Cano died leaving her only son Floranto Timbol as sole heir. Her brother, Jose Cano, was
appointed judicial administrator. Jose proposed that the agricultural lands of the estate be leased to him at P4,000
which was approved by the court. The court later on approved the reduction of rent to P2,400 and the conversion
of some of the agricultural lands to a subdivision. A year later, a project of partition was approved by court
designating Florante as the sole heir and he was appointed judicial administrator. He then proposed moved that
the area designated for the subdivision be increased but was opposed by Jose because the enlargement of the
subdivision would reduce the land leased to him and his tenants will lose their landholdings. Nevertheless, the
court approved Florantes petition hence the case at bar.

Issue: W/N the probate court has jurisdiction to annul rights under the contract of lease though it would prejudice
the lessee

Held: YES
In probate proceedings, the court orders the probate of the will of the decedent, grants letters of administration of
the party best entitled thereto, supervises and controls all acts of administration, hears and approves claims
against the estate of the deceased, orders payment of lawful debts, authorizes sale, mortgage, or any encumbrance
or real estate, directs the delivery of the estate to those entitled. The lease was obtained with the courts approval
hence if the probate court has the right to approve the lease, so may it order its revocation or reduction of the
subject of the lease.
And though lessee may be prejudiced by the reduction, reduction alone cannot bar the reduction of the land leased
because such reduction is necessary to raise funds to pay and liquidate the debts of the estate under
administration.



10. JUANITA LOPEZ GUILAS vs. JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF PAMPANGA AND ALEJANDRO
LOPEZ
Facts : Jacinta Limson de Lopez was married to Alejandro Lopez y Siongco. They had no children. Jacinta executed
a will instituting her husband Alejandro as her sole heir and executor. Petitioner Juanita Lopez, then single and
now married to Federico Guilas, was declared legally adopted
daughter and legal heir of the spouses Jacinta and Alejandro. After adopting legally Juanita Lopez, the testatrix
Doa Jacinta did not execute another will or codicil so as to include Juanita Lopez as one of her heirs.
In an order in the Testate Proceedings the will was admitted to probate and the surviving husband, Alejandro, was
appointed executor without bond by the CFI of Pampanga. Neverthless, both Alejandro and Juanita executed a
project partition, approved by the lower court on and directed that the records of the case be sent to the archives,
upon payment of the estate and inheritance taxes.
Juanita filed a separate ordinary action to set aside and annul the project of partition, on the ground of lesion,
perpetration and fraud, and pray further that Alejandro be ordered to submit a statement of accounts of all the
crops and to deliver immediately to Juanita the lots allocated to her. Meanwhile, in the Testate Proceedings, Juanita
filed a petition praying that Alejandro be directed to deliver to her the actual possession of said lots and its
produce. Alejandro opposed the separate petition alleging the testate proceedings had already been closed and
terminated; and that he ceased as a consequence to be the executor of the estate of the deceased; and that Juanita is
guilty of laches and negligence in filing the petition of the delivery of her share 4 years after such closure of the
estate. The parties have agreed to suspend action or resolution upon the said petition for the delivery of shares
until; after the civil action aforementioned has been finally settled and decided. TC denied Juanita's petition on the
ground that the parties themselves agreed to suspend resolution of her petition for the delivery of her shares until
after the civil action for annulment of the project of partition has been finally settled and decided. Hence this
petition for certiorari and mandamus.
Issue : WON the project partition approved by the TC ordering it closed and terminated terminated the Probate
proceeding?
HELD : No. The probate court loses jurisdiction of an estate under administration only after the payment of all the
debts and the remaining estate delivered to the heirs entitled to receive the same. The finality of the approval of
the project of partition by itself alone does not terminate the probate proceeding. As long as the order of the
distribution of the estate has not been complied with, the probate proceedings cannot be deemed closed and
terminated because a judicial partition is not final and conclusive and does not prevent the heir from bringing an
action to obtain his share, provided the prescriptive period has not elapsed. The better practice, for the heir who
has not received his share, is to demand his share through a proper motion in the same probate or administration
proceedings, or for re-opening of the probate or administrative proceedings if it had already been closed, and not
through an independent action, which would be tried by another court or Judge which may thus reverse a decision
or order of the probate on intestate court already final and executed and re-shuffle properties long ago distributed
and disposed of. Sec. 1 of Rule 90 of the RC as, which secures for the heirs or legatees the right to "demand and
recover their respective shares from the executor or administrator, or any other person having the same in his
possession", re-states the doctrines. In the case at bar, the motion filed by petitioner for the delivery of her share
was filed on July 20, 1964, which is less than 3 years from August 28, 1961 when the amended project of partition
was approved and which is within the 5-year period for the execution of judgment by motion.

11. Silverio v. CA

Facts: The instant controversy stemmed from the settlement of estate of the deceased Beatriz Silverio. After her
death, her surviving spouse, Ricardo Silverio, Sr., filed an intestate proceeding for the settlement of her estate. On
November 16, 2004, during the pendency of the case, Ricardo Silverio, Jr. filed a petition to remove Ricardo C.
Silverio, Sr. as the administrator of the subject estate. On January 3, 2005, the RTC issued an Order granting the
petition and removing Ricardo Silverio, Sr. as administrator of the estate, while appointing Ricardo Silverio, Jr. as
the new administrator. On January 26, 2005, Nelia S. Silverio-Dee filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order
dated January 3, 2005, as well as all other related orders.

On May 31, 2005, the RTC issued an Omnibus Order ordering Nelia Silverio-Dee to vacate the premises of the
property located at No. 3, Intsia Road, Forbes Park, Makati City. She received a copy of the said Order on June 8,
2005. Instead of filing a Notice of Appeal and Record on Appeal, private respondent filed a motion for
reconsideration of the Order. This motion for reconsideration was denied in an Order dated December 12,
2005. This Order was received by private respondent on December 22, 2005. On January 6, 2006, private
respondent filed her Notice of Appeal while she filed her Record on Appeal on January 23, 2006.

Thus, on April 2, 2007, the RTC issued an Order denying the appeal on the ground that it was not perfected within
the reglementary period. The RTC further issued a writ of execution for the enforcement of the Order dated May
31, 2005 against private respondent to vacate the premises. Consequently, private respondent filed a Petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition dated May 2, 2007 with the CA. On May 4, 2007, the CA issued the assailed Resolution
granting the prayer for the issuance of a TRO.

Issue: WON the Omnibus Order dated May 31, 2005 and the Order dated December 12, 2005 are Interlocutory
Orders which are not subject to appeal under Sec. 1 of Rule 41.

Held: The Orders are interlocutory and thus, cannot be appealed. The denial of due course by the RTC was based
on two (2) grounds: (1) that Nelia Silverio-Dees appeal was against an order denying a motion for reconsideration
which is disallowed under Sec. 1(a), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court; and (2) that Nelia Silverio-Dees Record on
Appeal was filed beyond the reglementary period to file an appeal provided under Sec. 3 of Rule 41. Petitioner
argues that because private respondent filed a Notice of Appeal from the Order dated December 12, 2005 which
denied her motion for reconsideration of the Omnibus Order dated May 31, 2005, her appeal is of an order denying
a motion for reconsideration. Thus, petitioner alleges that private respondent employed the wrong remedy in filing
a notice of appeal and should have filed a petition for certiorari with the CA under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
instead.

A final order is one that disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or terminates a particular proceeding or
action, leaving nothing else to be done but to enforce by execution what has been determined by the court,
while an interlocutory order is one which does not dispose of the case completely but leaves something to
be decided upon. Additionally, it is only after a judgment has been rendered in the case that the ground for the
appeal of the interlocutory order may be included in the appeal of the judgment itself. The interlocutory order
generally cannot be appealed separately from the judgment. It is only when such interlocutory order was rendered
without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion that certiorari under Rule 65 may be resorted
to.

In the instant case, Nelia Silverio-Dee appealed the May 31, 2005 Order of the RTC on the ground that it ordered
her to vacate the premises of the property located at No. 3 Intsia Road, Forbes Park, Makati City. On that aspect the
order is not a final determination of the case or of the issue of distribution of the shares of the heirs in the estate or
their rights therein. The purported authority of Nelia Silverio-Dee, which she allegedly secured from Ricardo
Silverio, Sr., was never approved by the probate court. She, therefore, never had any real interest in the specific
property located at No. 3 Intsia Road,Forbes Park, Makati City. As such, the May 31, 2005 Order of the RTC must be
considered as interlocutory and, therefore, not subject to an appeal. Thus, private respondent employed the wrong
mode of appeal by filing a Notice of Appeal with the RTC. Hence, for employing the improper mode of appeal, the
case should have been dismissed.

The implication of such improper appeal is that the notice of appeal did not toll the reglementary period for the
filing of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, the proper remedy in the instant case. This means that private
respondent has now lost her remedy of appeal from the May 31, 2005 Order of the RTC.


12.) Mari v. Bonilla, 83 SCRA 1137
Facts: Casimiro Evangelista was married to Leonida Mari. During their marriage, they begot two children, Caridad
and Deogracias Evangelista. Casimiro died intestate.
Deogracias Evangelista alleging to be the only heir of Casimiro Evangelista, executed a declaration of
heirship, and sold the disputed property that same day to the defendant spouses, Isaac Bonilla and Silvina Ordaez.
Thereafter, the defendants assumed possession of the land, and the harvested the crops and everything planted
thereof. The defendants did not know that Leonida Mari is the mother of Deogracias Evangelista at the time when
he bought the land as Deogracias Evangelista was living with his grandfather, and that Caridad Evangelista was
living with her mother, Leonida Mari.
The judge rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. Hence, this action was brought to recover plaintiffs
combined 3/4 share in a parcel of land sold to defendants by Deogracias Evangelista, plaintiffs co-owner. The
defendants invoked good faith.
Issue: Whether the plaintiff may still file an action for the recovery of her share.
Held: Yes. A judicial partition in probate proceedings does not bind the heirs who were not parties thereto. No
partition, judicial or extrajudicial, could add one iota or particle to the interest which the partitioners had during
the joint possession. Partition is of the nature of a conveyance of ownership, and certainly none of the co-owners
may convey to the others more than his own true right. A judicial partition in probate proceedings is not final and
conclusive, and not being of such definitive character as to stop all means of redress for a co-heir who has been
deprived of his lawful share, such co-heir may still, within the prescriptive period, bring an action for
reinvindication in the province where any of the real property of the deceased may be situated. Broad perspectives
of public policy are set out in the opinion of the court in support of the wisdom of allowing a co-heir the benefits of
the law of prescription even after a partition, judicial or extrajudicial, has been had."

13.) Vda De Lopez v. Lopez, 35 SCRA 81
Facts: Saturnina M. Vda. de Lopez, judicial administratrix of the estate of the deceased (Sp. Proc. No. 3740), filed
with the lower court a project of partition adjudicating the whole estate to herself and her legitimate children with
the deceased. In an order dated March 30, 1964 the lower court approved the project of partition and declared the
intestate proceeding "terminated and closed for all legal purposes." Seventeen days thereafter, or on April 16,
1964, the minors Dahlia and Roy, both surnamed Lopez, 1 represented by their mother, Lolita B. Bachar, filed a
motion to reopen the proceeding, together with a petition claiming that they were illegitimate children of the
deceased Emilio Lopez, born out of his extra-marital relations with Lolita B. Bachar, and asking that their rights as
such be recognized and their shares in the estate given to them. The motion was opposed by the judicial
administratrix on the ground that the proceeding had already been ordered terminated and closed and the estate
was already in the hands of the distributees.
The trial court dismissed the case and ruled that the said proceeding was already ordered closed and that
the property was divided to their respective heirs. The movants filed for a motion for reconsideration but it was
denied. Hence, this petition before the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether or not the motion to reopen filed by the movants is proper.
Held: Yes. Where the movants in the motion to reopen the intestate proceedings wherein a project of partition was
undertaken, claim to be illegitimate children of the deceased but were omitted in said partition, the order declaring
the proceedings as closed does not bind them, and their motion to reopen the proceedings was proper.

14. G.R. No. 94005. April 6, 1993.

LUISA LYON NUAL, herein represented by ALBERT NUAL, and ANITA NUAL HORMIGOS, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and EMMA LYON DE LEON in her behalf and as guardian ad litem of the minors
HELEN SABARRE and KENNY SABARRE, EDUARDO GUZMAN, MERCEDEZ LYON TAUPAN, WILFREDO GUZMAN,
MALLY LYON ENCARNACION and DORA LYON DELAS PEAS, respondents.

FACTS: The case began when the respondents (Emma Lyon, as guardian ad litem of the above named respondents
) filed a case for partition of a parcel of land of the deceased Luisa Lyon Nual. Subsequently, on December 17,
1974, the RTC approved of the petition for partition. However, on January 9, 1987, the RTC issued another order
which allowed the inclusion of Mary Lyon Martin for her name also appeared in the TCT and the court presumed
her to be one of the heirs which should be included in the partition of said land.

The petitioners argued that the RTC amended its earlier decision which excluded Mary from partition, which
cannot be done according to them. They argued as such for the earlier decision is already final and executory.

ISSUE:WON the RTCs decision may still be amended?

HELD:NO. The decision cannot be amended already for it has already lapsed into finality. Being as such, the trial
court already lost jurisdiction over the case.








15.G.R. No. L-3342 April 18, 1951

Intestate Estate of the deceased Lee Liong. RAFAEL A. DINGLASAN, ET ALS., petitioners-appellees,
vs.
ANG CHIA, as Administratrix of the above intestate, LEE BING HOO alias CLARO LEE, and LEE BUN
TING,respondents-appellants.

FACTS:

Rafael Dinglasan et al. filed a case in the Court of First Instance of Capiz on February 16, 1948, against Ang Chia, her
son Claro Lee and one Lee Bun Ting to recover the ownership and possession of a parcel of land located at Capiz,
Capiz, and damages in the amount of P1,000 a month. Subsequently, Ang Chia, who was the administratrix of the
estate of Lee Lions was included in the civil case regarding ownership of the property. The court then temporarily
held in abeyance the case as to the disposition of the estate until the issue with regard to the ownership has been
settled.

The respondents argued that the court exceeded its jurisdiction when it ordered the suspension of the intestate
proceedings pending the resolution of the ownership issue for the court allegedly exceeded its jurisdiction.

ISSUE: WON the court may suspend the intestate proceedings?

HELD:YES. The court may suspend said proceedings.

The Supreme Court gave the following reason:

If the appellants filed a claim in intervention in the intestate proceedings it was only pursuant to their desire to
protect their interests it appearing that the property in litigation is involved in said proceedings and in fact is the
only property of the estate left subject of administration and distribution; and the court is justified in taking
cognizance of said civil case because of the unavoidable fact that whatever is determined in said civil case will
necessarily reflect and have a far reaching consequence in the determination and distribution of the estate. In so
taking cognizance of civil case No. V-331 the court does not assume general jurisdiction over the case but merely
makes of record its existence because of the close interrelation of the two cases and cannot therefore be branded
as having acted in excess of its jurisdiction.




16.Lorenzo v. Posadas
GR 43082

GIST: Trustee does not administer estates (Account and distribute) but rather manage estate (preserve
the estate)


Facts: The petitioner is the trustee of the estate of the testator, while the respondent a Collector of Internal
Revenue charged the petitioner for inheritance tax; which the petitioner paid in protest.
The petitioner contends that In determining the net value of the estate subject to tax, the compensation due to
trustees should be deducted.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner`s contention is meritorious.

Held: No, although a trustee is entitled to receive a fair compensation for his services, however there is no which
provides that the trustee`s commissions may be deducted in determining the net value of the estate subject to
inheritance tax.
The compensation of a trustee is earned not in the administration of the estate, but in the management of the
estate for the benefit of the legatees or devises.
And although there is no mention of the word trust in the will the same was constituted when the following
elements are all present
(1) Sufficient words to raise a trust; (intent to create a trust)
(2) A definite subject; (an heir)
(3) A certain or ascertain object. (a definite property to manage/preserve)



17.Salinas v. Tuazon
GR 33626

GIST: Trustee cannot acquire the trust estate thru prescription,
Except if
1) The trustee repudiates the trust
2) The repudiation is known by the cestui quetrust
3) The repudiation must be clear, open and unequivocal.


Facts: The petitioners are the heirs of the testator, which the latter prior to his death appointed one lahaba as his
trustee.
After the death of the testator lahaba sold one of the properties entrusted to him, after the death of Lahaba it was
discovered by the petitioners that Lahaba sold the said properties; thus the petitioners are now recovering the sum
of the purchase price.
The heirs of Lahaba the respondents herein contends that the properties entrusted to their ascendant was
acquired by their ascendant thru prescription.

Issue: Whether or not the respondent`s contention is meritorious.

Held: No, as a general rule a trust estate is cannot be acquired thru prescription.
Except if
4) The trustee repudiates the trust
5) The repudiation is known by the cestui quetrust
6) The repudiation must be clear, open and unequivocal.

And since there was no clear, open and unequivocal repudiation of the trust nor was there any proof of
knowledge on the part of cestui quetrust of the alleged repudiation, the prescription does not apply at the case at
bar.

* cestui quetrust (The heir/s /beneficiary who is entitled to the property being held in trust)


18. Estate of Cabacungan vs Laigo (about TRUSTS)
Facts: Margarita Cabacungan (Margarita) owned three parcels of unregistered land in Paringao and in Baccuit,
Bauang, La Union, each measuring 4,512 square meters, 1,986 square meters and 3,454 square meters.Margaritas
son, Roberto Laigo, Jr. (Roberto), applied for a non-immigrant visa to the United States, and to support his
application, he allegedly asked Margarita to transfer the tax declarations of the properties in his name. For said
purpose, Margarita, unknown to her other children, executed an Affidavit of Transfer of Real Property whereby the
subject properties were transferred by donation to Roberto. In 1979, RObert adopted respondents Pedro Laigo
(Pedro) and MarilouLaigo (Marilou), and then he married respondent Estella Balagot.
In 1990 Robert sold the properties to campos 1property and another property to his adopted children. The sales
were not known to Margarita and her sons. Only at 1995 at Robertos wake did they know of the transactions.
Complaint for annulment of sales ensued. Although Margarita admitted that she transferred the properties in
Roberts name, there was no intention of divesting such ownership to Him.
Defenses of Buyers: 10 year ownership prescription, Buyers in good faith.
On feb 3 1993, margarita and spouses Campos (buyer) amicably entered into a settlement. Trial court agreed with
the settlement and then dismissed the complaint against the adopted sons of Roberto.
CA upheld. barred by prescription, Laches, implied trust
ISSUE: WON CA erred
HELD: Yes SC discussed about trusts (Implied, Express, Constructive implied, read it in the full case mahabaung
discussion nila about trusts). we find that petitioner before the trial court, had actually adduced evidence to prove
the intention of Margarita to transfer to Roberto only the legal title to the properties in question, with attendant
expectation that Roberto would return the same to her on accomplishment of that specific purpose for which the
transaction was entered into. The evidence of course is not documentary, but rather testimonial through open
court statements of luz, niece, hilariaconstales (disinterested witness)
Laches - laches, being rooted in equity, is not always to be applied strictly in a way that would obliterate an
otherwise valid claim especially between blood relatives. The existence of a confidential relationship based upon
consanguinity is an important circumstance for consideration; hence, the doctrine is not to be applied
Prescription - Yet not like in the case of a resulting implied trust and an express trust, prescription supervenes in a
constructive implied trust even if the trustee does not repudiate the relationship. Prescription did no attach
because no repudation.

19. UNgab-Valeroso vs Ungab-Grado (Trusts)
UNGAB-VALERO vs. UNGAB-GRADO G. R. No. 163081, June 15, 2007
FACTS: TimoteoUngab, deceased, owned a parcel of land 14.3375 hectares in Binuni, Bacolod, Lanao Del Norte.
Petitioner is the only direct heir while respondents are heirs of the brothers and sisters of Timoteo except one
named Felix. There is a showing that petitioner and her mother signed an Affidavit of Acknowledgment recognizing
the rights of the brothers and sisters of Timoteo. In addition to that a compromise agreement was entered into by
the parties showing that a trust was given to petitioner to hold the land subject of the controversy. When
respondents asked for their share of the proceeds of the land, petitioner refused to grant the same on the ground
that there exists no co-ownership between the parties and that the latter is the sole heir of the deceased Timoteo.
The lower and appellate courts, however, ruled that there is co-ownership between the parties and that
respondents are entitled to a share of the proceeds of the land. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was an intent to create a trust despite the lack of the technical nomenclature to
express such.
RULING: When the parties started sharing the proceeds of the land, they had in effect partially executed the
compromise agreement. Such partial execution weighs heavily as evidence that they agreed on the co-ownership
arrangement. Note also that the judgment did not explicitly order the partition of the land itself, but merely
identified the rights to and respective shares of the parties in said land.
Petitioners argue that the co-ownership was already extinguished because the Civil Code provides that an
agreement to keep a thing undivided shall not exceed ten years. Indeed, the law limits the term of a co-ownership
to ten years, but this term limit may nevertheless be extended. The action to reconvey does not prescribe so long
as the property stands in the name of the trustee. To allow prescription would be tantamount to allowing a trustee
to acquire title against his principal and true owner.
Moreover, the execution of the Affidavit of Acknowledgment and the compromise agreement established an
express trust wherein the respondents, as trustors, reposed their confidence on petitioner Anita and her mother, as
trustees, that they will hold the land subject of the co-ownership. There are no particular words required in the
creation of an express trust, it being sufficient that a trust is clearly intended. This express trust is shown in the
two documents. Express trusts do not prescribe except when the trustee repudiates the trust.


20. G.R. No. 157806 November 22, 2007
SPOUSES SHEIKDING BOOC and BILY BOOC, petitioners,
vs.
FIVE STAR MARKETING CO., INC.,
FACTS: Five Star Marketing Co., Inc. (respondent) filed with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Iligan
City a Complaint for unlawful detainer against the spouses Sheikding and Bily Booc (petitioners).
Petitioners contended that Five Star has no cause of action against them as they are actually the owners of the
portion of the building that they are occupying; that the said property is owned in common by petitioner Sheikding
and his brother, Rufino Booc; that the complaint for unlawful detainer is a mere offshoot of two complaints earlier
filed before the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in Cagayan de Oro City by Sheikding and his son James,
the first of which is against the board of directors of Five Star, questioning, among others, the validity of the
election of the members of the said board; and second, a criminal complaint for falsification of public documents
against Salvador Booc, in his capacity as the President of Five Star. The spouses Booc filed a counterclaim for
damages.
In claiming that the subject lot and building were bought and constructed with the money of petitioner Sheikding
and Rufino, petitioners, in effect, aver that respondent is merely holding the property in trust for them.
ISSUE:WON there is an implied trust?
HELD: The said issue boils down to a determination of who between petitioners and respondent is entitled to the
physical possession of the subject properties.
In Arambulo v. Gungab
16
, this Court held:
The sole issue for resolution in an unlawful detainer case is physical or material possession. But even if
there was a claim of juridical possession or an assertion of ownership by the defendant, the MTCC may still
take cognizance of the case. All that the trial court can do is to make an initial determination of who is the
owner of the property so that it can resolve who is entitled to its possession absent other evidence to
resolve ownership. Courts in ejectment cases decide questions of ownership only as it is necessary to
decide the question of possession. The reason for this rule is to prevent the defendant from trifling with the
summary nature of an ejectment suit by the simple expedient of asserting ownership over the disputed
property.
17

On the basis of the foregoing, the Court finds no error in the ruling of the CA that the preponderance of evidence
lies in favor of respondent's claim of ownership. Surely, the Deed of Sale, TCT, Tax Declarations and Official
Receipts of tax payments in the name of respondent are more convincing than the evidence submitted by
petitioners.
The Court stresses, however, that its determination of ownership in the instant case is not final. It is only a
provisional determination for the sole purpose of settling the issue of possession.
40
It would not bar or
prejudice a separate action between the same parties involving the quieting of title to the subject
property.
41


21. G.R. No. 58010. March 31, 1993.
EMILIA O'LACO and HUCO LUNA, petitioners, vs. VALENTIN CO CHO CHIT, O LAY KIA and COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.
FACTS: It involves half-sisters each claiming ownership over a parcel of land. While petitioner Emilia O'Laco
asserts that she merely left the certificate of title covering the property with private respondent O Lay Kia for
safekeeping, the latter who is the former's older sister insists that the title was in her possession because she and
her husband bought the property from their conjugal funds.
The Philippine Sugar Estate Development Company, Ltd., sold a parcel of land naming Emilia O'Laco as vendee.
Private respondent-spouses Valentin Co Cho Chit and O Lay Wa learned from the newspapers that Emilia O'Laco
sold the same property to the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila for P230,000.00, with assumption of the real
estate mortgage constituted thereon.
respondent-spouses Valentin Co Cho Chit and O Lay Kia sued petitioner-spouses Emilia O'Laco and Hugo Luna to
recover the purchase price of the land before the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, respondent-spouses
asserting that petitioner Emilia O'Laco knew that they were the real vendees of the Oroquieta property sold in
1943 by Philippine Sugar Estate Development Company, Ltd., and that the legal title thereto was merely placed in
her name. They contend that Emilia O'Laco breached the trust when she sold the land to the Roman Catholic
Archbishop of Manila.
Petitioner-spouses deny the existence of any form of trust relation. They aver that Emilia O'Laco actually bought
the property with her own money; that she left the Deed of Absolute Sale and the corresponding title with
respondent-spouses merely for safekeeping; that when she asked for the return of the documents evidencing her
ownership, respondent-spouses told her that these were misplaced or lost; and, that in view of the loss, she filed a
petition for issuance of a new title.
ISSUES: WON there is a trust relation between the parties in contemplation of law.
2. WON prescription set in?

HELD: By definition, trust relations between parties may either be express or implied. Express trusts are those
which are created by the direct and positive acts of the parties, by some writing or deed, or will, or by words evincing
an intention to create a trust. Implied trusts are those which, without being express, are deducible from the nature of
the transaction as matters of intent, or which are super induced on the transaction by operation of law as matters of
equity, independently of the particular intention of the parties. Implied trusts may either be resulting or constructive
trusts, both coming into being by operation of law.
Resulting trusts are based on the equitable doctrine that valuable consideration and not legal title determines the
equitable title or interest and are presumed always to have been contemplated by the parties. They arise from the
nature or circumstances of the consideration involved in a transaction whereby one person thereby becomes
invested with legal title but is obligated in equity to hold his legal title for the benefit of another. On the other hand,
constructive trusts are created by the construction of equity in order to satisfy the demands of justice and prevent
unjust enrichment. They arise contrary to intention against one who, by fraud, duress or abuse of confidence, obtains
or holds the legal right to property which he ought not, in equity and good conscience, to hold
Until the sale of the Oroquieta property to the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, petitioner Emilia O'Laco
actually recognized the trust. Specifically, when respondent spouses learned that Emilia was getting married
to Hugo, O Lay Kia asked her to have the title to the property already transferred to her and her husband
Valentin, and Emilia assured her that "would be arranged (maaayos na)" after her wedding. Her answer was
an express recognition of the trust, otherwise, she would have refused the request outright. Petitioners never
objected to this evidence; nor did they attempt to controvert it.
2. As differentiated from constructive trusts, where the settled rule is that prescription may supervene, in resulting
trust, the rule of imprescriptibility may apply for as long as the trustee has not repudiated the trust. Once the
resulting trust is repudiated, however, it is converted into a constructive trust and is subject to prescription.
A resulting trust is repudiated if the following requisites concur: (a) the trustee has performed unequivocal acts of
repudiation amounting to an ouster of the cestui qui trust; (b) such positive acts of repudiation have been made
known to the cestui qui trust; and, (c) the evidence thereon is clear and convincing.
After all, so long as the trustee recognizes the trust, the beneficiary may rely upon the recognition, and ordinarily
will not be in fault for omitting to bring an action to enforce his rights. There is no running of the prescriptive
period if the trustee expressly recognizes the resulting trust. Since the complaint for breach of trust was filed by
respondent-spouses two (2) months after acquiring knowledge of the sale, the action therefore has not yet
prescribed.

22. G.R. Nos. L-16185-86 May 31, 1962
TRUSTEESHIP OF THE MINORS BENIGNO, ANGELA and ANTONIO, all surnamed PEREZ Y TUASON,
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, Judicial Guardian, J. ANTONIO ARANETA, trustee-appellee,
vs.
ANTONIO M. PEREZ, judicial guardian-appellant.
FACTS: These are two (2) incidents of the trusteeship of the minors Benigno, Angela and Antonio, all surnamed
Perez Y Tuason. The issue in G.R. No. L-16185 is whether or not the trustee, J. Antonio Araneta hereinafter
referred to as the appellee may be allowed to pay a sum of money to the law firm, Araneta & Araneta, of which
he is a member, for services rendered to him, in his aforementioned capacity as such trustee, in several judicial
proceedings, whereas G.R. No. L-16186 concerns the question whether the purchase of certain shares of stock nude
by the appellee for the benefit of the trusteeship merits judicial approval. Both questions were decided by the
Court of First Instance of Rizal (Quezon City Branch) in the affirmative. Hence, this appeal by Antonio M. Perez
hereinafter referred to as the appellant as guardian of the person of said minors.
Appellant assails upon the ground that, pursuant to Section 7 of Rule 86 of the Rules of Court:
When the executor or administrator is an attorney he shall not charge against the estate any professional
fees for legal services rendered by him.

ISSUE: WON SEC.7 of Rule 86 applicable to trustees?
HELD: Appellant's pretense is untenable. Said Section 7 of Rule 86 refers only to "executors or administrators"
of the estate of deceased persons, and does not necessarily apply to trustees. It is true that some functions of
the former bear a close analogy with those of the latter. Moreover, a trustee, like, an executor or administrator,
holds an office of trust, particularly when, as in the case of appellee herein, the trustee acts as such under judicial
authority. Hence, generally, the policy set forth in said Section 7 of Rule 86 basically sound and wise as it is
should be applicable to trustees. The duties of executors or administrators are, however, fixed and/or limited by
law, whereas those of trustee of an express trust like that which we have under consideration are, usually,
governed by the intention of the trustor or of the parties, if established by contract (Art. 1441, Civil Code of the
Philippines). Besides, the duties of trustees may cover a much wider range than those of executors or
administrators of the estate of deceased persons.
For the rest, it is well settled that "a trustee may be indemnified out of the trust estate for his expenses in
rendering and proving his accounts and for costs and counsel fees" in connection therewith (54 Am. Jur. 415-
416), apart from the fact that the nature of the professional services in question appeared in the records before the
lower court and that the amount of P5,500 fixed by the same as compensation for such services is not excessive.