Kim Bumsoo

12A01A
Assess the view that policies of the independent SEA states towards minorities was a
major cause of political instability

The assimilative policies of independent SEA states towards minorities were a major
cause of political instability to the extent that they were responsible for inflaming
political dissension and alienating both indigenous as well as immigrant minorities,
thereby encouraging sub-nationalisms to develop. Often, it was the response to these
sub-nationalisms as much as the policies themselves which brought about such political
instability in independent SEA states. Nonetheless, the statement fails to recognize that
policies, especially accommodative or integrative ones, were also responsible for
political stability instead, a fact best seen in different regimes approaches towards
minorities and the differing degrees of political stability which resulted from these
approaches. A more nuanced view might then be that while the types of policies were
responsible for the presence or lack of political stability, it is execution of these policies
which contributed to the extent of this stability/instability.

Suppression took the form of political, social and economic policies, which in turn
served to confirm perceptions of marginalization, thereby heightening secessionist
tendencies. Policies regarding political space, autonomy and jurisdiction in particular
provoked violent uprisings, contributing to political instability. For example, the series of
successively suppressive policies, such as the forgoing of judicial powers (1950) and
eventual termination of administrative powers (1959), were directly responsible for the
resentment that created the resentment that birthed the Shan Mong Tai Army, an
insurgent group that was later to engage in armed movements against the Rangoon
government throughout the 1960s to the present day, generating political instability.
Similarly, the political domination of the Indonesian military in all branches of the East
Timor government created the impetus for guerilla separatists, Falintil, to engage in a
bloody insurrection from the 1970s through the 1990s. Suppressive political actions
clearly provoked violent reactions towards the government, a tangible indication of
political instability.

Furthermore, excessively harsh reprisals towards such insurgents such as the Jabaidah
Massacre in the Philippines against the Mindanao Muslims or the Dili Massacre in
Indonesia against the East Timorese guerillas were to exacerbate these tensions. This
demonstrates that while suppressive political policies contributed to these tensions, the
extent to which they were enforced often amplified the effects of these policies, as
witnessed in the rapid following/momentum that both the Moros National Liberation
Front (MNLF) and Falintil were to gain in the aftermath of these massacres.
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Suppressive social engineering projects also added to perceptions of marginalization,
which in turn strengthened deviant ethnic nationalisms. In particular, these projects
refer to the forced transmigration of ethnic majorities into areas which had
concentrated minority populations. In doing so, it fuelled the growth of the very ethnic
nationalisms it was meant to weaken, as ethnic groups felt alienated even in their own
homes. For example, the transmigrassi program under Suharto transferred some 700
000 families from the inner islands to the outer islands where the majority of the
minority (such as the Timorese, Acehnese and Irian Jayans) population resided. Similarly,
the migration of the Christian population from Luzon into Mindanao created a
demographic imbalance. The primarily Muslim community which once dominated 76
percent of the population came to constitute barely 19 percent of it instead, leading to
their disenfranchisement and sense of alienation. These suppressive social policies
created the festering sentiments which later expressed themselves through dissension
and political instability.

On a more cultural level, the assertive imposition of the dominant ethnic language was
responsible for amplifying the social and political alienation felt by minorities,
contributing to political instability. In the Philippines, the national language declared by
Marcos was Pilipino, a derivative essentially based on Tagalog. Likewise, the
acculturation programs into Thai society were conducted with education through the
medium of Central Thai. This led to low performance among the hill tribes, further
enhancing the perceptions of ethnic distinctiveness. It is seen then that the imposition
of a national language based completely or largely on the dominant ethnic language was
to further the central-periphery tensions. Indeed, minorities which did not adapt to the
national language were disenfranchised, contributing to political instability on a more
intangible level.

Contrastingly, the adoption of a neutral language by Suharto in Indonesia, bahasa
Indonesia, facilitated the acceptance of the dominant Javanese culture without explicit
implications or inflammatory overtones. Its success is best seen in the usage of bahasa
Indonesia as an accepted lingua franca to this day.

Economic exploitation, or at least perceived economic exploitation, also formed the
basis for resentment and subsequent political instability. The perception that central
governments would reap economic benefits at the expense of minorities galled them
into rebellion. For example, the rise of armed resistance against the Filipino government
was spurred by Marcos plans to build hydroelectric dams along the Chico and Pasil
rivers, which would have flooded lands important to the economic survival of the
Kim Bumsoo
12A01A
Cordillerans. The anger that resulted, manifested itself through the Cordillera Peoples
Democratic Front, growing into a conflict that assumed a region-wide ethnic character.
In Thailand, the Isan people were allocated 18 percent of the budget when they had 34
percent of the Thai population. The unequal official investment was seen as economic
discrimination and quickly led to ill will and rebellion from the Hmong tribes from 1967
to 1973. What makes it far more regrettable is that both the Isan people and
Cordillerans still identified themselves as Thai and Filipino citizens but it was the
economic subordination and inequity that they were subjugated to, which contributed
directly their uprising, and consequently political instability.

However, the same sort of repressive policies regarding political space were also
responsible for creating political stability, particularly during the chaotic infancies of SEA
states in the aftermath of achieving independence. New Order Indonesia was
characterized by a maximum government under Suharto that pursued large scale
depoliticization. Resting on the assumption that the electorate was unsophisticated,
uneducated and prone to ill-considered decisions, political parties were banned. The
same sort of policies were pursued by PAP-led Singapore and Sarits Thailand where
centralized control of the Sangha accompanied outlawing of political parties. This
allowed for greater political maneuvering and a cutback on democratic bureaucracy, a
fact that Suharto and Sarit came to take advantage of with their focus on economic
development, unencumbered by opposition. The subsequently successful economic
development served to re-direct their countries energies away from factionalism and
into productive economic activity instead, achieving political stability. In addition, the
economic success came to become a source of pride (especially in Indonesia), adding
political performance legitimacy to their rules, further strengthening political stability.

In truth, certain policies were assimilative in name alone, while being accommodative in
practice. Such symbolic policies placated both the majority and the minorities, achieving
political stability. For example, despite Malay dominance in the government and blatant
ethnic favoritism being practiced (e.g. educational quotas and differentiated
requirements for bumiputeras introduced in 1971), regular concessions were given to
the non-bumiputera population. Such accommodations included the freedom to
worship, the retaining of non-Malay primary schools and allowances made for the usage
of Chinese and Tamil as languages of instruction. Similarly, Indonesias distinctively
secular constitution was accompanied by official state patronage of Islam, though it was
carefully cultivated to ensure this sponsorship never came at the expense of any other
parties. Such policies were therefore responsible for creating political stability.
Kim Bumsoo
12A01A
Yet, a political caveat exists. Like Suharto, U Nu adopted an official endorsement of the
dominant culture and religion (Buddhist Socialism) and yet it maintained pluralism
through ethno-religious concessions such as the allowance to teach Christianity and
Islam. Why then did U Nu fail in creating political stability? The answer lies once again in
the execution of these policies. Whereas the UMNO Alliance and Suharto have been
careful to never impose a policy at the expense of another groups rights or liberties, the
assertive implementation of Buddhist Socialism (indeed, an agency was financed in 1951
purely to propagate Buddhism) drew criticism from the minorities against U Nu. In a
similar vein, his inability to replicate Suhartos gradual and careful de-emphasis of Islam
in official space earned him the ire of the dominant Buddhist majority as well. We then
see the importance of implementation. It was not so much of a policy failure but the
failure of execution that doomed U Nu to massive social unrest and political instability.

Finally, accommodative policies towards minorities catered to their demands, placated
them, hereby achieving political stability. Malaysias offer to extend the same sort of
economic, political and social benefits of the bumiputera to Sabah and Sarawak was
responsible for their eventual inclusion into the federation. Singapores adoption of
multiculturalism created a synthetic Singaporean identity, divorced from racial and
religious demarcations. The accommodation of ethnic minorities was encouraged
through state support for groups such as Mendaki (representing Malay interests) and
SINDA (representing Indian interests). The political stability such policies created can be
seen in the territorial unity of the Federation of Malaysia and the lack of severe race
riots in Singapore to this day.

Of course, a qualification must be made. While accommodative policies towards
minorities often proved effective, they were often merely stop-gap measures. In the
long run, they proved to be either ineffective at solving the underlying tensions, or
generated more problems. For example: Suhartos strategy to refocus the peoples
attention on the economy worked as a depoliticizing agent, but in the long run,
economic development led to democratization and the rise of an Islamic middle class
which challenged the secular foundation of the Indonesian state. Furthermore, the
inequity that followed economic development intensified social cleavages in both
centre-periphery tensions as well as between the Chinese immigrant community and
the society. Similarly, the ceasefires that Burma negotiated with its minority separatist
groups were merely military arrangements that did not offer political solutions to
continuing problems of ethnic disunity. Hence we see that accommodative policies were
generally able to produce short term methods of achieving political stability but not
necessarily able to sustain these successes.
Kim Bumsoo
12A01A

In general, we see that accommodative policies were largely responsible for creating
political stability while the assimilative and coercive actions provoked far more
disruptive responses, compromising political stability. This is best seen in the different
amounts of political stability from regime to regime in the Philippines and Vietnam.
While the Philippines movement towards reconciliation and accommodation gradually
reduced the tensions between the Mindanao Muslims and the state (even coming to a
Peace Agreement in 1989 under Aquino), Vietnams increasingly assimilative approach
(as the CPV sought to establish its socialist society after reunification) came to
discriminate against the Chinese, leading to their eventual departure from Vietnam. The
movement towards accommodation can thus be seen to result in political stability while
the converse proved to jeopardize it.

Yet these policies seem to be insufficient in explaining the varying degrees of success
the countries had in achieving political stability. Perhaps an examination of inherent
conditions, factors and experiences is necessary to understand this. For example, while
both Burma and Indonesia engaged in harsh military crackdowns against the minorities
and both possess some form of repressive colonial legacy, Indonesia was by and large
far more successful in maintaining political stability. This is perhaps best explained by
the political culture of sapto pandhito ratu it possesses, an innate respect for authority
in the Javanese populace that Suharto tapped on to forward his agenda. The same sort
of maximum government was not as successful in Burma because of the failure of its
politics to align in conjunction with its culture. Understandably, the effects of policies
towards minorities were also amplified by the ethnic composition of respective
countries. Countries with relatively higher ethnic homogeneity such as the Philippines
(95 percent Filipino), Vietnam (88% Annamese) and Thailand (85% Thai), found
accommodative policies to be far less effective than ethnically diverse states such as
Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia.

The final distinction to make is also between indigenous and immigrant minority groups.
While indigenous minority groups have often been more active in asserting their ethnic
identities, the immigrant Chinese community has been far more pliant regarding
discriminatory policies against them. Hence indigenous minority groups have been a
greater source of political instability than their counterparts. This is best explained by
the unique colonial experiences (e.g. East Timor in Indonesia, Moros in the Philippines)
and primordial attachments that indigenous minorities have for their lands (e.g. Shan in
Burma, Aceh in Indonesia). Contrastingly, the anti-foreignism, xenophobia and
discrimination that has followed the Jews of the East, has never been strongly
Kim Bumsoo
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challenged by the Chinese community, or at least not on the scale of violence that
indigenous minorities pursue.

In conclusion, it is the interplay of these factors, often in relation to the policies
implemented, that determine the carrying extent to which political stability is achieved,
and far more importantly, sustained. We can only hope to appreciate the multiple
dimensions of national unity.