Acta Astronautica Vol. 40, No. 2-8. pp.
545-560, 1991
81997 International Astronautical Federation. Published by Elsevier Science Ltd
PII: sw4-5765(97)00147-l
THE NEW U.S. GOVERNMENT SPACE SYSTEM ACQUISITION POLICY
ITS IMPACT ON RISK MANAGEMENT PROCEDURES
Chester L. Whitehair and Malcolm G. Wolfe
The Aerospace Corporatton
El Segundo. CA 902454691. USA
INTRODUCTION
In its efforts to reduce the budget deficit. the Umted
States (U.S.) government has &utiated new
acquisition policies which are caustng significant
repercussions throughout the space mdustrv. Drasttc
budget cuts have been made m both the civil and
military sectors, at a ti*me when the dependence on the
use of space is expandmg exponentially. Private
industry IS being asked to carry a greater
responsibility for space system development and. tn
the interest of cost savtng, is also being encouraged
to incorporate foreign [particularly Former Sovtet
Union (FSU)] subsystems and technology into U.S.
space systems. The intent of the new acqutsition
policy IS to place the responsibihty for the mtegrtty
of the systems on the private contractor by reducing
specifications, documentatton and government
oversight. A risk that is faced is that the Integrity of
space systems. unlike many other systems produced
for the commercial markets, cannot be fully
demonstrated on the ground and often is not
challenged until the system is required to perform a
critical life-or-death function. Tradittonally, space
systems designed for the government have been
subjected to constant detailed scrutiny from
conception to operational use. either by the customer
or by an independent organization [a Federally Funded
Research and Development Center (FFRDC)] which
does not produce hardware and has no vested interest
other than misston success.’ Although the new
acquisttion policies are intended to reduce acquisition
costs m an envtronment of ever-decreasing budgets, it
IS not clear that reducmg front end costs and customer
overstght will necessarily reduce the total program
cost of bringing systems to a rehable and fully
operational state.
This paper discusses the issues raised by the new
policies. the possible consequences, and proposals to
ensure that the government and the contractors fully
understand and manage the process so that it does not
Inadvertently build risk mto one phase of a program
that can cause catastrophic failure and excessive cost
of recovery further down stream. Lessons learned,
such as from the Air Force Space Test and
Expertmentatton Program (STP), which has a long
history of usmg a management philosophy which
allows for acceptmg greater risks in the interest of
545
Printed in Great Britain
0094-5765/97 $17.00 + 0.00
AND
keepmg costs to a mintmum. are used to describe the
benefits and penalties that can be encountered.
WHAT IS ACQUISITION REFORM
Acquisttion reform IS a widespread activity pervading
all departments of the U.S. government to reduce the
cost of government procurement of goods and
services.’ It is being Implemented tn response to
declining government budgets, the ristng cost of
government procurement, and the perception that
private sector space technology is outstripping
government technology. A recurring theme is to
replace government oversight by Insight and to
transfer the responsibility for government space
system development to private industry. Its
implementation in government organizations such as
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA), the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA),
and the Department of Defense (DoD) is having
considerable Impact on the whole U.S. space
community. ‘.’
This new way of doing business is summarized in
Figure I. Under the acquisition reform process,
Request for Proposals (RFPs) contain no government
standards or specifications [for example, military
standards (MIL STDs) or Military Specifications
(MIL SPECS)]. as either compliance or reference
documents. The government philosophy is to not
tell the contractor how to run the program. Instead,
the government outlines what the contractor must
achteve and allows maximum flexibility for the
contractor to pursue what they see as the best
solution to the government requirements. Instead of a
detailed Statement of Work (SOW) the government
provides only a Government List of Objectives
(GLO) which merely describes the broad objectives of
the program. The number of Contract Data
Requirement Lists (CDRLs) is strictly limited. The
government needs to know how the contractor will
address the system level requirements while allowing
the contractor to propose the methods, procedures,
policies, materials, and resources by which they will
satisfy those requirements. The key management
challenge is to replace the highly centralized, micro-
managed government bureaucracy with a simple
orgamzattonal structure. The general approach to
546 47th IAF Congress

InthePast)
Government lndush
Detailed SOW Performed NOW ._
Government Way -I
Government Industry
Detailed Spec Constrained Solution
Statement of Determines “How”
Many Mil Specs Limited Flexibility Objectives
and Standards
erformance Spec Best Solution
Many CDRhs Huge Cost
Fewer Mil Specs Greater Flexibility
Massive RFP Massive Proposal and Standards

Limited CDRLs Report as Needed

Becomes
streamlined RFP Performance Based
Proposal

Source: Joint Air Force/Industry Acquisition Reform Training

Figure 1. New Way of Doing Business

acquisition reform is common to all U.S. government
departments. It can be illustrated by describing how
it is being applied by the Department of Defense.
ACQUISITION REFORM IN DOD
Acquisition reform in the DOD was initiated by
William Petry, Secretary of Defense, in 1994.’ In
1995. DOD Directive DoDD5000. I and DOD
Instruction DoD15000.2, which have been the
centerpiece of defense acquisition policies and
procedures for nearly 25 years, were modified. ‘.’ ’
The modified DOD 5000 documents were approved by
the Secretary of Defense on March 15, 1996.’ These
documents, along with the 5000.2-M documentation
manual that was introduced in 1991, describe a
disciplined management approach for acquiring
systems and materiel to satisfy valid military needs.
The intent of the change is to make a complete break
with the present system and the creation of a new
system which will allow the integration of the
defense industrial base with the commercial industrial
base. The update incorporates new laws and polictes
that have been enacted since the last update. These
include the Federal Acquisition Streamlmmg Act
(FASA) and the institutionalization of Integrated
Product Teams (IPTs).”
DOD Directive 5000. I emphasizes the
mterrelationship of the three principal acquisition
decision support systems: 1) the Requirements
Generation System, 2) the Acquisition Management
System. and 3) the Planning, Programming and
Budgeting System. Several important themes now
run throughout the documents.
Teamwork. ‘Theprocedures described in DODD
5000.2 help to create an acquisition system that
capitalizes on the strengths of all participants in the
acquisition process. The importance of working as
cross-functional teams is emphasized.
Tailoring. While all programs must accomplish
certatn core activities, the appropriate Milestone
Decision Authority (MDA) has the authority to tailor
how and when these activities occur. MDAs strive to
tailor most aspects of the acquisition process,
including program documentation, acquisition phases,
and the timing, scope and level of decision reviews.
MDAs management should be tailored to specific
program circumstances, rather than treating every
program identically.
Empowerment. Program managers have the
authority to do anything not prohibited by statute,
Executive Order FAR/DFARS, or the DOD 5000
documents. The DOD has long relied on volumes of
 47th IAF Congress
guidance and regulation, prescribing every detail of
both process and documentation, and has traditionally
dealt with Industry through a rigid system of military
specifications. The updated documents reflect current
efforts to empower contractors to do the best they
can. The documents do not reduce responsibility. but
balance responsibility with authority. They reduce
the burden of mandatory procedures and specifications.
but encourage prudent risk management. They imbue
the acquisition process with a customer focus: to
provide the best, most effective system or capability.
in the most timely fashion.
Cost as an Independent Variable (CAIV).
The new acquisition process must consider both
performance requiremknts and fiscal constraints.
Accordingly, cost must be an independent variable in
programmatic decisions, with responsible cost
objectives set for each program phase.
Commercial Products. Historically. DOD has
relied on segments of the U.S. technological and
industrial base principally dedicated to supporting
DOD requirements. Today, the number of vendors
capable or willing to provide Items or servtces to the
DOD has decreased. However. technology
advancements in some commercial sectors outpaces
Government-sponsored research. Procurement of
some commercial items, when practical. may provide
the rapid and affordable apphcation of these
technologies to validated DOD missIon needs.
Best Practices. The cost of the current defense
acquisition process, in dollars and time. is too high.
Reporting requirements, cost accounting practices,
oversight, audit, and quality assurance provisions all
contribute to an overloaded management process. The
Intent IS to replace outdated management techniques
and philosophies by a simplified and flexible
management process, modeled on sound commercial
busmess practices. Using the contractor’s best
practices imphes a significant reliance on the abihty
of the conuactor to carry out the contract and
completely fulfill all mission requirements.
Single Process Initiative. The Single Process
Initiative was issued by Paul Kaminski. Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology
in December, 1995.” The intent is a complete break
with the present system and the creation of a new
system which will allow the integration of the
defense industrial base with the commercial industrial
base. It IS to enable firms to consolidate or eliminate
most (preferably all but one) of the manufacturmg
processes they are applying to ongoing military
contracts. Where appropnate, companies may also
consohdate military and commercial production
processes. Industry has pushed for the right to make
547
contract changes without having to share the savtngs
with the government. However, if block changes to
fixed-price development contracts yield what the
Pentagon government deems “significant one-sided”
savmgs. the company is expected to negotiate a spht
of the money with the DOD and cost-benefit analyses
will have to be submitted. No such analysis is
required for “low value” or “short life” contracts.
Failure to define “short-life” and “low-value” leaves
considerable room for interpretation by government
administrative contracting officers (ACOs) and
corporate lawyers.
“Lightning Bolt” Initiatives. Darleen Druyun.
the .4lr Forces Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary
for Acquisition and Management announced on 28
February, 1995, that the Air Force will add two
acqulsmon reforms to what are termed the “Lightning
Bolt” mltiatives. “’ One will look at the science and
technology business practices in the Air Force
laboratortes and the other will aim to cut the time
between formation of a requirement and award of
contracts. On the laboratory measure, the Air Force
IS lookmg to remove federal acquisition restrictions
on certain contractual agreements, much the same
way as the Advanced Research Projects Agency
(ARPA) operates. In terms of cutting the time
between formulation of a requirement and contract
award, Druyan confirmed that it will require more
electronic contracting. She predicts that RFPs will
come out on CD-ROMs and source selection will
also be electronic. Presently, eleven Druyun
“Lightning Bolt” initiatives have been issued.
Establrsh a centralized Request for Proposals
(RFP) support team to scrub all RFPs, contract
options, and contract modifications over $10
milhon
Create a standing Acquisition Strategy Panel
(ASP) composed of senior level acquisition
personnel from SAF/AQ. Air Force Space and
Missile Systems Center (AFMC) and the usier
Develop a new System Program Office (SPQ)
manpower model that uses the tenets established
In the management of classified/SAR level
programs
Cancel all AFMC Center-level acquisition
policies by 1 December, 1995
Re-invent the AFSARC process through
Integrated Process Teams (IPTs)
Enhance the role of past performance in source
selectlons
Replace acquisition documents with a Single
Acquisition Management Plan (SAMP)
Revise the Program Executive Officers (PEO)
and DAC portfolio review to add a section that
deals specifically with acquisition reform
Enhance the acquisition workforce with a
548 47th IAF Congress
comprehensive education and training program
that integrates acquisition reform initiatives
l Look at the science and technology busmess
practices m the Au Force laboratories
. Arm to cut the time between formation of a
requrrement and the award of a contract
GENERAL PRINCIPLES
DODD 5000.1 articulates genera1 principles to guide
all defense acquisition. These principles are
representative of the approach being taken to
acquisition reform across all government departments
and are organized mto three broad categories:
. Translating operational needs mto stable,
affordable programs
Program stabihty
Risk assessment and management
Total system acquisition
Cost as an Independent variable
Program objectives and thresholds
. Acquiring quality products
Event oriented management
Hierarchy of materiel alternatives
Communication with users
Competition
Test and evaluation
Independent assessments
l Orpamzmg for efficiency and effectiveness
Streamlined organizations
Acquisition corps
Teamwork
Limited reporting requirements
Automated acquisition information
INTEGRATED PROCESS AND PRODUCT
DEVELOPMENT (IPPD)
Integrated Process and Product Development (IPPD)
is a management technique that simultaneously
integrates all essenttal acquisition activities through
the use of multi-disctplinary teams to optimize the
design, manufacturing and supportability processes.
IPPD facilitates meeting cost and performance
objectives from product concept through production,
including field support. One of the key IPPD tenets
is multidisciplinary teamwork through Integrated
Product Teams (IPTs). Another that is evolving in a
similar vein is through Acquisition Reform Process
Action Teams (PATS). Other manifestations of IPPD
include the Army’s Integrated Concept Teams (ICTs)
and NASA’s Technical Coordination Teams (TCTs).
Integrated Product Teams (IPTs). IPTs consist of
representatives from all appropriate functional
disciplmes working together to build successful and
balanced program, identify and resolve issues. and
make sound and timely decisions. IPTs may include
members from both Government and industry.
including program contractors and sub-contractors.
They mclude program management, engineering.
manufacturing. test, logistics. financial management.
procurement, and contract administration.
IPTs operate under the following broad princtples.
l Open discussion with no secrets
l Qualified. empowered team members
l Consistent, success-oriented, proactive
participation
l Continuous. “up the line” communications
l Reasoned disagreement
. Issues raised and resolved early
Acquisition Reform Process Action Teams
(PATS). Druyun Lightning Bolt number 5 calls for
reinventing the AFSARC process through the
formation of IPTs known as Acquisition Reform
Process Action Teams (PATS).
Integrated Concept Teams (ICTs). The U.S.
Army is planning to use Intepated Concept Teams
(ICTs) to develop requirements. ” ICTs will consist
of mdividuals from Army user, requirements and
acquisition communities. and relevant DOD staff,
industry and academia. Under the new concept, the
Commander of Training and Doctrine Command will
be responstble for all decisions on requirements.
Technical Coordination Teams (TCTs).
NASA is totally committed to acquisition reform in
its Reusable Launch Vehicle (RLV) Technology
Demonstration Program.” Figure 2 summarizes how
what are termed Technical Coordination Teams
(TCTs) are being used to streamline the activities of
the industry/government RLV development
partnership.
MILESTONE DECISION AUTHORITY
Certain core issues must be formally addressed at
appropriate milestones for every acquisition program.
Before making program decisions, the Milestone
Decision Authority (MDA) designatedto approve
entry of an acquisition program into the next phase
should rigorously address core issues such as:
. Why is the program needed
. Has the need been validated
. What specific capabilities are needed
. When do the capability need to introduced into
the field or fleet
. How much will the program cost
. Is the program affordable and fully funded
 47th IA F Congress 549

X-Vehkk
RLV PwDociola”
RLV-LllHP
STS-suppwl
I cvoluuon
IHPRPT

IRlD
X-Vohkk
LT I HP Program k lully rllgned with RLV indultry pattwn. RLV
RLV Pre.D9cirk”
Highw undrrstanding and support of LTI HP by Mustry. RLV-LTlHP
RLV-LTlHP
Technology tasks am:
slssuppor(I Evolutlo” - not duplicatlvr
SrSsup~ I EVotutlo”

IHPRPT - mrrimiza synergy to w~pporl htgher number of programs IHPRPT

kww-
,n#uSllvcuwiu. and oroonm activitks
Facilltks . high;, I~vwaga with lxkbng 6 pknned activities Fwflltks

Expwtke ’ . build on. nthrr than repeat past efforts II EXpWt&

- htghw kvol of integration with existing efforts and rinds
- initiitrd I mrintainrd with idontifurd requirwnwM for a I-
sp*cific application(s)
Metrics, mllo~ton~s, and technology delivwabks based on
idantifkd needs

Figure 2. NASA Technical Coordination Team (TCT) Process

. Why was this solution selected Director, Program Executive Officer and Service
. Have alternate solutions been reviewed Acquisition Executive). The EELV goal is to reduce
. Has the program’s risk been assessed the cost of launch by at least 25 percent.
. Has a program baseline been developed
. What is the acquisition strategy The NASA Reusable Launch Vehicle (RLV) program
. Is the system or item producible IS entirely dedicated to acquisition reform.”
l Can the system be supported
. Has the stabihty of the design and the operational
capability of the system been verified HISTORY OF ACQUISITION REFORM
. Is the system operationally effective and suited to
the need The application of streamlined government
procurement practices is not new. One example is
the U.S. Air Force Space Test and Experimentation
HOW IS ACQUISITION REFORM BEING Program.“, ” Another is the Advanced Launch
IMPLEMENTED System (ALS).”

Acquisition reform is being applied to both on-going
and new programs SPACE NEWS reports an Air
Force claim that acquisition reform has already helped
the Air Force avoid $13 bilhon in costs it would have
incurred under previous rules.” Reforms so far have
saved about $326 milhon on the Milstar program,
f80 million on the Global Positioning System and
5579 million on the Talon Shield program, according
to SPACE NEWS.
One of only four Air Force lead programs, the EELV
Program IS in the forefront in implementing the new
DOD acquisition policy.” Streamlined management
concepts are m force. includmg a small SPO.
dedicated IPTs. acceptance of government Insight
rather than traditional oversight to nurture maximum
contractor flexibility and responsibility, paperless
documentation. and the reduction of bureaucracy with
only three levels of management (System Program
U.S. Air Force Test Program (STP)
The U.S. Space Test Program (SIT’) has suppoqed
the DOD space research community since 1966 by
providing umque space flight testing opportunit/es for
experiments ranging from basis research to advatjced
development. Budgets have always been limited and.
in response, the program has developed a management
philosophy to minimize costs by using private
industry’s best practices, eliminating imposition of
government specifications and standards, and
minimizing the size of the program office.
STP specializes in providing access to space using
excess payload capability on the Space Shuttle or
other government. commercial, and foreign maipline
launchers. and on dedicated small launch vehicle/s.
The STP has flown more than 50 missions in the
pas1 30 years. More than 370 experiments have been
flown in support of operational missions, including
communications, navigation, weather, surveillance
 550 47th IAF Congress
and reconnarssance.
Space Test Experiments Platform (STEP)
Program. In 1989, drastically reduced budgets drove
STP to explore new ways of fulfilling its mission.
To accomplish this, STP imtiated the STEP program
in an effort to demonstrate that contractor’s best
practices could effectively replace restrictive
government control. A contract was awarded in April
1990 to TRW Space and Electronics Group in
Chantilly, Virgtnia, and their major subcontractor
CTA Space Systems tn McLean. Virginia. The
contract called for a series of small modular satellite
buses whose largely of-the-shelf components could be
assembled to meet the unique requirements of
experimental payloads from the Tri-Servrce
Expertment Revtew Board (Tri-SERB) list. The
contractor’s best practices would be used tn lieu of
military specifications and standards. Program
documentation and configuratton control would be
minimized. non-redundant subsystems used. test
requirements relaxed, and a mintmum staff employed.
The contract type would be fixed price with a penodic
award fee during the destgn, build. and test phases of
the program and a performance-based incentive that
could be collected during on-orbit operattons.
T&Service Space Experiments (TSX)
Program. The Tri-Servtce Space Experiments
(TSX) Program represents the latest STP initiative in
streamlining the acquisitton process. TSX goes
beyond STEP by assigning to the contractor the role
of provtdmg not only the spacecraft, but also the
launch services. TSX permits the contractor to decide
what percentage of the total contract dollars they are
willmg to assign to the on-orbtt Incentives. The
government will match dollar-for-dollar the amount
placed in these incenttves. This new contracting
approach transfers much of the risk management
effort from the government to the contractor.
Although the STP program is considered a success for
experimental mtsstons. it is clear that its practices
may not transfer easily to the operational world. This
IS demonstrated by the fact that, in 1994.
implementing the TSX inittattve resulted in all three
operational small commercial U.S. launch vehicles,
the Lockheed Martin Lockheed Launch Vehicle
(LLV). the EER Systems Conestoga. and the Orbital
Sctences Corporatton (OSC) Pegasus failing.
The Advanced Launch System (ALS)
Program
The Advanced Launch System (ALS) program
(Initiated in 1988 and later cancelled) was the first
DOD program to implement some of the cost-savmg
concepts bemg incorporated into the new acqutsttton
reform process, such as paperless environment, P
focus on contractor responsibility for the product, and
the application of Total Quality Management (TQM)
practices.
ACQUISITION REFORM AND THE
COMMERCIALIZATION OF SPACE
Acquisition reform in both the civil and the military
sectors of the space community has provided a major
impetus to the commercialization of space. Reduced
federal budgets and the threat of closure of
government facilities has encouraged state
government officials to look to surplus federal
resources and the private sector to generate economic
benefit. As a typical example. in a January26. 1996.
letter to President Clinton, Florida’s Governor
Lawton Chiles suggested that unused military launch
infrastructure at Cape Canaveral be converted to
accommodate a variety of foreign launch vehicles,
including Russian rockets. The Florida Spaceport
Authority said the proposal is intended to offset the
negative economic impact of U.S. agreements
allowing Russian, Ukranian. and Chinese launchers
to fly as many as 60 U.S.-built commercial satellites
through 2001. Flying foreign launchers from
American soil would generate jobs for the domestic
workforce.
Public / private partnerships between the Air Force,
NASA, private industry and Florida’s Spaceport
Authority are evolving. The Spaceport Authority is
already converting one facility for multiple U.S.
launch services providers, and has requested a second
facihty to serve other government and commercial
missions. “Creating a Floriaiz-based intemational
spacepon at Cope Cunuveml would provide &iitional
capaciQ and greater synergy to domestic satellite
builders and would augment the joint development of
the International Space Station, ” Chiles said. “It
would also offset some of the economic and job
impacts to Florida of recent defense downsizing and
reductions in NASA ‘s workjorce, ” he added.
The FAA, which like other departments of
government is committed to acquisition reform,
through its Department of Transportation Office of
Commercial Space is faced with ensuring the safety
of commercial space launches and, at the same time,
encouraging industry to privatize access to space.
WHAT IS THE EXPECTED OUTCOME OF
ACQUISITION REFORM
Acqutsittonreform, if it is applied as quickly as its
proponents would like, will cause radical change in
how the whole space community (government and
 47th IAF Congress
pnvate) conducts its business. Cost savings will be
achieved in the near term. Whether these cost savmgs
will be sustainable throughout program life cycles IS
hard to predict.
Reduced D’ocumentation and Configuration
Control
Cost savings should be realizable if the number of
documents required to be delivered under each contract
IS reduced. Large programs such as the Global
Positioning Satellite (GPS) and Milstar require up to
70 contractually deliverable documents. In additton.
the contractor’s format can be used for documentation
Instead of burdensome government documentation.
Consolidation of Space Resources
Acquisition reform is causmg consohdation and
reduction in force in government as well as Industry
as management practices converge
Program Office Consolidation. Two Air
Force program offices that are products of previous
consolidations - the Military Satellite
Communications Office and the Space-Based Infrared
Systems Program Office, have embraced acquisition
reform initiatives to produce faster, better and cheaper
space systems. Two launch vehicle system program
offices. the Titan and the Medium Launch Vehtcle
offices, at the Air Force’s Space and Missile Systems
Center (AF/SMC) have been combined into one. The
new organization’s focus will remain on the products.
with launch systems organized into IPTs with
separate support functions for each. The Program
Director still reports to the Office of the Assistant
Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition and the
PEO for Space on Titan IV. The SMC Launch
Programs System Program Office @MC/CL)
consolidated with the Launch Programs System
Program Office which included Atlas, Delta, and
Inertial Upper Stage with Titan Systems Program
Office. The Titan Systems Program office was
responsible for the Titan II, the Titan IV, and the
Centaur Upper Stage.
According to Co]. Brazie, Program Director, the
organization will more closely resemble re-engineered
businesses that have cut corporate bureaucracy and
have flattened their organizational charts for a leaner,
more efficient organization. Standardized operations
and streamlined organizations are expected to reduce
Titan IV launch processing time by 43 days at the
Cape Canaveral Eastern range and by I34 days at the
Vandenberg Western range. The Air Force expects to
cut Tttan IV program costs by IS to 20 percent tn the
next three years.
Contract Consolidation. NASA hopes to cut
$850 million from its long-term budget hy
551
eltminating duplicative management functtons. The
agency may consolidate as many as a dozen space
operations contracts worth $500 to $600 million in
the areas of maintenance and operations support.
sustaining engineenng and general support of its
worldwide space networks, mission and network
control facilities. data processtng and planning
systems and telecommunications systems. if
Implemented, four field centers could be affected:
Johnson, Marshall, Goddard. and the Jet Propulsion
Laboratory. This is in addition to the on-gotng
consolidation of about 28 Space Shuttle operations
contracts.
Human Resource Consolidation. Acquisition
reform WIIIinevitably lead to consolidation of human
resources, both in government and private industry.
resulting tn loss of jobs in the space community.
Consolidation of Military and Commercial
Processes. In many government contractor’s
facilities there are different processes imposed to
manufacture similar product lines. In one example
quoted by Dr Kaminski. a defense contractor was
forced to use eight different soldering specifications -
five for the government and three for commercial
customers purchasmg similar types of products.
Three separate production processes were maintained
by General Dynamics for the Atlas Centaur vehible -
one for DOD, one for NASA, and one for commercial
vehicles. The DOD single process initiative will
consolidate multiple processes to one or two and
reduce costs.
The Single Process Initiative authorizes firms to
consolidate or eliminate all but one of the
manufacturing processes they are applying to ongoing
military contracts. Where appropriate, companies
may also consolidate military and commercial
production processes. Industry has lobbied for the
right to make contract changes without having to
share the savings with the government. However, if
block changes to fixed-price development contracts
yteld what the Pentagon government deems
“stgniticant one-sided” savings, the company ~$1 be
expected to negotiate a split of the money with the
DOD and cost-benefit analyses will have to be
submitted. No such analysis is required for “low
value” or “short life” contracts. Failure to define
“short-life” and “low-value leaves considerable room
for Interpretation by government admmistrative
contracttng officers (ACOs) and corporate lawyers.
Consolidation of Government Agency
Satellite Management Responsibility. For
more than three decades, the U.S. government’s
satellites have been lumped into three management
spheres: defense, intelligence and civil, Within each
552 47th IAF Congress
sector, various agencies or military services have been
responsible for tasks such as budgeting, operations,
and maintenance. To reduce cost. the General
Accounting Office (GAO) claims there is an
opportunity for agencies to share some of these
responsibilities. In the words of a GAO audit report.
“The lack of strong coordination and cooperation
incentives among the agencies within these sectors
has encouraged both direrent solutions to similar
problems and overlap in capabihty. ----- We
recommend that the Natlonal Science and
Technology Council develop an inter-sector space
policy ---- that would integrate, consolidate. and share
to the extent feasible, the nation’s satellite control
networks. ” The agencies affected would be NASA,
the National Oceeanio Atmospheric Administration
(NOAA). the DOD. and the National Reconnaissance
Office (NRO).
Government Outsourcing
The DOD believes it can save up to $15 billion by
embracing new outsourcing initiatives, particularly
in areas such as depot maintenance, base operatmg
support, waste disposal, distribution and
transportation, warehousmg. housmg. finance and
accounting, and data centers.
To reduce the cost per flight, NASA is also making
drastic cuts in the number of government and
contractor personnel mvolved in Shuttle operations.
Privatization of Shuttle operations has been
discussed, but the present plan is to consolidate
Shuttle operations under a single sole-source Space
Fhght Operations Contract (SFOC) with United
Space Alliance, a 50-50 joint venture by Lockheed
Martm and Rockwell International, in order to launch
the first Space Station element in December, 1997.
Presently, the two companies control almost 70
percent of the current Shuttle operations contracts
which is an argument for not re-competing the
contract.
Government Acquisition of Commercial
Products and Services
The dynamic nature of information technology has
outpaced the development of military information
systems. The military’s acquisition system for
information technologies lags behind commercial
developments. It has been recommended that Air
Force laboratories “recast” themselves as users of
commercial and university research, rather than
developers of information technologies since the
commercial sector IS developing faster, better and
cheaper.
In the software area, although there is pressure to use
“commercial-of-the-shelf’ (COTS) systems to meet
military needs, the military has a tendency to modify
the commercial products even when modificatton is
not required. Since the commercial sector is now
advancing at breakneck pace the military can profit
from using commercial products. Encryption is
needed m some areas but ndt everything needs to be
encrypted. Also. as the commercial sector depends
more and more on software products for day-to-day
operations It will inevitably develop and incorporate
encryption safeguards to protect itself against cyber-
terrorists and industrial espionage.
Increased Emphasis on Dual Use
Technology Development
The DOD has admitted that, in some areas, private
sector technology is more advanced than the military.
This factor, combined with the intent of the military
to encourage m their supphers the application of the
“Smgle Process Initiative” will naturally lead to an
emphasis on dual use technology development.
Importation of Private Corporate Practices
into Government
NASA is bemg brought into line with private
corporate structure. Virtually all pro@am oversight
authority IS expected to be transferred to the centers.
The top level of managers, known as Associate
Administrators, would remain at Headquarters with
responsibility for obtaining funding, making policy
and determining requirements for programs. Program
managers who run the projects and handle funding
would be based at the centers and report to the center
directors. Capital investment board of directors would
Implement full-cost accounting methods that include
personnel and facilities in budget estimates.
As stated earlier, the reorganization being carried out
at AF/SMC will result in the SPOs taking on the
character of re-engineered commercial organizations.
Privatization of Traditional Government
Functions
Reductions in government budgets will mandate that
certain functions traditionally performed by the
government, or by government regulated
organizations, will be dropped or transferred to the
private sector.
NASA Institutes. According to SPACE NEWS,
NASA plans to create new, university-run institutes
to take over scientific research conducted by the
agency, as it cuts its staff by more than 30 percent.”
The institutes are not intended to replace NASA’s 12
research centers, but, as NASA downsizes, will take
over much of the scientific work now conducted at
these centers.
Three mstltutes that may be set up within the next
IWOto three years include: a Biomedical Research
 47th IAF
Institute at Johnson Space Center (JSC). Houston; an
Astrobiology Instiwe at the Ames Research Center.
Moffett Field, California; and a MicrogravIty Institute
for Fluid and Combustion at the Lewis Research
Center, Cleveland, Otuo. Already m existence are:
the Global Hydrblogy and Climate Center at the
Marshall Space Flight Center, Huntville, Alabama;
the Astromaterials Institute at Johnson Space Center;
the Goddard Institute for Space Studies at Goddard
Space Flight Center, Greenbelt, Maryland; and the
National Space Science Data Center. Goddard.
Additional proposals include: a Space Science
Institute at MSFC; a Space Power Institute at Lewis;
an Atmospheric Science Institute at Langley Research
Center, Hampton. Virginia; and a Microgravity
Institute for Materials and Biotechnology at MSFC.
By forming independently managed institutes. NASA
hopes to ensure a vibrant research program as the
agency cuts thousands of staff positions as part of the
government agency-wide downsizmg initiative.
Some NASA personnel are expected to be hired by
the new organizations.
Federally Funded Research and
Development Centers. Federally Funded
Research and Development Centers, such as those
operated by The Aerospace Corporation and the
MITRE Corporation, will be subjected to budget cuts
proportional to those Inflicted on their sponsors. Dr
Kaminskr stressed at a press conference on February
5. 1996. that FFRDCs are important DOD partners
and major contributors to national security.
However, the new acquisition policy and the move
towards the government becoming a customer of the
commercial sector mandates change. The DOD has
scrutinized FFRDCs and introduced several major
mitiatlves to manage these organizations more
effecuvely.
. Sponsors of’each FFRDC have idenufied focused
“core” work appropriate for each FFRDC.
Current work that is not core work is bemg
transitioned out of the FFRDCs
. A new DOD policy requires use of stringent
cnteria for the acceptance of work outside the
core by the FFRDC’s parent corporation. This
will ensure a focus on FFRDC operations by the
parent and eliminate concerns regarding “unfair
advantage” in the acquiring of such work
. An independent Advisory Committee of highly
respected individuals from outside of DOD has
been established to conduct a review of DOD
management. use, and oversight of its FFRDCs
. A new set of guidelines has been developed to
ensure that management fees provided to
FFRDCs are based on need and detailed
Congress 553
Justification. One proposal is to reduce fees to
zero
MF has already spun off a separate company,
Mitretek Systems. 10 pursue government work
outslde the FFRDCs that MITRE opeiates for the
DOD and the FAA. and eventually start a commercial
business sector. In order to retain its unique cadge of
skilled aerospace professionals, The Aerospace
Corporation is planning 10 merge with Science
Applications International Corporation (SAIC) ad is
also seekmg work outside the Air Force-sponsored
FFRDC from domestic, foreign and international
clients.
Corporate Mergers and Consequent
Downsizing
In response to the new government policies, U.S.
aerospace companies are universally merging and
downslzing their work force. Unfortunately, in the
process, they are eliminating their human knowlidge
base which could have a serious detimental affect on
future programs.
Increased Emphasis on International Agreements and
Cooperauon
For several years U.S. space policy has encouraded
the domestic space industry lo impon foreign
technology, and particularly Former Soviet Union
(FSU) technology. where benefit can be obtaineq.
This has resulted in a number of agreements between
U.S. and FSU firms. particularly in the rocket
propulsion area. ” It has also resulted in Russia
becoming a partner in the International Space St+on
program and the formation of new international
organizations to market FSU launchers.
WHAT ARE THE POSSIBLE
CONSEQUENCES OF ACQUISITION
REFORM
In principle, acquisition reform is obviously a “good
thmg” but there are some pitfalls that have to ba
considered. Grave concerns have been expressed1 for
Instance, by senior government officials, such as Mr.
Derek J. Vander Schaaf, Deputy DOD Inspector
General.“’ In a prepared statement lo the House
Small Business Committee, Mr. Vander Schaaf said:
“Acquisition refoml ... . is carrying out a longstr+zding
industrial or supplier agenda to cunail or elimin@te
many ofrhese key safeguards which have been +ift
ituo the United States procurement process over: the
past 200 years. I broadly class these as disclosure
requirements. certifications. price-reduction
requirements and audit rights. Certain of rhese
safeguards help ensure cosf #Gr price) and quality,
borh of which become greater risks as we rely wore
on commercial products and practices. It is our
554 47th IAF Congress
e.rperience .... that large private sector purchasers
consistently require these same apes of safeguards in
their own dealmg with suppliers .
High Cost of Program Recovery if Untried
Policy is Applied Without Scrutiny but
titer Proves to be Faulty
Examples are the Shuttle Challenger failure m 1986
and the Titan III failures in the mid 1980s. Many
launcher families have experienced a series of failures
when oversight principles have been bypassed.
Transfer of Space Product Liability to the
Private Sector
Traditionally, U.S. government contractors have been
shielded from product Itability lawsuits. The basis of
that protection has been the practice of the
government to dictate, in excruciaung detail. how
space systems should be developed. tested and
manufactured. Once the product was accepted by the
government, all legal liability shifted to the
government. Under these conditions. attempts to sue
government contractors have been unsuccessful. As
the use of commercial processes and performance
standards become the rule, manufacturers will be held
responsible for the integrity of their products. The
aerospace / defense industry could be exposed to the
kind of judgments imposed on other types of
commerctal activities, such as those suffered by the
auto and oil industries. This could amount to hundred
of millions of dollars a year and escalating insurance
costs.
increase In Insurance Premiums
The new acquisition policy is expected to generate an
increased need for insurance services in the aerospace
industry. As the government transfers responsibility
to the private sector, it can also be expected to
disavow liability. Acceptance of delivery of a product
or service to the government will no longer
automatically shift the liability for damages caused by
that product to the government. The contractor may
no longer be shielded from litigation by the
government and its exposure to risk could be the
same as if it had delivered the product to a private
sector customer. It can be expected that a broader
insurance base will be required and insurance
premiums will increase. Establishing a protocol for
converting to performance standards and commercial
practices from the world of “mils pets” may be as
risky as tt is potentially rewarding because of
possible product liability problems and lawsuits. If
Rockwell International had been held responsible for
the Space Shuttle Challenger accident in 1986. for
instance. litigation costs IO the corporation could
have been overwhelming. Expendable launch
vehicles do not have a long history.of offering a
threat to the life and
limb of the civilian population, but deaths have
occurred in two recent Chinese Long March failures.
If this had been the result of a Delta Atlas or Ariane
launch expensive litigation proceedings would have
immediately been inittated and the fleet would have
been grounded for years, resulting in extensive loss of
revenues.
The latest Long March failure was clearly caused by
the Chinese launch vehicle. However, in the case of
the previous two Long March failures, blame for the
failure was never assigned or accepted by either the
launch vehicle or the satellite. If a similar event
occurs in the future where loss of life takes place, we
can expect an enterprismg American litigation lawyer
to file a lawsuit against an American company such
as Hughes m the U.S. courts on behalf of the
families of the deceased, whether they are American
citizens or not. History shows that the courts could
easily rule agamst the defendant.
Undiagnosed Failures because of Lack of
Oversight
Space systems will continue to fail. Acquisition
reform mandates insight rather than oversight of
private industry and oversight rather than insight into
the FFRDCs that have traditionally performed the
unbiased oversight role over industry for the
government. There are many examples of the
problems generated when the oversight function has
been relaxed or eliminated. Examples include the
Space Shuttle and the DMSP, IUS. Titan III.
Pegasus, LLV, Conestoga. and Long March
programs.
Cost Overruns Late in a Program
The MDA concept, which is intended to avoid cost
overruns. could result in exactly the opposite. Each
MDA could still pass his/her problems downstream.
The acquisition reform initiative, like the U.S. justice
system, does not incorporate a fool-proof way to
assign crime and punishment.
Lack of Program Continuity
Putting aside the debate as to whether the Space
Shuttle Program was good or bad, the Shuttle would
never have flown if the new acquisition reform
policies had been in place. An MDA would very
likely have stopped the program.
Overly Conservative Program Management
Value Criteria Based on “‘Avoid Failure”
rather than “Succeed”
At a critical pomt in a program the MDA could be
too cautious, resulting in the kind of event that
occurred in the case of the X-34 program but with
greater down-stde consequences if a national security
issue were at stake.
 47th IAF Congress
Neglect of Total Quality Management
Principles
The acquisition reform initiative had part of its
genesis m the space launch industry as a guiding
principle in the joint DOD/NASA Advanced Launch
System (ALS) Program.” The ALS program,
although cancelled in 1993, was planned to
revolutionize the procurement of a new family of
launchers to achieve a recurring cost goal of 5300 per
pound to orbit. The ALS program pioneered some of
the management practices that are being re-invented
and partially applied in the Evolved Expendable
Launch Vehicle (EELV) Propam. The experience
and lessons learned at the program office and
contractor level (that is, at the day-to-day working
rather than the Washington bureaucracy level) during
the ALS program do not appear to be reflected in the
acquisition reform initiative and appear to either be
bemg ignored or are unknown to the architects of the
acquisition reform initiative.
Degradation of Customer Insight into
Cause of Failure
A lack of formalized oversight could degrade the level
of customer and contractor insight into the cause of a
particular failure resulting in uncertainty and risk in
the recovery decision process. Examples of this
phenomenon are: the run of Titan III failures in the
mtd-1980s; the Long March failures of December 21,
1992, January 26. 1995. and February 14. 1996.
when neither insight or oversight information was
made available to the customer: the Lockheed Martin
LMLV and Conestoga failures; and the Pegasus XL
failure where insight identified only a single anomaly
tn both the first failure and the second, but when an
oversight review was implemented for the second
failure. 87 anomalies were dtscovered.
Disruption of Critical Government
Functions
Reduction in oversight and excessive outsourcing will
place cxtenstve dependence on the private sector to
protect the public interest. Labor strikes or the vested
interests of management or stockholders could degrade
critical government functions at a time of crisis.
Public Interest Held Hostage by Corporate
Lawyers
Corporations may have increased opportunities to
exploit the U.S. legal system against the public
interest by pitting highly paid experienced, well-
connected court lawyers against possibly young, less
well-pald government lawyers.
Conflict of Interest in Consolidated
Business Relationships
The wave of mergers and consolidation in private
industry could result in one prime contractor’s
555
subcontractor being acquired by a rival prime
contractor. This could result in the “blacklisting ” of
suppliers to protect proprietary interests. As
companies merge in response to declining budgets.
fewer and fewer may remain to serve as independent
contractors whose fortune is linked directly to the
success of the prime contractor’s efforts. Merging
companies (an example is the Lockheed Martin I
Loral merger) are having, as a condition of
permission to merge, to accept an agreement with the
Federal Trade Commission that strictly limits the
amount of information a company’s subsidiarieslwill
be able to share with the parent company. However,
in practice. such an agreement is obviously
impossible to enforce and likely to result in
expensive litigation, the costs of which will be
passed on to the customer. the U.S. taxpayer.
INTERNATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
The new DOD acquisition strategy encourages the use
of foreign sources and international cooperative
developments where advantageous and within the law.
The potential exists for enhancing reciprocal defense
trade and cooperation, including international
cooperative research, development, production,
logistic support, and the sale of military equipment,
conststent with the maintenance of a strong national
technology and industrial base and mobilization
capability.
Ail Western defense departments are facing the
challenge of reconciling high operational capabilbties
with reduced budgets and instituting changes sin&r
to those being pursued by the DOD.” The U.K., for
example, is concluding that outsourcing is the
solution. The Private Finance Initiative (PFI) isi one
of the British government’s key policies in the drive
to deliver higher quality and more effective public
services.‘? Other policies with a similar aim are
privatization and the Competing for Quality (CPQ)
initiative. PFI differs from privatization in that the
Ministry of Defence (MOD) retains a substantial role
and controlling interest, either as the main customer
for the services provided or as an essential enabler of
the program. It differs from CFQ in that the private
sector is involved as the provider of the product as
well as the services. These policies represent a
fundamental change in the role of the MOD, which,
like the U.S. DOD. is moving away from being a
provider of services to becoming a purchaser of
services.
The MOD has identified six areas as particularly fertile
ground for PFI. Increased private sector involvement
also is being pursued through the government-wlde
CFQ. Thus far. 123 defense support activities with
556 47th IAF Congress
annual operating costs of more than 1 billion pounds
(%1.S2 billion) have been reviewed with savings of
250 million pounds ($380 million) bemg forecast.
Four activities were abolished altogether.
Other national and international aerospace
organizations are dedicated to acquisition reform,
particularly m Europe.
At a recent space transportation workshop chaired by
Mr. Chester Whitehair, Vice President, Space Launch
Operations, The Aerospace Corporation, a prestigious
international panel of experts concluded unanimously
that the assured access to space that everyone desired
would be best accomplished by international
cooperation.” ’ handbook is expected to capture lessons learned from
WHAT IS THE AEROSPACE
CORPORATION DOING
Many people are concerned that, in the attempt to
streamline government space system acquisition,
space system expertise that has been accumulated over
the past 35 years will be lost. Several hundred space-
related military specifications and standards and
Commander’s Policies were cancelled as part of
acquisttion streamlining. DOD cancelled these “mil-
specs” with good reason: to concentrate on product
performance rather than the manufacturmg process.
However, mvaluable. hard-won. and enduring lessons-
learned were painstakingly embodied m those
specifications and standards. MIL-STD- 1540 is one
of the better-known examples. containing methods for
restmp satellites on the ground to prevent failures on
orbn. Because The Aerospace Corporation was
heavily mvolved in the creation of many space-related
specifications and standards it is in a unique position
to document these lessons-learned.
Sponsored jointly by the Chtef Engineer’s Office and
the Oflice of the Executive Vice President, a three-
year prqject is underway to develop an Aerospace
lessons-learned handbook. The purpose of the
handbook is to capture expertise that Aerospace has
acquired over 35 years and to document ways to
mittgate technical risk in the acquisition reform
environment. The handbook is envisioned as a “sage
wisdom” reference tool for program managers and
matrix personnel to reduce technical risk in their
programs.
Each chapter will cover a particular military
specificauon. standard or Commander’s Policy.
Chapters will include the historical background of
each lesson: problems that led IO its creation: why
certain methods. procedures or requirements were
adopted; why other approaches were discouraged or
forbidden: and the types of programs or development
phases important to the lessons-teamed. When
appropriate. chapters will contain provisions for
recommended language. with tailoring instructions to
be included m an acquisition package if a pro-
office wants to ensure that the “spirit” of the
document is to be contractually required.
The Aerospace Corporation is working closely with
AF/SMC on this project. AF/SMC is carrying out a
complementary effort entitled Critical Processes
Assessment Tool (CPAT). CPATs are aimed at
those who write RFPs and do not contain background
rationale. The Aerospace Corporation lessons-learned
handbook will provide the background. The
approxtmately 45 space-related specifications and
standards and accessing the human knowledge base of
Aerospace Corporation space veterans is crucial to the
success of the project. At this time, chapters have
been written to capture the lessons learned previously
embodied in DOD-E-83578A. General Specification
for Explosive Ordnance for Space Vehicles; MIL-A-
83577, Moving Mechanical Assemblies: and MIL-
STD-498, Software Development and
Documentation.
The Aerospace Corporation has been actively
involved in program office consolidation at AF/SMC.
This has resulted in several primary streamlining
actions that have been heralded as acquisition
streamlining success stories by the Assistant
Secretaty of the Air Force (Acquisition), Darleen
Druyan. By reducing FFRDC support, it is estimated
that the Delta II Program will achieve cost savings of
$9.5 million from FY95-01. The Atlas II Program
has reduced its manpower support by 30 percent. In
i 8 months. the Titan Program achieved a 33 percent
reduction in contract settlement time, a 25 percent
reduction in FFRDC/SETA support, a 90 percent
reduction in contract provisions, and a 78 percent
reduction in both mil specs/standards and CDRLs;
SPO manning was reduced from 329 personnel to 247
personnel between August 1994 and March 1996.
The IUS Program will achieve a cost saving of $9.4
million from FY96-FYOO due to a reduction in
FFRDC support.
While The Aerospace Corporation is helping the
Government to make acquisition reform a success, it
is also considering its own future. As Government
financial support declines, the corporation expects,
through its merger with SAIC, to maintain its unique
carp of expertise by offering its services to non-DOD
customers. This will enable it to retain its traditional
level of excellence in its support to its Force, and at
the same time participate effectively in the expanding
globalization of space.
 47th IAF Congress 557

SUMMARY / CONCLUSIONS
Insight into the Pegasus failure revealed a single
anomaly on each of a series of flights. When concern
over, the series of failures resulted in a traditional
government oversight review being applied, the result
was more than 80 anomalies were identified, and
finally a successful flight achieved. The Chmese
Long March launcher had three out of five flights fail
without any clear understanding as to why the failures
occurred. The range of potential failure points is
broad, as illustrated in Table 1. It is believed that the
intense scrutiny traditionally applied to U.S.
government launches, and particularly the revtew
which takes place when a failure does occur, would
have mitigated this sttxng of failures. Relaxatton of
these stringent requirements may stall be detrrmental
to U.S. launch industry although, because these
requirements have been imposed for many years by
the U.S. government. their best features have already
been incorporated into the private industry culture for
mamline launches. Nevertheless, Figures 3.4 and 5
demonstrate the historical effectiveness of the launch
risk mitigation practices and procedures traditionall!,
used for U.S. government launches. The recent
failure of the first flight of the European Atiane 5 and
two consecutive Soyuz failures, in spite of extreme
vtgilance and care, demonstrate that routine access to
space has yet to be achieved by any nation. Perhaps
traditional oversight procedures are still required by
the space launch community. The effect of
acquisition reform on mission success will be
validated over the next few years by the results of the
mandated changes made in the Air Force/Aerospace
Corporation launch risk mitigation procedures and the
success of the EELV and RLV programs. In the
meantime, Aerospace is documenting the corporate
knowledge base, built up over more than 35 years, to
ensure that lessons-learned are not forgotten. Also, in
response to the downsizing of government technical
work, which is the inevitable consequence of
acquisition reform, the company is packaging the
products it has developed for the government in a
form that can migrate easily to the private sector. In
this way, the investment in space technology made
by the U.S. taxpayer over the last 40 years will1not
be lost but will be available to help private industry
carry the responsibility being transferred to it by
acquisition reform.

Table 1. Air Force/Aerospace Launch Failure Investigations: 1976 - 1996

Launch
Date Failure Site
Vehicle

Sep-77 Atlas SLV-3D Booster gas generator

Mar-78 Tttan 3C Stage 2 hydraulic pump
De3380 Atlas E Booster engine lube system
Dee-8 I Atlas E Booster gas generator
Apr-83 IUS SRM-2 nozzle
Aug-85 Titan 34D Stage 1 propellant feed system
Apt-86 Titan 34D SRM insulation
May-86 Delta 3914 Stage 1 electrical
Mar-87 Atlas G Guidance (lightning)
Sep-88 Titan 34D Transtage pressurization system
Mar-90 Titan 3* Payload separation system
Apr-9 I Atlas I* Centaur turbopump
Aug-92 Atlas I Centaur tutbopump
Mar-93 Atlas I* Booster engine control
Aug-93 Titan 4 SRM insulation
Jun-94 Pegasus XL Autopilot (incorrect aero)
Jun-95 Pegasus XL Stage I/2 interstage
Aug-95 ----Delta 7925.-_ SRM separation
* moderate involvement
558 47th IAF Congress

I I I
USAF/Aerosoace SuDDorted
.. 1
I
Al/n h Al A (
Atlas I

Delta
I I IA*
Titan

Atlas

Delta

Titan

86 07 66 69 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97

v Launch Failures 6/m/96

Figure 3. U.S. Launch Record

bird t

Id tmkl
hame

;at 7

89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96
v Launch Failures 8/29196

Figure 4. European I Chinese Launch Record

 47th IAF Congress 559

L orosi

86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97
VSatellite Failures in First 12 Months 6/21/96

Figure 5. U. S. Satellite Infant Mortality Record

REFERENCES

I. WhItehair. C. L. and M. G. Wolfe. “Space .!$sten~
Risk Management and Mitigation: Assuring
Mission Success. ” Presented at the 46’
International Astronautical Congress, Oslo.
Norway, 2-6 October 1995 (IAA Reprint IAA-95
IAA.6.2.01).
2 Perry, Wilham. U.S. Secretary of Defense.
“Specifications and Standards - A New WC?\of
Doing Business. ” 29 June 1994.
3. Donohue. George L. FAA Acquisition Reform:
The Road Ahead. ” Aerospace America. April
1996.
4. DOD Directive 5000. I, “Defense Acquisition. ”
1995.
5. DOD Instruction. DoDI 5000.1. “Defense
Acquisition. ‘*1995.
6. Executive Summary. DODD 5000-I. DoDI
5000.2, and Appendices. 10 November 1995.
7. DOD 5000 Fmal Approval Signed by SECDEF. I5
March 1996.
8. Statute - Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of
1994 (FASA 94).
9. Kaminski, Paul G. “Commentary The DaD
Single Process Initiative. ” Aerospace Ametica.
February 1996.
IO. Druyan. Darling, Assistant Secretary of the Air
Force for Acquisition. “Acquisition Reform
Lightning Bolt Initiatives. ” June 1995.
I I. Reimer. Dennis, Gen Army Chief of Staff, and
TRADOC Commander Gen William Hartzqg.
Draft of Document outlining the new requilrements
determination process. February 1995.
12. Whitehair, C. L. and M. G. Wolfe. “Curreqt
Status and Future Potential of the United States
Fully Reusable Launch Vehicle Program. ”
Presented at the 47” International Astronautical
Congress, Beijing, China. ( IAF Reprint IAF-96-
V.3.01).
13. SPACE NEWS. Vol 7, No 9. March 4-10, 1996.
14. McKinney, R.W., R. K. Steele and P. L.
Portanova. “Affordability Through Innovation:
Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle. ” Presented at
the 47* International Astronautical Congress,
Beijing, Chma. (IAA Reprint IAA-96-
IAA. I. I .02).
560 47th IAF Congress

15. Lutz. Roald F. and Richard M Macheske. ‘5% Space

Test Program, A Case for Dedicated Research,
Development, Test and Evaluation in Space. ‘* 33”
Space Congress. Cocoa Beach. Florida. April 1996.

16. Ward. M. J., et al. “Risk Managementfor .&all

Satellite Programs. ” 33n’ Space Congress. Cocoa
Beach, Florida. April 1996.

17. Wolfe. M. G., et al. “The Advanced Launch System

- Application of Total Qualiy Management
Principles to Low-Cost Space Transponation
Development. ” ACTA ASTRONAUTICA. Vol 25.
No 516, pp 339-346, 199 1.

18. SPACE NEWS. “6cience Institutes Moving Closer

to Realig. ” March I l-17, 1996. p. 6.

19. Whttehair, C. L. and M. G. Wolfe. “An Assessment

of the Long-Term Potentialfor Cooperative Space
Propulsion System development. ” Presented at the
46’h International Astronautical Congress. Oslo.
Norway, 2-6 October 1995 (IAF Reprmt IAF-95
S.2.01).

20 Vander Schaaf. Derek J.. Deputy DOD Inspector

General. “Debunking Acquisition Reform Myths. ‘*
DEFENSE ISSUES Volume 10, Number 79.
Prepared statement to the House Small Business
Committee. August 3, 1995.

2 1. Whitehair, C. L. and M. G. Wolfe. “Future Space

Transportation Systems and Their Potential
Contribution to the NATO Mission. ‘* Presented at
the Advisory Group for Aerospace Research and
Development (AGARD) Mission Systems Panel 5 Ih
Symposium - Space Systems as Contributors to the
NATO Defence Mission, Cannes. France, 2-6 June
1996.

22. Arbuthnot, James. U.K. Minister for Defense

Procurement. “U.K. Turns to Private Sector -
Reconciles Milita? Capahili~ with Tight Budgets. *’
DEFENSE NEWS. April 1-7, 1996.

23. Space Transportation Working Group Report.

Third AIAA Workshop on lntemattonal Space
Cooperation. Frascati, Italy, May 26-30, 1996.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Portions of the contents of this paper are extracted from

the Internet Air Force Acquisition Homepage. Readers
who wish to continue to follow the progress of
acquisition reform are encouraged to perlodically visit the
Air Force Acquisition Reform Homepage at
<http:Nwww.safaq.hq.af.mil/safaq/>.