HELLENIC ARMY GENERAL STAFF

ARMY HISTORY DIRECTORATE

A CONCISE HISTORY
OF THE BALKAN WARS
1912-1913

AN ARMY HISTORY DIRECTORATE PUBLICATION

ATHENS 1998

Dedicated
to our heroic fighters
of the Balkan Wars
1912-1913

PROLOGUE
Two Balkan Wars took place in 1912 through 1913, the first involving an alliance of Christian states,
namely Greece, Serbia, Bulgaria and Montenegro, against Turkey. The goal of the allies was the
liberation of their still enslaved Christian compatriots. The Second Balkan War involved Greece and
Serbia against Bulgaria, and was the result of the latter's aggressive attitude and territorial claims against
its former allies.
The Balkan Wars have been recounted by the Hellenic Army General Staff's War Report Office (today's
Army History Directorate) in a three-volume work which was published in the 1930s. It is accompanied by
four volumes of appendices and three volumes of sketch-maps. This detailed, voluminous work is
directed mainly to those who are interested in a comprehensive, in-depth study of the Balkan Wars.
In an attempt to familiarize the public, and in particular the young, with the main events of this period,
which is so important to the history of Greece, the Army History Directorate of the Hellenic Army General
Staff (AHD/HAGS) decided to publish a more concise history. AHD/HAGS hopes that this volume will offer
a synoptic but complete picture of the Balkan Wars, which are not only a historic milestone of modern
Greek history but also one of the finest hours of the Greek nation. Another aim of this publication is to
convey to present and future generations the national enthusiasm of the 1912-1913 period, when all
Greeks came together in an enviably united spirit for a nation-wide mobilization, threw themselves into a
titanic struggle, and succeeded in accomplishing miracles.
Greece, which possessed a fully reorganized, completely equipped and well-trained army, entered the
war against Turkey, alongside the other Balkan Allies, determined to liberate territories which were still
under the Turkish yoke. The nation was also determined to wash off the shame of defeat in the
unfortunate War of 1897. The Hellenic Army, under the country's capable political and military leadership,
and with the full support of the Greek people, undertook a great campaign and covered itself with glory on
the battlefields of Macedonia, Epirus, Thrace and the islands of the Aegean. Army victories inspired
admiration among Greece's allies and awe among its adversaries.
The Hellenic Army's gigantic endeavor had the ardent support and active participation not only of
Greece's still enslaved brothers in the Balkans but also of many philhellenes abroad and Cretan
volunteers. By the thousands the latter reinforced the struggle and contributed to the great victory.
The operations against the Turks in Macedonia began on 5 October 1912 and lasted approximately two
months. During this brief period of time, the Hellenic Army engaged in many victorious battles and utterly
defeated the opposing Turkish forces, liberating the greater part of Macedonia and the islands of the

Aegean. The high point of this period came within a few days after the outbreak of the war, with the
unconditional surrender of Thessalonica and the Turkish army there.
By contrast, the operations in Epirus lasted longer, due to the fact that primary priority was given to the
liberation of Macedonia. Exceptionally adverse weather conditions and the mountainous terrain of Epirus
were also contributing factors to the delay. Nevertheless, the Hellenic Army was not lacking in successful
campaigns: through its operations the strongly fortified position of Ioannina was conquered and the whole
of Epirus was liberated. Here too victory was the reward of the indefatigable spirit, enthusiasm and
unshakable national faith of the Greek warrior. Victory in Epirus permitted the timely transfer, once again,
of the bulk of the army to the Macedonian front, where Bulgaria had begun assembling its army, this time
with offensive intentions against its former allies. Bulgaria aimed to contest a large part of the indisputably
Hellenic Macedonian territories, which the Hellenic Army had just liberated through so many struggles and
sacrifices.
The Second Balkan War, which began on 16 June 1913, is distinctive for the speed with which it was
carried out, the fierceness of its battles and the great number of casualties suffered by both sides. During
this war as well, the Hellenic Army exhibited unrivaled heroism and a heightened spirit of self-sacrifice.
The result was the defeat of the Bulgarians and the final liberation of indisputably Hellenic Macedonia.
Thus, Greece emerged from the two Balkan Wars united and strong, with its territorial area almost
doubled and millions of its formerly enslaved Greek brothers now free.
The Balkan Wars were waged "for the sake of the enslaved brother and for the national honor."
Victorious Greece covered itself with glory and inspired its people with national pride. The Hellenic nation,
strong and confident, could look to the future and contemplate its destiny with trust and optimism, and
with strong faith that its glorious army would be its mighty shield.
Athens, Lieutenant General Constantinos Ailamakis
October 1986 Director of AHD/HAGS

INTRODUCTION
The present volume, entitled "A Concise History of the Balkan Wars, 1912-1913," recounts the war
operations and the major political and diplomatic events which decisively influenced the outbreak and the
conduct of these wars.
It is based on the three-volume work and appendices published in 1932 by the War Report Office of the
Hellenic Army General Staff, (the first of these volumes, amended in certain parts, was republished in
1939), as well as on other supplementary historical data and sources which are to be found in the
AHD/HAGS archive and library.
The present concise history is divided into three main parts, each of which relates to the contents of the
corresponding older volume, as follows:
Part One deals with the First Balkan War, giving a general description of the political/military situation in
the Balkans on the eve of the war, the ferment that preceded it, and the Hellenic Army's military
operations against the Turks for the liberation of Macedonia and the islands of the Aegean. Also in this
section is a synoptic account of the other Balkan Allies' war operations against the Turks during the same
period.
Part Two also deals with the First Balkan War, recounting in brief the war operations of the Hellenic Army
against the Turks for the liberation of Epirus.
Part Three covers the Second Balkan War, offering a general account of the situation that arose in the
Balkans after the end of the first conflict, the events which led to the clash between the former allies
-Greece, Serbia and Bulgaria- as well as the war operations of the Hellenic Army in eastern Macedonia
and Thrace, up to the signing of the peace treaty in Bucharest.
Sketch-maps, various tables and related photographs accompany the text in order to facilitate the
reader's study of the work.
Places within the actual Greek territory are referred to by their present names both in the text and in the
sketch-maps.

The events, and the circumstances under which they took place, are recounted concisely and without
judgement, thus enabling the reader to pursue an objective examination of the facts and to draw impartial
conclusions.
Athens Major General Evangelos Floros
October 1986 Director of the HAGS/5th Office

PART ONE
THE FIRST BALKAN WAR
THE OPERATIONS AGAINST THE OTTOMAN ARMY
IN MACEDONIA
CHAPTER 1
The Political and Military Situation in the Balkans
and the Causes of the First Balkan War.
The Political Situation in the Balkans on the Eve of the War
(Sketch-map 1)
1.
As the Christian nations of the Balkans gained their independence from the Ottoman Empire
throughout the nineteenth century, they immediately and zealously undertook to reconstruct and organize
their states. At the same time each nation initiated intense activity with the goal of improving the situation
of their compatriots who were still in bondage. The new states aimed to create the proper conditions for
advancing their claims on Ottoman-occupied territories, especially those in Macedonia and Thrace.
Over time, these territories became areas of intense nationalistic activity and competition among the
neighboring Christian states. In order to further their respective national interests at the expense of
Greece, each state sought to create a national consciousness in the indigenous population. The means
the states used to advance their ends were propaganda, the schools and the church.
2.
Greece had powerful and undisputed historical rights in the regions of Macedonia and Thrace:
they were contiguous, integral territories inhabited by a large and coherent Greek population noted for its
high cultural level, progressive attitudes and prosperous economic development.
Nevertheless any attempt by the free Greek state to liberate the still subjugated Hellenic population was
frustrated because of the power of the Ottoman Empire and because the policy of the European powers
vis-a-vis the Balkans was to preserve the territorial status quo in the region. No significant change was to
be permitted. Furthermore, due to a variety of domestic problems, Greece had fallen significantly behind
in the field of military organization. The unfortunate outcome of the War of 1897 and the tension that
followed in Macedonia as a result of the activities of the Bulgarian komitadjis1 demonstrated to the Greek
leadership and people the need to undertake immediate measures to improve the country's military
preparedness and to adopt a more realistic approach on national issues.
3.
Bulgaria, moreover, since gaining statehood, had concentrated all of its activity on Bulgarizing the
populations of Macedonia and Thrace in order to lend legitimacy to its efforts to change the boundaries
arbitrarily assigned it by the Treaty of San Stefano in 1878.
With the Great Powers divided on Balkan issues and the Ottoman Empire (referred to at the time as "the
sick man of the Bosporus") handicapped by internal problems, Bulgaria began to expand its activities; by
1885 it had annexed the autonomous region of Eastern Rumelia, which was inhabited by more than
100,000 Greeks. Bulgaria then began to infiltrate into Macedonia by actively promoting the revolutionary

committees. They were able to instigate a sham insurrection against the Turks in 1903, thus advancing
the claim of the region's autonomy. Even though this insurrection soon was suppressed by the Turkish
army, it provided the means for the promotion of the notion of the existence of a Bulgarian minority in
Macedonia, the voice of which allegedly was brutally stifled by a dominant Turkey.
This event, combined with the many forms of pressure exerted on the subjugated Greeks of Macedonia
and Thrace, provided the pretext for the intervention of the European powers. They obliged Turkey, under
the Mrzsteg Accord1 of 20 September 1903, to accept the assignment of European officers as
commanders of gendarmerie in Macedonia, and the implementation of certain administrative and
economic reforms under the supervision of Russian and Austrian representatives.
The Bulgarians were not the only ones actively spreading propaganda in Macedonia. The Romanians and
Serbs were also active, especially in western Macedonia, albeit on a smaller scale.
For the flourishing Hellenic population in this sensitive area, the threat of annihilation became even
greater with the passage of time because Turkey, employing the tactic of "divide and rule," both favored
Bulgaria at the expense of Greece and appeared to ignore the ferment in the region. In so doing, the
Porte intended to prevent the formation of a coalition of Christian Balkan states hostile to the Ottoman
Empire.
4.
The Greek reaction began to intensify in 1904. The Greek governments of the period, and the
Greek people as a whole, realized that the danger to the subjugated Greek populations of Macedonia and
Thrace was so serious that, despite their own efforts to organize and defend themselves against the new
threat, it could be dealt with only by means of a larger, organized armed struggle.
For this purpose guerrilla groups, headed by experienced leaders, officers and civilians, crossed the
border into Macedonia where, with the unreserved support of the indigenous population, they waged a
fierce struggle to preserve the Hellenic character of the region. The Macedonian Struggle, as this national
effort was named, continued until 1908. It was harsh and bloody but it provided a significant national
benefit: it preserved Hellenism.
5.
As the clashes between the Balkan nations reached a climax in June 1908, the Young Turk
movement erupted in Thessalonica. This movement was organized by Turkish officers who were
advocates of reform, and it appeared to be directed against the absolutist regime of the Sultan. In reality,
however, it aimed to prevent any further intervention by the European powers in the internal affairs of the
Turkish state, such as had been imposed by the Mrzsteg Accord, signed on September 20, 1903 and
accepted by the Sultan.
The movement's principles and the promises made by the Young Turks to ban state terror, were
welcomed enthusiastically by the subjugated Christians, who truly believed in a better future of freedom
and equality.
Their hopes were soon dashed, however, and they realized that in the new regime there was a place only
for Muslim Turks. The Christian population had to disappear. The new nationalistic policy pursued by
Turkey was promoted through a series of measures, such as compulsory military service for Christians,
the teaching of Turkish in non-Turkish schools, the abolition of certain privileges, and the like. Mainly,
however, the wrath of the Young Turks was directed against the Greeks. Turkish policy now aimed to
eliminate the historically strong Greek influence in the Turkish state, a result of the Greeks' administrative,
diplomatic and commercial experience and educational level, which was fed by their deep-rooted national
consciousness. As a result, the subjugated Greek population suffered yet another persecution.
At the same time as it carried out internal reforms, Turkey also sought to restore its authority and prestige
in relation to its neighboring states. Encouraged by the decision of the European powers to recall the
officers and representatives they had assigned to Macedonia, Turkey's response to demands or
demarches by the Balkan states concerning the rights of their compatriots in Turkish-held territory was
negative and often threatening.
6.
Greece, faced by this new situation, not only did not bend but steeled its will to resist and confront
the threat. It organized its army on new foundations and procured essential military equipment; at the
same time new units were added to the Hellenic Fleet.
Simultaneously, Greece embarked on an intense diplomatic campaign. It had become apparent that
Greece alone could not successfully confront Turkey militarily, nor did Athens expect that it could
unilaterally force Turkey to accede to Greek demands. Consequently it was deemed necessary to seek

the cooperation of the other Balkan states. Conditions were conducive to a diplomatic initiative, as a spirit
of conciliation and mutual understanding had already begun to take hold among the rulers of the other
Christian states of the Balkans.
It was not the first time that such an alliance of the Christian Balkan states against Turkey had been
sought. Previous efforts, however, had borne no fruit. The first endeavor to form an alliance was
attempted by the Serbian King in 1860; it was thwarted by his assassination the same year. Greece made
similar proposals to Bulgaria in 1891 and 1897, but they foundered owing to Sofia's pro-Turkish policies.
7.
The situation had now changed. The Balkan states recognized both the danger inherent in Young
Turk chauvinism and the need to stand up against it. Their close cooperation was crucial for their own
survival and for the liberation of their subjugated compatriots. A rapprochement between Greece and
Bulgaria was achieved rapidly, with both the Ecumenical Patriarch and the Bulgarian Exarch playing a
leading part in the process. The treaty for a Greco-Bulgarian alliance was drafted on 10 August 1910 but
was not signed because Greece wanted to include in it the issue of the abrogation of the Exarchate
Schism.
A new round of soundings began in 1911 on the initiative of Greek Prime Minister Eleutherios Venizelos.
Although these efforts did not end in an official agreement, they nonetheless reflected the prevailing mood
in both countries, which was conducive to cooperation. They also provided the opportunity for mutual
promises that each country would come to the aid of the other in the event of a Turkish attack.
At the same time, based on the demand and supervision of Russia, there took place negotiations with a
view to joint action between Serbia and Bulgaria; at the same time Montenegro expressed its unreserved
desire to join any alliance against Turkey.
The outcome of this activity in the Balkans became apparent at the beginning of 1912. On 29 February of
that year a secret Serbo-Bulgarian treaty of friendship and alliance was signed in Sofia; it stipulated
mutual military assistance in order to secure the political independence and territorial integrity of each
nation. Beyond these goals, an appendix to the treaty provided for possible military intervention against
Turkey if domestic disorders there threatened the interests of either ally, or if the preservation of the status
quo in the Balkans became problematic. The treaty also provided for the distribution of liberated territories
if the outcome of a war with Turkey were to be successful. Serbia recognized Bulgaria's right to annex
territories east of the Rhodope mountain range and the river Strymon, and Bulgaria acknowledged the
corresponding right of Serbia concerning territories north and west of Scardus mountain (Shar Planina).
The only areas not parceled out by the treaty were a large part of Mace donia and a part of Kosovo. The
fate of these areas was left to Russia in the role of arbitrator, under whose auspices the Serbo-Bulgarian
negotiations leading to the signing of the treaty had taken place.
A military agreement was signed on 29 April 1912, which provided for the mobilization of 200,000
Bulgarians and 150,000 Serbs in the event of a war with Turkey, Romania or Austria. A complementary
military agreement was signed a few weeks later on 19 June between the General Staffs of both
countries; it stipulated that the Bulgarian Army would take action towards the valley of the river Hebrus
(Maritza), while the 2nd Serbian Army would assemble in Bulgarian territory, in the region of Kstendil, and
from there direct its operations towards the valley of the river Axios (Vardar), at the same time maintaining
readiness to reinforce the Bulgarian Army on the Hebrus.
8.
In contrast, Greco-Bulgarian negotiations faced serious difficulties due to Sofia's territorial claims
on the Greek lands of Macedonia and Thrace, which were to be liberated from Turkish subjugation.
Despite these thorny issues Greece finally decided to sign a defense pact with Bulgaria, a pact which
contained no mention of the fate of any liberated territories. Greece's decision was dictated by its belief
that, in the event of a wider conflict between the Balkan states and Turkey, its reorganized army was in a
position quickly to liberate the territories up to the line from Perlepe to Drama.
On 16 May 1912, therefore, the Greek ambassador in Sofia, Demetrios Panas, and the Bulgarian prime
minister and Foreign Minister Geshov signed a treaty providing for a defensive alliance between Greece
and Bulgaria; it had a three-year term and called for mutual assistance and support in the event that
Turkey attacked either state.
Copies of the treaty were exchanged in Sofia on 15 June 1912, after being previously ratified by the
Bulgarian King Ferdinand and the Crown Prince of Greece, Constantine, acting as regent for King George
I, who was abroad.

A military agreement was also signed three months later on 22 September 1912, just before the
declaration of war. According to this agreement, in the event of a Turkish-Bulgarian war, Greece
undertook the obligation to attack Turkey with an army of 120,000 men and its entire fleet. Bulgaria
undertook a comparable obligation in the event of a Greco-Turkish war, namely to attack Turkey with an
army of 300,000.
Greece did not sign any treaty or military agreement with Serbia or Montenegro. It was only after the war
against Turkey had begun that the two countries decided to send representatives to the corresponding
general headquarters in order to coordinate military operations. Montenegro had signed a treaty with
Serbia that September, the purpose of which was to define the manner in which operations against
Turkey were to be carried out.
By the beginning of autumn, 1912, therefore the four Christian Balkan states,although they had not signed
a common defense pact, were in solidarity and of united purpose against the Ottoman Empire.
The Declaration of War
9.
Having reached a rapprochement, the Balkan states were in a position to wage war against
Turkey. All that remained was the pretext.
The massacres of Christian populations that had been organized by the Turkish authorities in the Serbinhabited town of Kochane in July 1912 had drawn strong protests from the Balkan states, and especially
from Bulgaria, where open demonstrations against Turkey had taken place.
The Bulgarian government deemed that the Italian-Turkish War1 offered an appropriate opportunity to
attack the Turks, and proposed to Greece in August 1912 that the latter provide the appropriate cause by
hastening the convening of parliament with the participation of deputies from the island of Crete, who had
been excluded when the issue had arisen in April. Greece, however, did not accept this solution, and so
Bulgaria stated that it would seek another opportunity to declare war on Turkey.
10.
In early September of the same year Turkish authorities, on the pretext of seeking guarantees
regarding Serbia's peaceful intentions, confiscated large amounts of Serbian military materiel in Skopje,
as it was being transported by rail from Thessalonica to Belgrade. Serbia lodged a strong protest on 10
September, and demanded the release of the trains; the Turks did not reply.
Another provocation occurred when Turkish troops landed on the island of Samos, in strict violation of the
special privileges that had been granted to the island in 1832, including self-government and a prohibition
on the stationing there of Turkish troops or police. The Turkish troops that landed on Samos opened fire
for no reason on the steamship Roumeli, which carried on a regular service to the island and was on its
way to the island's port of Vathy. The ship flew the Greek flag because the Greek consul general of
Alexandria, Egypt was on board. Turkish fire injured two passengers and a seaman. The Greek
government lodged a vehement protest with Turkey through its ambassador to Constantinople and
demanded satisfaction for the Turkish violations.
At the same time, daily incidents began along Turkey's borders with Bulgaria, Serbia and Montenegro.
The most notable incident occurred when a Turkish detachment entered Serbian territory in the region of
Novi Pazar; a serious engagement followed that resulted in many casualties on both sides.
11.
As a precautionary measure Turkey ordered the reinforcement of its border guards and began
mobilizing troops towards Thrace on the pretext of carrying out military exercises. Bulgaria responded on
16 September 1912, and after reaching an understanding with Serbia, called for a general mobilization. It
also invited Greece to mobilize, stating that it withdrew its reservations to the annexation of the island of
Crete.
Even though Greece was not obligated to join the war, as its agreement with Bulgaria was a defensive
one, the Greek government deemed that the participation of Greece in the war against Turkey was
imperative if the subjugated Greeks of Macedonia and Thrace were to be swiftly liberated. For these
reasons, the Greek government unanimously, and with the concurring opinion of the Regent-Crown
Prince, decided on the participation of the country in the war against Turkey; a general mobilization was
declared. The general mobilization decree was signed immediately and went into force at midnight of 17
to 18 September 1912.
Montenegro moved concurrently with Greece and seven days later, on 25 September, declared war on
Turkey first.

12.
The mobilization of the Balkan states and Turkey alarmed the European powers, each of which
understood the dangers implicit in military involvement in adventures in the Orient, owing to their
conflicting interests in the region. For this reason, the Great Powers lodged individual protests against
Turkey, demanding that it enforce the reforms in the European part of the country that had been stipulated
by the Berlin Conference of 1880.
At the same time the diplomats of the Great Powers in Athens, Belgrade, Sofia and Cetinje (capital of
Montenegro), in an attempt to prevent the conflict, made clear in a common demarche to the Balkan
states, that, should they declare war against Turkey, whatever its outcome might be, they should not hope
for territorial expansion. Encouraged by this, Turkey not only did not go ahead with reforms but, on the
contrary, confiscated all Greek ships that were anchored in Turkish ports, raised the Turkish flag on them,
and used the ships to transport its military.
The Greek government handed Turkey a strong note demanding the release of the Greek ships and
reparations; it did not receive a reply. Athens also protested to the Great Powers, stressing that Turkey's
actions were a blatant violation of international law, which obligated Greece to take stern measures.
13.
As a result of these developments Serbia, Bulgaria and Greece, having determined that the time
for decisive action had arrived, informed the Great Powers that they had an obligation to directly address
Turkey and dictate to it the principles upon which the reforms would take place and also the guarantees it
had to provide in order to ensure their implementation.
At the same time the allies handed Turkey's ambassadors, accredited in their capitals, an identical, urgent
and final note in which they called upon the Turkish government to make the following radical reforms in
the administration of its European provinces:
- Recognize the national autonomy of the various minorities.
- Grant proportional representation in the Ottoman parliament to each minority.
- Appoint Christian civil servants to all public positions in provinces inhabited by Christians.
- Recognize the schools of Christian communities.
- Prohibit the settlement of Turkish populations for the purpose of altering the demographic character of
the Christian provinces.
- Suspend the conscription of Christians until the creation by them of military cadres, at which time they
would be conscripted locally, according to province.
- Reorganize the gendarmerie according to General Prefectures (vilayets) under the command of Swiss
and Belgian officers.
- Appoint Swiss or Belgian General Prefects (valis) in European Turkey and establish general councils to
be elected by the voting districts.
- Establish a Supreme Council in Constantinople, consisting of Christians and Muslims in equal
proportion, to supervise the implementation of the reforms. The Supreme Council procedures would be
monitored by ambassadors of the Balkan nations and the Great Powers.
The Ottoman Foreign Ministry announced to the press on October 3 that it had decided not to reply to the
Serbian and Bulgarian diplomatic note; such a document, the Foreign Ministry said, could only be
rejected. The Government also rejected the demand of the Great Powers to intervene in order to
implement the reforms. Turkey recalled its ambassadors from Sofia and Belgrade on the same day and
notified the Great Powers of its action. At that point, Serbia and Bulgaria severed diplomatic ties with
Turkey and on the following day, 4 October 1912, declared war.
The Turkish stance towards Greece was different. The Ottoman government pretended that it had not
received the Greek diplomatic note (and therefore did not have to respond to it). Instead, Turkey tried
through a variety of means to separate Greece from its Balkan allies; it promised to cede to Greece Crete
and the territories stretching from the mouth of the river Kalamas up to the eastern foot of the Olympus
mountain as stipulated by the Congress of Berlin in 1880. In other words, Ioannina and Metsovo would be
ceded to Greece.
For this reason Turkey did not recall its ambassador from Athens and did not react to the admission of
Cretan deputies to the Greek parliament on 1 October 1912, hoping thereby to secure Greek neutrality.
At the same time, on 2 October 1912, Turkey rushed to sign a peace treaty with Italy at Ouchy,
Switzerland, thus ending the war between the two countries. This move relieved Turkey from the naval
blockade that had been imposed by Italy and opened up the sea routes for the transport of Turkish troops
from the East to Macedonia and Thrace. Turkey believed that by concentrating a significant number of
troops in its European provinces it could subdue Bulgaria and Serbia swiftly, provided that the Hellenic

fleet did not interfere with the seaborne transport of those troops. This was the rationale for Turkey's
diplomatic maneuvers and overtures to Greece.
For its part, the Greek government issued another, much harsher diplomatic note to Turkey demanding
that the captured Greek ships be released by 1600 on October 3.
When he did not receive a reply within the given deadline, Greece's ambassador to Constantinople
handed to Turkey on 5 October a notification announcing a break in diplomatic relations between the two
states and declaring war. At the same time Greece, with the full support of its allies, issued a notification
to the Great Powers informing them that it had declared war against Turkey. King George, after a
proposal by the Council of Ministers, directed the following address to the nation:
To my people
Sacred obligations towards our dearest country, towards our subjugated brothers and towards humanity
compel the state, after the failure of peaceful efforts to secure the human rights of the Christians under
the Turkish yoke, to end by the use of arms the plight they have suffered for so many centuries.
Hellas and its allies, fully armed, inspired by the same sentiments and bound by common obligations,
undertake the sacred struggle for justice and freedom of the oppressed peoples of the East.
Our army and navy, fully conscious of their duties towards the nation and Christendom, mindful of national
traditions and proud of their moral supremacy and worth, throw themselves into the struggle with faith, in
order to render freedom to the oppressed with their holy blood.
Hellas and its brother allied nations will seek at all costs to accomplish this holy mission, and having
called on the help of almighty God in this most just struggle of civilization, we exclaim: LONG LIVE
GREECE. LONG LIVE THE NATION.
Athens, 5 October 1912
George
The Council of Ministers
Eleutherios Venizelos
L. A. Koromelas
K. D. Raktivand
Emmanuel Repoules
I. D. Tsirimokos
Al. N. Diomedes
Andreas Michalakopoulos
N. A. Stratos
Thus, on 5 October, Greece was at war with Turkey.
Earlier, on 4 October, the Ministry of the Army had sent a wire to the commanders of the Armies of
Thessaly and Epirus informing them that military operations would commence on the morning of the next
day, 5 October.
The Army of Thessaly, whose zone of responsibility extended from the river Spercheios to the northern
frontiers of the Greek state in Thessaly, was ordered to undertake offensive operations and invade
Macedonia, crushing any enemy resistance. The Army of Epirus on the other hand, whose zone of
responsibility extended west of the river Acheloos, was ordered into an actively defensive posture on
account of its limited strength.
The Organization, Training and Mobilization Plans of the Hellenic Army
14.
The organization of the regular army in Greece began immediately after the onset of the struggle
for Greek independence in 1821; it was systematically continued after the country's liberation and the
arrival in 1828 of its first governor, John Capodistria. Capodistria formed a War Council to deal with
military affairs and the conduct of war, specifically: the organization of the army into Infantry, Artillery,
Cavalry, and Engineering corps, the organization of the Commissariat of the Army, the founding in
Nauplion of a military school for cadets under the name "Cadet Company," for the military education and
professional training of its permanent cadres, and others. This endeavor progressed slowly owing to
numerous problems, mainly economic, that had to be dealt with simultaneously. Until 1877, the
organization and in general the composition of the army was altered many times, especially with regard to
the number and the organization of the units.

During the mobilization of 1877, prompted by the Russo-Turkish war of that year and the Greco-Turkish
friction that followed, two Infantry divisions (of two brigades, each comprising two regiments), an Evzone
battalion, a Cavalry regiment, an Artillery regiment and a battalion of Engineers were formed.
A more serious effort to improve the Hellenic Army began in 1881, with the establishment of compulsory
military service, the formation of a school for reserve and non-commissioned officers, the establishment of
a Commissariat corps, the procurement of military materiel and the engagement of a French military
mission to consult in matters concerning training and organization.
Thus, with the new mobilization of 1885 prompted by Bulgaria's arbitrary annexation of Eastern Rumelia,
ten regiments of Infantry, eight battalions of Evzones, three regiments of Cavalry, three regiments of
Artillery and one regiment of Engineers were formed. Fifteen additional second-line battalions of Infantry
also were formed during the eight-month duration of this mobilization.
From this period onwards, however, until 1897, no substantial progress was made towards the
improvement or development of the army. The loss of the war in 1897 proved that Greece had not
appreciated its own military shortcomings. There was neither a staff service nor were there organic large
units from the peacetime period. The Commissariat essentially had never been organized and the rearareas service was non-existent. Even from the standpoint of numbers, the Hellenic Army was lacking
significantly, since for many years a sizable section of the eligible male population was not conscripted
due to a multitude of exemptions permitted by the conscription law. Furthermore, military training was
ineffectual.
15.
After the ill-fated outcome of the war of 1897, new systematic efforts were introduced to reform
and equip the army and rid it of the moral and physical deterioration caused by the war. In 1900 the
institution of General Command of the Army was established. Crown Prince Constantine was appointed
Commander General of the Army; he also held the post of Inspector General of the Army and, in both
capacities, was part of the Ministry of the Army. Constantine was given absolute initiative in the areas of
organization, training and the preparation of a battle-worthy force.
In 1904, a law was passed concerning "The Organization of the Army," designating that the army would
comprise three divisions and that the country would be divided into three mobilization districts, one for
each division. A series of legislative measures introduced in 1907 helped strengthen the army's
infrastructure, weapons and equipment. In addition, it was prohibited to detail officers and soldiers to the
gendarmerie, the forest and customs services, so that the army would be relieved of duties not consonant
with its mission. In 1908 the first ever military field dress uniform was introduced; its color was khaki.
After the revolt of the "Military League" at Goudi in 1909 the army was reorganized on a new basis in
order to speed up its battle readiness so that it would be able to deal with every new Turkish threat.
Indeed, that had been the Military League's primary objective. As part of the effort to reform the military,
the General Command and General Staff Corps, which were formed in 1904 and which were deemed to
constitute a privileged officer class, were abolished; the Crown Prince and the princes were dismissed
from the army. The divisions, non-divisional units and other military units which, until then, had been
under the General Command, were placed directly under the Ministry of the Army. The General Staff of
the General Command was merged with the Staff Service of the Ministry of the Army. In addition, a
general conscription was established and it was decided that untrained conscripts of the older classes
would undergo a three-month training program. Finally, it was decided that the Krupp gun be replaced by
the quick-firing Schneider-Canet field gun and the Schneider-Danglis pack gun. Large orders for
ammunition and mobilization equipment were placed and construction was begun on warehouses,
fortification works, wharves, railways, and other infrastructure projects.
A year later, in November 1910, Eleutherios Venizelos accepted an invitation from the Military League and
became prime minister of Greece. Venizelos's leadership decisively influenced the country's political
development and its military preparedness.
In 1911 the Venizelos government, in order to establish a rule of law and justice, proceeded to amend the
Constitution with a view to safeguarding individual rights and establishing new rules governing the
exercise of state authority. This was done without altering the form of government or the state's
organizational structure. In addition, a new law established the post of Inspector General of the Army to
which Crown Prince Constantine was appointed, with a provision that in the event of war he would
become Commander in Chief of the Army.
In January 1912 the new Organization of the Army was published, according to which the army adopted
the triadic system of organization. The Hellenic Army would consist of four divisions, each comprising

three Infantry regiments and one Field Artillery regiment, six independent Evzone battalions, two
battalions of Pack Artillery, one battalion of Heavy Artillery, three Cavalry regiments (of which two were
formed into a brigade), and two Engineer regiments.
As a result of the new organization, the divisions became lighter and better adapted for warfare in the
mountainous terrain of Greece.
16.
During this period the army's training method was gradually transformed and soldiers were
systematically trained in the methods of modern warfare (such as the use of fire and terrain, development
of an attack mentality, etc.); army unit leaders were trained to command their units in warfare conditions.
Annual military exercises took place during the summer months and helped to improve the army's combat
effectiveness.
The greatest impetus for improving the administration, organization, and training of the Hellenic Army
came from the French Mission, under the leadership of General Eydoux, who arrived in Greece in
January 1911.
17.
In order to supply the army with the necessary materiel and financing, the National Defense Fund
had been established by law in 1904; special funding was allocated to it by the state. The fund provided
respectable sums for the procurement of individual arms, artillery guns, vehicles, ammunition, clothing
and footwear, harnessing and quartering equipment, horses, pack animals, the construction of
warehouses and fortification works and for any other requirements of the army. Expenditures for these
purposes during the period between 1904 to 1912 totalled 214 million drachmas, of which 115 million
were incurred between 1910 and 1912.
Thanks to intense efforts by all concerned, the mobilization of 1912 took place with the warehouses
brimming with supplies of all types (clothing, harnessing and camping equipment, medical equipment,
foodstuffs, animal fodder etc.), sufficient to cover the needs of an army of 200,000. There were sufficient
armaments, including 115,000 Mannlicher rifles, the necessary pistols and revolvers, a large number of
Gras rifles with which to equip the services of the rear and the National Guard, artillery pieces for thirty-six
field batteries, nine pack batteries of the Danglis type, and a significant number of batteries of the older
type, as well as the ordnance required by all these weapons.
Between 1910 and 1912, the fortification of the country was accomplished at the same time that the
procurement of weapons and materiel was taking place. By the eve of the mobilization of 1912, four
fortified positions in Thessaly had been completed, covering the approaches to Larissa from the north.
These included infantry entrenchments, machine gun and artillery gun emplacements, obstacles, shelters,
and communication trenches, among others. Three bridges were also constructed over the Peneios river,
as well as the necessary road network to service the fortification projects and other military objectives.
Noteworthy fortification projects also were carried out in Epirus. The defensive organization of this region,
however, was temporary and incomplete, and was not completed until the outbreak of the war. Projects
included the setting up of a number of gun emplacements near Arta, forts at the entrance of the
Ambracian Gulf as well as combat entrenchments for the infantry.
18.
All the mobilizations that had taken place until 1897 had been makeshift and ill-prepared.
Beginning in 1904, however, systematic preparations were begun; the mobilization took place in
accordance with the Mobilization Plan, which was updated annually by the General Command, taking into
account as far as possible the country's actual capabilities in conscript-age manpower, pack animals,
vehicles and military materiel of all kinds.
The Mobilization Plan of 1912 was an obvious improvement and was based on the Government's policy,
the army's new organization, training of the younger conscript classes, and the receipt of new military
equipment and weapons. The army's primary objective in the event of war with Turkey was defined as the
elimination of the Ottoman Army in Macedonia and an active defense of Epirus until the battle in
Macedonia was resolved.
The 1912 Mobilization Plan also called for the formation of an Army of Thessaly, an Army of Epirus and an
Army of the Interior as follows:
- The Army of Thessaly included the General Headquarters, three army corps (A, B, C), an independent
division (Division VII), one Cavalry brigade, four independent battalions of Evzones, a two-company
Bridging Engineer unit, a two-company Telegraph Operators unit, one battalion of Garrison Artillery, three

companies of Litter-Bearers, eight Field Surgery Hospitals, two battalions of National Guard, a Rear Area
Service and other services.
Army Corps A included Divisions I and II, Army Corps B included Divisions III and IV and Army Corps C
included the newly formed Divisions V and VI.
- The Army of Epirus included a headquarters, four independent Evzone battalions, one Infantry regiment
consisting of three battalions, one National Guard battalion, one Cavalry company, one battalion of Field
Artillery, and one battalion of Pack Artillery, a Rear Area Service and others.
According to the plan, the total force of the Army of Thessaly would consist of 100,000 men, 25,000 pack
animals and 3,500 vehicles. The Army of Epirus comprised 13,000 men, 4,200 pack animals and 400
vehicles. The Army of the Interior consisted of 17,000 men, 2,900 pack animals and 1,800 vehicles.
The time designated for the peacetime army to change to a wartime footing after the mobilization order
was set at six to eight days.
The Mobilization Plan was supported by a corresponding plan to transport reservists from their homes to
mobilization centers and the units to the battle zone.
This, generally speaking, was the status and preparation of the Hellenic Army in the summer of 1912. Its
improvement, compared to what it had been in 1897, was impressive and swift. It was so swift that the
Balkan states did not become aware of it until the outbreak of hostilities, and consequently had not
calculated its potential correctly. Up until that point, only the Hellenic Fleet had been viewed as a serious
factor in the event of war.1
The Mobilization and the Strategic Concentration of the Hellenic Army2
19.
The General Mobilization Decree was signed on 17 September and its implementation began at
midnight of the same day. This and the supplementary decrees that followed called up servicemen of the
classes of 1910 and 1911 who were not with the colors, all the reserve classes of 1900-1909, trained
servicemen of the National Guard (classes 1896-1899) and the servicemen of the Infantry, Evzones and
Artillery of the older classes (1893-95).
The implementation of the Mobilization Decree also was ordered on the same day, 17 September , for the
island of Crete.
In addition, it was ordered that troops be detached to guard the key works (bridges, tunnels, crossings
etc.) along the railway line linking Athens to the borders; also ordered were the guarding of the
corresponding line in the Peloponnese and the manning of the border guard force with units assigned
there according to the plan.
Divisions II, III and IV, upon arrival in their assembly areas, would replace the border guard elements of
Division I, and undertake to cover their sectors in accordance with the relevant orders of the Army Staff
and of the Ministry of the Army.
On 18 September the Chief of the Army Staff informed the divisions that, because of the nature of the
theater of operations, separate headquarters would not be set up for each army corps; instead, it was
deemed preferable to command the divisions directly from General Headquarters.
After the mobilization decree and the arrival of reservists, the divisions and other units hastened to
proceed with the formation of the planned elements. The reservists arrived in great numbers, brimming
with enthusiasm, belief in the justness of the struggle and the sanctity of its purpose.
Many Greeks living abroad and many philhellenes had enlisted as volunteers, swelling the numbers of the
forces beyond projections. As a result not only did the army reach full strength, but also from the surplus
of reservists all three Infantry battalions of Divisions VI and VII were completed (the plan had originally
anticipated two battalions for each regiment). In addition there were formed a number of independent
detachments, battalions, and companies charged with policing the liberated territories, various Volunteer
Scout units1 and the Garibaldine Corps led by the philhellene General Riccioti Garibaldi.2
The requisition of pack animals posed many difficulties because in some areas their owners delayed in
delivering them to the requisition centers, in others because the formation of the committees responsible
for the task was delayed, and in still other areas because of delays by the escorts responsible for
receiving the animals. Finally, great difficulties were created due to the delivery of pack animals without
saddles, wagon-harness, etc.

20.
By the end of September, the expeditionary force that had been formed was transported to the
assembly areas indicated by the mobilization plan. The Army of Thessaly, under the command of Crown
Prince Constantine, assembled in the region of Larissa, while the Army of Epirus, under Lieutenant
General Konstantinos Sapountzakes, assembled in the region of Arta.
In the meantime, from the first day that the General Headquarters of the Army of Thessaly was formed in
Athens, the Operations Division began a detailed study of a plan of operations based on the strength of
the Hellenic Army and of the Turkish forces which could be mustered in the Thessalian theatre of
operations, as well as of the configuration and means of communications of that theatre, all with a view to
destroying the opponent's force.
21.
On 2 October General Headquarters issued an order for the army units to proceed the next day to
their departure areas near the border, which they successfully accomplished. On the evening of 4 October
the army was assembled as follows:
A. Army of Thessaly1
- Division I: 2nd, 4th, and 5th Infantry Regiments, Battalions I, and II of the 1st Field Artillery Regiment,
and other divisional units and services. It was mobilized in the region of Larissa-Lamia and finally moved
forward to the area of the village Ampelonas. It was commanded by Major General Emmanuel
Manousogiannakes.
- Division II: 1st, 3rd, and 7th Infantry Regiments, Battalions I, and II of the 2nd Field Artillery Regiment,
other divisional units and services. It was mobilized in Athens-Chalcis. It originally was assembled in an
area west of Larissa and finally moved forward to the area of Tirnavos. Its commander was Major General
Konstantinos Kallares.
- Division III: 6th, 10th, and 12th Infantry Regiments, Battalions I, and II of the 3rd Field Artillery Regiment,
Pack Artillery Battalion III, other divisional units and services. It was mobilized in Messolonghi, Corfu,
Patras and Lamia. It originally was assembled in the area of the villages Loutro and Kastro in Larissa and
finally was moved to the north on the right bank of the river Peneios (west of Larissa). Its commander was
Major General Konstantinos Damianos.
- Division IV: 8th, 9th, and 11th Infantry Regiments, Battalions I and II of the 4th Field Artillery Regiment,
Pack Artillery Battalion I, other divisional units and services. It was mobilized in Nauplion, Tripolis and
Kalamata. It was originally assembled in the area of the villages Petrino and Keramidi. It was finally
moved further the north, to the southern bank of the river Peneios and to the left of Division III. Its
commander was Major General Konstantinos Moschopoulos.
- Division V: 16th, 22nd, and 23rd Infantry Regiments, Battalion III of the 1st Field Artillery Regiment, one
Pack Artillery battalion, other divisional units and services. It was mobilized in Larissa, Lamia and Patras.
It first was assembled in the area of Pharsala and finally moved to the area of the village Crannon,
southwest of Larissa. Its commander was Colonel (Eng) Demetrios Matthaiopoulos.
- Division VI: 1st Evzone Regiment, the 17th and 18th Infantry Regiments, Battalion III of the 2nd Field
Artillery Regiment, other divisional units and services. It was mobilized in Nauplion, Lamia, and Trikala. It
was originally assembled in the area of Velestino and finally moved forward to the area of the village
Platykambos, east of Larissa. Its commander was Colonel (Cav) Konstantinos Komnenos-Meliotes.
- Division VII: 19th, 20th, and 21st Infantry Regiments, Battalion III of the 3rd Field Artillery Regiment, one
machine gun company, other divisional units and services. It was mobilized in Larissa, Trikala, Athens and
Patras and gradually assembled in Larissa. Its commander was Colonel (Arty) Kleomenes Kleomenes.
- Cavalry Brigade: 1st and 3rd Cavalry Regiments. It was mobilized in Larissa and Karditsa and was
moved forward to the area near the villages Pharkadon and Zarkos. Its commander was Major General
Alexandros Soutsos.
Four Evzone battalions were moved forward, the 1st and 4th Battalions under the command of Colonel
(Eng) Stephanos Gennades to the village of Koniskos (the Gennades Detachment), and the 2nd and 6th
Battalions under the command of Lieutenant Colonel (Eng) Konstantinos Konstantinopoulos (the
Konstantinopoulos Detachment) to the northeast of Tirnavos.
Rear Area Service: Its commander was Colonel (Eng) Napoleon Sotiles.
In total, the Hellenic Army in Thessaly amounted to 100,000 men and 23,000 pack animals and included
sixty-three Infantry and Evzone battalions, eight Cavalry companies, six small units of divisional Cavalry,
twenty-six field and six pack batteries, seven Pioneer companies, two companies of Telegraph Operators,
two Bridging companies and a flotilla of four airplanes. The number of machine guns amounted to
approximately 70, while field guns numbered 96, pack guns 24, and garrison guns 54.

B. Army of Epirus:
The Army of Epirus comprised a force of approximately division strength (which later, in December 1912,
was named Division VIII). It comprised the 15th Infantry Regiment, the 3rd Independent Evzone Battalion,
the 3rd, 7th, and 10th Evzone Battalions, the 2nd National Guard Battalion, Garrison Artillery Regiment II,
Field Artillery Battalion III/4, Pack Artillery Battalion II, and other units and services.
In total, the Epirus Army amounted to approximately 10,500 men and included eight Infantry and Evzone
battalions, one Cavalry company, one Pioneer company, twelve field, twelve pack and eighteen garrison
artillery pieces.
The Military Forces of the Other Balkan Allies
(Sketch-map 1)
22.
Bulgaria. The mobilization in Bulgaria produced eleven Infantry divisions (each one of which was
more than double the size of a Greek division), one division and one brigade of Cavalry, and eighty
National Guard battalions. In total, the Bulgarian Army comprised 300,000 infantrymen, 5,000
cavalrymen, and 720 guns.
These forces were distributed into three armies, one Cavalry Group consisting of one division and a
brigade of Cavalry, and one independent Infantry division. King Ferdinand was the formal Commander in
Chief of the Bulgarian Army; his assistant, General Savov, however, exercised the actual command, and
General Fichev was Chief of Staff. The Bulgarian armies and the Cavalry Group assembled in the upper
valleys of the rivers Hebrus and Arda, while the 7th Independent Division assembled in the upper valley of
the river Strymon.
23.
Serbia mobilized ten divisions, each somewhat greater in strength than the corresponding Greek
ones, two independent Infantry brigades and one Cavalry division. The total numbers included 220,000
Infantry, 3,000 Cavalry and 500 guns.
These forces were distributed into four armies. Although King Peter was the Commander in Chief,
General Putnik was his chief of staff and the actual Commander in Chief (in Serbian, Vojvoda). Three
Serbian army groups assembled in the upper valley of the river Morava, while the fourth assembled
opposite Novi Pazar.
24.
Montenegro mobilized eleven brigades, formed into four very weak divisions. The Commander in
Chief was King Nicholas (Nikita), with General Veljko Lazarovich as his chief of staff. His force totaled
some 35,000 Infantry and 130 guns.
Three Montenegrin divisions assembled southeast of the capital Cetinje, opposite Scutari (Skodra), while
the fourth assembled opposite Novi Pazar.
The Ottoman Forces: Allocation and Assembly
(Sketch-map 1)
25.
The Turks had seven army corps (twenty-two Infantry divisions), two Cavalry divisions and
twenty-six independent divisions. The latter were much weaker in strength than the divisions of the army
corps, which were roughly equal in strength to the corresponding Greek ones. The army totalled 340,000
Infantry, 6,000 Cavalry and 850 guns.
The forces were formed into two armies. The Army of Thrace, assembled in the quadrangle formed by the
cities of Adrianople-Kirk Kilisse (Saranta Ekklesies)-Babaeski-Didymoteicho, and the Army of Macedonia,
which was assembled with its main bulk astride the middle valley of the river Axios, between Skopje and
Veles.
Commander-in-chief of the Ottoman Army was Minister of War Nazim Pasha; the command of each
theater of operations was assigned to the following generals:
- Hasan Tahsin Pasha against the Greeks, with General Shahir Pasha as his chief of staff.
- Hasan Riza Pasha against the Montenegrins.
- Zeki Pasha against the Serbs.
- Abdullah Pasha against the Bulgarians.

26.
The Army of Macedonia under the command of Ali Riza Pasha had its headquarters in Perlepe
and comprised:
- The Army Corps of Ioannina, deployed against the Hellenic Army of Epirus.
- The 8th Provisional Army Corps, or the Army of Haliacmon, against the Hellenic Army of Thessaly.
- The Army Corps of Scutari, against the Montenegrins, and
- The Army of Axios against the Serbs
The 8th Provisional Army Corps was formed in Kozane to replace the 8th Army Corps of Damascus,
which was originally earmarked for this mission, but could not be transported to Thessalonica because of
the naval blockade imposed by the Hellenic fleet.
The 8th Provisional Army Corps was placed under the command of General Hasan Tahsin Pasha, who
was at the same time Commander in Chief of all Turkish forces deployed against the Greeks. It comprised
the following formations and units:
- The 22nd Division (of Kozane) consisting of the 64th, 65th, and 66th Infantry Regiments (each
consisting of three battalions), the 22nd Sharpshooter Regiment, four Border Patrol companies, one
Cavalry company, one Field Artillery battalion and a two-company unit of Medical Orderlies.
- The Reserve Division of Anaselitsa,1 comprising the regiment of Kozane (four battalions), the regiment
of Anaselitsa (three battalions), the regiment of Korytsa (three battalions), one Cavalry company and one
Field Artillery battalion.
- The Reserve Division of Drama, formed from the regiment of Drama (three battalions) and the regiment
of Kavala (three battalions).
- The detachment of Katerine, formed from four Infantry battalions, one Cavalry company and one Pack
Artillery battery.
27.
The strength and disposition of the Turkish army along the Thessalian border on 4 October was
the following:
- Twelve Infantry battalions, one Cavalry company and four Artillery batteries on the front line in the area
of the villages Grevena-Deskate-Elasson.
- Twelve Infantry battalions, two Cavalry companies and three Artillery batteries on the second line, in the
area between the towns of Servia and Kozane.
According to information that was available and based on the general disposition of the Ottoman army,
the above forces were in a position to receive as reinforcements from the area of Monastir up to fifteen
Infantry battalions, four Cavalry companies and twelve Artillery batteries. They could also receive as
reinforcements from Thessalonica four Infantry battalions, five Cavalry companies and seventeen Artillery
batteries.
Hence, the Ottoman Army, which was anticipated to draw up against the Hellenic Army in Thessaly, could
muster up to forty-three Infantry battalions, twelve Cavalry companies and thirty-five Artillery batteries, or
a total force of approximately 35,000 men.
Comparing the Turkish forces to the opposing Greek ones that were mobilized and already drawn up
facing them in Thessaly, it is obvious that the Turks were weaker as regards Infantry (forty-three Turkish
battalions against sixty-three Greek ones), of about equal strength as regards Cavalry (twelve Turkish
companies against eight Greek companies and six smaller units of divisional Cavalry), while the Turks
had a slight edge over the Greeks in artillery (thirty-five batteries against thirty-one).
CHAPTER 2
The Outbreak of the War and the Operations
of the Hellenic Army to the Liberation of Thessalonica.
Attack and Liberation of Elasson and Deskate
(Sketch-maps 3 and 4)
28.
Having received government authorization to commence operations, the commander of the Army
of Thessaly issued a general operations order on the evening of 4 October, calling on the Army of

Thessaly to advance on 5 October up to the line formed by the villages Photeino-Verdikousa-DomenikoLeuke-Lygaria.

Specifically:
- Division I, with its attached Konstantinopoulos Detachment, was to advance to the line of the heights of
Papalivado and the villages Argyroupolis and Ligaria.
- Division II to move to the village of Leuke.
- Division III to move to the line of the villages Mesochori- Domeniko.
- Division IV to move to the line of the villages Megalo Eleutherochori-Vlachogianni.
- The divisions of the second echelon were to advance as follows:
Division V to the line of the villages Damasouli-Damasi; Division VI to Ampelonas; Division VII would
remain in place securing the line of the forts of Thessaly.
- The Cavalry Brigade would advance to the valley of the river Titaresios up to the line between the
villages Praitori and Domeniko.
- The Gennades Detachment would advance up to the village of Photeino.
Other orders designated the way in which friendly aircraft would be identified by the army troops, and the
movements of supply convoys which would resupply the units.
According the the above-mentioned order of operations, the Hellenic Army's advance over the border
began at first light on 5 October.
The Greek forces drove back the Turkish border patrols and their advanced guards overran the enemy's
weak resistance, reaching by evening the line designated in their order of operations, as follows:
- Division I advanced in two columns and occupied the Melouna pass; it then forwarded security elements
in the direction of Elasson.
- Division II also advanced in two columns towards the village of Leuke and Papalivado heights, which it
reached by the evening hours, deploying security elements.
- Division III advanced through the village of Damasi and arrived unopposed to the line of the villages
Mesochori and Domeniko. It deployed security elements along the line running from the river Titaresios up
to the heights southeast of the village Domeniko .
- Division IV advanced in two columns and arrived at Vlachogianni village in the evening, deploying
security elements from the village of Verdikousa to the river Titaresios.
- Division V moved behind Division III and, after many difficulties caused by the advancing elements of
Division III, arrived at Damasi village.
- Division VI began its move in the morning and by midday had reached the village of Ampelonas, where it
encamped.
- Division VII effected some redeployments and replacements of its units at the Larissa bridgeheads
without essentially altering its positions.
- The Cavalry Brigade moved from the village of Pharkadon towards Megalo Eleutherochori and from
there to the villages Vlachogianni and Praitori; on its arrival there by the evening hours, it encamped after
deploying security elements north and west of Praitori.
- The Gennades Detachment advanced from Koniskos village towards Photeino village and after a brief
encounter captured the Turkish outposts north of Photeino.
General Headquarters relocated from Larissa to Tirnavos. It ordered air reconnaissance, which was
carried out in the afternoon in the area between the villages of Leuke and Tsaritsane.
Total Hellenic Army casualties on the first day of operations amounted to 46 killed and wounded.
29.
For the next day's operations, i.e. on 6 October, General Headquarters issued fresh orders,
according to which Divisions I, II, and III, by 0900, were to cross the line of the villages MagoulaStephanovouno-Melouna pass, and advance as follows: Division I and the attached Konstantinopoulos
Evzone Detachment was to head towards Elasson and the heights to its north; Division II was to occupy
Elasson and the surrounding hills, while Division III was to advance along the course of the river
Elassonitikos and occupy the Paliouri heights, northwest of Elasson. Division IV was to advance to the
village of Kephalovryso, Division V to push to the village of Palaiokastro, and Division VI to the northern
exit of the Melouna pass; Division VII would remain in its former positions. The Gennades Evzone
Detachment was ordered to take action in the direction of Deskate, while the Cavalry Brigade would
advance from the village of Verdikousa towards the village of Deskate so as to provide support to the
Evzone detachment.

30.
According to this order, operations on 6 October were carried out as follows:
- At 0930 Division I passed through the Greek outposts on the saddle of Melouna and moved in two
columns of regiments in the direction of Tsaritsane village. By 1000, Division I came under enemy artillery
fire. The division deployed immediately for battle and after a short encounter succeeded in pushing back
the forward Turkish elements and capturing the heights north of the Elasson-Tsaritsane line.
- The Konstantinopoulos Evzone Detachment, which had not yet established contact with Division I, and
lacked the relevant orders, moved east of Tsaritsane towards the Menexes heights. Around noon it
established contact with Division I and was ordered to move northeast of Elasson.
- Division II advanced by two different routes towards Elasson. Despite coming under intense Turkish
artillery fire on the open ground outside Elasson, it crossed the river Elassonitikos and, after a stubborn
struggle, seized the heights northwest of the village. It was not, however, in a position to pursue the
withdrawing Turkish troops.
31.
On the night of 6 to 7 October, Divisions I and II deployed security elements north of Elasson and
stationed the bulk of their forces in and around the town. The casualties of both divisions were relatively
low, amounting to sixty-six killed and wounded.
The Konstantinopoulos Detachment encamped north of the village of Tsaritsane.
According to Turkish information made available in 1929, the Turkish forces which had opposed the
Greek divisions in the battle of Elasson consisted of three Infantry battalions, one Field Artillery battery,
three Cavalry companies and one machine gun company.
At 0930, the Hellenic Army General Headquarters relocated to Hill 842, south of the village of
Stephanovouno, from where it directed the operations of Divisions I and II. At 1200 it ordered Division VI
to move from Melouna towards Tsaritsane and attack the left (eastern) wing of the Turkish deployment.
However, because of the Turkish retreat the attack never took place and the division halted in Tsaritsane.
32.
The remaining divisions did not take part in the battle of Elasson; their forward movement on that
day was as follows:
- Division III followed the valley of the river Titaresios and arrived in the village of Agioneri; it then
deployed security elements on the Paliouri hill.
- Division IV also passed through the valley of the river Titaresios, and reached the area by the village of
Kephalovryso, where it temporarily halted.
- Division V followed on the trail of Division IV and moved forward into the area of the villages of Praitori
and Sykia.
- Division VII remained in its positions in readiness for moving towards the north.
- The Cavalry Brigade, following the route from Palaiokastro to Kephalovryso, made reconnaissance
towards Deskate and then returned to Kephalovryso where it remained for the night.
- The Gennades Detachment advanced towards Deskate from 0700 on and engaged the enemy troops
defending the Tretimos heights. Despite strong resistance by the Turks, the Evzone battalions overrun the
enemy, forcing them into a disorderly retreat towards the north, abandoning Deskate. The detachment
moved immediately and entered Deskate, where it was welcomed enthusiastically by the local
inhabitants. The detachment's casualties amounted to nineteen killed and wounded.
33.
On the evening of 6 October, General Headquarters moved forward from Hill 842 to Tsaritsane.
On the basis of the little information collected, and mainly from a study of the terrain, General
Headquarters anticipated that the enemy would assemble its forces in the defile of Sarantaporos, most
probably south of the Skopia hill, in order to block the Hellenic Army's advance.
On the basis of this assessment, General Headquarters issued orders for taking the relevant preparatory
measures regarding information gathering on enemy disposition and the conduct of reconnaissance
missions. Division V and the Cavalry Brigade were to move forward into the positions designated by the
operations order; Divisions I and II were to regroup; the remaining units and the artillery were to redeploy
and move forward; there were also orders regarding communications, resupplying of units, etc.
More specifically, units would be resupplied by divisional supply convoys from the villages of Damasi and
Lygaria, where the Rear Service was to forward food in sufficient quantities.
On 7 October, Division V relocated from Sykia to Kephalovryso and the Cavalry Brigade moved from
Kephalovryso to Deskate.

The Field Artillery of Divisions III, IV and V was moved forward to the area of Elasson, while Division VII
assembled in Larissa.
Reconnaissance missions carried out by the divisions revealed that the villages of Lykroudi and Petroto
were not occupied by the enemy, while in the area of Sarantaporos there was a force of 5,000 men with
three or four batteries and with forward elements positioned along the line of the villages Vouvala-Chani
Chatzegogou-Kallithea.
34.
As a precautionary measure, in case operations' orders did not reach the divisions in time due to
distance or other cause, General Headquarters made it known that it would issue orders in advance, for a
number of days, as necessary.
Thus on 7 October, orders were sent to the Cavalry Brigade and the Gennades Detachment that were
stationed in Deskate; the orders specified that they should rest in place on 8 October and on the next
morning move towards the ford of Zabourda on the river Haliacmon. From there the Cavalry Brigade
would advance in the direction of Servia in order to provide support to an outflanking movement which
would be made by Division V, operating in the direction of Lazarades.
In the next few days, the Cavalry Brigade and the Gennades Detachment were to operate on their own
initiative in accordance with the intentions of General Headquarters to break through the defile of
Sarantaporos and liberate Servia.
Also on the same day, an order was issued for the divisions to advance on 8 October to the line formed
by the villages of Loutro-Giannota-Lykoudi-Kokkinogi. According to this order, the divisions were to
advance as follows:
- Division I would move without its artillery from Elasson to Kokkinogi. The Konstantinopoulos Detachment
would proceed to the village Kalyvia (Cheimadi).
- Division II was to move with its own artillery and the artillery of Division III from the village of Drymos to
Hill 385, east of the village of Lykoudi.
- Division III from the Paliouri height to Lykoudi village.
- Division IV from Kephalovryso village to Giannota village.
- Division V from Palaiokastro to Loutro village.
- Division VI from Tsaritsane to Petroto village.
- The artillery of Divisions I, IV and V was to remain in Elasson.
The divisions moved on the morning of 8 October; by the evening they had arrived at their designated
positions, where they deployed security forces.
Division VII, after it had assembled all of its forces in Larissa, by General Headquarters' orders detached
all of its transports to the Rear Service.
The Cavalry Brigade and the Gennades Detachment remained in Deskate. General Headquarters
remained at Elasson. According to information gathered, there were no Turkish forces in the area of
Katerine up to the river Haliacmon.
Meanwhile, the Ministry of the Army, not having received information on the army's operations on the
previous day, cabled orders to General Headquarters reminding it that it was obliged to submit every
evening at 2200 a bulletin, for the unbroken updates to the ministry and to the public.
The Battle of Sarantaporos and the Liberation of Servia
(Sketch-maps 4 and 5)
35.
The Sarantaporos defensive area, which was chosen and organized by the Turkish command, is
a naturally fortified area, providing for a powerful defense and offering excellent fields of fire.
The hill of Skopia (four to five kilometers northeast of the village of Sarantaporos), immediately to the
west of which is the Sarantaporos river and the carriage road from Elasson to Servia, dominates the
entire territory to the south and southeast up to a distance of approximately ten kilometers; all approaches
to it are vulnerable to effective fire from the steep ridges to the south and southwest.
The heights southwest of Skopia and those to the north of the village Sarantaporos are another very
strong foothold. The strength of this area is significantly enhanced by the fact that its east flank rests on
the steep slopes of the mountain Titaros, while the west flank rests on the mountain range of Kambounia.
Troops can travel through either side only by way of especially difficult mountain passes.

Moreover, the area of Lazarades-Vongopetra blocks the route from Deskate to Servia as well as the
passes through the villages of Loutro and Livadero towards the river Haliacmon. It is a mountainous and
inaccessible area over which movement takes place with great difficulty.
36.
The Turkish command's plan of action entailed a strong defense with the entirety of its forces
positioned at the naturally fortified locations of Sarantaporos and Lazarades-Vongopetra. The aim here
was to block the routes towards Elasson-Servia and Deskate-Lazarades-Servia and to interdict the
Hellenic Army's northbound advance. The Ottoman Army's deployment on these positions was as follows:
- The 22nd Division (of Kozane) with nine Infantry battalions, twelve guns and two machine-gun
companies held the left sector of the Sarantaporos position, from the Skopia heights to the village of
Livadi.
- The Reserve Division of Anaselitsa with five Infantry battalions and ten guns held the right sector of the
same area.
Both divisions came under the command of the 8th Provisional Army Corps. The 22nd Division had its
headquarters at Chania Viglas, which was also the headquarters of the corps, while the Anaselitsa
Reserve Division's headquarters was at the village of Sarantaporos.
- Two Cavalry companies positioned forward in the direction of the village Giannota covered the Turkish
right flank.
- Four Infantry battalions and one company of machine-guns defended the area of LazaradesVongopetra.
- One Infantry battalion was stationed at Chani Kastanias, in reserve for the Lazarades-Vongopetra area.
- One Infantry battalion was at Proselio village.
- One Infantry battalion and one Artillery platoon were at Servia.
- The Headquarters and four Infantry battalions of the Reserve Division of Drama remained in the region
of Kozane.
37.
The plan of operations of General Headquarters generally provided for a frontal attack against the
defending Turkish forces in the defile of Sarantaporos, with a simultaneous outflanking move from both
sides towards Servia, in order to capture the bridge on the river Haliacmon and thus cut off the enemy's
retreat.
The entire offensive operation was to combine with a wider turning movement from the area near the
village of Krania, through the ford of Zabourda and on towards Kozane.
General Headquarters issued the requisite orders and operational instructions on 8 October, putting the
plan into effect for the next day by providing for the following:
- Division I was to attack at 0900 in the direction of Kokkinogi-Skopia and seize the eastern part of the
Skopia hill. The Konstantinopoulos Detachment, attached to the division, would move at 0630 from the
village of Kalyvia (Cheimadi) towards the village of Livadi and advance from there towards the height of
Neochori, engaging the left flank and rear of the Turks. The division would be covered by a cavalry screen
from the direction of Agios Demetrios (Petra defile).
- Division II was to launch a frontal attack at 0730 on both sides of the Elasson-Servia carriage road, and
to seize the village of Sarantaporos and the western part of the Skopia hill. All of the Field Army's artillery
(apart from the Artillery battalion of Division VI) was committed to support Division II.
- Division III was to attack at the same time to the left (west) of Division II, and in close contact with it, in
the direction of the village of Sarantaporos.
- Division IV was to advance through the village of Livadero towards the Metaxas village and move
towards the direction of Sarantaporos, if intense fighting was taking place there. If, on the other hand,
there were indications that the enemy resistance was breaking, it would move towards Servia with the
objective of cutting off and annihilating the enemy.
- Division V was to cross the mountain range of Kambounia and move through Lazarades towards the
ford of Zabourda on the river Haliacmon, in order to pursue the enemy in the direction of Kozane, thus
encircling the Turkish troops from the west. The division's main effort, however, was to be limited up to the
ford of Zabourda, so that General Headquarters could issue new orders should conditions favor a wider
turning movement.
- The Cavalry Brigade and the Gennades Detachment were to operate according to the directions sent on
the previous day. It was stressed that the Cavalry Brigade's timely advance to Servia would play a
decisive role to a Greek victory.

- Division VI initially was ordered to remain in the village of Petroto as general reserve.
- Only the infantry of Division VII was to move at 0700 from Larissa towards Elasson.
38.
On the basis of General Headquarters' operation order, the divisions issued their own orders and,
on the morning of 9 October, the Hellenic Army launched an attack to capture the defile of Sarantaporos
and crush the Turkish army.
The advance of the divisions of the center (I, II, III) took place with two regiments in the first echelon of
each division. Since they were located at a considerable distance from enemy lines (from eight to ten
kilometers), the units initially had to deal only with the difficulties of the terrain. By 1000, however, they
had entered the zone of fire of the enemy artillery. Despite effective enemy fire and the casualties
sustained, the units continued their advance even with insufficient support from friendly artillery, because
the latter could not be deployed in time owing to the difficulties presented by the terrain.
The course of the battle in each divisional sector developed as follows:
- Division III (left) moved in two converging directions towards the villages of Pharmaki-TsapourniaSarantaporos and Melia-Sarantaporos.
Despite the rough terrain and effective fire by the enemy, the division overcame Turkish resistance before
Pharmaki and engaged closely the Turkish units in the heights of the village Tsapournia. Subsequently,
after committing its reserve regiment, the division succeeded in completing the capture of the Tsapournia
village heights by afternoon, and arrived at a distance of 600-1,000 meters from the enemy's main
defensive positions at Sarantaporos village.
- Division II (center) moved in two directions on both sides of the carriage road: to the left (west) with the
7th Regiment and to the right (east) with the 1st Regiment. The division's advance, despite being initially
delayed so that its field artillery could catch up, proceeded normally until 1030, when its advance
elements came under enemy fire from infantry that occupied the position south of Hill 514. After a brief
engagement, the division's first echelon seized Hill 514 at 1300, forcing the Turks to fall back towards
their main line of defense. The division then committed a part of its reserves and pursued the retiring
Turkish units to a distance of 700-1,000 meters from enemy positions, without being able to advance
further on account of the strong enemy resistance.
- Division I (right) moved with two regiments (4th and 5th) in the first echelon. Initially, on account of the
great distance from enemy positions, its movement was unimpeded. At 1100, advancing elements of the
division came under enemy infantry fire from Tsouma hill (Hill 821). Acting swiftly, they were able to push
back the Turkish unit there and to capture the hill by 1230.
The division's advance was then slowed down because of the effectiveness of heavy enemy fire.
Nevertheless, by 1600, it succeeded in seizing two important heights which were situated at a distance of
500-600 meters from the Turkish entrenchments. The division temporarily consolidated there.
The course of the battle on the left and the right of the Hellenic Army disposition on that same day, 9
October, was as follows:
- Division V moved at 0700 from the village of Loutro towards the village of Lazarades. At approximately
1100 its advance guard came in contact with the enemy. After completing the necessary reconnaissance,
the division attacked the position Lazarades-Vongopetra with two regiments in the first echelon. By the
evening, it succeeded in driving back enemy advance units and came into close contact with the enemy's
main defensive positions southeast and south of Lazarades and Vongopetra.
- Division IV, despite the instructions of General Headquarters, by its own orders determined that its sole
objective would be the swift movement and advance of its units by forced march through the villages
Livadero and Metaxas to Servia to the rear of the enemy disposition. Its order also provided for the
strengthening of its advance guard in order to overthrow quickly any possible enemy resistance.
The division began moving swiftly at 0600 and, after having pushed back light Turkish resistance at the
village of Livadero, the position of Kephalolivado and the village of Metaxas, arrived at about 1400 before
Trigoniko village. The advance guard noticed an enemy column to the south of the height of Agios
Christophoros; it was moving from Servia towards Lazarades. The division attacked with two battalions
and destroyed the column. With its other battalion the division covered its right flank from the direction of
Sarantaporos village to the level of Metaxas village. It then proceeded with the bulk of its force towards
the villages of Polyrracho and Proselio, which it seized at approximately 1730, forcing the Turks to fall into
a disorderly retreat towards the Porta defile. During the night the division's entire force assembled in the
area of the villages Polyrracho and Proselio, while its advance elements deployed at the heights
immediately southwest of the defile.

- The Cavalry Brigade moved at 0700 on the carriage road Deskate-Lazarades and by about 1200 arrived
south of the ford of Zabourda, where it was informed of the battle being waged at Lazarades. The brigade
halted its march and remained there through the entire day waiting for the battle to end. In the evening it
moved to the village of Elate, where it spent the night.
- The Gennades Detachment (extreme left) moved at 0700 from Deskate and after crossing the mountain
Vounasa arrived at 1000 at Elate village. Then it proceeded towards the ford of Zabourda on the river
Haliacmon.
After the necessary reconnaissance was carried out, it decided to bridge the ford of Longas instead of the
Zabourda (Longas being situated some 1,500 meters to the west of Zabourda). But as the detachment
was occupied with collecting material to bridge the river, artillery fire was heard from the area of
Lazarades. After this the detachment moved towards Lazarades, leaving behind a two-company force to
guard the ford. The detachment attacked the enemy troops it encountered in the area at 1600 with some
success and linked up with Division V which was operating on its right. The capture of Lazarades
however was not completed because night fell.
- At the extreme right, the Konstantinopoulos Detachment moved at 0630 from the village Kalyvia
(Cheimadi) and arrived, without encountering the enemy, at the hills north of the village Livadi, where it
spent the night.
- Moreover, the divisional Cavalry of Division I, which moved towards the Petra defile, reported at 0940
that it arrived at a distance of one kilometer from the village of Agios Demetrios without encountering the
enemy.
- Division VI, which was the Field Army's reserve, was ordered at around noon to move towards the
village Gerania to be in closer proximity to the battle zone. It was also ordered to dispatch a battalion in
the direction of Agios Demetrios in order to provide cover to the right flank of the Field Army. Later the
division moved further north, to the area of Chani Chatzegogou.
- Since the area did not offer the appropriate network of roads and sites for adequate artillery deployment,
the Field Army's field artillery was unable to provide sufficient support to the three divisions of the center
until the early afternoon.
39.
The fighting on the front of the three divisions of the center, which were in close contact with the
main line of resistance, was interrupted in the late evening hours, while the Turks stubbornly maintained
their positions.
Throughout the day of 9 October almost all units undertook great efforts against a powerfully organized
opponent on rugged terrain and under adverse weather conditions. The heavy casualties inflicted by
enemy fire, especially on the divisions of the center, which were attacking frontally, combined with
physical exhaustion had a relatively negative impact on the morale of the men.
General Headquarters initially moved forward, north of the village of Mikro Eleutherochori, to supervise
the battle, while later it moved to a hill southeast of Lykoudi village, finally spending the night at the village
of Gerania.
On the following day, General Headquarters ordered that the three divisions of the center (I, II, III) would
continue the battle at first light in order to drive the Turks from their positions. A specific order was given to
the artillery commander to advance and deploy the Artillery batteries that had not been used until then.
40.
On the morning of 10 October, while the divisions facing Sarantaporos prepared to continue the
attack, the enemy positions appeared completely calm. Reconnaissance revealed that during the night of
9 to 10 October the Turks had abandoned the position of Sarantaporos and had hurriedly withdrawn
towards Servia, apparently to avoid being cut off by Division IV. In fact, the withdrawal of the Turks had
begun after midnight, their march being executed at such a slow pace that the leading Turkish elements
did not reach until the morning hours the level of the covering elements of Division IV, which was
established at Polyrracho village.
The withdrawal was made in such a hurry that the Turkish command neglected to inform the Turkish
battalion which was defending the village of Livadi.
In spite of the above, the Greek units did not become aware of the Turkish withdrawal because they were
not in close contact with the enemy and the weather conditions were adverse (rain and dense fog).
Upon learning of the Turkish withdrawal, the divisions facing Sarantaporos hastened to take up their
positions, and informed General Headquarters accordingly.

Division III captured Sarantaporos village and its northern heights. Division II moved forward an Infantry
regimental with one Field Artillery battalion and the divisional Cavalry into the defile. Division I assembled
at the Skopia hill.
41.
General Headquarters was informed of the Turkish withdrawal on the morning of 10 October and
immediately ordered all forces to move towards the Porta defile and to pursue the withdrawing enemy
forces in this direction.
The divisions carried out the General Headquarters order by proceeding to move; by evening they
succeeded in capturing Servia and almost the entire field artillery and part of the remaining materiel of the
enemy. In addition, a limited number of cut-off elements and men were captured.
More specifically the divisions took the following actions:
- Division IV, which on the evening of 9 October was stationed in the area of the villages Polyrracho and
Proselio, realized only in the morning of 10 October that the Turkish columns were withdrawing from the
Sarantaporos area. At the same time, the division observed that a powerful Turkish force was moving
from Servia towards Proselio.
The division immediately attacked both columns, the advance elements of which, taken by surprise,
turned to flight.
At 0700, however, the division was attacked from two directions (from Servia and Sarantaporos) by strong
Turkish forces that were trying to force open a passage through the Porta defile. The Turkish attack failed
and in a short time troops of Division IV counterattacked, drove away the enemy and deployed astride the
road, thus permanently cutting off Turkish passage.
Beginning at 0830 the division attacked in the direction of the hill of Voursana and the town of Servia.
After overcoming Turkish resistance, it entered Servia at 1600 and from there immediately moved further
north in order to capture the Haliacmon bridge, which was found intact.
As the division was moving towards Servia, a Turkish column was detected at 1100 on the Lazarades
road; it, too, was moving towards Servia. Division troops attacked immediately, forcing the enemy into
disorderly retreat towards Kozane. The Turks left behind many killed, wounded and prisoners of war as
well as the flag of the Drama Battalion.
The scene encountered by the Greek forces entering the town of Servia was truly horrible. The retreating
Turks had massacred seventy of the town's notables and five priests and had thrown their corpses out in
the streets.
- Division VI moved at 0900 via the carriage road towards the defile. After overtaking elements of Division
II, it continued towards the Porta defile. During its march it encountered and captured various small
Turkish elements. It also captured the entire field artillery stationed at Sarantaporos (twenty-two pieces),
which the Turks had abandoned eight kilometers north of Skopia.
In the evening, at the exit of the Porta defile, the division met with the tail elements of Division IV, which
were moving towards Servia, and followed them.
- Division III started off at 1400 from Sarantaporos village on the carriage road and, after passing through
Chani Kastanias, arrived at the northwestern exit of the Porta defile on the morning of 11 October, where
it encamped.
- Division II followed Division VI towards Chani Kastanias.
- Division I set out at 1300 on the pack trail and arrived at the hill of Neochori in the late evening. In the
meantime, the Konstantinopoulos Detachment engaged with a Turkish battalion at the village of Livadi at
0900 and forced it to withdraw towards Servia.
- Division V and the Gennades Detachment did not receive General Headquarters orders in time to
pursue the enemy, and instead arrived at Lazarades village, which the Turks had evacuated, and
encamped there.
- The Cavalry Brigade stationed at Elate, being out of contact with Division V, was only informed of the
Turkish withdrawal at 0930, at which time it moved immediately and reached Lazarades around noon.
Despite the insistent recommendation by the commander of Division V that it move swiftly towards the
bridge of Servia in order to cut off the Turkish retreat, it remained stationed at Lazarades for quite some
time.
The brigade then moved slowly and hesitatingly through the village of Mikrovalto to the village of Proselio
where it spent the night without contributing at all to the pursuit.
General Headquarters, which was located at Hill 514 northwest of Gerania village, upon receiving
information that an enemy force was moving from Katerine to the Petra defile, ordered Division VII to

move in all haste in that direction to secure the flank and rear of the Field Army from the east. General
Headquarters then relocated to Chania Viglas from where, at midnight of 10 to 11 October, it ordered the
units to regroup and encamp at positions just north of the defile and up to the Haliacmon bridge.
This essentially was the way the battle of Sarantaporos ended.
To mark the victory of the Greek forces, the commander of the Army of Thessaly sent the following
congratulatory order to his units:
His Majesty the King has ordered me to express to the Army under my command His high satisfaction
and admiration for the victory at Sarantaporos, and to convey His gratitude.
On this occasion I address the following to my Army:
I am overcome by a sense of elation and pride for this resounding victory that you achieved against an
enemy holding strongly fortified positions, which it defended stubbornly. The victory at Sarantaporos
proved the superiority of the Greek soldier. Inspired by his loyalty to the King and his duty to the
homeland, he proves unrivaled not only in defense but also in attack.
Let my brave Army cherish the slogan "Forward forever." This sentiment leads surely to victory, a victory
necessary in order to accomplish our sacred duties and to fulfill our purest ideals.
In the certainty that no one will deviate from this principle, I express my warm congratulations to my Army.
I consider myself fortunate to lead this Army, one that is inspired by the most sacred sentiments. Long live
the King. Long live the Nation.
Constantine
The Government also sent the following telegram to the commander of the Army of Thessaly:
Commander of the Army of Thessaly,
The Government congratulates Your Highness and the brave Army for the brilliant victory.
Athens, 10 October 1912
Prime Minister Venizelos
The swift and victorious outcome of the battle of Sarantaporos boosted the army's morale and opened the
way for the liberation of Macedonia.
The casualties suffered by the Hellenic Army in the battles of 9 and 10 October were 182 officers and
enlisted men killed and 995 wounded. Among the dead officers was the commander of the 22nd Infantry
Regiment of Division V, Lieutenant Colonel (Inf) Kyriakos Mauromichales, who was killed during the battle
for the capture of Lazarades.
The Turks suffered heavy casualties in terms of killed, wounded and prisoners-of-war, while the Hellenic
Army captured twenty-two artillery pieces with their limbers, many vehicles and quantities of military
equipment.
42.
On 11 October the Field Army units moved to their encampment areas designated by General
Headquarters in the area north of the Porta defile-Servia up to the river Haliacmon.
At 0700, the Cavalry Brigade set out from Proselio through Servia to reach the bridge of Haliacmon. From
there it dispatched two battalions towards Kozane; the battalions, after overrunning small Turkish
elements at the villages Vathylakkos and Petrana, entered the town without encountering resistance and
spent the night there. The remaining force of the brigade spent the night at the bridge of Haliacmon.
Division VII advanced and encamped in the area south of the Melouna pass.
General Headquarters moved forward to Servia, where the staff, after receiving an enthusiastic welcome
from the town's inhabitants, attended the funeral of the notables and the priests who had been massacred
by the Turks.
In the meantime, Volunteer Scout forces that had crossed the border near the village Pyrgetos on 7
October, and others that landed in Litochoro the next day, advanced and deployed, the first group in the
village of Retine, the second in the area of the villages Karytsa-Dium south of Katerine.
43.
On 12 October the army units were partially reorganized and were resupplied in accordance with
an order issued by General Headquarters. The entire Cavalry brigade assembled in Kozane, while
Division VII advanced to the area of Elasson.
A battalion of Cretan volunteers, which was in Larissa, was ordered to move to the Petra defile and to
attach itself to Division VII.

The Volunteer Scout forces in the area of the Karytsa-Dium villages learned that the Turkish Army in
Katerine intended to capture the Petra defile. They hastened and after a night's march deployed at first
light at the defile, to secure the exit of Division VII.
The Advance towards Kozane and the Field Army's Turn towards Thessalonica - The Liberation of Beroea
and Katerine
(Sketch-maps 5 and 6)
44.
After receiving reliable information that Bulgaria was keenly interested in capturing Thessalonica
at all costs before the arrival there of the Hellenic Army, the Government sent on 12 October to the
Commander of the Army of Thessaly the telegram quoted below; in it the Government informed him that
serious political reasons required the swift liberation of Thessalonica.
Commander of the Army of Thessaly,
Number 80099. I anticipate that you will inform me of the further direction which the advance of the Army
of Thessaly will follow. I pray only that you keep in mind that significant political reasons require our arrival
in Thessalonica the soonest possible.
Athens 12-X-1912, 10.20 p.m.
Venizelos
A similar recommendation was made on the same day by the Minister of Foreign Affairs who, in the
telegram quoted below, informed the Commander of the Army of Thessaly of the capture of Kumanovo by
the Serbs and Kirk Kilisse (Saranta Ekklesies) by the Bulgarians.
Commander of the Army, H.R.H. the Crown Prince.
I have the honor of announcing that, according to official reports, the Serbian Army, having entered
Kumanovo, is currently situated between Kumanovo and Skopje. Turkish artillery has been destroyed; a
Turkish division is in disorderly retreat toward Skopje. The Bulgarian Army yesterday captured Saranta
Ekklesies, overcoming stubborn resistance. Much booty now in the hands of Bulgarians. Montenegrins
are bombarding Tarabosh;1 attack against Skodra imminent. I believe that we must intensify our efforts as
much as possible so that Thessalonica may be captured the soonest possible, so that our results do not
fall behind those of the allied armies.
Athens 12-X-1912, 3.35 p.m.
Koromelas
In the meantime, having received information that the greater part of the Turkish forces retiring from
Sarantaporos had withdrawn to the north, General Headquarters intended to move with the bulk of its
forces towards Monastir and then towards Beroea-Thessalonica; it therefore issued the following orders:
- The Gennades Evzone Detachment to move towards Grevena and Siatista, to clear the area of Turkish
elements, and to secure the communication routes and the Field Army's rear. At the same time General
Headquarters informed the detachment that on 13 October the Field Army would cross the river
Haliacmon and advance initially in a northerly direction.
- Division V to cross the Haliacmon on the same day and to advance as far as the village of Aiane, and on
the next day to continue moving northward.
- Division VII to advance through the Petra defile towards Katerine and Kitros village and to capture the
heights dominating the mouth of the river Haliacmon. The division also was informed that the intention of
the Field Army Commander was to move towards Beroea and that the Field Army would assemble north
of the line Kozane-Kissa village. From there, depending on the general tactical situation, it would either
head towards Beroea immediately or it would attack the enemy formations located in the direction of
Monastir and then it would turn towards Beroea.
- Divisions I, II and III to reconnoiter until the evening of 13 October respectively the routes to VelventosDaskio-Sphekia, Haliacmon bridge-Rodites-Kapnochori, and Nea Sige-Oinoe-Amygdalia.
- All divisions and the Cavalry Brigade were instructed as to how they would be resupplied as well as on
the advance for the next day, 13 October. According to these instructions, the Cavalry Brigade would

advance towards the village of Perdikas and would make reconnaissance towards Arnissa and Amyntaion
as far as the plain of Florina and towards Kleidi pass; Division I and the Konstantinopoulos Detachment
were ordered to move towards the village Velventos; Division VI would cross the Haliacmon bridge at
0600 and taking the carriage road was to pass through Kozane towards the village Koila; Division II would
cross the Haliacmon bridge at 0800 and move via the carriage road towards the village of Drepano;
Division III also would cross the bridge at 1100 and would move towards the village of Petrana; Division
IV also was ordered to cross the same bridge at 1400 and to move towards the village of Vathylakkos;
Division V, in the event that it reached the village Aiane, would move towards Kozane and deploy at the
heights north of the town, otherwise it would cross the river Haliacmon at the ford of Zabourda and would
advance until the village of Kepos.
45.
On 13 October the Hellenic Army continued its advance on the basis of the aforementioned
orders. Thus, on the evening of 13 October the units were in the areas provided for by their mission.
General Headquarters sent from Servia to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs the telegram quoted below, in
which it pleaded that the ministry not interfere with its management of operations. Then it departed from
Servia and at 1600 arrived at Kozane, where the population provided an enthusiastic welcome:
Servia 13-X-12, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Athens
We gladly learned of the successes of the Bulgarian, Serbian and Montenegrin armies. Our army
advanced to Kozane within eight days, that means we advanced a hundred kilometers in straight line into
Turkish territory, fought two battles, one near Elasson and the other by Sarantaporos, the latter fought
against three divisions, i.e the nizam1 Division of Kozane, the redif2 Division of Anaselitsa and a mixed
division comprising various battalions in extremely difficult terrain, followed by pursuit through the
mountain range of Kambounia, noted for its ruggedness; this resulted in the disintegration of the enemy,
the loss of his artillery and transportation services, whereas our own transportation services are extremely
incomplete. Compared to the Serbian Army's advance between Kumanovo and Skopje (only fifty
kilometers over much easier terrain, with the added advantage of a railway line along the line of
operations), and the Bulgarian Army's advance (of a mere forty kilometers over the easiest possible
terrain) the Hellenic Army's advance was a great achievement which demanded the straining of its forces
to the utmost. It is a feat that would cover with honor any army, a feat which must neither be overlooked
nor underestimated.
I will continue intense action with all my forces, in the same perseverance to destroy the enemy in
accordance with my own prescribed plan of action, the objectives of which I alone am responsible for and
in a position to determine.
Therefore I beseech you that, by your leave, I will be spared your efforts to influence the Army's
operations.
Constantine
46.
Immediately after arriving at Kozane, General Headquarters was briefed on all of the information
collected from reconnaissance parties. After receiving a stern order from Prime Minister and Minister of
the Army Eleutherios Venizelos calling for the immediate redirection of the Field Army to the objective of
the liberation of Thessalonica, General Headquarters issued an order at 2100 on 13 October for the Field
Army to advance the next day, 14 October, and specified the following: Division I would move through the
village of Kataphygi to the village Daskio. Division II would advance towards the villages of Kapnochori
and Voskochori and would seize the entrance of the Tripotamos defile, from where it would dispatch
reconnaissance missions towards Beroea. Division III would move up to the village Koilada. Divisions IV,
V and VI would advance until the villages of Tetralophos, Maurodendri and Kardia respectively. The
Cavalry Brigade would bypass possible enemy resistance and would head to the village of Perdikas, from
where it would reconnoiter the directions specified in its previous mission.
47.
On 14 October the units of the Field Army moved forward in accordance with the orders issued on
the previous day:
- The Gennades Evzone Detachment arrived in the late evening hours at Phelli village (ten kilometers
southeast of Grevena) where it was informed that the Turks had abandoned Grevena.

- The Cavalry Brigade, which according to General Headquarters' orders, was as of that day placed under
the command of Lieutenant Colonel (Cav) Georgios Karamanlikes, until then commanding the 3rd
Cavalry regiment, dispatched reconnaissance missions towards the villages of Proastio and Ptolemais.
These missions did not detect the presence of enemy troops. At around noon a Cavalry company was
dispatched to the heights east of Proastio village (defile of Komanos), where it remained until night fell,
before rejoining the remaining Cavalry brigade force at Komanos village.
- Division V moved from the village of Aiane and arrived at Kozane in the afternoon, where it encamped at
the northern approach of the town.
- Division VI, after first having dispatched reconnaissance missions towards the village of Kardia, moved
from Koila village and arrived at Kleitos village as night fell.
- Division II moved from the village of Drepano on the carriage road towards Beroea. After overcoming
small enemy forces in the area around the villages of Kapnochori and Polymylos, by evening it captured
the western entrance of the Tripotamos defile, and deployed there.
- Division III moved from the village of Petrana and following the path of Division II arrived at Koilada
village, where it spent the night.
- Division IV moved from the village of Vathylakkos and, following Division III, in the evening arrived, via
Drepano village, at the village of Tetralophos and encamped there. Divisional reconnaissance revealed
that a Turkish force, almost the size of a battalion, was located at the village of Xerolivado (north of the
Tripotamos defile).
- Division I, employing as its advance guard the Konstantinopoulos Evzone Detachment, which was
attached to it, moved towards Daskio village. On account of the difficult terrain it did not reach its
destination and was forced to spend the night at the village of Kataphygi.
- Division VII, which was operating in the direction of Katerine, was set in motion at 1400 and arrived at
the northeastern exit of the Petra defile in the early evening. The division was reinforced with the 8th
Evzone Battalion, which was stationed at Agios Demetrios.
- General Headquarters remained in Kozane.
48.
General Headquarters operation orders issued at 1835 on 14 October, to take effect the next day,
15 October, determined that the advance would continue in the same direction.
On the same day, at 1900, General Headquarters dispatched special instructions to Division V to advance
to the line of the villages Drosero-Perdikas-Komneno and to secure the left flank of the Field Army. It was
also ordered to be in readiness upon receiving fresh orders for operations towards Monastir or EdessaGiannitsa. At 2000 General Headquarters dispatched instructions to Division I to assist the action at the
Tripotamos defile and, on the afternoon of 16 October -by which time it was estimated that the Field Army
would have reached Beroea and would have encountered new points of resistance there- to cross the
river Haliacmon and to attack from the south the enemy forces there.
At the same time orders were also dispatched to Division IV to assist to the combat being waged by
Divisions I and II, without, however, halting its advance towards Beroea, which was its primary mission.
49.
On the basis of these orders on 15 October the divisions moved as follows (from west to east):
- The Gennades Evzone Detachment entered Grevena without meeting resistance because the Turkish
troops had withdrawn towards the villages Agios Georgios and Neapolis.
- The Cavalry Brigade was informed by the reconnaissance missions it had dispatched from the village of
Komanos to the villages Ptolemais and Anatoliko that a significant Turkish force (1,000 infantry, 50
cavalry, 200 irregulars and 6 guns) was in the village of Perdikas. The Cavalry Brigade reported this
information to Division V, which in response reinforced the brigade with a battalion drawn from its
advance guard regiment (the 23rd Infantry Regiment), and then ordered the brigade to support the
division's effort by executing an enveloping movement in the direction of the village Philotas.
At that, the Cavalry Brigade moved at 1300 from the village of Komanos, following the right (eastern) flank
guard of Division V towards Anatoliko village. After overcoming with its advance guard light enemy
resistance at the western exit of Anatoliko village, it continued northward but was hit by Turkish artillery
fire coming from the direction of Perdikas village and therefore halted any further movement. It returned to
Komanos village in the evening, where it spent the night.
- Division V moved from Kozane and Koila on the carriage road towards Ptolemais. The division's
advance guard, after assigning a battalion to the Cavalry Brigade for the outflanking operation from the

northeast, proceeded towards Ptolemais, which it entered in the evening without meeting any Turkish
resistance. The remaining forces of the division spent the night south of Ptolemais.
- Division VI moved from Kleitos village and, after taking a mountain path, arrived at 2000 at Koumaria
village, where it spent the night.
- Division IV moved towards Xerolivado village and after overcoming enemy resistance there with its
advance guard (the 11th Infantry Regiment), reached around noon the northern heights of Vromopegado
village, which was held in force by the Turks. The division launched a powerful offensive lasting until night,
causing the Turks to abandon their positions in the early evening and redeploy eastward.
- Division II, having by noon overrun with its advance guard (3rd Infantry Regiment) the defending Turkish
troops in the area around the village of Kastania, continued its march eastward and arrived in the evening
at the southwestern entrance of the Tripotamos pass, where it spent the night.
- Division III followed Division II and, upon arriving at the village of Polymylos, encamped there.
- Division I moved from the village of Kataphygi and arrived at the village of Sphekia in the evening, where
it encamped.
- Division VII moved from the Petra defile on the highway towards Svoronos village, with one of its
regiments (the 20th Infantry Regiment) as advance guard. The 8th Evzone Battalion and the Volunteer
Scout units moved towards Kitros village. Another scout unit had moved on the previous day, 14 October,
towards the Haliacmon to cut off the Turkish supply lines.
The division, having overcome the enemy resistance at Svoronos village and the heights northwest of it
with its advance guard, continued the battle falling on the enemy's new line of defense west of Katerine
until the evening hours; it ceased offensive operations due to nightfall.
The division resumed its attack at 0600 on the next day, 16 October; the two regiments that were fighting
on the first line entered Katerine at 0730 without encountering resistance as the Turks had already
withdrawn. At around noon, the division moved towards the village of Kitros, where it arrived in the
evening and encamped. The 8th Evzone Battalion also arrived there at the same time, as did the
Volunteer Scout units that were moving further north through the village of Palaio Keramidi.
Moreover, a Volunteer Scout corps that was moving in the direction of the Haliacmon crossed the river
during the night of 15-16 October near the village of Mese and blew up the Thessalonica-Beroea railway
line at three points, thus interrupting railway transport and cutting off many trains on the Beroea side of
the line.
The Cretan Battalion, which was assigned to Division VII, arrived during the evening of 16 October at the
eastern exit of the Petra defile, where it spent the night.
General Headquarters moved to Polymylos village, from which it reported to the Ministry of the Army that
the enemy had withdrawn from the Tripotamos defile. It also ordered that the advance to Beroea be
resumed on the following day, and ordered the Cavalry Brigade to assemble at the village of Voskochori,
by the entrance of the Tripotamos defile.
50.
In the meantime, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs informed General Headquarters that combined
Serbo-Bulgarian forces had captured Ishtib while a "Bulgarian Corps" had captured Nevrokop and was
pressing in all haste towards Drama and Serres. At the same time, the ministry stressed the efforts that
the Bulgarians and Serbs were making to find out whether the Hellenic Army was heading for Monastir or
whether it had turned towards Thessalonica, as can be seen in the following telegrams:
Commander of the Army of Thessaly
This very moment I am informed that, according to information from the Italian military attach here, last
week four trains each day have been moving towards Thrace, and two military trains to Thessalonica, i.e.
approximately 12,000 men. It is not known how many of these troops were destined to be used against
the Hellenic Army, and how many against the Serbian and the Bulgarian armies. The capture of Ishtib, if
true, would have been effected by the Army Corps of Kstendil, which is composed of two Serbian
divisions and one Bulgarian. Obviously the movement aims to cut off the Turkish Army by capturing Demir
Kapu, so that the situation of all those Turkish forces from Demir Kapu to Perlepe becomes desperate.
Perhaps this is the reason why Skopje was abandoned. The ambassadors of Serbia and Bulgaria here
are trying to find out through third parties the direction towards which the Hellenic Army will head. In other
words they would like to be assured that we are heading towards Thessalonica and not Monastir. Of
course it is imperative for our own reasons to capture Thessalonica as soon as possible, but you must
arrive also at Monastir before them. I appease them by saying that I do not know the plans of the

Commander in Chief, but it seems that we are heading for Thessalonica. The Bulgarian Corps that
captured Nevrokop is pressing towards Drama and Serres.
Athens, 15-X-12, 1.40 p.m.
Koromelas
To H.R.H. the Crown Prince
It has been telegraphed that the Turks are withdrawing also from Babaeski and are assembling towards
Constantinople. If this is true, then communications between Constantinople and Macedonia are being
severed.
The Bulgarian Agency cables that Bulgarian cavalry has seized the Babaeski railway station, capturing an
entire train, and that the Bulgarians captured Pinarhisar. It has been cabled that the transfer has begun of
the first of two Serbian reserve divisions via Bulgaria heading towards Thrace and that it will be completed
by Tuesday. It is said that the two divisions have a strength of 70,000 men.
The Bulgarian Agency cables that the Bulgarian Corps of Dzhumaya captured the Kresna defile. It is
reported from Serbia that some of the Turkish troops that retired in disorder from Skopje, abandoning
munitions and arms, headed in the direction of Velessa,1 and others towards Kalkandelen and are
descending into Monastir. The Serbs captured the territory between Velessa and Ishtib. The Serbs
maintain that they will advance southward, driving back the Turks, and that they will reach Thessalonica in
a few days. Information from Constantinople up to 13 October: from . . . until 10 October eight trains, each
of thirty cars, have departed for Thessalonica carrying troops, horses and eleven field guns; some
eighteen trains departed for Babaeski.
At Haydarpasha2 twelve troop trains of thirty cars each arrive daily from Asia Minor; they are heading for
San Stefano.3 Lack of food obvious. Rumored that at Saranta Ekklesiai4 troops mutinied before the battle
because they were hungry. Also rumored that after capture of Saranta Ekklesiai, General Headquarters
[of the Ottoman Army of Thrace] was transferred to Lleburgaz. Now preparing for its transfer to altalca,
which is being fortified feverishly.
Athens, 16-X-12, 2.40 a.m.
Koromelas
On the night of 15 to 16 October, General Headquarters issued an order to Division VII to continue its
march towards the Haliacmon, to secure a crossing and to coordinate further action with the movement of
the rest of the Field Army.
51.
The Field Army's advance continued on 16 October in accordance with the General Headquarters
plan:
- Division VI advanced towards Beroea, and passing over its northwestern outskirts, arrived at the village
of Patris in the afternoon.
- Division IV also advanced towards Beroea and entered the city in the morning hours. From there it
moved to the city's eastern outskirts, where it encamped.
- Division II arrived south of Beroea at 1100 and encamped there after moving forward its divisional
Cavalry to Beroea railway station and despatching security elements beyond the railway line.
- Division III got past Division II and encamped east of Beroea.
- Division I moved towards the Haliacmon fords southeast of Beroea. The bulk of the division arrived in
the region between the villages of Agia Varvara and Vergina in the afternoon and halted there in order to
cross the river the next day. The Konstantinopoulos Evzone Detachment crossed the Haliacmon at the
ford of Prophet Elias Monastery without hindrance and arrived at Diavatos village in the late evening
hours after passing through Beroea.
- Division V continued its offensive efforts based on the instructions from General Headquarters and
information it had received about the enemy. It moved in three columns: the left moved towards the village
of Drosero to attack the enemy's right flank; the central column launched a frontal attack towards
Perdikas village; the right column moved towards Anatoliko village to envelop the left flank of the enemy.
At 0900, the first elements of the central column came under heavy fire from enemy troops positioned on
the southern outskirts of Perdikas village. In a short time the fighting became generalized, making further
advance of the Greek units impossible.
Meanwhile, because the right column's movement had also slowed, the division committed its reserves
(two battalions) and an Artillery battalion to attack from the right in order to engage the flank of the enemy.
This column arrived at 0900 at the village of Anatoliko and continued towards Perdikas village, while at
the same time its artillery fired at the Turkish positions.

The left column had advanced in time and at 0900 engaged the right flank of the Turkish disposition. The
Turks, under effective fire on their flanks and pressed frontally, began to withdraw towards the north while
being pursued by elements of the division, which captured at least 200 prisoners. The pursuit continued
until south of Philotas village, where it halted due to nightfall.
The division suffered heavy casualties: 57 killed and 339 wounded officers and enlisted men.
- Although the Cavalry Brigade became aware of the battle being waged at Perdikas, it moved towards
the village of Anatoliko only after being notified by Division V at 1000, and arrived there after the fight had
ended. From there, however, it dispatched a battalion to the village of Philotas to exploit the successful
outcome of the battle there, while the rest of its force remained inactive. Upon reaching south of the
Pelargos-Philotas villages, the battalion came under Turkish artillery fire and halted. Then it turned back
and rejoined the rest of the brigade which, on its own initiative, had moved at 1400 towards Ptolemais;
there it received an order from General Headquarters to move in the direction of the village of Voskochori.
The brigade continued its march southward and spent the night at Komanos village.
52.
In the meantime, General Headquarters was established in Beroea on the afternoon of the same
day (16 October). From there it ordered the Cavalry Brigade to march towards Beroea; Division VII to
advance towards Haliacmon, simultaneously securing contact with Division I to its left; Division V to move
forward to Amyntaion and to the Kleidi defile to its north, or even to Monastir, thus securing the Army's left
flank. It was stressed to the commander of Division V that his division must not fail for a failure would
have an adverse effect on the entirety of the operations, and moreover the Field Army would not be able
to support the division as it was pressing to liberate Thessalonica.
The order of General Headquarters to Division V was as follows:
To Division V
Since the Field Army overcame the light resistance of the enemy at the defiles of the mountain Vermion, it
deployed this afternoon on the line of the villages Varvares1-Beroea-Tourkochori. Tomorrow it will resume
its march to Thessalonica. The Cavalry Brigade was recalled to the Field Army and should be in Beroea
tomorrow evening.
The order to Division V continues to be the same, i.e. to cover the left flank and rear of the Army. But now
that the Field Army already has come out to the Giannitsa plain, it is no longer necessary for the division
not to advance beyond Nalbandky2 On the contrary, successful offensive action by the division to the
north better secures the Field Army's left flank and rear. Consequently, it is left to the judgment of the
commander of Division V whether it will advance up to Sorovich3 and to the defiles to its north, or even up
to Monastir. The only thing that the commander of Division V should bear in mind is that he must not be
exposed to defeat because the Field Army will not be in a position to support him, and his defeat will
adversely affect the entirety of the operations. The [enemy] forces left in central and western Macedonia
are negligible. They may, however, be reinforced by the enemy units which have been defeated by the
Serbian Army and are retreating from Skopje . It remains up to the division commander to judge the
situation and to decide.
I must have daily news regularly from the division either by telegraph to Kozane and from there by car
care of me, or from Sorovich and Monastir, when you arrive there, by telegraph via Beroea.
Beroea, 16-X-12, 4 p.m.
Constantine
The other divisions were ordered to encamp as follows: Division II south of Beroea, Division III northeast
of Beroea, Division IV northwest of Beroea and Division VI at the village of Patris. Before encamping, all
four divisions were ordered to dispatch reconnaissance missions respectively to the river Haliacmon,
Alexandreia, Angelochori and Naousa.
The situation as of the evening of 16 October may be summarized thus:
After expelling the enemy from the mountainous area of Vermion and Katerine, the Hellenic Army arrived
at the plain of Beroea with Division V covering the Field Army's rear in the area of Amyntaion-Kleidi and
the Gennades Evzone Detachment at Grevena.
As regards the enemy, available information indicated that 13,000 Turkish troops with sixteen guns were
stationed at the line north of the lower course of Haliacmon, east of Beroea and up to Edessa, while in the
area of Amyntaion there were 2,000 men, with artillery and irregulars. These forces could be reinforced
from the area of Thessalonica and by Turkish troops retreating southward under pressure from the

Serbian Army. According to information from Thessalonica, units of the 14th Turkish Division had been
transferred hurriedly from the sector of the river Strymon through Thessalonica towards the west.
53.
The information gathered from reconnaissance missions carried out on 17 October was scanty.
According to this information, the Turkish troops which had withdrawn from Katerine and Beroea were
headed east of the river Loudias.
On the basis of the orders issued on the previous day, as well as on the basis of fresh orders issued by
General Headquarters at 1000 on 17 October, the Greek forces moved as follows:
- The Cavalry Brigade arrived from the village of Komanos to Polymylos village and spent the night there.
- Division V remained at the village of Perdikas, with covering elements at its northern heights.
- Division VI advanced from the village of Patris to Leukadia village, where it assembled at around
midnight with its divisional Cavalry southwest of Skydra.
- Division IV arrived at the Naousa railway station (east of of the city) during the late evening hours.
- Division II arrived at the village of Monospita in the late evening hours, with its divisional Cavalry at
Kephalochori village.
- Division III remained at Beroea railway station and in contact with the covering elements of Division I.
- Division I crossed the Haliacmon via a makeshift bridge and reached the village of Diavato, with the
Gennades Evzone Detachment at Loutro village.
- Division VII moved in two columns from the village of Kitros, and marching through Eleutherochori
arrived at Aiginion in the afternoon. The 8th Evzone Battalion, together with a unit of the corps of
Volunteer Scouts and the Cretan Battalion, moved forward to the area of Kolindros.
- The Volunteer Scout corps, after being reinforced by reconnaissance units of Divisions I and II, seized
the bridge over the river Haliacmon near the village of Neseli.
- The Gennades Evzone Detachment, which was at Grevena, occupied the village of Agios Georgios.
54.
General Headquarters relocated to the Naousa railway station on the afternoon of 17 October. It
received a telegram from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with the information that disturbances and
massacres were expected in Thessalonica, and recommended its precipitate capture. General
Headquarters responded that the Hellenic Army would be there after three or four days and that it was
imperative for the ministry to arrange for the administration and the policing of the city.
On the same day, the same ministry also informed General Headquarters that the Serbian Army had
linked up with the Montenegrin Army near Scutari (Skodra) and that a joint offensive with the objective of
capturing the city was expected.
General Headquarters decided that the bulk of the Field Army should head north of the lake of Giannitsa
and only advance some elements to its south. This decision was based on awareness of the
disadvantages inherent in moving the bulk of the Field Army to the south of Giannitsa, irrespective of
whether the enemy was located east of Loudias or north of the lake.
General Headquarters issued its operations orders for the army's advance on the next day on the basis of
the above decision.
55.
The army's advance began on the morning of 18 October according to plan, and by evening of
the same day its disposition was as follows:
- Division V in the area of Amyntaion-Xino Nero.
- Division VI at Skydra.
- Division IV in the area of the village of Agios Georgios with a battalion in the village of Sandali .
- Division II in the area of Esovalta village.
- Division I at Zervochori village.
- Division III in the area east of Agios Loukas village.
- The Cavalry Brigade in Beroea.
- Division VII in the area of the bridge of the Haliacmon near the village of Neseli.
- The Konstantinopoulos Evzone Detachment at Loutros, southwest of Alexandreia.
- The Gennades Evzone Detachment in the area of Grevena.
- General Headquarters at Naousa railway station.
As regards the enemy, information was still vague and confused. It was not known whether the
reinforcements, that were forwarded from Thessalonica east of the river Axios, had headed west of the
river, towards the river Loudias, or north of the Giannitsa lake. It was certain however that the enemy

forces that had withdrawn from Katerine and Beroea had retired east of Loudias. There was also
information that a small Turkish force had captured Edessa and that another force had moved towards
Giannitsa, while the greater part had withdrawn towards Thessalonica. According to other reports, the
Turkish force of Edessa had retreated towards Giannitsa, with a small part of it withdrawing towards
Aridaia.
The ambiguity of the information was due mainly to the fact that the Field Army lacked the appropriate
instrument for reconnaissance, i.e. the Cavalry Brigade, which had only arrived in Beroea on the evening
of 18 October. Consequently, the Field Army was oblidged, in the course of its further operations, to deal
successfully with all three possible circumstances, i.e. whether the main enemy force was in Giannitsa, or
behind the river Loudias, or finally, east of the river Axios.
It was decided finally to advance the bulk of the Field Army on a wide front north of Giannitsa lake,
towards the river Axios, and initially up to the line formed by the villages of Damiano, Pentaplatanos,
Mesiano and Paralimne, in order to bypass the obstacle presented by the river Loudias. At the same time,
the right flank of the Field Army would be covered from the direction of Loudias. Further movement by the
Field Army would be determined after a full clarification of the enemy's situation.
The Battle of Giannitsa
(Sketch-map 6)
56.
On the basis of the above assessments and decisions, General Headquarters at 1800 on 18
October issued operations orders for the next day, which provided for the following:
- Divisions VI, IV and III would move from 0700 and arrive at the respective locations east of the villages
of Damianos, Pentaplatanos, Mesiano and Paralimne, from where they would dispatch reconnaissance
missions towards the river Axios.
- Division I would move at the same time through the villages of Krya Vryse and Karyotissa and would
arrive at the southern part of the town of Giannitsa.
- Division VII was ordered to remain in the area of Alexandreia in order to cover the Field Army's right
flank and Beroea, in the event of an enemy attack coming from the area of the Adendro village. It was
also ordered to dispatch cavalry reconnaissance to the bridges of Loudias.
- The Konstantinopoulos Evzone Detachment would advance to Platanos village and make
reconnaissance at the ford of Loudias towards Kymina village, in order to assess the possibility of
crossing it.
- The Cavalry Brigade would move to the village of Vrysaki after assigning a company to Division V. The
company would advance through Edessa towards Amyntaion or to Veue, and would simultaneously make
reconnaissance of the defile between Edessa and Arnissa.
General Headquarters would depart from the Naousa railway station and head for Skydra, and then to
Giannitsa, where it would deploy at 1200 on 19 October.
The same order reported that the Turks had withdrawn beyond the river Loudias without, however,
clarifying whether their major force was still located between the rivers Loudias and Axios, or whether
they had retired beyond the Axios. Therefore General Headquarters anticipated that the Field Army's
advance towards Giannitsa on 19 October would not involve a serious engagement with the enemy; in
fact General Headquarter actually believed that the enemy was preparing for defense in the area of the
river Axios.
As can be concluded from the aforementioned, General Headquarters had determined that the advance
of the bulk of the Field Army would take place on the following day towards the river Axios through the
land zone north of Giannitsa lake. General Headquarters assigned Division VII, the Konstantinopoulos
Evzone Detachment, and the Cavalry Brigade to cover the Field Army's right flank and the town of Beroea
from the direction of Loudias. It was so certain that there was either no, or negligible, enemy presence in
the area north of the lake, that it designated Giannitsa as its base by noontime of the following day. Thus
the battle of Giannitsa may be characterized as unexpected, with all that this entails: incomplete
preparation, no plan for the direction of the battle, etc.
On the same day the Ministry of the Navy cabled to General Headquarters that a Greek torpedo boat had
blown up the Turkish battleship Fetih-i-Bulend in the harbor of Thessalonica the previous night.
57.
The territorial compartment of the area of Giannitsa, which the Turks had chosen as a defensive
position and to which they deployed the bulk of their forces, is some ten kilometers wide, and includes
mainly the heights of the villages of Ampelies and Pentaplatanos as well as the town of Giannitsa. Paikon

mountain marks its northern limit while the lake of Giannitsa (nowadays dried up) marks the southern
boundary. The river Loudias runs in the west and the river Axios in the east.
Between the lake and the mouths of the Loudias and Haliacmon there was at the time a narrow strip of
land, approximately three kilometers in length, which was easy to secure, because the marshes that
existed there limited movement only to specific directions.
Despite the disadvantage of having a major obstacle, the river Axios, to its rear, the position of Giannitsa
was suitable for defense on a frontage to the west, on account of the following advantages:
- It blocked the main highway from Edessa through Giannitsa to Thessalonica.
- Its flanks rested adequately on Paikon mountain to the north and Giannitsa lake to the south.
Although the hills in this area did not have a high altitude, they were suitable for defensive purposes
because the ground below them was completely flat and offered no cover, thus allowing for observed fire
and the full exploitation of traversing fire from the infantry.
- It allowed for the deployment of defensive forces and support weapons.
- Its manning required relatively limited forces as the area could not be easily turned either from the south,
because of the lake and the marshy terrain, or from the north through Paikon mountain, the terrain of
which was especially inaccessible.
- The existence to the rear (east) of the position of parallel ridges provided the necessary depth and
facilitated the stationing and movement of reserve forces.
For the Ottoman General Hasan Tahsin Pasha, it is possible that the defense of the eastern bank of the
river Axios would have presented greater advantages, due to the fact that the river was a considerable
barrier. He opted, however, to take his stand at Giannitsa, either because he would be directly defending
a sacred Muslim town, as the Turks considered it to be, or because he was reluctant to defend a line that
was very close to the city of Thessalonica.
58.
The Turkish forces that had withdrawn from Sarantaporos in the direction of Kozane headed
largely through Beroea to the east. After being reinforced by the 14th Division of Serres, which had been
transported by rail from Strymon, they deployed defensively at Giannitsa with the objective of blocking the
Hellenic Army's advance towards Thessalonica. These forces totaled approximately 25,000 men,
supported by twenty-four to thirty guns.
According to information published by the Turkish Army Staff in 1929, the main Giannitsa position was
defended by the 14th Division of Serres, comprising: the 40th, 41st and 42nd Infantry Regiments (of three
battalions each), the 14th Field Artillery Regiment (five batteries), one Pack Artillery battery of the 13th
Artillery Regiment, the 25th Cavalry Regiment, one Engineer company and one Medical Orderlies
company. The division also had attached to it the Katerine Detachment, consisting of four Infantry
battalions, one Pack Artillery battery and one Cavalry company.
The disposition of the above forces was as follows:
- Two Infantry regiments of the division occupied positions on ridges west of Giannitsa and directly north
of the Skydra-Giannitsa carriage road.
- The Katerine Detachment was deployed on the right of the defensive line and immediately to the north
of the carriage road linking the village Axos to Giannitsa.
- The third Infantry regiment of the division was southeast of Pentaplatanos village.
- Three Field and two Pack Artillery batteries had been placed west of Giannitsa to support the forward
defending elements. The other two field batteries had been placed south of Pentaplatanos village to
support that sector.
- The Cavalry regiment with the Katerine Detachment's Cavalry company covered the whole defensive
position.
- Small Infantry elements with machine guns occupied a position north and at a short distance of
Pentaplatanos village, interdicting access to the road towards Asvestario village. Elements of the 22nd
Division and of the Reserve Division of Anaselitsa, which had withdrawn from Sarantaporos, occupied
positions south of Giannitsa lake, downstream on the Loudias river.
The Ottoman Army's plan of operation was simple and called for a static defense of the Giannitsa position
with the aim of preventing the Hellenic Army's advance eastward towards Thessalonica.
59.
The Field Army's advance to the east began on the morning of 19 October in accordance with
General Headquarters operations orders. The divisions were lined up from left (north) to right (south) as
follows:

- Division VI departed at 0700 from Skydra, with the 9th Evzone Battalion as its advance guard, and
followed the route from Drosero to Achladochori villages in the direction of Ampelies and Pentaplatanos.
Owing to the rough and rugged terrain it only managed to arrive at Ampelies village at 1330, where it
came in contact with the enemy. After coordinating with Division IV on its right, it began to deploy its
forces for battle.
- Owing to delays in supplying its units, Division IV departed relatively late and moved via the route
Gypsochori-Mylotopos towards the village of Axos with the 9th Infantry regiment as its advance guard. At
midday the division assembled at Mylotopos and from there attacked with two regiments in the first
echelon (the 9th on the left and 8th on the right) towards Axos village and the northwestern outskirts of
Giannitsa. Having overrun some small enemy elements, it occupied Axos village and proceeded towards
Giannitsa, where it arrived in the early afternoon and came into contact with the main enemy defense
position.
- Divisions II and III departed in the early morning and followed respectively the routes EsovaltaKaryotissa-Giannitsa and Agios Loukas-Melissi-Giannitsa. They had first dispatched one of their
regiments (the 3rd and 12th respectively) as advance guards, together with their divisional Cavalry units.
As the latter approached Karyotissa village they came under infantry fire and halted their movement. At
the same time, the advance party of General Headquarters, which was moving in the direction of
Giannitsa to prepare its deployment and operation, also came under fire from the same position. But with
the intervention of the main force of the advance guard of the above two divisions, the forward enemy
troops stopped the firefight and pulled back hastily towards Giannitsa over the Aspropotamos bridge near
Melissi village. Their retirement was seriously threatened by the swift advance towards the bridge of
Battalion I/12, belonging to the advance guard of Division III. The battalion, pursuing the enemy closely,
captured the bridge intact and crossed to the east bank of the river Aspropotamos. It ceased further
movement, however, and waited for the arrival of the other units which were being delayed by effective
enemy artillery fire.
At around 1200, the artillery of Division II was able to deploy and to fire on the positions of the Turkish
artillery. But the movement of the troops was still slowed, and by 1500 no other forces except Battalion
I/12 had been able to cross the bridge. After being cut off west of the Melissi bridge, which was under
constant fire, the above two divisions did not attempt to cross it, the one waiting for the other to do so first.
Thus the fighting was limited to an artillery duel, while the divisions that were operating further north
already had begun their attack against Giannitsa.
60.
General Headquarters, while moving over the carriage road towards Giannitsa, was informed at
midday of the situation, at which point it halted west of Karyotissa and issued the following orders:
- Division IV to head towards Pentaplatanos village and to attack the enemy right.
- Divisions II and III to continue their attack towards Giannitsa.
- Division VII to ford Loudias, south of Giannitsa lake, and to attack the Turkish forces directly to its front.
- The Konstantinopoulos Evzone Detachment to move towards Kymina and to cross the ford of Loudias.
- The Cavalry Brigade was ordered initially to follow the Evzone detachment and then to operate
depending on the development of the situation.
61.
The action by the enemy artillery was limited by the intervention of the artillery of Divisions I and
II, and at 1500 the divisional troops began to cross over the Melissi bridge. Troops continued to cross the
bridge during the night and by the early morning almost all units had crossed to the east side of the bridge
except for one Infantry regiment and the artillery of Division III. These divisions, however, did not attempt
to reestablish contact with the enemy, opting to advance and deploy security elements locally.
Owing to the battle being waged by its forward 8th and 9th Regiments on the northern outskirts of
Giannitsa, Division IV, following General Headquarters' orders, assigned its reserve 11th Regiment to
move towards the village of Pentaplatanos and to attack the enemy right. Thus Division IV, which
continued its attack with three regiments on the front line and supported by the entirety of its artillery, was
able to advance and to capture, after a hard struggle, dominant sections of the main Turkish defensive
position.
At 1800 the Turks counterattacked on the right of the division (at the sector of the 8th Regiment), which
was uncovered because of the long delay involved in crossing the river by the troops of Divisions II and III
operating on its right (south). However, thanks to the stern determination of Battalion III/8, which
sustained the counterattack, the effort of the Turks was repelled with heavy casualties for the enemy. The

divisional units spent the night at the positions they had captured and remained in close contact with the
enemy.
62.
Division VI continued its offensive and its advance guard overrun the enemy covering elements.
At around 1430, it began its attack towards the Pentaplatanos village heights with two regiments (the 17th
on the left and 18th on the right) and succeeded in capturing significant terrain footholds and in linking up
fully with Division IV. In the effort of the division to seize the hillock which dominated the entire area, the
commander of the 18th Regiment, the commander of Battalion I/18 and many officers and enlisted men of
the battalion were put out of action. Confusion and disorder ensued, and the troops withdrew to positions
which allowed them to regroup.
After this, the commander of the 1st Evzone Regiment, Lieutenant Colonel (Inf) Dionysios Papadopoulos,
who found himself in an advanced position in the sector of his 9th Evzone Battalion and thus had a
personal view of the situation which developed on his right, ordered the 9th Evzone Battalion to press on
with the assault. At the same time, he rushed to the scene where, after he reorganized the units that had
retreated and boosted their morale, assumed personal command and resumed the attack. After a harsh
battle he was able to regain the territory that had been lost and to advance to Pentaplatanos village.
In the late afternoon, the units broke through the enemy line and reached the Turkish artillery positions
south of the Pentaplatanos village. The enemy was able to foresee in time the danger created by the
advance of the Greek units and withdrew, abandoning an abundance of ammunition and other equipment.
The 9th Evzone Battalion continued its assault and succeeded in driving back the enemy and capturing
the last footholds in the position. On account of its large casualty count, the battalion was forced to
interrupt further movement and to secure the positions it already had captured.
The 17th Regiment, which was operating to the left of the division, moved very slowly and consequently
came into contact with the defending enemy at Pentaplatanos village only in the evening; it then
exchanged fire with the enemy there.
On the night of 19 to 20 October the fighting was interrupted and the opponents deployed security
elements in front of their positions, in anticipation of resuming the fighting on the next day. In the
meantime, rainfall throughout the night harassed the troops excessively, creating difficulties in resupply
and in the evacuation of the injured.
63.
The remaining Field Army units operated as follows:
- Division I relocated to Karyotissa village, where it spent the night.
- Division VII did not move from its positions because it had not yet received from General Headquarters
the order to attack towards Loudias; it therefore limited itself to dispatching reconnaissance patrols
towards the river bridges. The patrols reported that there were Turkish troops totalling about 2,000 men at
the road bridge east of Loudias, while there was also a Turkish force of about 1,000 men at the railway
bridge and at Platy village.
- The Cavalry Brigade spent the night at Alexandreia.
- The Konstantinopoulos Evzone Detachment assembled at Platanos village and collected material in
order to make a bridge over the Loudias, at the ford between the villages of Trikala and Kymina.
On the same day, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs informed General Headquarters of the Bulgarian victory
at Lleburgaz, of the Ottoman Army's withdrawal towards orlu and atalca as well as of the capture of Veles
by the Serbs and of Pech by the Montenegrins1.
In addition, the Ministry of the Army, anticipating that there would be a European intervention to bring
about a cease-fire following the victories of the Balkan Allies, sent the following cable to General
Headquarters calling for a speeding up of operations:
Commander of the Army,
After the annihilation of the Turks at Lleburgaz, the Bulgarians are advancing unrestrained to atalca. It is
believed that the Turks are incapable of offering serious resistance there, after their repeated defeats and
the disintegration of their army. A European intervention being thus most likely imminent, our military
operations must be hastened forthwith at all costs.
Athens, 19-X-1912, 11 p.m
Venizelos

64.
The battle continued on the morning of the following day, 20 October. According to the order of
General Headquarters it proceeded as follows:
- Division VI operating with vigor and decisiveness captured Pentaplatanos village by midday with its 17th
Infantry Regiment, while it attacked further south with the 9th Evzone Battalion against Turkish artillery
positions at the town's cemetery. After a fierce clash involving hand-to-hand combat, the battalion was
able to break the Turkish units and to capture the Artillery battery there. It then captured the hills east of
the cemetery and around noon it reached to within two kilometers east of Giannitsa, capturing another
four guns.
- Division IV attacked on the northwestern outskirts of Giannitsa with all its forces. The attack had such an
impetus, and the advance was so rapid that it became obvious by 0900 that the Turks had been shattered
in the entire area.
- Division II attacked the western outskirts of Giannitsa with two regiments in the first echelon. Despite
putting up a strong resistance, by 0900 the Turks began to yield and to show signs of abandoning their
positions.
- Division I also attacked with two regiments in the first echelon against the well organized Turkish
position south of Giannitsa. Owing, however, to the marshy terrain and driving rain, the division's advance
was slow and marked by many casualties.
The seizure by Division VI of the heights around the cemetery and its advance east of Giannitsa had a
decisive result. Confronted with the dangers of having their withdrawal routes cut off and of being
outflanked, the Turks began to deploy for general retreat across the entire front.
These movements were detected by Divisions II and IV, which intensified their offensive frontally and
against the flanks of the enemy forces still resisting there. Thus, by 1100, these Greek divisions entered
Giannitsa, where they captured an enemy company, three guns and two flags.
Division III continued its advance on the right through the southern outskirts of Giannitsa towards
Paralimne village.
- Division I, which was three kilometers east of the Melissi bridge, received a General Headquarters order
to pursue the enemy troops that were withdrawing towards the Axios bridge. The division immediately
moved, but was not able to advance very far as it was hampered by the concentration of vehicles and
other units of the other divisions around Giannitsa and the resultant confusion there. After this, it
assembled west of the town and remained there, without exploiting the success to pursue the enemy in
depth. A battalion of the division entered the city in accordance with General Headquarters orders, to
impose order.
Thus there was limited pursuit of the enemy by the units of Divisions II and IV, while the Turks withdrew in
disorder without serious harassment towards the river Axios further east. The Greek forces finally
encamped around the city of Giannitsa.
The casualties of Divisions II, III and VI in the battle of Giannitsa amounted to 188 killed and 785
wounded officers and enlisted men1.
- General Headquarters moved forward to Giannitsa in the late evening hours of 20 October and issued
operation orders for the next day, designating the following:
- Division III to remain at Paralimne village and dispatch reconnaissance patrols towards Loudias bridge.
Division I to advance up to the road bridge east of Paralimne and dispatch reconnaissance patrols
towards the road bridge at Axios. Division II to assemble at Mesiano village and dispatch reconnaissance
patrols towards the villages Pella and Kouphalia. Divisions IV and VI to remain in their positions and
dispatch reconnaissance patrols towards the villages of Rachona and Dytiko respectively.
65.
As has already been mentioned, Division VII, the Cavalry Brigade and the Konstantinopoulos
Evzone Detachment were operating in the southern part of the Giannitsa lake.
Division VII, in accordance with the order of General Headquarters on 19 October to cross the river
Loudias and attack the Turkish forces on the other side, decided to advance on the morning of 20 October
with one regimental group (the 19th Infantry Regiment) against the village of Platy and the railway bridge
and with one battalion group (the 8th Evzone Battalion) against the road bridge over the Loudias.
Before the division began its attack, however, the Turks attacked the advanced positions of the 8th
Evzone Battalion, east of the village Lianovergi, where there also was a corps of Volunteer Scouts. The
8th Evzone Battalion's reaction was immediate and, after a brief fight, the Turks were obliged to abandon
the occupied position and retire towards Platy village and the railroad station.

In the meantime, the 19th and 20th Regiments of Division VII had moved forward and had deployed to the
level of Platy village; supported by artillery, they immediately attacked the enemy positions, forcing the
enemy to withdraw after 0930 towards the railway bridge over the Loudias.
As the struggle at Platy village was being waged, a Turkish force crossed the Loudias road bridge and, in
order to divert Division VII from the fighting at the village of Platy, moved to attack a two-company force of
the 8th Evzone Battalion, which was moving towards the bridge. The Turkish force, however, came under
heavy artillery fire and was forced to recross the bridge, which it unsuccessfully tried to destroy. The twocompany Evzone force advanced and arrived at the road bridge but did not cross it.
The Turks who had withdrawn from the village of Platy were not pursued. The division's units assembled
near Platy, the 8th Evzone Battalion moved forward to the road bridge, and only the Volunteer Scout unit
approached the railway bridge, disarming the explosives that had been placed there.
As soon as the Turks detected that the advance of the Greek units had halted west of the Loudias, they
regained courage and attempted a counter-offensive on the railway bridge. They were cut short, however,
by accurate fire from the division's artillery. The division then sent a battalion east of the bridge at the level
of Adendron village, where the rest of the units later arrived and stationed.
In the meantime, the Konstantinopoulos Evzone Detachment, which was operating from the village of
Platanos towards Kymina village, after bridging the Loudias crossed to the eastern bank at 1400 and
advanced to Kymina, where it spent the night. A team of Volunteer Scouts, which was moving ahead of
the Evzone detachment, engaged and dispersed a group of irregular Turkish peasants before moving up
to the river Axios.
The Cavalry Brigade moved at 0800 from Alexandreia towards the east to link up with the Evzone
detachment. It halted further movement upon arrival at the western bank of the Loudias, and only its
advance guard moved up as far as Kymina village; there it clashed with a small Turkish force that was
stationed in the village. In the evening, the entire brigade returned to the village of Kleidi, where it spent
the night.
Thus Division VII and the Cavalry Brigade did not exploit the successful crossing of the Loudias bridge
and did not resolutely pursue the withdrawing Turkish forces towards the bridges of the river Axios. This
was mainly due to the rainy weather and lack of liaison between Division VII and the Cavalry Brigade. As
a result, the two formations were unable to coordinate their actions.
The Crossing of the Axios and the Liberation of Thessalonica
(Sketch-maps 6 and 7)
66.
Immediately after the victorious battle of Giannitsa, the Hellenic Field Army made the necessary
preparations to cross the river Axios and to move from there to Thessalonica. Timely orders issued
specified that its units advance to the Axios, which was to be bridged as quickly as possible using
makeshift materials. The bridges (one wooden road bridge and two railway bridges) had been destroyed
by the Turks during their withdrawal, while the river waters had risen due to the constant rainfall.
Specifically, General Headquarters informed the divisions on 21 October that the Field Army would make
an effort to cross the Axios on the night of 23-24 October from the following possible locations: Division IV
through the ford of Axiochori, Division VI from the road bridge, Division II from the railway bridge, Division
I at a point between the railway bridge and the village of Anatoliko, Division III in the vicinity of Anatoliko,
and Division VII near Chalastra village. The orders specified that divisions were to move to the
abovementioned points of crossing and collect the necessary materials for bridging.
In order to facilitate operations, General Headquarters asked the Ministry of the Army to order the fleet to
make a demonstration and stage a feint landing at Epanome bay, east of Thessalonica, so as to deceive
the Turks. On 23 October, General Headquarters was relocated from Giannitsa to Adendro village.
At the same time, the Ministry of the Interior informed General Headquarters that the Bulgarian Army had
captured Didymoteicho, which meant that communications between the Ottoman Army of Macedonia and
Constantinople had been cut-off.
Furthermore, the ministry informed General Headquarters regarding the situation prevailing in
Thessalonike and the demoralization of the Turkish army there, which was ready to surrender.
67.
On the basis of General Headquarters orders, between 21 and 23 October the divisions gradually
pushed forward in the following manner:

- Division IV moved through the village of Athyra and reached Agios Petros village, where it encamped.
- Division VI moved through the villages of Agriosykia and Dytiko and reached northwest of Athyra village,
where it encamped.
- Division II moved from Giannitsa through Mesiano village and arrived at Kouphalia. From there it
deployed security elements on the west bank of the river Axios.
- Division I moved from Giannitsa through Pella and arrived at Partheni village, deploying security
elements on the west bank of the river Axios from the road bridge to the railway bridge. In the late evening
hours of 23 October, a two-company force crossed to the east of the river Axios over the railway bridge, to
secure the army's passage.
- Division III was relocated from Giannitsa to Adendron village and assumed the task of transporting
material from Platy village to bridge the river at Anatoliko village.
- Division VII was relocated from Adendron to Vrachia village and deployed outposts on the west bank of
the river Axios from the railway bridge to Anatoliko village. It then proceeded to bridge the river over the
western branch of the Chalastra ford.
- The Cavalry Brigade moved from Kleidi via Kymina village to the village of Chalastra, whence it
dispatched reconnaissance elements towards the east.
- The Konstantinopoulos Evzone Detachment moved from Kymina through the village of Vrachia to
Partheni village. From there it dispatched a two-company force to occupy the railway line east of the
Axios. However, owing to the partial destruction of the bridge by the Turks, the force established itself on
the western bank of the river. It then returned through Vrachia to Chalastra, where it encamped.
68.
The Field Army's effort to cross the river Axios was resumed on 24 October. Divisions VI and IV
advanced to Agios Petros and Kouphalia respectively, where they deployed security elements. Division I
ferried over just one of its battalions east of the river Axios. Division II moved forward towards the railway
bridge of the river Axios, and ferried one battalion to the eastern bank. Division III was not able to cross
the Axios river because it had not completed by nightfall the construction of the bridge.
- Division VII succeeded in constructing a bridge over the eastern branch of the Chalastra ford as well,
over which crossed the Volunteer Scout unit, which then advanced to Sindos, and the Konstantinopoulos
Evzone Detachment, which occupied positions near Sindos in order to cover the passage of the units
which followed. There followed the crossing of the Cavalry Brigade, which, on orders of General
Headquarters, moved through the villages of Anchialos and Vathylakkos towards Pikrolimne village.
Reconnaissance made by the brigade reported that there was one Turkish battalion at Mikrokampos
village; four battalions and ten artillery pieces were at Neochorouda village, while an unverified force was
stationed in the area east of Oraiokastro village. After the Cavalry Brigade, Division VII crossed the river
and spent the night in the area between the villages of Axios and Sindos.
69.
Reports generally indicated that the enemy was withdrawing towards Thessalonica and to the
northwestern heights of the city, where its forces were hastily organizing temporary defensive positions.
Thus at 2300 on 24 October, General Headquarters issued the following operations orders for the next
day: Division VI was to assemble at the village of Mikrokampos and to dispatch reconnaissance missions
towards the village of Monolophos. - Division II, departing at 0600 and crossing the Axios over the railway
bridge, was to assemble west of Xerochori village; from there it would dispatch reconnaissance missions
towards Pournari village and further southeast. - Division IV, departing at 0730 and crossing the river
Axios also on the railway bridge, was to assemble at Vathylakkos village, from where it would dispatch
reconnaissance missions in the direction of the village of Melissochori. - Division I, departing at 0600 and
crossing the river Axios on the bridge near the village of Anatoliko, was to assemble north of Agios
Athanasios village; from there it would dispatch reconnaissance missions towards the village of
Neochorouda. - Division III, departing at 0800 and following on the trail of Division I, was to assemble
south of the village of Agios Athanasios, from which it would dispatch reconnaissance missions towards
Diavata village. - Division VII was to assemble east of the Axios; from there it would also dispatch
reconnaissance missions towards Diavata village. - The Konstantinopoulos Evzone Detachment was to
assemble in the area of Sindos, from which it would dispatch reconnaissance missions towards
Thessalonica. - The Cavalry Brigade was to assemble at the village of Pikrolimne, from where it would
dispatch reconnaissance missions towards Melissochori and Drymos. - General Headquarters was to
relocate to the village of Gephyra at noon on 25 October.

In the meantime, the Ministry of the Army had not been informed about the progress of military operations
since the day of the battle at Giannitsa, and, having been concerned about the fate of Thessalonica ever
since it received information about the swift movement of strong Bulgarian forces towards the city, sent
the following telegram to the Commander of the Army, with a copy to King George, who was then in
Beroea.
Athens 24-X-12. 7 p.m. To H.M. the King, Beroea.
I have the honor of bringing to Your Majesty's notice that I am sending a telegram to the Commander of
the Army of Thessaly, to wit:
To Headquarters, Army of Thessaly.
Ever since the battle of Giannitsa you have not announced to the ministry anything concerning your
subsequent military operations as well as those of Division V. Yet four entire days have passed since the
battle of Giannitsa. This silence and the total lack of knowledge of the Government and of the Nation
about the fate of its Army is indeed amazing.
Venizelos
The prime minister informed General Headquarters by another telegram of the actions taken for the
execution of the feint landing at Epanome, which had been requested by it. He also recommended that
the Hellenic Army hasten its entry into Thessalonica and informed General Headquarters that the consuls
of the Great Powers were negotiating with the Turkish authorities for the city's surrender. Moreover, the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs advised General Headquarters about information in the foreign press regarding
the condition of the belligerents in Thessalonica, and pleaded for the entry of the army into the city as
soon as possible.
70.
On the basis of General Headquarters' operations orders, the advance of the Greek forces on 25
October continued as follows:
- Division VI was occupied with the construction of a bridge near the village of Axiochori. It did not
complete its task until nightfall, but it nonetheless ferried four companies across the river on rafts.
- Division II crossed the Axios river on the railway bridge and assembled at Vathylakkos village, even
though the plan had been to move towards Xerochori.
- Division IV moved from Kouphalia village and crossed the Axios on the railway bridge following Division
II, and assembled in the rain at its designated encampment areas.
- Division I crossed the Axios on the bridge it had constructed near the village of Anatoliko, and
assembled at Agios Athanasios village.
- Division III crossed the river Axios on the railway bridge following Division IV and encamped near the
eastern bank of the river.
- Division VII and the Konstantinopoulos Evzone Detachment remained in the positions at which they had
arrived on the previous day. Reconnaissance revealed that the area around the village of Diavata was
occupied by Turkish units.
- The Cavalry Brigade dispatched reconnaissance missions towards the villages of Pournari and Krithia
and advanced towards Vathylakkos instead of Pikrolimne, which brought about a stern reprimand from
General Headquarters. Cavalry Brigade reconnaissance made on the previous day revealed that Turkish
forces were deployed on the heights of Diavata village.
This was how Divisions I, II, III and IV crossed the river Axios on 25 October. They were not, however,
able to arrive at the assembly areas designated by General Headquarters until the early hours of the
night. General Headquarters was established on the morning of the same day at the village of Gephyra.
71.
On the same day (25 October), as the Hellenic Army was advancing, the consuls of the Great
Powers in Thessalonica, persuaded the commander of the Ottoman army, Hasan Tahsin Pasha, to agree
to negotiations in order to avoid needless bloodshed.
Hasan Tahsin Pasha then charged two staff officers to deliver a document to the Greek outposts; in the
document he announced that a delegation consisting of the consuls of the Great Powers and General
Sawfik Pasha had been authorized to talk with the commander of the Hellenic Army, and for that reason it
would be proper to avoid all military action before the delegation's mission was accomplished. The
document was delivered at the outposts of Division I and then forwarded to General Headquarters.

At approximately 1400 on 25 October the consuls of the Great Powers and General Sawfik Pasha arrived
at the village of Sindos on a special train. But since their timely arrival at General Headquarters at the
village of Gephyra was not possible via Sindos, the train returned to Thessalonica, escorted by the
commanders of the Evzone Detachment and the divisional Cavalry of Division III. In Thessalonica the
train changed rail lines and then reached the village of Gephyra via the Skopje line.
The commander of the Hellenic Army received the delegation immediately, and the conditions of Hasan
Tahsin Pasha were submitted to him. The most important term was that Tahsin Pasha be allowed to
withdraw his army, with all its weapons, to the eastern outskirts of Thessalonica and remain there until the
end of the war.
The commander of the Hellenic Army rejected the terms, demanding the immediate surrender of the
Ottoman Army, which would be considered a prisoner-of-war and transported, at Greek government
expense, to a port in Asia Minor; only the Ottoman officers would be allowed to keep their swords. The
delegation was given a deadline to respond by 0600 on 26 October, and returned on the same train to
Thessalonica.
72.
In the meantime, the Ministry of the Army and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs informed General
Headquarters of the southward advance of the Bulgarian Army following the capture of Serres, and
expressed fear that a dangerous situation would be created if the Bulgarian and Greek armies arrived in
Thessalonica simultaneously.
A little after midnight, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs forwarded new information to General Headquarters
on allied operations and affirmed that the entire city of Thessalonica was awaiting the entry of the Hellenic
Army in order to participate in the doxology at the church of Agios Demetrios.
General Headquarters issued an order at 2000 in which it specified that, as of 0930 on 26 October, a fullscale attack against the Turks would be launched, in accordance with the plan announced to the divisions
on the morning of the same day.
73.
On the next day, 26 October, at around 0500, General Sawfik Pasha arrived at Gephyra village
and announced that Hasan Tahsin Pasha had accepted all the terms set by the commander of the
Hellenic Army. He only requested that the Turks be allowed to keep 5,000 weapons for the training of new
conscripts. The request was rejected and the Ottoman general asked for a two-hour deadline to respond.
However, the deadline passed without a Turkish response.
In the meantime, the units of the Hellenic Army began in the morning to move to their departure lines.
Thus Division VI continued to cross the river Axios on rafts. Division IV continued moving towards the
villages of Vathylakkos and Nea Mesembria. Division I assembled north of the village of Agios Athanasios
and then crossed the river Gallikos, advancing towards the east. Division II moved from Vathylakkos
through the villages of Xerochori and Philadelphiana towards Drymos village. Division III assembled south
of Agios Athanasios, then crossed the river Gallikos and arrived west of the village of Diavata by noon.
Division VII also crossed the Gallikos, followed by the Evzone Detachment. The Cavalry Brigade
advanced in the direction of the villages Mikrokampos-Pikrolimne-Asseros. At approximately 1000, its
advance guard detected a column moving from the village of Gynaikokastro towards Apostoloi village. It
was verified that the column consisted of Serbo-Bulgarian elements (one Serbian Cavalry regiment and
one Bulgarian Cavalry company). It also was informed that behind this column there followed a force the
size of a Bulgarian division, at a distance of about a three-hour march. The Cavalry Brigade immediately
reported this information to General Headquarters.
74. At the same time, having seen that the Hellenic forces were advancing somewhat reluctantly, the
commander of the Ottoman Army Hasan Tahsin Pasha, in an effort to gain time, avoided replying to the
commander of the Hellenic Army.
At 1000 of the same day, the consuls of the Great Powers met with representatives of the commander of
the Ottoman Army, who insisted on the condition that their army be allowed to retain 5,000 weapons. The
stance of the Turks was deemed to have an ulterior motive, so the consuls withdrew from the meeting,
passing the responsibility for the consequences to the Ottoman Army commander. At approximately 1100,
the consuls dispatched a representative on a special train to the Hellenic Army General Headquarters,
informing it of the Turkish stance.
Meanwhile, the advance of the Greek divisions continued, with the encirclement of the Turkish army
becoming ever tighter, after which, seeing the futility of persistence and the consequences of a

purposeless battle on the Ottoman army, Hasan Tahsin Pasha decided to accept all the terms set by the
commander of the Hellenic Army. Shortly thereafter, Hasan Tahsin Pasha sent an officer on horseback to
deliver a written statement according to which he accepted the terms of surrender of his army.
While these events were taking place, General Headquarters, which had moved forward to the village of
Anchialos, was informed by the Cavalry Brigade about the appearance of Serbo-Bulgarian cavalry at the
village of Apostoloi and about the remaining Bulgarian force that followed behind it. In view of this,
General Headquarters ordered Division VII and the Evzone Detachment to hasten to capture the city of
Thessalonica. At the same time, General Headquarters sent a letter to the commander of the Bulgarian
forces moving towards Thessalonica, informing him of the Hellenic Army's imminent occupation of the city
by evening, and stating that the Bulgarian column could spare itself from the effort of further advance
towards the city and turn to where its presence would be more important strategically.
75.
After receiving General Headquarters' orders, Division VII and the Konstantinopoulos Evzone
Detachment to its right commenced a forced march to occupy Thessalonica.
Division III also continued its advance. At 1600 on 26 October, while it was at the level of the village of
Oraiokastro, the mounted Turkish officer dispatched by Hasan Tahsin Pasha arrived with instructions to
present himself to the Greek commander in chief, ask for the postponement of the Hellenic Army's
advance, and request the dispatch of representative officers to Thessalonica to draw up and sign the
protocols of surrender. The Turkish officer was escorted to General Headquarters, which had been
relocated close to Sindos.
Further to the north, Division I continued to advance towards the heights by the village of Neochorouda,
while the Turks were withdrawing from their forward positions. At 1600 the division had arrived at a
distance of four hundred meters from the heights where the Turkish forces had assembled. It was
informed by the Turkish commander of the imminent surrender and was requested to halt its advance until
the relevant procedures were completed. The division agreed to this.
76.
General Headquarters dispatched representatives at 1900 on 26 October to the headquarters of
Hasan Tahsin Pasha in Thessalonica to draw up the surrender protocols, and sent a new letter to the
commander of the Bulgarian forces informing him of the surrender of Thessalonica.
At the same time, General Headquarters sent relevant reports to the King and the Ministry of the Army
and ordered the divisions to halt their advance in place.
Division VII and the Evzone Detachment that had arrived at 1800 at a distance of approximately 1500
meters from Thessalonica encamped along the railway line there.
Division III halted and encamped in the Oraiokastro-Diavata area.
Division I encamped near the village of Neochorouda.
Division IV assembled at the village of Nea Mesembria, where it spent the night.
Division II arrived after midnight at the village of Drymos, after a laborious march.
Because of the difficulties the division faced bridging the river, only a few elements of Division VI were
able to cross east of the Axios to Axiochori. Consequently, General Headquarters ordered that in the
event the division did not cross the river by evening, it should move in the morning of the next day
downstream along the west bank of the river towards Valtochori and Gephyra, where it should encamp.
After a forced march, the Cavalry Brigade arrived at the village of Krithia in the afternoon. It was informed
there that a Bulgarian column of divisional strength (in fact the 7th Bulgarian Division), advancing in the
direction of the villages of Asseros and Lete, had exchanged fire with Turkish troops positioned at the
heights south of Lete. The Cavalry Brigade then moved towards Asseros village and its commander
hastened to meet with the officer commanding the Bulgarian column, whom he briefed about the tactical
situation and of the Hellenic Army's disposition. In the late evening the brigade arrived at Asseros village
and from there it dispatched one of its officers to General Headquarters, to brief it about the movement of
the Bulgarian column towards Thessalonica.
The Bulgarian forces spent the night south of Asseros, while Bulgarian officers visited the Cavalry Brigade
commander and were briefed about his intentions for the following day and on the Hellenic Army's plan of
operations.
Meanwhile, the Greek officers who had been dispatched to Thessalonica immediately began negotiations
with the commander of the Ottoman Army; after a two-hour conference, at 2300 on 26 October, the
following protocol of surrender of the city and of the Ottoman Army was signed:

Protocol
Between H.R.H. the Commander in Chief of the Hellenic Army and His Excellency the Commander in
Chief of the Turkish Army, the following were agreed:
Article 1: The weapons of the Ottoman soldiery will be delivered and stored in a warehouse, where they
will be guarded under the responsibility of the Hellenic Army. A special protocol will be drafted on this
subject.
Article 2: The Ottoman soldiery will be billeted partly at Karaburnu Fort and partly at the Artillery Barracks
known as Topshin. They will be fed by the Thessalonica authorities.
Article 3: The city of Thessalonica will be surrendered to the Hellenic Army until the formal conclusion of a
treaty.
Article 4: All senior military employees and officers have the right to keep their swords and to move freely
in Thessalonica. They will give their word of honor that they will not fight against the Hellenic Army and its
allies for the duration of this war.
Article 5: All senior civil employees and the vilayet employees will be free.
Article 6: The gendarmerie and police will carry their weapons.
Article 7: Karaburnu Fort will be used only to billet disarmed Ottoman soldiery. The guns and the military
equipment at Karaburnu will be put out of action by the Turkish Army and surrendered to the Greek force.
Article 8: The terms of the first article will be implemented within two days beginning tomorrow, Saturday,
27 October 1912. This deadline may be extended with the consent of the Commander in Chief of the
Hellenic Army.
Article 9: This state of affairs will be preserved until peace terms are concluded.
Article 10: The gendarmerie and the Ottoman police will remain in service until a further decision is made.
Thessalonica, 26 October 1912.
The plenipotentiaries of H.R.H. Crown Prince Constantine,
V. Dousmanes, I.P. Metaxas
The Commander of the Turkish Army, Hasan Tahsin
77.
After the signing of the Surrender Protocol, the commander of the Ottoman Army submitted a
request to the Greek representatives that the Greek forces be informed of the agreement immediately,
especially those stationed near Drymos and Asseros villages. The request was granted and a little before
midnight the representatives signed, on behalf of the commander in chief of the Hellenic Army, the first
order from Thessalonica for the suspension of hostilities.
Having not yet been informed about the signing of the protocol and the surrender of Thessalonica, due to
difficulties with the means of communication, the Government was anxious lest the Bulgarians capture the
city first. For this reason the prime minister sent to the commander in chief at 0230 on 27 October the
following telegram, in which he ordered the latter to accept the city's surrender without delay:
Commander of the Army
No. 80200. You are instructed to accept the surrender of Thessalonica offered to you and to enter it
without any delay whatsoever. I hold you responsible even for the slightest delay.
Athens, 27-X-12. 2:30 a.m.
Prime Minister Venizelos
Later that same day, however, the prime minister was informed of the reports by the commander in chief
and immediately gave instructions to recall his previous order, which no longer pertained to the situation.
But the order already had arrived at General Headquarters; the commander of the Army personally
composed the following reply, which was not, however, transmitted because he learned, in the meantime,
of the cancellation of the order which had prompted his response:
I am totally aware of my responsibilities and I would be grateful if, from now on, you did not remind me of
them for any matter whatever. I was the only one competent to judge whether or not I was in the position
to accept the surrender of Thessalonica, as I was in place and imposing the terms. Proof of this is the
result achieved.
Constantine.
On the morning of the same day, 27 October, the representatives of the Greek commander in chief in
Thessalonica and of the Ottoman commander signed a supplementary protocol agreement which settled
various details relating to the Turkish Army's surrender and the capture of the city.

In total, 25,000 soldiers and approximately 1,000 officers surrendered, and a total of 70 guns, 30 machine
guns, 1,200 horses and plentiful materiel of all kinds came into the possession of the Hellenic Army.
78.
At midday, the Evzone Detachment with a Cavalry element entered Thessalonica and headed
towards the Governor's Palace, via some of the city's central avenues, and was billeted in the barracks
there.
- Division VII advanced to the city outskirts on the same day.
- Division III moved a regiment and its headquarters south of the village of Diavata, while its remaining
elements held their positions.
- Division I remained in position until the afternoon, when it received orders from General Headquarters to
move towards Thessalonica in readiness to enter the city on the morning of the next day.
- Division IV remained in the area of the village of Nea Mesembria.
- Division VI had not yet received the previous day's orders to move and cross the river Axios over the
railway bridge, and therefore remained in position in the area of the villages Europos and Agios Petros.
- Division II began to move towards the village of Lete at 0920. At the same time, an Ottoman officer and
the adjutant of the 6th Regiment arrived at the divisional advance guard and delivered the Ottoman
Army's surrender orders and the orders for the suspension of military operations, at which point the
division halted its further advance.
A little later, the division noticed a Bulgarian column moving on the carriage road towards Thessalonica.
The division commander contacted immediately the commander of the nearest Bulgarian unit and
informed him that the Turkish Army had surrendered and that hostilities had ceased. At the same time, he
handed him a copy of the relevant order with the request that he forward it to the commander of the
column.
- The Cavalry Brigade, unaware of the order for the suspension of hostilities, dispatched on the morning
of 27 October two reconnaissance teams towards Lete. The mission of one team was to link up the
Bulgarian column with Division II, and the other, to penetrate up until Thessalonica. It was soon realized
that the Bulgarian column was taking up battle positions in the direction of Lete. At this point the Cavalry
Brigade moved towards Langadas to impede the Turkish withdrawal and informed the Bulgarian General
accordingly. When the Cavalry Brigade arrived at Langadas, it was informed by the Bulgarians of the
surrender of Thessalonica and of the Turkish Army.
79.
On the afternoon of 27 October, General Headquarters issued the following order regarding the
stationing of formations:
- Division II in the area around the villages Monolophos-Drymos-Melissochori.
- Division III in the area around the villages Anchialos-Agios Athanasios-Gephyra.
- Division IV in the area around the villages Nea Mesembria-Vathylakkos.
- Division VI in the area around the villages Europos-Agios Petros.
- Division VII in the area around the villages Eukarpia-Polichne.
- The Evzone Detachment in Thessalonica.
- The Cavalry Brigade in the area around the village of Asseros.
- Division I in Thessalonica. The division was ordered to be on the Giannitsa-Thessalonica road at 1000
the following day, with its head in the railway station, so that it could enter Thessalonica led by the
commander in chief.
80.
The 7th Bulgarian Division, under the command of General Todorov, continued its advance
towards Lete in formation, while one of its batteries began to fire against Turkish positions. This took
place in spite of the fact that the division had received timely notification from the Greek commander in
chief regarding the surrender of the Turkish Army and of Thessalonica, in addition to having been
informed of the suspension of hostilities by Division II.
The commander of Division II, fearing that the behavior of the Bulgarians might be considered by the
Turks as a breach of the treaty agreement, dispatched a messenger on horseback to request that the
Bulgarian commander of the 7th Division halt its advance and its fire. While the battery did hold its fire,
the movement of Bulgarian units towards Lete continued. Division II reported these developments to
General Headquarters.

General Headquarters, after receiving the reports about the Bulgarian behavior and protests by Hasan
Tahsin Pasha, sent the commander of the 7th Bulgarian Division (which was still moving towards
Thessalonica) the following letter requesting the suspension of any further movement and for the
Bulgarian units to avoid any kind of incident with the Turks:
General Headquarters of the Hellenic Army, 27-X-1912
To the General commanding the Bulgarian forces at Gyuvesna1
Dear General,
As I had the honor of informing you through my letter yesterday evening, the city of Thessalonica and the
Turkish Army have surrendered to me. The disarmament of the Turkish Army, the evacuation of the city
and the Hellenic Army's entrance began this morning. Nonetheless, since the commander of the Turkish
forces protested that the Bulgarian forces fired against his troops, and because the surrender agreement
engages me to forestall any harassment of the Turkish troops by the Allied armies, I beg that you issue
the necessary orders so that the Allied troops halt all movement and remain in their positions in order to
prevent any incidents.
The Commander General of the Hellenic Army,
Crown Prince Constantine, Duke of Sparta
At the same, Constantine submitted a report to the Greek government requesting that it lodge a vehement
protest with the Bulgarian government for its army's action, which did not conform to the spirit of the
alliance.
In spite of this, the Bulgarian column continued towards Thessalonica and on the evening of 27 October it
arrived south of Lete.
In the meantime, the Greek government dispatched the Minister of Justice, Konstantinos Raktivand, to act
as its representative in Thessalonica. The minister was accompanied by administrative staff and a force of
gendarmerie.
On the evening of the same day, the Greek prefect of Thessalonica was informed about the movements
of the Bulgarian units; he dispatched a special train to the village of Gephyra and proposed to the
commander in chief that he hasten his entry into the city, returning if possible on the same train.
The commander of the Hellenic Army boarded the special train at 0345 on 28 October and at 0500 arrived
at the Thessalonica train station on the city outskirts. There he met with the commander of Division VII,
and ordered him to hasten his movement towards the Thessalonica-Serres carriage road in order to
prevent a further advance by the Bulgarians and their entry into Thessalonica.
At 1100 the commander in chief with his staff, at the head of Division I, entered Thessalonica in triumph.
After attending a doxology at the Church of Saint Menas, the commander in chief arrived at the
Governor's Palace and then reviewed Division I, which marched before him. Then he received the city
authorities. Division I then proceeded towards the Field of Mars (Pedion tou Areos) and was billeted at the
barracks there.
81.
Division VII moved in haste and occupied positions on the northwestern outskirts of the city,
where in a short while the leading elements of the Bulgarian column appeared, which was rushing to
enter the city. The division forbade further movement by the Bulgarian units, allowing only one staff
captain to enter the city, escorted by Greek officers, to present himself to General Headquarters in order
to make billeting arrangements for the 7th Bulgarian Division.
The Bulgarian staff officer indeed appeared at General Headquarters, where he was informed that the
matter of the encampment of the Bulgarian force in Thessalonica required direct communication in person
between the Greek commander in chief and the commander of the 7th Bulgarian Division. At the same
time, a General Headquarters staff officer was dispatched, along with a Turkish officer, to the Bulgarian
General in order to convey the Hellenic Army Commander's surprise at the "repeated" incidents that were
contrary to the spirit of the existing alliance. These incidents included the unjustified bombardment of
Turkish positions at Lete, the advance of troops towards Thessalonica and, finally, the Bulgarians' absurd
demand to Hasan Tahsin Pasha that he draw up and sign a surrender protocol similar to that which he
signed with the Greek commander in chief. The Turkish officer also delivered a letter from Hasan Tahsin
Pasha by which the latter informed the Bulgarian commander that he refused to sign a new surrender

protocol, as the Ottoman Army and Thessalonica had already surrendered on 26 October to the Greeks,
whose prisoner-of-war he was.
The two officers arrived in Lete and reported the purpose of their mission to the Bulgarian General
Petrov1, who initially wished to protest the denial of entry into Thessalonica to the Bulgarian Army. But not
having serious arguments with which to counter those of the Greek officer, the Bulgarian general was
forced to change tactics and asked him to transmit to the Greek commander in chief a request to permit
the entry of two Bulgarian battalions into the city.
Meanwhile, the Bulgarian column that was moving towards Thessalonica gradually assembled before the
positions of the Greek Division VII and General Todorov, commander of the 7th Bulgarian Division,
protested to the commander of the Greek division against the prohibition of movement of his units, asking
that they be given free passage. The response given to General Todorov stated that General
Headquarters' orders were categorical regarding the prohibition of the entry of Bulgarian units into
Thessalonica, which already had been surrendered by Turkish authorities to the Hellenic Army as of 26
October.
After the Greek denial, General Todorov, just as had General Petrov, sought to achieve the entry of two
battalions into the city with the excuse that they needed shelter from the pouring rain. After this effort also
was unsuccessful, General Todorov decided to meet with the Greek commander in chief. Thus, at 1000
on 28 October, General Todorov, accompanied by his aide-de-camp and diplomatic advisor (who was
Bulgaria's ambassador to Paris, Cavalry Lieutenant of the Reserve Stanchev), presented himself to the
commander in chief. After congratulations on the Hellenic Army's brilliant victory, the Bulgarian officer
submitted a request that two Bulgarian battalions be permitted to enter the city. Lieutenant Stanchev
stated in support of the request that the aim was to provide shelter and rest for the two Bulgarian princes,
Crown Prince Boris and his brother Prince Cyril, who were assigned to these battalions. In the event that
the request would be granted, his men would conform absolutely to the instructions and orders of the
Greek garrison commander.
After these categorical assurances, the commander in chief issued the order for the entry of two Bulgarian
battalions into the city in the morning of 29 October, and reported accordingly to the Ministry of the Army.
82.
In the afternoon of 28 October, Division VII withdrew its units from their positions and assembled
them at their encampments, in accordance with the order by General Headquarters. Units of the
Bulgarian division spent the night opposite Division VII while others, despite the agreement, entered
Thessalonica during the night.
The remaining Greek divisions encamped as follows: Division III in the area of the village of Diavata,
Division IV at Vathylakkos and Nea Mesembria, Division II in the area of Melissochori and Drymos
villages, Division VI at Gephyra and the Cavalry Brigade at Langadas.
The Serbian Cavalry regiment that was moving alongside the Bulgarian forces towards Thessalonica,
spent the night at Xerochori on 27 October and entered Thessalonica on 28 October. The commander of
the regiment with his officers immediately sought to congratulate the commander in chief of the Hellenic
Army. They were not able to meet him, however, because he was occupied with other matters. The
Serbian commander then sent a congratulatory letter on behalf of the Serbian Army for the superb
victories by the Hellenic Army and then departed with his regiment in order to meet his division north of
Gevgelije.
On the morning of 29 October, King George entered Thessalonica escorted by the Crown Prince and the
princes. Honors were paid by Division I and the Evzone Detachment.
Huge crowds greeted the King's arrival with frenzied enthusiasm, despite the heavy rainfall. When the
procession reached the White Tower, the Greek flag was raised in an atmosphere of emotion and national
exaltation, while Greek guns fired a twenty-one gun salute.
At noon of the same day, the entire Bulgarian regiment that had entered the city the night before, instead
of just the two battalions that the commander of the Hellenic Army had authorized, paraded through the
streets of Thessalonica. The parade of the Bulgarian regiment was greeted by cold silence, expressing an
emphatic protest against the clandestine entry of so many Bulgarian units into the city. At the same time,
this Bulgarian action signalled the beginning of a new round of struggles for the Hellenic Army.
Engagements of Division V
(Sketch-maps 5 and 8)

83.
Division V -which had been designated as the flank guard of the Hellenic Army following the
latter's turn towards Thessalonica- after capturing the village of Perdika continued its move towards the
north during the morning of 18 October; in the afternoon hours it arrived in the area of the villages Xino
Nero-Soteras-Amyntaion, and deployed security elements.
The following day, 19 October, after repelling minor Turkish forces which had attacked its forward
elements in the morning hours, the division continued its movement towards the north, covering its flanks
with strong flank guards. By the afternoon hours it had passed, without impediment, the defile of Kleidi
and moved forward security elements to the village of Lophoi.
The division's intention for the following morning, was to continue its advance towards Monastir, but after
receiving information that the Turks were assembling forces in the area of Florina-Armenochori-Neochori,
it temporarily halted its movement and deployed defensively at the northern exit of the defile of Kleidi.
A flank guard battalion of the division which had arrived at the village of Flambouro did not receive the
order for halt on time and moved towards the village of Skopia, which it reached, after driving off a small
Turkish force,in the afternoon hours of 20 October. Upon reaching the village of Skopia the battalion was
informed of the division's order and returned to the village of Flambouro that night.
84.
On 21 October, the commander of Division V decided to move towards Monastir and issued an
order to this effect. He arrived at this decision after receiving new information indicating that there were
few Turkish forces at Monastir which were of very low morale and lacking the will to put up a resistance.
The Hellenic Army's victory at Giannitsa and the capture of Skopje by the Serbs had an effect on his
decision as well. It was planned that the movement would take place in three columns, with measures
taken accordingly to cover the flanks.
The forward movement of the units began at 1030 on the same day, but with a delay owing to the slow
assembling of the right column.
Immediately after the start, the advance guard of the right column, which was moving towards the village
of Melite, halted its movement and assumed a defensive disposition on the heights north of the village of
Lophoi in order to repel strong Turkish forces, which were moving in the same manner in three columns
from Melite towards Lophoi and were supported by artillery. These forces belonged to the 18th Turkish
Division from the area of Monastir, where the bulk of the Turkish Army, withdrawn from Skopje, had finally
assembled.
Division V, on being informed of the offensive movement of the Turks, ordered the halting of its advance
and the assumption of a defensive disposition until the situation become clear. Thus, its regiments
returned and deployed defensively at their initial positions, while the flank guard battalion in the west
continued its movement towards the village of Tropaiouchos, because once again it did not receive the
order to halt.
In the meantime, the Turkish forces established close contact with the battalion of the right column that
was defending the heights north of the village of Lophoi. The battalion put up obstinate resistance, but
being heavily pressed and threatened by encirclement, it abandoned its positions and withdrew in
disorder to Veue.
An attempt on the part of the division to attack the flanks of the Turks at the village of Lophoi and at the
Veue railway station, with the simultaneous defensive deployment of other forces north of the defile of
Kleidi, did not met with success. In fact, the regiment moving against the Turkish left towards Lophoi
made a disorderly withdrawal towards Veue, while the regiment moving towards the Veue railway station
withdrew to the northern exit of the defile.
The hasty withdrawal of the entire division began during the afternoon hours, via the only road going
through the Kleidi defile. This resulted in disorder in the march, a mixing of the units and the collapse of
unit integrity. In the evening hours most of the units assembled in the area of the village of Soteras, while
the regiment which was operating towards the Veue railway station, along with the divisional
headquarters, stationed themselves at Amyntaion.
The battalion covering the left of the division captured the village of Tropaiouchos in the afternoon.
The division's casualties on 21 October were two officers and 166 enlisted men killed, four officers and
192 enlisted men wounded and ten prisoners, who were freed later after the capture of Monastir by the
Serbs.
The commander of the division dispatched an officer by train to brief General Headquarters in Giannitsa
on the situation which had developed in its sector.

General Headquarters issued an order to the Rear Area Service, which had its headquarters at Larissa, to
take immediate measures to serve the division's needs as regards transportation -to cover medical or
equipment evacuation, etc.; General Headquarters also ordered Division V to maintain its positions and to
secure the left of the army, to even include in its actions the execution of offensive actions against the
Turks. At the same time it briefed the Ministry of the Army, and requested a more rapid forward movement
of the Army of Epirus towards Ioannina and more active action by the Serbian Army towards Monastir.
Finally, the Ministry of the Army ordered that the field batteries stationed in Larissa, as well as a force of
2,000 men which was moving from the hinterland of the country towards Larissa, be dispatched to
Kozane.
85.
From the morning of October 22, the units of Division V began to regroup in their assembly areas
around the village of Soteras, with the aim of assuming the offensive against the Turkish forces. However,
in accordance with fresh orders from the division, the units deployed defensively on the line of the villages
Soteras-Amyntaion, with two regiments on the front line.
At approximately 0800 hours a Turkish column moving towards the village of Xino Nero appeared; it was
shot at by artillery fire and was forced to take cover to the north of the village. In the early afternoon hours
another Turkish column appeared, coming down from the village of Petres towards Amyntaion; that
column too was shot at by artillery fire. A short time later the Turkish artillery began to fire as well, and this
intense exchange of fire continued until nightfall. In the meantime, an attack by a small Turkish element
against the right of the division near Amyntaion was successfully repelled.
The covering battalion, which had spent the night in the village of Tropaiouchos, became aware of the
withdrawal of the division during the early hours of 22 October. It withdrew on the initiative of its
commander to the village of Drosopege, where it spent the night.
86.
On the morning of 23 October, the division dispatched reconnaissance elements which, however,
were shot at by Turkish troops and did not manage to advance. They did verify, at least, that there were
no Turks at the village of Xino Nero. There then followed a Turkish artillery fire attack against the division's
positions. The division responded by turning all of its artillery fire against the enemy, effectively silencing
its guns.
Before midday a Turkish column moved from the Kleidi defile towards the division's right. Its movement
was blocked temporarily by artillery fire, but was resumed a short time later and despite the obstinate
resistance put up by the troops of the division, the Turks succeeded in approaching Amyntaion.
The division took prompt measures to reinforce its troops fighting on the northern outskirts of Amyntaion,
by sending one battalion and directing artillery fire. Then, at 1500 hours, it launched an attack against the
Turkish positions with two regiments frontally, and one regiment against the Turkish right towards the
village of Petres.
The division's attack was successful and forced the Turks to withdraw towards the Kleidi defile without
putting up serious resistance. But the division's units, for their part, did not continue their pursuit. Indeed,
the 22nd Regiment, which had attacked towards the village of Petres, in the early evening hours began to
fall back from its forward positions. During its movement to the rear its left flank came under enemy fire,
resulting in confusion and disorder, and in the end the unit managed, with great difficulty, to hold itself
together at the level of the railway line.
The division, through its reports to General Headquarters, requested the dispatch of reinforcements that
same night, so that it would be able to maintain its positions. Following this, General Headquarters
ordered a two-company force from the 20th Regiment (of Division VII), which was stationed in Beroea, to
move by train to Amyntaion; in the event of its being unable to do so, it was ordered to remain in Edessa
and secure the defile there.
Furthermore, the Ministry of the Army made a demarche to the Serbian government, asking the Serbs to
exercise greater pressure upon the Turkish forces in the area of Monastir, in order to alleviate the difficult
position of Division V.
87. On the night of 23 to 24 October, a small Turkish element, guided by peasants who knew the terrain
well, moved from the village of Phanos to the south of the village of Rodon and at 0630 hours attacked
the division's Engineer company there, taking it by surprise; the men of the company, overcome by panic,
began to flee in all directions, abandoning arms, gear, even their clothing. Soon the panic spread to the
men of neighboring units, who also began a disorderly flight.

The Turks, taking advantage of this confusion, moved quickly and attacked the positions of a battery
which had been installed nearby, which they captured following a brief but fierce skirmish. Most of the
battery's men, including its commander, were killed while manning the guns; they only had time to fire ten
rounds.
Then the Turkish troops moved towards the northeast, penetrating the division's disposition; at sunrise
Turkish columns began to move from the defile of Kleidi and the village of Xino Nero towards the south.
These actions of the Turks resulted in heightened panic, and despite the efforts made by the commanders
of the Greek units, soon thereafter the flight became general. Thus, from 1000 hours Division V found
itself in a general and disorderly withdrawal towards Kozane, where the first elements began to arrive in
the afternoon hours of the same day. The commander of the division, unable to halt the withdrawal of its
elements, moved with his headquarters to the village of Philotas and from there to the village of Koila,
where they spent the night.
The Turks, meanwhile, pursued the withdrawing troops only for a short time. The greatest confusion
among the withdrawing elements, that resulted in their complete disorganization, was mainly caused by
the Turkish inhabitants of villages of the area through which the Greek columns were withdrawing.
The covering battalion, which had spent the previous night at Drosopege, upon seeing the villages of the
area around Xino Nero and Amyntaion ablaze, perceived that the division had withdrawn already, and for
that reason moved towards Kleisoura, where it arrived in the afternoon hours without establishing contact
with the division.
88.
In the meantime, the Kozane garrison commander, following an order from the Ministry of the
Army to reinforce Division V, assembled a force of approximately 300 men from the land army and
gendarmerie, and approximately 400 armed civilians and occupied positions at the level of the village of
Maurodendri, seeking mainly to restrain fugitives. By night and after many attempts, the regrouping of the
greater part of the division's units inside the town of Kozane had been attained.
In addition, in accordance with a General Headquarters order, a Field Army Section was established,
consisting of the regrouped Division V, the Gennades Evzone Detachment (which was in Neapolis) and
the two-company force of the 20th Regiment; they were placed under the command of Colonel (Eng)
Stephanos Gennades, hitherto commander of the Evzone Detachment. The mission of the Field Army
Section was to cover the left flank and rear of the Field Army, and in the event of favorable conditions
arising, to undertake the pursuit of the Turks towards the north.
89.
The regrouping and redisposition of the division's units in the area of Kozane continued on 25
October. The three battalions of each regiment were merged into two, in order to economize on personnel
and particularly officers, whose number had been reduced through casualties.
Throughout the entire day a state of nervousness and confusion prevailed in the town of Kozane, which
anticipated a renewed attack by the Turks. The inhabitants exercised restraint and did not begin to
abandon the city, thanks to the timely intervention of the Metropolitan and the division commander.
On the same day, an Infantry battalion and three field batteries from Larissa as well as an Infantry
battalion from Elasson were sent for the reinforcement of Division V.
The covering battalion moved from Kleisoura towards the village of Perdika, seeking to meet the division;
however, upon realizing that the division had withdrawn much further south, it continued towards the
village of Vlaste, where it encamped for night.
The commander of the Evzone Detachment received the order from General Headquarters for the
establishment of the Field Army Section and at 1600 hours left Neapolis with the entire detachment for
Kozane, by way of Siatista; they arrived at Siatista during the night hours. Colonel Gennades appointed
the commander of the Volunteer Scout bands there, Captain (Inf) Nikolaos Katechakes, as the military
commander of the Neapolis-Grevena area. Besides the Volunteer Scouts, two companies of the 24th
Infantry Regiment remained at Neapolis.
90.
At 0730 hours on October 26, Turkish peasants attacked Division V's outposts at the northwest
heights of Kozane. Their attack was repelled and the Turks were dislodged from their positions by the
intervention of the division's forces and by elements that the Kozane garrison commander had at his
disposal.
Despite the fact that this Turkish attack was successfully repulsed, troops of the Engineer Battalion, which
had been deployed at the outposts, abandoned their sector for no reason and withdrew to within Kozane.

However, the disorder caused by the action of the Turkish peasants was greater in the units which were
stationed within the town: many of their men began fleeing panic-stricken in the direction of Servia.
Despite the efforts of the officers, it proved impossible to contain them. They began to return to their units
en masse only after the firing ceased and it was ascertained that there was no danger.
In the afternoon hours, the division deployed two battalions as outposts to the northwest and west of
Kozane, at the level of the line of the villages Leukovryse-Vatero-Skaphidi. During their movement
towards their positions, these battalions came under heavy fire and minor harassing attacks from armed
Turkish peasants, whom they successfully repelled following a brief fight.
The Evzone Detachment moved from Siatista to Kozane, which it reached at night. Its commander
assumed immediately the duties of commander of the Field Army Section.
91.
The night of 26 to 27 October passed calmly and the units continued their regrouping, while their
men, in the main, returned to their units.
General Headquarters, through a general order, made known to the units and formations of the Field
Army of its intention to turn towards Amyntaion with the bulk of its forces -leaving only two divisions,
Divisions II and VII, in Thessalonica- in order to provide assistance to Division V and definitively eliminate
the Turkish troops issuing out of Monastir.
92.
On 27 October, the commander of the newly established Field Army Section in Kozane
immediately relieved the elements of Division V at the outposts with the two Evzone battalions which were
in Kozane. He gave an order to Division V to assemble well to the rear and preoccupy itself with rapid
rehabilitation and reorganization, since it still remained at a low level of combat effectiveness.
On 28 October, the commander of the Field Army Section issued an order to the units to deploy
defensively, in order to secure the town of Kozane from the west and the north. The western sector was
assigned to Division V and the northern to the Evzone Detachment, which was reinforced by Marine
Battalion II/24 and one field battery. The 16th Regiment was kept as the reserve force of the Field Army
Section, along with the Bridging Engineer battalion and one field battery, all of which were dispatched
from Division V. The divisional Cavalry of Division V and the Cavalry company from the Cavalry Brigade
(which had been assigned to Division V after the Field Army's turn towards Thessalonica) would cover the
defensive deployment and keep contact with the enemy.
Reconnaissance patrols sent by the cavalry that day could not advance into the defile north of Komanos
village, being harassed by Turkish peasants who were occupying the heights on both sides of the defile.
Thus, following the surprise and unreasonable panic suffered by Division V in the area of Amyntaion, the
front in western Macedonia finally was stabilized and the units there deployed defensively to the
northwest of Kozane, awaiting the arrival of the bulk of the Field Army for the resumption of the offensive
once again.
CHAPTER 3
The Field Army's Turn towards Western Macedonia
The Advance of the Army towards Florina
(Sketch-map 9)
93.
General Headquarters, in accordance with the decisions taken concerning the further operations
of the Field Army following the liberation of Thessalonica, issued on 29 October a general order of
operations, according to which the forces that were in Macedonia would be divided into three groups, as
follows:
- The Group of the Left, comprising the Field Army Section of Kozane (Division V, the Gennades Evzone
Detachment, Marine Battalion II/24, the two-company unit from the 20th Infantry Regiment, plus other
elements on the spot), under Colonel (Eng) Stephanos Gennades.
- The Group of the Center, comprising Divisions I, III, IV and VI and the Cavalry Brigade (minus one
regiment), under the direct orders of the Commander in Chief.
- The Group of the Right, comprising Divisions II and VII, the Konstantinopoulos Evzone Detachment and
a Cavalry regiment, under the commander of Division II, Major General Konstantinos Kallares. Division II

would replace Division I, which was stationed at Thessalonica and henceforth would be attached to the
Group of the Center.
Command of Division VII was assigned to Colonel (Eng) Napoleon Sotiles as of 29 October.
The missions of the aforementioned Field Army Groups were assigned through other orders issued the
same day.
of the Left would remain in the area of Kozane and would continue its reorganization, awaiting the
reinforcements from the area of Larissa (six battalions and four batteries of Field Artillery) which were
assigned to it by order of the Ministry of the Army.
The Group of the Center, after assembling by the night of 1 November in the area between Giannitsa and
Edessa, would then move towards the Florina plateau and operate against the Turkish Army, which was in
the area of Monastir. The liaison officer between the Serbian and the Hellenic Army was informed of the
Field Army's operation so that the operations of the two allies could be coordinated.
The Group of the Right would remain in the area of Thessalonica with the mission to liberate the
hinterland of the city.
At the same time, General Headquarters proposed to the Ministry of the Army that detachments
disembark at Kavala and Alexandroupolis, where there were no Turkish military forces, abolish Turkish
authority there and substitute Greek authority. Another reason for the disembarkation of Greek forces in
Alexandroupolis was the expectation that they would be transferred from there by rail to Constantinople in
order to enter the city alongside Bulgarian troops, because, according to information, the fall of that city
was considered certain.
On 31 October the Ministry of the Army replied by cable to the above proposals by General Headquarters,
informing it that, if there was a possibility of one division being available after the liberation of Monastir
and Ioannina, it would be much better that it capture the Gallipoli peninsula, to secure free passage for
the Hellenic Fleet through the Hellespont towards Constantinople.
94.
The Group of the Center began its movement towards the west on the morning of 30 October.
After a three-day march, it arrived in the afternoon hours of 1 November at the following areas:
Division VI arrived in the area of Edessa, with forward elements on the heights northwest of the village of
Agras. The independent Cavalry company, which was moving ahead of the division's advance guard and
had reached Agras in the early afternoon hours, reported that the Turks were occupying Arnissa, with
outposts on the line from the village of Drosia to the village of Xanthogeia.
Division IV arrived in the area of Skydra.
Divisions I and III and the Cavalry Brigade arrived in the area of Giannitsa.
In addition, from 1 November General Headquarters relocated to the Skydra railway station. The Field
Army's Group of the Left in Kozane continued the rehabilitation of Division V, whose combat effectiveness
still had not reached the desired level. During the morning hours of 1 November, the Volunteer Scout
bands, which had remained in the area of Neapolis, came under attack from a strong Turkish force and
withdrew towards the southeast. Subsequently the Turks headed to Neapolis, which they captured after a
brief engagement with the two-company Marine unit of the 24th Infantry Regiment that was stationed
there. Among the fallen of the two-company unit was its commander, Captain (Inf) Georgios Dedouses.
In the meantime, the Ministry of the Army telegraphed to General Headquarters on 30 October advising
combined operation with the Serbs against Monastir, in order to clear up the situation quickly and prevent
Turkish forces from fleeing towards Ioannina and reinforcing the Turkish Army there. Additionally, the
ministry emphasized the need for reinforcements to be dispatched to Epirus from the theater of
operations of Macedonia in order to speed up the capture of Ioannina.
In response, General Headquarters reported on 2 November that, for the time being, it was inadvisable to
weaken the Army of Macedonia, because continuing operations towards Monastir until the Turkish forces
there were completely destroyed was an issue of absolute necessity; the operations of the Army of Epirus
against Ioannina would thereby be supported indirectly. Furthermore, in a previous telegram, sent on 31
October, General Headquarters had reported to the Ministry of the Army that the Bulgarian units which
had entered Thessalonica amounted to eight battalions, despite the initial agreement for an entry of only
two battalions. Moreover, it reported that the Bulgarians were showing signs of permanently establishing
themselves in the city and pleaded that the Government see to the matter in order to prevent more
serious complications.

95.
On 2 November, the divisions of the Group of the Center completed their assembly in the area of
Edessa, in accordance with the orders of General Headquarters. Specifically:
Division VI, after repelling a Turkish attack against its forward positions in the area of the village of Agras,
ordered the 1st Evzone Regiment, reinforced with a battalion of the 17th Regiment, to move towards the
same village. The rest of the 17th Regiment and the other units of the division remained in Edessa.
Division IV advanced from Skydra, with the 9th Infantry Regiment as advance guard, towards the village
of Phlamouria, and during the afternoon of the same day its advance guard along with the 8th Infantry
Regiment arrived at Phlamouria, while the rest of the force spent the night at the village of Platane.
Division III advanced to the village of Rizari, southeast of Edessa.
Division I advanced to the north of Skydra, via the Giannitsa-Edessa carriage road.
The Cavalry Brigade, after dispatching reconnaissance missions in the direction of Aridaia, advanced to
the village of Sandali, northeast of Skydra.
The Field Army Section of Kozane, by order of General Headquarters, from 2 November ceased to exist
and all its units henceforth were attached under Division V. The Gennades Evzone Detachment was
disbanded as well, and its two battalions also were assigned to Division V.
On the morning of 2 November in Siatista, where the regrouping of the Volunteer Scout bands and the
two-company Marine force of the 24th Infantry Regiment was still under way, envoys of the Turkish
commander of the forces of the area Kastoria-Neapolis arrived bearing a letter from the commander to
the town notables, in which he requested the surrender of the town within the following twenty-four hours.
On the recommendation of the Greek military commander of the area, an immediate reply to the Turkish
envoys was not given, in order to gain time until reinforcements arrive, which he had requested hurriedly
from the Field Army Section of Kozane. Indeed, the Field Army Section ordered Battalion II/24 (now a twocompany force), and one of those battalions that had been assigned to it from the area of Larissa, as well
as various Volunteer Scout bands which had reached Kozane from the hinterland of the country, to rush
and reinforce the garrison of Siatista. By the same order, Lieutenant Colonel (Arty) Antonios Epites was
appointed commander of all the forces in Siatista (Siatista Detachment). These sections moved
immediately and reached Siatista on the same day.

The Battle of Komanos and Arnissa

(Sketch-map 9)
96.
On the night of 2 November, General Headquarters, which remained at the Skydra railway
station, issued an operations order for the following day, according to which: Division V would advance
towards Ptolemais and Division IV towards the village of Kato Grammatiko, dispatching reconnaissance in
the direction of Amyntaion and Arnissa. Division VI, to which was attached the entire Field Artillery of
Division III, would remain in its positions in the area of the village of Agras, in a state of readiness to
advance towards Arnissa. Division III would assemble west of the Edessa railway station, in a state of
readiness to advance towards the villages of Karydia and Panagitsa. Division I and the Cavalry Brigade
would remain at Skydra and the village of Sandali respectively.
In the meantime, the Ministry of the Army informed General Headquarters that Turkey had requested an
armistice from Bulgaria. Bulgaria asked under what conditions would Greece accept this proposal. The
opinion of the Greek government on the acceptance of the proposed armistice was that Ioannina be
surrendered by the Turks to the Hellenic Army and Monastir to the allied forces of Greece and Serbia. At
the same time, the Ministry of the Army advised the acceleration of the army's advance towards Monastir.
General Headquarters replied that it agreed with the Government's conditions for the conclusion of an
armistice with Turkey, with one added term, however, that the Hellenic Fleet be permitted to sail freely
through the Dardanelles and the Sea of Marmara, as a guarantee against a possible transfer of Turkish
troops to Thrace and Macedonia during the period of the armistice.
97.
On the basis of General Headquarters' operations orders, on 3 November the divisions moved as
follows:
Division V moved from Kozane towards the north on the carriage road Kozane-Ptolemais, covering its
movement with the 23rd Infantry Regiment as its advance guard.

The Cavalry company at the head of the advance guard, after overrunning enemy resistance put up by a
Turkish body of cavalry and armed peasants, arrived at the village of Komanos in the early afternoon
hours. However, a short time later the Cavalry company was attacked by a strong Turkish force, which
arrived there from Ptolemais, and was forced to abandon the village and withdraw towards the southeast.
The main force of the division's advance guard, continuing its movement towards the north, came in
contact with the Turkish elements at approximately 1600 hours, east of the village of Mauropege. The
division then moved the 22nd Regiment forward also and ordered an attack by two regiments in the first
echelon in order to capture the villages of Mauropege and Komanos. The attack was launched in the late
afternoon, but owing to obstinate enemy resistance the seizure of the aforementioned objectives was not
accomplished until that night. Thus, the attacking troops consolidated in the positions they occupied, in
close contact with the enemy.
Division IV, with the 8th Infantry Regiment as its advance guard, moved from the area of the village of
Phlamouria towards the village of Kato Grammatiko, where it arrived in the evening hours and posted as
covering elements one battalion towards Arnissa and one towards the southwest.
In the morning hours, Division VI repelled an attack by a weak Turkish force against its forward positions.
It was informed by reconnaissance elements that three enemy battalions were in Arnissa, one battalion
was in Amyntaion, while at the same time a Turkish force of approximately 1,000 men reinforced the units
that were deployed at the village of Nesi. The division remained in a state of readiness to operate towards
Arnissa, without taking any other action.
Division III moved to its assembly area west of the Edessa railway station, and with one of its battalions
which it moved forward to the village of Agia Paraskeue, assumed the cover from this direction for which
Division VI had been responsible until then.
Division I remained in its position at Skydra and sent forward a battalion (minus two companies) to
Edessa, with the mission to move towards Aridaia, disarm the Turkish troops there and install Greek
authorities.
The headquarters of the Cavalry Brigade, following a General Headquarters order, ceased to exist from
that day (3 November). Its commander, Lieutenant Colonel Georgios Karamanlikes, returned as
commander of the 3rd Cavalry Regiment, while the rest of the officers were assigned to the 1st Cavalry
Regiment, which was operating with the Group of the Center. The 1st Cavalry Regiment remained at the
village of Sandali, after assigning a platoon to Division I. This element would support one of the division's
battalions that was to operate towards Aridaia.
Moreover, on the same day, another battalion and a battery arrived in Siatista from Larissa, to reinforce
the town's garrison. With them was Lieutenant Colonel (Arty) Antonios Epites, who had been appointed
commander of the Siatista Detachment. Furthermore, at 1900, Turkish elements attacked the Marine
company of the 24th Regiment at Grevena, took it by surprise, and forced it to abandon its positions and
withdraw towards the south. Upon entering Grevena the Turks put the town to the torch and physically
abused many of its inhabitants.
98.
On November 4, the Greek forces advanced as follows:
Division V resumed its attack in the morning, with two regiments in the first echelon against the Turkish
troops holding the line between the villages of Mauropege and Komanos. Again the Turks put up
obstinate resistance and the 23rd Infantry Regiment, which was attacking to the right, suffered great
casualties. Among the wounded was the regimental commander, who was forced to retire from the
battlefield. This event had a negative effect on his men's morale, and for a moment there was the danger
that panic would break out. However, thanks to the timely intervention of the divisional command, which
brought forward two battalions from its reserve to reinforce the two regiments in the front line, the attack
continued with greater fierceness and determination. By 1300 the battle had ended with a victory for the
Greek troops which, after capturing the villages of Mauropege and Komanos, advanced as far as the
northern exit of the defile of Komanos, but did not exploit their success further. The division's casualties
during this two-day battle were serious, with 352 killed and wounded.
Division IV moved from the village of Kato Grammatiko with the 9th Infantry Regiment as advance guard,
and after driving back minor resistance put up by the Turks, captured the villages of Peraia and Pyrgoi in
the afternoon hours and forwarded troops as far as the heights southeast of Arnissa (immediately north of
the railway line), and in contact with the Turkish troops.
Division VI advanced towards Arnissa by the carriage road, with the 18th Infantry Regiment and three
units of divisional Cavalry as advance guard.

The advance guard of the division, after overcoming some minor resistance put up by the enemy, reached
the line of the heights southeast of Arnissa in the afternoon, where it was attacked by Turkish forces.
Initially some confusion arose and the Greek troops fell back, due to heavy enemy fire and a Turkish
enveloping move against their right flank. Following the intervention of the divisional command, however,
the advance guard was reinforced with new units, the line of battle was restored and the Turkish force
attempting the envelopment was forced to withdraw to its initial positions.
A night attack, which was planned by the 1st Evzone Regiment with the cooperation of the 17th
Regiment, did not meet with success, owing to the lack of surprise and a strong Turkish counterfire.
Confusion and disorder followed. One of the battalions started to withdraw and the mood spread to the
men of the 18th Regiment. The situation was restored through the active intervention of the officers, and
the Greek forces returned to the line of battle, in close contact with the Turkish elements southeast of
Arnissa.
The mission of Division III was to advance north of Division VI, in the direction of the villages of KarydiaPanagitsa towards the village of Zerve. However, before beginning its move, its forward troops in the area
of Agia Paraskeue came under heavy Turkish fire and were forced to deploy for battle. Following this, the
Turks, at about midday, abandoned their positions and withdrew towards the west; the division did not
undertake to pursue them. Thus, by nighttime the division assembled in the area of the villages of Nesi
and Karydia, having forwarded security forces to the village of Patema.
Division I moved from Skydra to the village of Agras, with its artillery in Edessa.
On the same day, following a hard struggle, the Siatista Detachment successfully repelled a strong
Turkish attack which had begun in the early afternoon hours and lasted until night. The detachment's
casualties were heavy and amounted to 60 killed and wounded. In the evening hours, the volunteer Greek
Redshirt Corps1 under Alexandros Romas also arrived in Siatista, but not soon enough to take part in the
battle.
General Headquarters, which had been informed about the previous day's events at Grevena by a
telegram from the Ministry of the Army, ordered Division V to reinforce the troops of the Grevena area with
forces from Siatista. In addition, it ordered the Rear Area Service in Larissa to assemble every available
force and dispatch it immediately towards Grevena, in order to block the Turks and then recapture the
city. The Ministry of the Army sent similar orders to the commander of the 24th Infantry Regiment, the
military commander of Metsovo and the police chief of Trikala, recommending that they take similar
measures to deal with the situation that had developed.
The Advance of the Army to the Florina Plateau
(Sketch-maps 9, 10, and 11)
99.
The advance of the Greek forces resumed on the following day, 5 November, in accordance with
General Headquarters' orders.
Division V advanced from the line of the villages Mauropege-Komanos towards Ptolemais and Perdikas in
two columns, with a common cover for their left flank. They arrived in the afternoon, without having
encountered resistance, in the area of the villages of Perdikas, Philotas and Pelargos, where the division
encamped.
Division IV moved towards Amyntaion with one regiment as advance guard, and in the afternoon, without
encountering resistance, arrived at the village of Maniaki, and camped there.
Division VI, after brief fighting at the heights east of Arnissa, effectively overran weak enemy resistance
and entered the town in the early afternoon. It encamped there, after previously deploying security
elements at the west exit of the defile of Arnissa.
Division III advanced with two regiments in the first echelon towards the villages of Panagitsa and Zerve.
It reached them in the afternoon, without encountering resistance, and camped there.
Division I moved forward from the area of the village of Agras to the heights east of Arnissa, while the 1st
Cavalry Regiment reached the village of Vryta.
The same day, in accordance with an order from General Headquarters, the commander of the Siatista
Garrison ordered the Redshirt Corps to move on the following day to the area of the villages of KivotosAgios Georgios, and block any eventual movement of Turkish troops from Neapolis to Grevena.
In addition, the commander of the Rear Area Service at Larissa ordered the commander of the 24th
Regiment to move with a force of two companies towards the village of Agiophyllo, south of Grevena, to

block the approach of a Turkish force which was moving from Grevena in that direction. The Greek force
reached the village of Agiophyllo during the night and linked up with two companies that had withdrawn
from Grevena and with a company that had arrived from Neapolis.
At the same time, a body of 300 men (100 soldiers and 200 Cretan volunteers), led by the military
commander of Metsovo, moved to recapture Grevena. This force arrived at the village of Melia in the
early afternoon hours, and encamped there.
100.
On the morning of 6 November, General Headquarters moved forward to the Arnissa railway
station and immediately issued an operations order to its units, setting out the following: Divisions IV and
V were to comprise a Field Army Section under the commander of Division IV, Major General
Konstantinos Moschopoulos, and advance towards the defile of Kleidi. Division VI was to move towards
the village of Kelle and secure the west exit of the defile of the same name. Division III was to remain in
the area of the villages of Zerve-Agios Athanasios, while Division I was to assemble at Arnissa. The 1st
Cavalry Regiment was ordered to move towards the village of Kelle and dispatch reconnaissance patrols
towards Amyntaion and Xino Nero. The Siatista Detachment was to operate independently of Division V
in the upper reaches of Haliacmon valley in order to mop up the Turkish elements in the area.
On the basis of these orders from General Headquarters, the units conducted operations on that day as
follows:
Division V advanced along the carriage road Ptolemais-Veue, with one regiment as advance guard and
another as flank guard, and by night of the same day arrived and encamped in the area of the villages of
Xino Nero-Soteras.
Division IV moved from the village of Maniaki towards Amyntaion, with the 11th Infantry Regiment as an
advance guard. After neutralizing minor enemy resistance near the village of Vegora and linking up at
Amyntaion with Division V operating to its left (west), it continued its advance towards the enemy position
at the Kleidi defile, with which it made contact in the afternoon hours. The Turks, who were occupying the
heights at the south entrance to the defile, put up only weak resistance and then withdrew towards the
interior of the defile. The division's advance guard deployed on the heights, while the rest of the division
spent the night in the area of Amyntaion.
Division VI advanced along the carriage road towards the village of Kelle, with the 1st Evzone Regiment
as advance guard. By midday, and as the division's advance guard was approaching the heights east of
Kelle, it came under heavy Turkish fire and was committed to action. Following this, the division deployed
the 17th Infantry Regiment in the first echelon and attacked the Turkish positions. Following a brief fight,
the Turks fled in a westward direction, pursued by the Greek troops beyond Kelle; Turkish casualties were
heavy. The units of Division VI finally deployed at the village of Kelle and the surrounding heights. Division
I moved forward to Arnissa, where it remained overnight.
On that day the Redshirt Corps from Siatista arrived in the area of the villages of Kivotos-Agios Georgios
and deployed there.
In the area of Grevena, the forces at the villages of Agiophyllo and Melia remained in their positions and
reported that the Turkish troops at Grevena -with a strength of approximately 2,000 infantry, two guns and
50 cavalry- departed from Grevena on the night of 6-7 November.
In the meantime, the Commander in Chief of the Army informed the Government of the rapid advance of
the army, at the same time requesting that the limit of its advance be defined and that he be informed
regarding the negotiations among the Allies.
In reply, the Ministry of the Army informed General Headquarters that, according to a telegram from the
Greek ambassador in Belgrade, the capture of Monastir by the Serbs and the surrender to them of
approximately 40,000 prisoners of the Turkish Army was announced officially in the Serbian capital. It
addition, the ministry specified that after eliminating the Turkish forces opposing it, the Field Army was to
return three divisions to Thessalonica. Two divisions and the cavalry should capture Florina, Kastoria,
Korytsa, Neapolis and Grevena, while one regiment and two batteries should proceed to Monastir. One of
the divisions in Thessalonica was to be transported to Epirus for the reinforcement of the Army of Epirus
there.
Following this, General Headquarters issued an operations order for the following day, according to which
the 1st Cavalry Regiment was to advance to Florina, Division III was to move towards the village of
Lophoi, Division VI to Veue, Division I to the village of Kelle, Division IV to the village of Sitaria and
Division V to the village of Agios Vartholomaios.

101.
On the basis of the order issued by General Headquarters, the advance of the units towards the
Florina plateau continued from the morning of 7 November.
The 1st Cavalry Regiment moved in the morning and after overtaking Division VI, arrived at the Veue
railway station, from where it continued towards Florina. At around 1130 it seized the Florina railway
station, where it took approximately 100 prisoners and captured an abundance of war materiel, including
twelve steam engines and 300 railway cars. Continuing its movement, it arrived close to the city, where it
spotted a large Turkish column withdrawing from Monastir through Florina towards Pisoderi. After that the
division hastened its march, and when the advance guard reached the outskirts of the city at 1330, its
commander called on the Turkish authorities to declare submission. Indeed, a short time later, a
committee composed of the metropolitan, the rabbi and the mufti presented themselves and declared the
surrender of the city to the Hellenic Army. There followed the capture and disarmament of the Turkish
troops who were found in the city (approximately 1,300 men) and the pursuit, until the night hours, of the
Turkish forces that were withdrawing towards Pisoderi.
In the afternoon, a Serbian officer arrived and presented himself to the commander of the Cavalry
Regiment and pleaded with him to permit the entry of one Serbian Cavalry company into the city to
remain there overnight. The commander of the regiment approved the request and the Serbian Cavalry
company entered the city. This event was immediately reported to General Headquarters, along with
information on the withdrawal from Monastir towards Pisoderi, by way of Florina, of a force of
approximately 30,000 men of the Turkish Army.
The other divisions also moved in accordance with General Headquarters' orders, and arrived at the
Florina plateau as follows:
Division V arrived at the village of Agios Vartholomaios; Division IV at the village of Sitaria, from where, in
accordance with a General Headquarters order, it moved forward its 8th Regiment to Florina to secure the
city; Division VI arrived at the Veue railway station, Division III at the village of Lophoi, and Division I at
the village of Kelle.
During the afternoon the Siatista Detachment recaptured Neapolis, while the Redshirt Corps remained in
the area of the villages of Agios Georgios, Kivotos, and Kokkinia.
The troops of the 24th Regiment remained in their positions at the village of Agiophyllo. When the
commander of the regiment became informed of the evacuation of Grevena by the Turks, he sent a small
reconnaissance force there, which recaptured the city. The 300-man force which, since 5 November, had
moved forward to the village of Melia, returned to Metsovo.
General Headquarters relocated to Veue, and issued new orders from there. The 1st Cavalry Regiment
was ordered to keep contact with the Turkish forces and to continue pursuing them from the following day
towards Pisoderi; Division IV was to move, by way of Florina, towards the village of Alona; Division V to
the area of the village of Armenochori; Division VI to the village of Sitaria; Division III to the village of Xino
Nero; and Division I to the Veue railway station.
On the same day, the Greek liaison officer at Serbian General Headquarters reported the entry of the
Serbs into Monastir and the withdrawal of a large part of the Turkish Army towards Korytsa, by way of
Chani Diavatou (north of the Prespa lake) and Florina. The commander of the Army, in a telegram,
immediately reported this information to the prime minister, emphasizing that the withdrawal of a force of
approximately 30,000 men of the Turkish Army towards the west by way of Florina, made necessary their
pursuit perhaps as far as Korytsa. Consequently the dispatch of three whole divisions to Thessalonica
was impossible for the time being. In addition, he reported on the need of the army to rest and to be
resupplied with winter equipment.
Indeed, from the onset of the war, i.e. over a period of approximately one month, the Field Army had
covered more than 500 kilometers, under adverse weather conditions and through difficult terrain, and it
was natural that it should need rest and resupply.
102.
On 8 November the Greek forces continued their advance.
The 1st Cavalry Regiment, pursuing the Turkish forces which were withdrawing along the carriage road
leading to Pisoderi, captured approximately 200 Turkish privates, but owing to the thick fog and the snow
it encountered, it was forced to suspend any further pursuit and remain at the village of Alona overnight.
Division IV, whose mission was to continue towards the village of Alona, moved extremely slowly,
hindered by the muddy terrain; it only managed to arrive at Florina in the afternoon. The consequence of
this delay was that the 8th Infantry Regiment, which had been in the city since the previous day, did not

move to pursue the withdrawing Turkish Army. Shortly before midday a Serbian Cavalry division arrived in
Florina and encamped there temporarily, after receiving permission to do so from the Greek authorities.
The rest of the Greek divisions moved towards their new positions, which had been assigned to them by
General Headquarters. Division V moved to the village of Armenochori, with its 16th Regiment at the
village of Skopia; Division VI moved to the village of Sitaria; Division III to the village of Xino Nero; and
Division I to the Veue railway station.
The Siatista Detachment was renamed the Western Macedonia Detachment and remained in Neapolis
where, on the same night, one more battalion arrived from Larissa as reinforcement.
Also that night the Redshirt Corps, following the recapture of Grevena by an element of the 24th
Regiment, moved and arrived at Neapolis.
General Headquarters relocated to Florina, after first reporting to the Ministry of the Army that Division I
would be transported to Thessalonica by rail and that, owing to the adverse weather conditions, the
advance of the Field Army towards Korytsa was impossible for at least a fortnight, a time period needed
for the troops to rest and resupply for a winter expedition.
103.
On the following day, 9 November, the 1st Cavalry Regiment continued towards the village of
Antartiko under the same adverse weather conditions. After arriving there in the afternoon it dispatched
reconnaissance missions further south as far as the village of Vatochori.1 The regiment spent the night at
the village of Antartiko and reported to General Headquarters that the Turkish Army, with a strength of
35,000-40,000, had withdrawn towards Korytsa. In addition, it reported that a Turkish force, of about two
to three battalions with three pack batteries, was assembling at Kastoria.
Division III moved from the village of Xino Nero to the village of Sklethro, while the other divisions (IV, I, V
and VI) remained in their positions.
The Serbian troops, which had been in Florina since the previous day, departed for Monastir in the
afternoon hours.
General Headquarters remained in Florina and sent, via an Ottoman private citizen, a letter signed by the
Deputy Chief of Staff, Lieutenant Colonel (Eng) Viktor Dousmanes to the commander of the Turkish Army
withdrawing towards Korytsa, Ali Riza Pasha, requesting the surrender of the Turkish forces, to whom all
honors would be rendered and who would be transported to Asia Minor on Greek ships. Upon arriving at
Turkish Headquarters, the envoy delivered the letter to Ali Riza and requested a reply. Instead of a reply,
however, he was molested by two Turkish officers and imprisoned, but managed to escape and return to
the Greek forces bearing a letter from the Metropolitan of Korytsa, who urged for the capture of Korytsa
by the Hellenic Army as a national necessity.
Meanwhile, the Ministry of the Army proclaimed a decree promoting Crown Prince Constantine to the rank
of General "for his excellent services to the country." The ministry also requested his views on the further
course of the operations. The views of the ministry on this matter were that two divisions be assigned to
the capture of Korytsa and to secure order in the area of Florina-Kastoria-Neapolis-Grevena-Kozane. The
other three divisions were to be transported to Thessalonica, and one of these was to be sent to Epirus by
sea for the reinforcement of the army which was operating there, unless General Headquarters preferred
to send to Epirus, by road via Metsovo, one of the divisions located on the southernmost edge of the Field
Army's zone of operations.
The Liberation of Kastoria
(Sketch-maps 9 and 11)
104.
On 10 November, the 1st Cavalry Regiment, after dispatching 300 Turkish prisoners to Florina,
continued its movement towards the village of Vatochori, where it arrived in the afternoon hours and sent
forward reconnaissance patrols towards the village of Biglishte. At the same time, under orders from
General Headquarters, it sent one of its companies towards Kastoria, as there was information that the
city had been abandoned by the Turks. The company's mission was to approach the city and request its
surrender from the Turkish authorities there. In the late evening hours the company arrived at the village
of Aposkepos where, after reconnoitering, it ascertained that the Turkish forces had abandoned Kastoria a
few hours earlier and had fallen back towards Korytsa. On the following morning the company entered
Kastoria, encountering no resistance. The company reported this event immediately to the 1st Cavalry
Regiment, and also reported that a Turkish force of approximately 1,000 men with two to three guns had
abandoned the town of Argos Orestikon and was heading towards Korytsa.

The 1st Cavalry Regiment, which was still at Vatochori, on the same day (11 November) sent
reconnaissance missions towards Biglishte, which determined that a Turkish infantry column (about
3,000-4,000 men) with four guns was moving from Kastoria towards Korytsa.
On 12 November, the 1st Cavalry Regiment sent reconnaissance missions once again towards the
villages of Biglishte and Tsangoni, and moved towards Kastoria, which it entered, encamping there in the
afternoon hours. The reconnaissance element which was headed towards the village of Tsangoni reached
its destination without encountering Turkish forces and reported that, according to its information, the
Turks were withdrawing from Korytsa towards Ioannina and Valona (Aulon).
105.
During the same period (10-12 November) as the 1st Cavalry Regiment was moving to Kastoria,
the operations of the other units of the Field Army were as follows:
Division V, having been ordered to relocate to Kozane, moved on 10 November in the area of PtolemaisAmyntaion and on the following day arrived and encamped at Kozane.
Division VI extended its front to include the village of Armenochori, while Division IV remained at Florina.
Division III sent forward its divisional Cavalry towards Kastoria, with the Volunteer Scout units of Western
Macedonia attached to it. All the Volunteer Scout bands, in the meantime, had been accorded military
status by order of General Headquarters. On 11 November, the division moved from the village of
Sklethro to the village of Vasileiada, and on the following day it relocated to Kastoria.
From 11 November, Division I began its movement by rail, in sections, from Veue to Thessalonica. This
movement was completed by 15 November.
The Western Macedonia Detachment, after leaving one battalion in Neapolis, moved on 12 November to
Vogatsiko village, where it encamped.
On 10 November, General Headquarters, following a proposal by the Ministry of the Army, ordered
Military Area I of Larissa to dispatch the Garibaldine Corps (which had been sent forward to Trikala) to
Metsovo for the reinforcement of the garrison there.
On the same day, the commander of the Army submitted a proposal to the prime minister by telegram,
that a squadron of the Hellenic Fleet be sent to Durazzo to reinforce the Serbian effort there. In exchange
for this, Monastir was to be ceded by the Serbs to Greece.
In another telegram to the prime minister, the commander of the Army reported the military view regarding
the political question of the conclusion of an armistice (a proposal to this effect having been submitted by
Turkey at the beginning of November). From the military point of view, it was deemed absolutely
disadvantageous for Greece to conclude an armistice prior to the settlement of pending territorial issues
among the allied Balkan states, thereby giving Bulgaria the opportunity to turn undistracted its forces
against the Hellenic Army.
Furthermore, on the same day, the Ministry of the Army asked General Headquarters to report on whether
it was possible for Division II to be assigned to the Epirus theater of operations, for the quick liberation of
Ioannina.
On 12 November, the Crown Prince and Commander in Chief went to Monastir by rail to pay a visit to the
Crown Prince of Serbia. At the same time, General Headquarters in Florina reported to the Ministry of the
Army that Division II had been ordered to prepare for its transportation to Epirus, in spite of the dangers
which could be engendered by this movement, owing to the weakening of the forces in Macedonia.
In addition, General Headquarters, following a telegram from the ministry which informed it that the
garrison of Metsovo was being threatened by an attack by Turkish forces, ordered the Western
Macedonia Detachment, stationed then in the Neapolis-Grevena area, to rush immediately to Metsovo in
order to reinforce the garrison there.
106.
On returning to Florina from Monastir, on 13 November, the Commander in Chief reported to the
Ministry of the Army on the discussions he had with the Crown Prince of Serbia and on the latter's desire
that communication between the two allied headquarters be more frequent, for a better exchange of
information regarding the strength, the actions and, in general, the condition of the Turks in Korytsa. On
the following day the Commander in Chief departed for Thessalonica.
On 14 November, the liaison officer of the Serbian Army to General Headquarters delivered a document
by which Serbia made known that its army would not continue its operations further south of Monastir.
Serbia furthermore asked the Greek government to provide for the transportation of a large number of
Turkish prisoners from the area of the Albanian port of San Giovanni di Medua to Thessalonica, because
it was impossible to transport them to Serbia. The Greek government did not assent to this request.

No serious war operations took place during the period between 13-18 November, and the activities of the
army units were limited mainly to matters related to their redeployment and rehabilitation.
Division V, in Kozane, took measures for the incorporation of all elements in the area into its units, and
sent forward its 22nd Regiment to Grevena and the 23rd to Siatista.
On 16 November the 1st Cavalry Regiment moved from Kastoria to Biglishte, while the Western
Macedonia Detachment moved to Metsovo and the Redshirt Corps was placed under the orders of the
Army of Epirus.
In the meantime, all the information collected at General Headquarters from the 1st Cavalry Regiment
and other sources concerning Turkish forces in the area of Korytsa led to the conclusion that the greater
part of the forces had withdrawn towards Ioannina, while the rest were organizing themselves defensively
in the area of the village of Pljasha, northwest of Korytsa.
On the basis of this information, General Headquarters ordered, for a surveillance mission, the move
forward of one Infantry regiment of Division IV and one pack battery to the village of Vatochori. Following
this, Division IV formed a detachment from the 9th Infantry Regiment, which moved on the morning of 17
November through Antartiko village and arrived the following day at Vatochori, where it deployed after
linking up with the 1st Cavalry Regiment.
On 17 November, General Headquarters reported to the prime minister information received from a
trustworthy Greek notable at Monastir, according to which the Serbs had begun to withdraw their forces
from Monastir, and many Serb officers had declared that Monastir would be ceded eventually to Greece in
exchange for indemnities. In addition, General Headquarters reported that Bulgarian General
Khesapchiev (the representative of the Bulgarian Army at General Headquarters) had agreed on the
distribution of the areas to be occupied by the allies, through reciprocal concessions among themselves
and without the intervention of the Great Powers; furthermore it reported that the general did not agree
with the chauvinistic ideas of other Bulgarian military officers.
On 18 November, the Chief of Staff of General Headquarters submitted to the commander of the Army,
then in Thessalonica, by telegraph, the following assessment on the further conduct of the war. It was
proposed that a Field Army Section be established comprising Divisions III, V and VI and the 1st Cavalry
Regiment, in order to continue operations against the Turkish forces which remained in the area of
Korytsa, while the remaining divisions would assemble in Thessalonica so as to be available for a
possible expedition to the Gallipoli peninsula.
Florina, 18-XI-12,
to H.R.H. the Crown Prince, Thessalonica.
From the general war situation it arises that already the primary operation of the Hellenic Army ought to
be aimed toward the capture of the straits of the Hellespont. If this operation resolves itself successfully,
then enemy resistance before Constantinople can be shattered through the action of the fleet. Given that
the enemy can assemble approximately 30,000 troops on this peninsula, the operation against him must
be executed by larger forces, or at least equal ones; consequently, disembarkation must take place at
such a point and the action must be conducted in such a way as to enable the fleet to contribute through
its supporting fire for the entire duration. For example, disembarkation should take place at the
southwestern section of the peninsula, if technical reasons do not rule this out. In this case our operation
would be helped greatly by the Bulgarian Army operating toward Raidestos1 and the Bolayir pass, so as
to hold a part of the enemy forces far from the main effort of the Hellenic Army.
The forces that Greece can assign for the moment are the ones remaining from the army in Macedonia,
allowing for the subtraction of those that have to stay behind to face the enemy forces that have taken
refuge in Korytsa and Albania. If we launch an operation to destroy the latter, so as to free our own forces
now tied down by them, it will surely entail the commitment of too many forces for too much time, owing to
the mountainous terrain, adverse weather conditions and the low-scale warfare which the enemy will most
likely conduct, since it will be in a position to do so. This will render the operation against Gallipoli
impossible for a long period of time. Hence the decision of the entire war will not be possible within the
time expected. Furthermore, the forces assigned for the occupation of territory for political reasons, i.e. to
counter similar actions on the part of our allies, will have to be freed and remain available for the
operation against Gallipoli.
For this reason, and before everything else, the Government has to resolve the political issues dividing us
and the allies. Besides, the political solution must perforce precede the operation against Gallipoli, even if
forces were not absorbed in Macedonia for political purposes for the reasons explained above. Now, the

minimum number of forces that must at all events remain in Korytsa and Albania are Division VI, Division
III, Division V and the Cavalry Regiment, but mainly the two first divisions, because Division V, on account
of its establishment and morale, cannot be considered a primary factor of this Field Army Section, not
even for another operation; it will mainly be utilized to secure the left flank and the rear of the Army
Section from low-scale warfare operations. In conclusion, the forces of Divisions VI and III, that is about
15,000 rifles, 24 (pack) guns and 300 sabers, are sufficient against the enemy at Korytsa.
There remain for the operation against Gallipoli the following forces: Division I, Division IV, Division VII,
the Konstantinopoulos Detachment and the 3rd Cavalry Regiment, that is 25,000 rifles, 48 guns and 300
sabers. This force is evidently not adequate numerically. Furthermore, it is inappropriately provided with
artillery, for pack artillery is indispensable to the Gallipoli campaign. But pack artillery is also necessary for
the Field Army Section that is to operate against Korytsa. The conclusion is that the annihilation of the
enemy at Ioannina must precede the campaign against Gallipoli. Only then can a number of units be
added to the operation against Gallipoli: Division II, at least if its elements in the islands are withdrawn
from there; the Pack Artillery Battalion now in Epirus; and, considering the fact that after destruction of the
enemy in Ioannina the importance of the enemy troops in Korytsa will surely diminish, it will be possible to
assign also two Pack Artillery batteries from the total of six of the Field Army Section, i.e. those belonging
to Divisions III and VI. Moreover, if it could be certified by precise reconnaissance that the roads leading
from Florina and Kastoria to Biglishte would require only limited repairs so as to permit the use of Field
Artillery in this area too, then another four batteries can be added to the operation of Gallipoli, out of the
six mentioned above. Under these conditions the strength of the army against Gallipoli would consist of
32,000 rifles, at least twenty, or at the most twenty-eight, pack guns, and 300 sabers.
Therefore we must first wait until the operations in Epirus end. Meanwhile:
(1) We must form a Field Army Section out of Divisions VI, III and V, with two battalions of Pack Artillery,
and the Field Artillery of Divisions IV and V. (2) We must repair the roads from Kastoria and Florina to
Biglishte for Field Artillery use. (3) We must transport Division IV (without its artillery) to Thessalonica. (4)
We must reform and equip the army in Thessalonica for the Gallipoli operation. (5) We must make
preparations from the technical standpoint for a quick landing operation.
Study of the operation at the strategic level will begin from now on by the staff of the Army of Thessaly.
The political issues that divide us and our allies must also be resolved beginning now. If Your Royal
Highness approves this plan we request that you order its conveyance to the Prime Minister.
Chief of Staff Dangles
The commander of the Army, after studying and approving this evaluation, submitted it to the Ministry of
the Army; at the same time he ordered the quick relocation of General Headquarters to Thessalonica,
which was realized on 21 November. The relocation was ordered because operations west of Florina had
already been afforded secondary priority, in contrast to the situation in central Macedonia, where the
stance adopted by the Bulgarian Army necessitated the presence there of the Greek High Command.
The Operations in the Biglishte-Korytsa Area
(Sketch-maps 9 and 11)
107.
On 19 November, General Headquarters issued an order for the establishment of a Field Army
Section comprising Divisions III, V and VI and the 1st Cavalry Regiment, under the orders of the
commander of Division III, Major General Damianos. The Field Army Section's mission was to secure the
areas of Kastoria and Florina against every Turkish threat coming from the direction of Korytsa.
On the same day, General Headquarters declared the area of Korytsa under blockade and reported this
to the Ministry of the Army, submitting a request that the sea blockade be extended as far as Durazzo. At
the same time, the commander of the Serbian forces at Monastir, following a proposal from Greek
General Headquarters, ordered the interruption of all communication between that city and Korytsa.
In the period from 24 November to 28 November, Division IV was transported by rail to Thessalonica and
Division VI was relocated to Florina.
According to information regarding the strength of the Turkish Army in the area of Korytsa, there were
approximately 1,000 infantrymen with two guns at the Dardha pass, about another 1,000 infantrymen and
30 horsemen in the area of the village of Bradvitsa, three battalions with six guns in the area of the
villages of Pljasha, Zemblak and Tsangoni, as well as an Infantry force of unknown strength further north

at the village of Goloborda. In total, the strength of the Turkish Army from the Dardha pass as far as the
village of Goloborda, according to information from the Metropolitan of Kastoria, amounted to thirteen
Infantry battalions, all told.
On 23 November, the Turkish elements that were in the area of the villages of Tsangoni and Goloborda
moved their disposition forward up to the line formed by the villages of Piluri-Progeri, but on the following
day, 24 November, these forces retired to the village of Pljasha, where they established themselves. The
Serbs, in the meantime, taking advantage of the fifteen-day armistice which had been concluded between
themselves and the Turks (20 November-5 December), moved their forces forward from the north as far
as the village of Maliki, and in the entire area north of the river Devol, as far as the village of Progeri to the
east. On the night of the same day, a Turkish battalion moving from the village of Pljasha established itself
at the village of Khochishte.
On receiving the above information on 25 November, the Field Army Section ordered Division III to move
a battalion forward to the village of Ieropege, with two companies well forward, one at Kapestitsa and the
other at Biglishte. In addition, it ordered Division VI to establish a detachment composed of one Infantry
regiment and one pack battery, and to send it forward to the line formed by the villages of KrystallopegeMoschochori, relieving the detachment of the 9th Regiment of Division IV, which departed with its division
for Thessalonica.
Reconnaissance patrols sent by the 1st Cavalry Regiment on 26 and 27 November towards the village of
Progeri were hindered by the Serbs from advancing further north, on the pretext of the above-mentioned
armistice. In addition, other reconnaissance missions revealed that a Turkish force of about two battalions
had advanced from the Dardha pass to the line formed by the villages of Bozhigrad, Suli and Poloka.
108.
In the morning hours of 29 November, a Turkish force of approximately three battalions moved
offensively from the area of the villages of Tsangoni and Piluri towards Biglishte, while at the same time a
battalion was also moving towards the same village from the south, from the direction of the village of
Poloka. The 1st Cavalry Regiment and the two companies of the battalion belonging to Division III, which
had been sent forward to Biglishte and Kapestitsa, occupied suitable positions in time, so that they could
confront the Turkish attack. However, with the approach of the Turkish forces and the initial exchange of
fire, the Cavalry regiment, deeming its engagement in a decisive battle disadvantageous, began, at
around 1300, to fall back, delaying its opponent. The two-company Infantry force which was there did the
same, and was ordered to withdraw to the village of Ieropege. In the end, the 1st Cavalry Regiment
reached Vatochori and encamped there.
The regimental detachment of Division VI (Battalion I/18, the 9th Evzone Battalion and one pack battery)
moved from the village of Antartiko at 0800, and during the afternoon deployed in the area of the village of
Krystallopege in order to secure the pass of the same name.
The Field Army Section, on being informed of the situation, ordered Division VI to move, on the morning
of 30 November, from Florina to the village of Antartiko; Division III to assemble at the village of Ano
Leuke; Division V to assemble all of its available forces at Argos Orestiko.
109.
On the following day, 30 November, Field Army Section headquarters relocated from Kastoria to
the village of Ano Leuke.
At the same time, Division III also moved from Kastoria to Ano Leuke, from where it sent forward covering
forces to the line formed by the villages of Mesopotamia-Agia Kyriake.
Division VI moved forward to the area of the villages of Trigono and Antartiko, while its detachment
remained in its positions at Krystallopege and, by order of the Field Army Section, was attached to the 1st
Cavalry Regiment, which was at Vatochori.
Division V ordered all of its units which were located in the area of Grevena, Siatista and Neapolis (the
23rd Infantry Regiment, two Evzone battalions and one battalion of the 22nd Regiment) to assemble at
Argos Orestiko.
110.
On 1 December a Turkish force attacked the Greek troops at the Krystallopege pass, but was
successfully repelled and returned to its positions. On the same day, the Field Army Section ordered
Division VI to assemble at Vatochori and to reintegrate its detachment, which was at Krystallopege. In
addition, it issued an order according to which the units of Division V which had assembled at Argos
Orestiko would be reinforced with one pack battery and would establish a detachment under the
Division's Chief of Staff, Lieutenant Colonel (Eng) Ioannes Georgiades.

Division III remained in its positions, while Battalion II/10 relocated from Dendrochori to Ieropege.
111.
On the following day, 2 December, the enemy repeated its attack against the Krystallopege pass,
supported by fire from one battery. The attack continued fiercely until night, when the Turks were
definitively repelled and ceased their attacks. During the afternoon, the forces which were defending the
north side of the pass briefly showed signs of being shaken by effective artillery fire, lack of sleep, hunger,
thirst and cold. But by the personal intervention of the officer commanding the neighboring Evzone
battalion and the reinforcement of the front-line elements with one more company, order was quickly
restored.
In the meantime, on the same day, the units of Divisions III, V, and VI completed their assembly in the
areas, respectively, of the villages of Ano Leuke-Ieropege, Argos Orestiko and Vatochori-Krystallopege.
The Field Army Section reported to General Headquarters that it was ready to begin an attack against the
Turks on 4 December. Accordingly, General Headquarters sent an order to the Field Army Section
granting it complete freedom of action.
112.
During 3 and 4 December a redisposition of the Field Army Section was carried out, in order to
facilitate its attack aimed at forcing open the Biglishte pass. Also during that time various minor Turkish
attacks took place against the forward positions of Division VI. Specifically, in the afternoon of 3
December, the Field Army Section determined, by order, the following regarding the concentration and
further advance of its units:
- Division VI was to assemble at Krystallopege by the night hours of 4 December, and on the following
day advance, by way of the village of Vernik, towards the bridge spanning the river Devol, northwest of
Biglishte.
- The detachment of Division V was to move at the same time from Argos Orestiko to the village of
Ieropege, and on the following day to advance towards the direction of the villages of Kapestitsa-Biglishte.
- Division III was also to assemble during the same time at the village of Korphoula, and on the following
day to launch an attack towards the direction of the village of Poloka.
- The 1st Cavalry Regiment was to send reconnaissance patrols up to the line formed by the villages of
Bozhigrad-Poloka.
The movements of the units to their new positions took place on 4 December, as had been determined by
order of the Field Army Section; a partial modification of the disposition of the security elements of the 1st
Evzone Regiment also took place on that day. The Turks, taking the movement of the Greek troops to be
signs of a withdrawal, attacked them and managed, by the afternoon, to capture the Vernik height to the
north of the Krystallopege pass. The attack by the Turks continued with intensity, both against the central
and the southern heights of the pass; it was, however, successfully repelled by the Greek troops there.
For the following day, the 1st Cavalry Regiment was assigned the mission of securing the left flank of the
Field Army Section from any attack against it.
113.
The attack of the Field Army Section to force the Biglishte pass began on the following day, 5
December .
Division VI attacked in the morning with two regiments in the first echelon. The 18th Infantry Regiment
advanced on the right, in the direction of the villages of Moschochori-Vernik; its mission was to capture
the heights between the villages of Biglishte-Bitinka and outflank the Turkish left, in order to threaten their
rear.
The regiment's advance slowed, owing to the difficulty of the terrain. For this reason, the division
intervened and ordered the 1st Evzone Regiment (which was to advance frontally against the heights
south of the village of Vernik, soon after the 18th Regiment was committed to action) to begin its attack
immediately. At 0930 the 1st Evzone Regiment began its attack against the Turkish troops and by the
afternoon hours had succeeded in capturing its objectives and the villages of Biglishte and Bitinka. As a
consequence, the 18th Infantry Regiment, which was further north, accelerated its advance and captured,
at the same time, the heights north of the villages of Bitinka and Vernik.
The Detachment of Division V, beginning at 0700, moved in the direction of the villages of IeropegeKapestitsa. At around 0930 its advance guard came under fire from Turkish troops which occupied the
line of the villages of Vichotitsa-Kapestitsa. Following this, the detachment deployed, attacked the Turkish
positions, and succeeded in capturing the villages of Vichotitsa and Kapestitsa by midday. Afterwards the

detachment moved towards Biglishte and arrived at the bridge of the river Devol, where it captured 80
Turks. It could not, however, advance beyond the bridge, because of effective Turkish artillery fire.
The battle ended in the afternoon and the troops occupied themselves with regrouping and the
deployment of security elements.
Division III conducted operations towards the village of Poloka, which it captured during the night, after
having waged serious fighting on the line formed by the villages of Brachani-Kurila and further to the
south, in coordination with the 1st Cavalry Regiment. The division crossed the river Devol over three
makeshift bridges constructed by its Engineer Company.
The 1st Cavalry Regiment advanced from the village of Ponchara to the village of Bozhigrad, but this
action did not bear fruit because the regiment found itself confronting stronger Turkish forces and was
forced to fall back on the heights south of the village of Brachani. In the afternoon, fighting on foot, it
confronted a Turkish column moving towards the northeast, and then fell back on the village of Trestenik,
where it remained overnight.
The Field Army Section, informed of the movements of the Turks in the Bozhigrad-Ponchara sector,
ordered the 6th Infantry Regiment of Division III, along with a pack battery, to remain at the village of
Kurila, as a standing flank guard of the Field Army Section's left.
In addition, the Field Army Section reported to General Headquar-ters on the development of the attack
up to that time, as well as on its intention to continue against the defile of Tsangoni on the following day.
At the same time, in an operations order to its units, the Field Army Section determined the following:
Division VI, with the Detachment of Division V attached to it, was to attack in the direction of the villages
of Tsangoni-Zemblak. Division III (minus the 6th Infantry Regiment and one pack battery) was to advance
in the direction of the villages of Babani-Disnitsa, against the rear of the Turks who were defending the
Tsangoni defile. The 1st Cavalry Regiment would maintain contact with the Turkish troops on the line of
the villages of Ponchara-Bozhigrad, in close cooperation with the screening elements (6th Infantry
Regiment and pack battery) belonging to Division III, which were located to its right (north).
114.
On the basis of the above Field Army Section operations order, from the morning of 6 December
the divisions continued their offensive towards the Tsangoni defile with all their forces.
Division VI advanced along the carriage road toward Tsangoni-Korytsa, with the Detachment of Division
V, which had been attached to it, on its left (south) in the direction of the villages of Piluri-Pljasha, and with
a flank guard the size of battalion on its right (north) towards the village of Goloborda.
At around 0930 reconnaissance reported that a Serbian outpost had been positioned at the village of
Tren, while the Turks and their artillery occupied the heights south of the village of Tsangoni. The advance
guard of the division's main column crossed the river Devol over the bridge east of the village of Piluri
and, after a brief fight, overran enemy resistance there and moved swiftly towards the village of Tsangoni.
The flank guard, which was operating further north towards the village of Goloborda, reported at 1100 that
a Serbian element deployed at the village of Progeri hindered further movement. Following this, the flank
guard was ordered to move further south and integrate into the division's main column.
The main column of Division VI, after regrouping in the area of Tsangoni village, continued its advance
along the carriage road towards Korytsa. Upon reaching the village of Pljasha, the division's advance
guard came under heavy infantry and artillery fire from Turkish forces occupying the heights south of the
village. The division immediately deployed its forces and, without any delay, attacked the Turkish
positions. A brief engagement followed, during which the Turks offered only weak resistance and then
turned to flight towards Korytsa, pursued by the Greek troops. The division assembled at the village of
Pljasha that night, with advance elements at the village of Beliyorta. A letter from the commander of the
Turkish forces at Korytsa to the commander of the Serbian Army was found on a Turkish peasant, who
was arrested; in the letter the Turkish commander invited the Serbian commander to rush and capture
Korytsa, before the Hellenic Army entered it.
On the same day, the Detachment of Division V, which was operating in the mountainous direction of the
villages of Piluri-Pljasha, after overrunning a Turkish force of battalion size on the heights southwest of
the village of Piluri, continued its movement and, following a strenuous march, arrived at the village of
Pljasha during the night.
In the morning, Division III advanced in the direction of the villages of Babani-Disnitsa, after leaving the
6th Infantry Regiment with one pack battery to cover the left (south) flank of the Field Army Section, in
cooperation with the 1st Cavalry Regiment. At around 1400, the divisional Cavalry reported the presence
of Turkish troops between the villages of Disnitsa and Beliyorta and requested the intervention of the main

force of the advance guard to neutralize them. Despite the adverse terrain and weather conditions two
companies of the advance guard managed to deploy and to attack the Turkish troops which, after a brief
resistance, turned to flight; their further pursuit, however, was not possible.
The 1st Cavalry Regiment, which together with the 6th Infantry Regiment of Division III covered the left
flank of the Field Army Section, sent reconnaissance missions towards Bozhigrad and Suli and moved at
0800 from the village of Trestenik westward. From the reconnaissance, the regiment was informed that
the Turkish troops which were in the area of the village of Suli had withdrawn during the previous night to
the direction of the village of Dardha.
Around midday, the 1st Cavalry Regiment was notified by the 6th Regiment that, in accordance with oral
orders from the Field Army Section, if something extraordinary did not arise in its sector by 1300, the
Cavalry Regiment was to follow Division III and move towards the village of Disnitsa. The entire regiment
then turned north and at night arrived and encamped at the village of Gratsa. The 6th Infantry Regiment
moved at night as well and arrived at the village of Babani, where it spent the night.
115.
On the following day, 7 December, from 0600, the divisional Cavalry of Division III continued its
movement towards Korytsa, and upon arrival found the town to be empty of Turkish troops. This fact was
immediately reported to the Field Army Section, which ordered one battalion of Division III to enter and
occupy the city. The divisional Cavalry units of Division VI and of the Detachment of Division V, as well as
one company of the Cavalry Regiment that had been assigned to Division VI, were ordered to rush to
meet Division III's divisional Cavalry; all of them together were to make contact with the Turkish troops.
In the meantime, the divisional Cavalry of Division III continued its movement and at around 1000
reached the Turkish rear guard, between the villages of Drenova and Boboshnitsa.
The rest of the elements of Division III, in accordance with an order from the Field Army Section, entered
Korytsa, where they established themselves after sending forward a battalion as a covering section to the
west of the city. The 6th Infantry Regiment moved from the village of Babani in the morning and arrived at
the village of Disnitsa, where it encamped. In addition, the 1st Cavalry Regiment moved from the village
of Gratsa in the morning, by way of the carriage road toward Tsangoni, and arrived at Disnitsa at 0930,
where it also encamped.
116.
On 7 December at 1030, the Field Army Section ordered the Detachment of Division V, to which it
assigned the entire cavalry force, which was advancing ahead, and one Pack Artillery battery, to
immediately pursue the Turkish troops that were at the villages of Drenova and Boboshnitsa.
In the meantime the detachment, under its own initiative, moved beginning at 0730 from the village of
Pljasha towards Korytsa. Upon reaching the area of the village of Beliyorta, it seized three abandoned
Turkish guns and received the order from the Field Army Section to pursue the Turks who were
withdrawing. Following this, it moved quickly, by way of Korytsa, towards the village of Boboshnitsa,
where it was informed that three Turkish battalions, which had arrived from Dardha, had passed through
there in the morning and had headed towards the village of Dvoran. That night the detachment halted its
movement and spent the night at the villages of Drenova and Boboshnitsa, after previously deploying
screening forces of battalion size to the east of the village of Dvoran.
Division VI, by order of the Field Army Section, remained in its positions at the village of Pljasha, after
sending forward the 1st Evzone Regiment to the village of Nevichishte and one battalion of the 17th
Infantry Regiment to the village of Beliyorta.
Around midday of 7 December, the commander of the Field Army Section, Major General Konstantinos
Damianos, entered the city of Korytsa along with his staff and was received by the inhabitants in a
delirium of enthusiasm. The inhabitants of Korytsa gave a triumphant reception to all the Greek troops
who entered the city.
That night, the Field Army Section ordered the Detachment of Division V, in cooperation with the 1st
Cavalry Regiment, to resume, beginning on the morning of the following day, the pursuit of the Turks until
the capture of the defile of Qare.
117.
Following this, from 0730 on 8 December, the Detachment of Division V resumed its advance
towards the south, following the carriage road between the village of Dvoran and Qare pass.
Upon reaching the area in front of the pass, the leading elements of the advance guard came under
artillery fire, while at the same time, it was ascertained that the Turks occupied the pass in strength.

The detachment deployed immediately and attacked without delay in order to force the pass. The attack
took place from two directions, one frontal and one from the right (west) to envelop the left flank of the
Turks. Simultaneously, an Evzone battalion (the 4th Battalion) moved from the east, by way of the village
of Kamenitsa, in order to attack the rear of the Turkish positions.
The Turkish troops -evidently constituting the rear guard of the Turkish forces of the Korytsa area, which
were withdrawing because they were threatened with encirclement- abandoned their positions in time and
retreated southward, aiming to delay the Greek troops in new successive lines. They failed to achieve
their purpose, however, because of unceasing Greek pressure.
In the meantime, the 1st Cavalry Regiment also moved in the morning from the village of Disnitsa. It met
the Detachment of Division V at around 1200 and received an order to advance and take part in the
pursuit of the enemy that, until then, was being carried out only by the detachment's Cavalry company,
because the rest of its force had halted temporarily to regroup.
The 1st Cavalry Regiment's movement was quick, and despite the necessity to fight dismounted many
times, it managed to breach successive Turkish defenses and to pursue the Turks beyond the village of
Helmesi (Elmes) as far as the heights in front of the village of Qinami. There it halted the pursuit because
of darkness, and assembled at the village of Helmesi in order to spend the night.
The Detachment of Division V spent the night south of the village of Kamenitsa, except for the 4th Evzone
Battalion, which was moving on the left (east) of the detachment in order to attack the rear of the enemy;
the battalion arrived at night at the village of Helmesi and was attached to the 1st Cavalry Regiment.
Divisions III and VI remained in their positions.
118.
On the following day, 9 December, a company of the 1st Cavalry Regiment continued its advance
and entered the village of Qinami, but at night it fell back on the village of Helmesi. Thus the Turks
returned to their positions north of the village of Qinami. The remaining forces of the Field Army Section
remained in the same positions.
On the same day, General Headquarters, estimating the needs of future operations, ordered Division VI
and the 1st Cavalry Regiment to relocate to Florina and from there to be transported to Thessalonica by
rail, with the provision that Division VI would possibly be transferred to Epirus.
By another order on the following day, 10 December, General Headquarters informed the Field Army
Section that, following its successful advance and the expulsion of the Turks from the plateau of Korytsa,
the need for its existence had ceased. General Headquarters thereafter determined the redisposition of its
remaining divisions as follows: Division III would relocate from Korytsa to Florina, two days following the
departure of Division VI. Three battalions and one pack battery of the Detachment of Division V would
remain in Korytsa, while its 4th Battalion would return to Kastoria under Division V.
119.
On the basis of the above orders from General Headquarters, the Field Army Section, by its own
orders, determined the manner and other details of the movement. On 11 December the redisposition of
the units began. Thus the 1st Cavalry Regiment moved from the village of Helmesi and reached Korytsa;
the Detachment of Division V relocated to the village of Boboshnitsa; Division III remained in its positions,
while Division VI was placed in motion and that night reached the area between the villages of Biglishte
and Vatochori, where it spent the night.
On the same day (11 December) the Field Army Section reported to General Headquarters that the Turks
had withdrawn towards Ioannina, after leaving two battalions and one pack battery at the village of
Selenitsa (45 kilometers southwest of Korytsa).
120.
On the following day, 12 December, the Field Army Section, after receiving a General
Headquarters' order concerning the relocation of Division III to Florina, reported that it considered the
removal of that division from the area of Korytsa premature, especially following more recent information
that eight Turkish battalions remained at Erseka, in addition to the two battalions that were in the area of
the village of Selenitsa.
General Headquarters gave its approval for Division III and the Detachment of Division V to remain in the
area of Korytsa, and reported this to the Ministry of the Army.
Division VI moved again on the morning of 12 December, and on the following day, 13 December,
reached Florina. From 14 to 20 December this division was transported to Thessalonica by rail.
The 1st Cavalry Regiment also arrived at Florina on 14 December and two days later was also
transported by rail to Thessalonica.

121.
In the meantime, from 14 December the Field Army Section ceased to exist. According to its final
order, the Field Army Section determined that of the units of the Detachment of Division V, the two
Evzone battalions, Battalion II/22 and the divisional Cavalry would remain at Korytsa attached to Division
III, while the 23rd Infantry Regiment would relocate to Siatista, reverting to the command of Division V.
On 14 December at 1630, Division III issued an order to its units to deploy in the area of Korytsa, as
follows: the 10th Infantry Regiment, with one pack battery and the divisional Cavalry, would relocate to the
village of Helmesi and would assume the outposts. The 6th Infantry Regiment would remain in Korytsa
with one of its battalions at the villages of Boboshnitsa and Dvoran. The 12th Infantry Regiment would
also remain in Korytsa with one of its battalions at Moschopolis and one at outposts on the line formed by
the villages of Ravonik-Turan-Bulgarech. The Detachment of Division V was to leave one battalion at the
village of Drenova and with the rest of its force was to relocate to Korytsa.
Pack Artillery Battalion I with one of its batteries was to relocate to Korytsa, while it was to leave one
battery in each of the villages of Helmesi and Boboshnitsa.
During the period from 14 to 18 December, all the necessary movements and deployment of the units in
their new positions had taken place, according to division's orders.
On 2 January, by order of General Headquarters, the Detachment of Division V moved towards Kozane in
order to link up with its division. Thus, only Division III remained at Korytsa. This division, issuing fresh
orders, established three Infantry regimental detachments with one battery apiece. They were echeloned
in depth from Korytsa as far as the village of Helmesi, their mission being to secure the plateau of Korytsa
from the south and the west.

CHAPTER 4
The Military Operations of the Other Balkan Allies
Against the Turks.
The Operations of the Serbs
(Sketch-map 1)
122.
The Serbian Army conducted its main operations in southern Serbia and operations of a
secondary nature further north in the area of Novi Pazar and in Albania.
In southern Serbia the Serbian Army conducted operations with the 1st and 2nd Armies against the
Turkish Army, which was assembled in the Skopje-Kumanovo area. The 1st Army attacked frontally and
the 2nd against the right flank (east) of the enemy. Simultaneously, the 3rd Army advanced to the Kosovo
plateau and after driving back the Turkish forces there, turned towards the east, in order to attack the left
(west) of the Turks in the area of Skopje.
The Serbian Army's advance, however, came up against serious difficulties, because the Turks had
already occupied all the passes which led towards southern Serbia with significant forces. There they put
up a stubborn resistance.
123.
The initial plan of the Turks provided for the following: concentration of the main bulk of their army
(the 7th Army with the V, VI, and VII Army Corps) south of Kumanovo; organization of a defensive position
in this area; securing with strong screening forces all passes leading to southern Serbia. Simultaneously,
the protection of the Turks' left flank was planned for by moving a group of divisions forward towards
Prishtina. Protection of their right flank was provided for by the movement of an army corps forward to the
area of Radovishte.
On 8 October the Turkish Army following new orders assumed immediately an attack against the Central
(1st) Serbian Army, with the aim of isolating it before it could link up with the 2nd and 3rd Armies, which
were operating on its flanks. Thus, on 9 October, the opposing armies were advancing frontally towards
one another.

On 10 October the Turks were the first to begin the attack, with the VI and VII Army Corps, which had
arrived at Kumanovo. In the ensuing battle the Serbs managed to repel the Turkish attack and, in the
afternoon hours of 11 October, to counterattack with their 1st Army and push back the Turkish forces
towards the line formed by Skopje-Veles-Ishtib. Despite the fact that the Serbs did not exploit their
success in depth, the Turks abandoned this line and withdrew in complete disorder towards the
southwest. Following the rapid development of events in favor of the Serbs, the latter advanced their
forces and on 13 October captured Skopje, Veles and Ishtib, without meeting any resistance.
The 3rd Serbian Army could not take part in the battle of Kumanovo, because its advance was delayed
considerably by serious Turkish resistance on the Kosovo plateau.
The 2nd Serbian Army, on the other hand, assisted the 1st Army's operations only indirectly -by posing a
threat and not through direct action- because its movement had slowed significantly; on 10 October it had
only reached the area directly south of Kriva Palanka.
124.
Following its defeat at Kumanovo, the Turkish Army withdrew to the Perlepe-Monastir plateau,
where many Turkish fleeing troops had gathered. There, however, the army found itself completely
isolated, because on 14 October the Bulgarian Army captured Babaeski in eastern Thrace and on 17
October the Hellenic Army captured Beroea, thus severing all communication of the Turks with
Constantinople and Thessalonica.
The Turkish commander in Chief Zeki Pasha decided then to organize his forces and put up strenuous
resistance on the Perlepe plateau. The terrain of this mountainous area lends itself to defense and,
moreover, covers Monastir from the north as well as the valley of the river Erigon, from which important
axes originate for operations towards central Albania and Epirus.
Following this decision, Zeki Pasha assembled the bulk of his forces (V and VII Army Corps) and
deployed defensively on the heights north of Perlepe with the aim of interdicting the main pass on Babuna
mountain, through which the road from Veles to Monastir runs. Additionally, he took solid measures to
cover the remaining mountain passes on Babuna towards the north and the east, as well as towards
Kichevo. The VIth Turkish Army Corps assembled at Monastir.
The Serbian Army undertook further operations against the Turks with the 1st Army alone, because after
Kachanik the bulk of the 3rd Army turned towards Prizren and from there towards Albania, while the 2nd
Army turned towards Kstendil and then moved to reinforce the Bulgarian Army, which was acting in
eastern Thrace towards Adrianople.
The advance of the 1st Serbian Army took place in three columns (left, center and right). The first two
columns (left and center) moved quickly and on 20 October attacked the Turkish forces north of Perlepe.
The ensuing battle lasted until 24 October and ended in a resounding victory for the Serbs, forcing the
Turks to withdraw in disorder towards Monastir. The right column of the 1st Serbian Army, which was
moving in the direction of Skopje-Kichevo, could not take part in the battle, owing to a considerable delay
brought about by strong Turkish forces at Kichevo.
125.
The Turkish Army, which withdrew towards Monastir, organized a defensive area directly north of
the city, with a front approximately 30 kilometers in length, which anchored its right (east) at the marshes
of the Erigon river and its left (west) at the mountainous mass of Plakenska, to the northwest of Monastir.
The Serbian Army, after assembling at the Perlepe plateau and completing its resupply, continued its
advance towards the south on 1 November. The battle of Monastir ensued (1-5 November), during which
the Turkish forces were defeated and were forced to surrender, on the afternoon of 5 November.
Nevertheless, a large part of the Turkish forces managed to escape and withdraw towards Korytsa and
Ioannina.
126.
The operations of the Serbs further north, against the dispersed and weak Turkish garrisons
there, were assumed by the 3rd and 4th Armies in cooperation with the army of Montenegro. These
operations resulted in the successive capture, from 10-24 October, of the cities of Novi Pazar, Prizren,
Pech, and Diakova, and from 3-5 November 1912, of the cities of San Giovanni di Medua and Alessio on
Albania's Adriatic coast.
Afterwards, the two Serbian armies turned towards the south and the interior of Albania, capturing
Durazzo, Tirana and Elbasan from 15 to 18 November 1912; in March 1913 they advanced as far as
Valona and Berat, where they halted their further movement because of the Greek advance in North
Epirus.

In the meantime, from December 1912 the Serbs, having essentially neutralized Turkish resistance
against them, allocated significant forces for the reinforcement of the Montenegrins, who were laying
siege to Scutari (Skodra), and for reinforcement of the Bulgarians, who were laying siege to Adrianople.
The Operations of the Montenegrins
(Sketch-map 1)
127.
The Army of Montenegro conducted its main operations against the well defended city of Scutari
and secondary ones in the area of Novi Pazar and further south, in cooperation with 4th Serbian Army.
The advance against Scutari began at the end of September 1912 with two columns, one (North)
approaching from the northwest and one (South) from the south. Their aim was to encircle and capture
the naturally fortified, ideally located, formidable fort of Tarabosh mountain, which covered the city of
Scutari. The fate of that city depended on possession of the fort.
The South column managed to reach Tarabosh Fort without great difficulty, unlike the North column,
which met with numerous and strong successive lines of resistance at Turkish fortifications.
Consequently, the latter's movement was very slow. The complete encirclement of Tarabosh Fort was
achieved in mid-October, but it was not enough to force the commander of the Turks, Hasan Riza Pasha,
to abandon further resistance.
The siege of Tarabosh continued until the beginning of January 1913, when the Montenegrins were
reinforced by Serbian forces. On 25-26 January they undertook a general offensive in the entire region of
the fortified city of Scutari. The result of this attack was that many of the Turkish forts were captured, but
not Tarabosh; the siege of that fort continued.
Scutari was finally surrendered to the Montenegrins on 9 April 1913, following a proposal by the Turkish
commander of the city, Esat Pasha.1 Esat Pasha had replaced Hasan Riza Pasha after the latter was
assassinated in February 1913, in Tarabosh Fort.
The operations of the Montenegrins in the area of Novi Pazar took place in close cooperation with the 4th
Serbian Army and were of a conventional nature, lacking cohesion and a specific objective. The city of
Novi Pazar was finally captured by the Serbs on 10 October, 1912.
The Operations of the Bulgarians
(Sketch-map 1)
128.
The Bulgarian Army conducted operations against the Turks on three fronts, with nine divisions
assigned to eastern Thrace, one division (2nd) to western Thrace and one division (7th) to Macedonia.
On the eastern Thrace front, the Bulgarians' intent was to pin down the Turks along the Adrianople-Kirk
Kilisse (Saranta Ekklesies) front and to turn the Turkish position from the east from the mountain chain of
Strandzha.
For this purpose they distributed their forces into three armies, which conducted operations as follows:
The 2nd Army, under General Ivanov, invaded eastern Thrace on 5 October and advanced towards
Adrianople through the valleys of the rivers Hebrus (Maritza) and Tundzha. The 3rd Army, under General
Dimitriev, crossed the border on 8 October and attacked towards Kirk Kilisse (Saranta Ekklesies). The 1st
Army, under General Kundichev, interposed between the two other field armies, attacked the center of the
Adrianople-Kirk Kilisse front.
The Turkish Army in eastern Thrace intended at first to vigorously defend the position at Kirk Kilisse.
However, on the night of 8-9 October it was ordered to undertake an attack with the objective of
enveloping the left (eastern) flank of the Bulgarians.
Lack of information regarding the march of the Bulgarian forces from the east, and the Turkish view that
the Strandzha mountain chain did not lend itself to a Bulgarian advance, resulted in a significant defeat of
the Turkish forces during the battle which ensued on 9-11 October. After their defeat, the Turks were
forced to evacuate the position of Kirk Kilisse, cut off all contact with their forces in the fortified city of
Adrianople and withdraw, in a state of confusion, to a new line at Lleburgaz.
Kirk Kilisse (Saranta Ekklesies) was the second most strongly fortified Turkish city in Thrace after
Adrianople, and its capture by the Bulgarians was of particular importance to the entire course of the
operations.

After their victory, the Bulgarians temporarily halted their advance in order to regroup and resupply, and
consequently lost contact briefly with the withdrawing Turkish forces. However, immediately after
completing the necessary preparations and being informed of the Turks' new line of defense, they
continued their offensive movement with the 1st and 3rd Armies against the new Turkish line at Lleburgaz,
and with the 2nd Army against Adrianople.
The 3rd Army attacked frontally, while the 1st moved to make contact with the left (west) wing of the
Turkish disposition. During the battle of Lleburgaz on 16-20 October, the Turks put up a strong resistance,
particularly on their right (east), where they had concentrated their reserves. With the breakup of the
center, however, and the envelopment of their left, they were forced to withdraw, after losing some 30,000
men and many guns.
The withdrawal of the center and the left of the Turkish disposition took place in great disorder, while the
right retained its relative cohesion.
The Bulgarians, who had sustained serious casualties as well (about 15,000 men), were not in a position
to pursue the Turkish forces. Thus the Turkish Army withdrew unhindered and on 30 October arrived and
deployed at the atalca Line, a network of old fortifications dating from the Russo-Turkish war of 1878,
which covered Constantinople from the west. At this position the Turks regrouped their forces, reinforced
them with new troops from the interior, and organized the defense of the area, which was covered on its
two sides by the Turkish Fleet of the Black Sea and the Fleet of the Sea of Marmara.
From 25 October, the Bulgarians resumed their advance in the direction of Strandzha and orlu, but were
delayed by rain and the condition of the roads. It was not until 4 November that they made contact with
the new defense position of the Turks. On the night of 4-5 November and during the day of 5 November,
the Bulgarians launched a series of fierce attacks against the Turkish positions; the attacks were repelled,
however, with serious casualties (approximately 10,000 Bulgarians out of action). This the Bulgarians
were thus forced to interrupt their attacks and from 9 November began to withdraw their forces, which
they assembled in the area of Lleburgaz-Kirk Kilisse. The Turks did not pursue the Bulgarians, but
reinforced their defensive position even further.
129.
On 20 November, following a proposal by Turkey, a fifteen-day armistice was signed at Baheky in
atalca, by plenipotentiaries of Turkey and Bulgaria; it was also accepted by Serbia and Montenegro.
According to the terms of the armistice, the opposing armies would remain in the positions they occupied.
Following the signing of the armistice, delegations of all the belligerent states opened negotiations in
London for the conclusion of a permanent peace. Because of Turkish intransigence, however, the talks
were interrupted on 24 December without any agreement having been achieved. Consequently, military
operations were resumed.
On 28 January 1913, the Turks launched a large-scale attack from the direction of Gallipoli and further
north; it was successfully repelled by the Bulgarian forces there, who suffered many casualties.
In mid-February, the Turks resumed their offensive efforts from the direction of atalca, but because of
adverse weather conditions they were soon forced to suspend further operations and return to their
positions.
130.
The 2nd Bulgarian Army, which was operating against Adrianople, did not succeed in capturing
the city, but it did manage to tie down the Turkish forces there and, from the end of October, to encircle
them. In the meantime, it was reinforced with troops of the 2nd Serbian Army and assumed the regular
siege of the city.
In mid-February 1913, the forces which were laying siege to Adrianople were reinforced significantly with
Bulgarian forces from the area of atalca, as well as with fresh Serbian forces which were supported by a
large number of heavy artillery guns. There followed a general attack which lasted many days and
resulted in the fall of Adrianople on 13 March 1913.
131.
On the western Thrace front, the 2nd Bulgarian Division waged fierce fights from 7-15 October
1912, and succeeded in capturing the upper valley of the river Ardas. A Turkish counterattack followed,
which lasted until 25 October but yielded no result. After this, the Turkish forces attempted to withdraw
towards the east, but on 14 November they came under strong Bulgarian attack at Harmanli and were
forced to surrender.
In the meantime, troops of the 2nd Bulgarian Division moved towards the south as well, extending their
occupation to the Greek cities of Komotene and Xanthe, where there were but few Turkish forces.

132.
On the Macedonian front the 7th Bulgarian Division, under General Todorov, advanced, on the
outbreak of hostilities, from the area of Kstendil towards the south; at Simitli it found itself faced with
superior Turkish forces and was forced to withdraw.
Following the victorious advance of the Hellenic Army towards the north, however, the Turks, from 13
October, withdrew the greater part of their forces confronting the 7th Bulgarian Division. This was done in
order to reinforce the Turkish Army under Hasan Tahsin Pasha, who was attempting to check the Greek
advance. The Turkish troops' withdrawal allowed the Bulgarians to resume their advance southwards and
to capture Siderokastro, Serres and Drama, without encountering serious Turkish resistance.
On the morning of 26 October, the 7th Bulgarian Division crossed the bridge over the Strymon river near
the village of Strymoniko and moved quickly towards Thessalonica, which had already been captured by
the Hellenic Army. Thus, the Bulgarians were forced to halt their march and not enter the city which had
been their objective all along.
CHAPTER 5
Measures for the Broader Covering of Thessalonica
The Liberation of Chalcidice and the Hinterland of Thessalonica
(Sketch-map 12)
133.
While the Army of Thessaly was crossing the Greco-Turkish border on 5 October 1912 and was
dashing towards Macedonia, on the same day Volunteer Scout bands were disembarking in Chalcidice, at
the Gulf of Ierissos. These bands, after establishing the first bases, began to penetrate into the interior in
the direction of Arnaia, driving out the small Turkish garrisons or gendarmerie forces there and putting
Greek local authorities in place.
Thus, by 10 October, almost the whole of the province of Arnaia had been liberated. On the following day
(11 October), a Volunteer Scout band crossed Cholomontas mountain and reached the village of
Taxiarches, where it was informed that significant Turkish forces were heading from Polygyros and
Thessalonica towards Arnaia. Upon this, the Volunteer Scouts halted their movement and captured the
passes at Cholomontas, in order to interdict any further movement of the Turks.
Indeed, in the afternoon hours of 13 October, a strong Turkish detachment coming from Polygyros
attacked the Greek positions and attempted to force a passage towards the east. A fierce, five-hour battle
ensued, and despite the strong pressure exerted upon the Volunteer Scout bands, they managed to retain
their positions and inflict heavy casualties upon the Turkish troops. As a result, the Turks withdrew
towards Polygyros.
The other Turkish detachment, moving from Thessalonica, reached the village of Agios Prodromos; it did
not, however, link up with the Turkish garrison at Polygyros, because in the meantime the Scouts had
moved forward to the village of Palaiokastro and cut off communications.
After gathering the necessary information regarding the Turkish forces that were in the village of Agios
Prodromos, the Scouts attacked them on 22 October. After a fierce fight, which lasted almost the entire
day, the Scout bands succeeded in overcoming Turkish resistance and took ten Turks prisoner. Defeated,
the Turkish detachment abandoned the village of Agios Prodromos and withdrew towards the north.
The victory of the Volunteer Scout bands at Agios Prodromos forced the Turkish garrison at Polygyros to
evacuate the city on 23 October and to withdraw to Thessalonica. The Scouts entered Polygyros on the
same day, and the next day began to advance further north. On 26 October they reached the lake of
Langadas, where they linked up the next morning with reconnaissance patrols of the Cavalry Brigade,
which informed them of the liberation of Thessalonica by the Hellenic Army.
At about the same time, a Volunteer Scout band moved on 11 October towards Nigrita and deployed at
Vertiskos mountain; from there, through offensive actions, it seriously impeded the communications of the
Turks between Thessalonica, Nigrita, and Serres. On 22 October, the Scouts attacked a Turkish
detachment near Nigrita, dispersed it, and entered the city, establishing Greek authority there. The
following day the band continued the pursuit of the Turkish detachment towards the village of Strymoniko,
and by night managed to reach it, capture the bridge over the Strymon river -at this point intact- and link
up with the Bulgarian 7th Division, which was moving from Siderokastro towards the south. By 24
October, the entire region of Nigrita had been liberated by the Volunteer Scouts.

During the same time, another Volunteer Scout band crossed Kerdylion mountain and reached the village
of Myrkinos, where, on 12 October, it clashed with a Turkish detachment, dispersed it, and took twenty
men prisoner. This event had serious repercussions on the morale of the Turkish inhabitants of the area:
they hastened to declare their submission and surrender their arms. By 17 October, the entire area of
Pangaeum mountain, from the river of Angites to Amphipolis, was liberated; on 23 October the Volunteer
Scout band linked up with the Bulgarian forces at the village of Nea Zichne and reciprocal support was
agreed upon. On 27 October the Volunteer Scout band entered Eleutheroupolis, after having received a
letter from its Metropolitan. There the Scouts established Greek authority and disarmed the Turkish
inhabitants of the area.
Thus, on the day that the Hellenic Army was victoriously entering Thessalonica, the entire area to its east,
as far as Eleutheroupolis, was liberated and administered by Greek authorities, thanks to the vigorous
activities of the Volunteer Scouts.
134.
General Headquarters, in the meantime, after receiving relevant information and instructions from
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, began, on the day after the liberation of Thessalonica, to take intense
measures to move its forces forward further to the north. This was necessary in order to secure the
territories which had been liberated up to that time, especially the city of Thessalonica. Thus on 27
October it ordered the Cavalry Brigade at Langadas to dispatch one of its regiments toward Serres, where
it was to establish itself. The brigade assigned this mission to the 3rd Cavalry Regiment, which arrived at
Serres on 31 October but found the city already occupied by the 7th Bulgarian Division. The regiment
then established itself at surrounding villages.
In addition on 29 October, following the decision to turn the bulk of the army towards western Macedonia,
General Headquarters ordered the establishment of a Field Army Section of Thessalonica, comprising
Divisions II and VII, the Konstantinopoulos Evzone Detachment and the 3rd Cavalry Regiment, under the
commander of Division II, Major General Konstantinos Kallares; he was ordered to move a battalion
forward to Polygyros and another battalion to the north of Thessalonica as far as Kerkine mountain. The
Konstantinopoulos Evzone Detachment was ordered to capture and secure the area of Gevgelije.
135.
On the basis of the instructions from General Headquarters, the commander of the Field Army
Section of Thessalonica, on the morning of 30 October, ordered Division II to dispatch a battalion of the
3rd Infantry Regiment to Xylopolis; the rest of the division was ordered to move the same day from the
area of the village of Drymos and establish itself in Thessalonica. In addition, he ordered Division VII to
dispatch the Cretan Battalion to Polygyros and the Konstantinopoulos Evzone Detachment to take up
positions at Gevgelije.
The battalion dispatched by Division II reached Xylopolis on 31 October, and on the following day it
moved one of its companies forward to the village of Strymoniko to secure the bridge of the same name
on the river Strymon. The Cretan Battalion of Division VII moved on the morning of 31 October, and after
a three-day march arrived at Polygyros, Chalcidice, and took up its new position.
During the afternoon of 1 November, the Konstantinopoulos Evzone Detachment departed by rail for
Polykastro, where it remained overnight. From there on the following day it moved by road, and after a
seven-hour march arrived at Gevgelije, where it found a Serbian cavalry element already encamped. With
Gevgelije as its base, the Detachment dispatched elements to the villages of the area and sent one
company to occupy Strumitza. The company withdrew from there a short time later on an order from
General Headquarters1.
Beginning on 1 November, following the departure of General Headquarters for western Macedonia,
Prince Nicholas took over as military commander of Thessalonica. He was assigned the supreme
supervision and direction of the administration, including public security and order, of the city and the
surrounding area.
On 1 November, the Field Army Section of Thessalonica, following a General Headquarters order,
assigned Division VII to dispatch, by steamship, a battalion to secure the Holy Mountain of Athos. The
20th Infantry Regiment, which was composed of only one battalion, was assigned this mission.
Information indicated, however, that a battalion of the Bulgarian Army was moving towards this area and it
was doubtful whether the 20th Regiment could catch up to it in time. For that reason, the Ministry of the
Army was asked to order the fleet to land one of its detachments as quickly as possible at the Athos
peninsula.

The proposal was approved immediately, and on the morning of 2 November, by order of the Admiral of
the Fleet, the destroyer Thyella landed forty marines at the small port of Daphne, in Athos; they moved
quickly towards Karyes, the capital of the monastic community of Athos. A short time later, the battleship
Averoff, the flagship of the Aegean Sea Fleet, sailed into the area, escorted by the destroyers Ierax and
Panther, and landed another force of about two hundred marines. Their mission was to secure the Athos
peninsula. That night all of the warships sailed for Lemnos.
On the same day the battalion of the 20th Infantry Regiment and the regiment's command embarked on
the steamship Aiolis in Thessalonica harbor, and shortly before midnight arrived and disembarked at
Daphne, except for one company which disembarked in the area of Ierissos.
On 3 November, by order of the Ministry of the Navy, the admiral of the Aegean Sea Fleet recalled the
landing detachment from the Athos peninsula, whereupon the 20th Regiment assumed control of the
entire area.
136.
While these events were taking place, the Bulgarian 7th Division, which was acting in Macedonia,
having failed to arrive in time to capture Thessalonica, attempted to extend its occupation to as many
Hellenic areas as possible. The Bulgarians attempted this without taking allied obligations into
consideration, or the general interests of the common struggle against Turkey.
On 7 November, the military commander of Thessalonica reported to General Headquarters that,
according to information that had reached him, a Bulgarian regiment was moving to capture the
Giannitsa-Edessa region.
General Headquarters informed the Government of the matter, at the same time submitting a request that
the Government see to it that differences with Bulgaria be settled quickly, so similar friction could be
avoided in the future. In response, the prime minister gave an order that the military forces at Giannitsa
and Edessa be reinforced and that a complete Greek civil administration be organized in those cities. At
the same time, he informed General Headquarters that the negotiations with the Allies were proceeding at
a slow pace and that Bulgaria had not as yet expressed its claims officially.
In executing the above orders, General Headquarters on 9 November ordered Division I to dispatch a
battalion to Edessa and one to Giannitsa and to reinforce its two-company force at Aridaia with the rest of
the strength of the battalion from which the two-company force had been dispatched. Simultaneously, it
asked of the Government's representative in Thessalonica to arrange the complete organization of the
civil authorities at Giannitsa, Edessa and Aridaia.
The movement of the aforementioned units to their new posts and their positioning there took place on
the following day, 10 November.
Thus the attempt of the Bulgarians to establish themselves in already liberated Hellenic territories failed; it
did, however, force the Hellenic Army to strengthen its garrisons in the areas of Giannitsa, Edessa,
Aridaia, and Chalcidice. At the same time, the actions of the Bulgarians became a cause of repeated
friction among the allied armies. At first the friction was limited in extent and importance, but later it
increased in gravity, with the result that allied ties gradually began to loosen significantly.
The Restoration of Law and Order in Thessalonica
137.
During the first days after the liberation of Thessalonica, the security and order situation in the
area, especially within the city, was not at all satisfactory.
Despite the explicit provision in the protocol of surrender that the Turkish Army assemble at
predetermined points in the city and be disarmed, many Turkish soldiers wandered about the streets
unrestrained, starving and in tatters; some were armed, a fact that generated many problems for the
population and the new Greek authorities.
In addition, the large number of Turkish refugees from the surrounding villages who gathered in
Thessalonica constituted another serious cause of disorder. The Bulgarian troops that entered
Thessalonica after receiving permission from General Headquarters to quarter there, intentionally created
similar problems and fomented disorder. Their aim was to give the Western powers the impression that
Greece was unable to enforce a state of law in the areas liberated by the Hellenic Army, and was
incapable of governing a large city like Thessalonica.

138.
In response, the Greek government strengthened the force of approximately 300 Cretan
gendarmes, who had originally been allocated to enforce order in the city, with new forces from the
interior of the country. In addition, the authorities in Thessalonica actively took to rounding up Turkish
prisoners and transporting them to Greek territory behind the liberated areas. This was done to ease
congestion in the city, an additional cause of the serious provisioning and encamping difficulties which
had been created. In addition, the Greek authorities took measures against a significant number of
members of the Young Turk organization, who were preparing a coup in Thessalonica, and against the
Turkish press, which through a number of provocative articles was attempting to inflame the population.
The departure of the 7th Bulgarian Division at the beginning of November to reinforce the theater of
operations of eastern Thrace (where the development of operations was presenting serious difficulties for
the Bulgarian Army), helped to consolidate law and order in Thessalonica and its environs.
The transport of the Bulgarian division to Alexandroupolis was accomplished by means of trains and ships
provided by Greece, at the request of Bulgaria, and was completed on 15 November. One brigade, under
General Andreev, remained in Thessalonica and the surrounding area.
139.
It was at this time that General Headquarters ordered the liberation of the islands of the Aegean
Sea. To that end, a regimental Infantry force belonging to Division II was ordered to embark on ships
departing from Thessalonica on 9 November. In addition, on 15 November Division I returned to
Thessalonica from the area of Florina, but its quartering presented serious difficulties owing to the scarcity
of suitable buildings.
On 16 and 17 November the rest of Division II embarked on ships and departed for Epirus, after first
gathering its outlying elements, which were relieved by units of Division VII.
The Conclusion of an Armistice
140.
At the beginning of November 1912 Turkey, following adverse developments in its operations on
all fronts, requested from the Balkan Allies that an armistice be concluded.
On 15 November, Bulgarian plenipotentiaries, who also represented the governments of Serbia and
Montenegro, met at atalca with Ottoman representatives and exchanged ideas on the manner in which
the negotiations would be conducted. That night, the Hellenic delegation arrived at atalca; it consisted of
the Greek ambassador and the military attach from the embassy at Sofia.
On 16 November, the meeting among all the representatives of the belligerent states took place. The
plenipotentiaries of Turkey rejected the conditions put forward by the Balkan Allies and announced their
counterproposals. The Greek prime minister, who was informed of the matter, immediately communicated
with the commander of the Army in Thessalonica and expressed to him the reasons why Greece should
not accept the counterproposals of the Turks. At the same time, he asked to have his opinion on the
matter, as well as the opinion of the King, who was in Thessalonica. The commander of the Army,
following a consultation with the King on the issue, reported to the prime minister that both were in
agreement with the positions of the Government and added the opinion that Ioannina had to be
surrendered to the Greeks on the conclusion of the armistice. Turkey's counterproposals and the Greek
positions appear in the following telegraphic consultation, sent from the prime minister to the commander
of the Army in Thessalonica:
Telegraphic consultation between Venizelos and the Crown Prince on 17 November 1912, 5:15 p.m:
Venizelos: Today the first cable from Mr. Panas, who arrived at Kavdiky on Thursday evening, was
received. According to Mr. Panas, Turkey, considering that the terms of the armistice put forward by the
Bulgarians, representing the Allies, are unacceptable, counter-proposed the following: A truce should be
concluded during the peace negotiations. If negotiations fail, hostilities cannot begin until after a 48-hour
period has elapsed, following the notification by one of the belligerents. The troops are to maintain their
positions. The Greek government should lift its blockade of the Adriatic Sea coast and the Turkish
government its blockade of the Black Sea littoral. During the truce Turkey should be entitled to provision
the forts of Adrianople, Ioannina and Scutari, as well as the local garrisons, and its supply convoys should
be given access to pass through the lines of the allied forces, the latter being responsible for their safe
passage. As regards the terms that we have proposed, Mr. Panas says that the one concerning the return
of our confiscated ships, and free passage of those that had been blocked in the Black Sea, is conceded.
As regards the continuation of the blockade of the coasts of Epirus and Albania and the right of inspection
of ships that we are enforcing, the Bulgarian plenipotentiaries seem willing, in exchange for this, to waive
their demand that Turkey lift its blockade of the Black Sea littoral. Mr. Panas adds that the Bulgarians,

who are exhausted and are suffering from cholera and consider the atalca line strong, do not want to risk
a new battle which could have an unfortunate outcome for them. For this reason they are determined to
sign an armistice accepting the Turkish terms with minor modifications of secondary importance. Mr.
Panas adds that this weakness of the Bulgarians, having come to the attention of the Turks, could have
results that are not at all satisfactory for the peace terms proposed by the Allies. This is Mr. Panas' cable;
he has asked for directions for the new meeting scheduled tomorrow afternoon. The Cabinet believes that
we should not accept the Turkish terms under any conditions. The acceptance of these terms will
constitute, in and of itself, a defeat for the Allies, with harmful consequences. Even if the Bulgarian Army
is too exhausted to carry out an attack against atalca, we believe that the four Allies, cooperating in
earnest, have at their disposal adequate forces to enforce the terms of peace on Turkey. According to
Ambassador Bojkovich, Serbia having no enemy forces confronting it, is in a position to provide at least
50,000 more troops for the Thracian theater of operations. If we agree with the Bulgarians to end our
common occupation of many of the captured areas and limit our occupation to the areas which each of us
first conquered, reserving all rights as regards the distribution of these areas, they will be in a position to
send 15,000 additional troops from Macedonia to Thrace, not including those already sent to Dedeaga*.
We, for our part, would be able to assign no more than three divisions to seize Gallipoli. The capture of
Gallipoli will allow the entrance of our fleet to the Sea of Marmara and render us in a position to impose
our own terms on Turkey. Therefore, the Cabinet believes that this is what we should propose to our allies
and give the appropriate directions to Mr. Panas. At most, in order to accommodate Bulgaria's wish, we
can accede to peace negotiations beginning immediately, without the signing of an armistice. Up to now
we have been refusing to begin such negotiations before having settled the problem of the land
distribution with Bulgaria. Nevertheless, in order to facilitate the procedure, we can announce to Bulgaria
that we agree to begin peace negotiations with Turkey, withholding our rights, and postpone the
distribution of land, but under the condition that the Allies agree that any disagreement during the
distribution process will be settled through arbitration by the Heads of the States of the Triple Entente:
England, France and Russia. If this term is accepted, we will not run the risk of clashing with Bulgaria
after concluding the peace with Turkey. I announce these thoughts of the Cabinet to Your Royal Highness
and I request that He convey them to His Majesty the King. And I request that He convey to me His own
and the King's opinion if possible before midnight, so that Mr. Panas is instructed in time for tomorrow's
meeting.
Crown Prince: I will go to His Majesty immediately and return in an hour.
Venizelos: Agreed.
Crown Prince (7:35 p.m): The King is in full agreement with the opinion of the Cabinet and I myself dare
to share the opinion of His Majesty. Is there anything else, Mr. President?
Venizelos: I wish specifically to have the opinion of H.R.H. the Crown Prince on the proposed operation
against Gallipoli from a military standpoint.
Crown Prince: I agree with the opinion of the Cabinet but I believe that if our proposals are not accepted,
at any rate Ioannina must be surrendered to us during upon the signing of the armistice.
Venizelos: If the Turks refuse and the Allies support the beginning of peace negotiations without a truce,
don't you think that we should not disagree with the Allies about this?
Crown Prince: We shouldn't disagree with the Allies, but with the terms proposed by the Government.
Venizelos: I thank you, very much. I pay my respects. Do you have anything else to add?
Crown Prince: Nothing else, thank you.
In the end, the Greek government rejected the counterproposals of Turkey. In contrast, Bulgaria,
pressured by the difficulties that its army had come up against in eastern Thrace, was forced to accept
them and, on 20 November, representing also the governments of Serbia and Montenegro, to conclude a
fifteen-day armistice. Thus, as of that day, Greece continued the war against Turkey on its own.
141.
After the signing of the armistice, the delegations of all the belligerents departed for London to
negotiate a permanent peace, under the supervision of the Great Powers. The representatives of Greece,
led by the prime minister, departed from Athens on 25 and 29 November.
The representatives of the allied Balkan states gathered for their first meeting on 1 December and
decided on the implementation of a common line against Turkey during the negotiations, which would
take place at the Foreign Office of Great Britain.
From the beginning of the negotiations, Turkey showed that it was not inclined to acknowledge that it was
the defeated party of the war, and consequently to accept the demands of the allied Balkan states. At the

same time, Turkey's delegation adopted a delaying stance at the talks, for the purpose of gaining time to
regroup its military forces and to undertake new military action.
Moreover, from the beginning of December the Turkish Army in Epirus began to engage in intense
offensive activity, which obliged the Greek government, following a telegraphed report from the
commander of the Epirus Army, to propose, via its delegation in London, the conclusion of an armistice.
This was not accepted by the Turkish delegation.
Turkish intransigence continued during the days that followed, and resulted in the interruption of the
negotiations on 24 December, without any agreement having been achieved.
142.
During the course of his stay in London, the Greek prime minister, in repeated meetings with the
president of the Bulgarian delegation, discussed the settlement of the territorial differences between the
two countries. Their inability to achieve a rapprochement was ascertained when Bulgaria put forward
extravagant demands aiming at the acquisition of greater gains from the conduct of the war against
Turkey, and the expansion of its borders even beyond those envisaged by the Treaty of San Stefano.
Since Bulgaria's position prompted well-founded fears of a possible Bulgarian military action at the
expense of Greece, the Greek government promptly gave General Headquarters relevant orders to take
the necessary measures.
In addition, another indication of the disposition of the Bulgarians is offered by the following proposals of
the Staff of the Bulgarian Army to the President of the Greek government for the distancing of the Hellenic
Army from all territories east of the Axios river:
To H.R.H. the Crown Prince, Thessalonica.
I kindly request Your Royal Highness to order that the following Bulgarian text be read with the aid of His
Majesty's French dictionary. We are sending it in French in order to preserve the exact terms used by the
Bulgarian Army staff and which are not common for both Bulgarian and Greek forces. We have
complained to the Bulgarian government of the daily friction in Macedonia and have proposed that some
way be found for peaceful coexistence so that violations of the peace are not escalated. The Bulgarian
Staff is examining the issue and has sent the following proposal:
1. "All lands" located east of the Axios river shall remain under the command of Bulgarian troops which
had in fact "conquered them first." The Greek troops will evacuate inhabited areas they are already
"temporarily" occupying.
2. "All the inhabited areas west of Axios" which were conquered by the Greek troops will remain under
their command.
3. The Bulgarian troops located in Thessalonica will be placed under the command of Prince Nicholas of
Greece and General Andreev will be appointed "Commander of the Bulgarian troops of Thessalonica
acting as garrison commander."
I am requesting that by Your Highness' orders this text be examined as soon as possible, drawing special
attention to the words in quotation marks and send me a reply the soonest possible.
Athens, 24-XI-1912, 3 a.m.

Koromelas

143.
General Headquarters, as is apparent from the following document, rejected the Bulgarian
proposals and counterproposed that, until the final settlement of the matter, all places, cities or villages, in
whatever section of the theater of operations they may be located, remain under the occupation of the
allied army which captured them first or was the first to pass through them.
Thessalonica, 24-XI-1912. To Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Athens.
In reply to your cable of today I am informing you that my staff considers wrong the opinion of the
Bulgarian staff that the lands east of Axios river were first captured by the Bulgarian Army and can prove
this officially. For Thessalonica in particular it has been proven "beyond any doubt" that it had been
captured only by the Hellenic Army, acting alone, with no cooperation whatsoever from the Bulgarian
Army, only an element of which was allowed entry to Thessalonica temporarily "following a request" by
the commander of the Bulgarian Army, and under the guise of hospitality and temporary quartering. Thus
my staff proposes the following, which are in full agreement with my own opinion:
(1) All lands, towns and villages "without exception" in any part of the Theater of war will remain in the
hands of the army that captured them or passed through them first. Until the issue of distribution is settled

permanently, the other army must "evacuate" and withdraw its administrative authorities, should such
have been established.
(2) A mixed committee of officers of both staffs will examine on the spot and will determine the disputed
areas relying on official evidence.
Constantine
Based on the proposals of General Headquarters, joint committees were established for the verification of
the precedence of occupation of the disputed territories. Their work, however, did not result in an
agreement, owing to bad faith on the part of the Bulgarians. And although General Headquarters
recommended that Greek newspapers use milder language regarding the Bulgarians in order to facilitate
relations with them and, moreover, demobilized the Volunteer Scout bands in the hope that the irregular
komitadji bands would also be dissolved, contrary to this the Bulgarians threatened to invade Greece and
capture Athens so as to impose their wishes. At the same time, they were exerting intense pressure upon
the Greek inhabitants of Macedonia to accede to the Bulgarian Exarchate and were carrying out every
kind of violent act at their expense in order to destroy their morale. Indicative of these Bulgarian actions is
the following telegram from General Headquarters to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Thessalonica, 27-XI-1912, 0200. To Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Athens.
The Metropolitans of Strumitza and Melenikon1 report the abuse of Greeks by the Bulgarian Army and
especially by irregulars. In addition they report moral blackmail, the seizure of churches, and the forced
conversion of Greeks to the Bulgarian schismatic Church.
In Strumitza they shut down Greek schools and ten Greeks have been killed in various villages. Bulgarian
officers forbid the use of the Greek language. They seized the churches of Radovo, Kpri, Kamaroti,
Latrovo, Bayrakli Dzhumaya2 and Demir Hisar.3
In Savyoko they expelled the schoolmistress and imprisoned a Greek priest who had reprimanded a
schismatic priest allowing the burning of a living woman. In Gevgelije, the Bulgarian guerrillas committed
such heinous atrocities that they prompted the military commander of the Serbian Army to send delegates
to report them to the commanders of the Greek and Bulgarian armies in Thessalonica.
In Goumenitsa, the Bulgarian Army entered, following our own military occupation, and arrested seven
Christians and in front of a small detachment of ours handed them over to the irregulars who butchered
them, despite the promises made to the commander of our detachment by the Bulgarian officers that they
would protect them.
In Boemitsa,4 a village under our occupation, Bulgarian irregulars arrested and killed seventeen Turks.
Vojvoda Chakalarov, along with many komitadjis, are terrorizing the villages round Kastoria and
Khrupishte,5 and are disarming and looting the Greeks. I ordered formation commanders to disband and
disarm the irregulars and pursue them as bandits. I understand that this measure will bring us into
confrontation, but is it possible for me to tolerate such crimes and such moral blackmail in lands under our
command? Please order department secretary Dragoumes, now at the ministry, to return to his post. Daily
friction with the Bulgarian military authorities, as well as a host of other matters of a political nature,
require presence at the civil division of General Headquarter of a higher official of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs who should be familiar with Macedonian issues, there being no such persons, even among the civil
representation of the Government here.
Constantine
Specifically, the Bulgarian stance at Eleutherae was so provocative that General Headquarters was
forced initially to allocate a Cavalry platoon and later a two-company force to secure the town and the
entire Pangaeum mountain area. General Headquarters made this action known to the Bulgarian
government, also informing by cable the Greek prime minister, who was in London, on the matter.
The positioning of Greek troops in the area of the Pangaeum mountain annoyed the Bulgarians who, in
their attempt to remove them, falsely propagated information that the Greeks had gradually expanded
their presence to all of Macedonia, while, at the same time, a representative of theirs in London made
similar demarches to the Greek prime minister.
The Reinforcement of the Army of Epirus
(Sketch-map 1)

144.
The attempt by the Bulgarians to penetrate into the territories which the Hellenic Army had
liberated in Macedonia became more apparent day after day; nor did they fail to demonstrate that they
intended to bring Thessalonica under their control. Naturally, it became imperative to concentrate the
largest possible force of the Hellenic Army in Thessalonica. At the same time, the need to reinforce the
Army of Epirus for the quickest possible liberation of Ioannina was also of great concern for the
Government and General Headquarters.
Within this framework, from 30 October the Government expressed its thoughts to General Headquarters
regarding the reinforcement of the Army of Epirus with units from the Field Army of Macedonia. This
reinforcement was deemed impossible, however, so long as the Field Army of Macedonia, as has been
mentioned already, was turning from Thessalonica towards the west in order to undertake operations
against the Ottoman Army in western Macedonia.
On 6 November, the Government asked General Headquarters to dispatch one division to Epirus, two
divisions to Thessalonica, and assign one Infantry regiment and one battery to capture the island of
Chios. At this request, and after the liberation of Florina, General Headquarters on 15 November
transported Division I to Thessalonica. This freed Division II, which had remained in Thessalonica, to
embark on 17 November for Epirus. One of its regiments had already been assigned to the liberation of
the islands of the Aegean and was duly dispatched on 9 November. In addition, the transfer of Division IV
from Florina to Thessalonica took place on 28 November; following the liberation of Korytsa, the transfer
of the 1st Cavalry Regiment and Division VI took place, and was completed on 25 December.
In time, the situation in Epirus and the development of the negotiations in London led to the decision to
quickly terminate military operations in this area. Indeed, following the reinforcement of the Turkish forces
in Epirus from the area of Monastir, the situation was growing more disadvantageous for the Hellenic
Army. Its immediate and complete reinforcement was imperative so that it could continue its offensive
against the fortified position of Ioannina. The negotiations in London, furthermore, did not look as though
they would come to a conclusion, as a result of which the Bulgarian Army continued to occupy the bulk of
its forces in Thrace. Consequently, the primary need for the Hellenic Army was to send reinforcements to
Epirus, as long as the Bulgarian threat in Macedonia was not considered immediate.
On the basis of these considerations, Divisions IV and VI also departed for Epirus, on 12 and 25
December respectively.
Division III remained at Korytsa. Division I remained in the city of Thessalonica, while the security of the
countryside was assigned to Divisions VII and V. In addition, measures were taken to reinforce the forces
in the Metsovo area against the possibility of an attack against them by the Turkish forces of the area of
Ioannina.
145.
Another issue which preoccupied General Headquarters during this period was the study of an
operation to capture Gallipoli. Following the liberation of Ioannina, it was possible that the need would
arise for part of the Hellenic Army, with or without the cooperation of another allied army, to attempt the
capture of the peninsula of Gallipoli and to secure the passage of the Hellenic Fleet to Constantinople.
For this reason General Headquarters and Fleet officers conducted the necessary reconnaissance of the
area.
The study of the Gallipoli operation was interrupted, however, by General Headquarters' preoccupation
with the Epirus theater of operations, and by the fact that the Admiral of the Fleet and the Ministry of the
Navy expressed reservations concerning the success of a landing on the peninsula of Gallipoli.
Furthermore, the Bulgarians, despite their initial request for the preparation of a landing with the objective
of capturing the peninsula, no longer showed any willingness to cooperate with the Hellenic Army in its
operations toward Constantinople.
At the end of December, the greater part of the Hellenic Army was in Epirus, where the operations were
dragging on. The swift liberation of Ioannina was imperative, so that the Hellenic Army could then
concentrate in Macedonia. It was deemed necessary, in order to attain the unified command of all the
expeditionary forces, to assign the command of the Army of Epirus also to the Commander in Chief and
Crown Prince.
146.
In view of the Commander in Chief's departure for Epirus, a Field Army Section was established
by his order on 4 January and placed under the military commander of Thessalonica; it consisted of
Divisions V and VII, the Konstantinopoulos Evzone Detachment, the 1st and 3rd Cavalry Regiments, the

4th Field Artillery Regiment, the Rear Service and the remaining services which were in Thessalonica.
Division I remained independent.
On 6 January, the Commander in Chief and General Headquarters departed from the port of
Thessalonica for Preveza, to lead the operations of the Hellenic Army in Epirus. The result was the
liberation of Ioannina and the surrender of all of the Turkish forces there, as is described in detail in Part
Two of this concise history.

CHAPTER 6
The Liberation of the Aegean Islands
The Liberation of the Islands of Lemnos, Imbros, Thasos,
Samothrace, Psara, and Others
(Sketch-map 1)
147.
The Hellenic Fleet, under Rear Admiral Paulos Kountouriotes, assembled at the naval base and
was divided into two groups: the Aegean Sea Fleet and the Ionian Sea Squadron1. The Aegean Sea
Fleet, which was the strongest, assembled in large part in Phaleron bay and on 5 October, led by the
Admiral of the Fleet, it set sail to accomplish its mission, as determined in Article 2 of the military
agreement with Bulgaria: "The primary objective of the Hellenic Fleet must at all events be for it to
become master of the Aegean Sea and to sever maritime communications between Asia Minor and
European Turkey . . ."
For the success of the above objective it was necessary to establish a naval base near the southern exit
of the Dardanelles, a naval base that would permit control of the exit of the Turkish Fleet from the Straits
and the timely assumption of operations against it, as well as the interdiction of the transit of commercial
vessels from the coasts of Asia Minor to the coasts of Thrace and Macedonia. To fulfill not only this
requirement, but also Greece's national goals, it was necessary, as a first stage, for the fleet to liberate
the islands of the north Aegean (Lemnos, Imbros, Samothrace, Tenedos, etc.). Lemnos in particular was
important because its location and the gulf of Moudros, made it ideal for the establishment of a naval
base.
At a second stage, the liberation of the other Greek islands of the Aegean Sea (i.e. Lesbos, Chios,
Samos, etc.) would follow. This action demanded the use of significant forces of the land army.
Noteworthy defensive measures had been taken on these islands and there were significant Turkish
forces there, owing to the Italian-Turkish war which had taken place earlier. Consequently a special effort
would be necessary in order to liberate these islands.
Thus the liberation of the islands of the first group began immediately with the onset of military operations,
while that of the second group began when the result of operations in Macedonia had been decided after
the liberation of Thessalonica.
148.
The requisitioned steamship Peneios, of the Ionian Sea Squadron, upon which had embarked a
two-company force of the 20th Infantry Regiment, was given the task of liberating of Lemnos. It sailed,
along with the Aegean Sea Fleet, from the bay of Phaleron on 5 October.
The Aegean Sea Fleet reached Myrina in Lemnos at 1400 on 6 October and the Admiral of the Fleet
immediately began negotiations with the Turkish authorities for the surrender of the town. The talks lasted
the entire afternoon on account of the prevaricating attitude of the Turks, who requested a twenty-fourhour time limit before having to give a reply.
On the following day, 7 October, at around 1000, the steamship Peneios, with the two-company Infantry
force aboard, also arrived, after which the entire fleet sailed to the port of Moudros, where the landing was
planned to take place by a joint decision of the Admiral of the Fleet and the commander of the twocompany force.

The landing began at 0800 on 8 October and was completed at 1100, without any resistance by the
Turks. The two-company force then moved westward, and after overrunning various small Turkish
positions that resisted -and taking quite a few prisoners- reached Myrina that night. There it blocked off
the Turkish quarter and, beginning at midnight, abolished the Turkish authorities. On the morning of the
following day, 9 October, the Greek flag was hoisted at the fort of Myrina, to the accompaniment of salvos
from the battleships.
The liberation of Lemnos secured for the Hellenic Fleet the port of Moudros which, as a naval base,
offered valuable services throughout the duration of the war.
149.
On 15 October the requisitioned steamship Pelops also reached Moudros, with a naval
detachment of approximately 600 men to replace the two-company Infantry force, which was to be
transported to the Macedonian front. However, two days later, on 17 October, the Admiral of the Fleet
received an order to also liberate the islands of Thasos, Imbros, Samothrace and Agios Eustratios. This
obliged him to postpone the departure of the two-company force so that he could use both forces (the
naval detachment and the two-company force) for that operation.
In order to carry out its new mission, the Aegean Sea Fleet was divided into four groups to escort an
equal number of landing elements for the liberation of the above-mentioned islands.
The two-company Infantry force was divided into two elements. The larger part embarked on the
steamship Pelops and on 17 October departed to liberate Thasos, while the remainder embarked on the
Kanares (a fleet supply ship) and departed on the following morning for the liberation of Agios Eustratios.
Encountering no Turkish resistance, the Greek forces liberated the two islands on 18 October.
Similarly, naval detachments liberated Imbros on 18 October, Samothrace on the 19th, Psara on the 21st,
Tenedos on the 24th, and Icaria on 4 November. Thus the liberation of the island complex of the north
Aegean, so necessary for the fleet, was completed.
The inhabitants of these islands welcomed the Greek troops with unrestrained enthusiasm and shed tears
of joy at regaining their freedom after some five centuries of slavery.
The two-company force of the 20th Infantry Regiment was relieved, in the meantime, by a Marine
detachment and on 27 October disembarked at Volos. From there it reached Thessalonica by way of
Larissa and Kozane on 10 November, and linked up with its parent regiment.
The Liberation of the Islands of Lesbos, Chios and Samos
(Sketch-maps 13 and 14)
150.
The liberation of the Greek islands of Lesbos, Chios, and Samos was among the primary
objectives of the Greek government from the very start of the war.
However, these islands, for the reasons cited above, required the allocation of significant forces,
something which could not possibly be realized at the beginning of operations and before the war in
Macedonia had been decided.
In the meantime, because official information from abroad indicated that the signing of an armistice was
imminent, the Government deemed that political reasons made necessary the hastening of the liberation
of these islands before the termination of operations. To achieve this, it was decided, following an
understanding between the Commander of the Army of Macedonia, Crown Prince Constantine, and the
Prime Minister and Minister of the Army, Eleutherios Venizelos, that one Infantry regiment and one battery
be allocated from Division II, which was in the area of Thessalonica.
At the same time, an attempt was made to assemble as many new forces as possible from naval
detachments and from the barracks of Athens; they were assigned the same objective. As a result, a
naval detachment of 250 men reached Moudros on the morning of 7 November and embarked upon the
battleship Averoff and the requisitioned Pelops, headed for the island of Lesbos. A naval detachment that
was gathered from the peninsula of Athos, the island of Lemnos, and others, along with a platoon
comprising two landing-support naval guns and two machine guns, also embarked on the Pelops.
While this force was heading for Lesbos, an Infantry battalion, with a strength of fifteen officers and 1,019
enlisted men was added. This battalion had been constituted at the Athens barracks, and had set sail,
with two requisitioned vessels, from the port of Piraeus on 6 November.
The Greek ships entered the port of Mytilene at 0700 on 8 November and immediately the Admiral of the
Fleet dispatched a launch with an officer to transport the Turkish civil administrator, the Metropolitan and

the mayor to the flagship. He requested from them the surrender of the island. Following negotiations, a
deadline of 1130 was set for the Turkish forces to withdraw from the city. With the expiration of the
deadline, the disembarkation of the naval detachment and the Infantry battalion began, to the enthusiastic
cheers of the inhabitants.
At 1400 the Greek flag was hoisted at the Governor's Palace and hailed with salvos from the ships. The
forces that had disembarked captured and secured the heights west of the city. The Turkish Army, with a
strength of 1,500-2,000 men, had no time to put up any resistance; it withdrew to the village of Philia (fifty
kilometers northwest of Mytilene) where there was an organized camp that had been set up at the time of
the Italian-Turkish War, and where there were sufficient provisions and other supplies.
The Admiral of the Fleet, after leaving the Cruiser Squadron and two destroyers at Mytilene, sailed with
the fleet at 2300 in order to undertake the mission of escorting the Bulgarian 7th Division, which was
being transported from Thessalonica to Alexandroupolis.
The Greek forces that had disembarked at Mytilene (approximately 1,600 men), remained in the city.
Security elements watched the surrounding heights, but the forces avoided action, because of their
limited capabilities. On 10 November, part of the naval detachment sailed off with the armed merchant
cruiser Macedonia to liberate Plomari, but owing to rough seas it did not succeed in approaching and
headed for Chios instead, taking part in the landing there.
151.
In the meantime, by request of the Admiral of the Fleet, who pointed out the need for a quick
mopping up of Turkish forces on the island, General Headquarters, after conferring with the Ministry of the
Army, decided on the reinforcement of the landing detachment with Battalion II/19 of Division VII, one
element of 94 marines from the area of Thessalonica, and two Infantry companies and one battery of six
pack guns transferred from the interior of Greece. According to the same decision, command of the
detachment was assigned to Colonel (Inf) Apollodoros Syrmakezes, who was dispatched from the interior
of the country. His staff officer was assigned to him by General Headquarters.
The commander of the detachment, along with the elements from the interior, reached Mytilene on the
night of 28 November, and Battalion II/19 arrived in the afternoon hours of 1 December. Thus, a
significant force of 3,175 men (of whom 300 were marines carrying out police duties) with six pack guns
and two landing-support naval guns assembled in Mytilene, against approximately 2,000 Turks who had
assembled at the village of Philia.
The commander of the landing detachment divided his force into two columns, which on 2 December
assembled at the villages of Lambou Myloi and Therme respectively. From 3 December, the two columns
advanced, the left one (south) in the direction of the villages of Lambou Myloi-Kallone-Philia and the right
one (north) in the direction of the villages of Therme-Agia Paraskeue-Philia and, after driving back light
Turkish covering elements, in the night hours of 4 December the first one reached the area northeast of
the village of Daphne and the second the area northwest of Agia Paraskeue.
On the night of 4-5 December, the commander of the detachment issued an order for the continuation of
the advance and the final attack against the Turkish elements at the village of Philia. According to the
order, the left column was to continue its advance from midday on the following day, while the right
column was to continue from the morning of 6 December, because of the shorter distance it had to cover.
The advance of the left column began, as had been planned, at midday on 5 December; a short time later
it made contact with the Turkish troops that were occupying positions west of the monastery of Leimon.
There followed an attack which lasted until night; the Turks put up a strong resistance and managed to
maintain their positions.
In the meantime, on the afternoon of the same day, an officer of the Ottoman Army, acting as emissary,
presented himself to the commander of the detachment at Kallone. He bore a document, ostensibly a
demarche from the Turkish commander, regarding alleged physical violence against Turkish peasants; in
reality, however, he sought to sound out the situation regarding negotiations. Because the officer in
question did not have any authorization, however, the commander of the detachment broke off the
discussion, assuring him only that the necessary orders for the liberation of the hostages had been given,
and that all possible measures had been taken to protect the inhabitants, regardless of their religious
faith.
On the following day, 6 December, the offensive action of the left column continued, but its advance was
exceptionally slow owing to Turkish resistance and the rough terrain. The advance of the right column
began in parallel, and it easily managed to overrun Turkish resistance; that night it reached the western
outskirts of the village of Philia.

On morning of the following day, 7 December, the attack continued simultaneously by the two columns.
However, immediately following its initiation, at around 0800, an officer of the Ottoman Army appeared
before the left column and stated that the commander of the Ottoman forces was requesting a meeting
with the commander of the detachment. There followed a cease-fire, and at 1100 the commander of the
Turkish forces arrived on the spot. In an attempt to gain time, he feigned that he had been invited without
prior knowledge and had no proposal to make. As was expected, the discussion was halted and from
1400 the Greek troops resumed the attack, which lasted until the last light of day. The same Turkish
officer arrived again at 2200, bearing the following surrender request signed by all the Turkish officers:
To His Excellency the Commander of the Hellenic Forces, Klapados Military Camp.
Midnight Friday 7-8-XII-12.
After the capture of the city of Mytilene the entire Ottoman Army here has withdrawn to the hills of
Klapados, in the pre-existing camp, to avoid presenting a pretext for a futile destruction of the city. Today,
and for various reasons, the armies of the two governments began hostilities in order to fulfill their military
obligations. We, as yourselves, have both been fighting to uphold our military honor.
Our forces are familiar to you. As we have already said, we have fulfilled our military duties. In order to
avoid a greater bloodbath on both sides, all our officers and the army have abandoned the hostile attitude
toward you. We are requesting and are awaiting that Your Excellency order all Troops of his Army to do
the same. We have authorized as official delegates to confer on the manner of our surrender Captain
Ihsan Bey, medical officer of our battalion, and Lieutenant of the Gendarmerie Kemal Efendi.
All the officers of our troops shake the hand of your Excellency and all his officers, with the greatest
sincerity.
Major Abdul Ghani, Commanding Officer
Gendarmerie Battalion Commander Sleyman Bahri.
Captain Seyfettin, Captain Hankii, Captain Hseyin Husnu, Captain (illegible), Captain Fehmi, First
Lieutenant Hseyin Bahri, First Lieutenant Isman Nuri.
The commander of the detachment replied immediately to this request of the Turks by means of the
following document, and ordered, at the same time, the termination of hostilities.
7/8-XII-12, His Excellency, Major Abdul Ghani, Commander of the Ottoman Troops.
In reply to your letter, of 7 September,1 I have the honor of assuring that I have ordered the cessation of
the attack and I am appointing the following as my plenipotentiaries, for the discussion of the details of the
surrender: Military Commander of Mytilene Lieutenant Melas (Hellenic Royal Navy), and Captain
Vernardos, my Chief of Staff.
Take pleasure in knowing that, recognizing the valor with which your troops fought, I, myself, as well as
the officers sincerely shake the hand you extended to us.
The Commander of the Greek Forces
Syrmakezes
On 8 December at 0800, the Greek and Turkish representatives met and signed the protocol of surrender,
while in the midday hours the surrender of arms began at the village of Philia. In the meantime, troops of
the detachment seized the hills around the village.
Thus ended the operation for the liberation of Lesbos, with Greek casualties totalling one officer and eight
enlisted men killed, and one officer and 80 enlisted men wounded.
Following the surrender of the Turks, the Greek troops assembled in Mytilene by 10 December. The
Turkish prisoners embarked on a vessel at Methymna in order to be transported by steamship to
Mytilene, according to the terms of the agreement of surrender. In the end, only a few elements of the
detachment remained in Lesbos to guard and secure the island; the remainder, by order of General
Headquarters, were allocated for the liberation of Chios.
152.
Chios was the best prepared of all of the islands, from the period of Turkish-Italian War, to repel a
landing and to put up a systematic and organized defense.
One Infantry regiment was allocated for the liberation of Chios, under the commander of the 7th
Regiment, Colonel (Inf) Nikolaos Delagram-matikas. The regiment was formed of one battalion of the 1st

Regiment and two of the 7th Regiment, which belonged to Division II in Thessalonica, and one battery of
Krupp guns from the Army of the Interior.
After assembling at the port of Thessalonica on 8 November, the regiment embarked on the vessels
Patris and Sappho and set sail for Chios on the following day. In the meantime, the steamship Erietta left
the port of Piraeus with the battery of Krupp guns.
The ships sailed toward Chios separately. Of these, the Patris, upon which the two battalions of the 7th
Regiment and the commander of the landing detachment had embarked, initially sailed to the port of
Mytilene and from there, escorted by the Cruiser Squadron, sailed toward Chios, which she reached at
0800 on 11 November and linked up with the Sappho and the Erietta.
After an initial naval demonstration, the ships moored in front of the port of Chios and the commander of
the Cruiser Squadron, Commander (HRN) Ioannes Damianos, requested the surrender of the city within
three hours. The commander of the Turkish forces refused explicitly, hoping that he could defend
effectively, with the strong force (2,000 men) under his command, the significant defensive organization of
the island, and the sufficiency of supplies and ammunition at his disposal.
At 1510, following the refusal of the Turkish commander, the forced landing began, some four kilometers
south of the city of Chios. The first elements of the landing were a company of Battalion III of the 1st
Regiment and the Marine detachment.
The Turks, having organized the coast, put up a strong resistance, despite the effective fire of the fleet
and the threat from the landing elements.They fought until the night hours, when they were forced to
abandon their positions and flee to the interior of the island. The landing of the remaining troops followed,
except for the artillery, which, due to the inclement weather and lack of means, disembarked on the
following morning.
Information collected during the night revealed that the Turks had withdrawn northwest to the
mountainous area of the village of Karyes.
The landing forces then moved towards the city of Chios, which they entered at 0800 on 12 November
without encountering any resistance. The enthusiasm of the inhabitants and their reception of the troops
were indescribable. The troops remained in the city, except for one battalion, which moved forward and
deployed to the northwest.
The Turks who had taken up defensive positions in the area of the village of Karyes, began in the early
afternoon to fire on the battalion. This forced the commander of the landing detachment to attack with a
strength of six companies and with the support of the battery; by nightfall they had ousted the Turks from
their forward positions at the level of the village. The Greek troops deployed in the captured positions.
On the following day, 13 November, the landing detachment dealt with regrouping its forces and
proceeded with the necessary preparations for the continuation of its offensive action, with the aim of
crushing the Turkish forces completely.
On 14 November, following a brief struggle, the detachment captured the villages of Agios Georgios and
Daphnonas with Battalion I/7, forcing the Turks to withdraw to the surrounding dominant heights. In
contrast, repeated attempts to break through the Turkish position in the area of the village of Karyes, and
to capture the Aipos heights from the direction of the village of Vrontados, did not meet with success; in
fact they caused great casualties to the Greek troops, because of vigorous Turkish resistance and rough
terrain. Finally, the Aipos heights were captured in the late night hours of 16 November, following a
successful night attack by Battalion III/1.
Offensive actions up to that point led to the conclusion that the crushing of the Turks would not be
possible with the landing forces then present on the island. Besides the fact that the Turks had significant
forces at their disposal, they occupied naturally fortified positions and, moreover, fought with great
tenacity, showing no sign of waning morale.
The commander of the landing detachment reported these difficulties to the Ministry of the Navy, which
ordered that other means be used to obtain the desired result, such as blockading the island or landing on
another shore. Acting on this, the commander of the landing detachment decided to attack the Turks at
other points on the island, in order to force them to surrender. For this purpose, on 18 November, the
armed merchant cruiser Macedonia sailed to the bay of Volissos, on the western part of the island; there,
following a brief bombardment, it landed a small detachment and captured the monastery of Mounda,
taking the Turkish garrison prisoner. In addition, a small force with an officer at its head and 200 small
arms was dispatched to the village of Kardamyla, where it organized a volunteer corps; another volunteer
corps captured the village of Lithi on the west of the island. Thus, the Turks were limited to the occupation
of certain naturally fortified and inaccessible positions in the center of the island.

In the meantime, a depot battalion along with an Evzone company arrived for reinforcement. The men,
however, had not been fully trained and were not in a position as yet to be used for offensive action. For
this reason the commander of the detachment decided to continue the blockade of the Turks, temporarily
postponing the final attack against them.
Despite the blockade the Turks continued to fire on and harass the Greek positions, and on 19 November
effected a limited attack against the troops at the Aipos heights, without, however, achieving any results.
Besides this, adverse weather conditions forced the landing detachment to abandon its mountain
positions and confine itself to lower ones near inhabited areas, where deployed defensively.
On 24 November, the embarkation and departure of the battery was ordered; it was replaced by another
which had arrived from the Army of the Interior. In addition, 200 Cretan volunteers also arrived, assigned
to the forces on the island to reinforce the blockade of the Turks.
The Ministry of the Navy, pressed to have the island mopped up before the conclusion of the anticipated
armistice, on 27 November ordered the commander of the detachment to resume, as quickly as possible,
the offensive, in cooperation with the chief of the naval force and after receiving the reinforcements which
had been sent to him.
The commander of the detachment reported immediately by cable that the result of that action was
deemed questionable, because the Turks occupied naturally fortified and inaccessible positions, having
been well organized for a year. At the same time, he dispatched an officer with a report on the condition of
the enemy forces. On 30 November, the ministry ordered the suspension of all offensive actions.
In the meantime, the Turks, on 29 November, launched three new attacks in the areas of the villages of
Agios Georgios, Karyes and Lithi. They were successfully repelled and resulted in many casualties for the
Turkish troops.
Following the repulse of these Turkish offensives, the Greek forces continued to close in upon the Turkish
positions. The Greeks did not, however, have the capability as yet of staging a general offensive. From
mid-December, the landing detachment of Chios was reinforced with Battalion II/19 -which possessed two
machine guns-, the depot Infantry battalion, and one battery from Lesbos, as well as with two guns from
the Army of the Interior. On 18 December its commander, after receiving the approval of the Ministry of
the Army, decided to attack and clear the island of Turkish forces.
The commander issued an order to his forces to attack the next day, 19 December, in cooperation with all
the volunteer bands and the fleet. However, two Turkish officers, emissaries of the commander of the
Turkish forces, appeared on the afternoon of the same day to discuss the termination of hostilities. As a
result, the commander of the detachment ordered the suspension of the attack.
The negotiations which followed failed, owing to the excessive demands of the Turks, who requested that
they be allowed to depart the island with their arms and all of their supplies. With the failure of the talks,
the commander of the detachment issued an order for the attack to begin on the morning of the following
day.
The attack began at 0700 on 20 December with supporting fire from the fleet.
The main column (four battalions, one Evzone company, twelve guns), which was moving from the village
of Vrontados towards the Aipos heights with the commander of the detachment himself at its head,
managed, following a fierce fight, to bend Turkish resistance and, after successive attempts, to seize the
heights by the afternoon and pursue the Turks towards the villages of Anavatos and Pityous.
The south column (Battalion I/7, the Volunteer Scout element, four guns), which was advancing from the
villages of Lithi and Agios Georgios towards the height of Provatas, after capturing the village of
Augonyma with the Volunteer Scout element and the southern ridges of the height of Provatas with
Battalion I/7, effected a coordinated attack against the latter height, which it captured in the early
afternoon.
Thus the Turkish forces which had withdrawn to the area of the village of Anavatos found themselves
encircled, and were forced to request that they be allowed to surrender. The surrender began
"unconditionally" at 2000 on the same day and was completed the following day.
At about the same time, the elements that had disembarked in the area of Volissos and Kardamyla
villages, as well as other smaller elements which had been sent to the villages of Viki and Langada, with
the assistance of local volunteers moved quickly towards the interior of the island. By the evening of 20
December they managed to encircle -from the north and the west- the Turkish forces which had
withdrawn in the direction of the village of Pityous. Following this development, the Turkish forces there
were also forced, on the morning of 21 December, to hoist white flags and surrender. They signed the
following protocol:

Protocol
The following protocol was drafted by the Gendarmerie Lieutenant Hseyin Bey, representative of the
Ottoman Army in Chios and Captain Vernardos of the General Staff, representative of the Hellenic Army:
(1) The Ottoman Army will surrender its arms and evacuate Chios. It will embark at a port, any port, and
will be a prisoner at the disposal of the Greek government.
(2) The officers of the Ottoman Army will keep their swords and will be free to live in Greece, enjoying the
same privileges as other officers of the Ottoman army.
(3) Materiel of every kind belonging of the Ottoman Army will be collected at any location on the island in
order to be transported to Greece, in accordance with orders issued by the Greek government.
(4) The Hellenic Army of Chios will offer medical care to the ill and wounded of the Ottoman Army.
Critically wounded and seriously ill soldiers whose health will not allow any further military service will be
transported to eshme, care of the Greek government.
(5) The families of Turkish soldiers and civil employees are free to depart for any destination they wish,
accompanied by civil employees or police officers.
(6) This protocol was signed by the delegates of the Greek and Turkish armies in two copies, one copy to
be kept by each of the parties.
Karyes, 21-XII-12
The representative of the
The representative of the
Ottoman Army, Hellenic Army,
Major Hseyin Lut
E. Vernardos, Captain (Inf)
In total, the Turkish force which surrendered came to 37 officers and approximately 1,800 enlisted men.
The casualties of the Greek forces from the beginning of the landing were significant and amounted to a
total of 202 officers and enlisted men killed and wounded.
Following the surrender of the Turkish forces and the mopping up of the countryside, the Greek troops
began to assemble in the capital of the island for the return to mainland Greece. The battalions of Division
II, the depot battalion and two pack guns departed for Epirus on 26 December, while the battalion of the
19th Regiment departed on 31 December for Thessalonica. Only one barracks company remained in
Chios. Later a force of marines arrived and one battalion was formed and assigned the mission of
securing the island.
153.
The last of all of the islands to be liberated was Samos, the inhabitants of which had thrown off
the Turkish yoke on 11 November 1912. A Provisional Government, under Themistokles Sophoules, had
been formed, which declared union of the island with mother Greece.
On 1 March 1913, a two-company Infantry force, composed of 318 officers and enlisted men, embarked
upon the steamship Thessalia, which set sail for Samos under the escort of the battleship Psara and two
destroyers. At 1030 on the following day, 2 March, the ships dropped anchor at the port of Vathy, to the
cheers of the inhabitants who had gathered on the waterfront.
Before the two-company force disembarked, and by common deliberation with the Greek President of the
Provisional Government, a declaration from the Admiral of the Fleet was read from the balcony of the
Governor's Palace to the people who had gathered. Then the President of the Provisional Government
visited the battleship Psara and after the anticipated honors had been payed, the disembarkation of the
two-company force began, to the cheers once more of the inhabitants. A parade followed through the flagdecorated streets of the city, and then a doxology was celebrated, after which the two-company force
established itself at various buildings.
Thus with the arrival of Greek troops at Samos, the liberation of the Greek islands of the Aegean was
completed, with the exception of the Dodecanese islands, which had come under Italian occupation on 4
May 1912.
Overview of the Events in Part One
154.
Part One of this concise history refers generally to the political/military situation in the Balkans up
to the declaration of the First Balkan War, the diplomatic events and the ferment which preceded it, as

well as the military operations, in particular those of the Greek forces against the Turks for the liberation of
Macedonia and the islands of the Aegean Sea. The firm decision of the Balkan states to support in
concert their unredeemed compatriots who continued to be under the yoke and unrelenting persecution of
the Turkish conquerors constituted the starting point of these events.
Indeed, the Christian states of the Balkans, since acquiring gradually their independence from the
Ottoman Empire during the 19th century, began to develop intense activity to improve the situation of their
enslaved compatriots and to establish the preconditions for the promotion of their claims on lands still
occupied by the Turks.
From the beginning of 1912, the situation of the Christian populations of these lands had grown desperate
because of Turkish behavior. Despite the liberal reforms, which the Young Turks had announced following
the consolidation of their revolt in July of 1908, the pressures on the Christians continuously increased;
the danger of their annihilation became greater day by day.
Consequently, the Christian Balkan states put aside the differences among them in order to confront their
common enemy, Turkey. Thus, on 22 February 1912, a treaty of defensive alliance was signed between
Serbia and Bulgaria and on 16 May of the same year a similar treaty was signed between Greece and
Bulgaria. Furthermore, these states concluded various military agreements between them, with which
they assumed the obligation of mutual support in the event of war with Turkey.
Similarly Montenegro, which had unreservedly declared its desire to take part in any coalition against
Turkey, signed a corresponding agreement with Serbia in September of 1912. Thus, at the beginning of
autumn, 1912, the four Christian states were united and in allegiance against Turkey.
155.
The reaction of Turkey to this activity of the Balkan states was directly and dynamically
demonstrated through the reinforcement of the frontier garrisons and the movement of significant forces
from the east to Macedonia and Thrace, under the pretext of conducting military exercises. In response
the Balkan states declared complete mobilization; Montenegro, taking the initiative, was the first to
declare war against Turkey, on 25 September.
Five days later, Serbia, Bulgaria, and Greece, by a common stern note, requested of Turkey to radically
reform the administration of the enslaved Christians of European Turkey. However, the tone and the
contents of this note predestined its rejection. This, in fact, is what the demarche sought and exactly what
happened.
The war between the Balkan allies and Turkey was unavoidable, and on 5 October 1912 hostilities
commenced, with the Bulgarian Army commencing operations towards eastern Thrace, the Serbian Army
towards Skopje and Monastir and the Hellenic Army towards Macedonia and Epirus.
156.
Greece was entering the war under the most favorable of conditions: the people were united, the
army completely organized and trained, and the country enjoyed naval supremacy. Morale was at its
greatest height, forged by the intellectual class of the country; professors, teachers, poets, and writers
had imbued the youth with their patriotic writings and had sparked in their hearts the impetus for the
struggle in support of the just causes of the nation and the grandeur of Greece.
The Hellenic Army was organized into two field armies:
- The Army of Thessaly, which constituted its main bulk (seven Infantry divisions, one Cavalry brigade,
four Evzone battalions, a flotilla of four airplanes and other small support and administrative units), under
Crown Prince Constantine, with the mission of advancing toward Macedonia.
- The Army of Epirus (one Infantry regiment, four Evzone battalions, one National Guard battalion, one
Cavalry company, seven batteries, other support and administrative units, totalling a strength of
approximately one division), under Lieutenant General Konstantinos Sapountzakes, initially having a
defensive mission, which sought mainly to secure national territory.
Opposite the Hellenic Army of Thessaly, the Turks had assigned the 8th Provisional Army Corps, which
was composed of three Infantry divisions, one Infantry detachment (three Infantry battalions, one Cavalry
company and one pack battery) and the corresponding support and administrative units.
In Epirus, the strength of the Turkish Army during the same period was two Infantry divisions (18 Infantry
battalions, one Cavalry company, eight batteries and one Pioneer company).
157.
The Army of Thessaly began its advance at dawn on 5 October, with the liberation of Macedonia
as its objective. After driving back the Turkish border patrols and capturing Elasson on the following day, it

continued its advance and on 9 October attacked the Turks at the naturally fortified position of
Sarantaporos.
Three Divisions (I, II and III) attacked frontally, while Division IV, through an outflanking maneuver from
the west, reached the area before the Porta defile, at the rear of the position. This forced the Turks to
withdraw in disorder, starting at midnight, toward Servia and Kozane, abandoning all of their wheel-borne
materiel and artillery.
Division IV, pursuing the Turks from the morning of 10 October, on the afternoon of the same day entered
Servia, while one battalion of the Cavalry Brigade captured Kozane on the following day.
The victory of the Hellenic Army at Sarantaporos, a result of its unrivaled bravery and combat
effectiveness, further reinforced the morale of the men and paved the way for the liberation of Macedonia.
158.
Following the defeat of the Turks at Sarantaporos, the Army of Thessaly left Division V to act
towards Amyntaion-Florina in order to cover its flanks from that direction, and with the bulk of its forces
turned towards the east, with the objective of quickly liberating Thessalonica, the main politico-strategic
objective of the operations in Macedonia.
Beroea was liberated on the morning of 16 October, while that night Division VII, moving by way of the
mountainous passes of Olympus, liberated Katerine after a tough, three-hour battle. The battle of
Giannitsa followed (19-20 October), which was victorious for the Hellenic Army; then again the Turks,
faced with the danger of being encircled, withdrew hastily toward Thessalonica.
The successful outcome of the battle of Giannitsa seriously eroded the morale of the Turkish forces,
which were obliged, following brief negotiations, to sign, on 26 October, the surrender of the city of
Thessalonica and the Turkish forces there, amounting to approximately 26,000 men, 70 guns, 30 machine
guns and 1,200 animals.
Subsequently, the Greek forces turned towards west Macedonia. On 7 November they liberated Florina,
on 11 November Kastoria, and on 7 December Korytsa.
At the same time, Volunteer Scout elements disembarked at and liberated Chalcidice and the area of
Pangaeum mountain, while strong detachments of the fleet successively liberated the Greek islands of
the Aegean Sea, except for the islands of the Dodecanese which, after a long period under the Turkish
yoke, found themselves under Italian occupation beginning on 4 May 1912.
The unfolding of operations of the other allies against Turkey on the other fronts was similar, thus forcing
Turkey to request an armistice early in November. After lengthy discussions, a fifteen-day armistice was
finally signed at 2000 on 20 November, between the plenipotentiaries of Turkey and Bulgaria, who also
represented the governments of Serbia and Montenegro. Greece did not agree with the conditions of the
armistice and from that day continued the war against Turkey on its own.
Following the signing of the armistice, representatives of all the belligerent states, including Greece, met
in London for the conclusion of a permanent peace. Owing to Turkish intransigence the negotiations were
interrupted on 24 December, with no agreement having been attained.
PART TWO
THE FIRST BALKAN WAR
THE OPERATIONS IN EPIRUS
CHAPTER 7
The Military Situation in Epirus at the Start of the War
and the Operations of the Hellenic Army of Epirus
to 20 November 1912
Condition of the Opposing Forces
(Sketch-maps 15 and 16)
159.
Because Epirus is a distinct territorial compartment, it constituted a special theater of operations
during the 1912-1913 Balkan Wars, that was directly subordinate to the Ministry of the Army. The mission

of the Greek forces (the Army of Epirus) assigned to this region was to secure the frontier from the
Ambracian gulf to Metsovo, an area extending in length to about 150 kilometers.
The commander of the Army of Epirus was Lieutenant General Konstantinos Sapountzakes, who arrived
in Arta and assumed his duties on 2 October. He was in command of a force of approximately division
strength, that was later redesignated Division VIII.
The Epirus theater of operations was mostly mountainous. Due to an extremely poor network of roads, it
was also inaccessible. The interposing mountain ranges of Pindus and Agrapha had only a few passes
through which communications with the neighboring regions of Thessaly and Macedonia could be
maintained. The only paved road in the region was the macadamized road that ran from Preveza and
Amphilochia towards Ioannina, via Philippias; from there the road followed the valley of the river Louros,
crossing high and precipitous mountains. Further east, there was a high carriage road which ran through
the naturally fortified defile of Pente Pegadia and linked Arta with the aforementioned paved road south of
Ioannina. These were the sole axes of movement and resupply from the south towards the north and
vice-versa, and consequently it was of vital importance for the two opponents to secure them.
160.
On 5 October 1912, the day that military operations against the Turks began, the greatest part of
the Army of Epirus was assembled in the area of Arta. The force consisted of one Infantry regiment, four
Evzone battalions, one National Guard battalion, three independent Artillery battalions, one Cavalry
company, one Engineer company, one Telegraph Operator platoon, and the necessary medical, supply
and ammunition services.
The Army's general disposition was the following:
- Headquarters of the Army of Epirus: In Arta.
- 15th Infantry Regiment: Battalions I and II in the area of Arta and Battalion III at the village of Limine
(southeast of Arta).
- 3rd Evzone Battalion: At the village of Petas, with two companies operating as screening elements (in
the area of the villages of Zygos and Agnanta).
- 3rd Independent Evzone Battalion: Moving from the area of Arta towards the village of Agnanta.
- 7th Evzone Battalion: In Arta, with one company as garrison at the bridge of the same name.
- 10th Evzone Battalion: At the village of Limine, with two companies operating as screening elements
along the river Arachthos in the area of the village of Loutrotopos.
- 2nd National Guard Battalion: In Arta.
- Cavalry Company: At the village of Kompoti.
- Garrison Artillery Battalion II with 18 garrison guns: Southeast of Arta.
- Field Artillery Battalion III/4 comprising three batteries, with twelve guns each: Southeast of Arta.
- Pack Artillery Battalion II comprising three batteries, with twelve guns each: Southeast of Arta, deployed
at the villages of Kompoti, Petas and Kato Panagia.
- Engineer Company: In Arta.
- Three field surgery hospitals, one convoy element and other small units: Immediately south of Arta.
The total strength of the Army of Epirus at the beginning of operations was approximately 10,500 men.
161.
The replenishment of combat units with equipment was accelerated, while the establishment of
the various services continued, albeit at a somewhat slower pace owing to limited stocks of supplies and
equipment. In addition, beginning on the afternoon of 5 October, the Headquarters of the Army of Epirus
gradually reinforced the screening elements with Infantry elements, which were supported by field and
pack artillery as well as by eighteen garrison guns, which had been positioned in the area of Arta and
Petas.
In order to neutralize the Turkish flotilla, which lay in the harbor at Preveza and was composed of two
gunboats and a torpedo boat, the Ministry of the Navy ordered the establishment of the Ionian Sea
Squadron, two gunboats of which blockaded the Ambracian gulf starting on 4 October 1912, thus securing
unhindered communication by sea for the Army of Epirus with the interior of the country.
162.
The Turkish Army in Epirus comprised the 23rd Division (active army), which was based in
Ioannina and consisted of the 67th, 68th and 69th Infantry Regiments, one battalion of Sharpshooters,
one Cavalry company, one company of Pioneers, one Border Guard battalion, three machine gun
companies, each with four machine guns (one for each Infantry regiment) and various auxiliary services
(Red Crescent, Transport, Orderlies, Clerks, Telegraph Operators). Starting on 5 October, the greater part

of these forces began moving towards Philippias and Preveza, while at the same time the border posts
were reinforced.
Furthermore, starting on 18 September, the 23rd Reserve Division (of reduced strength) was also
mobilized at Ioannina, and from 7 October it began to move forward a part of its force to the area of the
village of Ammotopos.
As for Turkish artillery, apart from the artillery of the fortified position of Ioannina (which had been
reinforced with twenty out-dated Krupp guns), the Turks also had available one other Field Artillery
regiment with twenty-four guns, and one Pack Artillery battalion with eight guns. The latter, however,
departed for Monastir on 27 September.
In addition to the aforementioned units of the regular army, the establishment of various irregular bands
was planned, to be composed of combat-experienced Turk-Albanians with a total strength of
approximately three to five thousand men.
The total strength of the Turkish Army came to approximately 20,000 men; it was subordinate to the Army
Corps of Ioannina under Esat Pasha.
In the meantime, the Turks were energetically organizing the defense of Ioannina and Preveza, with
particular importance placed upon the forts of Bizani and Kastritsa (south of Ioannina), while in the area of
Pente Pegadia they were constructing entrenchments and installing barbed wire.
The Operations towards Gribovo and Ammotopos
(Sketch-map 16)
163.
The Commander of the Army of Epirus, in accordance with the order issued by the Ministry of the
Army (which informed him that, as of 5 October, Greece was in a state of war with Turkey), issued an
operation order on the same day; it provided for a resolute defense of the positions occupied in the event
of enemy attack, until conditions permitted to revert to the offensive. No noteworthy event had taken place
by that evening.
On the night of 5-6 October, the High Command of the Army of Epirus decided that an attack would be
delivered the following day to drive back enemy troops which were stationed along the line of the
Arachthos river, so that the Army could occupy the most economic and naturally fortified defensive line
west of the village of Gribovo, and provide broad coverage for the vital area of Arta.
The area between the rivers Arachthos and Louros, where the struggle would be transferred, is divided by
the mountain range of Xerovouni, which runs from north to south. This range, to the south of Summit
1607, divides into two branches: the western, which passes through the heights of Valaora, running as far
as Philippias, and the eastern, which passes through the heights of Gorgomylos and the Kiapha saddle,
and then from Summit 1082 down is divided into ridges which cover the Arta road-junction and are known
by the names of Kilberine, Gribovo and Progono. Almost the entire area is rocky, with precipitous cliffs
towards the Arachthos and less steep ones towards the Louros river.
164.
At 1400 on 6 October, in torrential rain, troops of the 7th Evzone Battalion, with supporting
artillery fire, began to cross the Arta bridge practically unopposed; by nightfall they had deployed security
elements at the Gribovo heights, since the Turkish outposts had been put to flight following the first
artillery shots. Further north, at the bridge spanning the Arachthos near the village of Plaka, the Turks had
been forced by a Greek attack in the early morning of the same day to abandon their positions and
withdraw towards Ioannina. Residents of the neighboring villages of Platanoussa and Monolithi
contributed to the success of the operation by pursuing the Turks beyond the ridge of Xerovouni.
That evening the Commander of the Army of Epirus issued an order to advance: the bulk of the Army of
Epirus was to move to the area west of the Arachthos on the following morning, and remain there until it
received new orders. Also, he cabled to the prime minister requesting reinforcements of 10,000 men in
order to continue offensive operations to the north. His request was not approved, however, because it
was contrary to the decision which had already been taken regarding the general allocation of forces and
according to which it was planned that the greatest part of the forces would be assigned to Macedonia,
where the main effort would be.
165.
On the morning of 7 October, in accordance with an order issued by Headquarters, the 15th
Regiment (minus Battalion II), the 10th Evzone Battalion and the Cavalry Company crossed the Arta

bridge and continued northward. In the meantime, the Greek outposts came under the fire of Turkish
troops of the 23rd (active) Division that occupied the heights near the village of Kampe. The Turkish force
had moved forward to Philippias on 6 October and occupied the area of the Kalogeros bridge and the
heights of the village of Kampe, positions which blocked the routes towards Philippias and Ioannina.
At the same time, considerable movements of Turkish troops of the Reserve Division of Ioannina were
noted from Pente Pegadia towards the village of Ammotopos.
Following these events, the Headquarters of the Army of Epirus decided that its forces should be
deployed defensively at the heights of Gribovo and at the Kiapha saddle.
The defense at the heights of Gribovo was assigned to the Gribovo Detachment under the commander of
the 15th Infantry Regiment, which included the 15th Regiment (minus Battalion II) and the 10th Evzone
Battalion; the defense of the Kiapha defile was assigned to the Kiapha Detachment, which was composed
of the 7th Evzone Battalion and one pack battery.
The 3rd Independent Evzone Battalion was ordered to seize the heights east of the village of Anogeio.
The 3rd Evzone Battalion (minus the Agnanta Company) was ordered to assemble at Arta, where
Battalion II/15 and the 2nd National Guard Battalion were also located as a reserve force.
The aforementioned troop movements were completed by the evening of 8 October.
In addition, Headquarters requested of the Ministry of the Navy that the coast of Epirus be subjected to a
naval blockade; this, however, had already been carried out by the Ionian Sea Navy Squadron which was
present in the area.
166.
On 9 October, the Gribovo Detachment came under artillery fire, while the Kiapha Detachment,
which occupied the village of Ammotopos, opened fighting with the Turkish troops that were holding the
heights of Kastri and Gorgomylos. This battle continued throughout the day, with no substantial result
owing to the resolute resistance put up by the enemy.
However, from the morning of the following day, 10 October, the Turks launched successive impetuous
counterattacks using strong forces, thereby forcing the Kiapha Detachment to abandon its positions and
to fall back by evening to the heights at Kilberine, Tsouka (Hill 893) and Pyrgos.
The Gribovo Detachment was not disturbed throughout that day, except by artillery fire.
The same day, the Headquarters of the Army of Epirus established, on the extreme left, a third joint
detachment comprising Battalion II/15, the 3rd and 10th Evzone Battalions and one pack battery under
the commander of the 3rd Evzone Battalion, with the mission of securing the plains sector in the area of
Kalogeros bridge, because enemy movements were being observed there. In reality, however, the Turks
were assembling their forces in the area of the village of Kampe. That night, aided by adverse weather
conditions, they approached the positions of the Gribovo Detachment at Hill 459 quietly, and using men
who knew the Greek language, managed to deceive and neutralize the sentries, resulting in the Greek
troops there being caught by surprise and put to disorderly flight, so that the hill came under the control of
the Turks.
The Turks launched a similar night offensive further south at Hill 342, which, however, was repelled with
success, the troops of the 15th Regiment there firmly retaining their positions.
At the same time, Turkish forces entered the village of Ammotopos, arrested the Christian residents who
had not managed to escape, and murdered them after brutally torturing them. The Turks plundered the
village and set it afire.
Further north, on the right side of the Greek disposition, the 3rd Independent Evzone Battalion occupied
the village of Anogeio at about midnight, without meeting any serious resistance.
167.
The dawn of 11 October found the Gribovo Detachment troops who were at the heights of
Kilberine in an extremely poor condition. Continuing inclement weather, hardships and the withdrawal
from Ammotopos had shaken the morale of the men, many of whom began to abandon their positions.
A significant number of men serving in front-line companies, almost all belonging to pack transportation
units, together with the residents of the area began to leave for the rear, racing in the direction of the Arta
bridge. The bad weather conditions exacerbated the confusion.
After this, the Headquarters of the Army of Epirus reinforced the 3rd Evzone Battalion, which was in the
area of Arta, with two companies of the 10th Evzone Battalion and one pack battery, and ordered it to
rush to the area of the village of Gribovo so as to help the troops defending there. The 3rd Evzone
Battalion, after crossing the Arachthos by way of the Arta bridge, reached Gribovo shortly before noon,

where it found the troops of the 15th Infantry Regiment engaged in a tough battle to repel successive
Turkish attacks.
A successful Greek counterattack was launched in the direction of Hill 459, and the Turks were forced to
withdraw towards the village of Kampe.
Further north, the Turks attempted to recapture the village of Anogeio, but were repelled successfully by
the Greek troops there; in the end the Turks were forced to abandon the area of Pente Pegadia and
withdraw north towards the village of Pesta. But the 3rd Independent Evzone Battalion, acting on an order
issued by Headquarters, abandoned the village of Anogeio that night in order to move to the village of
Plaka and secure the bridge spanning the Arachthos.
Thus the Greek troops, following a tough, wavering battle which lasted the entire day of 11 October,
managed to repel all of the forceful attacks of the Turks and to firmly maintain their positions west of the
Arachthos river.
The Withdrawal of the Turks- The Liberation of Philippias
(Sketch-maps 16 and 17)
168.
On the morning of 12 October, the Headquarters of the Army of Epirus issued an order which
called for Gribovo to be held at all costs, and assigned its defense to the 15th Regiment (minus Battalion
II), which was already there, reinforcing it with the 7th and 10th Evzone Battalions.
The 3rd Evzone Battalion, using a two-company force, was to secure the defile near the village of
Korphovouni, while the rest of the battalion's strength would remain at its position as a local reserve force.
From reconnaissance missions carried out throughout the course of that day in the direction of the
Kalogeros bridge, Philippias and the heights at Kilberine, Tsouka (Hill 893) and Pyrgos, it was ascertained
that the Turks had abandoned their positions during the night and had withdrawn hurriedly northward.
After this unexpected development and following an oral order issued by Headquarters, Battalion I/15,
supported by a pack battery, moved quickly and liberated the village of Kampe; at the same time Battalion
II/15 liberated Philippias without meeting any resistance. Further north, the 3rd Evzone Battalion deployed
at the height of Manou Pegadi.
On the next day, 13 October, troops of the 3rd and 10th Evzone Battalions occupied the heights at Tsouka
and Pyrgos without meeting any resistance. Elements of the 3rd Evzone Battalion moved forward to the
Kiapha defile and from there to the village of Ammotopos where they encamped.
169.
On 14 October Headquarters issued an order according to which two sectors -the Left and the
Right- would be established, in place of the Gribovo and Kiapha Detachments and the sector of the
plains.
Command of the Left Sector (the 15th Regiment and one pack artillery battery) was assigned to the
commander of the 15th Regiment, Lieutenant Colonel (Inf) Georgios Polymenakos. The sector's mission
was to capture the heights north of the village of Agios Georgios in order to control the Philippias-Ioannina
road.
Command of the Right Sector (3rd, 7th, 10th Evzone Battalions and two pack artillery batteries) was
assigned to the commander of the 3rd Evzone Battalion, Lieutenant Colonel (Inf) Alexandros Kontoules.
The mission was to capture the line formed by the heights Kastri-Gorgomylos-Tsouka (Summit 1429).
The entire 3rd Inpedendent Evzone Battalion was to move forward to the area of the village of Anogeio
and link up on its left with the troops of the Right Sector at Tsouka height (Summit 1429).
The 2nd National Guard Battalion would remain in the village of Chanopoulo as a general reserve force.
Until the night of 14 October, the Army of Epirus had moved its disposition forward without encountering
enemy resistance. It occupied the line formed by the villages of Pantanassa and Agios Georgios, the
heights of Gorgomylos and Lakka Pegadia, and the bridge of Plaka.
On the same day Headquarters relocated at the village of Chanopoulo, where it issued the following
congratulatory order to the Army of Epirus regarding its successful battles to that time:
Officers and Soldiers,
I am satisfied with you. For eight days of almost continuous fighting, all of you -with very few exceptions,
fortunately- managed to endure, with enviable stamina and perseverance, not only the hardships brought
on by the marches and the fighting against the enemy, but also the tribulations and privations brought on
by the wretchedness of the weather. Within a period of eight days you conquered a great area of the

countryside from Preveza to Ioannina, and as victors you entered Philippias, Louros and Strevina1 and
very many villages in the area, restoring liberty to thousands of unredeemed brethren. I am proud to
command Soldiers of such sentiment and such endurance.
I am satisfied with you because you did not fall short of the achievements of the Army of Thessaly, which
is progressing as well, at the rapid pace of a conqueror, towards the liberation of the land which has been
enslaved for four hundred years.
When the time comes for new trials, I am certain that you will readily endure these with the same
perseverance and zeal, because above all you know that whatever you do, it will be for the success and
glory of our beloved Homeland.
Arta 14-X-12

Sapountzakes

On the night of 14 October a telegram arrived from the Ministry of the Army informing Headquarters that a
regiment of Cretans (the Cretan Independent Regiment), with a strength of about 2,000 men, would be
departing from Piraeus that day at midnight to reinforce the Army of Epirus.
170.
On 15 and 16 October, the Greek troops remained in their positions and occupied themselves
mainly with regrouping and improving their positions.
At the same time, in accordance with an order from the Army of Epirus Headquarters, a detachment was
formed composed of Volunteer Scout elements and a company from the Arta barracks; it was placed
under the command of First Lieutenant (Eng) Demetrios Botsares, and was ordered to move to western
Epirus and secure the area between Souli and the sea (the area of the Acheron river) from the activities
there of Turk-Albanian gangs.
In order to secure the left (southwest) flank of the entire disposition from the direction of Preveza, another
detachment was established in the Left Sector. It was composed of two companies of Battalion III/15 and
one pack artillery battery, under Major (Eng) Panagiotes Speliades, which moved forward to the village of
Louros where it was reinforced with 100 men from the Arta barracks.
Further north the 3rd Inpedendent Evzone Battalion moved forward to Kalyvia Kokkale, and reported to
Headquarters from there that strong Turkish forces had begun to return to their old positions at Pente
Pegadia.
Meanwhile a Cretan volunteer band, which had arrived at the island of Leucas on the previous day,
departed for Epirus on the morning of 16 October; on the same day another Cretan volunteer band was
departing from Piraeus for Leucas.
There were other bands in Epirus besides these two, and their strength totalled approximately 1,000 men,
with leaders who were experienced and tested in war. Their mission was to scout out the terrain and to
reinforce the Greeks of Northern Epirus in their struggle against the Turk-Albanian gangs which were
ravaging the countryside.
171.
On 17 October, in the area of the village of Anogeio, the outposts of the 3rd Inpedendent Evzone
Battalion clashed with a small Turkish element which withdrew, following a brief exchange of fire.
In the afternoon the Turks attempted to penetrate to the rear of the position of Anogeio and to move
forward towards the Tsouka height, but were repelled.
The Cretan Independent Regiment, which had departed from Piraeus for Epirus on the night of 14
October, in the morning of the next day began to disembark in the area of the village of Kopraina, and in
the early afternoon set out on a march towards Arta.
The Headquarters of the Army of Epirus, which, in the meantime, had returned to Arta, ordered the 2nd
National Guard Battalion along with one pack artillery battery to advance to the village of Gribovo and link
up with the troops of the Right Sector.
172.
On the morning of 18 October, the Turks moved forward towards the southeast and small
elements of theirs entered the village of Gorgomylos. However, a band of Volunteer Scouts intervened
immediately and after a brief skirmish managed to put them to flight and to recapture the village.
Further north, the Turks entered the village of Anogeio, which was deserted, and proceeded towards the
east. When they reached the outskirts of the settlement of Kalyvia Kokkale, they came under heavy fire
from the outposts of the 3rd Inpedendent Evzone Battalion. Attempts made on the part of the Turks to
capture the settlement failed, thanks to the resolute resistance of the Evzone battalion.

However, despite its successful repulsing of the Turkish offensive, the 3rd Inpedendent Evzone Battalion
withdrew throughout the night behind the position of Kalyvia Zarkada, on the initiative of its commander,
because he had deemed that it was unsafe for his unit to remain in its forward position.
For the following day, 19 October, Headquarters ordered that Major Speliades' Detachment, which was in
the village of Louros, be reinforced with the remaining force of Battalion III/15, two field batteries, the 300man-strong Cretan Volunteer Scout Band under their leader Manos and a field surgery hospital, and that
it move towards Preveza so as to attack and liberate Preveza on 20 October.
It also ordered the commander of the Right Sector to capture the Gorgomylos crest line and the village of
Anogeio, using the 10th Evzone Battalion and the 3rd Inpedendent Evzone Battalion, and to be in
readiness with his remaining forces to move towards Pente Pegadia.
173.
The required movements of the units took place on 19 October, in accordance with the
aforementioned order issued by Headquarters. Thus in the evening Major Speliades' Detachment
reached the area to the north of the village of Nea Sampsous, where it spent the night, while the Epirotan
Scout bands operating there moved forward to the village of Kanali. The 10th Evzone Battalion occupied
the eastern heights of the villages of Gorgomylos and Anogeio without meeting enemy resistance. The
3rd Inpedendent Evzone Battalion moved to the village of Plaka, where it left a company, and with its
remaining force reached the village of Agnanta that afternoon.
During the same day, the Headquarters of the Army of Epirus ordered the commander of the Left Sector
to execute, on the following day, a feint reconnaissance in force between the roads from Philippias to
Thesprotikon and from Philippias to Ioannina, using two of his companies, with the aim of deceiving the
Turks regarding the true intentions of the Army of Epirus. The real objectives were the liberation of
Preveza and the conducting of operations against the naturally fortified position of Pente Pegadia. It also
made known to the officer commanding the gunboats in the Ambracian gulf and the commander of the
Ionian Sea Naval Squadron that an attack against Preveza would begin the next day at 0630; it would
require supporting fire from the vessels.
At the same time, Major Speliades' Detachment, which was conducting operations towards Preveza,
decided to continue its movement in the direction of Nicopolis-Preveza starting at 0530 on the following
day. The Epirotan Scout bands, which had moved forward to the village of Kanali, also would head
towards Nicopolis, coordinating their movement with that of Major Speliades' Detachment.
Finally, also on 19 October, the Ministry of the Army sent an order to Army of Epirus Headquarters,
informing it that the defensive mission of the Army of Epirus henceforth had ceased, and assigning to it
the liberation of the whole of Epirus.
The Battle of Nicopolis- The Liberation of Preveza
(Sketch-map 17)
174.
On the morning of 20 October, Major Speliades' Detachment continued its movement towards
Nicopolis, with a company of Battalion III/15, reinforced by a Cavalry platoon, as its advance guard. After
a march of some five kilometers, the advance guard of the detachment came under heavy fire from
Turkish forward elements, as well as under artillery fire from the fort batteries at Nicopolis. At the same
time an armed Turkish steamboat, which was sailing parallel to the coast, opened fire with machine guns
on the Greek troops.
The concentrated fire of the Turks, particularly that from the steamboat, took the moving Greek troops by
surprise, and for a moment the threat of confusion and disorder arose. However, the commander of the
6th Battery saved the situation by deploying his guns on the road -without delay and with no cover- and
with one platoon firing at the steamboat, which was sunk by the first shots, and with the other platoon
firing at the Nicopolis fort batteries and forcing them to suspend their firing.
Then Major Speliades' Detachment reinforced its advance guard with one more company and, after
overthrowing the Turkish forward defenses, moved with all of its forces towards Nicopolis, where the
Turks' main line of defense was located. At this last line the Turks put up a resolute resistance but, faced
with the Greek troops' offensive momentum and accurate artillery fire, were forced in the end, at about
noon that day, to abandon their positions and withdraw towards the south. And while Major Speliades'
Detachment was capturing the Turkish fort batteries of Nicopolis, the Epirotan Scout bands, which were

operating further west, were taking possession of the Turkish fort batteries at Mytika. Thus, after a brief
but tough battle, Nicopolis was liberated and the way was cleared for the liberation of Preveza as well.
The detachment's attack towards Nicopolis was also aided by the Ionian Sea Naval Squadron, mainly
through supporting fire which it directed at the Turkish fort batteries of Nicopolis.
The Turkish torpedo boat Attaleia, which had been blockaded in the bay of Nicopolis, was scuttled by its
own crew so that it would not be seized by the Greeks. A few days later, however, it was raised and on 7
November it was towed first to Preveza and from there to the Naval Station, where, after it was repaired
and armed, it was renamed Nikopolis and incorporated in the Hellenic Fleet.
175.
The Greek victory at Nicopolis and the accurate artillery fire against the Fortress of Preveza,
which took place during the afternoon of 20 October, had a deep effect on the inhabitants of the town and
shook the morale of the Turkish garrison. The consuls of the Great Powers visited the commander of the
Turkish forces and advised him to surrender the city, since resistance was now deemed futile.
This proposal was accepted and surrender negotiations began, resulting in an agreement that the
surrender would take place the next day at 1100.
Following the aforementioned agreement, from the morning of 21 October all Turkish posts in Preveza
hoisted white flags. At midday the commander of the Ionian Sea Naval Squadron, Captain (HRN) Ioannes
Damianos, entered the port of Preveza with two vessels, while a short time later Major Speliades'
Detachment also entered the town and disarmed the 810-man force of the Turkish garrison. The Turkish
prisoners were transported to the island of Leucas by ship.
The Greek casualties at the battle of Nicopolis totalled 10 killed and 54 wounded.
The Liberation of Pente Pegadia
(Sketch-map 16)
176.
At the same time that Major Speliades' Detachment and the Epirotan Scout bands were liberating
Preveza, the Greek troops in the area of Xerovouni were being reinforced and were taking the necessary
measures to complete their new mission, which was the campaign to liberate the whole of Epirus from the
Turkish yoke.
Thus the Cretan Independent Regiment (minus Battalion II), which had left Arta and was commanded by
Colonel (Inf) Lampros Synaniotes, arrived on 21 October at the village of Pantanassa, where it relieved
troops of the 15th Infantry Regiment there and in the village of Agios Georgios; the latter returned to their
regiment stationed at the height of Valaora. Also on that day the 2nd National Guard Battalion and the 7th
Evzone Battalion moved forward to the height at Tsouka. The 10th Evzone Battalion moved further north
and occupied positions at the height of Lakka Pegadia, while the 3rd Inpedendent Evzone Battalion
returned to the village of Anogeio.
Furthermore, the commander of the Army of Epirus, who on 21 October visited Preveza and returned to
Arta on the same day, ordered the commander of the Right Sector (north) to reconnoiter the routes
leading to Pente Pegadia, in order that future operations from the south against this position would be
coordinated with operations by troops of the Right Sector.
177.
As a result of the battles of the Army of Epirus up to that point, a wide and strong bridgehead had
been created in the vital area of Arta. The resolute occupation of the heights of Gribovo and the Kiapha
pass, as well as the movement of strong forces forward, west of the river Louros, secured for the High
Command of the Army of Epirus an exceptional base from which to conduct operations towards the north
and northwest.
Moreover, the liberation of Preveza opened a new and shorter route of resupply and reinforcement for the
Army of Epirus, which henceforth could be served by sea transport and also by small sailboats via the
navigable Louros river, as far as Philippias.
178.
Meanwhile, as the Army of Epirus continued its preparations for an attack towards the north,
Turkish forces of a strength of about five battalions, which had returned to Pente Pegadia from the area of
Ioannina, began to deploy for battle on the morning of 22 October. After a brief artillery preparation, these
forces attacked the Greek positions of the Right Sector (north), directing their main effort towards the
village of Anogeio. A tough battle ensued, during which the Greek troops countered with a stubborn

resistance. By night they had successfully managed to repel all enemy attacks and to firmly maintain their
positions.
On the morning of the following day, 23 October, the Turks repeated their operations with a surprise
attack carried out by a force of about battalion size against the right flank of the Greek disposition at
Summit 1614 (Lakka Pegadia). But once again the Turkish maneuver failed and the Turkish troops were
checked in front of the Greek positions, where they became trapped the entire day. At sunset, troops of
the 10th and 3rd Inpedendent Evzone Battalions counterattacked and drove the Turks back at bayonet
point. During their withdrawal the Turks abandoned many killed and wounded.
On the same day, in the Left Sector (south), Battalion II of the Cretan Independent Regiment moved
forward and occupied the vitally important heights north of the village of Tsangaropoulo, which the Turks
had also tried, without success, to capture. After this, the Turkish troops withdrew yet again towards Pente
Pegadia.
179.
The Headquarters of the Army of Epirus, with a view to resuming the offensive, issued an order
on 23 October for a new organization of the front line units. It divided them into two sectors which it called
"phalanxes" (columns). Thus the Left Column, under the commander of the 15th Regiment, would include
the 15th Regiment, the 7th Evzone Battalion, two pack batteries and two field surgery hospitals, while the
Right Column, under the commander of the 3rd Evzone Battalion, would include the 3rd Evzone Battalion,
the 10th Evzone Battalion, the 3rd Inpedendent Evzone Battalion, one pack battery and one field surgery
hospital. The remaining units, i.e. the Cretan Independent Regiment, the 2nd National Guard Battalion,
the Field Artillery Battalion, the Cavalry Company and the Engineer Company, remained at the disposal of
Headquarters as a reserve.
Another order from Headquarters commanded the Volunteer Scout bands to capture the ridges of
Xerovouni towards Pente Pegadia.
It was requested of the Ministry of the Army that a Gendarmerie force be sent for the security of Preveza,
and that an Ordnance Commission be organized in order to round up the materiel which was captured.
180.
On 24 October the Turks once again attacked the Greek outposts outside the village of Anogeio,
but after a short skirmish abandoned their attempt and returned to their positions.
The next day a sudden cold set in, and thick fog and continuous torrential rain made the operations of the
Army of Epirus difficult. On the same day, in the area of the outposts of the 10th Evzone Battalion, on the
northwest ridges of the height of Lakka Pegadia, the troops were affected by rumors of an alleged
advance of strong Turkish forces, and began abandoning their positions at night and heading towards the
rear. Along the way they swayed a large part of the rest of the battalion's men. The Turks did not perceive
this withdrawal, however, and took no action. On the following morning the situation was restored and all
men returned to their positions.
Also on 25 October, at the village of Anogeio, the Turks attempted to capture the northern heights but
were repelled. The battle continued the next day as well, with greater resolve, but without the Turks
scoring any success. In the meantime, Headquarters received an order from the Ministry of the Army,
according to which the former had to suspend the further forward movement of the Army of Epirus,
because the new forces which had been allocated for Epirus were now being dispatched to Kozane in
order to reinforce Division V, which had suffered a surprise attack near Amyntaion.
The commander of the Army of Epirus did not notify his units of this order because they had already
become engaged in combat; the operations continued during the days that followed as well.
181.
On 27 October a company of the 3rd Evzone Battalion at the height of Pyrgos, following brief
fighting occupied the fortified position opposite, on Summit 1032, and consolidated there. The position
dominated the south entrance to the defile of Pente Pegadia.
Further north, the 7th and 10th Evzone battalions, after repelling repeated attacks by the Turks (to whom
they caused significant casualties), in the end launched a counterattack the result of which was the
withdrawal of the enemy towards the village of Sklivane.
The disorderly withdrawal of the Turks influenced the rest of their disposition, and by the afternoon they
had withdrawn along the entire line of Pente Pegadia and were now conducting a rear-guard fighting.
Meanwhile, the Ministry of the Army informed the commander of the Army of Epirus of the liberation of
Thessalonica, the improvement of the situation in the sector of Division V and the movement forward of
troops to the Metsovo area. These troops, by orders of Army of Epirus Headquarters, henceforth would

participate in the coordinated attack against Ioannina. In line with this, the units were supplied with
machine guns and Headquarters issued instructions for their tactical use.
182.
From the morning of 28 October on, the Greek troops began to move forward towards the north.
After capturing Pente Pegadia, which had been abandoned by the enemy, the troops continued their
movement in the afternoon and by night reached and deployed at the north entrance of the defile of Pente
Pegadia, without encountering any serious enemy resistance.
Greek casualties during the six days of fighting totalled one officer and twenty-five enlisted men killed,
and five officers and 217 enlisted men wounded.
In the days that followed, the troops were occupied with improving their positions and completing their
movement forward further to the north of Pente Pegadia. Thus on the night of 31 October, they had
occupied the line from the village of Pentolakkos to the village of Varlaam, to the southern heights of
Sklivane village, and to the height of Lakka Pegadia; small elements of Volunteer Scouts and one
company of Evzones moved forward as far as Manoliasa, where they deployed without encountering
enemy resistance.
183.
The expectation of reinforcements and the heavy winter which had begun by then, forced the
commander of the Army of Epirus, at the beginning of November, to suspend offensive operations and
maintain a defensive stance until 20 November. The Turks maintained a similar stance. During this period,
both opponents preoccupied themselves with the improvement of their positions and developed intensive
patrol action.
The Headquarters of the Army of Epirus moved forward from Arta to Pente Pegadia.
The Volunteer Scout troops and the Evzone company which had moved forward as far as Manoliasa
following the occupation of Pente Pegadia, came under attack on 1 November by Turkish forces. As a
result, they withdrew and occupied positions at the heights of the Lesser Olitsikas range. The next day,
owing to the continuing enemy attack, they were forced to withdraw towards the village of Pentolakkos.
An attempt on the part of the Turks to continue towards the south was repulsed successfully by the Greek
troops that were deployed in the area of the villages of Pentolakkos and Melia.
On 7 November, troops of the 15th Regiment reoccupied the heights of Lesser Olitsikas, without
encountering serious enemy resistance.
In the meantime, the reinforcement of the Army of Epirus continued, mainly with artillery sent from the
interior of the country. According to available information, the Turkish Army had been significantly
reinforced as well.
The Liberation of Cheimarra
(Sketch-map 15)
184.
The Greek government intended to extend the penetration of Greek troops into Northern Epirus,
where, on the basis of ethnological criteria, it expected the northwest boundaries of the new state to run.
Accordingly, in early October it sent Major of the Gendarmerie Spyros Spyromelios, who hailed from
Cheimarra, to the island of Corfu, with orders to organize Volunteer bands in Northern Epirus, to arrange
the gradual arming of the Christian inhabitants and to come to an understanding with the Albanian beys
on the voluntary submission of the Albanian-speaking population to the Hellenic Army. At the same time,
the Greek government ordered the commander of the Army of Epirus to give the aforementioned officer
all assistance possible for the fulfilment of his mission.
In the meantime, the political situation changed and Turkey submitted armistice proposals directly to the
countries with which it was in a state of war, asking that negotiations begin for a permanent end to the
hostilities.
The Greek government deemed it politically expedient that, before the start of negotiations, the Hellenic
Army should advance in Northern Epirus and reach the furthest point claimed by Greece. In this spirit, on
2 November, it ordered the commander of the Army of Epirus to proceed with the liberation of Cheimarra,
by 4 November at the latest, with a Volunteer band under the command of Major of the Gendarmerie
Spyromelios.
185.
The following day, 3 November, by order of the commander of the Army of Epirus, 200 Cretan
volunteers embarked on the ship Acheloos at Kopraina and headed for Corfu, where, in the early hours of
5 November, the Volunteer band which had been organized there also embarked and sailed for

Cheimarra. The disembarkation of the troops began at 0730 that day at Spelia Bay of Cheimarra, without
any resistance.
The landing force troops were divided into two groups. The Cretan Volunteer group headed towards the
south sector of the city and the other one, with a small number of volunteers from Cheimarra, moved
towards the north sector; it was the first to reach the Governor's Palace, where it came under fire from
Turkish soldiers. At about the same time, the Cretan group arrived. A small clash ensued, which ended
with the surrender of the Turks.
Immediately afterwards, the commander of the landing force, Spyros Spyromelios, entered the city and
hoisted the Greek flag at the Governor's Palace, amid wild expressions of enthusiasm from the residents.
Then he issued proclamations to the residents of the area, calling on them to defend liberty and advising
submission to and respect for the laws.
At the same time, he dispatched two Cretan Volunteer Scout bands, with a strength of about 100 men, to
the mountain pass of Logara, to the northwest of Cheimarra. Their mission was to secure the city against
any enemy threat from the direction of Aulon (Valona). However, armed Turk-Albanians from surrounding
villages, who refused to surrender to the Greek bands, had already occupied the mountain pass. A Greek
attack, which was launched on 12 November, did not succeed and so the Logara pass remained under
the occupation of the Turk-Albanians.
Meanwhile, there was positive information that the Albanian bey Ismail Kemal Vljora, at the instigation of
Italy and Austria, was assembling forces and was preparing to declare the autonomy of Albania, which
eventually he did, on 15 November. Acting on this information, on 13 November the Ministry of the Army
reinforced the Greek troops at Cheimarra with one company from the Corfu garrison.
The Liberation of Metsovo
(Sketch-map 18)
186.
On 16 October, the Ministry of the Army informed the Headquarters of the Army of Thessaly and
Epirus that a Turk-Albanian gang had attacked the village of Megalo Peristeri and was moving towards
Metsovo.
Following this, the Headquarters of the Army of Thessaly formed a detachment of about 350 men (the
Metsovo Detachment) under the commander of the Garrison Artillery Battalion of Larissa, Lieutenant
Colonel (Arty) Stamatios Metsas, with the mission of liberating and securing Metsovo.
As a parallel measure, on 19 October the Ministry of the Army dispatched a band of Cretan Volunteer
Scouts, about 250 men, to Kalampaka by rail, with orders that they be attached to the Metsovo
Detachment.
On 29 October the Metsovo Detachment reached the village of Malakasi and was placed under the orders
of the commander of the Army of Epirus.
Meanwhile, there was information that the Turkish force stationed at Metsovo amounted to approximately
250 men and was supported by two field guns.
The Detachment departed from the village of Malakasi on the morning of 30 October, with the band of
Cretan Volunteer Scouts in the lead. At 1430 the troops that were ahead reached the Katara pass, where
they linked up with a band of Epirotan Volunteers from the village of Melia.
From brief reconnaissance it was ascertained that the largest part of the Turkish garrison had been
deployed at the northeast and southeast outskirts of the city of Metsovo, while a force of about fifty men
had moved forward to the height of Zygos.
The commander of the Metsovo Detachment ordered a frontal attack, while the band of Epirotan
Volunteers would move offensively towards the height of Karakasi, to the west of the city.
The attack was launched at 0630 on 31 October. A tough battle ensued which lasted until the afternoon.
The result was the liberation of Metsovo and the capture of three officers and forty-two enlisted men of
the Turkish army. In addition, two guns and substantial quantities of materiel were captured.
A counterattack which was launched by the Turkish force occupying the Zygos height against the
southern flank of the Greek troops was repelled successfully, and the Turks were forced to withdraw
towards Ioannina. Their casualties totalled fifteen killed and wounded, and ten prisoners.
187.
Meanwhile, in the area of Zagorochoria, Turk-Albanian gangs were carrying out unprecedented
acts of cruelty, pillage and arson in the villages. Consequently, on the morning of 2 November a band of

Epirotan Volunteers moved to protect the villages there. At the same time, strong security measures were
taken towards the west and north, because of information that Turkish troops were moving from those
directions towards Metsovo.
Indeed, on 3 November two Turkish battalions moved from Ioannina to recapture Metsovo.
On 8 November one of the Turkish battalions reached the heights of Saranta Raches and Tria Chania,
where it was blocked by elements of the Metsovo Detachment. The following morning the Metsovo
Detachment launched a strong and successful attack against the Turkish positions.
In the afternoon the Turks began to withdraw in disorder towards the southwest, leaving behind on the
battlefield 128 killed and wounded, as well as all of their equipment and pack transportation.
The second Turkish battalion, along with 400 irregular troops, moved from the area of Zagoria. After
clashing with the band of Epirotan Volunteers and capturing the villages of Flambourari and Neo
Amarousi, in the afternoon of 10 November, it moved forward as far as the first ridges of Tsouka, at a
distance of two kilometers from Metsovo, seeking to encircle the Metsovo Detachment from the northeast.
Faced with this situation, two companies of the Metsovo Detachment attacked from the southeast, while
other Volunteer Scout bands were deployed at the heights of Tsouka and Katara in order to check the
Turkish envelopment. In the meantime, the Greek troops were reinforced by other volunteer bands and
the fighting was generalized.
The Turks, under stifling pressure, gradually began to withdraw and were put to disorderly flight a short
time later, leaving behind on the battlefield 72 killed and wounded as well as significant quantities of
materiel. The Greek casualties during the liberation of Metsovo and the battles which followed totalled
nine killed and 31 wounded.
For the reinforcement of the Metsovo garrison, the Ministry of the Army ordered on 12 November that one
infantry battalion and one battery from Athens be immediately dispatched to the area, as well as the
Garibaldine Corps (about 1,300 men, led by General Garibaldi himself) from Trikala, the Greek Redshirt
Corps under Alexandros Romas (two battalions) from the area of Grevena and the Western Macedonia
Detachment (four Infantry battalions and one band of Cretan Volunteers) from the Siatista-Neapolis area.
CHAPTER 8
The Reinforcement of the Army of Epirus and
Operations to 15 December 1912
The Reassignment of Division II to Epirus
and the Preparation for a General Attack
(Sketch-maps 15 and 19)
188.
Immediately following the liberation of Thessalonica, the Greek government, in its effort to liberate
Epirus and terminate as quickly as possible the operations there, decided to reinforce the Army of Epirus
with forces from Macedonia.
Within this framework and following consultations between the Ministry of the Army and the commander
of the Army of Thessaly, Division II (minus the 7th Infantry Regiment, which had been given the mission of
liberating the Aegean Sea islands) was ordered to move from Thessalonica to Preveza by steamship, and
to be attached to the Headquarters of the Army of Epirus.
The disembarkation of Division II at Preveza took place between 19 and 25 November. The division was
immediately moved forward to the area of Chani Terovou, 25 kilometers north of Philippias.
189.
At the same time, the Headquarters of the Army of Epirus, at whose disposal a squadron of three
airplanes had been placed, having decided to attack Ioannina, made the necessary movements and
preparations of units, organized ammunition and provisions supply depots, developed new
communications centers as well as hospitals for both men and animals, and assigned routes to serve the
movement and resupply of units. In addition, it established two independent detachments to support the
main operation from the flanks and the rear.
One of these (the Olitsikas Detachment) was deployed west of the assembly area of Division II, in the
area of Mount Olitsikas, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel (Eng) Chrestos Malamos; it was
composed of the Volunteer bands operating there and two companies of Evzones. On 25 November this
detachment, in a surprise attack, liberated Eleutherochori and Skala Paramythias and cut off Ioannina's

communication with western Epirus. Subsequently, the detachment was reinforced with one National
Guard company and was attached to Division II.
The second independent detachment (the Pramanta Detachment) assembled east of the river Arachthos
in the area of the village of Pramanta, under Colonel (Arty) Aristoteles Korakas; it was composed of the
Volunteer Scout bands operating there, one Evzone company and one Engineer company. Its mission
was to secure the Pramanta-Kalarites area and to assist the main operations of the Army of Epirus
against Ioannina from the direction of the village of Daphnoula.
190.
The new grouping of the Army of Epirus for the attack against Ioannina was the following:
- Left (west): Division II, under Major General Konstantinos Kallares, comprising the 3rd Infantry
Regiment, Infantry Battalion II/7, the divisional Cavalry, one Field Artillery battalion, two Mountain Artillery
batteries, one Engineer company and other smaller units.
- At the center: Joint Detachment B, under Lieutenant Colonel (Inf) Lampros Synaniotes, comprising the
Cretan Independent Regiment, the 15th Infantry Regiment, one Cavalry platoon, one Artillery battalion,
one Mountain Artillery battery, one Engineer platoon and other smaller units.
- Right (east): Joint Detachment A, under Lieutenant Colonel (Inf) Alexandros Kontoules, comprising the
3rd, 7th and 10th Evzone battalions, the 3rd Inpedendent Evzone Battalion, one Mountain Artillery
battalion, one Engineer platoon and other smaller units.
- Reserves (at the disposal of the Commander of the Army of Epirus): One Cavalry company (minus a
platoon), one Field Artillery battalion, one Heavy Artillery battery, one Engineer two-company unit, the
airplane squadron and other smaller units.
The Landing at Agioi Saranta
(Sketch-map 20)
191.
The Headquarters of the Army of Epirus, in preparing for a general attack against Ioannina and
seeking to support it with secondary operations, from 21 October repeatedly suggested to the Ministry of
the Army that Volunteer Scout bands be dispatched to the areas of Delvino and Argyrokastro. Its requests
were not satisfied, as there were no available forces. Instead, following an order issued by the Ministry of
the Army, as of 22 November a two-company force was assigned for the reinforcement of the troops
which had disembarked at Cheimarra.
However, with security in the area of Cheimarra being restored and in view of incoming information
regarding the rapid expansion of the Albanian movement for autonomy, the Ministry of the Army decided
that the 1st Regiment of Division II (two battalions), which had reached Preveza on 20 November, should
disembark at Agioi Saranta (Santi Quaranta).
192.
The convoy sailed into Agioi Saranta on the morning of 24 November. Landing began at once,
without any resistance, since the Turkish Gendarmerie force there had been put to flight towards Delvino
after the warships fired their first rounds.
Meanwhile, the Ministry of the Army informed the landing detachment that an Infantry two-company force
and one Pack Artillery battery had sailed from Chios for its reinforcement, and determined that the landing
detachment advance as quickly as possible towards Delvino and Argyrokastro. It was to be supported by
Spyromelios' force, already present at Cheimarra.
The Pack Artillery battery arrived at Agioi Saranta on 27 November and the following morning the
detachment moved towards Delvino. However, when it reached the river Kaliasiotikos, strong forces of
Turk-Albanians, supported by artillery, launched a surprise attack, forcing the detachment to withdraw to
Agioi Saranta. There it once again embarked on the vessels and departed for Corfu instead of Preveza,
as had been ordered by the Ministry of the Army. For his action, the commander of the regiment was
stripped of his command.
Upon reaching Corfu the detachment was ordered to head to Preveza immediately and to be once again
integrated into Division II.
The detachment's casualties totalled some fifty men, most of whom were carried away by the current of
the river Kaliasiotikos.
The Operations towards Driskos

(Sketch-map 21)
193.
The Headquarters of the Army of Epirus, having planned the main attack against Ioannina for 26
November, ordered on 21 November that the Metsovo and Pramanta Detachments advance towards
Driskos and, by the morning of 26 November, gain contact with the fortified position of Ioannina from the
northeast, in order to pin down the Turkish forces there.
In the meantime, the battalion and the pack battery which had been sent from Athens had reached
Metsovo, as had the Garibaldine Corps and the Greek Redshirt Corps from Trikala and the Grevena area
respectively; the Western Macedonia Detachment was still expected to arrive from the Siatista-Neapolis
area.
According to an order of the Ministry of the Army, Colonel (Eng) Demetrios Matthaiopoulos was appointed
commander of all of the forces of the Metsovo area. He arrived at Metsovo and assumed the command
on 23 November.
194.
Upon reaching Metsovo, General Garibaldi opted for an independent attack, sending his son,
Pipino Garibaldi, and 500 men towards Driskos on 22 November. They reached the area northeast of the
village of Kryovryse on the afternoon of 25 November, without encountering any resistance.
On 24 November, the remaining force of the Garibaldine Corps as well as the Greek Redshirt Corps
moved towards Driskos, but without the approval of the commander of the Metsovo forces, Colonel
Matthaiopoulos, who was preparing for coordinated action with all available forces.
Following this, Colonel Matthaiopoulos ordered the four battalions of the Western Macedonia Detachment
to move towards the village of Greveniti, while the Cretan Scout Band under his command was ordered to
move towards Metsovo. On 25 November, the commander, along with the battalion and the battery that
had arrived from Athens, as well as with a medical (surgery) section, headed to the village of Chrysovitsa,
from which he ordered the Volunteer Scout bands stationed at the villages of Tristeno and Greveniti to
move towards the village of Kryovryse.
On 26 November at 0200, the Greek Redshirt Corps moved in the direction of the villages of Kryovryse
and Driskos and at daybreak launched a surprise attack against the Turkish troops occupying the heights
at Driskos. The Turks, a force about the size of a battalion, were caught off guard and were put to
disorderly flight towards the plateau of Ioannina, leaving all their materiel on the spot. The Redshirt Corps
pursued the Turks as far as the bank of Ioannina lake and in the end deployed defensively at the heights
south of the village of Mazia.
The Garibaldine Corps also arrived at Driskos in the afternoon and occupied the right (north) sector as far
as the church of Christ the Saviour, while the other troops of the Cretan Volunteer Scouts occupied
positions at the heights of Driskos further to the left (south).
195.
The Pramanta Detachment, which from 20 November had been reinforced and its strength was
now about 1,750 men, carried out its offensive operation on the morning of 23 November, simultaneously
advancing towards Papastathes bridge from the converging directions of the villages of Phraxos, Christoi
and Kalarites.
After successive attempts, the detachment managed to capture the dominant position of Lapata and the
villages of Proselio and Sirako, forcing the Turks to withdraw towards Palaiochori. There the enemy put
up resolute resistance until late into the night. During the night, however, in order to avoid encirclement
the Turks withdrew towards the northwest, leaving behind a significant amount of arms and great
quantities of ammunition.
On the morning of the next day the troops of the detachment pursued the Turks and, after crossing the
Papastathes bridge, reached the precipitous heights of Agia Paraskeue which block the passage towards
the village of Daphnoula, where the Turks had strongly organized themselves.
The Greek troops continued their offensive effort on 25 November, and by a successful maneuver from
the right (north), having been reinforced by Volunteer Scout elements of the Metsovo Detachment from
the direction of the village of Megale Gotista, forced the Turks to fall back to the line linking the villages of
Daphnoula and Gerakari, which they managed to hold until the evening; during the night, however, the
Turks withdrew from this line as well, leaving behind an abundance of war materiel.
The Greek troops became aware of the Turkish withdrawal the next morning, and continued their
advance. Upon reaching the area in front of the crest line of the old Eliokale monastery, they encountered
strong enemy resistance from forces that, in the meantime, had been reinforced with fresh troops from

Ioannina and the village of Koutselio. The Greeks thus deployed defensively at the heights west of the
villages of Daphnoula and Gerakari, in contact with the left of the Metsovo Detachment, which had
occupied the Driskos crest line.
Thus on 26 November, the Metsovo Detachment firmly occupied the heights of Driskos and the Pramanta
Detachment the heights west of the village of Daphnoula. However, the main frontal effort of the Army of
Epirus towards Ioannina did not take place, because Division II had yet to complete the assembly of its
forces.
196.
In the early morning hours of 27 November, the Metsovo and Pramanta Detachments came
under attack from strong forces of the Turkish 19th Division, which the previous day had arrived in
Ioannina from Monastir and during the night moved forward to the area of the villages of Koutselio and
Vasilike.
The outposts in the Metsovo Detachment sector, which occupied positions from the edge of the lake of
Ioannina to the monastery of the Dormition of the Virgin, delayed the Turkish forces up to the main line of
defense, which in the meantime had also been reinforced. The detachment's commander, who also
arrived at Driskos, ordered part of the reinforcements to occupy positions north of the village of Mazia, in
order to secure the pass of the same name and simultaneously to provide cover for his right.
The intense fighting lasted the entire day. The Greek troops, despite the strong pressure exerted on them,
managed to maintain their positions.
In the Pramanta Detachment sector the Greek troops repelled successive Turkish counterattacks and
maintained their positions. However, during the night the bands of Volunteer Scouts retired to rest
overnight behind the front line, with the intention of returning the following morning. The Turks, taking
advantage of the gap thus created, moved quickly and occupied the villages of Daphnoula and Gerakari,
which they then set afire.
197.
On the following day, 28 November, the Turks continued their offensive operations with greater
intensity and with their main effort directed against the monastery of the Dormition of the Virgin and the
twin hills, 1053 and 1078.
The commander of the Metsovo Detachment reported the situation to the Headquarters of the Army of
Epirus and at the same time ordered the Western Macedonia Detachment, of which two battalions had
already reached the village of Greveniti, to move as quickly as possible towards Driskos and to reinforce
the troops fighting there.
Meanwhile, the fighting continued tenaciously along the entire front. At about 1100 the Turks, following
continuous and intense counterattacks, managed to seize the Dormition of the Virgin monastery, then the
1053 and 1078 hills, and to seriously endanger the flanks of the Metsovo and Pramanta Detachments
fighting on either side, which at that point began to withdraw.
The Volunteer Scouts and Garibaldine Corps, which pulled back the furthest, crossed the river Arachthos
and moved towards Metsovo. The remaining forces withdrew towards the villages of Itia and Petra. The
battalions of the Western Macedonia Detachment, which had moved towards Driskos, returned to the
village of Tristeno. The Pramanta Detachment withdrew towards the Papastathes bridge, while the
Volunteer bands attached to it fled to the village of Pramanta.
In the meantime, the Headquarters of the Army of Epirus ordered that the frontal attack against Ioannina
be carried out by the remaining units on 29 November; the Pramanta and Metsovo Detachments were
ordered to regroup and attempt to recapture the territories they had abandoned.
The following day the Pramanta Detachment managed to regroup a part of the Cretan Scout bands and
send them forward to Palaiochori, but was unable to repeat the operation towards the village of
Daphnoula.
In the sector of the Metsovo forces, the Garibaldine Corps continued its withdrawal towards Metsovo,
while one battalion of the Western Macedonia Detachment deployed outposts along the line of the
villages Megale Gotista-Demati-Itia-Tristeno, as it had been ordered to do. The commander of the
detachment headed to the village of Chrysovitsa, where he was intensively occupied with regrouping his
troops.
Thus ended the operations of the Pramanta and Metsovo Detachments towards Driskos. They did not
yield the hoped-for results because the scheduled main effort of the Army of Epirus against Ioannina did
not take place simultaneously.

During these operations the Garibaldine Corps suffered great casualties, the result of which was a
significant reduction in its combat capability. Ultimately, following a proposal made by General Garibaldi,
the Ministry of the Army, on 3 December, ordered its demobilization and the return of the men to their
homes. Only the Greek Redshirt Corps of Alexandros Romas remained, with a strength of about 300
men. Among those in the corps who were killed was the Corfiot poet Lorentzos Maviles.
The Battle of Pesta
(Sketch-maps 19 and 21)
198.
On 20 November the Greek government informed the Headquarters of the Army of Epirus that, in
view of the negotiations to conclude peace, Ioannina would have to be captured as quickly as possible
and definitely before the decision to end hostilities.
Thus, through a series of orders, the Headquarters of the Army of Epirus prepared the attack and on 24
November issued a general operations order, according to which the date of 26 November was
determined for the launching of the offensive, as it had been estimated that the forward movement of
Division II would be completed by that day. According to Headquarters' plan of operations, Division II
would assume the main effort from the left (west), while the other units would engage the enemy forces
facing them.
The forward movement of Division II did not occur within the scheduled period of time, however, and thus
the attack was postponed. By a new order on 28 November, Headquarters determined the next morning
as the beginning of the attack. The same order altered the initial plan of operations as follows:
- Division II would attack the right (west) of the Turkish disposition, towards the direction of the village of
Manoliasa.
- Joint Detachment B would engage the sector between the villages of Myrodaphne and Pesta, in order to
fix in place the Turkish forces there. Two of the detachment's battalions would remain at Pente Pegadia
as a reserve force at the disposal of the commander of the Army of Epirus.
- Joint Detachment A, which had been assigned the main effort, would attack from the Agia Paraskeue
pass towards the heights of Aetorache, to the northeast of Pesta.
- The Olitsikas Detachment would cover the left (west) of Division II, while the Pramanta and Metsovo
Detachments would support the attack from the right (east), moving forces forward to the line of heights
east of the villages of Kastritsa and Ligiades, at the rear of the Turks.
199.
On the morning of 29 November, the commander of the Army of Epirus moved forward to Chani
Terovou, in order to follow and direct the battle from close by.
At 0800 on the same day, Division II crossed the river Louros and moved towards the village of Melia; its
movement was very slow because of the rough terrain and the incomplete preparation of the offensive.
When the first troops reached the Melia pass, they were fired by Turkish artillery fire and pinned down.
Only one battalion continued towards the village of Kopane, which it reached in the afternoon, deploying
outposts southeast of the village. At the same time, the Olitsikas Detachment, which was operating as a
screening element of the division, reached the line of the villages Agios Georgios-Kopane without
encountering enemy resistance. During the night the rest of the division's units moved through the pass
and then forward east of the village of Melia.
Joint Detachment B began its movement at daybreak on 29 November, supported by artillery fire. When
the first troops went past Hill 544, they came under intense infantry and artillery fire from enemy troops
that held the heights south of the village of Pesta. After a brief struggle the Greek troops managed to drive
back the Turks and to advance by night-time to the line formed by the villages of Myrodaphne and
Prophetes Elias, capturing two guns and abundant war materiel abandoned by the enemy. The
inhabitants of the village of Pesta received the Greek troops with unreserved enthusiasm.
Joint Detachment A moved in the direction of the Agia Paraskeue pass with the bulk of its forces;
simultaneously a force of battalion size (the 3rd Inpedendent Evzone Battalion) covered this operation
from the northeast, towards the direction of the village of Kalentzi.
Despite their initial surprise, the Turks reacted with obstinacy and countered with a strong resistance. But
the Greek troops continued their successive attacks as well, closely supported by artillery fire. After a
tough struggle which lasted until the afternoon, the attacking forces managed to drive back the enemy at
bayonet point. The Turks, in their flight towards the rear, abandoned six field guns.

At the far right, the 3rd Inpedendent Evzone Battalion, moving from the position of Kalyvia Zarkada,
reached the heights east of the village of Kalentzi, where it met strong enemy resistance and was
checked.
The Pramanta and Metsovo Detachments, as noted, owing to their withdrawal the previous day and the
need to regroup their troops, did not manage to attack towards the villages of Kastritsa and Ligiades, as
they had been ordered to do by the Headquarters of the Army of Epirus.
The Army of Epirus's casualties on 29 November were heavy and totalled one officer and 42 enlisted men
killed and eight officers and 234 enlisted men wounded.
200.
On 30 November the Hellenic Army continued its offensive effort in order to exploit its success,
but came up against the strong defensive position of Ioannina and was forced to halt its advance.
Division II deployed outposts at the approaches towards the village of Manoliasa and moved light
elements forward as far as the village of Theriakesi.
Joint Detachment B deployed at the Kaneta defile and further north as far as Hill 807.8, while
Joint Detachment A seized strategic positions on the north slopes of Aetorache, in front of Bizani Fort.
The Fortified Position of Ioannina
(Sketch-map 22)
201.
The Ioannina plateau is of elliptical shape, with a maximum length of forty kilometers as the crow
flies and a maximum width of twenty-two kilometers. Its average height above sea level is about 500
meters. At its center are to be found the city of Ioannina and the lake of the same name.
It is surrounded by high, precipitous and inaccessible mountainous masses: the mountain range of
Mitsikeli to the northeast, the heights of Driskos to the east, Aetorache and Tomaros (Olitsikas) mountain
towards the south and the hill ranges of Chintzerelos and Megale Tsouka towards the west.
The naturally fortified heights of Dourouti, Manoliasa, Augo, Bizani and Kastritsa are located in-between.
In winter the cold is severe and there is much snowfall; fog is common too, resulting in poor or no
visibility.
The road network at that time was very poor. There was only the macadam road from Arta to PhilippiasIoannina-Elaia, as well as a few secondary (carriage) mountain roads of small capacity.
202.
The naturally fortified position of Ioannina had been strengthened in peacetime with many
permanent and semi-permanent works, the construction of which had been the responsibility of the
commander of Artillery of the fort of Ioannina, Lieutenant Colonel Vehip Bey, under the supervision of a
German military mission under General Von der Goltz. Various non-permanent field fortifications (pill
boxes, trenches, barbed wire, etc.) completed and improved the defensive strength of the position.
Finally, a dense telephone network had been developed for the unobstructed provision of
telecommunications.
The main weight of the fortification had been given to the southern sector and in particular to the heights
of Manoliasa (Megale Rache, Prophetes Elias, Kastri), Augo, and Bizani (Greater and Lesser Bizani) in
order to interdict the axis Arta-Ioannina and secure the communication and supply junction of Ioannina
from this direction, from which the biggest threat was expected in the event of a war between Turkey with
Greece.
The First Attack against Manoliasa and Bizani
and the Turkish Counterattack
(Sketch-map 22)
203.
On 30 November, the commander of the Army of Epirus ordered the continuation, beginning the
next day, of offensive operations by the forces of the two flanks; in the center, Joint Detachment B would
remain in its positions in order to distract the enemy.
Specifically, the missions assigned to the troops were the following:
- Division II would continue its advance towards Agios Nikolaos, by way of Manoliasa and the valley of
Dodona.

- Joint Detachment B, remaining in its positions, would secure the defile of Kaneta.
- Joint Detachment A was to continue its attack in the direction of the village of Palaiochori, aiming at
encircling Bizani Fort from the east.
- The Olitsikas Detachment would operate towards the heights of Megale Tsouka.
- The Pramanta and Metsovo Detachments would recapture the heights of Driskos and areas further
south, and, if unable to do so, would forcefully distract the Turkish forces there.
204.
Subsequent to the above order, all units completed quickly their preparations and necessary
movements, and from 1 December continued their offensive operations against the Turks.
On the left, Division II, which from 1430 had moved in the direction of the villages of Kopane, Manoliasa
and Agios Nikolaos, after a brief battle managed to overrun the enemy defenses there and to capture, by
the early evening, the heights north of Manoliasa, forcing the Turks to withdraw towards the plain of
Ioannina, after incurring many casualties.
In the meantime, the 21st Turkish Division had reached the area of Agios Nikolaos from Monastir, and
from the morning of 2 December launched fierce counterattacks against the Greek advanced forces on
the south ridges of Megale Rache and on the height of Prophetes Elias. A tough battle ensued which
lasted until the night of the following day and resulted in the Turks recapturing the vital heights northeast
of Manoliasa.
The casualties of Division II during this three-day battle amounted to eighteen enlisted men killed, and
three officers and 113 enlisted men wounded.
At the center, Joint Detachment B occupied itself with the improvement of its positions at the north exit
from the Kaneta defile, in accordance with the order of the Army of Epirus, without being engaged in
serious combat.
On the right, from early in the morning, Joint Detachment A moved from the heights of Pyrgos towards
Palaiochori, seeking to encircle Bizani from the east. After a brief fight it overran the Turkish defenses
which were on the north slopes of Aetorache and on 2 December seized Hill 921.7; the Turks withdrew
towards the northeast without putting up serious resistance.
On the following day, 3 December, the detachment attempted to capture Bizani Fort, but when its troops
reached a distance of about 300 meters from the Turkish positions, they came under heavy concentrated
fire from enemy artillery and were pinned down. At the same time the Turks launched a strong
counterattack from the direction of the height of Augo, as well as against the right flank of the detachment
in the area of the village of Elleniko (where the 3rd Inpedendent Evzone Battalion had moved forward),
forcing the Greek troops to redeploy to the positions they had occupied on the previous day.
The casualties of Joint Detachment A on 3 December were 19 killed and 72 wounded. Among the
wounded was the commander of the detachment, Lieutenant Colonel (Inf) Alexandros Kontoules.
On 2 December the Olitsikas Detachment captured Dodona and then turned towards Agios Nikolaos, in
order to fix in place the Turkish forces there.
The Pramanta and Metsovo Detachments moved forward to Palaiochori and to the line formed by GotistaDemati-Itia respectively, without meeting serious enemy resistance1.
Thus, the Army of Epirus, which from 1 December had moved northward in order to exploit the success of
the previous days, ran into the fortified position of Ioannina and was forced to halt its advance and deploy
defensively, with Division II on the southern heights of Manoliasa, Joint Detachment B at the Kaneta defile
and Joint Detachment A on the northern slopes of Aetorache, facing Bizani Fort.
205.
The Turks, after succeeding in checking the Greek advance, assumed the initiative and from 4
December began to attack on the entire front.
In the sector of Division II, the Turks, who from 3 December had also been reinforced with the 28th
Division from the area of Monastir, launched successive strong counterattacks, which lasted until 10
December before they were successfully repelled by the Greek forces. The Greek troops, although
exhausted by the continuous battle which lasted many days, countered with stubborn resistance and
managed, thanks to the incomparable bravery of the men, to keep the position of Manoliasa almost intact.
The only important success of the Turks was the capture, on 7 December, of the Prophetes Elias height to
the right (east) of the aforementioned position and their movement forward as far as Hill 1051.3, where
they were checked. On 9 December, Division II launched a strong counterattack and managed to restore
the position at Hill 1051.3, without, however, being able to recapture the Prophetes Elias height as well.

Thus, after a tough seven-day battle, Division II continued to steadily occupy the line formed by the village
of Manoliasa-Hill 1051.3-Kentroma height-Hill 902, while the aggressiveness of the Turks began to show
signs of waning.
The Turks showed no serious offensive activity at the center. They were content just to attack the position
with fire from the Bizani Fort batteries. It was returned by the Greek artillery. An attack by the Turks on 7
December against the Agios Nikolaos height, north of the village of Theriakesi, was successfully repelled
by the troops of Detachment B that were there.
Joint Detachment A came under fierce attacks from troops of the 13th and 23rd Turkish Divisions, with
particular intensity aimed at Hill 921.7 of the Aetorache position. The detachment's troops put up a strong
resistance and repelled all of the Turkish offensives, but suffered serious casualties, mostly from the
intense fire of the enemy artillery from Bizani Fort, that dealt a blow to the morale of the men.
Following this, it was decided that the troops redeploy as of 6 December to the heights northwest of the
villages of Aetorache and Kostetsi.
The Turks, continuing their offensive, from 8 December attempted to capture Hill 1058.8 in the sector of
Joint Detachment A. They launched a series of forceful counterattacks, without achieving any result,
however, and suffering serious casualties.
On 10 December, a Turkish force of about battalion size attempted to envelop the position from the east,
launching a surprise attack against the heights between the villages of Aetorache and Lazaina. It was
repelled after a brief and fierce battle, the Turks abandoning about 150 dead on the battlefield.
Because of the serious threat which had been created in this sector, the Headquarters of the Army of
Epirus ordered the Pramanta and Metsovo Detachments to move at all speed to Aetorache to reinforce
the troops in combat there. Moreover, after receiving news that the commander of the detachment,
Lieutenant Colonel Kontoules, had been wounded, Headquarters dispatched from Joint Detachment B the
commander of the 15th Regiment, Lieutenant Colonel (Inf) Georgios Polymenakos, to command Joint
Detachment A. Polymenakos arrived in Aetorache at midday on 9 December and assumed command of
the force. At about the same time, the detachment was reinforced with a fresh force of 750 enlisted men
from the depots.
These measures boosted the morale of the men of the detachment and contributed to the consolidation of
their positions, while the Turks, following their failure to capture Hill 1058.8, halted their offensive activity
in this sector as well, evidently exhausted by the continuous struggle, which had lasted many days.
206.
Meanwhile, from 5 December the commander of the Army of Epirus had repeatedly reported to
the Ministry of the Army that the situation on the Epirus front was critical, and that the Turkish forces there
continued to receive substantial reinforcements. He requested the dispatch of sufficient reinforcements
and suggested that the Government accelerate its actions on the issue of the conclusion of an armistice,
within the framework of the negotiations in London for the signing of a peace treaty.
The Ministry of the Army, following consultations with the commander of the Army of Macedonia, Crown
Prince Constantine, on the night of 8-9 December decided on the immediate reinforcement of the Army of
Epirus with Divisions IV and VI from the Macedonia theater of operations. At the same time, it proposed to
the Cabinet that the command of the Army of Epirus be assumed by Crown Prince Constantine. The
latter, deeming his stay in Thessalonica necessary, counter-proposed that the command of the Army of
Epirus be assigned to the commander of Division IV, Major General Moschopoulos, who had
distinguished himself on the Macedonian front. In the end, the Cabinet decided to assign the command to
Crown Prince Constantine, but at a more opportune time, because difficulties that had arisen at the
negotiations in London necessitated his presence in Thessalonica. The difficulties had been created by
the attitude of the Turkish representatives, who, evidently hoping for a victory by the Ottoman Army in
Epirus, were intransigent on the issue of the conclusion of an armistice with Greece.
CHAPTER 9
Further Reinforcement of the Hellenic Army in Epirus
and Operations to the Liberation of Ioannina
Transportation of New Reinforcements to Epirus
(Sketch-map 19)

207.
Following the decision by the Ministry of the Army to immediately reinforce the Army of Epirus
with Divisions IV and VI, the transportation of these divisions by sea from Thessalonica to Preveza began
on 12 December.
Division IV, with a total strength of 228 officers, 10,068 enlisted men and 2,300 pack animals, was
transported first. Immediately following its disembarkation, the division headed to Philippias, which had
been determined as the area of assembly. There, the division was replenished with personnel, equipment
and food supplies, and then moved further towards the zone of operations in the area of the village Chani
Emin Aga-Perdika, which it reached on 20 December.
Division VI, which was at Korytsa, followed. It too was transported by sea from Thessalonica; its
movement by road, via Kastoria and Metsovo, as the Ministry of the Army originally had requested, was
deemed unexpedient and dangerous by General Headquarters.
Division VI, with a total strength of 7,400 men, 1,800 pack animals and 110 vehicles, on 22 December
began embarking on eighteen steamships, and by 28 December had disembarked at Preveza, where its
units were brought up to strength by mobilized men who had reached that area from the interior. From
then until 13 January, the division, according to an order issued by Army of Epirus Headquarters,
relocated to the far right of the disposition of the Army of Epirus, in the area of the villages of KoritianePlaisia-Kalentzi.
208.
Besides those two divisions, the 7th Infantry Regiment of Division II (Chios Detachment), under
Colonel (Inf) Nikolaos Delagrammatikas, which comprised four Infantry battalions and two Pack Artillery
batteries of Krupp guns, with a total strength of 28 officers and 4,475 enlisted men, arrived at Preveza
from Chios on 29 December. By 5 January this unit had been moved forward to the village of Myrodaphne
as a general reserve force. During the same period, a significant number of field and heavy guns was
moved forward to Chani Emin Aga and Kaneta.
Furthermore, an independent Infantry battalion was established from the surplus of mobilized men who
had been allocated to replenish the units; the battalion's mission was to secure the lower course of the
Acheron river, in cooperation with the Volunteer Scout bands operating there.
Activities from 16 December 1912 to 6 January 1913
(Sketch-maps 21 and 22)
209.
During this period the front in the area of Manoliasa-Aetorache was consolidated and combat was
confined to an exchange of sporadic fire during the day and small-scale, mostly reconnaissance probes
throughout the night. The units occupied themselves with regrouping and improving their positions, while
the artillery moved forward and deployed in the area of the village of Theriakesi.
In the Olitsikas area, because of offensive operations by the Turks, the detachment of Lieutenant Colonel
Chrestos Malamos, which secured the left of the Army of Epirus, was reinforced with two companies.
Later on, an Infantry battalion of Division IV was also allocated to this area, as was a platoon of pack
guns.
210.
In the meantime, in order to cover the far left of the disposition and to mop up from the area of the
river Acheron the regular and irregular Turkish and Albanian forces which were operating there, a joint
detachment was established on 26 December. Under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Antonios
Epites, it consisted of two Infantry battalions, the Independent Infantry Battalion (which had been
established from the surplus of mobilized men), the remaining troops from the area of Paramythia and
Acheron, the Cavalry platoon and three pack guns. The troops of the joint detachment successively
repelled the Turkish forces and by 2 January had secured both banks of the lower course of the Acheron.
In the area of Cheimarra,1 the Cretan Scout bands, with the support of Greek warships, repelled a
Turkish attack on 28 December; no other important developments took place there at that time.
211.
In the area of Metsovo, Turkish gangs had infested the villages of the Zagoria region, and strong
Turkish forces had captured the villages of Tristeno and Greveniti. In addition, another Turkish force
crossed the Papastathes bridge and attacked the villages of Krapse and Palaiochori. It was repelled by
the Greek troops there and returned to its initial positions at the village of Daphnoula.

Because of this Turkish operation, the Ministry of the Army reinforced the Metsovo Detachment with 550
men from the interior and ordered it to assume operations as quickly as possible towards the Zagoria
villages in order to protect that area from the Turkish threat.
The attack of the Metsovo Detachment, which took place on 23 December with all the forces at its
disposal, achieved no result, however, because of adverse weather conditions and strong enemy
resistance. The Turks had significant forces at their disposal in this area, which were supported by artillery
and had recently been substantially reinforced for the purpose of launching a surprise attack against the
town of Metsovo on Christmas night, according to available information.
On 27 December, the Metsovo Detachment was placed under the command of the Field Army of
Macedonia, while on the following day, the command of the 24th Marine Regiment, along with a twocompany force, arrived in Metsovo to reinforce the Metsovo Detachment. The commander of the 24th
Marine Regiment, after assembling his four other companies (which were already in Metsovo) and
regrouping his troops, moved forward to the area of the village of Chrysovitsa, where he deployed.
In the meantime, in accordance with a government decision, as of 19 December, the commander of
Division II, Major General Konstantinos Kallares, was appointed Chief of Staff of the Army of Epirus, and
temporarily handed over command of Division II to Colonel Leonidas Paraskeuopoulos, commander of
the 2nd Field Artillery Regiment, who was the division's next senior officer.
The outgoing Chief of Staff, Lieutenant Colonel (Eng) Demetrios Ioannou, assumed the command of the
four Evzone battalions in Aetorache.
The Decision for a General Attack
(Sketch-map 23)
212.
Following the reinforcement of the Army of Epirus with Infantry Divisions IV and VI, as well as with
the Chios Detachment, the Commander of the Army of Epirus, intending to resume the attack for the
liberation of Ioannina, issued an order on 20 December for Division IV to study the possibility of launching
a new offensive from the left (west), in the direction of the heights of Megale Tsouka and Dourouti.
In conformance with an order he issued on 22 December, the commander of the Army proceeded with the
reorganization and redisposition of his forces as follows:
- Division IV, comprising three regiments (minus one battalion) and reinforced with one Artillery battalion
(minus one battery), on the left of the disposition, at the south heights of Manoliasa.
- Division II, comprising the 1st Infantry Regiment (minus one battalion), the 3rd Infantry Regiment, two
Infantry battalions and one Field Artillery battalion, to the right of Division IV as far as the village of
Kryphovo.
- The Epirus Division was established, under the command of Colonel (Eng) Demetrios Matthaiopoulos,
from four Evzone battalions, the Cretan Regiment, the 15th Infantry Regiment, two independent battalions
and two pack batteries, and deployed from the village of Kryphovo as far as Aetorache.
- Infantry Division VI, composed of two Infantry regiments of two battalions each, two Evzone battalions
and three pack batteries, on the right of the disposition, from Aetorache to the Arachthos river.
The Epirus Division and Division IV, according to a decision taken by the commander of the Army of
Epirus, were placed under a unified command and constituted the Field Army Section of the Right, with
Major General Moschopoulos, commander of Division IV, as its commander. The commander of the 11th
Infantry Regiment, Colonel (Inf) Demetrios Antoniades, assumed the command of Division IV.
- Two battalions of the Western Macedonia Detachment, which had moved forward to the south of
Kaneta, were to remain there as a general reserve force.
- The 2nd Field Artillery Regiment, one Field Artillery battalion and the two heavy batteries comprised the
Artillery of the Field Army, under Colonel (Arty) Leonidas Paraskeuopoulos, and were deployed in the
area of the village of Theriakesi.
- Finally, the engineer companies of the divisions made up the Engineer Corps of the Field Army, which
was to remain at Pesta.
213.
Division IV, after proceeding with the necessary reconnaissance and estimate of the situation,
submitted a detailed report to the Commander of the Army of Epirus on 25 December, stating that it
considered certain the success of the attack from the left. Despite this, the Commander of the Army of

Epirus deemed operations from the left to be dangerous and decided on an attack to seize Bizani Fort
through strong artillery preparatory fire and flank attacks by the infantry from the east.
The Ministry of the Army, meanwhile, considered it urgent that Ioannina be liberated and recommended
on 30 December that the date of the launching of the attack be moved up.
The next day, 31 December, the Headquarters of the Army of Epirus issued an operations order for a
general attack, according to which:
- The Field Army Section of the Right would launch the main attack from Aetorache against Bizani. There
would be a simultaneous secondary effort by a joint detachment of Division VI (three Infantry battalions,
one-and-a-half pack batteries, one Engineer company), under Lieutenant Colonel (Inf) Dionysios
Papadopoulos, in the direction of Lazaina and Elleniko villages.
- Division IV was to attack on the left, against the heights of Manoliasa.
- Division II was to capture the height of Augo and Hill 547.6, and then advance towards the plain of
Ioannina.
- The Olitsikas Detachment was to assemble at the village of Agia Anastasia and launch an attack against
the heights of Megale Tsouka and Agios Nikolaos, while the Acheron Detachment would secure
communications towards Preveza from the direction of Paramythia.
Finally, the Artillery of the Field Army was to support the operations of the right against Bizani.
- The Chios Detachment would remain as a reserve force in the Myrodaphne-Pesta area, and the Cavalry
of the Army of Epirus at Chani Emin Aga.
- The time of the opening of the attack was to be determined in a future order.
The Turks in the meantime, on the afternoon of 29 and on the morning of 30 December, attacked the left
of Division IV, but without result. On 2 January they engaged the troops of the Epirus Division at
Aetorache with effective fire.
214.
Suddenly on 3 January when everything was ready for the attack, the Commander of the Army of
Epirus was replaced and the attack against Ioannina was postponed until Crown Prince Constantine
could arrive in Epirus; the Government had appointed him Commander in Chief of all Greek forces in
Macedonia and Epirus.
The Government's decision was influenced by the following factors:
First, by reports sent on 23 December to the Ministries of the Army and Foreign Affairs by their
representatives at the Headquarters of the Army of Epirus. In their reports, they presented the situation as
extremely dangerous (a) because of differences of opinion between the Commander of the Army of
Epirus and certain division commanders, and (b) because of the lack of specific plans of operations.
Second, by the cabled report which was submitted on 24 December by the commander of Division IV to
Crown Prince Constantine in which the former expressed his objections concerning the conduct of
operations in the Epirus theater of operations up to that point. He reported that, in his opinion, a bold
operation, simultaneously on both flanks and the center of the front, would bring about the quick fall of
Ioannina.
Lieutenant General Sapountzakes, after temporarily handing over the command of the Army of Epirus to
Major General Moschopoulos on 4 January, requested in a report that he remain in Epirus under the
orders of the Commander in Chief, in order to carry out the attack against Ioannina, which he had planned
for 5 January; he expressed absolute optimism concerning its success.
His request to remain was approved and on 6 January Lieutenant General Sapountzakes once again
assumed the command of the Army of Epirus, but any offensive operation was prohibited until the arrival
of the Commander in Chief in Epirus.
On the morning of 6 January, however, two Turcophone soldiers deserted to the enemy. Commandeering
a military automobile, they headed towards Ioannina. Fearing that the Turks would be informed of the
Greek plans and would undertake a surprise offensive initiative, the Commander of the Army of Epirus
ordered a general attack for the following day, even though he had orders to the contrary.
The Attack on 7 January and its Checking
(Sketch-map 23)
215.
Preparatory fire by artillery of the Field Army began on 7 January at 0800 and lasted until 1130,
resulting in the almost complete neutralization of the enemy gun batteries at Bizani.

On the right -the area of the main thrust- the Epirus Division attacked, with the Cretan Regiment towards
the direction of the village of Palaiochori, and with the Evzone battalions along Aetorache. The Turks, who
had suffered considerable casualties from the artillery fire, withdrew towards the fortified complex of
Bizani, with the Greek troops in pursuit. In the late afternoon, the Greeks seized the village of Palaiochori
and Hill 922, and by night came into close contact with the fortified position of Lesser Bizani.
In addition, on the eastern ridges of Aetorache, the Joint Detachment of Division VI, under Lieutenant
Colonel Dionysios Papadopoulos, attacked the heights of Elleniko village, and after driving back the
Turkish troops there pursued them as far as the southern heights of the village of Kyparissia, where the
detachment halted in order to regroup. This operation of the Joint Detachment of Division VI was backed
up by the Palaiochori Detachment, with artillery fire against the heights of the villages of Elleniko and
Daphnoula.
On the left, Division IV opened its attack at 0800 without waiting for the results of the preparatory artillery
fire against Bizani. Despite insufficient support of the artillery due to a craggy terrain divided by deep
gorges, the division managed, after a violent fight, to capture at bayonet point the line formed by Hill
1075-Kentroma height-Hill 902, where it consolidated. The casualties of Division IV on that day were very
heavy: a total of 62 killed and 295 wounded.
At the center, Division II delayed launching its attack, despite taking note of the withdrawal of the Turks
from Aetorache. This forced the Commander of the Army of Epirus to intervene more than once and order
the acceleration of the division's attack, which finally began in the early afternoon. However, a short time
later, the leading elements of the division came under artillery fire from Bizani Fort and halted their march.
That night division units moved forward to Augo hill, without meeting enemy resistance; there they
deployed defensively.
216.
On the night of 7 January, the Commander of the Army of Epirus ordered the continuation of the
attack, beginning on the following morning. During the early evening, however, driving rain and snow
began to fall in the mountainous areas and the temperature dropped significantly, seriously hampering all
offensive operations.
Thus on 8 January, only the Field Army Section of the Right continued its offensive, but its troops came
up against the resolute resistance of the Turks along the strong line of Lesser Bizani-Serviana-Goritsa.
Finally, after suffering heavy casualties, the Greek troops were forced to halt their movement, but they
maintained close contact with the Turkish forces. Owing to inclement weather, the fatigue of the men, and
the casualties suffered by Division IV, no offensive operations were launched on the rest of the front and
the opponents limited themselves to the exchange of sporadic fire.
The deterioration of weather conditions continued during the two days that followed, with an adverse
effect both on the morale of the men and on the continuation of offensive operations. The consequences
of this situation were that the offensive effort of the Army of Epirus petered out and the front consolidated
before of the fortified position of Ioannina.
Events and Operations from 11 January to 15 February 1913
(Sketch-maps 21 and 23)
217.
On 10 January, Commander in Chief, Crown Prince Constantine arrived in Philippias and
established his headquarters there, assuming command of all units that were in Epirus as well as the
direction of operations.
On the next morning, the Commander in Chief met Lieutenant General Sapountzakes at the Kaneta
height, and after being briefed on the general situation and the progress of operations, decided to attack
the fortified position of Bizani, following a suitable restructuring of the units of the Army of Epirus.
In order to keep the forces in the best possible condition, the Commander in Chief ordered the divisions to
allow their troops the necessary rest, keeping only the indispensable forces at the outposts, and relieving
them frequently.
As part of the force restructuring, the Epirus Division was renamed Division VIII, and Lieutenant General
Sapountzakes assumed the command of the Field Army Section of the Right (Divisions VI and VIII).
The Chios Detachment was assigned to Division IV and the Independent Battalion was assigned to
Division II.

Major General Moschopoulos returned to the command of Division IV and Major General Kallares to that
of Division II.
An Epirus Cavalry Regiment was established from the Cavalry company present in Epirus and two
additional Cavalry companies, which arrived from Thessalonica on 13 January.
The divisions remained in their positions, with the exception of the forward movement of one battalion of
Division IV to the outskirts of the village of Manoliasa by the night of 12 January, following a battle with
heavy casualties.
218.
On 7 January, General Headquarters, with the approval of the Ministry of the Army, ordered the
demobilization of all the Volunteer bands, except those that were in the area of the Acheron and Olitsikas.
The presence of the others was deemed unnecessary following the significant reinforcement of the Army
of Epirus. Moreover, because these units were not completely trained and organized militarily, they had
sustained heavy casualties; there have been even instances of undisciplined behavior from their part,
particularly at the expense of the inhabitants of the region. The men, after delivering their arms to their
commanding officers, were to return to their homes.
On the same day, the Commander in Chief sent a personal letter to the Commander of the Turkish forces
of Ioannina, Esat Pasha, in which he asked him to surrender the city so that meaningless bloodshed be
avoided, especially since at the conference in London the Ottoman Empire had relinquished all rights to
the territories between the Adriatic and Thrace. The army that was defending Ioannina would thus be free
to be transported, along with its arms and supplies, to a location to be decided upon mutually. Esat
Pasha's reply two days later was negative.
What followed was the immediate briefing of the Government and the intensive transport and stockpiling
of ammunition and provisions for the general attack against Ioannina. In addition, adjustments were made
to the mountainous road network and new roads were opened to meet the needs of the field artillery.
In the meantime the weather deteriorated. Thick snow covered the area, fog often blocked visibility, and
the men suffered from bitter cold.
The Metsovo Detachment, which from 11 January had moved the greater part of its forces forward to the
line formed by the villages Gotista-Demati-Itia-Tristeno-Greveniti, was ordered on 25 January to assemble
its forces in order to be ready to attack and seize Driskos and, under favorable circumstances, to continue
its advance towards the area south of the lake of Ioannina.
219.
On 6 February, Prime Minister Eleutherios Venizelos visited the front in order to get a clearer
picture of the situation, and also to confer in person with the Commander in Chief, so that they could
jointly determine in what manner further military operations would serve national interests more
effectively. After Philippias, where General Headquarters was located, the prime minister, accompanied
by the Commander in Chief, visited the sector of the front at Bizani and then departed for Preveza in
order to return to Athens.
On 9 February, General Headquarters issued general instructions to all units regarding the timely plan
and preparation of the imminent operation. According to these instructions, the main effort would be
directed towards the sector of Bizani-Koutselio-Kastritsa and would be undertaken by Divisions II, VI, VIII
and the Metsovo Detachment, with simultaneous operations of secondary importance conducted by the
Olitsikas Detachment and Division IV towards the heights of Agios Nikolaos and Manoliasa respectively.
The entire operation would be conducted in conjunction with an advance by Division III and a detachment
of Division V from Korytsa and Fourka southwards.
220.
Meanwhile, on 8 February, the 4th Infantry Regiment of Division I reached Kalampaka from
Thessalonica. Its commander, Colonel Ioannes Papakyriazes, received an order from General
Headquarters to establish a Joint Brigade consisting of the 4th Regiment, the former Metsas Detachment,
which was in Metsovo, one battalion, which had been sent from the interior, and one battery of quick-firing
guns. The objective was to force open the pass of Driskos and contribute to the general attack against
Ioannina by capturing Kastritsa.
From 15 February the Joint Brigade was placed at the disposal of the Field Army Section of the Right. Its
mission was to secure Metsovo with a small detachment, while its remaining forces mopped up the area,
crossed the Arachthos, attacked the Turkish forces in the villages of Daphnoula and Driskos, and linked
up with the Field Army Section of the Right. Another order established a general reserve force comprised

of the 15th Infantry Regiment, the 1st Evzone Regiment and one battalion of the 17th Regiment, which
assembled at the villages of Aetorache and Elleniko.
Meanwhile, a Field Artillery battalion (with two batteries) which had left Thessalonica disembarked at
Preveza on 12 February and was assigned to the commander of the Artillery of the Field Army.
At this time the Turks were occupied intensively with supplementing their defensive organization, mainly
at Bizani Fort and in the area of the village of Koutselio.
General Attack and Liberation of Ioannina
(Sketch-map 24)
221.
On 15 February, while preparations for the general attack were continuing at full momentum, with
the main effort directed on the right against Bizani, General Headquarters, after reassessing the situation
altered the plan. It was decided to redirect the main attack against the western section of the fortified
position of Ioannina. In other words, the maneuver which had been proposed in the past by the
commander of Division IV, Major General Moschopoulos, would now be adopted.
On the following day, 16 February, General Headquarters issued the relevant orders and the necessary
preliminary actions began for the implementation of the new plan.
For the better coordination of the efforts, the Greek forces present in Epirus, comprising Divisions II, IV,
VI, VIII, the Metsovo Joint Brigade, the Acheron, Preveza, Cheimarra Detachments and the Cavalry
Regiment (totalling fifty-one Infantry battalions, thirty-three machine gun platoons, fourteen field batteries,
ten pack batteries, two heavy batteries, three Cavalry companies and three units of divisional Cavalry),
were organized into commands under General Headquarters with the following disposition:
- On the left, Field Army Section B, under the commander of Division IV, Major General Konstantinos
Moschopoulos, in the area of Olitsikas and Manoliasa, reinforced with troops from the other divisions.
This section of the army was organized into three columns from left to right, as follows:
The 3rd Column, under Colonel (Inf) Nikolaos Delagrammatikas, in the village of Baousioi, comprising six
battalions, eight machine guns, one unit of divisional Cavalry, two-and-a-half pack batteries (ten guns), a
platoon of Engineers, and the Olitsikas Detachment (three battalions).
The 2nd Column, under Colonel (Inf) Ioannes Giannakitsas, at the Manoliasa defile, comprising eight
battalions, fourteen machine guns, two pack batteries (eight guns), and a platoon of Engineers.
The 1st Column, under Colonel (Inf) Demetrios Antoniades, to the south of the Manoliasa heights,
comprising six battalions, eight machine guns, two pack batteries (eight guns), and a company of
Engineers.
- In the center, Division II, under Major General Konstantinos Kallares, at the heights of the village of
Theriakesi and at the height of Augo, with a strength of about four-and-a-half battalions, eight machine
guns, one unit of divisional Cavalry, three field batteries (twelve guns), and a company of Engineers.
- On the right, Field Army Section A under Lieutenant General Konstantinos Sapountzakes in Aetorache,
and further northeast as far as Driskos. Field Army Section A comprised:
Division VIII, under Colonel (Eng) Demetrios Matthaiopoulos at Aetorache, with the Cretan Regiment
(three battalions and four machine guns), the 2nd Evzone Regiment (four battalions and eight machine
guns), three field batteries, and a company of Engineers (minus one platoon).
Division VI, under Colonel (Cav) Konstantinos Meliotes-Komnenos, east of Aetorache, comprising three
battalions and four machine guns, one unit of divisional Cavalry, two field batteries (eight guns), and a
company of Engineers.
The Metsovo Joint Brigade, under Colonel Ioannes Papakyriazes, holding positions from the eastern
foothills of Driskos as far as Metsovo, comprising six battalions, six machine guns, and two pack batteries
(eight guns).
- The Epirus Cavalry Regiment (three Cavalry companies and two machine guns), in the area of Chani
Emin Aga.
- The Artillery of the Field Army (six field and two heavy batteries with a total of 34 guns), in the areas of
Theriakesi and Kaneta. A platoon with two heavy guns which had been allocated to Field Army Section A
had been positioned in the area of Elleniko village.
- Finally, the Detachments:
of Acheron (four battalions, four machine guns and five guns), in the area of Acheron and Paramythia;
of Preveza (two battalions), in the areas of Preveza, Louros, and Philippias;
of Cheimarra (one battalion, two machine guns, and two guns), in Cheimarra.

The total strength of the Hellenic Army of Epirus amounted to 762 officers and 40,647 enlisted men, with
48 machine guns and 93 guns.
222.
The Turkish forces, on the other hand, which defended the fortified position of Ioannina
comprised four divisions, with a total strength of about 30,000 men, with 112 artillery pieces of various
calibers, in the following disposition:
- The 23rd Division of the active army (ten battalions), with one regiment at the heights of Megale Tsouka
and Agios Nikolaos, and two regiments at the fortified complex of Bizani.
- 2nd Provisional Division (sixteen battalions) at the Manoliasa heights.
- 3rd Provisional Division (nine battalions) in Aetorache as far as the village of Elleniko.
- Ioannina Reserve Division (twelve battalions), which had assigned three battalions to the 23rd Division
(one at the heights of Megale Tsouka and Agios Nikolaos and two at Bizani Fort), three battalions to the
plains sector from the village of Ampeleia as far as Bizani, and four battalions to the area of the villages
Kastritsa and Daphnoula; the remaining two battalions were located in Ioannina as a reserve force.
223.
According to the general order of attack which was presented on 16 February, the Greek
maneuver aimed at the surprise envelopment of Bizani Fort from the west at first light on 20 February,
simultaneously with a frontal attack. Artillery preparation would begin from the previous day in the central
and eastern sector of the fortified position, and diversionary attacks in the areas adjacent to Ioannina to
distract and fix in place the Turkish forces deployed there.
Field Army Section B was to undertake the main effort for the capture of the range of hills of Megale
Tsouka and the rapid infiltration towards the fortified heights of Chintzerelos and Dourouti.
Division II, at the center, and Divisions VIII and VI, on the right, were to operate with a view to distract the
central and eastern Turkish front (Bizani-Koutselio-Kastritsa), with the support of all the artillery.
From 18 February the Metsovo Brigade was to launch operations against the line formed by the villages
of Daphnoula and Driskos and, advancing towards Kastritsa, was to participate in the general attack
against Ioannina. Finally, within the context of diversionary operations, the Hellenic Fleet was to execute a
landing at Agioi Saranta from 17 February, while on 18 February troops of Division III and the Detachment
of Division V were to move from Korytsa towards Leskovik and from Fourka towards Konitsa respectively.
The plan of operations of the Turks provided for defense at the fortified position of Ioannina, with the main
effort on the Bizani heights (Lesser and Greater) and those of Kastritsa, with the aim of blocking the
avenues of approach towards Ioannina.
224.
From 16 to 19 February, all of the necessary preliminary actions and the assembling of the units
of Field Army Section B took place, in complete secrecy, at the positions set out by the plan, ready for the
attack on the following day.
On 16 February, the Ionian Sea Squadron sailed to Agioi Saranta and fired at the Turkish positions. In
addition, army troops that had been transported by commercial vessels from Corfu effected a
demonstration landing in that town at midday on 18 February, following shots fired from the naval vessels.
The Turks responded with fire from within the town and surrounding heights, and the Greek troops, after
destroying various enemy targets, embarked on the ships once again. A similar landing took place the
following day as well.
The Metsovo Brigade, after fighting in the areas of Demati-Petra-Tristeno and Greveniti, on 19 February
reached closer to its objective and was ready to attack the Turkish positions on the heights of the villages
of Daphnoula and Driskos, beginning on the morning of 20 February.
The Artillery, which had not ceased sporadically firing at the fortified position of Bizani since 10 February
and had caused great damage to the Turkish emplacements there, began, on the morning of 19 February,
preparatory fire against defined targets at the Forts of Bizani and Kastritsa, at a daily rate of 150 rounds
per gun.
225.
The general attack against the fortified position of Ioannina began on the morning of 20 February.
In the sector of Field Army Section B, the Third Column launched a surprise attack at first light in three
directions; after driving back the Turkish troops, by 1000 it had captured the saddle to the southeast of the
village of Lyngos and the heights of Megale Tsouka and Agios Nikolaos. At 1300 it seized the village of
Kosmera and the surrounding heights, taking many prisoners and capturing all kinds of materiel, including
fourteen guns and one machine gun.

During the afternoon hours a two-company force headed towards the Dourouti height and by nighttime
the troops of the column were firmly deployed along the line roughly running from the saddle of Lyngos to
Megale Tsouka, Agios Savvas, and Agios Nikolaos, while column command and the artillery were at the
village of Kosmera.
The Second Column also attacked beginning at first light, and with the advance guard, which was
composed of the 1st Evzone Regiment (8th and 9th Evzone Battalions) and Infantry Battalion I/17, seized
the saddle east of the village of Melingoi and then the Prasino height. At midday the entire advance guard
assembled in the area of Dodona, and as soon as its commander, Lieutenant Colonel Dionysios
Papadopoulos, was informed of the fact that Agios Nikolaos had been captured by the Third Column,
continued his advance towards Ioannina with two Evzone battalions, following the pack trail towards the
village of Pedine; on the right, Battalion I/17 moved as a covering force towards the heights of Chionasa.
The Turks were withdrawing and rushing towards Ioannina, pursued from all points of the Megale TsoukaManoliasa front. At 1700 the two battalions acting as advance guard seized the village of Pedine and
continued their pursuit towards Ioannina.
The commander of the column, seeing that his mission had been fulfilled, dispatched an order to the 1st
Evzone Regiment to halt its advance and to take up positions at the heights of Pedine. Lieutenant Colonel
Papadopoulos, however, did not receive the order and continued his advance. At 1800, the Evzone
battalions, with the 9th Battalion of Major Ioannes Velissariou at their head, entered the village then called
Agios Ioannes (today Velissarios), seized large quantities of materiel and took many Turkish prisoners.
Only Battalion I/17 received the order of the commander of the column and deployed on the southeastern
ridges of the Dourouti height, without linking up with the other units.
That night the 8th and 9th Battalions cut off the telephone lines, thus severing communication with Bizani,
and proceed to deploy security elements at a short distance from Ioannina. During the course of the night
of 20-21 February, these battalions blocked the movement of many Turkish troops who were withdrawing
towards Ioannina, and took thirty-five Turkish officers and 935 enlisted men prisoner.
The First Column, following artillery preparation, from 0800 attacked in three directions to capture the
heights of Megale Rache-Prophetes Elias-Kastri. By midday the troops of the column, despite the rough
terrain and the effective fire of the defenders, managed to carry their objectives at bayonet point. The
Turks withdrew towards Ioannina, abandoning on the battlefield many killed and wounded, as well as six
guns.
Division II, under cover of artillery fire, moved the disposition of its troops forward, astride the carriage
road towards Ioannina, and after capturing the Augo height gained contact with the first trenches of
Bizani. However, it was unable to continue the advance due to the openness of the ground and the
effective fire of the Turks from the forts of Lesser and Greater Bizani.
Field Army Section A launched a frontal attack with Divisions VIII and VI, which managed to move their
forces forward to a distance of 500-600 meters from the first Turkish trenches. A two-company force
belonging to Division VI entered the village of Mouzakaioi and by nighttime had moved forward to the
height of Agia Paraskeue.
In addition, beginning at 0600 the Metsovo Brigade launched a surprise attack, and after overrunning the
Turkish elements entered the villages of Daphnoula and Driskos and then linked up with the Detachment
of Division VI which had crossed the river Arachthos; the Turks withdrew towards Kastritsa.
In accordance with the fire plan, the Artillery of the Field Army fired at the fortified positions at a rate of
200 rounds per gun during the entire day. By 1000 the Turkish artillery at Bizani had been silenced.
226.
General Headquarters, which had reached the Kaneta height, after observing the development of
the operation, sent the Cavalry Regiment forward to the area, in a state of readiness to undertake a
possible pursuit of the Turks.
At 1000 in the evening General Headquarters issued an operations order for the following day, according
to which the units would attack as follows:
- Field Army Section B would capture the fortified height of Chintzerelos and, securing its left, would
continue the attack towards the village of Katsikas and against the rear of Bizani.
- Division II would execute a battle of attrition and would be in a state of readiness to support a possible
attack by Field Army Section B against Bizani.
- Field Army Section A would continue the battle of attrition, and would be on the alert for the opportunity
to capture the forts of Bizani-Koutselio and Kastritsa.

227.
In the meantime, the 1st Evzone Regiment's daring infiltration into the interior of the Turkish
position as far as the outskirts of Ioannina, while the Forts of Chintzerelos, Bizani and Kastritsa remained
intact, influenced the decision of the Turks to surrender.
Thus, the commander of the Turkish forces Esat Pasha did not wait for the coup de grace, but in order to
avoid further pointless destruction of his forces, appealed to the consuls of Russia, Austria-Hungary,
France, and Romania to intervene for the surrender.
On 20 February at 2300, two Ottoman officers arrived by coach at the outposts of the 9th Evzone
Battalion, accompanied by the Bishop of Dodona, bearing a document from the consuls with a proposal
from the Ottoman Commander in Chief to his Greek counterpart for the surrender of the city and the
cessation of hostilities.
Major Velissariou personally led the Turkish delegation to General Headquarters at Chani Emin Aga,
arriving there at about 0430 on 21 February. Following a brief discussion between the Ottoman delegation
and the Commander in Chief, Crown Prince Constantine, an agreement was reached for the surrender of
the city of Ioannina and of the Ottoman Army there, to begin on the morning of that day.
General Headquarters, through an order it issued by telephone, made this event known to all of its units,
while at the same time reporting the agreement for the surrender of the Turkish Army to the King and the
prime minister via telegrams. The following telegram from the King, who was in Thessalonica, was
conveyed to the prime minister:
Mr. Prime Minister Venizelos,
Athens
Glory to the Almighty for the new triumph of Our gallant army. I congratulate, with great emotion, the
Government. I am proud of this new national glory.
Thessalonica 21-II-13, 11 a.m., George
On the morning of 21 February the Cavalry Regiment headed towards Ioannina, and after crossing the
line of outposts at the village of Velissarios at 0900, entered the city. It was accompanied by two officers
from General Headquarters, acting as plenipotentiaries of the Commander in Chief, who met
representatives of Esat Pasha and signed the following protocol of surrender:
Ioannina 21-II-1913
21-XII-1328 (Turkish date)
Protocol
The following were agreed to between the undersigned Captain Metaxas and Captain Strategos,
plenipotentiaries of HRH the Commander in Chief of the Hellenic Army of Macedonia and Thrace, and
Vehip Bey, Lieutenant- Colonel and Commander of the fortified position of Ioannina:
1. The fortified position of Ioannina is surrendered to the Hellenic Army.
2. The troops which today are at the fortified position are surrendered as prisoners of war.
3. All war materiel, arms, flags and horses belonging to the army will be surrendered to the Hellenic Army
in their present condition.
4. All officers, men, wounded, and sick are subject to the laws of war.
Vehip

I. Metaxas

X. Strategos

The Commander in Chief officially entered the town on the following day, 22 February, to an enthusiastic
welcome from the inhabitants. A doxology, in a festive atmosphere, followed at the cathedral.
The liberation of Ioannina put an end to the long-lasting, outstanding issue of the operations in Epirus and
at the same time elevated the prestige of the Hellenic Army even further in the eyes of its Balkan allies
and the Great Powers of Europe. The news of the liberation of Ioannina was received by the Greek
people with sheer enthusiasm and prompted extremely favorable comments in the European press. The
French press acknowledged that the Hellenic Army had gained a great victory, while the British press
described the event as a triumph of Greek tactics. Military circles in Vienna acknowledged as well that the
liberation of Ioannina was a great achievement.
CHAPTER 10
The End of the Operations of the

Hellenic Army in Epirus

The Mopping-Up Operations in West and Northern Epirus
(Sketch-map 25)
228.
Following the liberation of Ioannina and the surrender of the Turkish forces, General
Headquarters, acting in accordance with the political aims of the Government, ordered that Divisions IV
and VI be transported to Thessalonica; it then proceeded with the regrouping of the forces of the Army of
Epirus, with the objective of mopping up and securing the whole of the remainder of the Epirus area from
the Turkish forces. Thus, Field Army Section A was disbanded and all of the divisions became directly
subordinate to General Headquarters. The Metsovo Joint Brigade and the Olitsikas Detachment were
also disbanded and their units assumed various missions at the rear.
At the same time, at the extreme left, the Acheron Detachment led by Lieutenant Colonel Epites entered
Paramythia at midday on 23 February. In the two days that followed his troops liberated Philiates and the
surrounding villages. On 27 February, following an order issued by General Headquarters, the
detachment, in cooperation with the Squadron of the Fleet, headed towards Agioi Saranta, arriving there
on 3 March. The Turks, in the meantime, had already abandoned the city, after having set fire to the
neighboring village of Gjashte. Simultaneously, the Cavalry Regiment moved towards the village of
Kalpaki, which it reached on 25 February without meeting any serious enemy resistance.
229.
Furthermore, according to information received, strong Turkish forces under Ali Riza Pasha were
withdrawing towards Argyrokastro, while others were heading towards Premeti.
Consequently, Division VIII was ordered to advance through Doliana towards Argyrokastro and to pursue
the Turkish forces that were withdrawing in that direction. The Cavalry Regiment had been assigned to
Division VIII, and it was followed by Division II. The pursuit of the Turkish forces in the direction of Premeti
was assigned to Division III, which was deployed in the area of Korytsa, in contact with the Turkish troops.
On the afternoon of February 28, two Cavalry companies of the Cavalry Regiment reached Chani
Delvinaki, where they were informed that a Turkish force of about 2,500 men was in Kakavia, with forward
troops at the village of Ktismata.
On the same day, Division VIII reached Kalpaki and on 2 March its units, following a brief battle, overran
the Turkish defenses in Kakavia and took seventeen officers and 500 enlisted men prisoner. In addition,
the division moved one Evzone battalion forward towards the village of Mourzina, which had already been
abandoned by the Turks. Only about 500 patients and wounded and 200 other men, along with five
officers, remained in the village; they surrendered to the Greek troops. The Turkish troops withdrew from
Argyrokastro towards Tepelene, which the troops of Division VIII entered on 3 March, where they took
about 800 prisoners.
The following day, 4 March, the division dispatched the Cavalry Regiment and one Evzone battalion
towards Paleokastro, which they reached after a brief battle at the Tzepos monastery, where they took
about 100 Turkish prisoners.
On the afternoon of that day, Division VIII received an order from General Headquarters to continue its
advance as far as Tepelene, securing from the northwest the routes towards Argyrokastro and Kleisoura
(Kelcyra).
The advance of Division VIII continued beginning on the morning of the following day, 5 March, but in the
afternoon the Turks abandoned Tepelene and withdrew towards the northwest. A short time later the
elements of the Cavalry Regiment, which constituted the advance guard of the division, entered the town
and established themselves there.
Division II reached Kalpaki on 2 March; the following day it moved towards Kakavia, following Division VIII
and in readiness to assist it in the event of serious Turkish resistance. On 5 March, troops of Division II
advanced to Delvino and Argyrokastro and assumed the task of guarding the towns.
In the meantime, Prime Minister and Minister of the Army Eleutherios Venizelos, in a telegram to General
Headquarters dated 1 March, emphasized the need for a rapid advance and liberation of the entire region
of Epirus, which was included in the Greek memorandum to the London Conference and comprised the
provinces of Cheimarra, Argyrokastro, Kolonia (Leskovik) and Korytsa. Advancement further north was
prohibited due to the strong opposition of Italy and Austria, particularly the former. Italy was interested in
the port of Aulon (Valona) and had already stated that it would react should the port be occupied by the
Greeks.

230.
On 22 February, Division III moved from Korytsa towards Premeti, by way of Leskovik, meeting
no Turkish resistance. An advanced detachment of the division reached Premeti on the afternoon of 27
February and on 2 March advanced as far as the line formed by the villages of Buhali and Pachomiti,
maintaining surveillance of the road towards Kleisoura (Kelcyra).
The bulk of Division III reached Premeti on the morning of 2 March and in the afternoon issued an order
to advance to Kleisoura the next day. It was there, according to available information, that the withdrawing
Turkish forces were now assembling. It was determined that the movement of the division would take
place in two directions on both sides of the Aous (Voyusa) river, with the main effort on the right, where
the bulk of the division's forces would also be moving.
The advance of the division began on the morning of 3 March, but when its advance guard reached the
village of Kuqare it came under heavy enemy fire. The division deployed its forces for battle, with the
objective of enveloping the naturally strong position of the Kleisoura defile from the right (northeast), while
simultaneously attacking against the front as well.
A tough battle ensued, and Division III, after committing all of its forces, managed to drive back the Turks
and seize the Kleisoura defile by the early afternoon; outposts were deployed forward to the northwest
exit of the defile, towards Tepelene and Berat.
Following their withdrawal, the Turks moved towards Berat, but left a strong rear guard near the village of
Dragoti.
In the meantime, a detachment of Division V, of three-battalion strength, moved from Eptachori via
Konitsa towards Korytsa, in order to relieve troops which had been ordered to move to Thessalonica.
The Departure of General Headquarters for Athens The Establishment of the Field Army Section of Epirus and
the Transportation of Two Divisions to Macedonia
(Sketch-map 25)
231.
On the night of 5 March, Prime Minister Eleutherios Venizelos informed the Commander in Chief
by telegram of an assassination attempt against King George in Thessalonica and of the latter's death
half an hour later. The prime minister asked Crown Prince Constantine to hasten his return to Athens in
order to be sworn in as King. It was decided that he would leave the next day. Before his departure,
however, a Field Army Section was established, under the command of Major General Panagiotes
Dangles, comprising Divisions III and VIII, the Cavalry Regiment and the Acheron Detachment. Its
mission was to secure Epirus. Division II was to be transported to Thessalonica. Lieutenant Colonel
Dousmanes was appointed Chief of Staff, and was to await an order to depart along with General
Headquarters for Athens.
In accordance with an order issued by the Field Army Section, Division VIII was to secure the terrain
southwest of the mountain range of Nemerka, and Division III the section northeast of it.
Thus, Division VIII deployed in the area of Georgoutsades-Argyrokastro-Tepelene and Division III in the
area of Kleisoura-Frasheri-Premeti.
232.
The transportation of the three divisions which were destined for Thessalonica took place by sea
from the ports of Preveza and Agioi Saranta. Division VI reached Preveza on 1 March and its embarkation
took place between 4 and 6 March, each ship sailing for Thessalonica immediately upon loading.
On 4 March, Division IV reached the area outside Preveza and ten days later boarded steamships. Under
the escort of warships, it sailed for Piraeus by way of the Corinth Canal. On 20 March, it took part in the
funeral of King George, and the next day it began to embark once again for transfer to Thessalonica.
Division II was to assemble at Agioi Saranta in order to board ships and be transported to Thessalonica.
The assembly of the division was completed on 17 March; the boarding of its troops onto eighteen
steamships began on 29 March. The ships sailed in two groups, on 31 March and 1 April respectively,
under the escort of warships.
Final Movements, Organization and Disposition of the Army of Epirus
(Sketch-map 25)

233.
As of 18 March, by order of General Headquarters, the Field Army Section of Epirus comprised
Division VIII and the newly established Division IX. The latter was to comprise three Infantry regiments,
one Pack Artillery battalion and one Cavalry platoon. These units would come from the Acheron
Detachment (which from then on would cease to exist as an independent unit), the former Metsovo
Brigade and other troops from the rear area or the interior of the country.
Also, from 26 March, the Detachment of Division V was assigned to the Army Section of Epirus, based in
Korytsa. The mission of the units of the Army Section of Epirus was the disarmament of the residents of
the area, the consolidation of order and the salvage of materiel abandoned by the Turks.
On 23 March, Division III departed for Florina by way of Korytsa, reaching its destination on 3 April.
On March 30, by order of the Army Section of Epirus, the disposition of its forces was determined as
follows:
- Division VIII, based at Premeti, would assemble in the Premeti-Kleisoura-Frasheri area, with one of its
companies at Leskovik.
- Division IX, based in Argyrokastro, would assemble at Argyrokastro and Tepelene, with one battalion at
Delvino, while the Spyromelios Detachment, which was attached to it, would continue to occupy the area
of Cheimarra.
- The Detachment of Division V would remain in the area of Korytsa until further orders.
234.
Apart from the aforementioned formations and units, the Army Section of Epirus had one more
battalion in the area of Paramythia, a two-company force at Philiates, a National Guard battalion at
Ioannina, a National Guard company at Philippias and a company at Preveza.
On 5 May, the aforementioned Detachment of Division V departed for Florina to meet up with its division,
while the transportation of Division VIII to Thessalonica was ordered on 23 June. The transportation took
place by steamship from Agioi Saranta to Kavala, except for two regiments which moved via Florina. The
security of the border of Epirus was assigned to Division IX, which was to redeploy its troops accordingly.
The Political Situation in Epirus
235.
Following Albania's declaration of autonomy on 15 November 1912, the provisional government
of the country, with the support of the Great Powers, sought the creation of a Greater Albania, exerting
pressure on the Greek element in Northern Epirus. Toward that end, the provisional government
organized guerrilla bands whose mission was to invade the areas that the Hellenic Army had liberated
and occupied, and to create disturbances. Also contributing to the stance of the Albanians were the facts
that (1) Aulon (Valona) had not been seized by the Hellenic Army so as to avoid diplomatic friction with
Italy, and (2) the bulk of the Greek forces were moved from Epirus to Macedonia, because of developing
problems with Bulgaria.
General Headquarters gave instructions to the Army Section of Epirus to resist in the event of a violation
of the line occupied, and to arm the residents of adjacent areas in cooperation with the General (Civil)
Command of Epirus.
236.
On 17 May 1913, the preliminary treaty with Turkey was signed in London, according to which the
Great Powers assumed the task of defining the borders of Albania and settling all the issues concerning it.
The decision reinforced the efforts of Albanian propagandists to overstate the numbers of the Albanian
national element in the areas of Northern Epirus that had been liberated by the Hellenic Army.
The Christian residents of the area, through continuous resolutions and telegrams, protested against the
Albanian actions, demonstrated their Hellenicity, and asked the Greek government for reinforcement so
that they could defend their rights as an ethnic entity. Even the Muslim inhabitants demonstrated that they
enjoyed absolute freedom under Greek administration.
237.
On 26 July, a large Albanian gang attacked the Greek border posts at the plateau of Korytsa near
Moschopolis. Spurred by this incident, the Field Army Section requested authorization to move forward
and capture the area of Skrapari to the north of Kleisoura, in order to disband the Albanian irregulars
assembled there and to straighten the demarcation line.
The Government, however, did not approve of this proposal, because the climate prevailing at the time in
international circles was unfavorable to Greek interests; on the other hand, it informed the Great Powers

that should provocations by Albanian gangs recur, the Hellenic Army would be forced to advance into
Albanian territory.
On 29 July, the Great Powers, intending to promote their interests in the area to their greatest advantage,
signed a protocol in London entitled "On the Independence and Organization of the Albanian State." The
protocol declared that Albania was an Independent Principality under the guarantee of the Great Powers.
The borders of the new state were determined later, on 4 December 1913, by the Protocol of Florence, at
the expense of the national borders of Greece; they were, with slight variations, the same as the borders
today. Following these decisions and actions of the Great Powers, the Hellenic Army was obliged to
withdraw from the indisputably Greek territories of Northern Epirus and to halt any further operations in
that area.
Overview of the Events in Part Two
238.
The Hellenic Army of 1912 possessed relatively limited forces. Since it clearly could not conduct
operations simultaneously on two fronts -Macedonia and Epirus- it was decided that priority would be
given to the liberation of Macedonia, a priority dictated by the serious national concerns mentioned earlier.
A force of about division size, under Lieutenant General Konstantinos Sapountzakes, was initially
allocated to Epirus; its defensive mission aimed mainly to secure the frontier, which began at Actium (on
the Ambracian gulf), passed through Arta, and ended at Tzoumerka, a total front line of about 150
kilometers.
With the advent of the war, however, the Greek forces in Epirus (the Army of Epirus) crossed the river
Arachthos and after capturing various dominant heights to the northwest of Arta following a brief fighting,
advanced towards Preveza, which they liberated on 21 October and organized as one of their supply
bases.
239.
Following the above successes and the favorable development of operations in Macedonia, the
Ministry of the Army reinforced the Army of Epirus with various units from the Macedonian front and the
interior, and altered its mission from defensive to offensive.
Fierce battles ensued, during which Greek troops captured the strong position of Pente Pegadia on 28
October and continued towards the plain of Ioannina, where the bulk of the Turkish forces had
assembled. At about the same time, other Greek troops launched attacks from the area of Kalampaka
and liberated Metsovo on 31 October.
In the meantime, battlefield conditions had changed significantly due to adverse weather and the strong
reinforcement of the Turks with new forces from the area of Monastir. Thus the advance of the Hellenic
Army was halted and the opponents were limited to exchanging fire and engagements between outposts.
240.
During the last ten days of November, following a decision by the Government to pursue the
liberation of Epirus before the conclusion of a peace treaty between the belligerents, the Army of Epirus
was reinforced with Division II from Thessalonica and began a new offensive effort.
After successive operations from 1 through 3 December, the Greek forces came up against the fortified
position of Ioannina, where they were checked. There followed a period of stagnation on the front, until
the reinforcement of the Army of Epirus with Divisions IV and VI from the Macedonian theater of
operations following the liberation of Thessalonica and western Macedonia; this made possible the
freeing of forces for the speedy liberation of Epirus.
241.
A new offensive from 7 through 10 January 1913, with the main effort directed against Bizani Fort,
was again checked by the Turks, with heavy casualties for the Greek forces.
Finally, a furious attack launched on 20 February surprised the Turks, particularly because of the Greek
penetration in-depth into their right flank, and led to the unconditional surrender by the Turkish
commander, Esat Pasha, of the city of Ioannina to the Hellenic Army on the next day, 21 February 1913.
The victory of Ioannina resulted from the indefatigable efforts, unrivaled enthusiasm, patriotism, and
unshakable faith of the Greek soldier to victory. The liberation of the city neutralized serious Turkish
resistance in Epirus, resulted in the capturing of significant quantities of war materiel, and, most
importantly, significantly increased Greece's prestige abroad. The enthusiasm with which the people of

Ioannina received the entry of the Greek forces into the city mirrored the enthusiasm of all Greeks, which
was indeed unprecedented.
242.
Following the liberation of Ioannina, Divisions IV and VI of the Army of Epirus were transported to
Thessalonica. The remaining divisions moved further north and by 5 March 1913 had liberated the
following areas of Northern Epirus: Argyrokastro, Cheimarra, Agioi Saranta, Tepelene, Premeti and
Kleisoura; Korytsa had already been liberated on 7 December, 1912.
The uniformly Greek population of these areas received the Greek troops with indescribable enthusiasm.
However, the struggles and sacrifices of the Hellenic Army in liberating Northern Epirus did not have the
expected results. In the end, the yearning and dreams of the Greeks of liberated Northern Epirus
remained unfulfilled. A decision taken by the Great Powers placed that region within the newly established
Albanian state, thereby placing the Greeks under the rule of new masters.

PART THREE
THE SECOND BALKAN WAR
THE OPERATIONS AGAINST THE BULGARIAN ARMY
CHAPTER 11
The Situation on the Eve of the Bulgarian Attack
Claims and Arbitrary Actions of the Bulgarians
(Sketch-map 1)
243.
Pursuing hegemony over the Christian states of the Balkans and with a view to expanding its
borders to the limits arbitrarily assigned to it by the Treaty of San Stefano in 1878, Bulgaria, towards those
ends, succeeded in including in the treaty of alliance it concluded with Serbia in February 1912, a
provision for the partition of territories conquered in a successful war against Turkey. In exchange, Serbia
would receive similar territorial gains. In particular, the treaty gave Bulgaria the right to annex the region
east of the Strymon (Struma) river. Conversely, Serbia was given the right to annex territory west and
north of Scardus mountain (Shar Planina). A large segment of Macedonia and part of Kosovo were not
partitioned; their future was left to Russian arbitration, since it was under the auspices of Russia that the
Serbo-Bulgarian talks for the forging of the alliance had taken place.
Greece could in no way surrender its rights to Macedonia and Thrace, rights that were based not only on
the Hellenic history of those regions but also on the Hellenic ethnicity of their population. Entire
generations had been brought up on the dream of the liberation of these Greek territories. It was to be
expected, therefore, that the Greek plenipotentiaries, in talks with Bulgaria that were held in Sofia for the
conclusion of a treaty of alliance, would accept no compromise regarding the partition of these territories.
As a result, no specific clause on the future of the territories to be liberated was included in the treaty of
defensive alliance between Bulgaria and Greece that was signed on 16 May 1912.
Greece signed the treaty with Bulgaria in this form out of an unshakable conviction that, in the event of
war between the Balkan states and the Ottoman Empire, the reorganized Hellenic army was in a position
to advance rapidly and liberate those territories. Bulgaria underestimated the military strength of Greece
and, in the certainty that its army could capture Macedonia and Thrace, accelerated the negotiations for
the conclusion of a treaty of alliance because of the importance it placed on the strength of the Hellenic
fleet in an eventual war with Turkey.
244.
Under the terms, moreover, of the supplementary Serbo-Bulgarian military agreement of 19 June
1912, the Bulgarian army was to operate towards the valley of the river Hebrus (Maritza), while the 2nd

Serbian Army was to assemble in Bulgarian territory, in the Kstendil area and conduct operations towards
the river Axios (Vardar), being always in readiness to reinforce the Bulgarian army at the Hebrus.
With the advent of the war, however, the Bulgarians modified their plan of operations and ordered their
7th and 2nd Divisions, which had assembled in Philippoupolis (Plovdiv) and the valley of the upper
Strymon respectively, to conduct operations in Macedonia and capture Thessalonica before the Greeks.
The Greek government had, in the meantime, been informed of the Bulgarian plan of operations.
Following the defeat of the Turks at Sarantaporos, the Greek government ordered the army to accelerate
its advance towards Thessalonica. At the same time, an officer was sent as liaison to the 2nd Serbian
Army, so that Athens could be kept informed about Serbian operations.
While the 2nd Serbian Army was preparing to be transported by rail to the Adrianople (Edirne) area to
reinforce the Bulgarian forces there, the Bulgarian 7th Division was heading for Thessalonica without
encountering any serious opposition, since the bulk of the Turkish forces had concentrated at Giannitsa,
west of Thessalonica, in an effort to block the Greek advance eastwards. However, the 7th Division failed
to enter Thessalonica before the Hellenic Army and thus the Bulgarian plans fell through. At the same
time, the Bulgarian 2nd Division advanced to the south and occupied Komotene and Xanthe unopposed.
The Bulgarians, deeply resenting the fact that they had lost Thessalonica, tried to infiltrate the city by
means of various pretexts; they also attempted to portray the Greek authorities as unable to impose
order. Under these circumstances, relations between the allied Greek and Bulgarian armies deteriorated
and armed conflict might have ensued if the Greek forces had not been accommodating and if the 2nd
and 7th Bulgarian Divisions had not been urgently dispatched in early November to reinforce the front in
Eastern Thrace. Still, conflicts did not disappear altogether, because the Bulgarians tried to expand the
territory they occupied by infiltrating small elements of regular troops and komitadjis into the territories
liberated by the Hellenic Army. Their ultimate aim was to create, in a subsequent phase, issues of
precedence of occupation.
At the same time, the Bulgarians proposed that the Hellenic Army withdraw west of the river Axios, with
only Prince Nicholas remaining in Thessalonica as military governor. At the very least they wanted a
Bulgarian to be appointed deputy garrison commander. The Greek side rejected the proposals as
unacceptable.
The Bulgarians' treatment of the Greek population in Bulgarian-occupied areas did not accord with their
promises of the liberation of the oppressed. They forced Greeks to sign declarations of accession to the
Bulgarian Exarchate and to perform all religious services and sacraments (marriages, christenings etc.) in
the Bulgarian language. They also forced the children of Greeks to attend Bulgarian schools, while Greek
schools and churches were commandeered, ostensibly for the needs of the army. Store signs had to be in
Bulgarian. The inhabitants were forced to speak Bulgarian and even had to add to their surnames the
suffixes "-ov" or "-ev." Finally, the Bulgarians forcibly drafted young Greek men of military-service age into
their army. When the Greeks refused to carry out the demands of the Bulgarians, they were jailed,
tortured, or even killed.
245.
At the end of January 1913, Greek Prime Minister Eleutherios Venizelos, wishing to put an end to
the continuous friction, met the Bulgarian representative, General Khesapchiev, in Thessalonica. He tried
to resolve the territorial disputes between the two countries amicably, but with no results.
Further diplomatic contact ensued and, finally, the two governments agreed to appoint a combined
commission to resolve their differences. The commission first met in Thessalonica on 30 March 1913 and
laid the groundwork for the completion of its mission. Fourteen more meetings followed, the last one on
26 April. In that meeting, the impossibility of further discussions, due to radical differences between the
two sides, was ascertained. So the meetings were definitively discontinued and no agreement was
reached.
Incident on the 14th Kilometer of the Thessalonica-Alexandroupolis Railway (20-21 November 1912)
246. The Greeks controlled the Thessalonica-Alexandroupolis railway up to the 14th kilometer from
Thessalonica. Beyond that point, it was under the control of the Bulgarians. An accord between the
General Headquarters of the two armies had conceded the operation of the entire railway line to the
Bulgarians, in order to facilitate their operations in eastern Thrace.

Since they had been conceded the operation of the entire railway, the Bulgarians demanded military
control of the small section held by the Greeks, even going so far as to use violence to achieve their aim.
They placed their own garrisons near the Greek garrisons, which belonged to the 6th Company of the
Greek 21st Regiment.
On 20 November, the Bulgarians notified the Greek garrisons on the 3rd and 14th kilometers of the
railway line that they should abandon their positions and return to Thessalonica. Since the Greek
garrisons did not comply, the Bulgarians determined to remove them by force the following day.
At midday on 21 November, a train coming from Serres stopped at the 14th kilometer and three Bulgarian
officers, along with sixty soldiers, disembarked. Together with the twenty-five men of the local garrison
they surrounded the Greek outpost, which had a strength of twenty men, led by a sergeant. At 1830 on
the same day, a second train stopped at the same place and a Bulgarian officer disembarked and ordered
the Bulgarian troops to use force to compel the Greek guard to evacuate the station. The Bulgarians,
bayonets fixed, entered the station and forced the Greek guard to embark on a freight car. Afterwards,
both trains departed for Thessalonica.
247.
Meanwhile, other incidents took place in the Thessalonica railway station. The commander of the
6/21 Company, by order of the Thessalonica Military Command, prepared a platoon led by an officer to
send to the 14th kilometer in order to reinforce the Greek outpost there.
The platoon boarded a train at 1730 and was ready to depart, when a Bulgarian officer appeared and
tried, using various pretexts, to prevent the departure. Faced with the Greek refusal to comply, he ordered
the capture of the train by force. The Greek garrison took up arms and deployed against the Bulgarians.
At that moment, the two trains carrying the Greek garrison which had been taken captive at the 14th
kilometer entered the station. The event exasperated the men of the 6/21 Company, and the opposing
troops were quite excited as well. A clash was averted thanks to the level-headedness of the company
commander and the intervention of a high-ranking Bulgarian officer who arrived and undertook to settle
the dispute. It was finally agreed that a small Greek garrison would be posted on the 14th kilometer,
alongside a Bulgarian garrison of the same strength. Thus at 2200 on 21 November, a Greek corporal
leading five soldiers arrived at the 14th kilometer. The Bulgarians, however, broke the agreement and did
not withdraw their excess forces, which obliged the Greeks to send a platoon to strengthen the garrison.
The situation remained tense until 29 November when, after strong protests by Greek General
Headquarters, the Bulgarian garrison was withdrawn from the railway station and was stationed at a
nearby water-mill.
Incidents in the Aridaea region
(Sketch-map 26)
248.
After the battle of Giannitsa, the Greek garrison commander at Edessa sent a team of Volunteer
Scouts to the Aridaea area with the mission of arresting deserters from the Turkish Army who were
loitering there. By 12 November 1912, Greek authorities had been established in the town and an Infantry
battalion had been stationed there.
At the same time a group of komitadjis and an element of the Bulgarian Army arrived in the area, claiming
precedence of occupation; several times they tried to wrest command from the Greek authorities.
On 6 February 1913, the Greek battalion commander, in his capacity as military commander of the
Aridaea region, told the self-styled Bulgarian administrative commissar of the region that he would not
allow Bulgarians to interfere in administrative matters and that the Bulgarian soldiers should stop stealing
food from the locals. Despite the warning, a Bulgarian band of fifteen komitadjis established itself at the
village of Loutraki on the same day.
249.
The Greek military commander of Aridaea demanded the withdrawal of the irregulars by the next
day. Otherwise, he declared, he would have to resort to force.
With no answer forthcoming, a platoon was ordered on 8 February to proceed to Loutraki and expel the
Bulgarians. The Greek force moved very quickly and managed to arrest four komitadjis who resisted and
to transfer them to the village of Orma. A Bulgarian element of about fifty men rushed to the area to
liberate the komitadjis.

Faced with this situation, the military commander of Aridaea was forced to send a Greek element of equal
strength. The two forces met at 0600 on 9 February outside Loutraki, but calm prevailed and a clash was
avoided. At midday, the four arrested komitadjis were transferred to Aridaea and were held at the
Headquarters. The Bulgarians tried to forcibly liberate them but were repulsed by Greek troops.
250.
After these incidents, entrance to and exit from the village by its inhabitants was forbidden. The
Bulgarian troops were confined to their billets and three companies from the 16th Infantry Regiment were
sent to Aridaea.
On the next day, after a request by the Bulgarians, their confinement was lifted on the condition that they
walk about unarmed. At the same time, the Field Army of Macedonia, having reported the events to
General Headquarters and the Ministries of the Army and Foreign Affairs, protested to the Bulgarian
representative, General Khesapchiev, about the Bulgarian attack on the Governor's Palace of Aridaea.
After an agreement between the Bulgarian and Greek governments, the inquiry on the Aridaea incident
was entrusted to a Combined Incident Commission composed of Bulgarian and Greek officers. The
committee met in Thessalonica and drafted a protocol on the incident, but did not agree on the attribution
of blame. After that, however, the Aridaea area remained calm and the Bulgarians did not interfere in
administrative matters.
The Nigrita Clashes
(Sketch-map 27)
251.
The entire area of Nigrita was liberated from the Ottoman Empire on 22 October 1912, after a
battle between Greek Volunteer Scout troops and a Turkish National Guard battalion. Greek
administrative authorities were established and a small element of Division VII was posted in the area.
On 26 November, a Bulgarian force of about 1,200 men arrived; they were allowed to stay temporarily in
the city as guests. The Bulgarians, however, not only showed no willingness to leave, but by various
pretexts managed to send troops to the villages of Asprovalta, Eraklitsa and elsewhere, and also tried to
set up administrative authorities, often resorting to violence.
252.
To deal with the situation, the local Greek command, from mid-December until early February,
gradually augmented its forces in Nigrita with six Infantry companies. The Bulgarians did the same and
officially stated their demand for the installation of Bulgarian administrative authorities. They repeatedly
provoked serious incidents at the expense of the Greek authorities.
On 16 February, a Bulgarian section under the komitadji leader Lefterov attacked a Greek sailboat which
was unloading food and other supplies for the Greek troops in the small port of the village of Nea
Kerdylia. The Greek garrison returned fire and the clash spread, lasting about seven hours, with many
casualties on both sides.
A commission composed of a Greek and a Bulgarian officer arrived on the spot to investigate. The
commission found that it was indeed the Bulgarians who had started the clash. The main culprit was the
komitadji leader Lefterov, who sought to prevent the Greek customs authorities from doing their job, so
that he could collect illegal payoffs from incoming ships.
253.
On the same day the Bulgarian military commander of Serres, ostensibly offended by the refusal
of the Greeks to allow a unit of Bulgarian divisional Cavalry to enter Nigrita, ordered a joint detachment of
Infantry, Artillery and Cavalry to proceed towards Nigrita and expel the Greek forces stationed there.
On being informed of the above-mentioned Bulgarian actions, the Greek commander of Nigrita ordered
his troops to occupy suitable positions in the village of Terpne; the two companies stationed in the villages
of Strymoniko and Verge respectively were to survey the movements of the Bulgarian detachment. At the
same time, he ordered the blockade of the Bulgarian force in Nigrita, in order to neutralize it if necessary.
In addition, a commission composed of a Bulgarian and a Greek officer was sent to meet the
commanding officer of the Bulgarian detachment, inform him of the situation, and ask him to halt at the
village of Demetritsi.
The commission met the Bulgarian detachment and its commanding officer was briefed by the Greek
officer; on finding that the Greeks had taken extensive measures, he decided to move the detachment to

the village of Agia Paraskeue and go to Nigrita alone. He arrived at Nigrita in the afternoon of 17 February
and met with the Greek military commander of the town.
The latter told the Bulgarian officer that the area of Nigrita had been liberated by the Hellenic Army and
that consequently, the movement of the Bulgarian forces in the area was contrary to the agreements "on
the non-dispatching of forces in locations occupied by an ally." At the same time he requested the
immediate return of the Bulgarian detachment to Serres.
254.
On 19 February, Greek Division VII ordered the reinforcement of the Nigrita garrison with three
companies from the 21st Infantry Regiment and a company from the 19th Regiment. Lieutenant Colonel
Nikolaos Michalopoulos-Arkadikos, the commander of the 21st Regiment, was ordered to proceed to
Nigrita and take command of all Greek troops in the area.
On the same day, the Bulgarian commander of the detachment invited the Greek military commander of
Nigrita to Agia Paraskeue and informed him that he had orders from Serres to send troops to various
villages to protect supply convoys. The military commander of Nigrita said that he was obliged to hinder at
all costs any such troop movements. It was finally agreed to request updated instructions and until then all
troops were to remain in place.
Despite this, a general attack was launched at 1400 on 20 February both from the village of Agia
Paraskeue towards Nigrita, and from the Bulgarian troops in the town itself. A company of the 21st
Regiment, which had moved forward to Terpne to reinforce the Greek element there, bore the brunt of the
attack. The Bulgarians attacked that company with great tenacity but with no result, and suffered many
casualties.
The military commander of Nigrita, having secured the blockade of the town, went to the village of Terpne,
where in the meantime three more Greek companies had also moved; there he took charge of the battle.
About 150 Bulgarians in Nigrita managed to break the blockade of the town and attacked the Greeks'
right (eastern) flank, but they were repelled.
Losses on both sides that day were heavy and totalled one Greek officer and 13 enlisted men killed, and
approximately 150 Bulgarians killed and wounded.
The military commander of Thessalonica protested forcefully to General Khesapchiev for the attack, but
did not receive a reply. He reported the incident to the Ministries of the Army and Foreign Affairs.
Bulgarian attacks continued for the next two days, but they were all successfully repulsed by the Greek
troops. On 23 February, the Bulgarians were reinforced with a Cavalry regiment and all Bulgarian forces
were put under the regiment's command. The Greek forces were reinforced with a Cavalry platoon and
were supplied with ammunition. At 1730, the commander of the 21st Regiment arrived with two
companies and took command of the Greek forces in the area.
255.
Meanwhile, the military commander of Thessalonica ordered two Infantry companies, a Cavalry
company and an Artillery battery to depart for Nigrita. The Ministry of the Army also ordered the urgent
return to Macedonia of the 2nd and 4th Infantry Regiments of Division I, stationed at Korytsa and Metsovo
respectively, but the 4th Regiment began its movement after the liberation of Ioannina.
Around midnight on 23 February, the Bulgarians started withdrawing towards Serres, but the Greek forces
perceived their movement and attacked them; they soon turned the withdrawal into a rout.
On the following day, 24 February, the Bulgarians agreed to pull back all troops to the Serres area and
end hostilities. Thus the clashes begun by the Bulgarians ended, after five days, in their defeat. An
exchange of prisoners took place, but the Bulgarians kept the notables of the village of Demetritsi captive
despite repeated requests for their release.
The inquiry into the causes of the Nigrita clashes and the identification of those responsible for them was
entrusted to a combined commission which had been set up to investigate the Aridaea incidents. The
commission could not agree on apportioning responsibility; therefore each side prepared a separate
protocol in which it blamed the other side.
The Return of the Army of Epirus to Macedonia
(Sketch-map 27)

256.
After the capture of Adrianople on 13 March 1913, the Bulgarians ordered two divisions to move,
one to the Serres area and the other to the Kilkis-Dojran area. At the same time, more forces were
arriving in the area of Kavala-Eleutheroupolis.
This intensive transport of Bulgarian forces and their threatening and provocative stance caused the
Greek government to lodge a forceful protest, to which the Bulgarian government replied with appeasing
reassurances without, however, stopping the movement of troops.
Faced with this situation, the Greek government rushed to reinforce its forces in Macedonia, which until
then comprised Divisions I, V, and VII. Division I, with its headquarters in Thessalonica, had successively
detached the 2nd Infantry Regiment to Korytsa and the 4th to Metsovo. Division V, stationed in Kozane,
and Division VII, also with headquarters in Thessalonica, formed a Field Army Detachment under the
command of the military commander of Thessalonica; their mission was to keep order in the entire
countryside of Macedonia which had been liberated by the Hellenic Army.
By the beginning of April, Divisions II, IV, and VI, as well as the 4th Infantry Regiment of Division I, had
arrived at Thessalonica by steamship. The 2nd Regiment of Division I also arrived by rail by way of
Florina. At the same time, the establishment of Division X and its assembly in the area of Goumenissa
were ordered, as well as the transporting of Division III from Florina to Giannitsa and the assembly of
Division VII in the area of Nigrita-Eraklitsa and Pangaeum mountain.
As a result of the assassination of King George I at Thessalonica on 5 March and the succession to the
throne of Crown Prince Constantine, General Headquarters moved to Athens after 20 March; this was
necessary because the new King, who remained Commander in Chief of the Army, was obliged by his
new duties to remain in Athens.
257.
On 4 April, General Headquarters issued a final order for the redeployment of the Army, according
to which:
- Division I was to be stationed in the area of Nigrita-Nea Kerdylia village and Division VII on Pangaeum
mountain. These two divisions would constitute the Pangaeum Field Army Detachment, under the
commander of Division I, Major General Emmanouel Manousogiannakes. Their mission was to ensure
the security of the areas and prevent the extension westward of the Bulgarian occupation.
- Division II was to be stationed in the area of Thessalonica-Asvestochori, and be ready, if necessary, to
advance towards either the village of Langadas or the village of Prophetes.
- Division III was to assemble in the area of Giannitsa-Eleousa.
- Division IV was to be stationed northwest of Thessalonica, sending troops forward to the mouth of the
Gallikos river defile, south of the village of Xylokeratia.
- Division V was to assemble in the area between the villages of Vathylakkos and Aspros, and be ready to
move to the area between the Gallikos river and the lakes Amatovo and Ardzhan.
- Division VI was to be stationed in the area between Thessalonica and Philyro, and be ready to advance
along the Thessalonica-Serres axis.
- Division X was to complete its assembly in the area of Goumenissa, and be ready to advance towards
Strumitza and the village of Kalindria.
To relieve Division V and VII of their additional duties of maintaining order in the liberated Greek areas,
and mainly to counter the insidious activities of the Bulgarians, General Headquarters ordered the
organization of independent forces which would take up that mission in the areas of Chalcidice, EdessaBeroea and Kozane-Florina.
In addition, General Headquarters regulated the issues concerning the complement of units and the
creation of new ones, as well as matters of logistics and administration of the army.
The movement of the divisions began on 6 April and was completed by 16 April, except for Divisions III
and V, the movements of which were completed on 28 April and 30 April, respectively.
The Field Army of Macedonia issued orders to the divisions on the stance they were to maintain towards
the Bulgarians, according to which, the units were to show courtesy towards the Bulgarian allies but not
allow any violation of the rights of the Hellenic Army.

The Pangaeum Clashes and Army Movements to 20 May 1913

(Sketch-maps 27 and 28)

258.
As mentioned above, Volunteer Scout bands had liberated the area of Pangaeum mountain from
Turkish rule in October 1912 and established Greek administrative officials there.
The Bulgarian Army, having captured Kavala, sent troops to Eleutheroupolis; there they proceeded to
replace the local Greek authorities with Bulgarians and appointed the komitadji leader Bajchev as prefect.
Because the Bulgarian authorities used violence against the entirely Hellenic population in the area,
Greek troops of about five-company strength were sent there for their protection.
The Greek forces deployed in the area of Pangaeum mountain, to the west of Eleutheroupolis, with the
mission of enforcing order and minimizing arbitrary Bulgarian actions. The Bulgarians also augmented
their forces and began to cause continuous friction, with the aim of extending their occupation westwards
to the mouth of the Strymon river.
259.
The establishment of the Field Army Section of Pangaeum (Divisions I and VII), in early April
1913, did not stem the expansionist activities of the Bulgarians, despite the fact that the latter, after an
agreement on 5 April between the Chief of Staff of Division VII and the Bulgarian commander of the
Eleutheroupolis garrison, withdrew Bulgarian forces from the area of Eleutheroupolis on 13 April.
The Bulgarians continued causing incidents against the Hellenic Army, the most important of which were
those that took place in the village of Palaiochori, the area of Eleutherae, and the Angites river. Following
is a general outline of those incidents:
- Attack against Palaiochori: Beginning in mid-April, the Bulgarians carried out their expansionist plans by
setting up outposts east of the villages of Georgiane and Dryada and sending patrols to the village of
Palaiochori, in an attempt to cut off communications with the village of Rodolivos.
Faced with the situation, the I/21 Battalion of Division VII, which had been entrusted with the security of
the area, reinforced its outposts in the above-mentioned villages and ordered them to interdict any
movement by the Bulgarians to the west.
Following these measures, the Bulgarians sent large forces to Palaiochori on the night of 21-22 April; in
the morning of 22 April they launched a surprise attack in an attempt to capture the village. They did not
succeed, thanks to the heroic resistance of the garrison (a company from the I/21 Battalion), the
assistance of the inhabitants, and the prompt intervention of the battalion commander with a force of
about two-company strength from Rodolivos.
At noon on 23 April, the commander of the 21st Regiment arrived at Palaiochori, met the Bulgarians and
agreed that the confrontation would end and the troops would return to their previous positions.
- Clashes in the area of the village of Eleutherae: On the night of 25-26 April, the Bulgarians suddenly
opened fire on the Greek outpost north of the village of Eleutherae. The men at the outpost returned fire
and the firefight soon spread all across the line, from the village of Exoche to the sea, and northward in
the valley of Mousthene, in the area of the village of Melissokomio. The Bulgarian attacks were
successfully repulsed by the 20th Infantry Regiment, which was assigned to maintain surveillance of the
valley and the Eleutherae area. The Bulgarians suffered heavy casualties. Casualties to the Greek troops
totalled 30 killed and 43 wounded.
The commander of the 20th Regiment, wishing to take advantage of the situation, ordered an advance
through the valley of Mousthene towards the east. He was overruled by Division VII, however, and the
troops were ordered to remain in place. The division also ordered the replacement of the 21st Regiment
by the 19th.
On the following day, a commission of Greek and Bulgarian officers agreed on the cessation of hostilities
and the return of all forces to the positions previously occupied.
Following the above clashes, the Field Army Section of Pangaeum took steps to contain a general
Bulgarian attack, while the Army of Macedonia started preparatory measures for a general advance of the
army, in case of war with Bulgaria.
General Headquarters approved these measures and temporarily assigned Division VI to the Field Army
Section of Pangaeum, in order to better contain a generalized Bulgarian attack.
- Clashes along the Angites river: On the night of 4-5 May, the Bulgarians set up an outpost on the
northwestern bank of the river Angites. Other elements occupied the range of hills between the villages of
Domiros and Myrine. At the same time, the Bulgarians began to assemble considerable forces at the
bridge and the railway station of Angista. The total Bulgarian forces assembled against the 19th Infantry
Regiment were estimated at six Infantry battalions, two Cavalry companies and two to three batteries.
At 0400 on 9 May, a clash occurred near Domiros because Bulgarian troops had penetrated into the
village.

Division VII was informed of the incident after two hours and immediately ordered the 19th Infantry
Regiment to repel the Bulgarian forces beyond the Angites river.
Despite using almost the total of its forces, the 19th Infantry Regiment did not meet with much success.
By contrast, the Bulgarians, having succeeded in drawing the 19th Regiment's forces towards Domiros,
attacked its right wing with their main force, in the direction of the villages of Angista and Rodolivos.
Three companies stationed outside Angista bore the brunt of the Bulgarian attack. These companies
resisted tenaciously but were finally forced to withdraw towards Rodolivos because of the superiority of
the enemy forces and the heavy casualties the Greek forces had suffered.
Following this, Division VII ordered two battalions of the 21st Regiment and a Field Artillery battalion to
proceed quickly towards Rodolivos to block the Bulgarian attack.
Meanwhile, the rest of the forces of the 19th Regiment began to withdraw. Thus the Bulgarians advanced
all along the front and by nighttime on 9 May they had captured the northern foothills of Pangaeum
mountain and the villages of Myrine, Myrkinos and Rodolivos. After their success the Bulgarians halted
their advance and started organizing defensively.
The inhabitants left their villages in terror and fled towards the south. Those who did not leave were
mercilessly slaughtered by the Bulgarians, who pillaged all the villages they seized.
The casualties of Division VII on that day totalled three officers and 51 enlisted men killed, three officers
and 165 enlisted men wounded and 50 enlisted men missing. Most of the missing were taken prisoner
and murdered in a particularly gruesome manner, even though many of them were wounded.
260.
In view of the critical situation that had developed in Division VII's sector, the Field Army Section
of Pangaeum ordered Division I to immediately move the 2nd Infantry Regiment forward and the three
field batteries stationed at Eraklitsa towards the village of Palaiokome; it also ordered the 5th Infantry
Regiment to move from Maurothalassa to Amphipolis. The Field Army Section reported to the Field Army
Section of Macedonia and to General Headquarters on the unfavorable developments in the sector of
Division VII.
The Field Army Section of Macedonia, which had been informed of developments and the clash at the
river Angites ordered Division VI to secure the left flank of Division I and ordered the other divisions to be
ready to move.
On being informed of the aforementioned clashes, General Headquarters ordered that all action should
be avoided on the next day, 10 May, because strong demarches to the Bulgarian government would be
made.
No important events took place on 10 May. A limited Bulgarian attack towards Palaiokome was
successfully repulsed. Further to the east, the Bulgarians seized the villages of Nikissiane and
Palaiochori.
On 11 May, the ambassadors of Greece and Serbia to Sofia, following relevant directives from the Greek
government, protested to the Bulgarian government about the Pangaeum clashes. Bulgarian Prime
Minister Geshov informed them that he had given very strict orders to end hostilities and that he would
resign if his orders were not carried out.
After this diplomatic action no further serious hostilities took place in the area of Pangaeum mountain.
However, the Bulgarians continued to strengthen their forces there, especially those near Eleutherae and
Eleutheroupolis, with the obvious objective of capturing the southern slopes of Pangaeum. On 15 May a
Bulgarian battalion seized the village of Exoche and the surrounding heights and captured a Greek force
of approximately platoon size which had been blockaded in the village. After this incident the Field Army
Section of Pangaeum reinforced the troops in the Mousthene valley with a battalion from Division I.
261.
The Bulgarians, while strengthening their forces in the area of Pangaeum and provoking clashes
there, were zealously moving troops in large numbers from Thrace to Macedonia. According to available
information, the strength of the Bulgarian troops opposing the Hellenic Army came to about 70,000 on a
front stretching from Dojran to Kavala. According to the same reliable information, the movement of
Bulgarian troops to Macedonia would be completed by the first ten days of June, when the Bulgarians
would attack Greek and Serbian forces to fulfill their expansionist plans. Bulgarian Army officers did not
hide their determination to stage a coup to oust the Geshov government and even depose King Ferdinand
himself should they oppose their plans.
Confronted with this situation, General Headquarters deployed Division VI in the area of Vertiskos
mountain and temporarily assigned it to the Field Army Section of Pangaeum. It also deployed Division IV

northwest of Langadas, ready to advance along the Thessalonica-Serres axis, and Division III north of the
village of Gephyra.
Measures were also taken to reinforce the Army in heavy artillery and ammunition; orders were given to
prevent the reinforcement of Bulgarian troops in Thessalonica by troops that would probably be
transported there by railway.
On 10 May, General Headquarters established itself in Thessalonica. The Fleet, having ended its
operations against the Turks, was ordered to assemble in the bay of Orphano in order to support the
Army.
Delineation of the Demarcation Line between the
Hellenic and Bulgarian Armies
(Sketch-map 27)
262.
After the strong protests of the Greek government following the clashes at Pangaeum, the
Bulgarian prime minister proposed, on 15 May, the delineation of a demarcation line between the Hellenic
and Bulgarian armies in order to avoid future friction. He appointed General Ivanov, commander of the
2nd Bulgarian Army stationed at Serres, as representative of the Bulgarian government.
The Greek government accepted the proposal and on 19 May a meeting took place in Thessalonica
between General Ivanov and Chief of Staff of General Headquarters Colonel Dousmanes.
After three days of talks, the two representatives signed on 21 May a protocol setting out the demarcation
line behind which the troops of the two armies had to withdraw within three days. An exception was
granted, after persistent requests of the Bulgarians, for a Bulgarian battalion which was encamped in
Thessalonica, as well as for the troops guarding the railway lines.
According to the protocol, the demarcation line began roughly northwest of Dojran lake and passed
through the village of Akritas (yes, to the Greek side), the now dry lakes Ardzhan and Amatovo, the
villages of Pikrolimne, Nicopolis and Kydonia (yes, to the Bulgarian side), the village of Demetritsi (yes, to
the Greek side), the Achinos lake, the crest of Pangaeum mountain, and ended up at the sea, north of the
port of Eleutherae.
Four joint committees, composed of two Bulgarian and two Greek officers each, were to draw the
demarcation line on the ground. The first, for the section from the village of Valandovo, northwest of
Dojran, up to the railway line between Polykastro-Kalindria; the second, for the next section, up to the
railway line between Thessalonica-Kilkis, east of the village of Gallikos; the third, for the section up to
lake Achinos; the fourth, for the section stretching to the sea.
263.
The Greek troops had all withdrawn behind the demarcation line by 23 May. The Bulgarians
continued to occupy the positions they held at the time of the signature of the aforementioned protocol.
The commander of the 2nd Bulgarian Army claimed that he had been able to notify his units of the
protocol only on 24 May and asked for the deadline to be extended until the joint committees had drawn
up the demarcation line on the ground. The military commander of Macedonia agreed that Bulgarian units
could remain in place only where there were discrepancies about the demarcation line, and this until the
joint committees had completed the drawing up of the line.
In fact the joint committees encountered many difficulties because of the disparities between the maps
and the terrain, and the demands put forward by the Bulgarians. The result was that the committees had
left several points unmarked when they completed their work on 31 May. Even where the demarcation
line had been clearly drawn up, the Bulgarians were constantly looking for excuses not to adhere to it.
They did not evacuate the area of Demetritsi and the villages around Nigrita, and continued violating the
demarcation line in the areas of Dojran, Palaiokome and Pangaeum mountain, ignoring Greek protests.
Conclusion of a Preliminary Peace Treaty between the Balkan States
and Turkey (Treaty of London)
(Sketch-map 1)
264.
After the atalca Armistice (which Greece did not sign), was agreed to on 20 November 1912,
representatives of the allied Balkan states met in London to negotiate the terms of peace. No progress

was made in the negotiations, and they were finally suspended on 24 December because of the delaying
tactics of the Turks, whose purpose was to buy time to reorganize and strengthen their army.
On 4 January, the Great Powers delivered a note to Turkey in which they advised it to accept the peace
terms of the allies. Although the Turkish government was ready to accept the terms of the note, it was
overthrown on 10 January by a coup d'tat carried out by the Young Turks, who then took power. The new
Turkish government of Shevket Pasha did not accept the peace terms. As a result, the armistice between
Bulgaria and Turkey was denounced on 17 January, and four days later hostilities resumed. They were
terminated with a new armistice on 13 April.
The Great Powers continued to sound out the allied states on the peace terms. After a lengthy exchange
of views, the allies replied on 19 March that they accepted as a basis for discussion the line running from
the town of Ainos to the town of Medeia in eastern Thrace, the ceding of the Aegean Sea islands by
Turkey to the allies, and furthermore, they wished to know beforehand the precise borders of Albania as
they would be delineated by the Great Powers. The Great Powers agreed on the allied states' demand for
the line of Ainos-Medeia, but not on the Aegean islands, since they had certain reservations regarding
their fate. On the demarcation of Albania, they would announce its northern and northeastern borders and
would do the same later for the southern and southeastern borders, once they had decided on them.
The allied Balkan states accepted the terms of the Great Powers on 8 April and a preliminary peace
protocol was signed in London, at Saint James Palace, on 17 May. The protocol restored peace among
the belligerent states and stipulated the following:
- The Ottoman Empire would cede to the allied Balkan states the territory west of the line formed by the
towns of Ainos and Medeia; it would also cede the island of Crete.
- The Great Powers would determine the borders of the newly established state of Albania and the future
of the Aegean islands.
- Economic matters would be settled by an International Economic Commission and the return of
prisoners would be settled by special agreements between the states concerned.
Greco-Serbian Alliance Treaty
(Sketch-map 29)
265.
From the first moment of the declaration of war against the Ottoman Empire, Greece sought to
confer with its allies on a just partition of the territories which would be liberated from Turkish rule.
However, the allies -especially Bulgaria, which pursued the vision of creating a "Great Bulgaria"- were
unwilling to discuss the matter. Bulgaria adopted the same stance towards Serbia's demand for a revision
of the Treaty of 1912, under which they had settled territorial issues between them.
For this reason, Serbia conferred with Greece on 10 January 1913 and on 28 March, the two countries
exchanged relevant draft agreements.
Long discussions on the agreements followed and finally, on 22 April, the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs
and the Serbian Ambassador to Athens signed a preliminary alliance protocol, which was complemented
by a military agreement on 1 May.
After further discussions, the preliminary protocol led to a final treaty of alliance, which was signed on 12
May in Thessalonica. On the same day a revised military treaty was signed, since the first one had not
been approved by the Serbian government.
The treaty and the military alliance provided for a ten-year defensive alliance between Greece and Serbia,
which thus united would confront Bulgaria's excessive territorial demands.
According to the treaty, the two countries would have a common border beginning at the highest peak of
the Kamia mountain range (alt. 2150m); it would run south of Ohrid lake, would meet the west shore of
Prespa lake at the village of Kinsko and the east one at the village of Kato Doupeni, and would then head
towards Summit 1988. Then it would run between the villages of Nike and Kenali and towards the village
of Germiyan, from where it would follow the crest south of and parallel to the river Erigon (Cherna) until it
met Summit 1944. It would then follow the line formed by the peaks of Kaymakalan (alt. 2550m),
Dobropolje (alt. 1770m), Koziakas (1550m), Vlates (1342m), Porta (2050m), Summit 1149, Hill 560, and
would end at the river Axios, three kilometers north of the village of Euzonoi.
The same treaty specified the Serbo-Bulgarian and Greco-Bulgarian borders that the two countries would
propose; in the event that Bulgaria refused to accept them, they would seek arbitration.
If Bulgaria were to resort to arms, the two countries would act in common to crush their opponent.

The treaty and the agreements were sanctioned by the Greek government in Athens on 8 June and were
immediately implemented.
266.
Meanwhile, Greece and Serbia sought to settle their differences with Bulgaria amicably, but their
overtures were always met with intransigence on the part of Bulgaria.
On 25 May, the Bulgarian government resigned. The Serbian government, which considered the fall of the
Geshov government to be a ruse to hinder consultation between the erstwhile allied states until the
Bulgarian Army had completed its strategic concentration against the Serbs and the Greeks, proposed to
the Greek government that the two countries should immediately annex the territories that they had each
liberated and were occupying with troops. The Greek government, still hoping for a compromise, did not
accept the proposal and proposed instead that the two countries should ask Bulgaria to cease assembling
troops against them; all four allied Balkan states (Greece, Serbia, Bulgaria, and Montenegro) would then
simultaneously limit their troop strength and hold talks with a view to an amicable solution to the territorial
issues, and finally, in case of disagreement, they would resort to arbitration.
The Serbian government accepted the Greek proposal and, on 31 May, its ambassador to Sofia sent a
note to that effect to the Bulgarian government. The Greek ambassador did the same the following day.
The Tsar of Russia was sounded and accepted the role of arbitrator.
In reply, the Bulgarian government set unacceptable terms in order to reduce its troops; it demanded
expansion to southwestern Macedonia, liberated by the Hellenic Army, and it accepted the Tsar's
arbitration only under limiting conditions.
Thus the final efforts of the Greek government to settle its differences with the Bulgarians failed.
Strategic Concentration of the Hellenic Army
(Sketch-map 27)
267.
After the Treaty of Alliance with Serbia, signed on 19 May, and the agreement of 21 May with
General Ivanov for a demarcation line between the Hellenic and Bulgarian Armies, and having received
absolutely reliable information of an imminent Bulgarian attack against Thessalonica, General
Headquarters of the Hellenic Army decided to improve the strategic concentration of the Greek forces in
the area. On 24 May, it ordered the occupation by the Hellenic Army of the defensive line from Polykastro
to the heights north of Thessalonica, the lakes of Langadas and Volve, and the bay of Orfano. The Fleet
would cover the Army's right flank.
Division X was to assemble in the area of Axioupolis and secure the zone from Eidomene up to the village
of Axiochori.
Divisions III and V were to form a Field Army Section under Major General Konstantinos Damianos,
commander of Division III, and would occupy the heights between Axiochori and the river Gallikos.
Division IV was to occupy the line from Gallikos river to the Thessalonica-Serres carriage road and its
defensive efforts would be concentrated on the heights south of Monolophos village.
Division VI was to occupy the line between the Thessalonica-Serres carriage road (yes, to Division VI) to
the lake of Langadas, concentrating its defensive effort on the heights south of the villages of Lete and
Toumba.
Division I was to occupy the narrow pass between the lakes of Langadas and Volve.
Division VII would occupy the right of the defensive line between Volve lake and the bay of Orphano.
Following notification of the above order, the Field Army Section of Pangaeum, to which the two divisions
were subordinated, would cease to exist.
Division II would remain in Thessalonica at the disposal of General Headquarters, while the Cavalry
Brigade, the headquarters of which was reconstituted on 25 April, would assemble at Sindos.
The demarcation line would be patrolled by border patrols and outpost detachments from the front-line
divisions.
268.
The bringing up to strength, and the relocation and deployment of divisions to their new positions
was completed by 31 May. To augment the defensive strength of the Army, Position Artillery Battalion II,
which had been sent from Thessalonica to Epirus with a significant number of heavy guns, was recalled,
strengthened and was redesignated Garrison Artillery Battalion I. By 15 June, the Battalion possessed a
total of 54 guns.

Eight independent battalions were also constituted, two of which reinforced Division X, three the
Command of the Fortress of Thessalonica (constituted on 1 June), and the remaining three were
assigned to Division IV.
At the end of May the strength of the Hellenic Army in Macedonia came to 109,000 men and 24,000 pack
animals; in Epirus it came to 24,916 men. These forces increased each day, as new conscripts kept
arriving, which had recently completed their training in the interior of the country.
On 15 June, the Army in Macedonia consisted of 80 battalions (company strength: 300), 33 field and nine
pack batteries, eight units of divisional Cavalry, eight Cavalry companies, two independent battalions and
30 companies policing the liberated territories, a bridging battalion and a wireless company. On the same
day, the Army of Epirus consisted of 17 Infantry battalions, one Field and two Pack Artillery batteries, two
companies of Engineers, two units of divisional Cavalry, two independent battalions and six independent
companies.
The Volunteer Scout bands, which had been demobilized for reasons of political and diplomatic
expediency, were reformed after 24 May and their operations delineated by special instructions.
Measures were also taken limiting movement between the sides on the demarcation line in order to
prevent the spread of cholera, which had broken out among the Bulgarian troops, to the Hellenic Army.
CHAPTER 12
The Bulgarian Attack and the Operations
of the Hellenic Army to the Treaty of Bucharest
Bulgarian Concentration and Surprise Attack
(Sketch-maps 27 and 28)
269.
Having decided on a surprise attack against the Greeks and Serbs, the Bulgarians redeployed
the bulk of their forces by mid-June of 1913 to face the Greek and Serbian armies. They left only the
necessary minimum of forces in eastern Thrace. While carrying out their strategic concentration, the
Bulgarians adopted delaying tactics in the ongoing negotiations with Greece and Serbia to settle their
differences. At the same time, the Bulgarians avoided any major dispute that could cause a war at such a
critical point in time and endanger their strategic concentration.
The Bulgarian forces that assembled against the Greeks and Serbs were the 1st and 3rd Armies in the
north, close to the old Serbo-Bulgarian border; the 4th Army in the area of Ishtib-Strumitza, opposite the
southern flank of the Serbian army; the 5th at Kstendil, and the 2nd Army in the area of Serres. The latter,
under the command of Lieutenant General Ivanov, was deployed between Dojran and Kavala and
comprised Division III (minus a brigade), with its base at Kilkis; the 1st Brigade of Division X, in the area
of Lachanas; a brigade in the area of the village of Strymoniko, a brigade in the area of the village of
Rodolivos, and the 11th Division in the area of Eleutheroupolis.
When the Bulgarians completed their redeployment, they decided to put their plan into effect by a surprise
attack and occupation of Greek and Serbian territory, thus creating a fait accompli.
To this end the Bulgarian High Command on 15 June ordered the 2nd and 4th Armies to occupy as
quickly as they could as much Greek and Serbian territory as possible, before the Great Powers could
intervene.
The two Bulgarian armies completed their preparations by the afternoon of the following day and at 1850
attacked suddenly across almost the entire front, without a prior declaration of war.
270.
The 2nd Bulgarian Army directed its main attack effort on the area of Pangaeum mountain.
After a short artillery preparation, infantry units crossed the demarcation line and moved towards
Eleutherae and the valley of Mousthene.
The Greek company defending the Eleutherae sector delayed sufficiently the enemy advance, and on the
night of 16-17 June, boarded small vessels and landed on the island of Thasos and in the minor port of
Skala Staurou. The Bulgarians occupied the port of Eleutherae at dawn on 17 June.
The other Greek forces in the area of Pangaeum mountain, about two battalions in strength, also delayed
the enemy. On the morning of 17 June they crossed the river Strymon to unite with troops of the 20th
Infantry Regiment (of Division VII) on the heights northeast of the village of Nea Kerdylia. Having repelled
several Bulgarian attacks, they withdrew in the night towards the village of Vrasna.

The 21st Infantry Regiment (of the same division) that was deployed in the Nigrita area, aware of the
threat on its right flank, began withdrawing in the morning. By nighttime it had reached the heights south
of Arethousa, and deployed there defensively.
Around noon on 17 June, the destroyer Leon arrived at the bay of Orphanos; the rest of the fleet arrived
the following morning to support army operations.
In the sector of Division I, the Bulgarian attack took place on the afternoon of 17 June. The screening
elements of the division in the area of Vertiskos mountain delayed the enemy at first by putting up a brief
resistance; the next morning they fell back to the division's main defense line, between the lakes of
Langadas and Volve.
Further to the west, up to the lake of Amatovo (now drained), the Bulgarians advanced southwards
without crossing the demarcation line.
Division X, deployed north of Polykastro, was suddenly attacked on the night of 16-17 June. The
Bulgarian troops, having captured almost the entire Greek screening company in the village of Kastro,
seized the village of Peukodasos in the afternoon; their advance was checked there by the Greek forces,
which in the meantime had been reinforced by infantry and artillery troops from the Polykastro area.
Further to the north, the Bulgarians managed to capture intact the bridge over the river Axios, east of
Gevgelije, and to advance to the town. The Serbs withdrew to the northwest.
The Bulgarian government, in diplomatic notes delivered through its ambassadors to Athens, Belgrade
and the Great Powers, protested that its armies had come under attack by its erstwhile allies, the Greeks
and Serbs. Greece and Serbia informed the Great Powers about the situation, and strongly protested to
the Bulgarian government, as the telegrams to the Greek embassies in Europe and Belgrade show:
a) All Greek embassies in Europe.
Despite Danev's peaceful proclamations, Bulgarians continued attack against Serbian forces begun on
the night of 16th to 17th. Estimates that attacking Bulgarian forces number one hundred thousand.
Athens 18-VI-13,
Minister of Foreign Affairs,
Koromelas
b) Greek Embassy Belgrade
Announce promptly to Serbian government that Bulgarians protested here, seeking to lay blame on us,
who have been attacked without the slightest provocation, all across the line from Eleutherae to
Gevgelije. We answered that it is the Bulgarians who have launched an undeclared war and violated the
demarcation line at the very same hour towards Greek- and Serb-occupied areas. The treachery is
flagrant, premeditated and could not have been accomplished but for the orders of the [Bulgarian] High
Command. As you know, Mr. Panas has protested to Sofia that by this attack Bulgaria is forcing us into
war and declared that we are obliged to defend our territories by taking measures similar to the
Bulgarians'. The Bulgarian Army has thrown out of Pangaeum our weak forces and has captured
Gevgelije, driving a wedge between Serbian and Greek forces. We ask for Serbia's immediate joint
action, according to the terms of the agreement and the parallel action of its army. The right is absolutely
on our side and with God's help success will also be. Reply promptly. Yesterday, as we informed Sofia, we
were forced to call upon Bulgarian battalion in Thessalonica to lay down arms, since we cannot have
[armed Bulgarian forces] in our midst at the same time that a Bulgarian army is staging war operations
everywhere. General Khesapchiev, before the news of the clashes had become known, had asked
permission to depart.
Athens 18-VI-13
Koromelas

Minister of Foreign Affairs

General Counterattack against the Bulgarians

(Sketch-map 27)
271.
On the night of 16/17 May, communications of Division VII with Thessalonica and those of
Division I with its screening elements were severed, probably because of Bulgarian sabotage. Thus
General Headquarters was not informed of the events in Pangaeum until 0530 on 17 June.

Having ascertained that these were not the usual border clashes, General Headquarters at 0900 of the
same day informed Commander in Chief King Constantine and the Government in Athens. It asked for
orders regarding whether to launch a counterattack or limit itself to recapturing the area of Pangaeum
mountain. It proposed that before any such action was undertaken, Thessalonica should be cleared of all
Bulgarian forces stationed there.
The Cabinet, presided over by the King, met urgently and decided unanimously in favor of a general
counterattack. At 1200, Prime Minister Eleutherios Venizelos announced this decision to General
Headquarters, and also the decision to allow General Khesapchiev, who had asked permission in the
morning to go to Sofia, to depart.
The Government was cautious about the removal of Bulgarian forces from Thessalonica, not wanting to
open itself to accusations. After repeated consultation among the King, the Government and General
Headquarters, it was decided in early afternoon that the Bulgarian units would be blockaded in their
billets.
Division II had been charged with this mission since April and a detailed plan had been drawn up,
involving the gendarmerie's cooperation.
272.
General Khesapchiev left by railway to Kilkis, and at 1500 on the same day, 17 June, the
Bulgarian forces in Thessalonica were handed a written order by the commander of Division II, Major
General Kallares, to hand over their weapons and quit Thessalonica by special train within an hour.
Otherwise, they would be considered enemy forces.
The Bulgarians not only did not respond but began to take defensive measures in earnest. After that,
Hellenic Army units and troops of the Cretan Gendarmerie blockaded the Bulgarians' billets and from
1900 on they opened fire against the Bulgarian forces. The Bulgarians responded with intense fire.
There followed a general attack by the Greek forces lasting until the early hours of the following day.
Gradually, all the Bulgarian troops surrendered. Nineteen Bulgarian officers, 1,160 soldiers and 80
komitadjis were taken prisoner. Casualties were 54 soldiers and six komitadjis dead and 17 wounded.
Greek casualties were: 18 enlisted men killed, and four officers and 42 enlisted men wounded.
273.
On the morning of 18 June, Commander in Chief King Constantine arrived in Thessalonica on the
royal yacht Amphitrite to assume command. He was informed immediately of the situation and at 1100
issued an order stipulating the following:
- Division VII would leave an Infantry regiment and its field artillery at Asprovalta to cover its right flank
and would advance towards Nigrita, arriving at the village of Arethousa by the end of the day.
- Division I would advance towards the village of Vertiskos, arriving at the village of Lophiskos by day's
end.
- Division II would immediately move forward and spend the night between the villages of Melissochori
and Lete.
- The other divisions would stay in place, waiting for new orders.
The King also informed the Fleet and ordered it to support the detachment of Division VII at Asprovalta.
In further orders he warmly congratulated Division II, the Cretan Gendarmerie and the Rear Area Service
for the rapid clearance of the city of Thessalonica of the Bulgarian forces there.
274.
Division VII (which on 18 June had its 20th Regiment stationed at Vrasna village and its 21st
completing its defensive deployment south of Arethousa) on receiving the order to advance, detached the
20th Regiment with the entire divisional field artillery towards the villages of Asprovalta and Nea Kerdylia.
With its remaining forces, Division VII moved towards Arethousa without encountering serious resistance.
Only its forces of the left were forced to halt their movement, on reaching east of lake Lantza and on
receiving fire from Bulgarian troops positioned in the heights south of the village of Sevasto.
Division I assembled north of the lakes of Langadas and Volve and Division II departed Thessalonica at
1500, arriving in the late evening in the area of Melissochori and Lete. The other divisions spent the whole
day completing their preparations feverishly in order to assume offensive operations the following
morning.
275.
Russia, meanwhile, in a last-ditch attempt to prevent war among the three allied Balkan states, on
the morning of 18 July invited the prime ministers of the three countries to Saint Petersburg for talks. It

was too late, however, because hostilities had begun and bloody battles were already taking place,
especially across the Serbo-Bulgarian front.
After the Russian initiative, the Serbian government issued an open order regarding its commencing
hostilities against Bulgaria. The Greek government informed the King on the same afternoon, pointing out
that, for all intents and purposes, war had begun and that consequently the army should go on the
offensive in Macedonia.
The declaration of war was announced officially to the people in a message from the King, which was
read by the prime minister in Parliament on 21 June and was published in the Government Gazette on the
same day. The message summarized government policy and expressed faith in the Greek people and the
nation's attachment to its traditions; it was hailed with loud cheers and prolonged applause by the
deputies and spectators.
The Battle of Kilkis-Lachanas
(Sketch-map 27)
276.
Following the Government's order, General Headquarters, aware that the Serbs had already
begun operations against the Bulgarians, issued a new order of operations at 2000 on 18 June. It was to
take effect on the following morning and specified the divisions' lines of advance as follows:
- Division VII, having secured its right (eastern) flank from the direction of Nea Kerdylia, was to advance
towards Nigrita and on to the bridge over the river Strymon near the village of Strymoniko, if the division
deemed it necessary.
- Division I, starting at 0500, was to advance through the villages of Ossa and Nicopolis to the line of
Xylopolis-Lachanas, maintaining constant contact with Division VII.
- Division VI, starting at the same time, was to advance through the village of Asseros to the height of
Germaniko (Klepe).
- Division II was to advance, at the same time, through the villages of Petroto and Monolophos and seize
the heights east of the village of Potamia.
- Beginning at 0700, Division IV was to advance through the villages of Galliko and Kolchis and seize the
hills between the villages of Krestone and Potamia.
- Beginning at 0700, Division V was to advance through the village of Xylokeratia to Kilkis and, upon
meeting the enemy, attack, deploying its right in coordination with Division IV and its left towards Kilkis.
- Beginning at 0500, Division III was to advance through the village of Neo Gynaikokastro towards Kilkis
and, upon meeting the enemy, attack.
- Beginning at 0800, Division X was to attack the enemy forces in the heights over the village of
Soultogiannaiika and then, if the tactical position permit it, to turn towards Kilkis.
- The Cavalry Brigade was to advance towards the villages of Kato Apostoloi and Vaptistes, and serve as
a link between Divisions X and III; it was also ordered to ascertain whether enemy forces existed between
Soultogiannaiika and Kilkis or were moving along the Dojran-Kilkis road.
General Headquarters would deploy at Melissochori at 0830.
277.
The Bulgarians chose the area of Kilkis-Lachanas as their defensive position and deployed the
bulk of their forces there.
This area, because of its terrain features, presents considerable difficulties to infantry forces moving
northwards and eastwards, but is an excellent position for a defensive battle, because among other
factors, it provides the defending force with ample observation and extensive fields of fire. After occupying
the area on 26 October 1912, the Bulgarians immediately began to organize defenses, constructing
entrenchments, machine gun and artillery gun emplacements, and other field works with a front towards
the west and south.
278.
The forces of the 2nd Bulgarian Army deployed defensively in the area of Kilkis-Lachanas were
as follows:
- The 3rd Division (minus a brigade), under Major General Sarafov, was based in Kilkis; it had a brigade in
the hills north and northeast of Polykastro and a brigade in Kilkis.
- The 1st Brigade of the 10th Division, under Colonel Petev, was in the area of the villages of Xylopolis
and Lachanas.

- An independent brigade, under Colonel Petrov, was in the area of the village of Strymoniko.
- The 10th Cavalry Regiment was in the area of Xylopolis and Lachanas.
An additional independent brigade, under Colonel Ivanov, moved up from Pangaeum and took part in the
battle that followed from the night of 19-20 June on.
279.
On the morning of 19 June, the Hellenic Army, in an unprecedently high spirit, began an
irresistible advance against the Bulgarians.
Division VII moved offensively from the village of Arethousa towards the north; after hard fighting, it drove
back the enemy forces in the area of Skepasto village, captured the Karakol saddle, and forced the
Bulgarians to withdraw towards Nigrita and Daphne. A Bulgarian counterattack in the early afternoon
against the Karakol saddle was successfully repelled. In the meantime, the detachment of Division VII
(20th Infantry Regiment), covering the division's right, continued its movement without encountering
enemy resistance and arrived in Nea Kerdylia at 1700, where it deployed defensively.
Division I also moved offensively north of the area of Lophiskos village, and by the late evening had
captured the villages of Ossa and Vertiskos after hard fighting. The retreating Bulgarians left six artillery
pieces and plenty of equipment. A large number of prisoners were also captured.
Division VI moved forward by 1000 to the area of Asseros and attacked the Bulgarian forces deployed
opposite it. Pushing them back, it captured the line from Germaniko hill to Karteres village, and
established contact with the enemy positions at Lachanas. Its losses that day were heavy, with more than
530 killed and wounded. Among the fallen officers was the commander of the 8th Evzone Battalion, Major
(Inf) Georgios Iatrides.
Division II advanced from Lete to the village of Mandres, where it met serious Bulgarian resistance and
deployed for battle. After a tenacious fight, during which it was reinforced by Division IV, Division II
managed to overrun the well-organized Bulgarian positions and push the enemy far back. During the
battle the commander of the 1st Infantry Regiment, Major (Inf) Phokion Dialetes, was killed.
Advancing, Division IV came in contact with Bulgarian forces near the river Gallikos. It crossed the river
after a hard struggle, during which the commander of Battalion II/9, Major (Inf) Antonios Koutephares was
killed. Continuing to advance, the division arrived at night at the heights south of the village of Colchis,
where it deployed security elements.
Division V, moved between the village of Pikrolimne and Gallikos river, suffering heavy losses from the
Bulgarian artillery's effective fire. Total casualties for the day were about 1,275 killed and wounded.
Among the fallen was the commander of the 16th Infantry Regiment, Lieutenant Colonel (Inf) Antonios
Kamaras. Despite that, the division continued its advance and succeeded in pushing back the Bulgarians
beyond Mauroneri village, towards Kilkis.
Division III was also advancing that morning towards Kilkis. It met only slight resistance, which it overran
with no great effort, and arrived by the evening at Palaio Gynaikokastro, where it halted.
Division X, after a fierce struggle, captured the heights above the village of Platania and forced the
Bulgarians to fall back north of what was then the Ardzhan lake, which has since been drained.
The Cavalry Brigade, advancing from the area of Sindos to Vaptistes village, arrived at the village of Kato
Apostoloi in the afternoon. There it came under Bulgarian attack, and after an hour-long battle was forced
to withdraw behind Division III.
The Greek advance was very difficult that day because it was carried out under heavy enemy fire, which
was especially effective because of the level, open ground. Nevertheless, by late evening the Greek
forces had seized the entire position of the Bulgarian outposts and were in contact with the KilkisLachanas defense area.
280.
General Headquarters, having collected the divisions' reports by midnight of 19 June, issued new
orders at 0200 on 20 June, according to which:
- Division I would continue its attack on the morning of 20 June, reinforced by Division VI, which would
operate towards Xylopolis.
- Divisions II, III, IV, and V, which were to advance against Kilkis, would resume their attack against the
enemy forces opposite them at 0500. After the enemy withdrawing, Divisions II and IV would deploy east,
to the line of Terpylos-Akropotamia villages, while Divisions III and V and the Cavalry Brigade would
pursue the enemy to the north.
- Division X, after occupying the heights north of Soultogiannaiika village, would continue towards
Kalindria or Metalliko, according to developments in the tactical situation.

The mission of Division VII was not revised; General Headquarters would remain at Melissochori.
281.
On the basis of this new order the divisions continued their attack on the morning of 20 June
along the entire front of the Kilkis-Lachanas area.
Division VII continued its advance and arrived at Nigrita in the early afternoon hours. Before evacuating
the town, the Bulgarians had put it to the torch and had killed many of its Greek inhabitants. From Nigrita,
Division VII moved on to Terpne village, where it encamped. At the Vergopouliana hills (northwest of the
village of Skepasto) a Bulgarian force of 1,500 men (a battalion and a regimental command) was
surrounded and captured by troops of the division and by Volunteer Scouts. On the night of 20-21 June,
by order of the division, the detachment which was left at Nea Kerdylia (the 20th Infantry Regiment)
moved towards Nigrita.
Division I, attacking from Ossa village towards Lachanas, engaged in the afternoon in fierce fighting,
which lasted into the night; the division did not succeed in breaking through the Bulgarian defensive
position.
Division VI, which began its advance in the morning, captured Xylopolis at 1100, taking a Bulgarian
company prisoner. Resuming its advance, it arrived about 1,000 meters away from the main Bulgarian
defense position and restored contact with Division I which was operating on its right (east).
Divisions II, IV, V, and III, operating at the centre towards Kilkis, continued their attack. Despite committing
all their forces to action, they failed to bend Bulgarian resistance. Nonetheless, they succeeded in
approaching the Bulgarian positions at assault distance. On the night of 20 June the Greek divisions were
in firm occupation of the line from Megale Vryse (Division III), to the southern approaches of the village of
Krestone (Divisions IV and V), to the villages of Potamia and Akropotamia (Division II). Their casualties
were again heavy, due to the level terrain and the Bulgarians' determined resistance.
Division X, having repelled a Bulgarian attack from the direction of Euzonoi village, captured Gevgelije
and the bridge over the Axios; by late evening it had moved forward to the line Euzonoi-Kastro.
The Cavalry Brigade made a reconnaissance move towards the villages of Chorygi and Kastanies, and
drove back a Bulgarian Cavalry regiment moving against the left (west) of Division III. On reaching the
vicinity of Kastanies by the afternoon, the Cavalry Brigade was attacked by a small Bulgarian force, and
withdrew behind Division III at the village of Daphnochori. Its decision and the cautiousness of its moves
in general prompted a reprimand by General Headquarters.
282.
General Headquarters, concerned about the slow pace of the battle, ordered, at 1730 on 20 June,
Divisions II, III, VI, and V that were attacking Kilkis to intensify their efforts to capture the town during the
night of 20-21 June. The order only reached the above divisions at 1900, with the result that no
coordination was effected. Only Division II launched a night attack.
General Headquarters, being willing to reinforce the main effort against Kilkis, and in want of reserves,
ordered Divisions I and VI, which were moving towards Lachanas, to form a detachment of two regiments
(one from each division) under the commander of Division VI, Colonel Nikolaos Dellagrammatikas; this
detachment was to move as quickly as possible towards Kilkis and attack the enemy's left (east) flank and
its rear. General Headquarters also ordered Division X to make haste towards Kilkis, after capturing the
hills north of the village of Soultogiannaiika, in order to reinforce the other divisions from the west.
283.
The night attack of Division II began by surprise at 0330 on 21 June. After a fierce struggle, which
continued well into the morning, the division managed to occupy important enemy positions east of Kilkis,
putting in immediate danger the Bulgarian left flank and rear.
Repeated Bulgarian counterattacks were successfully repelled, but they inflicted heavy casualties on the
Greek troops, which often were forced to fight without artillery support. Among the fallen was the
commander of the 7th Infantry Regiment, Lieutenant Colonel Konstantinos Karagiannopoulos,.
At first light on 21 June the remainder of the Greek divisions resumed their attack; the Greek troops
launched successive forceful assaults, with bayonets drawn, on the Bulgarian positions.
Division IV, after fierce fighting, succeeded in capturing the southern approaches to Kilkis. During the
battle the commander of the 8th Infantry Regiment, Colonel Antonios Kampanes, and the commander of
Battalion IV of the same regiment, Captain (Inf) Charalampos Makrykostas, were killed.
Division V crossed the railway line and captured important positions southwest of Kilkis, while Division III
captured the village of Metalliko, thus gravely threatening the Bulgarian western flank and rear.

Faced with this situation, the Bulgarians began withdrawing to the north, covered by strong rear-guard
forces. The bulk of the Bulgarian forces withdrew to Dysoron mountain, and only small units, mostly
transport, moved in the direction of Kalindria.
Continuing their attack, Greek forces liberated Kilkis at 0930 and pursued the withdrawing enemy forces,
although not in great depth, because of lack of reserves and the exhaustion of the troops after a three-day
arduous struggle. Consequently, the great success of breaking through the Kilkis defense area was not
exploited to the full.
The line that was finally captured by the divisions of the centre passed through Metalliko village (Division
III), Xerovryse (Division V), Terpylos (Division IV) and Potamia-Akropotamia (Division II).
Division X, having captured the heights of the village of Soultogiannaiika came under heavy artillery fire; it
moved towards Valtoudi village, where it spent the night, dispatching only a battalion towards Kalindria.
The Cavalry Brigade, acting with considerable tardiness and hesitation, dispersed the Bulgarian forces
withdrawing towards Kalindria and captured about 100 enemy prisoners; it then moved forward to the
village of Koromelia, where it stopped, suspending any further pursuit of the enemy.
284.
Divisions I and VI, operating towards the village of Lachanas, began on the morning of 21 June to
withdraw troops from their front line in order to form the mixed detachment that was to move towards
Kilkis. The Bulgarians, interpreting this movement as a Greek retirement, launched a fierce attack against
the Greek forces' right (eastern) flank, in the area of the village of Kydonies, where Battalion I/5 of
Division I was posted. Thanks to that battalion's unparalleled bravery, the Bulgarian attack was repelled
and the threat was averted, at the cost of the life of Battalion Commander Major Anastasios Katsimides.
Almost all the battalion's officers were put out of action.
After the liberation of Kilkis, General Headquarters recalled the order for the formation of a mixed
detachment from Divisions I and VI, and ordered both divisions to intensify their efforts in common to
capture Lachanas.
Divisions I and VI opted for a simultaneous attack against Lachanas at 1500 on the same day.
After a brief but intense artillery preparation, the two divisions, with bayonets drawn, assaulted the
Bulgarian positions. Before the fury of the Greek attack, the Bulgarians began a disorderly withdrawal
towards the north, abandoning guns, vehicles, animals and every kind of materiel.
Having captured Lachanas village at 1600, the Greek troops continued to pursue the Bulgarians up to the
last heights before the valley the of Strymon; there, at nightfall, they halted their movement.
Despite the fact that the final phase of the battle to capture Lachanas was brief, the casualties, both killed
and wounded, were heavy. Among the dead officers were the commanders of the 4th Infantry Regiment of
Division I, Colonel Ioannes Papakyriazes, and of Battalion II of the same regiment, Major (Inf) Ioannes
Chatzopoulos. The Bulgarian losses were also considerable: about 500 were were taken prisoner, and
sixteen artillery pieces, 1,300 small arms, and plentiful ammunition were captured.
285.
Division VII, which had not received fresh orders for 21 June, queried General Headquarters at
0530 on that day regarding its further actions. General Headquarters replied that the division should
conform to the previous orders, at the discretion of the division commander. At 0930 of the same day,
General Headquarters informed the division that Bulgarian troops had withdrawn towards Lachanas
village and that they might soon attempt to withdraw further to the village of Strymoniko.
Upon receiving this information, Division VII began to move towards Lachanas, but at a very slow rate.
The division managed to reach the Verge-Lygaria line only at 1600, having encountered no resistance.
There it was informed by General Headquarters that Kilkis had been liberated and that the pursuit of the
Bulgarians had begun. A little later it was informed by Division I that Lachanas had also been captured
and that the Bulgarians were fleeing in panic towards Strymon. That information was verified by Division
VII's own advanced elements.
Despite that, Division VII failed to increase the speed of its advance, with the result that the Bulgarians
crossed the Strymon unimpeded and headed towards Siderokastro and Serres.
286.
Thus the three-day violent battle of Kilkis-Lachanas ended with an absolute victory for the
Hellenic Army. Total casualties for the Hellenic Army were 8,828 killed and wounded, including ten
battalion or regimental commanders. The casualties by division were as follows: Division I, 1,354; Division

II, 1,483; Division III, 773; Division IV, 1,257; Division V, 2,123; Division VI, 1,347; Division VII, 199;
Division X, 276; the Cavalry Brigade, 16.
The Bulgarian losses were also substantial but have not been completely verified. About 2,500 Bulgarians
were taken prisoner. Nineteen guns, five limbers, large quantities of small arms, and considerable
equipment were captured.
287.
General Headquarters, which spent the whole of 21 June at Melissochori, issued at 2100 an
order for the following day, according to which the divisions were to be ready by noon on 22 June to
resume their advance, except those which were already in pursuit of the enemy and which would continue
the pursuit. The unprecedented losses of officers during the battle of Kilkis-Lachanas led General
Headquarters to order that all insignia of rank be removed from the officers' caps, so as not to offer a
visible target to the enemy.
Operations of the Army between 22 and 24 June- The Battle of Dojran
(Sketch-map 30)
288.
On the morning of 22 June, Divisions I, II, IV, and VI remained in their positions in order to
reorganize and resupply. The other divisions and the Cavalry Brigade continued their pursuit of the
enemy, in accordance with the General Headquarters order of the previous day.
Division X, on the left, having liberated the village of Eliophoto and gained contact with Division III and the
Cavalry Brigade on its right, continued its movement towards Kalindria.
In the center, Division III captured the heights north of Kalindria; there, it came under effective fire from
Dojran and halted its advance. Division V moved forward to the village of Koromelia, while the Cavalry
Brigade moved towards Kalindria and Dojran and ascertained that the Bulgarians occupied the position
between the village of Drosato and the Dojran railway station.
On the right, Division VII, by order of General Headquarters issued at 0400 on 22 June, moved quickly
towards the river Strymon; it found the bridges at Strymoniko village and Koumaria village destroyed.
289.
On the same date at 0900, General Headquarters relocated to the Kilkis railway station (village of
Krestone), and at 1130 issued a new operations order to the forces of the left and center, according to
which Division X would continue its move towards Kalindria, Division III would capture the Dojran railway
station, Division V would move forward to Drosato, Division IV would move towards Antigoneia, and
Division II towards Metaxochori. The Cavalry Brigade would continue its movement towards Mouries,
dispatching reconnaissance missions to the Kastanoussa pass and the road to Strumitza.
Following this order, the Greek forces continued their movement north, and by nightfall on 22 June had
arrived at the line formed by the villages Kalindria, Drosato, Antigoneia, and Terpylos, without meeting
serious enemy resistance. It was ascertained through reconnaissance missions that the Bulgarians had
deployed in strength at the heights of Dojran.
290.
On the night of 22 June, by order of General Headquarters, a Field Army Section was formed
under the commander of Division I, Major General Emmanouel Manousogiannakes, called the
Manousogiannakes Field Army Section, and comprising Divisions I, VI, and VII. Its mission was to pursue
beyond the river Strymon the Bulgarian forces occupying presently the eastern heights of Dysoron
mountain, north of Lachanas, and if possible, to cut off the retreat of the Bulgarian forces at the
Kastanoussa pass. Another order specified the missions of the other units as follows:
- Divisions X and III would attack the enemy forces holding the heights over Dojran.
- Division V would advance to the village of Amaranta, and be ready to assist Division III if necessary.
- Divisions II and IV would move towards the ruins of the village of Akrochori and the Kastanoussa pass,
respectively.
- The Cavalry Brigade would advance towards the Kastanoussa pass, dispatching a company to
reconnoiter the road to Strumitza.
291.
On the next day, 23 June, the Greek forces continued their advance to the north, in accordance
with General Headquarters' orders as outlined above.

On the left, Divisions X and III decided to attack the Bulgarian forces on the Dojran heights
simultaneously, at 0830.
Division X, at the agreed time, attacked the heights at the Perasmata pass, southwest of Dojran.
Immediately after attacking, the Greek troops came under fierce infantry and artillery fire, which pinned
them down and caused heavy losses. Significantly to blame was the delayed attack of Division III, which
gave the Bulgarians the opportunity to concentrate all their fire on the troops of Division X.
Division III began its attack finally at 1000, drawing the entire Bulgarian artillery fire. The division kept up
its attack, and after a short but violent fight, captured the Dojran railway station and the town itself in the
early afternoon. Faced with the vehemence of the Greek attack, the Bulgarians withdrew in disarray to the
north, taking the Metropolitan of Dojran and thirty notables as hostages. Division III continued its pursuit,
and seized the first hills north of Dojran by the end of the day. Many Bulgarians were taken prisoner, while
others drowned in the lake while trying to flee. Among their dead was Brigade Commander, Colonel
Kavarnaliev.
Division X suffered heavy casualties on that day; five officers and 101 soldiers were killed and 22 officers
and 733 enlisted men wounded. Division III had fewer casualties: 146 officers and enlisted men killed and
wounded.
In the center, Division V, moving to the east of the lake of Dojran, assembled by nightfall in the area of the
village of Myriophyto. Division II reached Kentriko and sent reconnaissance missions to Dysoron
mountain; they confirmed that the Bulgarians had withdrawn towards Siderokastro. Division IV crossed
Dysoron and moved forward towards the southern heights of the Kastanoussa pass, meeting no enemy
resistance. The Cavalry Brigade, having dispatched reconnaissance forces towards Strumitza and the
Kastanoussa pass, moved to the village of Mouries, where it spent the night.
On the right, by orders of Field Army Section Commander, Major General Manousogiannakes, Divisions I
and VI moved to the north and reached the village of Lithotopos without encountering enemy resistance.
Division VII sent cavalry reconnaissance missions to the plain of Serres; they also discovered that the
enemy had withdrawn to Siderokastro, having first destroyed the bridge near the village of Cheimarros.
On the same day, in the area of Gevgelije, an Infantry battalion and a Marine battalion, hastily sent from
Thessalonica, foiled a Bulgarian attempt to recapture the town; the battalions pursued the Bulgarians up
to the village of Bogdantsi.
292.
After completing the occupation of Dysoron mountain and the movement forward of the bulk of
the Greek forces in the area of Dojran and the valley of the Strymon, General Headquarters, at 1730 on
23 June, ordered the continuation on the following morning of the advance towards the north. According
to this order, Division X would mop up the area east of Gevgelije and advance towards Valandovo.
Division III, following the carriage road, would advance towards the village of Kosturino. Divisions V and II
would advance towards the villages Kayali and Bayram Onbashi respectively, on the western slopes of
Kerkine mountain. Division IV would move towards the Old Tri-National Boundary Mark (Summit 1474).
The Manousogiannakes Field Army Section (Divisions I, VI, and VII) was given the liberty to take the
initiative and crush the Bulgarian forces in the Siderokastro area; this objective had to be accomplished
quickly in order to facilitate the advance of the army to the north through the Rupel pass. The Cavalry
Brigade would advance through Rodopolis to the Strymon bridge near Siderokastro.
General Headquarters also ordered the rapid transport of Division VIII from Epirus to Macedonia. Only
Division IX would remain in Epirus, with its strength supplemented by National Guardsmen. After the
making up of Division IX's numbers, excess National Guardsmen would move to Thessalonica to replace
the reservists of the Rear Area Service. The latter would be transferred to units on the front, to make up
for the units' considerable losses, amounting to approximately 10,000 men.
293.
On the morning of 24 June, the Hellenic Army continued its advance, pursuing the Bulgarian
forces that were still withdrawing to the north.
Division X, after a short march, arrived at the village of Tsanitsane, where it spent the night.
Division III, following the carriage road from Dojran to Strumitza, arrived at noon to the level of Dedeli
village, where it came under heavy artillery fire from the heights of Kosturino. The division, therefore,
halted its march, deployed its artillery and returned fire against the enemy artillery positions. The artillery
duel continued until nightfall, with infantry elements advancing only slightly.
Division V's main force entered Tatarli, where it deployed security elements.

Division II, moving through the villages of Myriophyto and Mouries, arrived at Bayram Onbashi, where it
spent the night.
Division IV, taking a route towards the Kastanoussa pass-Agia Paraskeue village, in the early afternoon
hours occupied the Old Tri-National Boundary Mark summit on Kerkine mountain, where it deployed
security elements.
The Manousogiannakes Field Army Section (Divisions I, VI, and VII) remained in its positions throughout
the day, collecting materials for the bridging of the river Strymon, south of the lake of Kerkine.
The Cavalry Brigade moved eastwards, in accordance with the order from General Headquarters, but
when its advance guard reached the village of Vyroneia, it came under fire from the Bulgarian troops in
the village and halted.
294.
On the same day, General Headquarters relocated to the railway station of Dojran. From there it
issued new orders to Divisions II, III, IV, V, and X to continue their advance the following morning and,
having captured the mountain passes of Kerkine, to send reconnaissance missions to the valley of
Strumitza.
At the same time, the Field Army Section ordered Divisions I and VI to move to the north and liberate the
villages of Livadia and Thrakiko respectively, while Division VII would remain in place to guard the passes
of Kerkine mountain
Capture of Strumitza Valley- Liberation of Kavala and Serres
(Sketch-maps 30 and 31)
295.
Following the above-mentioned orders from General Headquarters and the Manousogiannakes
Field Army Section, the Greek forces continued their northward advance along the entire front on the
morning of 25 June.
Division X followed a route in the direction of the villages of Fourka-Bravintsi-Balintsi and arrived at the
stream of Anska Reka, encountering little resistance on the way.
Division III moved towards the Kosturino pass, and having crossed the Anska Reka under heavy and
sustained enemy artillery fire, captured Rabrovo after a fierce fight; by nighttime it had moved forward to
the southern heights of the pass. The casualties of the division on that day were heavy: one officer and 20
enlisted men killed and three officers and 211 enlisted men wounded.
Division V also advanced towards Kosturino. Very soon, however, it came under heavy artillery and
infantry fire from the southeastern heights of the pass, and deployed for battle. After a fierce fight, which
lasted until night, it managed to seize many prominent points on the crest line of Kerkine mountain, and
even captured a Bulgarian battery.
Division II attacked the Bulgarian positions on the heights near the village of Dorlobosh and the mountain
pass near the village of Ormanli. It captured them after fierce fighting, which lasted into the night.
Divisional casualties on that day were 20 enlisted men killed and three officers and 122 enlisted men
wounded.
Division IV, by order of General Headquarters, moved forward the bulk of its forces to the crest line of
Kerkine mountain (the Old Tri-National Boundary Mark) and there it consolidated.
The Cavalry Brigade sent reconnaissance missions to the passes of Kerkine mountain north of Ano
Poroia village and towards the village of Neo Petritsi. It reported to General Headquarters that the
Bulgarians were holding the hills west of Neo Petritsi with 10,000-12,000 men and 15 guns.
On the right, the Field Army Section followed the western bank of the Strymon. Division VI entered the
village of Livadia, and Division I entered the village of Thrakiko, where it linked up with the Cavalry
Brigade. Division VII remained in its positions, surveying the western bank of the Strymon, from the
village of Cheimarros to the level of Koumaria village.
The Bulgarians in the meantime, on realizing the hopelessness of their position at the Kosturino pass,
withdrew in a disorderly manner towards Strumitza during the night.
296.
On the morning of the following day, 26 June, Divisions III and V, on learning that the Bulgarians
had retired, moved quickly to occupy the Kosturino pass.
General Headquarters, immediately upon receiving information on the withdrawal of the Bulgarians from
Kerkine mountain, ordered Division IV to advance at once towards the villages of Gabrovo and Kolesino;

the rest of the divisions were ordered to send forward strong advance guards towards the Strumitza
valley.
In accordance with this order, Division X moved forward as far as the village of Popchevo, where it
encamped. It remained at that position for the entire day of 27 June.
Division III remained at Kosturino, while some of its forces moved forward and encamped at the heights
west of Strumitza.
Division V advanced and captured Strumitza, where it established itself. On 27 June, the division
successfully repelled a Bulgarian counterattack and engaged an enemy column that was withdrawing to
the east of the Serbian front; the Greek forces took eight officers and 586 enlisted men prisoner.
Division II moved forward to the Strumitza valley as well and captured the line of the villages KuklishBansko. On 27 June it engaged a Bulgarian column that was withdrawing from the Serbian front, forcing it
to flee. The Greek forces captured four guns.
Using its advance guard, Division IV captured the village of Sushitsa in the Strumitza valley and blocked
the road from Strumitza to Petrich; the division also captured six guns. On the following day, 27 June, it
engaged Bulgarian columns retiring from the Serbian front, and dispersed them, capturing twelve guns,
many vehicles, and a variety of other means of transportation and equipment, and taking 52 prisoners.
The division's casualties amounted to 34 killed and 99 wounded.
On the right, Division I continued its advance, and despite the enemy's effective fire and the sparse cover
offered by the terrain, managed to capture the village of Neo Petritsi on the morning of 27 June. During
their withdrawal, the Bulgarians destroyed the railway bridge and a wooden road bridge which spanned
the river Strymon.
Division VI arrived west of the village of Vyroneia and from there sent an Evzone battalion to the
Sideroporta mountain pass (on the crest line of Kerkine mountain), which it captured after a fierce fight. In
the early afternoon of 27 June the division crossed the Strymon river, and its advanced troops liberated
Siderokastro, which the Bulgarians had abandoned after previously pillaging the town and massacring the
Metropolitan and more than a hundred Greek notables.
The casualties of Divisions I and VI totalled one officer and 38 enlisted men killed, four officers and 203
enlisted men wounded and 36 enlisted men missing.
The Cavalry Brigade, following an order from General Headquarters to head towards Strumitza, moved
rapidly and reached the village of Radovo (east of Strumitza) by way of Dojran on the morning of 27 June.
That afternoon the brigade withdrew behind the infantry forces to the village of Rabrovo, where it
remained overnight.
The Hellenic Fleet, meanwhile, landing a detachment from the destroyer Doxa, liberated the city of Kavala
on 26 June 1913. The Bulgarians had abandoned the city, taking with them the Metropolitan and thirty
Greek notables as hostages. The inhabitants of the city received the Greek detachment with unrestrained
enthusiasm.
297.
General Headquarters, which was still at the Dojran railway station, on 27 June received
information that the Serbian Army had scored significant successes in the area of Ishtib. In addition, the
Serbs had requested that Greek forces move towards Dubnitsa (28 kilometers north of Dzhumaya).
Moreover, General Headquarters was informed by the Ministry of the Army that Romania would declare
war on Bulgaria on the following day, 28 June, and that the Bulgarians were seeking ways to come to an
understanding with Serbia and Greece for the termination of hostilities.
On the afternoon of the same day, General Headquarters ordered the Greek forces to continue unabated
their pursuit of the Bulgarians, who were still withdrawing to the north. In addition, General Headquarters
ordered Division VII, which henceforth would cease to be subordinate to the Manousogiannakes Field
Army Section, to advance towards the east beginning on 28 June, in order to liberate Serres and Drama
and secure the Field Army's right (eastern) flank.
298.
The Greek forces operating in the valley of Strumitza and those that were following upstream the
valley of the river Strymon continued their advance from the morning of 28 June. By the night of 29 June
they had reached the following points: Division III was at the village of Piperovo, having taken along the
way 160 Bulgarian prisoners belonging to the Bulgarian forces that were withdrawing from the Serbian
front. Division X had reached the village of Hamzali; Division IV, the southern heights of Bajkovo village;
Division II, the village of Ljeshnitsa; Division V and the Cavalry Brigade, the village of Petrich; Division I
had reached the area north of the village of Pripecheno, and Division VI, the village of Marekostinovo.

On the right, Division VII, after repairing the bridges near the villages of Strymoniko and Koumaria, from
midday on 28 June began to cross the river Strymon and move rapidly towards Serres. From afar, thick
clouds of smoke were discerned rising from the city. The division's advance guard reached Serres in the
afternoon of 28 June and found the city plundered and burned. On evacuating, the Bulgarians massacred
many of the inhabitants and took many others as hostages.
General Headquarters, wishing to speed up the advance into the interior of Bulgaria, issued an order at
1600 hours on 29 June, according to which all of the Greek forces would be organized into three groups,
with the following missions:
- On the left, the Field Army Section of the Left, comprising Divisions III and X, under the commander of
Division III, Major General Konstantinos Damianos; its mission was to advance towards Pehchevo in the
valley of the river Bregalnitsa, cover the left flank of the Field Army, and be in a state of readiness to
assist the Group of the Center if necessary.
- In the center, the Group of the Center, comprising divisions I, II, IV, V and VI and the Cavalry Brigade,
was directly subordinate to the Commander in Chief. Its mission was to advance upstream along the
valley of the river Strymon towards Dzhumaya.
- On the right, Division VII; its mission was to advance with the bulk of its forces towards Nevrokop, while
simultaneously dispatching a regimental detachment towards Drama.
-- In addition, General Headquarters reported to the Government that, according to information provided
by the Greek liaison officer at Serbian Headquarters, the Romanian army had crossed the Danube on the
previous day (28 June 1913) and was advancing within Bulgarian territory. At the same time General
Headquarters asked the Government to circulate abroad the news of the Greek military successes and
the Bulgarian Army's disintegration.
Furthermore, on the same day (29 June), the Turks once again began war operations against the
Bulgarians in eastern Thrace. The Turkish Army, advancing quickly with five army corps and a Cavalry
brigade, reached Adrianople on 9 July, and recaptured the city after a brief battle.
The Liberation of Drama- The Battles of Babina and Koprivljane
(Sketch-map 31)
299.
The Hellenic Army's advance towards its new objectives, as set out by the above-mentioned
General Headquarters' order, began gradually once the units had completed their necessary
preparations.
On the left, the Field Army Section of the Left (Divisions III, X) continued its movement towards the north,
beginning on the morning of 2 July. On the following day it reached the line formed by the heights of
Garvan-Horoz Tepe-Gubenek Tepe, a line occupied by strong Bulgarian forces. A frontal attack by
Division X against the heights of Horoz Tepe and Gubenek Tepe did not succeed, owing to the difficult
terrain and resolute enemy resistance.
On the morning of 4 July, the Field Army Section of the Left was informed by General Headquarters that,
after an offensive action by the 3rd Serbian Army on the heights of Chuka Golek, the Bulgarian forces had
begun to retire to the north. Following this, on the morning of 5 July, the army section resumed its attack
and by nightfall had captured, with Divisions III and X respectively, the villages of Vladimirovo and
Rusinovo, encountering no serious enemy resistance.
300.
In the center, Division IV continued its advance beginning on the morning of 1 July. Following a
difficult and uphill trail, it arrived at the village of Tsaparevo on 4 July, and captured it after a brief fight.
Division II also continued its advance on the morning of 1 July, and by 4 July arrived west of the village of
Vuksan, without encountering resistance.
Division V departed from Petrich on the morning of 2 July and, after crossing the river Strymon over the
bridge near the village of Pripecheno, continued towards the village of Livunovo, arriving there by midday
of 4 July.
Division I continued its advance on the morning of 1 July, and by 4 July reached the village of Sveti Vrach.
Division VI continued its advance, starting in the early afternoon of 1 July. On the following day it arrived
at the village of Meleniko (Melnik), where it halted temporarily. In accordance with an order from General
Headquarters, on 4 July it dispatched an Infantry regimental detachment (the 18th Infantry Regiment and
a Pack Artillery platoon) towards Nevrokop, to cut off the withdrawal of the Bulgarian forces there
following the quick advance of Division VII in that direction. The detachment reached the village of Pirin

that afternoon, and despite its orders to move towards Nevrokop, it remained there the following day as
well. The remainder of Division VI moved forward as far as the village of Polanich on 5 July, without
meeting enemy resistance.
The Cavalry Brigade left Petrich at midday on 1 July and arrived at the village of Orman on 4 July, where
it halted. Brigade reconnaissance patrols ascertained that the Bulgarians had withdrawn further north of
the line of the villages of Ploshka-Liljanovo.
301.
On the right, Division VII had been reinforced with the 15th Infantry Regiment of Division VIII,
which had arrived in Serres from Korytsa via Thessalonica. On 30 June the division dispatched the 21st
Infantry Regiment and an Artillery battalion towards Drama. It then advanced on the morning of 1 July,
with its remaining forces, towards the village of Nevrokop.
The detachment of the 21st Regiment (Drama Detachment) arrived at the village of Angista on the night
of 30 June and on the following day, after a brief engagement, entered Drama in time to save it from the
inevitable arson. The inhabitants of the town gave a hearty reception to the Greek troops. The Bulgarians,
however, during their withdrawal on 30 June from the small town of Doxato southeast of Drama,
committed atrocities on a grand scale, putting the town to the torch and slaughtering more than 3,000 of
the inhabitants, among whom were many priests, women, and children.
The remainder of Division VII, advancing towards Kato Neurokopi, after an obstinate fight on 2 July,
captured the heights of Babina and advanced to the south of the village of Kato Vrontou. On the night of
2-3 July the Bulgarians launched a surprise attack against the left (west) flank of the division's advanced
forces and momentarily threatened the Greek disposition. However, a timely intervention by the division
warded off the danger and forced the Bulgarians to withdraw towards the north, leaving the road towards
Kato Neurokopi completely open.
On the following day, 3 July, Division VII resumed its advance and by the night of 4 July arrived at Kato
Neurokopi, which, in the meantime, had been liberated a short time before by the Detachment of the 21st
Regiment.
On 5 July, Division VII continued its movement towards the north, and in the early afternoon, when its
advance guard reached an area some three kilometers south of the village of Koprivljane, it came under
heavy fire from the Bulgarian forces which occupied the heights of Papazagir and Koprivljane. Upon this,
the division deployed for battle. The fight lasted until nightfall and resulted in the disorderly withdrawal of
the Bulgarians to the area beyond Nevrokop. Because night had fallen and an intense storm had
developed, the Greek pursuit was halted and the troops stopped outside of Nevrokop. During their
withdrawal, the Bulgarians abandoned twenty-four guns, two machine guns and large quantities of
materiel. Division casualties amounted to twenty-two men killed, and five officers and 165 men wounded.
302.
In the meantime, from 30 June General Headquarters had relocated to Vyroneia. Prime Minister
Eleutherios Venizelos came in person that day to confer with Commander in Chief, King Constantine
regarding the response to be given to a Russian proposal for the conclusion of an armistice.
On 5 July, the Hellenic Army High Command was informed of the capture of Vratsa by the Romanians. It
also received a Serbian request to direct the Field Army Section of the Left (Divisions III, X) towards the
village of Tsarevo Selo, to assist the 3rd Serbian Army, which was experiencing considerable difficulty in
its attack towards the heights of Chuka Golek.
General Headquarters then ordered the forces of the left and center to hasten the advance to the north,
and Division VII (on the right) to advance towards Mahomiye, after leaving a regimental detachment at
Nevrokop.
The Capture of Pehchevo, Kresna and Bansko
(Sketch-map 31)
303.
Starting on the morning of 6 July, the Hellenic Army continued its advance in pursuit of the
Bulgarian Army, which continued to withdraw towards the north, with strong rear guards providing cover.
On the same day, General Headquarters established itself at the village of Livunovo (north of the Rupel
defile); from there it directed the continuing operations of the Hellenic Army.
On the left, Division III crossed the river Bregalnitsa on 6 July. Over the next two days, after fierce
fighting, it captured the height of Beyaz Tepe; it then moved security forces forward to the village of

Kurakovtsi. The Bulgarians, despite their general withdrawal, countered with resolute resistance and
attempted, through successive counterattacks, to block the advance of Division III. They did not succeed,
however, and they sustained many casualties.
Division X, advancing towards the village of Pehchevo on the morning of 6 July, repelled small Bulgarian
elements occupying positions in the area of the village of Berovo; that afternoon, the division attacked and
captured the heights south of the village of Spikovo. The fighting that ensued was obstinate. The
Bulgarians attempted to recapture the heights by a vigorous counterattack; they were repelled, however,
and were subsequently pursued beyond Pehchevo.
Division X continued the pursuit of the Bulgarians on the morning of 7 July. After capturing the height of
Bukovik by nighttime, the division advanced on the following day to the height of Kaditsa, where it
deployed temporarily. On the right, Division X was assisted in its action by Division IV, which had reached
the height of Camii Tepe.
304.
In the center, Division IV continued its advance from midday on 6 July, and by nighttime of the
same day had reached the village of Vrakupovitsa, where it spent the night of 6-7 July. That night the
division came under a surprise attack by the Bulgarians, which it repelled successfully, inflicting many
casualties on the attackers. In the morning, twenty Bulgarians were found killed and wounded and 130
rifles were found abandoned.
On the afternoon of 7 July, Division IV launched a strong attack against the steep Rosalin heights, which
the Bulgarians had organized with successive rows of entrenchments and occupied with significant
forces. The Greek troops, fighting with unprecedented bravery and incomparable heroism, managed to
capture the heights and then advance to the height of Camii Tepe.
Division II -harassed continuously by the Bulgarian artillery with effective flanking fire- continued its
advance towards the north with great difficulty. After capturing the villages of Mikrovo and Budiltsa in
succession, it reached the area north of the village of Moraska on the night of 8 July, and camped there
temporarily.
Division I was moving astride the carriage road towards Dzhumaya under constant fire from Bulgarian
artillery. On 8 July, after a tough struggle, the division drove back a strong Bulgarian rear guard in the
area of the village of Yeniky, and captured important footholds at the southern exit of the Kresna defile.
Division VI (minus the detachment of the 18th Regiment, which had been sent towards Nevrokop), after
neutralizing weak enemy resistance at the Pilav Tepe height and in the area of the village of
Gradeshnitsa, continued to advance; by the night of 8 July it arrived at the village of Hushtava, where it
halted temporarily.
Division V and the Cavalry Brigade, in accordance with an order from General Headquarters, followed
behind Division I; by the night of 8 July they reached the area of the village of Gradeshnitsa, where they
encamped.
305.
On the right, Division VII entered Nevrokop on the morning of 6 July and found it vacated by the
Bulgarians. The inhabitants greeted the Greek troops with a hearty welcome. Advanced troops of the
division deployed at the Yeni iftlik height and linked up with the detachment of the 18th Regiment of
Division VI.
On the following day, 7 July, the advance guard of Division VII overran weak Bulgarian forces and
captured the village of Kremen and the surrounding heights. A Bulgarian counterattack, which was
launched during the morning of 8 July, was repelled successfully, thanks to the division's timely
intervention.
306.
On the left, following an order issued by General Headquarters on 9 July, the Field Army Section
of the Left was reinforced with Division IV and was ordered to attack the eastern flank and rear of the
Bulgarian forces, which held the Chuka Golek height and Tsarevo Selo and were obstinately resisting the
3rd Serbian Army.
In response, the Field Army Section of the Left ordered Division III to attack and capture the height of
Chuka Golek. Divisions X and IV were ordered to head in all speed to the village of Pancharevo, and from
there to attack towards the village of Tsarevo Selo.
The main attack of the above divisions began on 10 July and had the maximum momentum, but the
Bulgarians countered with an obstinate resistance.

Division III attacked the Bulgarian positions at the height of Chuka Golek, but because of the rugged
terrain and effective fire from the enemy, movement was extremely difficult. After a while the division was
forced to suspend any further offensive action, and ordered its sections to consolidate in the positions
they were currently occupying. A Bulgarian counterattack against the division's advanced positions was
repelled successfully and with significant casualties for the Bulgarians.
Division X, after capturing the Zanoga heights without engaging in decisive fighting, continued towards
the village of Pancharevo, where it encountered strong Bulgarian resistance. Despite successive efforts,
the division made little headway. Fighting continued with undiminished intensity until midday on 11 July,
when, in order to avoid further pointless casualties, the division commander decided to withdraw the
troops to the Zanoga heights and consolidate there.
Division IV, which was in close contact with the Bulgarian forces at the Rugen height, continued its attack.
By nighttime, after an extremely fierce struggle that included bayonet charges, it captured the summit of
the height of Rugen (alt. 1257m). This constituted the key to the whole position, and the division
consolidated there. It had, however, used up all of its Pack Artillery ammunition, and consequently any
further offensive operation was impossible before a full resupply.
307.
At the center, during the same period of time (9-11 July), Division II moved forward unopposed as
far as the village of Sushitsa, while Division I completed the capture of the Kresna defile, reaching as far
as the line of the villages of Krupnik and Poleto, without encountering serious enemy resistance. Despite
this, the division's movement through the Kresna defile was beset by great difficulties: the Bulgarians had
destroyed, in several places, the only carriage road and all of the bridges. A detour was impossible
because of the river and the steep rocks on both sides.
The remaining divisions and the Cavalry Brigade, by order of General Headquarters, remained in their
positions awaiting the development of the situation on the left as well as the opening of the Kresna defile
by Division I.
308.
On the right, Division VII continued the pursuit of the Bulgarians. After capturing Bansko on 10
July without resistance, it was ordered to move towards the village of Simitli, by way of the village of
Mahomiye, in order to facilitate the advance of the Group of the Center to the north. On 11 July, the
division advanced reconnaissance patrols towards the villages of Mahomiye and Predel Han, and began
to assemble in the area of Bansko in order to move offensively towards Simitli on the following day.
At the same time, Division VIII had completed its assembly in the area of Kavala and was ordered to
advance towards the east to liberate the rest of eastern Macedonia and western Thrace. The division's
advance began on the morning of 11 July, and that afternoon it reached Chrysoupolis, encountering no
Bulgarian resistance.
309.
Meanwhile, Prime Minister Venizelos informed Commander in Chief King Constantine that Russia
had expressed a strong desire to end the war; Romania had agreed to the conclusion of an armistice,
which Serbia, yielding to Russian pressure, probably would accept. He also informed the King that the
Austro-Hungarian ambassador had conveyed to him a telegram from his government, recommending that
representatives of the belligerents be sent to Nish for the conclusion of an armistice, while negotiations for
peace would be conducted in Bucharest. Following this, the prime minister expressed the opinion that it
would be advisable for Greece to accept the conclusion of the armistice, leaving the final decision to
Commander in Chief, King Constantine, because of the clearly military nature of the issue.
The King, seeking a fuller military victory over Bulgaria, insisted that the operations continue until the
signing of the preliminary peace. At the same time, after informing Serbian General Headquarters, at
2300 on 11 July, of the tactical situation on the Greek front, he ordered the Field Army Section of the Left
to continue advancing in all speed towards the height of Chuka Golek and the village of Tsarevo Selo.
The Group of the Center was ordered to attack and capture the line from Treskovo height to the village of
Uranovo, and Division VII was to hasten its advance to the village of Simitli.
The Battle of Simitli- The Liberation of Western Thrace
(Sketch-map 31)

310.
The Bulgarians, taking advantage of the suspension of the Serbian advance, withdrew forces
from the Tsarevo Selo sector and assigned them to reinforce their 2nd Army.
The rearguard of the 2nd Army, after delaying the Hellenic Army for a significant period of time, began on
11 July to occupy the defensive area of Hasan Pasha-Vidren (alt. 1050m)-Uranovo-Summit 1378, which
covered the area of Dzhumaya.
At the same time, Hellenic Army troops pursuing the Bulgarian forces deployed north of the Kresna defile.
Division III was at the height of Beyaz Tepe, Division X at the heights of Zanoga, Division IV at the Rugen
height, Division II at the village of Sushitsa, Division I south of Simitli, Division VI at the village of
Hushtava, and Division VII at Bansko. Division V and the Cavalry Brigade were still inside the Kresna
defile, while Division VIII had begun to advance from the area of Kavala towards western Thrace. The
field artillery was inside the Kresna defile as well and only a few Pack Artillery batteries followed the
divisions.
The tactical situation appeared unusually hard for the Greek forces. The divisions were deploying and
gaining contact with the Bulgarian forces with almost no artillery. Resupply was very difficult, because the
one road through the Kresna defile was virtually blocked by the massing of the field artillery and
administrative units. In addition, the front-line divisions had begun to experience a shortage of
ammunition.
Nonetheless, General Headquarters, estimating that the Bulgarian forces had suffered great attrition, that
their morale had fallen and that they were not capable of putting up a serious resistance, ordered its
forces to attack the Bulgarian positions immediately. General Headquarters' decision was determined by
the general course of the war against Bulgaria, which with the imminent collapse or capitulation of the
Bulgarian Army, appeared to be evolving rapidly to an end.
311.
On 12 July the Greek forces, in accordance with the orders of General Headquarters, resumed
their offensive efforts, except for the Field Army Section of the Left (Divisions III, X, IV) which remained in
its positions.
Division II, moving very slowly because of the rugged terrain and continuous driving rain, arrived in the
early afternoon at Hill 850, which it captured following a brief engagement. It then moved some of its
troops forward and linked up with Divisions I and IV on both sides.
Division I assembled the bulk of its forces near the village of Krupnik during the night of 11-12 July, and in
the morning attacked the Bulgarian advanced positions there. Hard fighting continued throughout the
entire day, and by nightfall the division succeeded in pushing back the Bulgarians towards the organized
position of Simitli. East of the river Strymon, the division's 4th Regiment moved towards the village of
Orekhovo; despite the rough terrain and dense enemy fire, the regiment managed to capture the
southeastern heights of the village and consolidate there.
Division VI moved speedily towards the north and when, at 1300, its advance guard reached the level of
the village of Gradevo, it came under intense artillery fire. The division immediately deployed its forces
and rushed to attack the Bulgarian positions. The 1st Evzone Regiment succeeded in capturing the
northwestern settlements of the village of Ognar Mahalle. Later the same regiment, after successfully
repelling a fierce Bulgarian counterattack, fighting hard at close quarters with bayonets, launched a fiery
new attack against Summit 1378. By nightfall the Greek troops managed to capture important Bulgarian
footholds, although not the summit itself. Among those who were killed during this battle was the
commander of the Cretan Independent Battalion, Major (Inf) Georgios Kolokotrones.
Division VII left the 15th and 19th Infantry regiments, a Field Artillery battalion, and a Cavalry platoon,
under the commander of the 15th Regiment, Colonel Georgios Polymenakos, in the village of Mahomiye
to assure the security of its eastern flank and of its communications with Nevrokop. It then advanced with
its remaining forces towards Predel Han. At approximately 1300 its advance guard came under Bulgarian
fire from the heights of Predel Han, and the division deployed immediately for attack. Following a threehour struggle in heavy rain, the division succeeded in capturing the Predel Han pass to the west of the
village of the same name. There it deployed temporarily.
In western Thrace, Division VIII crossed the river Nestos and liberated Xanthe without a fight. The
Bulgarian troops had abandoned the city the previous night, withdrawing towards the north. Detachments
of the Hellenic Fleet, with fire support from the ships' guns, landed at Alexandroupolis and liberated the
city and the surrounding area.
The residents of Xanthe and Alexandroupolis welcomed the Greek troops with unrestrained enthusiasm,
and offered them any assistance they could.

312.
On the following day, 13 July, the Greek forces continued their attack, with steadily increasing
intensity, against the organized position of Simitli.
At dawn, Divisions IV and II, by order of General Headquarters, attacked the height of Vidren, a well
organized position defended by strong Bulgarian forces. Despite the resolute resistance of the Bulgarians
and the broken ground, the Greek troops succeeded in successively capturing the Bulgarian forward
positions and penetrating into the interior of the position. A tough struggle with bayonet charges ensued. A
successful encircling movement by Division II from the northeast resulted in the Bulgarians abandoning
their last positions on the night of 13-14 July, and withdrawing towards the north.
The Greek troops, although aware of the Bulgarian withdrawal, did not attempt to reach the summit of the
height of Vidren during the night, fearing the possibility of confusion between friendly elements.
The casualties of the two divisions on that day were considerable: four officers and 114 enlisted men
killed, nine officers and 548 enlisted men wounded.
Division I, to which Division V was subordinated by General Headquarters' orders, conducted a night
attack, committing two of its regiments against Bulgarian positions in front of Simitli; the division
succeeded in penetrating to a satisfactory depth inside the Bulgarian position. It was temporarily checked,
however, by fierce counterattacks from strong Bulgarian forces.
On the morning of 13 July, Division I reinforced its front-line forces with a regiment from Division V and
launched a new, fierce attack against Simitli. Despite the obstinate resistance of the Bulgarians, the
Greek forces continuously gained ground; by midday they had succeeded in capturing the heights
southwest of Simitli. The Bulgarians, seeing their position crumbling, began to gradually fall back from
their positions and to withdraw towards the north. The commander of the division, deeming that the
moment was opportune, committed to action one more regiment of Division V and ordered an all-out
frontal attack against Simitli.
At the same time, the 4th Regiment was conducting operations east of the river. After capturing the village
of Orekhovo it turned towards the west and attacked the flank of the Bulgarian troops defending there,
spreading great confusion among them. Under these circumstances, the Bulgarians began to quit their
positions hastily and withdraw in panic towards the north, abandoning many guns, large amounts of
ammunition, and an abundance of other materiel.
Elements of Divisions I and V pursued the Bulgarians and at 1530, victorious, entered Simitli. They then
moved forward and occupied its northern heights.
Division I sustained the following casualties during the battle for Simitli: one officer and 40 enlisted men
killed, seven officers and 336 enlisted men wounded and 102 enlisted men missing. The dead officer was
the commander of Battalion III/5, Major (Inf) Ioannes Stamatopoulos. Division V had very few casualties.
Beginning at 0400, Division VI, which was advancing towards Summit 1378, came under successive
fierce attacks launched against the positions of the advanced 1st Evzone Regiment. The troops were tried
harshly throughout the entire day, but thanks to the unrivaled bravery of the men and reinforcement in the
early afternoon by two battalions from the division, all of the Bulgarian attacks were successfully repelled.
There were a great number of casualties; among the officers killed was the heroic commander of the 9th
Evzone Battalion, Major (Inf) Ioannes Velissariou.
Division VII advanced from Predel Han towards the village of Gradevo. The road was in wretched
condition, and many bridges had been destroyed. As a result, movement was achieved with great
difficulty, and it was only in the afternoon that the division's first elements managed to reach the village of
Kara Ali Deresi, where they spent the night.
On the same day in western Thrace, Division VIII and the fleet detachments completed the liberation of
the areas of Xanthe, Porto Lagos, and Alexandroupolis.
In the meantime, the governments of the belligerent countries had agreed to begin negotiations for the
conclusion of peace. The talks would be conducted in Bucharest; at 1700 on 13 July Prime Minister
Eleutherios Venizelos, as the representative of Greece, left Athens for Bucharest, via Thessalonica, to
take part in the negotiations.
313.
On 14 July the Greek forces resumed fighting along the entire front, but did not succeed in
breaking through the Bulgarian position and effecting the much sought-after decisive blow to the
Bulgarian forces there. Nevertheless, they succeeded in closing in on the height of Hasan Pasha with
Division IV, and on Summit 1378 with Divisions VI and VII and a regiment of Division V. Finally they forced
the Bulgarians to abandon Summit 1378 on the night of 14-15 July and withdraw towards Dzhumaya.

On the same day in western Thrace, Division VIII, unopposed, liberated the city of Komotene.
In the meantime General Headquarters, having received information that the Bulgarians were assembling
many forces in the area of Pancharevo, ordered the Field Army Section of the Left to attack and neutralize
the enemy threat that had been created in its sector. At the same time, General Headquarters informed
Serbian General Headquarters of this action and requested that the 3rd Serbian Army mount, as soon as
possible, a similarly vigorous attack.
Following the protracted Bulgarian resistance at Summit 1378, General Headquarters placed Divisions I,
II, V, VI and VII under the command of Major General Emmanouel Manousogiannakes, the commander of
Division I, and ordered that a fierce attack be launched on the following day, 15 July, against the
Bulgarian positions at the heights of Treskovo and Summit 1378. In addition, it placed Division I under the
commander of Division V, Colonel (Eng) Stephanos Gennades, and ordered the two divisions to cross
east of the river Strymon on the night of 14-15 July, leaving only one Infantry regiment in the west.
The forces of Division VII, which had remained at Mahomiye, were ordered to leave a detachment there
comprising an Infantry battalion and the Field Artillery battalion, under the commander of the Artillery
battalion, Major (Arty) Aristeides Kanares; the remaining troops were ordered to move in all speed, by
forced night march, to reinforce their division in its action against Summit 1378.

The Bulgarian Counterattack toward Pehchevo and Mahomiye

(Sketch-map 31)
314.
On the morning of 15 July, while the Greek forces were resuming the attack with Divisions II and
IV against the Hasan Pasha height, and with Divisions I, V, VI and VII were capturing the line from
Cherovo to Hill 1378, which the Bulgarians had abandoned on the previous night, the Bulgarians
launched a surprise offensive that gravely endangered the two flanks of the Greek deployment; the
offensive was especially threatening to the left (western) flank.
In fact, Bulgarian General Headquarters, after reinforcing the 2nd Bulgarian Army with strong forces
withdrawn from the Serbian front, on 15 July launched a counterattack against Divisions III and X at the
heights of Beyaz Tepe and Zanoga, as well as against Division VII's covering detachment in Mahomiye;
this was a desperate attempt to block the Greek advance. It was a surprise for the Hellenic Army and for a
short time the situation appeared critical. Thanks, however, to the courage and decisiveness with which it
was confronted, the Bulgarian attack was successfully repelled; after a tough, three-day struggle the
Greek forces were once again masters of the battlefield.
315.
The Bulgarian maneuver on the left (heights of Beyaz Tepe and Zanoga), against Divisions III and
X, began with a night action against the outposts of Division III and continued in the early morning with a
general attack against the front and left flank of these two divisions. At the same time, strong Bulgarian
forces following the valley of the Bregalnitsa river moved toward Pehchevo in an attempt to outflank the
Greek forces from the left.
The commander of Division III, Major General Damianos, was able to foresee in time the danger that his
division might be outflanked from the left, thereby seriously threatening the Hellenic Army's sole
communication axis through the Kresna defile. He decided to withdraw his forces gradually toward the
height of Kaditsa.
Division III's withdrawal began at 0800, and despite extremely strong enemy pressure, it took place with
absolute order, initially toward Hill 1450 and then to the heights east of Pehchevo.
Division X, after repelling successive enemy attacks in the morning, succeeded not only in maintaining its
positions at the Zanoga height but also in pursuing the Bulgarians toward their original lines of attack;
from midday the division began to withdraw gradually toward the line of the Bukovik-Kaditsa heights,
where in the end it deployed. The withdrawal of Division X was deemed necessary because Division III on
its left had withdrawn, and Division V on its right had not moved forward, placing Division X in danger of
being cut off from the rest of the forces.
316.
The Bulgarian attack on Division VII's covering detachment at Mahomiye came on the afternoon
of 15 July, from the direction of the village of Belitsa. The Greek detachment, despite facing far superior
Bulgarian forces, managed to maintain its positions until nighttime, when it withdrew from Mahomiye to
the saddle of Predel Han. Division VII ordered the 19th Infantry Regiment to rush to reinforce the

detachment; the regiment had been moving toward Hill 1378, and at the onset of the Bulgarian attack was
at the level of Gradevo village. The men were exhausted, however, and the regiment's movement was
slow; it was only in the following morning that it arrived at Predel Han to assume the conduct of the battle
there.
317.
General Headquarters, in the meantime, had also foreseen the serious threat from the direction of
Pehchevo to the rear of the Greek forces. Estimating that any attempt to retreat could possibly jeopardize
the cohesion and morale of the Hellenic Army, General Headquarters decided to react immediately by
increasing the pressure against the height of Hasan Pasha. By capturing this height, the Greek forces
would be able to attack the rear of the Bulgarian forces in the Bregalnitsa valley, isolate them and
paralyze their attack.
To carry out this risky maneuver, General Headquarters issued orders on the night of 15 July, setting out,
in general, the following missions:
- Divisions III and X were to maintain, at all costs, their positions at Pehchevo and the height of Kaditsa,
until the actions of the Bulgarians there were affected by the attack of the rest of the Greek forces toward
Hasan Pasha, and of the Serbian Army toward the Chuka Golek height and the village of Tsarevo Selo.
- Divisions II and IV, forming a separate Field Army Section under the commander of Division IV, Major
General Konstantinos Moschopoulos, were to attack against the height of Hasan Pasha, in order to assist
Divisions III and X in their struggle.
- Division V was to cross the river Strymon and attack in the direction of the village of Moshtantsa.
- Division I was to capture the heights south of Dzhumaya, while Division VII would consolidate at Hill
1378 and secure the eastern flank of Division I.
- Division VI would assemble south of Moshtantsa, as a reserve force.
- The Cavalry Brigade would dispatch strong reconnaissance patrols to the north and advance with the
bulk of its forces toward Tsarevo Selo, covering the right (eastern) flank of Division II.
At the same time, General Headquarters sent an urgent telegram to the prime minister. It reported on the
critical situation that had been created on the left of the Greek deployment due to the inactivity of the
Serbian Army, and added that as a result of Serbian inactivity, the prime minister could no longer refuse to
conclude an armistice with the Bulgarians.
318.
On 16 July the Bulgarians continued to attack, with undiminished pressure, the two flanks of the
Greek deployment. Once again, however, they failed to achieve a decisive result. Their only significant
success that day was the capture of the saddle of Predel Han on the right (eastern) flank. This was
accomplished after successive efforts and by forces several times greater than those at the disposal of
Division VII's 19th Infantry Regiment, which was defending there.
In contrast, the other Greek forces, in spite of the stifling pressure on them, managed not only to maintain
their position intact, but also to advance their disposition to the west of the river Strymon, in order to
launch their attack against the height of Hasan Pasha the following day, in accordance with the operation
plan laid out by General Headquarters.
In the meantime, the Serbs informed General Headquarters that the 3rd Serbian Army's attack on the
heights of Chuka Golek and Tsarevo Selo had begun and was proceeding favorably. From Bucharest,
meanwhile, Prime Minister Venizelos informed the Commander in Chief that Romanian Prime Minister
Majorescu had agreed to propose in the first session, which was to take place that day, the signing of a
five-day suspension of hostilities, which would take effect the following day.
319.
On 17 July, the battle continued along almost the entire front and by nightfall the situation clearly
favored the Greek forces, since everywhere the Bulgarians were fleeing and sustaining significant
casualties.
In the sector of the Field Army Section of the Left (Divisions III and X), the Bulgarians launched a series of
night attacks against the forward positions of Division X. In the morning they undertook a general attack
against the front of both Greek divisions. Despite the fierceness of the Bulgarian attack and its strong
support by a large volume of artillery fire, Divisions III and X managed to steadily maintain their positions
until the afternoon, when the Bulgarian pressure began to weaken. Following their successive failures and
heavy casualties, and because they ran the risk of being cut off by the threatening advance of the
Moschopoulos Field Army Section (Divisions II and IV) towards the height of Hasan Pasha, the Bulgarians
abandoned any further effort and retired to the north.

The Moschopoulos Field Army Section launched its planned attack against the height of Hasan Pasha at
0500 on 17 July with Division IV and one regiment only from Division II: the remainder of this division was
delayed in its move toward the west because of heavy Bulgarian artillery fire and by Division V's failure to
relieve it in time. The advance of the Greek forces, despite the obstinate Bulgarian defense and their
heavy casualties, was steady and uninterrupted during the entire day, and resulted in the complete
pinning down of the Bulgarian forces. That night the two remaining regiments of Division II arrived in the
area of battle. On the following day the attack would be reinforced with the addition of those regiments.
During that day, 17 July, the troops of Division II endured the most; they were subjected to a large number
of counterattacks and sustained considerable casualties. Among the officers killed was the commander of
Battalion III/7, Major (Inf) Konstantinos Tsirigiotes, who fell near the village of Leshko while fighting
valiantly with his unit.
The situation on the right of the Greek deployment at Predel Han developed in a similar fashion. There, in
accordance with an order from General Headquarters, Division VII undertook the conduct of the
operations on the morning of 17 July, leaving only one regiment at Hill 1378. The division's intervention
was quick and aimed at attacking the Bulgarian forces from the north, in the direction of the Kapatnik
height, in order to cut off the enemy's withdrawal route toward Mahomiye, and with simultaneous frontal
attack in order to recapture Predel Han.
The frontal attack toward Predel Han was launched early in the morning with absolute success; by
nightfall the Bulgarians were forced to withdraw two-and-a-half kilometers northeast of the saddle. By
contrast, the forces that moved from the north encountered strong Bulgarian resistance and came under
many flank attacks. As a result their arrival was delayed and they managed to reach the area northwest of
the height of Kapatnik only in the late evening.
Division VII's casualties that day were very heavy: eleven officers and 238 enlisted men killed and
seventeen officers and 1,062 enlisted men wounded.
On the night of 17 July the situation had become clear. The Bulgarian offensive maneuver had failed and
the flanks of the Greek deployment were secured. In the center, Divisions II and IV were in close contact
with the Bulgarians' main line of defense at the height of Hasan Pasha, and they were preparing to repeat
their attack on the following day. It did not take place in the end, however, since on that day (18 July
1913) an armistice was concluded between the belligerent countries and hostilities were suspended.
CHAPTER 13
The End of the War
The signing of the armistice (18 July 1913)
(Sketch-map 32)
320. Despite Russia's failure to prevent war between the Balkan states, Moscow never ceased
pursuing a policy to put an end to it, especially after the initial defeats of the Bulgarian forces. AustriaHungary and Romania also made overtures to end the hostilities. On 11 July 1913, Austria proposed an
armistice and the opening of negotiations in Bucharest for the signing of a peace treaty.
The belligerent countries accepted the Austro-Hungarian recommendation for negotiations without the
cessation of hostilities and dispatched delegations to Bucharest. The Greek delegation was headed by
Prime Minister Eleutherios Venizelos.
The first session began on 17 July. After a short discussion, a five-day suspension of hostilities, beginning
at noon the following day, was agreed upon.
321.
The Greek prime minister informed the Commander in Chief of the decision by telegram, which
reached General Headquarters at 0100 on 18 July.
General Headquarters immediately notified all divisions and ordered heralds to be sent to the enemy
forces to inform them of the suspension of hostilities. At the same time, it ordered Division III to capture
the villages of Berovo and Smojmirovo before noon and Division VII to continue its offensive efforts with
the objective of capturing Mahomiye and restoring communications between Mahomiye and Nevrokop.
The other divisions were ordered to suspend any further operation and to hold on to their positions.

An hour later, General Headquarters dispatched to all divisions a new order containing the terms of the
armistice. According to these, a demarcation line would be drawn using white flags as markers; the line
would pass through the middle of the opposing forces' positions. Movement of troops and convoys behind
the line would not be hindered.
322.
On the morning of 18 July, Division III sent its divisional Cavalry to Berovo. The village was
occupied without enemy resistance. A little later, however, the Bulgarians who had set off that night to
recapture the positions they had abandoned the previous day, moved considerable forces forward to the
area and forced the divisional Cavalry to pull back.
Herald-officers went to enemy lines and announced the armistice. The division's chief of staff was
charged with drawing the demarcation line. Despite the announcement, Bulgarian troops continued their
move forward and stopped only when the Greeks threatened to attack them. The drawing of the
demarcation line followed; it passed two kilometers east of Berovo, which remained, finally, in the hands
of the Bulgarians.
Division VII resumed its attack in the morning but could not capture Mahomiye by noon because the
Bulgarians held it with large infantry and artillery forces. Around noon, the Bulgarians raised a white flag
and the fighting stopped. The drawing of the demarcation line followed here too; it passed in between
Mahomiye and Predel Han.
Calm prevailed in the other sectors, and the drawing of the demarcation line began at noon, according to
the terms of the armistice.
323.
After the drawing of the demarcation line, the Greek forces were ordered by General
Headquarters to leave small screening elements near it, while their main forces were to move and
redeploy a little further back.
The Field Army Section of the Left (Divisions III and X) remained in the positions it occupied at noon on
18 July.
The Field Army Section under the commander of Division IV (Divisions II and IV) withdrew southeast of
the village of Pehchevo.
The Field Army Section under the commander of Division I (Divisions I and VI) deployed on the defense
line from Gradeshnitsa to Cagirli Dag; the two divisions left one battalion each in their previous positions.
Divisions VI and VIII also left a battalion each in their frontline positions and withdrew to Nevrokop, where
they formed a Field Army Section under the commander of Division VII.
Division V left a battalion in the area of Padesh-Moshtantsa and assembled the rest of its forces around
Simitli. All the screening forces of Divisions I, II, IV, VI, and VII, as well as the Cavalry Brigade, were
subordinated to the command of Division V, which became the advance guard of the Hellenic Army.
On 22 July, General Headquarters notified all formations that the armistice had been extended for three
more days and on 25 July that it had been extended again, "indefinitely."

Peace Treaty with Bulgaria (Treaty of Bucharest)

(Sketch-map 33)
324.
The Greek delegation to Bucharest encountered fierce resistance to its territorial demands, and
the prime minister informed the king that it was not possible to satisfy the Greek demand for a boundary
east of the river Nestos. In reply, the king approved the line of the Nestos river as Greece's minimum
position.
Meanwhile, some of the Great Powers, especially Austria-Hungary, insisted that Kavala ought to be
adjudged to Bulgaria. The Greek side was unyielding on the issue and succeeded in gaining the support
of France and Germany and, a little later, Italy.
325.
On 24 July, after two fruitless morning sessions, the Serb representative announced that his
country and Bulgaria had reached an agreement regarding their borders.
Subsequently, the Romanian prime minister proposed the suspension of the sessions and the holding of
bilateral talks between the Greek and Bulgarian delegations.

During these talks, Romanian General Kranda proposed a number of light amendments to the Nestos
boundary line, which satisfied some Greek demands and were also accepted by Bulgaria. Thus an
agreement between the two countries was reached.
On the basis of that agreement, the boundary line between Greece and Bulgaria followed roughly the
crest line of Kerkine mountain, met the river Strymon in its confluence with the Bistritsa, then by way of
Periblepton summit (alt. 1,270 m.), Plakes summit (1,534 m.) and Kushlar mountain (1,734 m.) went in
the direction of the mouth of the river Nestos. Thus western Thrace as well as the areas of Melenikon
(Melnik) and Nevrokop, remained in Bulgarian hands, while all the other areas liberated by the Hellenic
Army went to Greece.
Greece also gained possession of Crete, which had been turned over by Turkey to the Allies by the
preliminary Treaty of London (17 May 1913), Bulgaria having formally withdrawn of any relevant claim.
326.
On 25 July, the above-mentioned agreement was initialled and three days later, on 28 July 1913,
the peace treaty ending the state of war between the Balkan states was signed.
On 30 July a mutual assistance protocol was signed in Bucharest, providing for military and diplomatic
cooperation between the four Balkan allies (Romania, Serbia, Greece and Montenegro). The protocol was
a guarantee against Bulgaria failing to meet the terms of the treaty.
The success of the Greek delegation in ensuring the interests of the country was considerable.
Commander in Chief King Constantine sent Prime Minister Eleutherios Venizelos the following
enthusiastic telegram of congratulations; in it the king informed Venizelos that the Grand Cross of the
Royal Order of the Savior was bestowed on him, in recognition of his outstanding services to the nation:
Prime Minister Venizelos, Bucharest.
I thank you for your announcement of the signing of the Treaty. God has abundantly blessed our efforts. In
the name of the Nation and myself, I express my Royal pleasure. A new and glorious era is opening for us
and as a token of my gratitude and appreciation I bestow upon you the Grand Cross of the Royal Order of
the Savior. The Nation is grateful to you.
Livunovo 25-VII-1913
Constantine
Thus the Second Balkan War ended gloriously for the Greek arms. The Greek troops distinguished
themselves for their bravery and added yet another resplendent page to the history of the Hellenic nation.
After bilateral talks, the Turco-Bulgarian peace treaty was signed on 17 September 1913.

Redeployment of the Hellenic Army

(Sketch-maps 32, 34)
327.
On 27 July, General Headquarters asked the Greek delegation in Bucharest for instructions
regarding the evacuation of areas liberated by the Hellenic Army that were now to be left outside the new
boundaries of the Greek state. At the same time General Headquarters notified all units that the next day
it would depart from its post at Livunovo for Thessalonica.
The answer from Bucharest was that evacuation was to begin immediately. General Headquarters issued
an order, effective the next day, for the Hellenic Army to redeploy to the following new positions:
- Division V, was to deploy its subordinate screening battalions along the line from Camii Tepe to Kresna,
Poljana, and Melenikon, to cover the withdrawal of the army to the boundary line; subsequently it was to
assemble the rest of its forces in the area of Belitsa Han-Livunovo.
- The Field Army Section under the commander of Division III (Divisions III and X) was to assemble in the
area between the railway station of Dojran and the town of Kilkis.
- The Field Army Section under the commander of Division IV (Divisions II and IV) was to assemble in the
area of Siderokastro-Valtero-Erakleia.
- The Field Army Section under the commander of Division I (Divisions I and VI), was to assemble in the
area of Skotousa and Serres. The Cavalry Brigade, which had in the meantime relocated from Simitli to
Siderokastro, would also be placed under its command.

- The Field Army Section under the commander of Division VII (Divisions VII and VIII) was to assemble in
the area of Drama, leaving a regiment temporarily at Nevrokop to hand the town over to the Bulgarian
Army.
The military and civil administration in western Thrace would remain in place until its replacement by the
Bulgarian Army.
328.
General Headquarters issued an order on 3 August assigning the screening forces that were to
guard the new Greek boundary line as follows:
- Division V, based at Kilkis, would cover with three battalions the section of the boundary line between
the rivers Axios and Strymon.
- Division VI, based at Serres, would also cover with three battalions the section of the boundary line
between the rivers Strymon and Nestos.
- Division VII, based at Kavala, would cover with three battalions the boundary line east of the river
Nestos, to the mouth of the river.
The last two divisions would form a Field Army Section under the commander of Division VII. On 4
August, General Headquarters left for Athens, where it arrived the following day.
329.
The evacuation of the Greek forces was carried out smoothly, in accordance with General
Headquarters' orders.
Division X arrived on 7-8 August to the area of the village of Cherso and the Dojran railway station;
Division III arrived on the same date to the area of the village of Metalliko and the Krestone railway
station, where it deployed.
Division II reached its destination, the area of the villages Erakleia and Valtero, on 8 August, while
Division IV arrived at Siderokastro on 6 August.
Divisions I and VI arrived in the area of Serres on 6 August. Division I was billeted in the city, while
Division VI encamped in the village of Leukonas.
Division VIII arrived in Alistrate on 3 August; Division VII arrived in Drama on 5 August, and advanced to
Kavala on 12 August. The Cavalry Brigade relocated to Serres on 6 August.
Division V, which served as the rear guard of the army, having fulfilled its mission and gradually released
the screening battalions of the other divisions, assembled finally at Kilkis on 13 August.
The evacuation of Greek forces from western Thrace began on 8 August and was completed on 18
September. First to depart were the garrisons of Komotene and Xanthe, on 8 and 10 August respectively,
after surrendering the cities to the Bulgarian Army. The Marine Regiment1 stayed at Alexandroupolis until
18 September, when it was ordered by the Government to surrender the city to the Autonomous
Occupation Commission, which was based in Komotene. The regiment then left for Chrysoupolis.
The Greek inhabitants of western Thrace and the parts of Macedonia that were handed over to Bulgaria
by the Bucharest Treaty lamented the withdrawal of the Hellenic Army and many left their homes and
followed the withdrawing troops to Greek territory.
Peace Treaty with Turkey (Treaty of Athens)
(Sketch-map 34)
330.
After General Headquarters relocated to Athens, it immediately began the reorganization and
redisposition of the Hellenic Army in line with the new post-war conditions, i.e. the considerable territorial
enlargement of the Greek state. General Headquarters also made plans for a gradual demobilization,
especially of the older classes of troops.
The most important decisions were the following:
- To keep under the colors the reserve divisions V, VI, VII, and X, and to form a new one, Division XI, to be
based in Thessalonica.
- To organize, for the first time, a number of Army Corps, with which the eleven divisions would be
integrated, for a better and more efficient exercise of command.
- To abolish General Headquarters and form once again the Staff Service at the Ministry of the Army, to
which the Army Corps and the Cavalry Brigade would henceforth be directly subordinate.
- To dissolve the various wartime services and units (Medical battalions, Ammunition battalions, Convoy
battalions etc.) and incorporate them within the Infantry and Artillery regiments.

- To gradually demobilize by stages the reservists belonging to the classes of 1909 or earlier.
331.
Implementation of the above-mentioned decisions had already begun, when serious differences
with Turkey emerged during bilateral negotiations over the fate of the Aegean islands, Turkish private
properties and public charity funds (vaqufs), questions of citizenship, schools, and other issues not
resolved by the preliminary Treaty of London (17 May 1913).
In addition to these differences was the certainty that the peace treaty signed by Bulgaria and Turkey on
17 September 1913 contained a secret clause committing those two nations to cooperation against
Greece. The reoccupation of a section of western Thrace by Turkish irregular bands, without serious
resistance on the part of the Bulgarians, reinforced Greek suspicions and rekindled fears of a renewed
war with Turkey.
The Greek government telegraphed orders on 17 September to deploy military forces on the eastern
frontier. Further orders over the next few days recalled reservists of the Evzone battalions -classes 1901
through 1909- who had been demobilized, and called for the reformation of disbanded units and services.
332.
On 20 September, in accordance with the Government's orders, the following units were moved
hurriedly eastwards: Division I from Serres to Drama, Division III from Kilkis to the area of KavalaEleutheroupolis, Division IV from Siderokastro to the villages of Prosotsane and Photolivos, and Division
VII from Kavala to Chrysoupolis. The rest remained in their former positions, with the exception of Division
VIII, which was transported by rail to Florina in order to move later to Korytsa.
The demobilized Evzones returned to their units from 1 to 8 October, and thus the units were once more
on a wartime footing, ready to fight a possible new conflict.
333.
The presence of the bulk of the Hellenic Army in eastern Macedonia reinforced the Government's
bargaining position and persuaded the Turks to limit their demands and finally sign, in Athens on 1
November 1913, the Greco-Turkish peace treaty that became known as the Treaty of Athens.
The treaty settled matters pertaining to bilateral relations, since territorial issues had already been settled
by the Treaty of London.
The fate of the Aegean islands (with the exception of Crete) would be decided by the Great Powers, as
stipulated in the London Treaty. Crete, which in 1908 had proclaimed its union with Greece and sent
10,000 volunteers to fight in the Balkan Wars, had already been awarded to Greece by the London and
Bucharest Treaties of 17 May and 28 July 1913 respectively.
Because of World War I, the final cession of the Aegean islands took place ten years later and was finally
realized by the Treaty of Lausanne (24 July 1923). The islands of Imbros and Tenedos were ceded to
Turkey, as an appurtenance of the Dardanelles, while the Dodecanese islands remained under Italian
occupation. After nearly four hundred years of Turkish domination (from 1 January 1523) followed by the
Italian occupation (from 4 May 1912), the Dodecanese were finally united with Greece on 7 March 1947.
They were ceded to Greece by its World War II allies, the European Powers, in recognition of Greece's
significant contributions in the Second World War.
Demobilization
(Sketch-map 34)
334.
After the signing of the Greco-Turkish peace treaty, the Ministry of the Army ordered Divisions I,
II, III, and IV to prepare to be transported to Larissa, Athens, Patras and Nauplion respectively. All
divisions were ordered to disband their auxiliary services and transfer all their reservist servicemen of the
classes 1901-1909 to the above four divisions, which were scheduled to move to the interior of the
country.
On 4 November the order was made public to demobilize at once the reservists of the classes 1901-1909
who were serving in various services of the interior. Further orders over the following two days
demobilized the reservists of the technical arms, who had already presented themselves at the regimental
depots, and the reservists of the Evzone battalions, who had been recalled to the colors during the
renewed crisis with Turkey.
In the meantime, the divisions that were to move to the interior of the country completed the necessary
preparations, and from 5 November onwards began moving to their bases.

Division I arrived in Larissa, by road and rail, on 22 November. Division II was transported by road to
Thessalonica, and from there by steamboat to Piraeus, arriving on 10 November and establishing itself in
Athens on the following day. Division III moved by road and rail via Drama to Thessalonica and from there
by steamboat to Patras, arriving on 22 November. Division IV was transported by road to Thessalonica
and set off from there by steamboat, on 18 and 19 November, to Nauplion.
The rest of the divisions were to remain in Macedonia and Epirus. Division V was established in Drama,
Division VI in Serres, Division VII in Kavala, Division X, temporarily, in Kalindria and Division IX in
Argyrokastro.
On November 22, the decree was published demobilizing all servicemen of the classes 1910-1912. Three
days later, reserve officers up to the class of 1908 were also demobilized.
335.
After the end of the two Balkan Wars and the subsequent demobilization, the victorious Hellenic
Army did not rest on its laurels. On the contrary, it immediately reorganized and trained intensively in
order to learn and apply the lessons of the Balkan wars so that it would be ready to continue the work of
liberating Greek territories still under foreign rule.
It was decided to establish fourteen Infantry divisions, to be placed under five Army corps (designated A,
B, C, D, E), with headquarters respectively in Athens, Patras, Thessalonica, Kavala and Ioannina. A
Cavalry division would be directly subordinated to the Ministry of the Army. The Infantry began to be
provided with modern armaments, while the Artillery was divided into Divisional Artillery (the Pack Artillery)
and Army Corps Artillery (the Field Artillery). Many map exercises were conducted in order to train military
cadres.
These measures increased the numerical strength of the Greek forces to approximately 250,000 men,
and improved the quality of training and the army's fighting power.
The Greek people looked to their new Army with confidence, expecting it to liberate quickly their
unredeemed compatriots, satisfy their territorial claims, and realize the people's vision of the future.
Overview of the Events in Part Three
336.
Under the Treaty of London of 17 May 1913, Turkey relinquished all its European possessions
collectively to the states of the Balkan League. The apportioning of these territories among the Balkan
allies remained to be accomplished, but the incompatible differences in their ambitions were bound to
lead sooner or later to a confrontation. Beginning in February 1913, bloody incidents aimed against the
Greeks and Serbs had occurred, instigated primarily by advanced Bulgarian troops in Macedonia .
It was obvious that Bulgaria wanted to expand into Macedonia, to territories incontestably conquered and
held by Greece. The deployment of two of Bulgaria's best divisions toward Macedonia, instead of toward
eastern Thrace, as provided for by the Serbo-Bulgarian military pact concluded on 19 June 1912, was
ample evidence of Bulgarian ambitions. Further signs were the surreptitious entering into Thessalonica of
part of the 7th Bulgarian Division, under the pretext of giving temporary quarters to two of its battalions;
the repeated infiltration of small Bulgarian elements into areas occupied by the Greek and Serbian
armies, and the transfer of large forces from Thrace to Macedonia at the end of the First Balkan War.
337.
Bulgaria's attitude, plus information on an impending Bulgarian attack, led Greece and Serbia to
conclude a military alliance on 19 May 1913, in order to confront the common threat. Greece and Serbia
never ceased to seek a peaceful solution of their differences with Bulgaria, but they always met with
intransigence: Bulgaria had already decided to launch a surprise, simultaneous attack against Greek and
Serbian forces in Macedonia.
Putting their plans into effect, the Bulgarians moved the bulk of their forces opposite the Greek and
Serbian armies. Their redeployment was completed by mid-June. The 2nd Bulgarian Army, under General
Ivanov, deployed between Dojran and Kavala, facing the Hellenic Army. To the north, the 4th Bulgarian
Army was deployed against the southern flank of the Serbian Army, between Ishtib and Strumitza. The
total forces deployed by Bulgaria against Greece and Serbia numbered fifteen divisions.
At the same time, however, Greece and Serbia, in an attempt to counter the Bulgarian threat, had
advanced their strategic concentration. Eight Greek divisions (Divisions I, II, III, IV, V, VI, VII, and X) and
one Cavalry brigade were deployed between the rivers Axios and Strymon. Serbia and Montenegro
deployed a total of eleven divisions.

338.
The expected Bulgarian attack came on the afternoon of 16 June 1913, without a previous
declaration of war. The Bulgarians simultaneously attacked the Greeks in the area of Mount Pangaeum
and the Serbs in southern Serbia. On the following day, the Bulgarians continued their attack on the entire
front, capturing the port of Nea Kerdylia, at the mouth of the Strymon river, as well as the towns of Nigrita
and Gevgelije. Bulgarian intentions were now manifest: this was not a local incident similar to the ones
frequently staged in the past months, but an all-out, undeclared war.
The reaction of Greece and Serbia was swift and determined. The Hellenic Army, entering the war with
the highest possible morale and desirous of effectively countering Bulgarian perfidy and provocations,
proceeded on 17 June to clear Thessalonica of all Bulgarian forces, taking some 1,350 prisoners.
Immediately afterwards, the Hellenic Army launched a large-scale counterattack against the formidable
Bulgarian defense area of Kilkis-Lachanas. The battle of that name began on 19 June and, after a furious
and incessant three-day battle, ended in a resounding victory for the Hellenic forces.
The Bulgarian Army suffered a crushing blow at Kilkis-Lachanas and was obliged to retire hastily towards
the north. The Greek forces also suffered heavy casualties: losses during this bloody, three-day clash
amounted to 8,700 killed and wounded, including many senior commanders of battalions and regiments.
Pursuit of the Bulgarian Army was effected to a shallow depth only, owing to lack of reserves and the
exhaustion of the troops.
339.
After the victory at Kilkis-Lachanas, the Hellenic Army advanced the bulk of its forces towards the
valley of the river Strumitza, and from there on it was split into three groups. Two divisions (III and X)
advanced toward Pehchevo, in the valley of the river Bregalnitsa; five divisions (I, II, IV, V, and VI)
followed the valley of the Strymon upstream to the defile of Kresna-Dzhumaya; Division VII advanced
towards Vrontou and Nevrokop and through the valley of the Nestos towards Mahomiye.
The Hellenic Fleet liberated Kavala (26 June) and Alexandroupolis (12 July). In early July, Division VIII
was transported from Epirus to Kavala; it moved eastwards liberating many areas in eastern Macedonia
and Thrace up to Souphli (12 July).
The Bulgarians were everywhere in retreat. Withdrawing from Macedonia, they committed atrocious
crimes against the Greek population, massacring many of the inhabitants and burning their houses.
Nigrita, Serres, and especially Doxato, were the cities that endured the Bulgarians' vengeful wrath and
suffered the most.
340.
On 28 June the Romanian Army crossed the Danube and invaded Bulgaria. On the following day
the Turkish Army resumed hostilities, attacking the Bulgarians in eastern Thrace; by 9 July it had
recaptured Adrianople.
The Bulgarian Army had lost the initiative and its position was extremely difficult. Despite that, it kept on
stubbornly defending its territory, inch by inch. When the Hellenic Army came before the natural defenses
of the Kresna defile, on 8 July, it met with fierce resistance. After a bloody three-day battle, fighting at
close quarters with bayonets fixed (9-11 July), the Greeks managed to force their way through, pushing
as far as the area of Simitli (12-14 July) and moving on to Dzhumaya.
Simultaneously, the two groups on the Greek flanks captured Pehchevo on the left (Divisions III and X),
and Mahomiye on the right (Division VII). In a final effort, on 15 July, the Bulgarians launched a powerful
attack against the two flanks of the Greek deployment, suffering heavy losses without achieving any
significant success.
341.
While operations continued at the front, talks on a peace treaty between the belligerent states
began at Bucharest on 17 July. As a preliminary step, it was agreed to suspend hostilities at noon on the
following day.
Negotiations proceeded at a rapid pace, and after much diplomatic bargaining, the peace treaty ending
the Second Balkan War was signed on 28 July. Territorial issues were settled, with Greece receiving
eastern Macedonia. The boundary line between Greece and Serbia had been determined by a bilateral
treaty signed on 19 May 1913. Western Thrace, even though it had been liberated by the Hellenic Army,
was granted to Bulgaria. The Greek troops that were east of the river Nestos withdrew.
The Hellenic Army's struggles and sacrifices during the short but fierce Second Balkan War were not in
vain. Bulgarian expansionism was defeated and Greece liberated important territories that proved to be
decisive factors in shaping the nation's subsequent history.

342.
Greece had greatly increased its military prestige by the two Balkan Wars against Turkey and
Bulgaria. It had also fulfilled a great part of its national ambitions, since by liberating most of Macedonia,
Epirus, and the Aegean islands it had almost doubled its territory and population.
Greece's area grew from 64,000 square kilometers to 120,000 square kilometers, and its population grew
from 2.8 million to 5 million people. After a long period of subjugation, the Hellenic areas of Macedonia
and Epirus rejoined the free Greek nation and the Aegean islands once again became a place where
Greeks could live in freedom. Millions of unredeemed Greeks finally broke their chains, putting an end to
their suffering under a foreign tyranny.
The expansion of the country eventually influenced positively the population's material wealth, for in the
long run the integration of new and ample resources helped to build a robust economy. This strengthening
of the economy had in its turn an immediate and beneficial impact on the Greeks' standard of living, which
began improving considerably.
The bravery, excellent training, notable fighting abilities, and high morale of the Hellenic Army, combined
with an unprecedented harmony between the people and their leadership, led the Hellenic nation once
again to the fulfillment of its glorious destiny.

TABLE 1
The Strength of the Hellenic Fleet in 1912
AEGEAN FLEET
Battleships
4
Destroyers

Averoff, Spetsai,

Psara, Ydra

10
Velos, Sphendone,
Lonche,Aspis
Nike, Naukratousa, Nea Genea,
Thyella, Keraunos,
Doxa,

Reconnaissance

Submarines

Delphin

Leon,

Aetos, Panther,

Torpedo boats 5

11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16

Troop carriers

Sphakteria

Mine layers

Ares

Supply ships/
Torpedo carriers

Kanares

IONIAN SEA SQUADRON

Special gunboats1
2

Aktion, Ambrakia

Steam-powered corvettes

Gunboats

Alpha, Beta,

MERCHANTMAN SQUADRON
Armed merchant cruisers

Ierax

Alpheios,

Acheloos,

Peneios,

Eurotas

Delta

Esperia, Mykale, Macedonia, Athenai, Pelops, Arcadia, etc.

Auxiliary vessels

Aigialeia, Monembasia, Nauplia, etc

TABLE 2
The Strength of the Rival Balkan States during the 1912-13
Balkan Wars
FORMATIONS
NUMBER
GUNS OF MEN
COUNTRY
INFANTRY
CAVALRY
CORPSDIVI- BRIGA- DIVI- BRIGASIONS DES
SIONS DES
FIELD
A) ALLIES
GREECE
8 (a)
1
SERBIA
10
2
1
BULGARIA
11
1
1
MONTENEGRO
4
TOTAL
33
2
2
2
1,530
B) TURKEY
7
48 (b)
2

GARRI-INFA- CAVASON NTRY LRY

180
500
720
72
850

72

129.000
220.000
300.000
130
35.000
684.000
9.000
750
340.000

1.000
3.000
5.000
6.000

Notes
(a)
Includes Division VIII, which was established on 12 Dec. 1912 in Epirus from the forces present
there.
In its composition, the Greek division was numerically smaller than a Serbian division, about half
the size of a Bulgarian division and about equal to a Turkish division.
(b)
Twenty-two of the Turkish divisions were subordinate to army corps units and twenty six were
independent.

TABLE 3
The Main Events of the First Balkan War
(listed chronologically)
DATE GREECE
SERBIA
MONTENEGRO
BULGARIA
Sep. 1912
16
Declaration of mobilization
Declaration of mobilization
17
Declaration of mobilization
Declaration of mobilization
25
Declaration of war
Oct. 1912
5
Declaration of war
Declaration of war
Declaration of war
6
Liberation of Elasson
7
Capture of Dzhumaya
8
Liberation of Lemnos Capture of Kriva Palanka
9
Victory of Sarantaporos Capture of Prishtina
10
Liberation of Servia, Gribovo
Capture of Novi Pazar
11
Liberation of Kozane
Capture of Kumanovo
Capture of Kirk Kilisse
(Saranta Ekklesies), Battle of Simitli
12
Liberation of Philippias
13
Capture of Skopje
16
Liberation of Beroea, Katerine
17
Liberation of Naousa
Capture of Prizren
Capture of Lleburgaz
18
Liberation of Edessa, Amyntaion,
Capture of Pech
Imbros, Thasos, Agios Eustratios

19
20
21
22
24
26
27
31

Liberation of Samothrace
Capture of Siderokastro
Liberation of Giannitsa, Siatista
Liberation of Preveza, Psara
Liberation of Nigrita
Capture of Perlepe, Dojran
Capture of Serres
Liberation of Tenedos Capture of Diakova
Capture of Diakova
Liberation of Thessalonica
Liberation of Eleutheroupolis
Capture of Kavala
Liberation of Metsovo

DATE

GREECE
SERBIA
MONTENEGRO
BULGARIA
Nov. 1912
3
San Giovanni di Medua
4
Liberation of Icaria
5
Liberation of Cheimarra Capture of Monastir, Alessio
Capture of Alessio
7
Liberation of Florina
8
Liberation of Lesbos
Capture of Xanthe
11
Liberation of Kastoria, Chios
13
Capture of Alexandroupolis
15
Capture of Durazzo (Dyrrachium)
17
Capture of Tirana
18
Capture of Elbasan
20
Conclusion of armistice Conclusion of armistice Conclusion of armistice
21
Liberation of Agioi Saranta
Dec. 1912
7
Liberation of Korytsa
Jan. 1913
21
Resumption of hostilities
Resumption of hostilities
Resumption of
hostilities
Feb. 1913
21
Liberation of Ioannina
Mar. 1913
2
Liberation of Samos
3
Liberation of Argyrokastro
5
Liberation of Tepelene
13
Capture of Adrianople
Apr. 1913
9
Capture of Scutari (Skodra)
May 1913
17
Signing of peace treaty Signing of peace treaty Signing of peace treaty Signing of
peace treaty
TABLE 4
The Main Events of the Second Balkan War
(listed chronologically)
DATE GREECE
SERBIA
ROMANIA
TURKEY
June 1913
16
Beginning of operations Beginning of operations-Capture
of Ishtib by the Bulgarians
17
Mopping up of Thessalonica of
the Bulgarian forces there
18
Capture of Krivolak by
the Bulgarians
20
Liberation of Nigrita
21
Liberation of Kilkis, Lachanas

23
24
25
26

Liberation of Dojran
Recapture of Krivolak
Capture of Kosturino
Recapture of Ishtib
Liberation of Kavala-capture
Capture of Radovish
of Strumitza
27
Liberation of Siderokastro
Battle of Pirot Beginning of operations
28
Liberation of Serres
29
Resuming of operations
July 1913
1
Liberation of Drama
2
Capture of Varna
Recapture of Lleburgaz
4
Liberation of Kato Neurokopi
6
Capture of Nevrokop
7
Capture of Pehchevo
Capture of Plevna
9
Capture of Mahomiye
Recapture of Adrianople,
Kirk Kilisse (Saranta Ekklesies)
10
Capture of Kresna
12
Liberation of Xanthe,
Capture of Vidin
Alexandroupolis
DATE

GREECE
SERBIA
ROMANIA
TURKEY
14
Liberation of Komotene-Capture
of Simitli
17
Battle of Predel Han
Battle of Tsarevo Selo
18
Conclusion of armistice Conclusion of armistice Conclusion of armistice
28
Signing of peace treaty Signing of peace treaty Signing of peace treaty
Mid-Sept.
Signing of peace treaty
1913

TABLE 5
Greek Casualties during the Balkan Wars, 1912-131
No.
1
2
3

Officers Enlisted Men

Operations
Killed Wounded
Killed
Against the Turks
in Macedonia (First
Balkan War
81
87
Against the Turks
in Epirus (First
Balkan War)
62
174
Against the Bulgarians
(Second Balkan War) 164
TOTAL2

307

555

Wounded

Missing Frostbitten

682

3,583

1,549

5,451

294

5,687

7,918

32,587 1883

58
23,553
58

Notes
1.
Estimated casualties based on figures found in the archive of AHD/HAGS, included in the
following:

(a) In the reports on the proceedings of General Headquarter's Medical Service (F 1612/A) and
the Medical Service of the Army of Epirus (F 1622/ST) during the 1912-13 Balkan Wars;
(b) In the Ministry of Army publication Battles and the Fallen, 1830-1930, (in Greek) Vol. 1,
Athens, 1930, pp. 33-37 and 444.
2.
Nonbattle casualties, i.e. those deceased for various reasons or incapacitated by disease, are not
included in the list. According to available figures, the first number totals thirty officers and 1,520 men,
while the second totals about 10,000 officers and men.
3.
There are no separate figures for each period of operations.
TABLE 6
Commands and Headquarters of the Large Units (Formations)
during the Balkan Wars, 1912-13
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
COMMAND
5-10-12 Commander in Chief1 Crown Prince Constantine2
Chief of Staff Major General Panagiotes Dangles
until 3/6/13
Lieutenant Colonel (Eng)
Viktor Dousmanes3
HEADQUARTERS
5-10-12 Tirnavos
8-11-12 Florina
6-10-12 Tsaritsane
21-11-12
Thessalonica
8-10-12 Elasson10-1-13 Philippias
12-10-12
Servia
13-10-12
Kozane 13-2-13 Chani Emin Aga
15-10-12
Polymylos
22-2-13 Ioannina
16-10-12
Beroea 20-3-13 Athens
18-10-12
Naousa Railway Station 10-5-13 Thessalonica
21-10-12
Giannitsa
19-6-13 Melissochori
25-10-12
Gephyra
24-6-13 Dojran Railway Station
28-10-12
Thessalonica 30-6-13 Vyroneia
4-11-12 Edessa 6-7-13 Livunovo
6-11-12 Arnissa Railway Station 28-7-13 Thessalonica
7-11-12 Veue Railway Station 4-8-13 Athens
ARMY OF EPIRUS4
COMMAND
5-10-12 Commander
Lieutenant General
Konstantinos Sapountzakes
Commander in Chief, Crown Prince Constantine until 6-3-13
GeneralPanagiotes Dangles
Chief of Staff Lieutenant Colonel (Eng)
Demetrios Ioannou
Major General Konstantinos Kallares until 10-1-13
Major General Panagiotes Dangles
until 6-3-13
HEADQUARTERS
5-10-12 Arta
13-12-12
Philippias
28-11-12
Chani Terovou 8-1-13 Chani Emin Aga
4-12-12 Chani Emin Aga22-2-13 Ioannina
DIVISION I
COMMAND
5-10-12 Commander
Major General Emmanouel Manousogiannakes

until 10-1-13
Major
until 19-12-13

Chief of Staff

Colonel (Arty)

Anastasios Charalampes

HEADQUARTERS
5-10-12 Ampelonas
21-6-13 Lachanas
7-10-12 Elasson26-6-13 Neo Petritsi
14-10-12
Kataphygi
27-6-13 Vyroneia
16-10-12
East of Beroea 29-6-13 Mitinovo
19-10-12
Karyotissa
4-7-13 Bistritsa stream
26-10-12
Neochorouda 7-713 Belitsa Han
28-10-12
Thessalonica 8-7-13 Yeniky
31-10-12
Valtochori
15-7-13 Simitli
4-11-12 Agras 21-7-13 Gradeshnitsa Han
8-11-12 Veue 6-8-13 Serres
15-12-12
Thessalonica 22-9-13 Drama
4-4-13 Eraklitsa
24-11-13
Larissa
20-6-13 Ossa
DIVISION II
COMMAND
5-10-12 Commander
Major General Konstantinos Kallares until 19-12-12
Colonel (Arty) Leonidas Paraskeuopoulos
until 23-12-12
Colonel (Inf)
Ioannes Giannakitsas until 12-1-13
Major General Konstantinos Kallares until 27-2-13
Colonel (Arty) Leonidas Paraskeuopoulos
until 5-3-13
Major General Konstantinos Kallares
Chief of Staff Major (Arty)
Richardos Karamalikes (during First Balkan War)
Major (Eng)
Ippokrates Papavasileiou (during Second
Balkan War)
HEADQUARTERS
5-10-12 Tirnavos
5-3-13 Georgoutsades
6-10-12 West of Elasson
26-3-13 Preveza
10-10-12
Chani Kastanias
4-4-13 Thessalonike
13-10-12
Drepano
18-6-13 Lete
16-10-12
South of Beroea
21-6-13 Melissochori
21-10-12
Messanio
23-6-13 Terpyllos
22-10-12
Kouphalia
28-6-13 Eleutherochori
25-10-12
Vathylakkos
1-7-13 Sirbanovo
27-10-12
Melissochori
4-7-13 Vuksan
25-11-12
Preveza
7-7-13 Sushitsa
26-11-12
Chani Terovou 15-7-13 Summit 1050
1-12-12 Manoliasa saddle
17-7-13 Treskovo monastery
22-2-13 Ioannina
5-11-13 Athens
2-2-13 Elaia
DIVISION III
COMMAND
5-10-12 Commander
Major General Konstantinos Damianos
Chief of Staff Major (Arty)
Nikolaos Trikoupes
HEADQUARTERS
5-10-12 Karyes 24-3-13 Leskovik
6-10-12 Agioneri
2-4-13 Florina
8-10-12 Likoudi 28-4-13 Gephyra
11-10-12
Chani Kastanias
20-6-13 Gynaikokastro
15-10-12
Polymelos
21-6-13 Metalliko
18-10-12
South of Karyotissa
23-6-13 Dojran Railway station

21-10-12
Paralimne
28-6-13 Strumitza
22-10-12
Adendro
29-6-13 Piperovo
26-10-12
Agios Athanasios
2-7-13 Novochinevo
3-11--12
Northwest of Edessa
5-7-13 Vladimirevo
6-11-12 Agios Athanasios
6-7-13 Umljane
8-11-12 Sklethro
10-7-13 Summit 1450
12-11-12
Kastoria
16-7-13 Pehchevo
30-11-12
Leuke 7-8-13 Krestone
7-12-12 Korytsa 25-9-13 Kavala
23-2-13 Leskovik
21-11-13
Patras
3-1-13 Premeti
DIVISION IV
COMMAND
5-10-12 Commander
Major General Konstantinos Moschopoulos
until 3-1-13
Colonel (Inf)
Demetrios Antoniades until 11-1-13
Major General Konstantinos Moschopoulos
Chief of Staff Lieutenant Colonel (Eng)
Eustratios Pissas (during First Balkan
War)
Major (Inf)
Demetrios Skarpaletos (during Second
Balkan War)
HEADQUARTERS
5-10-12 Loutro 7-1-13 Manoliasa
6-10-12 Kephalovryso 22-2-13 Ioannina
8-10-12 Giannota
4-3-13 Preveza
10-10-12
Servia 20-3-13 Athens
13-10-12
Vathylakkos
22-3-13 Thessalonica
16-10-12
Northwest of Beroea
20-5-13 Langadas
18-10-12
Agios Georgios 17-5-13 Oraiochori
19-10-12
Mylotopos
18-6-13 Melissochori
22-10-12
Athyra 22-6-13 Terpyllos
24-10-12
Kouphalia
25-6-13 Summit of Kerkine mountain
26-10-12
Nea Mesembria 27-6-13 Sushitsa
30-10-12
Giannitsa
1-7-13 Mikhovo
31-10-12
Skydra 4-7-13 North of Ljeshnitsa
3-11-12 Kato Grammatiko
6-7-13 Tsaparevo
6-11-12 Amyntaion
13-7-13 Summit 1257
8-11-12 Florina 6-8-13 Siderokastro
24-11-12
Thessalonica 25-9-13 Kallithea
16-12-12
Philippias
19-11-13
Nauplion
20-12-12
Chani Emin Aga
DIVISION V
COMMAND
5-10-12 Commander
Colonel (Eng) Demetrios Matthaiopoulos
until 26-10-12
Colonel (Eng) Stephanos Gennades
Chief of Staff Lieutenant Colonel (Eng)
Spyridon Klaudianos
(during First Balkan War)
Lieutenant Colonel (Eng)
Ioannes Georgiades
(during First Balkan War)
Major (Eng)
Leonidas Choudales
until 7-7-13
Lieutenant Colonel (Arty)
Aristoteles Vlachopoulos
HEADQUARTERS
5-10-12 Crannon
7-10-12 Kephalovryso

22-6-13 Xerovryse
23-6-13 Drosato

10-10-12
Lazarades
26-6-13 Strumitza
13-10-12
Aiane 29-6-13 Petrich
14-10-12
North of Kozane
2-7-13 Kopatovo
18-10-12
Amyntaion
6-7-13 Sveti Vrach
19-10-12
Veue 9-7-13 Gradeshnitsa Han
20-10-12
Kleidi defile
11-7-13 Yeniky
22-10-12
Amyntaion
13-7-13 Krupnje
25-10-12
Kozane 15-7-13 North of Uranovo
4-11-12 Komanos
16-7-13 Cherovo
8-11-12 Armenochori
17-7-13 Treskovo monastery
11-11-12
Kozane 21-7-13 Simitli
2-4-13 Beroea 1-8-13 Krupnik
30-4-13 Gephyra
3-8-13 Livunovo
27-5-13 Nea Mesembria 13-8-13 Kilkis
19-6-13 Perinthos
20-11-13
Drama

DIVISION VI
COMMAND
5-10-12 Commander

Colonel (Cav) Konstantinos Meliotes Komnenos

(during First Balkan War)
Colonel (Inf)
Nikolaos Delagrammatikas
Chief of Staff Major (Arty)
Georgios Chatzanestes until 24-12-12
Lieutenant Colonel (Arty)
Anastasios Charalampous
First Balkan War)
Lieutenant Colonel (Arty)
Georgios Chatzanestes

HEADQUARTERS
5-10-12 Platykampos 18-10-12
Skydra
7-10-12 Petroto 19-10-12
Pentaplatanos
10-10-12
West of Servia 23-10-12
Ydromylos
13-10-12
Koila 25-10-12
Axiochori
15-10-12
Patris 28-10-12
Gephyra
31-10-12
Nea Kallipolis 28-5-13 Asvestochori
2-11-12 Edessa 18-6-13 Lana
5-11-12 Arnissa 21-6-13 Xylopolis
7-11-12 Veue Railway Station 24-6-13 Cheimarros
8-11-12 Sitaria 26-6-13 Vyroneia
24-11-12
Florina 27-6-13 Siderokastro Railway Station
2-12-12 Vatochori
28-6-13 Marekostinovo
7-12-12 Pljasha 2-7-13 Melenikon
13-12-12
Florina 5-7-13 Polanitsa
22-12-12
Thessalonica 7-7-13 Gradeshnitsa
28-12-12
Preveza
9-7-13 Hushtava
7-1-13 North of Helleniko
12-7-13 Gradevo
3-3-13 Preveza
13-7-13 Ognar Mahalle monastery
10-3-13 Thessalonica 16-7-13 East of Cherovo
13-4-13 Lana 18-7-13 Summit 1378
11-5-13 Ossa 6-8-13 Serres
DIVISION VII
COMMAND

(until end of

5-10-12 Commander
Chief of Staff

Colonel (Arty) Kleomenes Kleomenes until 29-10-12

Colonel (Eng) Napoleon Sotiles
Major (Eng)
Iakovos Negrepontes

HEADQUARTERS
5-10-12 Larissa 20-6-13 Nigrita
12-10-12
North of Elasson
21-6-13 Nikokleia
14-10-12
Northeast exit of Petra defile
22-6-13 Verge
16-10-12
Katerine
23-6-13 Livadochori
18-10-12
Neseli bridge 25-6-13 Strymoniko
20-10-12
Adendro
26-6-13 Serres
22-10-12
Vrachia 3-7-13 Kato Vrontou
26-10-12
Sindos 6-7-13 Nevrokop
28-10-12
Polichne
10-7-13 Dubrovnitsa
March 1913
Thessalonica 12-7-13 Predel Han
29-5-13 Stauros 21-7-13 Gradevo
10-6-13 Modio 30-7-13 Nevrokop
19-6-13 Skepasto
21-8-13 Kavala

DIVISION VIII (OF EPIRUS)

COMMAND
12-12-12
Commander
Colonel (Eng) Demetrios Matthaiopoulos
Chief of Staff Captain (Arty) Nikolaos Zapheiriou
HEADQUARTERS
12-12-/12
Koritiane
11-7-13 Chrysoupolis
7-1-13 Northwest of Lessiana 13-7-13 Xanthe
28-2-13 Elaia 23-7-13 Drama
2-3-13 Kakavia25-7-13 Nevrokop
3-3-13 Argyrokastro
15-9-13 Florina
5-3-13 Chani Soubase 25-10-13
Korytsa
6-7-13 Kavala
DIVISION IX
COMMAND
20-3-13 Commander

Lieutenant Colonel (Eng)

Demetrios Ioannou

HEADQUARTERS
20-3-13 Argyrokastro
DIVISION X
COMMAND
30-3-13 Commander
Chief of Staff

Colonel (Arty) Leonidas Paraskeuopoulos

Lieutenant Colonel (Eng)
Ioannes Georgiades

HEADQUARTERS
30-3-13 Gevgelije
3-7-13 Qadi Mezer Tepesi
10-6-13 Gorgope
5-7-13 Horoz Tepe
18-6-13 Axioupolis
8-7-13 South of Panoritsa
19-6-13 Goumenissa
9-7-13 Kaditsa
20-6-13 Platania
11-7-13 Panoritsa
23-6-13 Kalindria
12-7-13 Zanoga height
24-6-13 Chernitsa
16-7-13 Simitli
27-6-13 Popchevo
17-7-13 Krupnik
28-6-13 Strumitza
29-7-13 South of Summit 1900
29-6-13 Hacali 10-8-13 Kalindria

CAVALRY BRIGADE1
COMMAND
5-10-12 Commander
Major General Alexandros Soutsos
until 13-10-12
Lieutenant Colonel (Cav)
Georgios Karamanlikes until 3-11-12
25-4-13
Lieutenant Colonel (Cav)
Konstantinos Zacharakopoulos
Chief of Staff Lieutenant Colonel (Cav)
Georgios Metaxas
until 2-11-12
Major (Cav)
Epameinondas Zymbrakakes until 21-6-132
Captain (Cav) Nikolaos Spyropoulos
HEADQUARTERS
5-10-12 Tsioti 25-4-13 Lete
6-10-12 Kephalovryso 29-5-13 Sindos
7-10-12 Deskate
18-6-13 Akropotamia
9-10-12 Elate 19-6-13 Agios Georgios
10-10-12
Proselio
21-6-13 Erakleia
11-10-12
Kozane 22-6-13 Kalindria
13-10-12
Komanos
23-6-13 Mouries
17-10-12
Beroea 24-6-13 Kerkine
19-10-12
Alexandreia
27-6-13 Livadia
21-10-12
Kymina 28-6-13 Petrich
24-10-12
Nea Mesembria 1-7-13 Pripecheno Brod
25-10-12
Vathylakkos
14-7-13 Simitli
26-10-12
Asseros
16-7-13 Padesh
27-10-12
Langadas
S21-7-13
Simitli
30-10-12
Thessalonica 30-7-13 Siderokastro
1-11-12 Giannitsa
8-4-13 Skotousa
2-11-12 Sandali (west of Giannitsa)

1. As of 3-11-1912, by order of General Headquarters, the Cavalry Brigade was dissolved. It was
reestablished on 25-4-1913 at Lete.
2. Wounded in accident on 21-6-1913.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
(All works are in Greek)
A. MILITARY HISTORY WORKS
1. Operations in Macedonia against the Turks (Volume 1), published in 1932, 1939 by War Report
Office/HAGS; Appendices to Volume 1, published in 1932, 1940.
2. Operations in Epirus (Volume 2), published in 1932 by War Report Office/HAGS; Appendices to
Volume 2, published in 1932.
3. Operations against the Bulgarians (Volume 3), published in 1932 by War Report Office/HAGS;
Appendices to Volume 3, published in 1932, 1935.
B. OTHER HISTORICAL SOURCES AND AIDS
4. AHD/HAGS Archive, Balkan Wars 1912-1914.
5. History of the Hellenic World, vol. 14. Athens: Ekdotike Athenon.
6. Paparregopoulos, Konstantinos. History of the Greek Nation, vol. 8.
7. Markezines, Spyros. The Political History of Modern Greece, 1828-1964, vol. 3.
8. Politakos, Ioannes. The Military History of Modern Greece, Athens, 1980.
9. Laskaris, S. Th. The Diplomatic History of Greece, 1821-1914, Athens, 1947.
10. Phokas, D. The Fleet of the Aegean, 1912-1913, vol. 1, Athens, 1972.
11. The Battles and the Dead, 1830-1930, vol. 1, published by the Ministry of the Army, Athens, 1930.
12. Army and Navy Encyclopedia, vol. 2, entry: Balkan Wars.
13. Nikolaou, Ch. International Political and Military Conventions, Agreements and Treaties. Athens, 1980.
14. Military History Issues, published by DEK/GES, Athens, 1981.
15. War Museum Photographic Archive.

ALPHABETICAL INDEX OF PROPER NAMES

(Entries of the names of Greek individuals do not designate nationality, all others do so.)
A
Abdul Ghani (Turkish major), 138
Abdullah Pasha (Turkish general), 21
Ali Riza Pasha (Turkish general), 21, 93, 200
Andreev (Bulgarian general), 122, 127
Antoniades Colonel (Inf) Demetrios, 187, 193, 290
B
Bajchev (Bulgarian komitadji), 220

Boris (Prince of Bulgaria), 71-72

Botsares, Lieutenant (Eng) Demetrios, 159
C
Capodistria John (first Governor of independent Greece), 12
Chakalarov (Bulgarian komitadji), 128
Chatzopoulos, Major (Inf) Ioannes, 242
Constantine, Crown Prince, later King of Greece, 7, 13-14, 18, 35, 39, 47, 67-68, 70, 93, 127, 129, 134,
146, 183, 188, 190, 198, 202, 219, 234-235, 253, 256, 269, 288
Cyril (Prince of Bulgaria), 71-72
D
Dangles, Major General Panagiotes, 99, 202, 288
Damianos, (HRN) Captain Ioannes, 139, 163
Damianos, Major General Konstantinos, 18, 50, 99, 106, 230, 250, 261, 290
Dedouses, Captain (Inf) Georgios, 82
Delagrammatikas, Colonel (Inf) Nikolaos, 139, 184, 193, 291
Dimitriev (Bulgarian general), 113
Dialetes, Major (Inf) Phokion, 238
Diomedes, A. N. (cabinet minister), 11
Dousmanes, Lieut. Colonel (Eng) Viktor, 67, 93, 202, 225
E
Esat Pasha (Commander of the Turkish Army of Ioannina), 153, 191, 198, 206
Esat Pasha (Turkish commander of Scutari), 113, also n. 1
Eydoux (French general), 14
Epites, Lieut. Colonel (Arty) Antonios, 84, 86, 185, 200
F
Ferdinand, King (Tsar) of Bulgaria, 7, 19, 204
Fichev (Bulgarian general), 19
G
Garibaldi, Giuseppe (Italian unification hero), 17 n.2
Garibaldi, Pipino (son of Riccioti Garibaldi), 174
Garibaldi, Ricciotti (Italian philhellene general), 17, 170, 174, 177
Gennades, Colonel (Eng) Stephanos (also Gennades Detachment), 19, 23-24, 26-27, 30, 32, 34, 38, 4041, 47-49, 78-79, 81, 83, 260, 291
Georgiades, Lieut. Colonel (Eng) Ioannes, 101, 291, 293
George I King of Greece, 7, 11, 61, 73, 198, 202-203, 219, 288
Giannakitsas, Ioannes, 193, 289
Geshov (Bulgarian prime minister and foreign minister), 7, 224, 225, 229
Goltz, see von der Golz
H
Hasan Riza Pasha (Turkish general), 21, 113
Hasan Tahsin Pasha (Turkish general), 21, 51, 63-65, 70-71, 116
Hseyin Bahri (Turkish lieutenant), 138
Hseyin Husnu (Turkish captain) , 138
Hseyin Lut Bey (Ottoman gendarmerie major), 143-144
I
Iatrides, Major (Inf) Georgios, 238
Ivanov (Bulgarian colonel), 238
Ivanov (Bulgarian general), 113, 225, 230, 232, 275
Ismail Kemal Vljora (bey and leader of Albanian independence movement), 168
Ioannou, Lieut. Colonel (Eng) Demetrios, 186, 288, 293
K
Kavarnaliev, (Bulgarian colonel), 245
Kallares, Major General Konstantinos, 18, 81, 119, 172, 186, 190, 193, 235, 288-289
Kamaras, Lieut. Colonel (Inf) Antonios, 239
Kampanes, Colonel (Inf) Antonios, 241

Kanares, Major (Arty) Aristeides. 133, 260, 281

Karagiannopoulos, Lieut. Colonel (Inf) Konstantinos, 241
Karamanlikes, Lieut. Colonel (Cav) Konstantinos, 40, 85, 294
Katechakes, Captain (Inf) Nikolaos, 79
Katsimides, Major (Inf) Anastasios, 242
Khesapchiev, Khristofor (Bulgarian general), 96, 213, 216, 218, 234-235
Kleomenes, Colonel (Arty) Kleomenes, 19, 292
Kolokotrones, Major (Inf) Georgios, 258
Konstantinopoulos, Lieut. Colonel (Eng) Konstantinos (also Konstantinopoulos Detachment), 19, 23-25,
27, 29, 32, 34, 38, 41, 45, 49-50, 54-55, 57-58, 60-62, 65, 81, 98, 119-120, 131
Kontoules, Lieut. Colonel (Inf) Alexandros, 157, 172, 181, 183
Korakas, Colonel (Arty) Aristoteles, 171
Koromelas, Lampros, Minister of Foreign Affairs, 11, 38, 44, 127, 233-234
Kundichev (Bulgarian general), 113
Kountouriotes, Rear Admiral Paulos, 132
Koutephares, Major (Inf) Antonios, 238
Kranda (Romanian general), 267
L
Lazarovich, Veljko (Montenegrin general), 20
Lefterov (Bulgarian komitadji), 216-217
M
Majorescu (Romanian prime minister), 263
Makrykostas, Captain (Inf) Charalampos, 241
Malamos, Lieut. Colonel (Eng) Chrestos, 171, 185
Manos (Leader of Cretan Volunteer band), 160
Manousogiannakes, Major General Emmanouel (also Field Army Section), 18, 219, 244-247, 249, 260,
289
Matthaiopoulos, Colonel (Eng) Demetrios, 19, 174, 186, 193, 291, 293
Mauromichales, Lieut. Colonel (Inf) Kyriakos, 36
Maviles, Lorentzos (poet), 177
Meliotes-Komnenos, Colonel (Cav) Konstantinos, 19, 193
Metaxas Captain (Eng) Ioannes, 29, 31, 67, 198-199, 294
Metsas, Lieut. Colonel (Arty) Stamatios, 168, 192
Michael, King of Serbia, 6
Michalakopoulos, Andreas (cabinet minister), 11
Michalopoulos-Arkadikos, Lieut. Colonel (Inf) Nikolaos, 217
Moschopoulos, Major General Konstantinos (also Field Army Section), 19, 88, 183, 187-188, 190, 193,
262-263, 290
N
Nazim Pasha (Ottoman minister of war and commander in chief), 21
Nicholas (Nikita), King of Montenegro, 20
Nicholas, Prince of Greece, 120, 127, 212
P
Panas, Demetrios (ambassador), 7, 123-125, 234
Papadopoulos, Lieut. Colonel (Inf) Dionysios, 54, 187, 189, 196
Papakyriazes, Colonel (Inf) Ioannes, 192, 194, 242
Paraskeuopoulos, Colonel (Arty) Leonidas, 186-187, 289, 293
Petev (Bulgarian colonel), 237
Peter, King of Serbia, 20
Petrov (Bulgarian colonel).
Petrov (Bulgarian general),
Polymenakos, Lieut. Colonel Inf) Georgios, 157, 183, 258
Putnik, Vojvode Radomir (Serbian general), 120
R
Raktivand, Konstantinos (cabinet minister), 11, 70
Repoules, Emmanouel (cabinet minister). 11

Riza Pasha, see Hasan Riza Pasha

Romas, Alexandros (Commander of the Greek Redshirt Corps), 87, 170, 177
S
Savov (Bulgarian general), 20
Sapountzakes, Lieut. General Konstantinos, 18, 146, 151, 158, 188, 190, 193, 205, 288
Sarafov (Bulgarian major general), 237
Sawfik Pasha (Turkish general), 63-64
Shahir Pasha (Turkish general), 21
Shevket Pasha (Turkish prime minister), 227
Soutsos, Major General Alexandros, 19, 294
Sophoules, Themistokles (Prime Minister of the Provisional Government of Samos), 144
Speliades, Major (Eng) Panagiotes (also Speliades Detachment), 159-161, 163
Spyromelios, Major (Gendarmerie) Spyridon, 167, 173, 203
Stamatopoulos Major (Inf) Ioannes, 259
Stanchev (Bulgarian cavalry lieutenant and ambassador), 72
Strategos, Captain (Eng) Xenophon, 198-199
Stratos, Andreas N. (cabinet minister), 11
Synaniotes, Colonel (Inf) Lampros, 163, 172
Syrmakezes, Colonel (Inf) Apollodoros, 136, 138
Sotiles, Colonel (Eng) Napoleon, 19, 81, 292
T
Tahsin Pasha, see Hasan Tahsin Pasha
Todorov (Bulgarian general), 69, 72, 116
Tsirigiotes Major (Inf) Konstantinos, 264
Tsirimokos D. I. (cabinet minister), 11
V
Velissariou Major (Inf) Ioannes, 196, 198, 259
Venizelos, Eleutherios, Prime Minister and Minister of the Army, 6, 11, 14, 36-37, 40, 56, 62, 68, 123, 125,
134, 191, 198, 201-202, 213, 234, 252, 256, 260, 263, 265, 269
Vernardos, Captain (Inf) Emmanouel, 138, 143-144
Vehip Bey, 180, 198
von der Goltz, Kolmar (German general), 180
Z
Zeki Pasha (Turkish general), 21, 111