5-1

This section is concerned with the design and operation of

pressure relieving systems for gas processing plants. The princi-
pal elements of pressure relief systems are the individual pres-
sure relief devices, the flare piping system, the flare separator
drum, and the flare including igniters, tips, sealing devices,
purge and steam injection for smokeless burning. Application
of relief devices must comply with appropriate ASME Vessel
Codes. Design of relief systems must also comply with applica-
ble state and federal codes and laws as well as the requirements
of the insurance underwriter covering the plant or installation.
State and federal regulations not only cover safety but also
environmental considerations such as air and water pollution
and noise abatement. This section presents a convenient sum-
mary of relief system information obtained from API and other
sources, abridged and modified for this data book. Final design
work should be consistent with the full scope of API, ASME,
and other code and specification requirements.
SECTION 5
Relief Systems
a = sonic velocity, m/s
A = required discharge area of the valve, cm
2
. Use
valve with the next larger standard orifice size/area
A
B
= bellows area, cm
2
A = discharge area of the valve, cm
2
, for valve with
next standard size larger than required discharge
area
A
D
= disk area, cm
2
A
N
= nozzle seat area, cm
2
A
P
= piston area, cm
2
A
w
= total wetted surface area of vessel, m
2
A
3
= vessel area exposed to fire, m
2
B = liquid expansion coefficient, 1/C, at relieving
temperature [or (Vol/Vol)/C]
C = drag coefficient
C
p
= specific heat at constant pressure, kJ/(kg K)
Cv = specific heat at constant volume, kJ/(kg K)
C
1
= coefficient determined by the ratio of specific
heats of the gas or vapor at standard conditions
d = flare tip diameter, mm
D = particle diameter, m
f = correction factor based on the ratio of specific heats
F = environment factor (see Fig. 5-16)
F = relief valve factor, dimensionless
F* = fraction of heat radiated
F
2
= coefficient for subcritical flow (Fig. 5-12)
F
s
= spring force, Newtons
g = acceleration due to gravity, 9.81 m/s
2
G = relative density of gas referred to air = 1.00 at
15C and 101.325 kPa (abs); or, if liquid, the relative
density of liquid at flowing temperature referred to
water = 1.00 at 15C
h
L1
= enthalpy of saturated liquid at upstream
pressure, kJ/kg
h
L2
= enthalpy of saturated liquid at downstream
pressure, kJ/kg
h
G2
= enthalpy of vapor at downstream pressure, kJ/kg
H = height of vapor space of vessel, m
H
l
= latent heat of the liquid exposed to fire, kJ/kg
H
S
= flare stack height, m
FIG. 5-1
Nomenclature
I = radiation intensity at point X, W/m
2
k = specific heat ratio, C
p
/C
v
(see Section 13)
K
b
= capacity correction factor due to back pressure
K
c
= combination correction for rupture disk = 0.9
= 1.0 no rupture disk installed
K
d
= coefficient of discharge
K
n
= correction factor for Napier steam equation
K
sh
= correction factor due to the amount of superheat
in the stream
K
v
= capacity correction factor due to viscosity for liquid
phase pressure relief
K
w
= capacity correction factor due to back pressure for
balanced bellows pressure relief valves in liquid
service (Fig. 5-14)
L = drum length, m
L/D = length to diameter ratio of pipe
L
f
= length of flame, m
M = Mach number at pipe outlet
MW = molecular mass of gas or vapor
MABP = maximum allowable back pressure, kPa (ga)
NHV = net heating value of flare gas, kJ/kg
P = set pressure, kPa (ga)
P
CF
= critical-flow pressure, kPa (abs)
P
n
= normal operating gas pressure, kPa (abs)
P
1
= upstream relieving pressure, kPa (abs). This is
the set pressure plus the allowable overpressure
plus the atmospheric pressure
P
1g
= upstream relieving pressure, kPa (ga). This is the
set pressure plus the allowable overpressure
P
2
= downstream pressure at the valve outlet, kPa (abs)
P
b
= back pressure, kPa (ga)
P = pressure drop, kPa
P
w
= pressure drop, mm of water
Q = heat input, W
Q
r
= heat released, W
Q
v
= flow through valve, m
3
/h at standard conditions
(101.325 kPa (abs), 0C)
r = ratio of downstream pressure to upstream pres-
sure, P
2
/P
1
R = distance from flame center to point X, m
5-2
DOCUMENTATION
A facilitys documentation allows the user to determine that
the facility was designed in accordance with relevant codes and
standards. The relief system design documentation is one facet
of the overall facility documentation, which helps demonstrate
that the process can be operated in a safe manner. Any equip-
ment modifications, operations, or changes made to process pa-
rameters, or operating procedures, can have a direct impact on
the relief system, and should therefore be documented as part
of a facility management of change (MOC) process.
The relief system documentation should demonstrate that
all pressure-containing equipment has been identified and that
the overpressure protection has been analyzed. Documenta-
tion based on the individual protected systems can facilitate
ensuring that all systems requiring pressure protection have
been identified. The documentation should show that potential
causes of overpressure have been identified, rationale has been
provided as to whether a scenario is or is not credible, and cred-
ible causes of overpressure have been evaluated. The design
basis of the disposal system, including all assumptions made
in the determination of controlling load(s), and calculated back
pressure at each relief device should be documented. A detailed
list of documentation requirements is presented in ISO 23251
(API Std 521).
HAZARD REVIEWS
Appropriate hazard reviews, as a part of a Process Safety
Management Program, are required by U.S. OSHA-29 CFR
Part 1910 in the United States, and by similar regulations in
most other localities in the world. These reviews are conducted
during the design phase, prior to operation, and periodically
during operation. The relief device sizing, and relief and dispos-
al system design, are critical components of this review. Typical
steps in this process are:
Preliminary hazard review using process flow diagrams
and a preliminary layout, to identify hazards in the pro-
cess, with the proposed facility location, and layout, and
with storage and handling of feed materials or intermedi-
ate and final products.
Early engineering hazard review with more advanced
work products.
Detailed hazards review using one of several possible
techniques sanctioned by local authorities (e.g., HAZOP,
Hazard and Operability Analysis, What-if, Quantitative
Risk Evaluation), utilizing process and instrumentation
diagrams, plot plan, and other detailed design deliver-
ables.
Safety Integrity Level (SIL) Review.
Engineering management of change (MOC) process.
Facility management of change (MOC) process.
Pre-start-up detailed hazard review.
Periodic detailed hazard review.
CAUSES OF OVERPRESSURE
Pressure relief valves or other relieving devices are used to
protect piping and equipment against excessive over-pressure.
Proper selection, use, location, and maintenance of relief de-
vices are essential to protect personnel and equipment as well
as to comply with codes and laws.
Determination of the maximum relief requirements may be
difficult. Loads for complex systems are determined by conser-
vative assumptions and detailed analysis. By general assump-
tion, two unrelated emergency conditions caused by unrelated
equipment failures or operator error will not occur simulta-

R
o
= universal gas constant = 8314
J

kg mol K
Re = Reynolds number (dimensionless)
S = specific heat, kJ/(kg C)
t = temperature, C
T = absolute temperature of the inlet vapor, K
T
n
= normal operating gas temperature, K
T
1
= gas temperature, K, at the upstream pressure
T
w
= vessel wall temperature, K
U
d
= maximum allowable vapor velocity for vertical
vessel, m/s
V = gas velocity, m/s
V
ex
= exit velocity, m/s
V
l
= flow rate, liters/s at flowing temperature and
pressure
V
w
= wind velocity, m/s
W = flow, kg/h
W
hc
= hydrocarbon flow, kg/h
W
stm
= steam flow, kg/h
W
f
= flare gas flow rate, kg/h
W
r
= vapor rate to be relieved by the relief valve, kg/h
x
i
= weight fraction of component i in total stream
X = distance from the base of the stack to another
point at the same elevation, m
X
c
= dimensional reference for sizing a flare stack
(Fig. 5-19)
Y
c
= dimensional reference for sizing a flare stack
(Fig. 5-19)
Z = compressibility factor at flowing conditions
Greek
= prefix, indicates finite increment
= fraction of heat radiated

L
= density of liquid, kg/m
3

v
= density of vapor, kg/m
3
= angle of flare flame from vertical, degrees
= viscosity at flowing temperature, mPa s
(centipoise)

S
= viscosity at flowing temperature, Saybolt Universal
Seconds (SSU)
FIG. 5-1 (Contd)
Nomenclature
5-3
neously (no double jeopardy). The relationship and sequence of
events must be considered. ISO 23251 (API Std 521) provides fur-
ther guidance on these issues.
The development of relief loads requires the engineer to be
familiar with overall process design, including the type of pump
drives used, cooling water source, spares provided, plant layout,
instrumentation, and emergency shutdown philosophy. The de-
sign of the proper relieving device must take into consideration,
as a minimum, all of the following upset conditions for the indi-
vidual equipment item if such upset can occur. Each upset condi-
tion must be carefully evaluated to determine the worst case
condition which will dictate the relieving device capacity.
The following provides guidance for some common overpres-
sure scenarios. It must be recognized that it does not and cannot
address all potential overpressure scenarios that may be relevant
for a specific piece of process equipment. The designer should
employ the Hazard Reviews discussed above to ensure that all
credible overpressure scenarios have been incorporated into a
facilitys design.
SUMMARY OF COMMON
RELIEF SCENARIOS
Blocked Discharge
The outlet of almost any vessel, pump, compressor, fired heat-
er, or other equipment item can be blocked by mechanical failure
or human error. The relief load for many cases is the maximum
flow into the system, at relief conditions, but must be carefully
analyzed for each contingency.
Fire Exposure
Fire is one of the least predictable events which may occur in
a gas processing facility, but is a condition that may create the
greatest relieving requirements. If fire can occur on a plant-wide
basis, this condition may dictate the sizing of the entire relief sys-
tem; however, since equipment may be dispersed geographically,
the effect of fire exposure on the relief system may be limited to
a specific plot area. Various empirical equations have been devel-
oped to determine relief loads from vessels exposed to fire. For-
mula selection varies with the system and fluid considered. Fire
conditions may overpressure vapor-filled, liquid-filled, or mixed-
phase systems. See the discussion on Sizing of Relief Devices, for
details, and relief load calculation methods.
Tube Rupture
The tubes of shell and tube heat exchangers are subject to fail-
ure from a number of causes; including corrosion, thermal shock,
and vibration. In the event of such a failure, it is possibile that the
high-pressure stream can overpressure the equipment and pip-
ing connected to the low pressure side of the exchanger. A tube
rupture can also cause short duration hydraulic pressure shock,
due to the rapid acceleration of the fluid on the low pressure side
at the time of rupture.
An internal failure can vary from a leaking tube or tube sheet
to a complete tube rupture where a sharp break occurs in one tube.
The loss of containment of the low-pressure side to atmosphere is
unlikely to result from a tube rupture, if the resulting pressure on
the low-pressure side, including upstream and downstream sys-
tems, does not exceed the corrected hydrostatic test pressure.
Appropriate design options to be considered for protecting the
low pressure side equipment and piping from potential tube rup-
ture are: 1) Install a relief device (pressure relief valve or rup-
ture disk) on, or close to, the low pressure side of the heat
exchanger, 2) ensure there is an adequate open relief path,
so that the low pressure side will not be over-pressured by a
tube rupture, or 3) design the low pressure side of the heat
exchanger, and the piping and equipment in the associated
systems, such that the corrected hydro-static test pressure of
the low pressure system exceeds the high pressure side design
pressure (in some cases maximum upstream side operating
pressure may be used instead of design pressure). The best
option for each application is a function of the operating and
design pressure for each side, fluid phase on each side, fluid
type and service corrosion history, and the heat exchanger
design. Systems with gas, two phases, or a liquid which will
flash across the tube rupture, on the high pressure side, and
a liquid on the low pressure side, should be thoroughly re-
viewed, since a relief valve may be less effective in preventing
surges in these circumstances. See ISO 23251 (API Std 521)
for the definition of corrected hydro-static test pressure and
detailed guidance on this subject.
Relief protection for tube rupture is not required for dou-
ble pipe heat exchangers, if the internal parts are constructed
of schedule pipe.
Control Failure
The failure positions of instruments and control valves
must be carefully evaluated. In practice, the control valve
may not fail in the desired position. A valve may stick in the
wrong position, or a control loop may fail. Relief protection for
these factors must be provided. Relief valve sizing require-
ments for these conditions should be based on flow coeffi-
cients (manufacturer data) and pressure differentials for the
specific control valves and the facility involved. Credit can be
taken for some downstream flow paths, if ensured to be open
throughout the relief event. No favorable control valve action
may be assumed. In addition, the relief load determination
should take into account that the liquid level in the upstream
vessel may be lost, causing gas blow-by through the open con-
trol valve.
ISO 23251 (API Std 521) describes several relief scenarios
that consider the position of a control valve and its bypass
valve. If during operation, the bypass valve may be opened to
provide additional flow, then the total maximum flow (control
valve wide open, plus bypass valve at some position, depend-
ing on the service and facility practices, must be considered
when determining the relief load. If the bypass is opened only
during maintenance, when the control valve is blocked in af-
ter switchover, then a design based on the maximum flow
through either the control valve, or the bypass valve, which-
ever is greater, may be considered. In this case the system
must be evaluated during the facility hazard review to en-
sure that the proper administrative controls are in place to
prevent a situation in which both the control valve and the
bypass are open simultaneously.
Thermal Expansion
If isolation of a process line on the cold side of an exchanger
can result in excess pressure due to heat input from the warm
side, then the line or cold side of the exchanger should be pro-
tected by a relief valve. If any equipment item or line can be
isolated while full of liquid, a relief valve should be provided
for thermal expansion of the contained liquid. Low process
temperatures, solar radiation, heat tracing, or changes in at-
mospheric temperature can necessitate thermal overpressure
protection. Flashing across the relief valve needs to be consid-
5-4
ered. Administrative controls for block valves around heat ex-
changer are discussed in ASME Section VIII, Appendix M.
As a practical manner, thermal relief valves are not installed
in all instances where piping systems may be blocked in by two
valves. The decision to install a thermal relief valve for pip-
ing systems is typically based on the following factors: length
and size of piping, vapor pressure of the fluid at the elevated
temperature possible, volatility and/or toxicity of the fluid, po-
tential for valve leakage (metal vs. soft seated valves), and the
presence of automatic shut down valves in the system. It is
common to provide thermal relief valves for cryogenic liquid ap-
plications. Guidance for when to specify thermal relief and for
sizing of the valve are provided in ISO 23251 (API Std 521).

A
sizing equation for a simple thermal relief valve is given later
in this chapter. A 19 mm 25 mm relief valve is commonly
used for liquid filled, non-flashing piping systems containing
non-cryogenic liquids.
Utility Failure
Loss of cooling water may occur on an area-wide or plant-
wide basis. Commonly affected are fractionating columns and
other equipment utilizing water cooling. Cooling water failure
must be considered for individual relief devices. In addition, it
is often the governing case in sizing flare systems.
Electric power failure, similar to cooling water failure, may
occur on an area-wide or plant-wide basis and may have a vari-
ety of effects. Since electric pump and air cooler fan drives are
often employed in process units, a power failure may cause the
immediate loss of reflux to fractionators. Motor driven compres-
sors will also shut down. Power failures may result in major
device and flare system relief loads.
Instrument air system failure, whether related to electric
power failure or not, must be considered in sizing of the flare
system since pneumatic control loops will be interrupted. Also
control valves will assume the position as specified on loss of
air and the resulting effect on the flare system must be con-
sidered.
Fans on air cooled heat exchangers or cooling towers oc-
casionally become inoperative because of a loss of power or a
mechanical breakdown. On cooling towers and on air cooled
exchangers where independent operation of the louvers can be
maintained, credit may be taken for the cooling effect obtained
by convection and radiation in still air at ambient conditions.
Check Valve Failure
Failure of a check valve to close must be considered. A single
check valve is not an effective means for preventing overpres-
sure by reverse flow from a high-pressure source. In most cases,
focus should be on prevention of reverse flow. It is important to
note that, in addition to overpressure of the upstream system,
reverse flow through machinery can destroy rotating equip-
ment, causing loss of containment. If this hazard is of concern,
additional means of backflow prevention should be provided
(i.e. emergency shut down inter-lock and valve).
For relief purposes, a single check valve is treated as if it is
not there, unless specific maintenance and inspection practices
are adhered to. Two check valves in series reduce the likelihood,
and potential magnitude of reverse flow, but over-pressuring
of the low pressure side can still take place due to even small
check valve leaks, assuming the pressure is high enough. ISO
23251 (API Std 521) provides specific guidance both on how to
treat check valve failure as a relief scenario, maintenance/in-
spection practices for critical check valves, when relief protec-
tion is required, and recommended practices for determining
the controlling relief rate.
Reflux Failure and/or Loss of Overhead
Cooling For Fractionators
The failure of electrical or mechanical equipment that pro-
vides cooling or condensation in process streams can cause
overpressure in fractionators and process vessels. The evalua-
tion of relief scenarios for towers, in order to determine the ap-
propriate load for the relief device, is complex. Various simpli-
fied approaches have been used in the past, however the most
common method used today is a modified steady state material
balance at relief conditions, as described by Nezami.
11
Dynamic
simulation may also be applied to evaluate the tower relief load
vs. time. Care should be exercised when using the dynamic ap-
proach since the results can be highly dependent on the specific
assumptions used, and may not be conservative.
Abnormal Heat Input
Reboilers and other process heating equipment are designed
with a specified heat input. When they are new or recently
cleaned, and/or due to loss of control, additional heat input
above the normal design can occur. In the event of a failure of
temperature control, vapor generation can exceed the process
systems ability to condense or otherwise absorb the build-up
of pressure, which may include non-condensables generated by
overheating. The system should be evaluated at the relief condi-
tion using a modified material balance approach.
Process Upset
The source of a process upset can vary depending of the ap-
plication. Therefore this contingency must be analyzed individ-
ually based on the specific circumstances. For example, guid-
ance for fractionation towers is included in reference 11.
Liquid Overfilling of a Vessel
Vessels are subject to overfilling and must be protected from
overpressure from that source. The cause can be an loss of con-
trol on the inlet, or a failure of the controls or pump on the
outlet.
Transients
Transient pressure surges can occur as a result of liquid
hammer, steam hammer, or steam condensate induced ham-
mer, A pressure relief valve is normally not effective as a pro-
tective device for these causes of overpressure, so the focus
should be on avoiding transient pressure surges through design
and operation, and/or the use of a surge suppressor device.
Vacuum Protection
Vessels may be subject to (partial) vacuum from liquid pump
out, condensation of volatiles, or other causes. Typically, indus-
try practices for vessels containing hydrocarbons is to design
for the maximum possible vacuum. In some services (i.e., very
large low design pressure vessels) alternate vacuum protection
is generally necessary.
Relief Scenarios For
Specific Equipment Types
The following equipment considerations should be followed
for relief system design.
5-5
Centrifugal Compressors Centrifugal compressor sys-
tems should be analyzed in order to properly understand the
maximum pressure that can occur, and required relief protec-
tion (if any) for each part of the system, during operation (nor-
mal and upset), start-up, and at shutdown, based on the normal
and maximum suction, and/or discharge conditions. The maxi-
mum settle out pressure for each portion of the system should
be calculated based on the configuration of the recycle valves,
check valve, seal balance line, and the volumes of the drums,
piping and coolers. At compressor shutdown, the pressure in
one portion of the system may temporarily rise to a higher pres-
sure than the overall final settle out pressure.
Reciprocating Compressors Each positive displace-
ment compressor must have a relief valve on the discharge up-
stream of the block and check valves in order to protect the com-
pressor and downstream equipment. Commonly, relief valves
are also provided on each individual stage to protect the inter-
stage equipment. Reciprocating compressor systems should be
analyzed in order to properly understand the maximum pres-
sure that can occur, and required relief protection for each part
of the system, during operation (normal and upset), start-up,
and at shutdown, based on the normal and maximum suction,
and/or discharge conditions.
Fired Heaters General best practice is to design fired
heaters such that the process side cannot be blocked in. Typical-
ly, the heater control system will shut down the heater in case
of loss of flow on the process side, but the safety integrity level
(SIL) may be inadequate to avoid overpressure. If there is a pos-
sibility that the process side of a fired heater may be blocked in,
then a relief valve should be provided to protect the heater. The
relief valve should be installed on the downstream of the heater
to help ensure flow through the heater upon blocked outlet.
Pumps Relief valves are required on the discharge of
each positive displacement pump. Normally, these relief valves
are piped back to the source vessel. In some instances, the relief
device discharge can be returned to the suction line, depending
on the service and extent of heat up due to recycle. In either in-
stallation, the pressure present at the discharge of the pressure
relief valve must be considered in determining the set pressure
of a conventional pressure relief valve. Isolation valves around
the pressure relief valves may not be required, if the recycle is
to the suction line and the pump itself can be isolated for main-
tenance. Many small metering pumps will have built-in inter-
nal relief protection. As these internal reliefs are typically not
identified in facility documentation (e.g., P&IDs, critical device
lists, etc.), they are typically not tested or maintained. For this
reason, they generally should not be relied upon as a means to
prevent overpressure.
Atmospheric Storage Tanks, and Low Pressure Tanks
Atmospheric storage tanks are typically protected against
overpressure and vacuum due to process conditions and atmo-
spheric changes. In addition, relief protection for fire and other
upset conditions is required. Tanks are commonly protected by
weighted or spring loaded pallet operated relief devices (con-
servation vents). A pilot-operated pressure relief can also be
utilized. Storage tanks with diameters of 15 m or larger may be
fitted with a frangible roof (weak roof to shell attachment which
will fail upon overpressure); such a roof-to-shell joint serves as
emergency pressure relief device in lieu of a separate fire relief
valve valve (See API Std 650). All other tanks require fire over-
pressure protection by an emergency relief vent.
Pressure relief requirements and relief device sizing for at-
mospheric tanks and any tanks, vessels, or other equipment
designed for less than 103 kPa (ga), are covered by ISO 28300
(API Std 2000), which sets thermal breathing rates, and fire
relief rules for this equipment. Note that the fire sizing equa-
tions for low pressure equipment covered by ISO 28300 (API
Std 2000) differ from those in ISO 23251 (API Std 521).
At a minimum, design of overpressure protection for tanks
should consider: liquid movement into the tank, tank breathing
due to weather changes that heat the tank, inert gas pad and/or
purge regulator failure, internal and external heat transfer devic-
es, failure of vent collection systems, utility failure, blow-through
of gas from a higher pressure source, composition changes, cooling
failure upstream of the tank, fire, and overfilling.
At a minimum, design of vacuum protection for tanks should
consider: liquid movement out of the tank due to pump transfer,
liquid movement out of the tank due to opening of a drain valve,
tank breathing due to weather changes that cool the tank, fail-
ure of inert pads, utility failures.
SPECIAL RELIEF SYSTEM
CONSIDERATIONS
Administrative Controls
Administrative controls are procedures that, in combination
with mechanical locking elements, are intended to ensure that
personnel actions do not compromise the overpressure protec-
tion of the equipment. They include, as a minimum, document-
ed operation and maintenance procedures, and training of op-
erator and maintenance personnel in these procedures [ASME
Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code Section VIII, Appendix M].
Block Valves in the Relief Path
ASME Section VIII, Appendix M, provides requirements, in-
cluding specific administrative controls, for block valves associ-
ated with the inlet and outlet of pressure relief devices, block
valves around equipment, such as heat exchangers, which may be
isolated and drained for maintenance, and block valves between
two pieces of equipment protected by a single relief device.
High Integrity Protection Systems (HIPS)
A High Integrity Protection System (HIPS) is an instru-
mented system that has multiple redundancies to ensure the
system is reliable and will react with desired effects as close to
100% of the time as possible. As part of this, the instruments
and valves, and the safeguarding system, are rated and main-
tained to a stricter standard than most instruments. These sys-
tems are even on a different control system. The instruments
have a Safety Instrument Level (SIL); the higher the level the
more reliable the system. HIPS are typically used to mitigate
flare loads that otherwise would become excessively large, or
where a pressure relief valve would not adequately protect the
system. See Section 4 of the Data Book for more information on
High Integrity Protection Systems (HIPS).
In some very limited instances (i.e. loss of control for an in-
let valve downstream of a large packed pipeline upstream of
a treating facility, or protection against runaway reaction,) a
High Integrity Protection System may be considered to replace
the requirement for a pressure relief device. This is now rec-
ognized by ASME Section VIII, Division 1 (UG-140),
15
with a
number of requirements including:
The user shall ensure that the MAWP of the vessel is
greater than the highest pressure that can reasonably
be expected to be achieved by the system. The user shall
conduct a detailed analysis of all credible overpressure
scenarios.
5-6
This analysis shall utilize an organized, systematic process
safety analysis approach such as: a Hazards and Operabil-
ity (HAZOP) review; a failure mode, effects and criticality
analysis (FMECA); fault tree analysis; event tree analysis;
what-if analysis, or other similar methodology.
Instrumentation associated with a HIPS shall be tested
at regular intervals to ensure it functions per design.
Documentation of the HIPS system design and testing
shall be developed and maintained.
The user shall consult ASME Section VIII, Division 1 (UG-
140) for the complete set of requirements for the use of HIPS as
a means of overpressure protection.
Emergency Depressuring
Emergency depressuring system are commonly used in
natural gas facilities. The system can be automatically actu-
ated or operator actuated, on emergency shutdown of a piece
of equipment, a process unit, or an entire facility. The purpose
of the depressurization system is one or more of the following:
1) minimize risk of loss of containment due to fire/runaway re-
action for pressure vessels, 2) minimize risk of fire, explosion,
or release of toxic gas due to partial loss of containment (e.g.,
piping or flange leak), or 3) minimize risk of fire, explosion, or
release of toxic gas due to partial or total seal/packing failure of
rotating equipment.
Depressurization systems are often used to prevent poten-
tial stress rupture of a vessel when the metal temperature is
raised above the design temperature due to an abnormal heat
source. This source is usually from a fire, but could also be from
a runaway exothermic reaction or other source of heat. This
type of rupture can occur before a vessel reaches the set pres-
sure of relief devices on the vessel. A general guideline is that a
depressurization system should be able to reduce the pressure
in the vessel to 50% of the design pressure in 15 minutes in
the event of a pool fire. However, the required depressurization
time is dependent on the vessel material and wall thickness. A
detailed discussion of emergency depressurization design basis
is provided in ISO 23251 (API Std 521).
Another application for a depressurization system is to re-
duce the consequences of a leak by quickly reducing the pres-
sure of the system/plant/compressor. By reducing the equip-
ment pressure, both the leak rate and the total inventory of
fluid leaked can be reduced. A general criterion for system de-
pressurization is to reduce the pressure in the system to 690
kPa (ga) in fifteen minutes or less.
For compressors, the depressurization time is partially a
function of the location of the machine, and de-pressurization
times of less than 15 minutes is often used. For compressors
located in buildings, a depressurization time of 3-5 minutes to
near atmospheric pressure are not uncommon.
For each application, the designer must verify that all com-
ponents (especially vessel internals and machinery elastomer
seals) can withstand the chosen de-pressurization rate. In ad-
dition, cold metal temperatures can be developed both in the
source vessel and the flare system during de-pressuring. Both
systems must be designed for these conditions.
Note that the ASME Pressure Vessel Section VIII code re-
quires a pressure relief device or HIPS to be installed to protect
the vessel even if a depressuring system is used.
Low Temperature Flaring
Natural gas plants frequently have more than one flare
system. (i.e. high pressure flare, low pressure flare, cryogen-
ic flare). The segregation of flare systems should be carefully
evaluated, based on the fluid compositions, temperatures, and
allowable back pressures in the relief header. Several incidents
have raised industry awareness on the need to properly con-
sider segregation of flare headers and systems.
When low temperature streams are relieved, the flare sys-
tem piping and equipment exposed to cryogenic temperature
may require stainless steel or other acceptable alloys. The sys-
tem should be designed for the coldest process stream to be re-
lieved including the cooling effect of the expanding fluid (Joule-
Thomson effect). Materials selection should be made according
to applicable code recommendations.
Industry experience has shown that formation of limited quan-
tity of hydrates at a relief valve outlet can typically be handled
safely. However, relieving large amounts of hydrates, or solid
CO
2
/H
2
S/ methane solids to a closed flare system should be avoid-
ed. Industry experience has shown that pure CO
2
can be safely
vented to the atmosphere, utilizing proper design practices.
SET PRESSURE FOR PRESSURE
RELIEF VALVES
Fig. 5-2, extracted from ISO 23251 (API Std 521), shows the
characteristics of safety relief valves for vessel protection. It can
be used as a general guide in determining the proper set pres-
sure of a pressure relief valve, for a protected system. Refer to
the Standard for further guidance on setting single or multiple
pressure relief valves.
RELIEVING DEVICES
Several pressure relief devices are certified and approved
under Section VIII of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel
Code covering unfired pressure vessels. They include spring
loaded direct-acting pressure relief valves, pilot operated pres-
sure relief valves, and rupture disks and shearing pin devices.
When the governing code is ANSI B31.3

or ANSI B31.8, other
types of pressure relieving devices such as monitoring regula-
tors, series regulators, weight-loaded relief valves, liquid seals,
etc. are permitted. The discussion below is limited to ASME,
Section VIII, devices. The devices must be compatible with the
service and the overall design of the system. See ASME, Sec-
tion I, for fired boiler relieving criteria.
Conventional Pressure Relief Valves
In a conventional pressure relief valve, the inlet pressure to
the valve is directly opposed by a spring. Tension on the spring
is set to keep the valve shut at normal operating pressure but
allow the valve to open when the pressure reaches relieving
conditions. This is a differential pressure valve. Most conven-
tional safety-relief valves available to the petroleum industry
have disks which have a greater area, A
D
, than the nozzle seat
area, A
N
. The effect of back pressure on such valves is illustrat-
ed in Fig. 5-3b. If the bonnet is vented to atmospheric pressure,
the back pressure acts with the vessel pressure so as to over-
come the spring force, F
S
, thus making the relieving pressure
less than when set with atmospheric pressure on the outlet.
However, if the spring bonnet is vented to the valve discharge
rather than to the atmosphere, the back pressure acts with the
5-7
spring pressure so as to increase the opening pressure. If the
back pressure were constant, it could be taken into account in
adjusting the set pressure. In operation the back pressure is not
constant when a number of valves discharge into a manifold.
A cut-away of a conventional relief valve is shown in Fig. 5-
3a. Materials of construction for relief valves vary by service.
Balanced Pressure Relief Valves
Balanced safety-relief valves incorporate means for mini-
mizing the effect of back pressure on the performance charac-
teristics opening pressure, closing pressure, lift, and reliev-
ing capacity.
These valves are of two types, the piston type and the bel-
lows type. A cross section drawing of a balanced (bellows) relief
valve is shown in Fig. 5-4a. In the piston type, of which several
variations are manufactured, the guide is vented so that the
back pressure on opposing faces of the valve disk cancels itself;
the top face of the piston, which has the same area, A
P
, as the
nozzle seat area, A
N
, is subjected to atmospheric pressure by
venting the bonnet. The bonnet-vented gases from balanced pis-
ton-type valves should be disposed of with a minimum restric-
tion and in a safe manner.
In the bellows type of balanced valve, the effective bellows
area, A
B
, is the same as the nozzle seat area, A
N
, and, by at-
tachment to the valve body, excludes the back pressure from
acting on the top side of that area of the disk. The disk area ex-
tending beyond the bellows and seat area cancel, so that there
are no unbalanced forces under any downstream pressure. The
bellows covers the disk guide so as to exclude the working fluid
from the bonnet. To provide for a possible bellows failure or
leak, the bonnet must be vented separately from the discharge.
The balanced safety-relief valve makes higher pressures in
the relief discharge manifolds possible. Balanced-type valves
should have bonnet vents large enough to assure no appreciable
back pressure during design flow conditions. If the valve is in
a location in which atmospheric venting (usually not a large
amount) presents a hazard, the vent should be piped to a safe
location independent of the valve discharge system. The user
should obtain performance data on the specific type of valve
being considered. A diagram of the force balance for piston and
bellows balanced pressure relief valves is shown in Fig. 5-4b.
Pilot Operated Pressure Relief Valves
A pilot operated pressure relief valve consists of two princi-
pal parts, a main valve and a pilot. The valve utilizes a piston
instead of a shaft. Inlet pressure is directed to the top of the
main valve piston. More area is exposed to pressure on the top
of the piston than on the bottom so pressure, instead of a spring,
holds the main valve closed. At the set pressure, the pilot opens,
reducing the pressure on top of the piston thereby allowing the
main valve to open fully. For some applications, pilot-operated
relief valves are available in minimum friction, light-weight
diaphragm construction (in place of heavy pistons).
Pilot operated valves can allow backflow if downstream
pressure exceeds set points. Backflow prevention is required
on valves, connected to common relief headers, where protected
equipment can be depressured and isolated while connected to
an active flare header, where a vacuum could occur at the inlet,
or where the downstream is connected to a system or vessel
where the pressure could exceed the inlet pressure.
A check valve, split piston type valve, or backflow preventer
in the pilot line can be used.
A typical pilot operated relief valve is shown in Fig. 5-5. Pilot
operated valves may be used in liquid or vapor services. These
valves contain nonmetallic components (elastomers), therefore
fluid pressure and temperature, fluid characteristics, polymer-
ization, fouling, solids, and corrosion can limit their use.
Pilot operated valves are available with snap-action or mod-
ulating action. The modulating type relieves only the amount of
fluid required to control the overpressure.
When specifying pilot operated pressure relief valves, the
elastomers chosen for the o-rings, and seals should be carefully
considered. Temperature (maximum and minimum), chemical
compatibility (for the principle and trace components, and for
potential liquid carryover), and resistance to explosive de-com-
pression, are all factors in the choice of elastomers.
Seat Leakage, and Resilient
Pressure Seat Relief Valves
Some leakage can be expected through the seats of with met-
al-to-metal seated, conventional or balanced type relief valves,
when the operating pressure rises too close to the set pressure.
Allowable seat leakage rates are specified in API Std 527.
16
Re-
silient seat pressure relief valves (see Fig. 5-6), with either an
O-ring seat seal or a plastic seat, can provide seat integrities
which are significantly higher than metal seated valves. API
Std 527
16
specifies that, soft seated, pressure relief valves shall
have zero bubbles/minute leakage at the same test pressures as
metal seated valves. This can allow bubble tight operation to
90%, of the set pressure, or higher. Proper elastomer choice is
critical for resilient seat pressure relief valves.
Vapor Trim vs. Liquid Trim
For Pressure Relief Valves
Pressure relief valves handling gas or vapor are supplied
with vapor trim. Valves which releive liquid, two-phase, or po-
tentially two-phase fluids, require a liquid trim. It is important
that the supplier is properly informed of the full range of expect-
ed operation when procuring pressure relief valves. In addition,
liquid trim pressure relief valves have a significantly higher
blowdown as compared to vapor trim. In these applications the
designer must be prudent to allow sufficient pressure margin
between the operating pressure and the relief valve set pres-
sure to ensure reclosure of the valve following a relief event.
Rupture Disk
A rupture disk consists of a thin diaphragm held between
flanges. The disk is designed to rupture and relieve pressure
within tolerances established by ASME Code Section VIII. Rup-
ture disks can be used in gas processing plants, upstream of
relief valves, to reduce minor leakage and valve deterioration.
In these installations, the pressure in the cavity between the
rupture disk and the relief valve should be monitored to detect
a ruptured or leaking disk. In some applications a rupture disk
with a higher pressure rating is installed in parallel to a relief
valve.
Rupture disks should be used as the primary relieving de-
vice only if using a pressure relief valve is not practical. Some
examples of such situations are:
(a) Rapid rates of pressure rise. A pressure relief valve sys-
tem does not react fast enough or cannot be made large
enough to prevent overpressure (e.g., an exchanger rup-
tured tube case or a runaway reaction in a vessel).
5-8
(b) Large relieving area required. Because of extremely
high flow rates and/or low relieving pressure, providing
the required relieving area with a pressure relief valve
system is not practical.
(c) A pressure relief valve system is susceptible to being
plugged, and thus inoperable, during service.
All rupture disks have a manufacturing design range (MDR),
which essentially specifies the users tolerancefor variations in
the burst pressure. Furthermore, disk temperature can have a
significant affect on the pressure at which the disk will open.
Therefore, it is essential that the designer communicate the de-
sired MDR and the full range of expected operating and relief
temperatures when specifying requirements for a rupture disk.
This will help ensure that the disk ruptures and provides relief
flow at the desired pressure rather than at a pressure higher or
lower than the stamped pressure.
A rupture disk is subject to fatigue failure due to operating
pressure cycles. To establish recommended replacement inter-
vals, consult rupture disk suppliers.
Shearing Pin Device (Rupture Pin)
A shearing pin device is a non-closing pressure relief-device
actuated by differential pressure, or static inlet pressure, de-
signed to function by the shearing of a load-carrying member
that supports a pressure-containing member. The devices are
sanctioned by ASME Section VIII, and may be used for circum-
stances where rupture disks may also be appropriate. They
have the advantage that the pin can be replaced without re-
moving a piping flange.
FIG. 5-2
Pressure Level Relationships for Pressure Relief Valves
14
Courtesy American Petroleum Institute
5-9
FIG. 5-4a
Balanced Bellows Pressure Relief Valve
14
FIG. 5-4b
Effect of Back Pressure on Set Pressure of
Balanced Pressure Relief Valve
14
FIG. 5-3b
Effect of Back Pressure for Conventional
Pressure Relief Valve
14
FIG. 5-3a
Conventional Pressure Relief Valve
14
Courtesy of American Petroleum Institute
Courtesy of American Petroleum Institute
Courtesy of American Petroleum Institute Courtesy of American Petroleum Institute
5-10
FIG. 5-6
O-Ring Seals For Conventional and Bellows
Pressure Relief Valves
DISC RETAINING RING
DISC
RETAINER
SCREW
O-RING SEAT SEAL O-RING RETAINER
Courtesy Lonergan Company
FIG. 5-5
Pilot Operated Pressure Relief Valve
14
Courtesy of American Petroleum Institute
5-11
SIZING OF RELIEF DEVICES
After the required relief capacity of a relief valve has been
determined, the minimum orifice area required must be calcu-
lated. Industry standards for orifice designation, orifice area,
valve dimensions, valve body sizes, and pressure ratings are
available. The standard orifices available by letter designa-
tion, orifice area, and valve body size are shown in Fig. 5-7.
In addition to the standard sizes, many relief valves are
manufactured with orifice areas smaller than D, and some
pilot-operated relief valves contain orifice areas larger than
T. Manufacturers should be contacted for information on non-
standard sizes.
The set pressure and the overpressure allowed must be with-
in the limits permitted by the applicable codes. System analysis
must include downstream piping. For example, consider the use
of a relief valve made for a vessel with a maximum allowable
working pressure of 1000 kPa (ga). The relief valve set pressure
is 1000 kPa (ga), and the maximum allowable overpressure is
10% [100 kPa (ga)]. The vessel pressure, when relieving, must
be limited to 1100 kPa (ga) [1000 kPa (ga) set pressure plus 100
kPa (ga) maximum overpressure]. Pressure buildup downstream
of the relief valve should never cause the vessel pressure to ex-
ceed the maximum allowable overpressure.
API vs. Pressure Relief Valve Supplier
Discharge Coefficient/Orifice Area
API Std 520 Part I (clause 5.2)
14
provides a thorough discus-
sion of the distinctions between the API effective area and the
actual flow area of a pressure relief valve, as well as those be-
tween the API effective coefficient of discharge and the ASME
certified coefficient of discharge. The designer is cautioned nev-
er to mix the API effective orifice area and discharge coefficient
with the certified values of these parameters. Furthermore,
final selection of pressure relief valve and sizing of associated
(inlet/outlet) piping should always use the certified values.
Sizing for Gas or Vapor Relief
The rate of flow through a relief valve nozzle is dependent
on the absolute upstream pressure (as indicated in Equation 5-
1, Equation 5-2, and Equation 5-3) and is independent of the
downstream pressure as long as the downstream pressure is
less than the critical-flow pressure (See API Std 520-1). Howev-
er, if the downstream pressure increases above the critical-flow
pressure, the flow through the relief valve is materially reduced
(e.g., when the downstream pressure equals the upstream pres-
sure, there is no flow).
The critical-flow pressure, P
CF
, may be estimated by the per-
fect gas relationship shown in Equation 5-5.
As a rule of thumb if the downstream pressure at the relief
valve is greater than one-half of the valve inlet pressure (both
pressures in absolute units), then the relief valve nozzle will
experience subcritical flow.
Critical Flow Safety valves in gas or vapor service may
be sized by use of one of these equations:
14
A =
131.6W

(T
1
) (Z)

(C
1
) (K
d
) (P
1
) (K
b
) (K
c
)


MW

Eq 5-1
A =
5.875Q
v


(T
1
) ( MW) (Z)

(C
1
) (K
d
) (P
1
) (K
b
) (K
c
)
Eq 5-2
C
1
= 520

Eq 5-3
2
k + 1
k

k + 1

k 1
C
1
can be obtained from Figs. 5-8, and 5-9. Note that the
ideal gas specific heat ratio k = Cp/Cv has to be used for the
determination of C
1
in Equation 5-3. The ideal gas specific heat
ratio is independent of pressure. The heat capacity ratio used
should be based on the upstream relieving temperature. Note
that most process simulators will provide real gas specific heats
at the process pressure and temperature. These should not be
used in the above equation because if this value is used, the
pressure relief device may be undersized. For real gases with
a compressibility of less than 0.8 or greater than 1.1, API Std
520 Part I states that use of the ideal gas specific heat ratio
can introduce significant error, and a more thermodynamically
sound approach should be considered.
14
The Theoretical Mass
Flux Isentropic Expansion Method as described in API Std 520
Part I provides this foundation.
K
b
can be obtained from Figs. 5-10 and 5-11. For final de-
sign, K
d
should be obtained from the valve manufacturer. A
value for K
d
of 0.975 may be used for preliminary sizing.
Subcritical Flow For downstream pressures, P
2
, in ex-
cess of the critical-flow pressure, P
CF
, the flow through the pres-
sure relief valve is subcritical. Under these conditions, Equation
5-4
14
may be used to calculate the required effective discharge
area for a conventional relief valve that has its spring setting
adjusted to compensate for superimposed backpressure, or for a
pilot operated relief valve.
=
0.179 W

A
Z T
1
Eq 5-4
(F
2
) (K
d
K
c
)

MW (P
1
) (P
1
P
2
)
F
2
is taken from Fig. 5-12.
P
CF
= P
1

Eq 5-5
2

k


k + 1

k 1
Balanced pressure relief valves should be sized using Equation
5-1 or Equation 5-2 and the back pressure correction factor sup-
plied by the valve manufacturer.
Sizing for Steam Relief
Safety-relief valves in steam service are sized by a modi-
fication of Napiers steam flow formula. Valve manufacturers
can supply saturated steam capacity tables. A correction fac-
tor, K
sh
, must be applied for safety valves in superheated steam
service.
For safety-relief valves in steam service, the required area
may be estimated from the following equations from the ASME
Code Section VIII, Div. 1 and API-520-1:
14
A =
(1.905) W

(P
1
) (K
sh
) K
d
K
b
K
c
K
n

Eq 5-6
K
n
= 1 for P
1
< 10 339 kPa (abs)
K
n
=
0.02764 P
1
1000

0.03324 P
1
1061
Eq 5-7
for P
1
> 10 339 kPa (abs) and 22 057 kPa (abs), K
n
= 1.0 where
P
1
13 339 kPa (abs).
See Fig. 5-13 for superheat correction factors. For saturated
steam at any pressure, K
sh
= 1.0.
5-12
Sizing for Liquid Relief
Turbulent Flow Conventional and balanced bellows re-
lief valves in liquid service may be sized by use of Equation 5-
8.
14
Pilot-operated relief valves should be used in liquid service
only when the manufacturer has approved the specific applica-
tion.
A =
(7.07) (V
l
)

G

(K
d
) (K
c
) (K
w
) (K
v
)


(P
1
P
b
)

Eq 5-8
Laminar Flow For liquid flow with Reynolds numbers
less than 4,000, the valve should be sized first with K
v
= 1 in
order to obtain a preliminary required discharge area, A. From
manufacturer standard orifice sizes, the next larger orifice size,
A, should be used in determining the Reynolds number, Re,
from the following relationship:
14
(V
l
) (112 654) (G)
Re = Eq 5-9


A
(511 300) (l/s)
Re = Eq 5-10

S



A
After the Reynolds number is determined, the factor K
v
is
obtained from Fig. 5-15. Divide the preliminary area (A) by K
v

to obtain an area corrected for viscosity. If the corrected area
exceeds the standard orifice area chosen, repeat the procedure
using the next larger standard orifice.
Sizing for Thermal Relief
The following may be used to approximate relieving rates of
liquids expanded by thermal forces where no vapor is generated
at relief valve setting and maximum temperature.

These calcu-
lations assume the liquid is non-compressible.
13
(B) (Q)
V
l
= Eq 5-11
1000 (G) (S)
Typical values of the liquid expansion coefficient, B, at 15C
are:
API
Gravity
Relative Density, G
Liquid Expansion
Coefficient, B, 1/C
Water 1.000 0.00018
3 - 34.9 1.052 - 0.850 0.00072
35 - 50.9 0.850 - 0.775 0.0009
51 - 63.9 0.775 - 0.724 0.00108
64 - 78.9 0.724 - 0.672 0.00126
79 - 88.9 0.672 - 0.642 0.00144
89 - 93.9 0.642 - 0.628 0.00153
94 - 100 0.628 - 0.611 0.00162
n-Butane 0.584 0.0020
Isobutane 0.563 0.0022
Propane 0.507 0.0029

For heating by atmospheric conditions, such as solar radia-
tion, the surface area of the item or line in question should be
calculated. Solar radiation [typically 7871040 W/m
2
] should be
determined for the geographic area and applied to the surface
area to approximate Q (W).
When the flow rate is calculated, the necessary area for re-
lief may be found from the turbulent liquid flow equations.
Sizing a Pressure Relief Device
for Two Phase Flow
For two phase fluids and flashing liquids, a choking phenom-
enon limits the flow through the pressure relief valve nozzle, in
a manner similar to the choking of a gas in critical flow. In order
to estimate the relief capacity of a nozzle, it is necessary to es-
timate the choking pressure and then determine the two phase
physical properties at these conditions. The historical method
of calculating areas for liquid and vapor relief separately, and
then adding the two areas together to get the total orifice size
does not produce a conservative relief device size.
Improved sizing methods have been developed using the fol-
lowing assumptions:
The fluid is in thermodynamic equilibrium through the
nozzle.
The overall fluid is well mixed and can be represented by
weighted averaging the gas and liquid densities (this is
sometimes referred to as the non-slip assumption).
Use of these assumptions has been found to produce a result
which in most instances is close to the real flow rate through the
nozzle, and which almost always will result in a conservative
calculation of the required nozzle area. However, these methods
require additional equilibrium data along the isentropic expan-
sion path through the relief valve. Refer to API Std 520, Part
1, for a description of the sizing methods for two-phase liquid
vapor relief. Two methods are described in API Std. 520, Part
1, Annex C; the Omega method and the Mass FluxIsentropic
Expansion Method.
14
Sizing for Fire for Partially
Liquid Filled Systems
The method of calculating the relief rate for fire sizing may
be obtained from ISO 23251 (API Std 521)

, API Standard 2510

,
NFPA 58

, and possibly other local codes or standards. Each of
these references approach the problem in a slightly different
manner. Note that NFPA-58 applies only to U.S. marine termi-
nals, or U.S. terminals at the end of DOT regulated pipelines.
Most systems requiring fire relief will contain liquids and/or
liquids in equilibrium with vapor. Fire relief capacity in this
situation is equal to the amount of vaporized liquid generated
from the heat energy released from the fire and absorbed by the
liquid containing vessel. The difficult part of this procedure is
the determination of heat absorbed. Several methods are avail-
able, including ISO/API, and U.S. National Fire Protection As-
sociation. ISO 23251 (API Std 521) applies to the Petroleum
and Natural Gas Industries, and is the standard most common-
ly used to assess fire heat load in these services.
ISO 23251/API Std 521
13
expresses relief requirements in
terms of heat input from the fire to a vessel containing liquids,
where adequate drainage and fire fighting equipment exist.
Q = (43 200) (F) (A
w
)
0.82
Eq 5-12
The environment factor, F, in Equation 5-12 is determined
from Fig. 5-16. Credit for insulation can be taken only if the in-
sulation system can withstand the fire and the impact of water
5-13
from a fire hose. Specific criteria are provided in ISO 23251/
API Std 521. The appropriate equation to use where adequate
drainage and fire fighting equipment do not exist is also pro-
vided in this Standard.
A
w
in equation 5-12 is the total wetted surface, in square me-
ters. Wetted surface is the surface wetted by liquid when the ves-
sel is filled to the maximum operating level. It includes at least
that portion of a vessel within a height of 8 m above grade. In
the case of spheres and spheroids, the term applies to that por-
tion of the vessel up to the elevation of its maximum horizontal
diameter or a height of 8 m, whichever is greater. Grade usually
refers to ground grade but may be any level at which a sizable
area of exposed flammable liquid may be present.
The amount of vapor generated is calculated from the latent
heat of the material at the relieving pressure of the valve. For
fire relief only, this may be calculated at 121% of maximum
allowable working pressure. All other conditions must be cal-
culated at 110% of maximum allowable working pressure for
single relief devices.
Latent heat data may be obtained by performing flash calcu-
lations. Mixed hydrocarbons will boil over a temperature range
depending on the liquid composition; therefore, consideration
must be given to the condition on the batch distillation curve
which will cause the largest relief valve orifice area require-
ments due to the heat input of a fire. Generally the calculation
is continued until some fraction of the fluid is boiled off. Other
dynamic simulation methods are also available. The latent heat
of pure and some mixed paraffin hydrocarbon materials may be
estimated using Fig. A.1 of ISO 23251 / API Std 521.
13
When the latent heat is determined, required relieving ca-
pacity may be found by:
13
W = Q / H
l
Eq 5-13
The value W is used to size the relief valve orifice using
Equation 5-1 or Equation 5-4.
For vessels containing only vapor, ISO 23251 (API Std 521)
13

has recommended the following equation for determining re-
quired relief area based on fire:
183.3 (F) (A
3
)
A = Eq 5-14


P
1
F can be determined using Equation 5-15.
13
If the result is
less than 0.01, then use F = 0.01. If insufficient information is
available to use Equation 5-15, then use F = 0.045.
F =

0.1406

(T
w
T
1
)
1.25

Eq 5-15

(C
1
) (K
d
)

T
1
0.6506

To take credit for insulation, ISO 23251 (API Std 521) re-
quires the insulation material to function effectively at tem-
peratures of 900C, and to retain its shape, and most of its in-
tegrity in covering the vessel in a fire, and during fire fighting.
Typically, this requires proper insulation, plus an insulation
jacket constructed of a suitable material, and banding that can
withstand the fire conditions. However, other systems may be
able to meet these requirements.
Sizing for Fire for Liquid
Full or Nearly Full Equipment
For totally or near totally liquid filled systems, the control-
ling relief condition can be single vapor phase, liquid phase, or
two phase, depending on the fluid, liquid level, vessel size and
configuration, and location of the relief device. For many gas
plant applications, the assumption of single phase vapor relief
is adequate for pressure relief valve sizing. See ISO 23251 (API
Std 521) for further guidance.
Sizing for Fire For Supercritical Fluids
Sometimes, the phase condition at the relieving pressure and
temperature will be supercritical. API recommends to consider
a dynamic approach where the vessel contents are assumed to
be single phase (supercritical), and a step by step heat flux is
applied to the vessel walls [See ISO 23251 (API Std 521),] and
Ouderkirk
10
for details. The same methodology can also be ap-
plied for gas filled systems.
Heavy hydrocarbons can be assumed to crack (i.e., to ther-
mally decompose), and it is the users responsibility to estimate
the effective or equivalent latent heat for these applications.
Traditionally, a minimum latent heat value of 116 kJ/kg has
been used if the conditions can not be quantified.
When a vessel is subjected to fire temperatures, the resulting
metal temperature may greatly reduce the pressure rating of the
vessel, in particular for vessels in vapor service. Design for this
situation should consider an emergency depressuring system
and/or a water spray system to keep metal temperatures cooler.
For additional discussion on temperatures and flow rates due to
depressurization and fires refer to Reference 7.
RELIEF VALVE INSTALLATION
Relief valve installation requires careful consideration of
inlet piping, pressure sensing lines (where used), and startup
procedures. Poor installation may render the safety relief valve
inoperable or severely restrict the valves relieving capacity.
Either condition compromises the safety of the facility. Many
relief valve installations have block valves before and after the
relief valve for in-service testing or removal; however, these
block valves must be sealed or locked open, and administrative
controls must be in place, to prevent inadvertent closure.
Inlet Piping
The proper design of inlet piping to safety relief valves is
extremely important. Relief valves should not be installed at
physically convenient locations unless inlet pressure losses are
given careful consideration. The ideal location is the direct con-
nection to protected equipment to minimize inlet losses. API
STD 520

, Part II recommends a maximum non-recoverable
pressure loss to a relief valve of three percent of set pressure,
except for remote sensing pilot-operated pressure relief valves.
This pressure loss shall be the total of the inlet loss, line loss,
and the block valve loss (if used). The loss should be calculated
using the maximum rated flow through the safety relief valve.
Discharge Piping and Backpressure
Proper discharge and relief header piping size is critical for
the functioning of a pressure relief valve. Inadequate piping can
result in reduced relief valve capacity, cause unstable opera-
tion, and/or, relief device damage.
The pressure existing at the outlet of a pressure relief valve
is defined as backpressure. Backpressure which is present at
the outlet of a pressure relief valve, when it is required to op-
erate, is defined as superimposed backpressure. Backpressure
which develops in the discharge system, after the pressure re-
lief valve opens, is built-up backpressure. The magnitude of
pressure which exists at the outlet of the pressure relief valve,
5-14
Orifice
Area
cm
2
Orifice
Area
(in.
2
)
D 0.710 0.110
S
t
a
n
d
a
r
d

O
r
i
f
i
c
e

D
e
s
i
g
n
a
t
i
o
n
E 1.265 0.196
F 1.981 0.307
G 3.245 0.503
H 5.065 0.785
J 8.303 1.287
K 11.858 1.838
L 18.406 2.853
M 23.226 3.60
N 28.000 4.34
P 41.161 6.38
Q 71.290 11.05
R 103.226 16.0
T 167.742 26.0
in. 1 2 1.5 2 1.5 3 2 3 3 4 3 6 4 6 6 8 6 10 8 10
mm 25 50 38 50 38 75 50 75 75 100 75 150 100 150 150 200 150 250 200 250
Valve Body Size (Inlet Diameter times Outlet Diameter)
FIG. 5-7
API Pressure Relief Valve Designations
k C
1
0.4 216.9274
0.5 238.8252
0.6 257.7858
0.7 274.5192
0.8 289.494
0.9 303.0392
1.0 315.37*
1.1 326.7473
1.2 337.2362
1.3 346.9764
1.4 356.0604
1.5 364.5641
1.6 372.5513
1.7 380.0755
1.8 387.1823
1.9 393.9112
2.0 400.2962
2.1 406.3669
2.2 412.1494
*Interpolated values since C
1
becomes indeterminate as k approaches 1.00
Note: Calculated from Eq. 5-3.
FIG. 5-8
Values of Coefficient C
1
vs. k
Mol mass k C
1
Acetylene 26 1.28 345
Air 29 1.40 356
Ammonia 17 1.33 351
Argon 40 1.66 377
Benzene 78 1.10 327
Carbon disulfide 76 1.21 338
Carbon dioxide 44 1.28 345
Carbon monoxide 28 1.40 356
Chlorine 71 1.36 352
Cyclohexane 84 1.08 324
Ethane 30 1.22 339
Ethylene 28 1.20 337
Helium 4 1.66 377
Hexane 86 1.08 324
Hydrochloric acid 36.5 1.40 356
Hydrogen 2 1.40 356
Hydrogen sulfide 34 1.32 348
Iso-butane 58 1.11 328
Methane 16 1.30 346
Methyl alcohol 32 1.20 337
Methyl chloride 50.5 1.20 337
N-butane 58 1.11 328
Natural gas 19 1.27 345
Nitrogen 28 1.40 356
Oxygen 32 1.40 356
Pentane 72 1.09 325
Propane 44 1.14 331
Sulfur dioxide 64 1.26 342
FIG. 5-9
Values of C
1
for Various Gases
5-15
FIG. 5-10
Back Pressure Correction Factor, K
b
, for Conventional Pressure Relief Valves (Vapors and Gases)
14
FIG. 5-11
Back-Pressure Correction Factor, K
b
, for Balanced Bellows Pressure Relief Valves (Vapors and Gases)
14
Note: The above curves represent a compromise of the val-
ues recommended by a number of relief valve manufactur-
ers and may be used when the make of valve or the actual
critical-flow pressure point for the vapor or gas is unknown.
When the make is known, the manufacturer should be con-
sulted for the correction factor.
These curves are for set pressures of 350 kPa gauge and
above. They are limited to back pressure below critical-flow
pressure for a given set pressure. For subcritical-flow back
pressures below 350 kPa gauge, the manufacturer must be
consulted for the values of K
b
.
Courtesy American Petroleum Institute
Courtesy American Petroleum Institute
5-16
Set
Pressure
kPa (ga)
Total Temperature Superheated Steam, C
149 204 260 316 371 427 482 538 593 649
Correction Factor, K
sh
100 1 0.98 0.93 0.88 0.84 0.8 0.77 0.74 0.72 0.7
140 1 0.98 0.93 0.88 0.84 0.8 0.77 0.74 0.72 0.7
275 1 0.99 0.93 0.88 0.84 0.81 0.77 0.74 0.72 0.7
415 1 0.99 0.93 0.88 0.84 0.81 0.77 0.75 0.72 0.7
550 1 0.99 0.94 0.88 0.84 0.81 0.77 0.75 0.72 0.7
690 1 0.99 0.94 0.89 0.84 0.81 0.77 0.75 0.72 0.7
830 1 0.99 0.94 0.89 0.84 0.81 0.78 0.75 0.72 0.7
970 1 0.99 0.94 0.89 0.85 0.81 0.78 0.75 0.72 0.7
1 100 1 0.99 0.94 0.89 0.85 0.81 0.78 0.75 0.72 0.7
1 250 1 0.99 0.94 0.89 0.85 0.81 0.78 0.75 0.72 0.7
1 380 1 0.99 0.95 0.89 0.85 0.81 0.78 0.75 0.72 0.7
1 520 1 0.99 0.95 0.89 0.85 0.81 0.78 0.75 0.72 0.7
1 660 1 0.95 0.9 0.85 0.81 0.78 0.75 0.72 0.7
1 790 1 0.95 0.9 0.85 0.81 0.78 0.75 0.72 0.7
1 930 1 0.96 0.9 0.85 0.81 0.78 0.75 0.72 0.7
2 070 1 0.96 0.9 0.85 0.81 0.78 0.75 0.72 0.7
2 410 1 0.96 0.9 0.86 0.82 0.78 0.75 0.72 0.7
2 760 1 0.96 0.91 0.86 0.82 0.78 0.75 0.72 0.7
3 450 1 0.96 0.92 0.86 0.82 0.78 0.75 0.73 0.7
4 140 1 0.97 0.92 0.87 0.82 0.79 0.75 0.73 0.7
5 520 1 0.95 0.88 0.83 0.79 0.76 0.73 0.7
6 900 1 0.96 0.89 0.84 0.78 0.76 0.73 0.71
8 620 1 0.97 0.91 0.85 0.8 0.77 0.74 0.71
10 350 1 0.93 0.86 0.81 0.77 0.74 0.71
12 070 1 0.94 0.86 0.81 0.77 0.73 0.7
13 790 1 0.95 0.86 0.8 0.76 0.72 0.69
17 240 1 0.95 0.85 0.78 0.73 0.69 0.66
20 690 1 0.82 0.74 0.69 0.65 0.62
Courtesy American Petroleum Institute
FIG. 5-13
Superheat Correction Factors for Pressure Relief Valves in Steam Service
14
FIG. 5-12
Values of F
2
for Subcritical Flow
14
Courtesy American Petroleum Institute
5-17
FIG. 5-14
Back-Pressure Sizing Correction Factor K
w
for 25 Percent Overpressure on Balanced
Bellows Pressure Relief Valves (Liquids Only)
14
Note:
The above curve represents a compromise of the values recommended by
a number of relief-valve manufacturers. This curve may be used when the
make of the valve is not known. When the make is known, the manufacturer
should be consulted for the correction factor.
Courtesy American Petroleum Institute
FIG. 5-15
Capacity Correction Factor Due to Viscosity for Liquid Phase Pressure Relief
14
Courtesy American Petroleum Institute
5-18
after it is opened, is the total of the super imposed and built-up
backpressure, and is commonly referred to a total backpres-
sure.
The total backpressure, for all pressure relief valve styles,
can affect the capacity of the valve. For gas service the capacity
will be affected if the flow through the valve is sub-critical. For
liquid service the outlet backpressure will directly affect the ca-
pacity. This is shown by Equations 5-2 through 5-10.
For a conventional (spring loaded) pressure relief valve, su-
per imposed backpressure at the outlet of the valve acts to hold
the valve disc closed with a force additive to the spring force
(see Fig. 5-3b). The pressure relief valve set pressure is essen-
tially increased by the amount of super imposed backpressure
present.
Conventional spring loaded pressure relief valves exhibit
unacceptable performance (unstable operation, and possible
chatter), when excessive backpressure develops during a relief
incident due to the flow through the valve and outlet piping.
For this reason API-520-1 specifies that the built-up backpres-
sure for conventional pressure relief valves should not exceed
10% of the set pressure, at 10% allowable overpressure (process
relief scenarios).
14
Higher allowable built-up backpressure may
be acceptable for other, allowable overpressures (see API-520-1
for specifics).
A balanced pressure relief valve, Fig. 5-4a and 5-4b, can be
applied where the built-up backpressure is too high for a con-
ventional pressure relief valve, and/or the superimposed or to-
tal backpressure is unacceptable for a conventional valve. The
balanced style can typically be used up to a total backpressure
of 50% (consult with manufacturer for specific limits). The set
pressure for a balanced pressure relief valve is not affected by
superimposed backpressure. The capacity of a balance pressure
relief valve, however, can be affected by total backpressure, due
to a reduction in lift caused by a closing force on the unbalance
portion of the disk at high backpressure. See Figs. 5-11 and
5-14 for typical capacity correction factors for gas and liquid
service for balanced pressure relief valve.
The lift and set pressure of pilot operated relief valves,
where the pilot is vented to the atmosphere (typical configu-
ration), are not affected by backpressure. Therefore, for most
applications the performance of pilot operating pressure relief
valves it not affected by either superimposed or built-up back-
pressure. The relief valve capacity can be affected if the flow
becomes sub-critical for gases, or due to reduced pressure drop
available for liquids. In addition, if the discharge pressure can
exceed the inlet pressure (e.g., tanks storing low vapor pressure
material), a back-flow pre-venter is required for pilot operated
pressure relief valve.
Pressure relief valve discharge piping must be at least the
same diameter as the valve outlet, but generally must be larger
to minimize backpressure.
Reactive Force
On high pressure valves, the reactive forces during relief are
substantial and external bracing may be required. See equa-
tions in API RP 520-II for computing this force.
Rapid Cycling
Rapid cycling can occur when the pressure at the valve inlet
decreases at the start of relief valve flow because of excessive
pressure loss in the piping to the valve, or excessive back-pres-
sure.
Pressure relief valves are designed with a given blow-down
(difference between the set pressure and closing pressure of a
pressure relief valve), that is adjustable within limits. Under
conditions of high inlet loss, the valve may cycle at a rapid rate
which is referred to as chattering. Rapid cycling reduces capac-
ity and is destructive to the valve seat, subjects all the moving
parts in the valve to excessive wear, and can induce potentially
destructive vibration in the piping system. The valve responds
to the pressure at its inlet. If the pressure decreases during flow
to below the valve reseat point, the valve will close; however, as
soon as the flow stops, the inlet pipe pressure loss becomes zero
and the pressure at the valve inlet rises to relieving pressure
once again. If the vessel pressure is still equal to or greater than
the relief valve set pressure, the valve will open and close again.
The mechanism of chatter is complicated and not uniquely as-
sociated with inlet pressure loss. However, experience has
shown that chattering can be prevented if the non-recoverable
inlet pressure loss is limited to 3% of the set pressure. Excessive
back-pressure for conventional and balanced-bellows pressure
relief valves can also cause chatter, and must be avoided. An
oversized relief valve may chatter since the valve may quickly
relieve enough contained fluid to allow the vessel pressure to
momentarily fall back to below set pressure only to rapidly in-
crease again. In some cases multiple relief valves, may be pre-
ferred, depending on the relief contingencies.
Resonant Chatter
Resonant chatter can occur with pressure relief valves when
the inlet piping produces excessive pressure losses at the valve
inlet and the natural acoustical frequency of the inlet piping ap-
proaches the natural mechanical frequency of the valves basic
moving parts. The higher the set pressure, the larger the valve
size, or the greater the inlet pipe pressure loss, the more likely
resonant chatter will occur. Resonant chatter is uncontrollable;
that is, once started it cannot be stopped unless the pressure is
removed from the valve inlet. In actual application, however, the
valve can self-destruct before a shutdown can take place because
of the very large magnitude of the impact forces involved.
FIG. 5-16
Fire Sizing Environmental Factors
Environment
1
F Factor
Bare metal vessel 1.0
Insulation Note 2
Water-application facilities 1.0
Depressuring facilities 1.0
Underground storage 0.0
Earth-covered storage 0.03
Notes:
1
See ISO 23251 (API Std 521) for appropriate use of these environmental
factors.
2
See ISO 23251 (API Std 521) for the equations to use if insulation credit
is taken.
5-19
DESIGN OF RELIEF SYSTEM TO FLARE
Grouping of Systems
The first step in designing a flare system for a facility is to
determine the number of segregated vent and flare headers, if
more than one, which are required. Depending on plot plan, the
range of equipment design pressures, desirability of isolating
certain streams, temperature of the relief streams, possibility of
liquid carryover, heating value of the streams, and quantities of
the relief streams, it may prove desirable to provide two or more
segregated headers to the flare K.O. drum, or even to use totally
independent flare systems. Separation of high pressure and low
pressure headers, or low-temperature and wet headers, is not
uncommon. Some large integrated gas treating facilities have a
high pressure, low pressure, and a cryogenic flare.
Load Determination
The first step in determining controlling loads for a relief
header and flare system is to identify the credible major flar-
ing scenarios. These scenarios may be associated with pressure
relief, emergency depressuring, or transitory operating (e.g.,
startup, shutdown, etc.) events. A case may be controlling be-
cause of the back-pressure it will generate in the relief header,
the heat release at the flare stack, or the nature of the fluid to
be flared (i.e. low heating value, composition of the fluid, low
temperature, high liquid flow rate, etc.). This analysis may in-
clude dividing the plant into fire zones (fire zone size is dis-
cussed in ISO 23251 (API Std 521), identifying large individual
process relief loads, identifying common mode process failure
loads, identifying common mode local or plant wide utility fail-
ure, identifying which process valves that discharge to the flare
may already be open when an upset occurs (e.g., during startup
or shutdown), identifying maximum depressurization rates,
and identifying possible common events of pressure relief and
venting or depressurization.
Some favorable instrument response may be included in the
design of flare systems. ISO 23251 (API Std 521), Fifth Edition
states, Although favorable response of conventional instrumen-
tation should not be assumed when sizing individual process
equipment pressure relief, in the design of some components
of a relieving system, such as the blow-down header, flare, and
flare tip, favorable response of some instruments can be as-
sumed. In practice, the relief system design basis should be
thoroughly analyzed using appropriate methodology (i.e. layers
of protection analysis, SIL review, quantitative method), before
credit is taken. The basis of the flare design load determination
should be part of the plant formal hazard review.
For gas plants, another key decision is whether to design
the flare system for the maximum inlet flow of the production
header or inlet pipeline, or instead rely on a shutdown system
at the plant inlet, and/or an automatic or manual well shut-in.
Provisions also may be needed to allow venting some or all of
the produced gas to the flare on facility start-up, pipeline de-
pressurization, or during an emergency in one process unit.
Flare Location
After the load is determined, it is necessary to decide on the
location of the flares, and size of the headers and flare lines. Lo-
cation and height of the flares must consider flare stack height,
thermal radiation, emissions during flaring, ground level con-
centrations in case of a flame-out, consequences of liquid car-
ryover, and noise. Frequently, the controlling criterion for flare
location is the minimum distance to continuously operating
equipment, which may require maintenance.
Back Pressure Consideration
The next step in the analysis involves setting a preliminary
maximum back pressure for the system at various locations in
the flare system, and choosing between conventional, pilot op-
erated, or balanced pressure relief valves for the various relief
stations. A pressure relief device inventory should be prepared,
summarizing set pressure, estimated relieving temperature,
and approximate capacity, if available. The flare style should
be considered, as well as the maximum pressure expected at
the flare base.
Pressure relief valves that can tolerate higher back pressure
(e.g., balanced or pilot operated pressure relief valves) may be
selected if the back pressure is too high for conventional pres-
sure relief valves. Excessive built-up back pressure will affect
the operation of conventional pressure relief valves; high super-
imposed back pressure will affect the set point of these valves.
Flare Header Sizing Methods
Line sizing for flare headers and relief lines requires the
use of compressible flow equations. Computer programs are
normally used to size flare headers and to calculate the back
pressure at the relief devices. The header sizes are checked for
the major relief scenarios and then fixed. Based on these header
sizes, each pressure relief device is checked for proper style,
backpressure, and the effect of other devices on the set pres-
sure and operation of the valve. API RP 520-II requires that the
pressure relief valve inlet and outlet piping be sized for the rat-
ed relief device capacity for all devices except modulating pilot
operated relief valves, while header systems may be sized using
the required capacity of the controlling scenario(s). A manual
sizing method is outlined below:
1. Start at the flare tip, where the outlet pressure is atmos-
pheric, use design flows and work toward the individual
relief valves (pressure drop across the tip will vary with
the style of the flare and available system pressure drop
check with the tip manufacturer).
2. Establish equivalent pipe lengths between points in the
system and establish losses through fittings, expansion,
and contraction losses.
3. Many users limit the maximum allowed velocity at any
part of the flare system to Mach 0.7. This limit is intend-
ed to minimize the possible effects of acoustically or flow
induced vibration on the piping in the flare system. More
detailed methods to evaluate these effects are presented
in references 8 and 9.
4. Estimate properties of gases in the headers from the fol-
lowing mixture relationships (i indicates the i
th
compo-
nent).
MW = W
i
/ (W / MW)
i
Eq 5-16
T = W
i
T
i
/ W
i
Eq 5-17
= x
i

i
(MW)
i
0.5
/ x
i
(MW)
i
0.5
Eq 5-18
5. Calculate the inlet pressure for each section of the line
by adding the calculated pressure drop for that section to
the known outlet pressure.
6. Calculate sections of pipe individually using the inlet
pressure of a calculated section as the outlet pressure for
the new section.
7. Continue calculations, working towards the relief valve
or other flow source.
5-20
8. Check calculated maximum superimposed backpressure,
built-up backpressure, and total back pressure at the re-
lief valve against piping design pressure and the maxi-
mum allowable back pressure (MABP) of the flow source.
See Discharge Piping and Backpressure, in this section
for a definition of these terms, and API Std 520-I for maxi-
mum allowable values.
9. Adjust line size of headers until the calculated back pres-
sure is less than both the MABP for each valve in the
system and the design pressure of the associated piping.
The method outlined above employs sizing equations which
assume isothermal flow in the flare header. This is adequate for
most uses; however, if the actual flow condition differs greatly
from isothermal, the use of more complex equations and meth-
ods is required to predict pressure and more accurately and
temperature profiles for the headers.
The choice of piping material other than carbon steel may
be dictated by temperatures and pressures in some parts of the
flare system. Flare systems relieving fluids that produce cryo-
genic temperatures may require special metallurgy.
Flare Knockout Drums
Gas streams from reliefs are frequently at or near their dew
point, where condensation may occur, and some systems may
relieve liquids or two-phase fluids in an overpressure event.
A knockout drum is usually provided near the flare base, and
serves to recover liquid hydrocarbons or water, prevent liquid
slugs, and remove large (300600 micron diameter and larger)
liquid particles. The knockout drum reduces hazards caused by
burning liquid that could escape from the flare stack. All flare
lines should be sloped toward the knockout drum to permit con-
densed liquid to drain into the drum for removal. Liquid traps
in flare lines should be avoided. If liquid traps are unavoidable,
a method for liquid removal should be provided. The location of
the flare knockout drum also needs to take into account radia-
tion effect from the burning flare. Typically these drums are
located between the flare and the process area, where the maxi-
mum flare radiation exposure may be higher than allowable for
continuously operating equipment, but reasonable enough to
allow properly trained personnel appropriate time to leave in
a major flaring event.
Knockout drums may be vertical external to the flare stack,
built into the bottom of a self supporting flare stack, or hori-
zontal external to the flare stack. Internals which may break
free and block the relief path are not allowed in a flare knock
out drum.
Additional material on design and sizing for flare knock out
drums, including sizing examples are provided in ISO 23252
(API Std 521).
Flare Seals and Flare System Purging
A seal is provided in the flare system between the knockout
drum and the flaretip to prevent flashbacks due to air ingress.,
which can result in a sudden substantial increase in pressure in
the flare system, and potential damage. Several types of seals
can be used: 1) a water seal drum, 2) a molecular purge reduc-
tion seal (buoyancy seal), or 3) a velocity purge reduction seal.
A water seal drum is almost always installed in refinery
flare systems, and is sometimes used in natural gas processing
plants. It separates the flare system from the flare stack and
provides a water barrier which is capable of stopping flashback.
A molecular purge reduction seal is a seal device, installed in
a flare stack, which uses the difference in relative molecular
masses of purge gas and infiltrating air to reduce the rate at
which air will enter the stack. A velocity seal is a purge reduc-
tion seal which operates on the principle that air infiltrating
the stack counter to the purge flow hugs the inner wall of the
flare tip. The seal looks like one or more orifices located be-
low the flare tip, which forces the air to the center of the stack
where it is swept up by the purge gas.
To be effective, purge reduction seals require a purge gas,
typically natural gas or nitrogen. These seals do not stop flash-
back, but rather minimize the chances that the air concentra-
tion below the flare tip becomes high enough to support flash-
back. These devices reduce the flow rate of purge gas which
otherwise would be required to accomplish this. The minimum
seal purge gas rate will be specified by flare supplier.
Purge gas is normally supplied at the end of all major flare
headers and sub-headers, to ensure that the flare headers are
free of air. Changes in ambient temperature, or cooling of the
flare header after a hot relief could cause a partial vacuum in
the flare header if no purge is provided. In most cases, the sum
of the purge rates needed for the flare headers is greater than
the purge needed for the flare seal.
Flare systems are commonly designed for a mechanical de-
sign pressure of at least 335 kPa (ga), to minimize the chances
of equipment damage due to a flashback.
FLARE SYSTEMS
Types of Flares
A number of different types of flares are used in natural gas
processing facilities. The most common can be classified as:
1. Elevated Pipe Flares This style consists of an el-
evated flare riser with typically a flame stability device
constructed of stainless steel at the tip. The degree of
smokeless operation is dependent on the gas composi-
tion and discharge velocity (natural gas lean in NGL may
burn relatively smokelessly)
2. Elevated Assisted Smokeless Flare A general clas-
sification of several different styles of elevated flares, de-
signed to minimize smoke formation. The mechanism is
improved combustion due to the turbulence caused by the
assist gas. Assist gas mixing can be external at the flare
tip exit, internal to the flare tip, or both. These flares can
operate from below 0.5 Mach to sonic. The decision de-
pends on the acceptable back-pressure for the flare head-
er, the availability of utility streams, and the particular
design of the flare tip. The required quantity of assist gas
depends on the type.
Steam assisted flare tip: most common type of flare
used in refinery and natural gas service where suf-
ficient steam is available. Can achieve a smokeless
operation over a wide range of flared fluids and oper-
ating conditions
Low Pressure Air Assist: commonly uses air supplied
by a blower in a channel around the flare stack to
promote smokeless operation. Generally, these sys-
tems will permit smokeless operation during day-
to-day operation, but not necessarily at full flaring
rate.
5-21
Natural gas assisted Flare: uses high pressure natu-
ral gas to provide the discharge turbulence required
for smokeless operation.
3. High Pressure Elevated Staged Flare Flare tips
operating at sonic velocity, which use pressure energy
to promote smokeless burning. Typically, the flare tips
are staged using valves at the flare base. This design is
most efficient when the flare stream is high pressure
natural gas.
4. Horizontal Ground Flare A ground flare typically
consists of a flare system operated with the flame hori-
zontally on the ground. The most common style is similar
to staged flare tips. They are often used in remote loca-
tions where emissions, noise and flame visibility are not
of significant concern.
5. Enclosed Ground Flare an enclosed ground flare
consisting of a burner surrounded by a shell. The system
operates by introducing the flare gas into the unit via
a burner. Air enters the bottom of the shell via air lou-
vers. Enclosed ground flares are normally used only for
small capacity, low pressure flaring operations (such as
tank flares) where an elevated flare is inconvenient, and
for high capacity situations where an elevated flare is not
practical due to thermal radiation or community visibility
concerns. Special flame arrestor burners are used in tank
applications to minimize the possibility of back flash.
6. Loading and Tank Flares Several designs of elevat-
ed flares are available that are tailored to the destruction
of vapors during truck loading and from tanks. These de-
signs deal with the problems of low pressure, large varia-
tion in flow rate, and the potential of air ingress.
Elevated Flare Allowable Thermal Radiation
Thermal radiation is a prime concern in flare design and
location. Thermal radiation calculations must be performed to
avoid dangerous exposure to personnel, equipment, and the
surrounding area (trees, grass). Thermal radiation exposure
limits, and the effects on personnel, equipment and instrumen-
tation on shown in Fig. 5-17 from ISO-23251 (API Std 521).
13
Equipment protection should be evaluated on a case by case
basis, as various pieces of equipment have different protection
needs.
Solar radiation may add to the calculated flame radiation
and is dependent upon specific atmospheric conditions and site
location. A typical design range for a temperate climate is 0.79
to 1.04 kW/m
2
, but depends on the location. The decision to in-
clude solar radiation, is dependent on design critieria, and is
dependent and the site and the intent of the evaluation.
Determining Elevated Flare
Thermal Radiation
Flare suppliers have developed proprietary radiation mod-
eling programs based on equations and empirical values, and
these are commonly used to assess the effects of flare radiation,
and set the flare height. The F* factor (fraction of heat radiat-
ed) values used in these programs are specific to the equations
used, and are generally not interchangeable with the F* factor
values used in other methods. These programs have not been
subject to review and verification in the open literature, and are
specific to a particular flare design and exit velocity.
Several non-proprietary methods for predicting thermal ra-
diation from flares are available. One method based on flare
supplier input, which can be used for preliminary calculations
for simple flares with smokeless capacity of 10% or less, at tip
mach number of 0.5 or less, is presented below. ISO 23521 (API
Std 521)
13
presents a similar method, which in general will pro-
duce more conservative results. This and other radiation mod-
els are reviewed in a paper by Schwartz and White.
6
Preliminary Elevated Flare Thermal Radiation
Calculation
Spherical Radiation Intensity Formula:
(W
f
) (NHV) ()
I = Eq 5-19
14.4 (R
2
)
This equation has been found to be accurate for distances as
close to the flame as one flame length.
Equation 5-19 is valid so long as the proper value of fraction
of heat radiated, , is inserted. Classically, has been considered
a fuel property alone. Brzustowski et al.
2
experimentally observed
a dependence of on jet exit velocity. Other authors have present-
ed models that consider the carbon particle concentration in the
flame. The fraction of heat radiated is a function of many variables
including gas composition, tip diameter, flare burner design, flow-
rate and velocity, flame temperature, air-fuel mixing, and steam
or air injection; therefore a flare supplier should be consulted to
determine the specific values for a given application. A list of ven-
dor recommended fraction of heat radiated values for the most
frequently flared gases is shown in Fig. 5-18.
FIG. 5-17
Permissible Design Flare Thermal Radiation Levels
13
Permissible
design level
K (kW/m
2
)
Conditions
9.46 Maximum radiant heat intensity at any location
where urgent emergency action by personnel is
required. When personnel enter or work in an area
with the potential for radiant heat intensity greater
than 6.31 kW/m
2
(2000 Btu/hft
2
), then radiation
shielding and/or special protective apparel (e.g. a
fire approach suit) should be considered. SAFETY
PRECAUTION It is important to recognize that
personnel with appropriate clothing a cannot toler-
ate thermal radiation at 6.31 kW/m
2
(2000 Btu/hft
2
)
for more than a few seconds.
6.31 Maximum radiant heat intensity in areas where
emergency actions lasting up to 30 s can be required
by personnel without shielding but with appropriate
clothing
a

4.73 Maximum radiant heat intensity in areas where
emergency actions lasting 2 min to 3 min can be
required by personnel without shielding but with
appropriate clothing
a

1.58 Maximum radiant heat intensity at any location
where personnel with appropriate clothing
a
can be
continuously exposed
a
Appropriate clothing consists of hard hat, long-sleeved shirts with cuffs but-
toned, work gloves, long-legged pants and work shoes. Appropriate clothing
minimizes direct skin exposure to thermal radiation.
5-22
To calculate the intensity of radiation at different locations,
it is necessary to determine the length of the flame and its angle
in relation to the stack (see Fig. 5-19). A convenient expression
to estimate length of flame, L
f
, is shown below, based on infor-
mation from equipment suppliers.
L
f
= (0.12) (d)

Eq 5-20
P
w

1400
For conventional (open pipe) subsonic flares, an estimate of to-
tal flare pressure drop is 1.5 velocity heads based on nominal
flare tip diameter. The pressure drop equivalent to 1 velocity
head is given by:
(0.102) V
2
V
2
P
w
= = Eq 5-21
2

19.62
P
w
is the pressure drop at the tip in mm of water. After deter-
mining tip diameter, d, using Equation 5-22, and the maximum
required relieving capacity, flame length for conditions other
than maximum flow can be calculated using Equation 5-20.
The flare radiation method applies to flare tip Mach number
of 0.50 or less in Equation 5-22.
d =

1000 Eq 5-22

3.23 10
5
W

Z T
0.5

P
2
M k MW
Sonic velocity of a gas is given by:
a =

Eq 5-23
R
0
k T
MW
The center of the flame is assumed to be located at a distance
equal to 1/3 the length of the flame from the tip.
The angle of the flame results from the vectorial addition of
the velocity of the wind and the gas exit velocity.
| V
w
|
= tan
1
| Eq 5-24
\ V
ex
.
V
ex
= 168

Eq 5-25
P
w

1400
The coordinates of the flame center with respect to the tip
are:
X
c
= (L
f
/ 3) (sin ) Eq 5-26
Y
c
= (L
f
/ 3) (cos ) Eq 5-27
The distance from any point on the ground level to the center
of the flame is:
R =

Eq 5-28
(X X
c
)
2
+ (H
s
+ Y
c
)
2
Equations 5-19 and 5-28 allow radiation to be calculated at any
location.
The stack height results from considering the worst position
vertically below the center of the flame for a given condition of
gas flow and wind velocities (see Fig. 5-19).
R
2
= (H
s
+ Y
c
)
2
Eq 5-29
R = (H
s
+ Y
c
) Eq 5-30
H
s
= (R Y
c
) Eq 5-31
H
s
= R [(L
f
/ 3) (cos )] Eq 5-32
This method assumes that for different wind velocities the
length of the flame remains constant. In reality this is not true.
When the wind blows at more than 25 m/s, the flame tends to
shorten. For practical design, this effect is neglected.
API Preliminary Elevated Flare Thermal Radia-
tion Method ISO 23251 (API Std 521) presents a similar
methodology for calculation of flare radiation. The API method
is generally more conservative to that shown above. The follow-
ing are the major differences.
FIG. 5-18
Typical Fraction of Heat Radiated Values for Flared
Gases
Carbon Monoxide 0.075
Hydrogen 0.075
Hydrogen Sulfide 0.070
Ammonia 0.070
Methane 0.10
Propane 0.11
Butane 0.12
Ethylene 0.12
Propylene 0.13
The maximum value of for any gas is 0.13.
FIG. 5-19
Dimensional References for Sizing a Flare Stack

L
f
y
C
X
C
d
H
S
+ Y
C
R
X - X
C
X
H
S
WIND
Courtesy American Petroleum Institute
5-23
Different equation used for length flame
Different values used for fraction of heat radiated for
flared gas by component
The API method gives a leaner flame angle
Low Heating Value Gas Flaring
Low heating value gases are common in many gas plants;
for example, vent gas from a sweet gas amine system or the
feed gas to a sulfur plant. These streams can be a challenge for
a flare system. A number of tests were performed in the 1980s
to assess flare flame stability, and combustion efficiency, for a
wide range of fluids. Based on this testing it was concluded that
high heating value gases can be flared with a thermal destruc-
tion efficiency of greater than 98% over a wide range of flare
types and flare tip velocities. For low heating value gas, howev-
er, the testing found that a minimum heating value is needed,
and that flare tip velocity must be limited in order to achieve
high destruction efficiency. To flare gas streams with low heat-
ing value, the gas must be supplemented by natural gas injec-
tion in the flare header or at the flare tip, to ensure a minimum
heating value of approximately 7450 kJ/Nm
3
for an unassisted
flare and 9315 to 11 180 kJ/Nm
3
for an assisted flare, and the
maximum flare tip velocity must be substantially limited.
Smokeless Operation
Most smokeless flares utilize outside motive forces to pro-
duce efficient gas/air mixing and turbulence from the momen-
tum transferred by the high velocities of the external motive jet
streams (steam, fuel, gas, etc.). The assist medium mass flow
requirements are low for steam and fuel gas because of their
high velocity relative to the flare gas. Flare suppliers should
be consulted, because the assist gas rate is dependent on the
flare design.
ISO 23251 (API Std 521) presents a table with suggested
injection steam rates based on the type of gas being flared. The
following fitting equation may be used for calculation of the in-
jection steam rate for a mixture of paraffins (reference 12):
| 10.8 | (
W
stm
= W
hc

0.49 | ( Eq 5-33
\ MW .
For a mixture of olefins, the fitting equation becomes:
| 10.8 | (
W
stm
= W
hc

0.79 | ( Eq 5-34
\ MW .
The water spray and air blower methods provide necessary
mixing with low velocities and greater mass flow rates. The re-
quired assist fluid injection rate is highly dependent upon the
method of injection and atomization. Wind also has a signifi-
cant effect on water spray flares and may greatly reduce their
effectiveness.
The blower assisted flare uses air to produce smokeless op-
eration. Forced draft from a blower assists combustion and air/
gas turbulence, promoting smokeless operation. With blower
assisted flares it is common, for high capacity flares, to design
the air assist for a the portion of the maximum capacity ex-
pected during operation, and to allow a degree of smoke during
the full emergency relief. This, however, is dependant on local
requirements.
Pilots and Ignition
Reliable pilot operation under all wind and weather condi-
tions is essential. Flaring operations are for the most part inter-
mittent and non-scheduled. The flare must be instantly available
for full emergency duty to prevent any possibility of a hazard-
ous or environmentally offensive discharge to the atmosphere.
Wind-shields and flame-retention devices may be used to ensure
continuous piloting under the most adverse conditions. Most pi-
lots are designed to operate at wind velocities of 160 km/h and
higher. Multiple pilots are generally provided.
The most common flare pilot ignition system is a flame front
generator, where a flame generated by compressed air and fuel
gas is sent through a pipe at high velocity up the flare stack
to ignite the pilot gas. Spark plug type igniters are sometimes
used as well.
Proper flame monitoring is critical to flare operation. Typi-
cal systems consist of multiple flame detectors, or multiple
thermocouples, along with closed-circuit television.
Flare Siting and Regulations
Flare design must comply with local, state, and federal reg-
ulations regarding pollution, noise, and location. Permits are
usually required prior to construction. Flaring of gas for the
purpose of emissions control (as opposed to relief), is regulated
in the U.S.A. by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA),
and specific maximum flare tip velocities may apply. Stand-
ards for design of flare systems are covered by API Std 537 and
ISO23251 (API Std 521).
Atmospheric Vent Stacks
Atmospheric vent stacks can be used to dispose of non-toxic
hydrocarbons to the atmosphere, under the proper conditions.
In the natural gas industry, vent stacks for hydrocarbons are
typically limited to atmospheric disposal of lighter-than-air
gases. Stacks are many times used in natural gas compressor
stations to vent an individual compressor or the entire station
to the atmosphere on an emergency shutdown.
Before designing a vent stack system for a facility, it is
important to consider a number of factors: vent stack location
relative to plant and public facilities (permanent or temporary),
vent stack height, possibility of a combustible or toxic mixture
at grade or at an elevated platform, layers of protection in place
at upstream equipment, level controls to prevent overflow of
volatile liquids into the stack, appropriately sized knock out
drum, possibility of explosive release of energy due to detona-
tion of a vapor cloud, radiation due to a jet fire at the vent stack
tip caused by static ignition or lightning. The decision to dis-
charge hydrocarbons or other flammable or hazardous vapors
to the atmosphere usually requires that a dispersion analysis
be carried out to ensure that disposal can be accomplished with-
out creating a hazard. These topics are covered extensively in
ISO 23251 (API Std 521).
APPLICABLE CODES, STANDARDS, AND
RECOMMENDED PRACTICES
The designers of relief systems should be familiar with the
following documents related to pressure relief valves in process
plants and natural-gas systems.
ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section I, Rules for
Construction of Power Boilers
ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section VIII.
ASME B31.1 Power Piping
ASME B31.3 Process Piping
5-24
ASME B31.4 Pipeline Transportation Systems for Liquid
Hydrocarbons and Other Liquids
ASME B31.8 Gas Transmission & Distribution Systems.
API Std 520-I Sizing, Selection, and Installation of Pres-
sure-Relieving Devices in Refineries, Part I Sizing and Selec-
tion.
API RP 520-II Sizing, Selection, and Installation of Pres-
sure-Relieving Devices in Refineries, Part II - Installation.
API Std 526 Flanged Steel Pressure Relief Valves.
API Std 527 Seat Tightness of Pressure Relief Valves.
API Std 537 Flare details for General Refinery and Pet-
rochemical Service.
API Standard 620 Design and Construction of Large,
Welded, Low-Pressure Storage Tanks.
API Standard 650 Welded Steel Tanks for Oil Storage.
API STD 2508 Design and Construction of Ethane and
Ethylene Installations at Marine and Pipeline Terminals, Nat-
ural Gas Processing Plants, Refineries, Petrochemical Plants,
and Tank Farms Covers the design, construction, and loca-
tion of refrigerated (including autorefrigerated) liquefied eth-
ane and ethylene installations, which may be associated with
one or more of the following: railroad, truck, pipeline stations,
or marine loading or unloading racks or docks.
API STD 2510 Design and Construction of LPG Installa-
tions. Covers LPG Storage Vessels, Loading and Unloading Fa-
cilities at Marine and Pipeline Terminals, Natural Gas Process-
ing Plants, Refineries, Petrochemical Plants, and Tank Farms.
API Specification 12F Specification for Shop Welded
Tanks for Storage of Production Liquids.
API Specification 12D Specification for Field Welded
Tanks for Storage of Production Liquids.
API Bulletin 2521 Use of Pressure Vacuum Vent Valves
for Atmospheric Pressure Tanks to Reduce Evaporation Loss.
National Board Pressure Relief Device Certifications NB-
18 (RedBook)
ISO 15156/NACE MR0175 Petroleum and Natural Gas In-
dustries Materials for Use in H2S-containing Environments
in Oil and Gas Production.
ISO 23251 (API Std 521), Pressure-Relieving and Depres-
suring Systems.
ISO 28300 (API Std 2000), Venting Atmospheric and Low-
Pressure Storage Tanks (Nonrefrigerated and Refrigerated).
NFPA 30 Flammable and Combustible Liquids Code
NFPA 58 Liquefied Petroleum Gas Code
NFPA 59 LP-Gas, Plant Code (Note: For Utility Plants)
NFPA 59A Production Storage and Handling of Liquid
Natural Gas (LNG)
NFPA 68 Standard of Explosion Prevention by Deflagra-
tion Venting
NFPA 69 Standard of Explosion Prevention Systems
OSHA Publications OSHA Title 29, Part 1910 Part
1910 includes handling, storage, and safety requirements for
LPG and ammonia.
CGA (Compressed Gas Association) Publications Se-
ries of standards covering transportation, handling, and stor-
age of compressed gases including:
Pamphlet S-1.2 Safety Relief Device Standards
Part 2: Cargo and portable tanks for compressed gases.
Pamphlet S-1.3 Safety Relief Service Standards
Part 3: Compressed Gas Storage Containers.
REFERENCES
1. Min, T. C., Fauske, H. K., Patrick, M., Industrial Engineering
Chemical Fundamentals, (1966), pp. 50-51.
2. Brzustowski, T. A., Flaring In The Energy Industry, Process
Energy Combustion Science, Pergamon Press, Great Britain,
V. 2, pp. 129-144, 1976.
3. Straitz III, J. F., Nomograms Determining Proper Flame Tip Di-
ameter and Height, Oil Gas and Petroleum Equipment, Tulsa,
Oklahoma, July and August, 1979.
4. Recommendations and Guidelines Gasoline Plants, Pam-
phlet 301, Oil Insurance Association, 175 West Jackson Blvd.,
Chicago, Illinois 60604, August 1971.
5. Van Boskirk, B. A., Sensitivity of Relief Valves to Inlet and
Outlet Line Lengths, Chemical Engineering, August 23, 1982,
pages 77-82.
6. Schwartz, Robert E. and White, Jeff W., Predict Radiation From
Flares, Chemical Engineering Progress, Vol. 93, pp. 42-49, July
1997 .
7. Overa, Sverre J., Strange, Ellen and Salater, Per, Determina-
tion of Temperatures and Flare Rates During Depressurization
and Fire, GPA Convention, San Antonio, Texas, 1517 March,
1993.
8. Carucci, V.M., and Mueller, R.T., Acoustically Induced Piping
Vibration in High Capacity Pressure Reducing Systems, ASME
Paper 82-WA/PVP-8, 1982.
9. Energy Institute, IP SAFE Hydrocarbon Leak Reduction Volume
2.00, Guidelines for the Avoidance of Vibration Induced Fatigue
in Process Pipework, ISBN 9780852934630, 2nd edition, March
2008.
10. Ouderkirk, R., Rigorously Size Relief Valves for Supercritical
Fluids, Chemical Engineering Progress, August 2002.
11. Nezami, P.L., Distillation Column Relief Loads Part 1, Hydro-
carbon Processing, April 2008, and Part 2 May 2008.
12. O.C. Leite, Smokeless, Efficient, Non-toxic Flaring, Hydrocar-
bon Processing, March 1991, page 77.
13. ISO 23251 API Std 521 Pressure-relieving and Depressuring
Systems (Fifth Edition, 2007), American Petroleum Institute,
1220 L Street, NW, Washington, DC 20005.
14. API 520-520-I Recommended Practice for the Design of Pres-
sure Relieving Systems in Refineries (Eighth Edition, 2008,
American Petroleum Institute, 1220 L Street, NW, Washington,
DC 20005.
15. ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section VIII, Div. 1,
2010.
16. API Std 527, Seat Tightness for Pressure Relief Valves, Reaf-
firmed 2007.
5-25
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Chiu, C. H. Apply Depressuring Analysis to Cryogenic Plant Safety,
Hydrocarbon Processing, November 1982, Pages 255-264.
Kandell, Paul Program Sizes Pipe and Flare Manifolds for Compress-
ible Flow, Chemical Engineering, June 29, 1981, Pages 89-93.
Powell, W. W., and Papa, D. M., Precision Valves for Industry, Ander-
son, Greenwood Company, Houston, Texas, 1982, Pages 52-61.
Straitz III, J. F., Solving Flare-Noise Problems, Inter. Noise 78, San
Francisco 8-10, May 1978, Pages 1-6.
Straitz III, J. F., Flaring for Safety and Environmental Protection,
Drilling-DCW, November 1977.
Straitz III, J. F., Make the Flare Protect the Environment, Hydrocar-
bon Processing, October 1977.
Tan, S. H., Flare Systems Design Simplified, Hydrocarbon Process-
ing (Waste Treatment & Flare Stack Design Handbook) 1968, Pages
81-85.
5-26
NOTES: