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Vietnam, China and the

Oil Rig Crisis: Who
Blinked?
Did Vietnam buckle under Chinese
pressure or did China blink?
Chinas unexpected announcement on July 15 that
it was withdrawing its mega oil drilling platform
from Vietnamese waters early has resulted in a
debate among academic specialists about the
reasons why.
Zachary Abuza, a professor at Simmons College in Boston, argues that Vietnam
buckled under Chinese pressure, while Alexander Vuving, a professor at the Asia-
Pacific Center for Security Studies in Hawaii, argues that Vietnam stood its ground
and China blinked.
Abuzas analysis appeared in the Speaking Freely section of the Asia Times on July
29. His analysis was original, provocative and highly speculative.
Abuza argued that Chinas placement of the oil rig presented the most divisive threat
in years to Hanois Communist Party leadership. Not only were members of the
Politburo deeply divided, but the majority chose to de-escalate the crisis by
accommodating Chinese pressure. Hanois decision to back down has potential grave
implications, Abuza writes, Vietnam has effectively appeased China, which will most
likely lead to more aggression. A policy of appeasement, Abuza concludes, will pose
a danger to the regime itself [and] to the regimes legitimacy.
To support his argument Abuza provides some very detailed information about the
normally opaque decision-making process by the Vietnamese leadership. Abuzas
argument may be summarized in four points:
First, in response to Chinese assertiveness in placing the HYSY 981 oil rig in
Vietnamese waters in early May, Abuza avers that the Vietnam Communist Partys
Central Committee met in June and unanimously resolved to condemn Chinese
aggression and encroachment.
Second, the visit to Hanoi of Chinas State Councilor Yang Jiechi on June 18 proved
pivotal. Prior to the visit Vietnams leaders hoped that Yang would make diplomatic
By Carl Thayer
August 04, 2014
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concessions. According to Abuza, just the opposite occurred. Yang was anything but
conciliatory; he berated his hosts for hyping up the situation and warned bluntly
that China would take all necessary measures to protect the rig.
Third, as a result of Councilor Yangs visit a majority of the 16-member Politburo
reversed the Central Committees June resolution. According to Abuza, a minority of
six members favored a multi-faceted strategy of standing up to China, while the ten-
member majority favored de-escalating the crisis in order to accommodate China.
The most speculative aspect of Abuzas analysis is his classification of individual
Politburo members into these two groups. According to Abuza, the minority group
comprised six members: Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung, Chairman of the National
Assembly Nguyen Sinh Hung, Ho Chi Minh City Party Secretary and pro-reformist
Le Thanh Hai, Deputy Prime Minister Nguyen Xuan Phuc, and Deputy Chairs of the
National Assembly Nguyen Thi Kim Ngan and Thong [sic] Thi Phong.
The ten-member majority comprised: Party Secretary General Nguyen Phu Trong,
party Secretariat members To Huy Rua and Le Hong Anh, head of the partys Central
Inspection Commission Ngo Van Du, head of the partys Propaganda and Education
Commission Dinh The Huynh, Hanoi City party chief Pham Quang Nghi, chair of the
Vietnam Fatherland Front Nguyen Thien Nhan, Minister of National Defense Phung
Quang Thanh, probably Minister for Public Security Tran Dai Quang, and most
likely President Truong Tan Sang.
Fourth, as a consequence of this policy reversal, the Politburo shelved an earlier
decision to take legal action against China, downplayed Vietnams insistence on a
binding code of conduct in the South China Sea, and cancelled the well publicized
scheduled trip to Washington by Foreign Minister Pham Binh Minh.
The Politburo decided to sound out Washington on its level of commitment to
playing a role in a potential conflict with China in the South China Sea by dispatching
Hanoi party boss and Politburo member Pham Quang Nghi in Minhs place.
Abuza concluded that the majority of the Politburo is unwilling to stand up to China
and that there is a hope in some quarters that by making concessions on the Paracel
Islands, the Chinese will reciprocate in the Spratly Islands.
Alexander Vuving offers a contrasting view in a commentary entitled, Did China
Blink in the South China Sea, which was published on the The National Interest.
Vuving wrote that the oil rig crisis was a battle of wills The party with more resolve
may win even if it is the less powerful party. With their respective sovereignties at
stake, the two states tested each others resolve to see who would blink first.
Immediately after China placed the oil rig in Vietnamese waters, Hanois leaders
sought to negotiate with Beijing. China responded with four preconditions: Vietnam
must stop its harassment of the oil rig; Vietnam must drop its sovereignty claims over
the Paracels; Vietnam must not pursue legal action against China; and Vietnam must
not involve third parties, such as the United States.
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According to Vuving, Vietnams collective leadership responded by dropping plans to
proceed with legal action against China and by postponing the visit of Foreign
Minister Minh to Washington. This set the stage for China to undertake a reciprocal
act of de-escalation.
On July 15 China announced that it was withdrawing the HYSD 981 from Vietnamese
waters and, in a separate statement, releasing 13 Vietnamese fishermen it had
arrested earlier. Vuving concluded that Beijings actions may look like a tacit bargain,
but its real nature is something different. Vuving noted the symmetrical nature and
the fragility of mutual concessions by both China and Vietnam.In other words each
party could reverse its actions at any time.
In contrast to Abuza, Vuving considered the motivations of both China and Vietnam
in his analysis. Vuving concluded that Hanois deference to Beijing was only a small
portion of the recipe, if any portion at all.
Vuving argued that up until the oil rig crisis China pursued salami-slicing tactics
through which Beijing pursued a delicate balance between assertiveness and restraint
so that [its] actions are enough to change facts on the ground but not enough to create
a good reason for others to turn decisively against it.
In contrast to Abuza who asserted that Vietnams leaders capitulated to China and
the United States did not get involved in a meaningful way, Vuving concluded the
opposite. According to Vuving, Chinas bullying led to an unprecedented change in
Vietnamese perceptions of Beijing and together with the threat of a de facto alliance
with the United States, they indicate a huge change in Hanois approach to Beijing.
Further, Vuving noted the general trend has added more impetus for several states,
including Japan, the Philippines, Australia, India and Vietnam, to adjust their military
postures and foreign-policy alignments to more effectively counter Chinese
aggressiveness.
Vuving argued in his conclusion that in the past, many states, including Vietnam and
the United States, created a glass ceiling and adopted a policy of restraint for fear of
provoking the giant dragon. China adroitly exploited this fear with its salami-slicing
tactic[s]. As a result of the oil rig crisis, the glass ceiling has been broken and China
has been exposed as not much different from other actors in its fear of escalation. In
other words China blinked.
Abuzas account of Vietnamese decision-making may be challenged on the grounds of
plausibility and factual accuracy.
First, there is no public record that the Vietnam Communist Party Central Committee
met in June. As one Hanoi-based observer noted in a private communication, there
have been no whispers in Hanoi on such a meeting it is also hard to hide something
as big as a CC meeting. A senior government official confirmed in late July that no
meeting of the party Central Committee had been held since the ninth plenum (May
8-14).
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Further, as one Hanoi-based diplomat noted in private to The Diplomat, if in fact the
June CC meeting unanimously resolved to condemn Chinese aggression and
encroachment, why did the Party not issue any resolution on this after the meeting.
Would this not have served a domestic purpose in assuring the public of the Partys
handling of the situation.
Second, Abuzas account of Councilor Yangs June 18 visit to Hanoi too narrowly
focuses on public posturing by Yang. Up until Yangs visit China rebuffed
approximately thirty Vietnamese approaches to open talks about the oil rig crisis, yet
Yang attended the long-scheduled annual meeting of the Joint Steering Committee for
Bilateral Cooperation. This is a significant indicator of Chinas willingness to engage
Vietnam.
A close reading of official statements by Vietnams Ministry of Foreign Affairs
indicates that when Yang met party Secretary General Trong there was a general
agreement to continue discussing ways to ease tensions and solve sea-related issues.
After Yangs visit, the Chinese media portrayed the outcome in far more positive terms
than the western media quoted by Abuza. As noted by Vuving, Yangs visit set the
stage for a tacit bargain to deescalate the crisis.
Third, Abuza does not provide sources for his assertion that the Politburo met after
Yangs visit and overturned a Central Committee resolution condemning China for
aggression. The Central Committee is the highest party executive authority between
national party congresses. As evidenced in domestic politics in 2013, the Central
Committee has on several occasions overturned a decision by the Politburo.
It is known that the Politburo met on several occasions during the oil rig crisis both
before and after Yangs visit. In a visit to Vietnam in late July, the author was told by
Vietnamese and diplomatic sources that the Politburo voted 9 to 5 to approve a
proposal to go ahead with international arbitration.
Hanoi-based diplomats who follow these events closely suggest that the decisive
Politburo meeting took place in early July. This was prior to Chinas announcement
that it was withdrawing HY SY 981.
It is impossible to know with certainty the breakdown of how individual members of
the Politburo voted at the early July meeting. A canvass of informed Vietnamese and
foreign observers in Hanoi suggests the following:
The majority reportedly comprised: Nguyen Tan Dung, Truong Tan Sang, Nguyen
Sinh Hung, Le Thanh Hai, Le Hong Anh, Tong Thi Phong, Nguyen Xuan Phuc,
Nguyen Thien Nhan and likely Phung Quang Thanh.
The five-member minority reportedly included Nguyen Phu Trong, To Huy Rua,
Pham Quang Nghi, Ngo Van Du and Dinh The Huynh.
Reports that two Politburo members abstained are incorrect. In early July two
members of the Politburo were overseas and unable to attend the meeting. Public
Security Minister Tran Dai Quang visited Germany from July 3-4, while National
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Assembly Deputy Chair Nguyen Thi Kim Ngan visited Argentina and Chile from June
30-July 5.
Fourth, Abuza errs in asserting that Foreign Minister Minhs trip to the United States
was cancelled and Politburo member Pham Quang Nghi was sent instead. Minhs trip
was postponed until September. Presently the Vietnamese Embassy in Washington
and the State Department are in discussions on the timing of Minhs visit.
Pham Quang Nghis visit reportedly was to burnish his foreign affairs expertise and to
provide a sounding of the current state of relations with the United States in advance
of Minhs visit.
It appears unlikely that the Politburo shelved a decision to take legal action against
China or Vietnam downplayed its insistence on a binding code of conduct in the South
China Sea. On July 26 the University of Law in Ho Chi Minh convened a high-
powered international conference on the Legal issues regarding the incident of
Chinas placement of oil rig Haiyang Shiyou 981 in Vietnams Exclusive Economic
Zone and Continental Shelf. Vietnamese participants noted privately that the
recommendations of this conference would be forwarded to high-level leaders in
advance of a meeting of the Central Committee scheduled for sometime in August.
Vietnam remains fully committed to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN) and its support for a binding code of conduct (COC) in the South China Sea.
Last year China executed an about face and agreed to meet with ASEAN officials to
discuss a COC within the framework of discussions on implementing the Declaration
on Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea. It is unlikely that Vietnam downplayed
its support for the COC to curry favor with China. Both sides are committed to the
diplomatic process. Whether or not Vietnam actually believes the COC will be
negotiated is another matter. As a senior Vietnamese official told The Diplomat, the
journey is more important than the destination.
The impending annual meetings of ASEAN Foreign Ministers, the ASEAN Regional
Forum and associated meetings between ASEAN and its dialogue partners will all
discuss the oil rig crisis and where to go from here. It is clear that China will come
under intense diplomatic pressure to freeze its provocative behavior in the South
China Sea.
The oil rig crisis has demonstrated that Vietnam is capable of standing up to China
and showing resolve. Vietnam is unlikely to foreclose any options including taking
legal action against China. It is in Vietnams interest to hold this option in reserve.
Vietnams cautious leaders are as unlikely to buckle under pressure from China as
they are to lurch into an alignment with the United States. Vietnam and China have
much diplomatic work to do to repair their damaged bilateral relations and restore
strategic trust. Vietnam is also likely to deepen its comprehensive partnership with
the United States.
There is more likely to be continuity in Vietnamese foreign policy than change.
Vietnam will continue to apply the injunction of Central Committee Resolution No. 8
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to struggle and cooperate with the major powers to further its national interests and
to pursue a multilateral approach in its external relations.
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